

A. Safeguards Statement for 2013

In 2013, safeguards were applied for 180 States^{1, 2} with safeguards agreements in force with the Agency. The Secretariat's findings and conclusions for 2013 are reported below with regard to each type of safeguards agreement. These findings and conclusions are based upon an evaluation of all the information available to the Agency in exercising its rights and fulfilling its safeguards obligations for that year.

1. One hundred and seventeen States had both comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force:

- (a) For 63 of these States², the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and no indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.**
- (b) For 54 of these States, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities. Evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for each of these States remained ongoing. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.**

2. Safeguards activities were implemented for 55 States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force, but without additional protocols in force. For these States, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.

While the Secretariat concluded that, for 2013, declared nuclear material in Iran remained in peaceful activities, it was unable to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran was in peaceful activities.³

3. As of the end of 2013, 12 non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) had yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency as required by Article III of that Treaty. For these States, the Secretariat could not draw any safeguards conclusions.

4. Three States had safeguards agreements in force based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, requiring the application of safeguards to nuclear material, facilities and other items specified in the relevant safeguards agreement. For these States, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of nuclear material or of the misuse of the facilities or other items to which safeguards had been applied. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, nuclear

¹ These States do not include the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), where the Agency did not implement safeguards and, therefore, could not draw any conclusion.

² And Taiwan, China.

³ See paragraph 25.

material, facilities or other items to which safeguards had been applied remained in peaceful activities.

5. Five nuclear-weapon States had voluntary offer agreements and additional protocols in force. Safeguards were implemented with regard to declared nuclear material in selected facilities in all five States. For these States, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of nuclear material to which safeguards had been applied. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, nuclear material to which safeguards had been applied in selected facilities remained in peaceful activities or had been withdrawn from safeguards as provided for in the agreements.

B. Background to the Safeguards Statement and Summary

B.1. Safeguards conclusions

1. The *Safeguards Statement* reflects the safeguards conclusions resulting from the Agency's activities under the safeguards agreements in force. The Secretariat derives these conclusions on the basis of an evaluation of the results of its verification activities and of all the safeguards relevant information available to it. This section provides background to the *Safeguards Statement*.

Fact box 1. Safeguards Activities Overview

In 2013, there were:

- 699 (692)⁴ facilities and 565 (625) material balance areas containing locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOFs) under safeguards;
- 188 500 (183 767) significant quantities of nuclear material and 431 (437) tonnes of heavy water under safeguards; and
- 1969 (1962) inspections, 573 (604) design information verifications and 71 (57) complementary accesses utilizing 11 777 (11 859) calendar-days in the field for verification⁵.

2. A summary of the status of States' safeguards agreements and other information presented below is given in Tables 1 to 5 in Section B.7.

B.1.1. States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force

3. Under a comprehensive safeguards agreement, the Agency has the "right and obligation to ensure that safeguards will be applied, in accordance with the terms of the agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the State, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."⁶

4. Comprehensive safeguards agreements consist of Part I, Part II, and Definitions. Part I consists of general provisions and Part II describes the procedures for implementing those provisions. These procedures include the record keeping and reporting obligations of the State with regard to nuclear material, nuclear facilities and LOFs. They also include procedures related to Agency access to nuclear material, nuclear facilities and LOFs.

5. The procedures set out in Part II of a comprehensive safeguards agreement include certain reporting requirements related to the export and import of material containing uranium or thorium which has not yet reached the stage of processing where its composition and purity make it suitable for fuel fabrication or for isotopic enrichment. Nuclear material which has reached that stage of

⁴ The numbers in parentheses provide the respective data for 2012.

⁵ Calendar-days in the field for verification comprise calendar-days spent in performing inspections, complementary access and design information verification and in the associated travel and rest periods.

⁶ Paragraph 2 of INFCIRC/153 (Corrected).

processing, and any nuclear material produced at a later stage, is subject to all the other safeguards procedures specified in the agreement. An inventory of such nuclear material is established on the basis of an initial report by a State, which is then verified by the Agency and maintained on the basis of subsequent reports by the State and by Agency verification. The Agency performs its verification and evaluation activities in order to confirm that these declarations by the State are correct and complete — i.e., to confirm that all nuclear material in the State remains in peaceful activities.

