Drawing safeguards conclusions

To draw a safeguards conclusion for each State with a safeguards agreement in force, the IAEA needs to have conducted a sufficient level of safeguards activities and performed a comprehensive evaluation of all safeguards-relevant information available to it about a State. It also needs to have addressed anomalies, questions or inconsistencies identified in the course of its safeguards activities, and assessed whether there are any indications that, in its judgement, would constitute a safeguards concern.

The type of conclusion varies according to the type of safeguards agreement in force.

For States with a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and an Additional Protocol in force

• If the IAEA’s Secretariat has completed all evaluations and found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities, no indication of undeclared production or processing of nuclear material at declared facilities and locations outside facilities, and no indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities, the Secretariat can conclude, on this basis, that all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities; and
• If the IAEA’s Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities, and no indication of undeclared production or processing of nuclear material at declared facilities and locations outside facilities, but evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities remained ongoing, the Secretariat can conclude, on this basis, that declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.

For States with a CSA but without an Additional Protocol in force

• If the IAEA's Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities, and no indication of undeclared production or processing of nuclear material at declared facilities and locations outside facilities, the Secretariat can conclude, on this basis, that declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.

Under item-specific safeguards agreements

• If the IAEA's Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of nuclear material or of misuse of the facilities or other items to which safeguards had been applied, the Secretariat can conclude, on this basis, that nuclear material, facilities or other items to which safeguards had been applied remained in peaceful activities.

For States with voluntary offer safeguards agreements

• If the IAEA's Secretariat found no indication of the undeclared withdrawal from safeguards of nuclear material to which safeguards had been applied, the Secretariat can conclude, on this basis, that nuclear material in selected facilities to which safeguards had been applied remained in peaceful activities or had been withdrawn from safeguards as provided for in the agreements.

For States with no safeguards agreements in force

• The IAEA Secretariat cannot draw any safeguards conclusions.

Safeguards conclusions

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