Small quantities protocols

6. Many States with minimal or no nuclear activities have concluded a small quantities protocol to their comprehensive safeguards agreement. Under a small quantities protocol based on the original standard text⁷ submitted to the Board of Governors in 1974, the implementation of most of the safeguards procedures in Part II of a comprehensive safeguards agreement are held in abeyance as long as certain criteria are met. In 2005, the Board of Governors approved the revision⁸ of the standard text of the small quantities protocol. This revision changed the eligibility criteria for a small quantities protocol, making it unavailable to a State with an existing or planned facility, and reduced the number of measures held in abeyance. Of particular importance is the fact that, under the revised text of the small quantities protocol, the requirement that the State provide the Agency with an initial inventory report and the Agency's right to carry out ad hoc and special inspections are no longer held in abeyance.

Additional protocols

7. Although the Agency has the authority under a comprehensive safeguards agreement to verify the peaceful use of all nuclear material in a State (i.e., the correctness and completeness of the State's declarations), the tools available to the Agency under such an agreement are limited. The Model Additional Protocol⁹, approved by the Board of Governors in 1997, equips the Agency with important additional tools that provide broader access to information and locations. The measures provided for under an additional protocol thus significantly increase the Agency's ability to verify the peaceful use of all nuclear material in a State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement.

B.1.1.1. States with both comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force

Status of implementation

8. As of 31 December 2013, 117 (114) States had both comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force.

9. Safeguards implementation involved, as appropriate, activities carried out in the field, at regional offices and at Agency Headquarters in Vienna. The activities at Headquarters included the evaluation of States' accounting reports and other information required under comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols and the evaluation of safeguards relevant information from other sources.

⁷ GOV/INF/276/Annex B.

⁸ GOV/INF/276/Mod.1 and Corr.1.

⁹ INFCIRC/540 (Corrected), Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards.

Deriving conclusions

10. A safeguards conclusion that all nuclear material has remained in peaceful activities in a State is based on the Agency's finding that there are no indications of diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and no indications of undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State as a whole. The Agency draws such a conclusion only where a State has both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force and the evaluations described below have been completed.

11. To ascertain that there are no indications of diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities in a State, the Agency needs to carry out a comprehensive evaluation of all safeguards relevant information available to it, which includes information provided by the State with regard to the design and operation of nuclear facilities and LOFs, the State's nuclear material accounting reports, the State's declarations submitted under the additional protocol and the results of the Agency's in-field activities carried out to verify the State's declarations.

12. To ascertain that there are no indications of undeclared nuclear material or activities in a State, the Agency needs to carry out an evaluation of the consistency of the State's declared nuclear programme with the results of the Agency's verification activities under the relevant safeguards agreements and additional protocols and with all other safeguards relevant information available to the Agency. In particular, the Agency needs to have:

- conducted a comprehensive State evaluation based on all safeguards relevant information available to the Agency about the State's nuclear and nuclear related activities (including design information on facilities and information on LOFs, declarations submitted under additional protocols, and information collected by the Agency through its verification activities and from other sources);
- performed complementary access, as necessary, in accordance with the State's additional protocol; and
- addressed all anomalies, discrepancies and inconsistencies identified in the course of its evaluation and verification activities.

13. When the evaluations described in paragraphs 11 and 12 above have been completed and no indication has been found by the Agency that, in its judgement, would give rise to a proliferation concern, the Secretariat can draw the broader conclusion that all nuclear material in a State has remained in peaceful activities. Subsequently, the Agency implements integrated safeguards — an optimized combination of safeguards measures available under comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols — for that State. Due to increased assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for the State as a whole, the intensity of inspection activities at declared facilities and LOFs can be reduced. Integrated safeguards were implemented during 2013 in 53 States^{2, 10}.

Overall conclusions for 2013

14. On the basis of the evaluations described in paragraphs 11 and 12, the Secretariat drew the conclusions referred to in paragraph 1(a) of the *Safeguards Statement* for 63 (60) States²: Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso,

¹⁰ Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Palau, Peru, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, the Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine, Uruguay and Uzbekistan.

Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark¹¹, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Latvia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, the Netherlands¹², New Zealand¹³, Norway, Palau, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, the Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay and Uzbekistan. For Albania, Andorra and Mauritius, the conclusion in paragraph 1(a) of the *Safeguards Statement* was drawn for the first time.

15. Because the evaluation process described in paragraph 12 had not yet been completed for 54 (54) States¹⁴, the conclusion drawn for these States relates only to declared nuclear material in peaceful activities. The conclusion in paragraph 1(b) of the *Safeguards Statement* was drawn for: Afghanistan, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Guatemala, Haiti, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lesotho, Malawi, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Panama, Paraguay, Republic of the Congo, the Republic of Moldova, Rwanda, Swaziland, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Togo, Turkmenistan, Uganda, the United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu and Vietnam.

B.1.1.2. States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force but no additional protocols in force

Status of implementation

16. As of 31 December 2013, safeguards were implemented for 55 (57) States in this category. Safeguards implementation involved activities in the field and at Headquarters, including the evaluation of States' accounting reports and other information required under comprehensive safeguards agreements and the evaluation of safeguards relevant information from other sources.

Deriving conclusions

17. For a State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement, the Agency's right and obligation are as described in paragraph 3 above. Although the implementation of safeguards strengthening measures¹⁵ under such an agreement have increased the Agency's ability to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities, the activities that the Agency may conduct in this regard are limited for a State without an

¹¹ This conclusion is drawn with regard only to that part of Denmark which is covered by INFCIRC/193 and INFCIRC/193/Add. 8; i.e., Denmark and the Faroe Islands, which excludes Greenland. Denmark has concluded a separate comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol thereto that apply to Greenland (INFCIRC/176 and INFCIRC/176/Add.1, respectively).

¹² This conclusion is drawn with regard only to that part of the Netherlands which is covered by INFCIRC/193 and INFCIRC/193/Add.8, i.e., the Netherlands in Europe, which excludes the Caribbean part of the Netherlands (the islands of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba), Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten. The Netherlands has concluded a separate comprehensive safeguards agreement that applies to its constituent parts mentioned above (INFCIRC/229), but has not yet concluded an additional protocol thereto.

¹³ This conclusion is drawn with regard only to that part of New Zealand which is covered by INFCIRC/185 and INFCIRC/185/Add.1; it is not drawn for the Cook Islands and Niue, which are covered by INFCIRC/185, but not by INFCIRC/185/Add.1.

¹⁴ This conclusion is drawn with regard only to that part of Denmark, which is covered by INFCIRC/176 and INFCIRC/176/Add.1 (i.e., Greenland) for which the broader conclusion was not drawn.

¹⁵ Such measures include the early provision of design information, environmental sampling and the use of satellite imagery.

additional protocol. Thus, the conclusion in the *Safeguards Statement* for a State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement alone relates only to the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful activities.

18. In the course of its evaluation, the Agency also seeks to determine whether there is any indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State which would need to be reflected in the *Safeguards Statement*. However, without the measures provided for in the *Model Additional Protocol* being implemented, the Agency is not able to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for the State as a whole.

Islamic Republic of Iran

19. During 2013, the Director General submitted four reports to the Board of Governors entitled *Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran* (GOV/2013/6, GOV/2013/27, GOV/2013/40 and GOV/2013/56).

20. In 2013, contrary to the relevant binding resolutions of the Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council, Iran did not: implement the provisions of its Additional Protocol; implement the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to its Safeguards Agreement; suspend all enrichment related activities or suspend all heavy water related activities. Neither did Iran resolve the Agency's serious concerns about possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme, in order to establish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of that programme.

21. In October 2013, following further rounds of talks aimed at reaching agreement on a structured approach document for resolving outstanding issues related to Iran's nuclear programme, the Agency and Iran concluded that the negotiations had become deadlocked. As there was no prospect for agreement on the document, the Agency and Iran agreed that a new approach aimed at ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme should be developed.

22. On 11 November 2013, the Director General, on behalf of the Agency, and the Vice President of Iran and President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, on behalf of Iran, signed a "Joint Statement on a Framework for Cooperation". In the Framework for Cooperation the Agency and Iran agreed to cooperate further with respect to verification activities to be undertaken by the Agency to resolve all present and past issues, and to proceed with such activities in a step by step manner. Iran agreed to take six initial practical measures within three months.

23. On 24 November 2013, a Joint Plan of Action¹⁶ was agreed between Iran and China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, the aim of which is to reach a "mutually-agreed, long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure Iran's nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful". Under the Joint Plan of Action, the Agency was to be "responsible for verification of nuclear-related measures" contained therein.

24. The Director General welcomed the Joint Plan of Action, noting that it was an important step forward but that much more needs to be done. The Director General also indicated that, with the agreement of the Board of Governors, the Agency would be ready to fulfil its role in monitoring and verifying the implementation of nuclear related measures.¹⁷

¹⁶ INFCIRC/856.

¹⁷ On 24 January 2014, the Board endorsed the Agency undertaking monitoring and verification in relation to the nuclear-related measures set out in the Joint Plan of Action.

25. While the Agency continued throughout 2013 to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and LOFs declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement, the Agency was not in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran and, therefore, was unable to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran was in peaceful activities.¹⁸

Syrian Arab Republic

26. In August 2013, the Director General submitted a report to the Board of Governors entitled *Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic* (GOV/2013/41). The Director General informed the Board of Governors that the Agency had not received any new information from Syria or other Member States that would have an impact on the Agency's assessment that it was very likely that a building destroyed at the Dair Alzour site was a nuclear reactor which should have been declared to the Agency by Syria¹⁹. In 2013, the Director General renewed his call on Syria to cooperate fully with the Agency in connection with unresolved issues related to the Dair Alzour site and other locations. Syria has yet to respond to these calls.

27. While Syria invited the Agency to conduct an inspection at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor in Damascus in 2013, the Agency decided not to conduct any in-field verification activities in Syria. In this regard, in June 2013, the Agency informed Syria that, after considering the United Nations Department of Safety and Security's assessment of the prevailing security conditions in Syria and the small amount of nuclear material declared by Syria at the reactor, the 2013 physical inventory verification at the reactor would be postponed until the security conditions had sufficiently improved. By the end of 2013 the assessment of the security situation in Syria had not changed.

28. Based on the evaluation of information provided by Syria and other safeguards relevant information available to it, the Agency found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful activities. For 2013, the Agency concluded for Syria that declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.

Overall conclusions for 2013

29. On the basis of the evaluation performed and as reflected in paragraph 2 of the *Safeguards Statement*, the Secretariat concluded that for the 55 States²⁰, declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities. This conclusion was drawn for Algeria, Argentina, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominica, Egypt, Ethiopia, Grenada, Guyana, Honduras, Islamic Republic of Iran, Kiribati, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Malaysia, Maldives, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, the Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Tuvalu, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

¹⁸ As, for example, Iran did not implement its Additional Protocol, as required in the binding resolutions of the Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council.

¹⁹ The Board of Governors, in its resolution GOV/2011/41 of June 2011 (adopted by a vote) had, inter alia, called on Syria to remedy urgently its non-compliance with its NPT Safeguards Agreement and, in particular, to provide the Agency with updated reporting under its Safeguards Agreement and access to all information, sites, material and persons necessary for the Agency to verify such reporting and resolve all outstanding questions so that the Agency could provide the necessary assurances as to the exclusively peaceful nature of Syria's nuclear programme.

²⁰ In addition, this conclusion is drawn for those territories of the Netherlands and New Zealand referred to in footnotes 12 and 13 for which the broader conclusion is not drawn – i.e., the Caribbean part of the Netherlands (the islands of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba), Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten; and the Cook Islands and Niue, respectively.

B.1.2. States with no safeguards agreements in force

30. As of 31 December 2013, 12 (13) non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT had yet to bring comprehensive safeguards agreements into force pursuant to the Treaty.

Overall conclusions for 2013

31. As indicated in paragraph 3 of the *Safeguards Statement*, the Secretariat could not draw any safeguards conclusions for the following States: Benin, Cabo Verde, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Federated States of Micronesia, São Tome and Principe, Somalia and Timor Leste.

B.1.3. States with safeguards agreements in force based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2

32. Under safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, the Agency applies safeguards in order to ensure that nuclear material, facilities and other items specified under the safeguards agreement are not used for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon or to further any military purpose, and that such items are used exclusively for peaceful purposes and are not used for the manufacture of any nuclear explosive device.

Status of implementation

33. As of 31 December 2013, safeguards were implemented at facilities in India, Israel and Pakistan pursuant to safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2. In 2009, India signed an additional protocol, which has not yet entered into force.

Deriving conclusions

34. The conclusion described in paragraph 4 of the *Safeguards Statement* is reported for these three States, and relates to the nuclear material, facilities and other items to which safeguards were applied. To draw such a conclusion in respect of these States, the Agency evaluates all safeguards relevant information available, including verification results and information about facility design features and operations.

Overall conclusions for 2013

35. On the basis of the results of its verification and evaluation activities, the Secretariat concluded that the nuclear material, facilities or other items to which safeguards were applied in India, Israel and Pakistan remained in peaceful activities.

B.1.4. States with both voluntary offer agreements and additional protocols in force

36. Under a voluntary offer agreement, the Agency applies safeguards to nuclear material in those facilities that have been selected by the Agency from the State's list of eligible facilities in order to verify that the material is not withdrawn from peaceful activities except as provided for in the agreement. In selecting facilities under voluntary offer agreements for the application of safeguards, the Agency takes into consideration factors such as: (i) whether the selection of a facility would satisfy legal obligations arising from other agreements concluded by the State; (ii) whether useful experience may be gained in implementing new safeguards approaches or in using advanced equipment and technology; and (iii) whether the cost efficiency of Agency safeguards may be enhanced by applying safeguards, in the exporting State, to nuclear material being shipped to States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force. By implementing measures under the additional protocol in these five States with voluntary offer agreements, the Agency also seeks to obtain and verify information

that could enhance the safeguards conclusions in States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force.

Status of implementation

37. During 2013, safeguards were implemented at facilities selected by the Agency in the five States with voluntary offer agreements in force: China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (United Kingdom) and the United States of America.

Deriving conclusions

38. The conclusion contained in paragraph 5 of the *Safeguards Statement* is reported for the five States with voluntary offer agreements in force in which safeguards were applied to nuclear material in selected facilities. To draw the safeguards conclusion, the Agency evaluates all safeguards relevant information, including verification results and information about facility design features and operations.

Overall conclusions for 2013

39. On the basis of the results of its verification and evaluation activities, the Secretariat concluded for China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America that nuclear material to which safeguards had been applied in selected facilities remained in peaceful activities or had been withdrawn as provided for in the agreements. There were no such withdrawals in France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

B.2. Democratic People's Republic of Korea

40. In August 2013, the Director General submitted a report to the Board of Governors and General Conference entitled *Application of Safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea* (GOV/2013/39–GC(57)/22), which provided an update of developments since the Director General's report of August 2012.

41. Since 1994, the Agency has not been able to conduct all necessary safeguards activities provided for in the DPRK's NPT Safeguards Agreement. From the end of 2002 until July 2007, the Agency was not able, and since April 2009 has not been able, to implement any verification measures in the DPRK and, therefore, could not draw any safeguards conclusion regarding the DPRK.

42. Since April 2009, the Agency has not implemented any measures under the ad hoc monitoring and verification arrangement agreed between the Agency and the DPRK and foreseen in the Initial Actions agreed at the Six-Party Talks. Statements by the DPRK concerning its conducting of a third nuclear test and its intention to readjust and restart its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, together with its previous statements about uranium enrichment activities and the construction of a light water reactor in the DPRK are deeply regrettable.

43. Although not implementing any verification activities in the field, the Agency continued to monitor the DPRK's nuclear activities by using open source information (including satellite imagery) and trade information. The Agency has continued to observe building renovation and new construction activities at various locations within the Yongbyon site; although, without access to the site, the Agency cannot confirm the purpose of these activities. The Agency also continued to further consolidate its knowledge of the DPRK's nuclear programme with the objective of maintaining operational readiness to resume safeguards implementation in the DPRK.

B.3. Areas of difficulty in safeguards implementation

44. Although progress was made during 2013 in addressing some of the areas of difficulty in implementing safeguards, further work remains to be done.

45. The performance and effectiveness of State and regional systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material have significant impacts upon the effectiveness and efficiency of Agency safeguards implementation. In 2013, some States still had not established national systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material, which are required under comprehensive safeguards agreements. Moreover, not all State and regional authorities have the necessary authority, resources, technical capabilities or independence from nuclear facility or LOF operators to implement the requirements of safeguards agreements and additional protocols. In particular, some State authorities do not provide sufficient oversight of nuclear material accounting and control systems at nuclear facilities and LOFs to ensure the required accuracy and precision of the data transmitted to the Agency.

46. In accordance with the decision of the Board of Governors in September 2005, States which have not amended or rescinded their small quantities protocols should do so as soon as possible. At the end of 2013, 44 (48) States²¹ had operative small quantities protocols that had yet to be amended. Fifty-one (46) States²² had small quantities protocols based on the revised standard model; four (one)²³ were amended in 2013 and one²⁴ of which was brought into force.

B.4. Strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of safeguards

47. The Agency has continued to improve the efficiency of safeguards implementation while maintaining or strengthening its effectiveness. During the past five years, the number of States with safeguards agreements in force increased by 6%, the number of States with nuclear facilities increased by 3%, the number of nuclear facilities and material balance areas containing LOFs under Agency safeguards increased by 12%, and the quantities of nuclear material under safeguards increased by 14%.

48. The Agency has put greater resources into the collection, analysis and evaluation of State provided information, Agency verification data, and other safeguards relevant information available to the Agency, thereby significantly increasing the Agency's knowledge of the nuclear activities being conducted in States. As a result, safeguards have been implemented more effectively while it has been possible to reduce the number of calendar-days spent in the field for verification⁵ by 16% over the past five years. While there has been a reduction of inspection effort in the field, the verification and

²¹ The States with small quantities protocols based on the original text are: Afghanistan, Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brunei, Cambodia, Cameroon, Dominica, Ethiopia, Fiji, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jordan, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Lao Peoples Democratic Republic, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Sudan, Suriname, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen and Zambia.

²² The States with small quantities protocols based on the revised standard text are: Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Azerbaijan, the Bahamas, Bahrain, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Republic of the Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Gabon, Gambia, Guatemala, Holy See, Honduras, Iceland, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Palau, Panama, Qatar, the Republic of Moldova, Rwanda, San Marino, Senegal, the Seychelles, Singapore, Swaziland, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu and Zimbabwe.

²³ Small quantities protocols were amended by Andorra, Gabon, Kuwait and Mauritania.

²⁴ Vanuatu.

evaluation activities at Headquarters that enabled the reductions have comparably increased. The number of regular staff in the Department of Safeguards decreased by 3% over the past five years.

49. During 2013, comprehensive safeguards agreements entered into force for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Vanuatu. Additional protocols entered into force for four States: Antigua and Barbuda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Denmark²⁵ and Vanuatu. At the end of the year, 122 (119) of the 180 States², where safeguards were applied¹, had additional protocols in force. Fifty-five States with comprehensive safeguards agreements, where safeguards were applied, and three States with safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 did not have additional protocols in force.

50. Of the 109 (111) States with a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force but not a broader conclusion, only eight States possess more than one significant quantity of nuclear material. Of these States, three have additional protocols in force, two have signed additional protocols, one has a Board of Governors approved additional protocol, and two have not yet negotiated additional protocols.

51. In 2013, progress continued in strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of Agency safeguards through strategic planning, evolving safeguards implementation, introducing integrated safeguards in additional States, developing safeguards approaches, strengthening the Agency's technical and analytical capabilities, and increasing cooperation with State and regional authorities.

Fact box 2. Strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of safeguards

In 2013, significant progress was made as follows:

- The Agency continued to better integrate verification activities in the field and at Headquarters with the State evaluation process.
- Simplified Agency statements to States about the results of verification activities and conclusions drawn from those activities were introduced in April 2013.
- The development and implementation of more effective and efficient facility-level safeguards approaches continued for new types of facilities (such as geological repositories, spent fuel encapsulation plants, laser enrichment facilities and pyroprocessing facilities).
- Monitoring, containment and surveillance systems were further improved and deployed.
- Further use was made of short notice or unannounced inspections to verify declarations of facility data and operational plans.
- The Agency continued modernizing technologies used for attended measurements and unattended monitoring and for the operation of such systems in the remote monitoring mode.
- The enhancement of information analysis capabilities continued, supported by the collection of open source information (including satellite imagery) and information on nuclear related trade, consolidation of State declarations, and advanced evaluation of verification data.
- The Agency continued to re-engineer outdated software used to record and process safeguards data and to make other enhancements in support of the safeguards information system. Concerted efforts were placed on strengthening information security. In 2013, the Modernization of Safeguards Information Technology project was established to address continued information technology modernization needs and to bring these efforts under a comprehensive management approach.
- In the Environmental Sample Laboratory, the Agency's first multi-collector inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometer further improved the precision of analysis of uranium and plutonium in environmental swipe samples. The Agency's large geometry secondary

²⁵ This additional protocol is applicable to that part of Denmark which is covered by INFCIRC/176, i.e., Greenland (INFCIRC/176/Add.1).

Fact box 2. Strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of safeguards

ion mass spectrometer provided a significant increase in the precision of measurements of environmental samples.

- Construction of the Nuclear Material Laboratory building of the Safeguards Analytical Laboratories at Seibersdorf, Austria, was completed in July 2013 on schedule and within the approved budget. The phased transition of scientific functions into the Nuclear Material Laboratory building began in September 2013.
- The Agency published the *Safeguards Implementation Guide for States with Small Quantities Protocols*, held training courses at national, regional and international levels, and conducted two safeguards advisory missions.
- The quality management system continued to be implemented with a focus on document management, knowledge management, performance indicators, cost calculation methodology, and tools to help improve processes such as quality control reviews, internal audits and condition reports.

52. Member State Support Programmes and the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation continued to make substantial contributions to Agency safeguards through the provision of assistance and advice, respectively.

B.5. Safeguards expenditures and resources

53. During 2013, the activities of Major Programme 4 — Nuclear Verification — were funded from various sources — primarily through the Regular Budget and extrabudgetary contributions. The Regular Budget²⁶ appropriation for 2013 was adjusted to €124.1 (€122.9) million at the average United Nations exchange rate. The extrabudgetary allotments for 2013 were €33.2 million.

54. The expenditures for Major Programme 4 were €122.5 (€121.2) million from the Regular Budget, an increase of 1.1%, over 2012. The Regular Budget utilization rate for 2013 was 98.7% (98.6%) with an unspent balance at the end of the year of €1.6 (€1.8) million. Figure 1 shows the revised Regular Budget and expenditures of Major Programme 4 since 2009.

55. The expenditures from the extrabudgetary contributions were €14.6 (€15.5) million, a decrease of 42.7% from 2012. This decrease resulted from completion of major construction activities under the Enhancing the Capability of the Safeguards Analytical Services (ECAS) Project under which some construction and transition costs remain to be met.

B.6. Further activities supporting the nuclear non-proliferation regime

56. During 2013, the monitoring scheme approved by the Board of Governors in 1999 regarding separated neptunium and americium continued. The Agency received information from eight States²⁷ and the European Commission about separated neptunium or americium. Facilities in Japan and Germany continued to be subject to flow sheet verification. By the end of 2013, evaluation of the information that had been obtained under the monitoring scheme and from open sources and other sources had not indicated any issue of proliferation concern.

²⁶ €130.6 million (at an exchange rate €1=\$1).

²⁷ The Czech Republic, France, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Norway, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.




Figure 1. Major Programme 4 — Nuclear Verification — budget and expenditures, 2009-2013

B.7. Status of safeguards agreements (as of 31 December 2013)

57. This section contains information — presented in the five tables below that conform with the structure of the *Safeguards Statement* — on safeguards agreements that provide the basis for the Agency’s implementation of safeguards in 2013. It does not include agreements under which the application of safeguards has been suspended in the light of implementation of safeguards pursuant to another agreement. For full details see the Agency’s website:

http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/documents/sir_table.pdf.

Table 1 – States with comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force

State	SQP	INFCIRC	Additional protocol (date of entry into force)	Broader conclusion drawn	Integrated safeguards implemented
Afghanistan	X	257	19 July 2005		
Albania		359	03 November 2010	X	
Andorra	X(A)	808	19 December 2011	X	
Angola	X(A)	800	28 April 2010		
Antigua and Barbuda	X(A)	528	15 November 2013		
Armenia		455	28 June 2004	X	X
Australia		217	12 December 1997	X	X
Austria		193	30 April 2004	X	X
Azerbaijan	X(A)	580	29 November 2000		
Bahrain	X(A)	767	20 July 2001		
Bangladesh		301	30 March 2011	X	X
Belgium		193	30 April 2004	X	X
Bosnia and Herzegovina		851	03 July 2013		
Botswana		694	24 August 2006	X	
Bulgaria ⁽¹⁾		193	01 May 2009	X	X
Burkina Faso	X(A)	618	17 April 2003	X	X
Burundi	X(A)	719	27 September 2007		
Canada		164	08 September 2000	X	X

State	SQP	INFCIRC	Additional protocol (date of entry into force)	Broader conclusion drawn	Integrated safeguards implemented
Central African Republic	X(A)	777	07 September 2009		
Chad	X(A)	802	13 May 2010		
Chile		476	03 November 2003	X	X
Colombia		306	05 March 2009		
Comoros	X(A)	752	20 January 2009		
Congo, Republic of the	X(A)	831	28 October 2011		
Costa Rica	X(A)	278	17 June 2011		
Croatia	X(A)	463	06 July 2000	X	X
Cuba		633	03 June 2004	X	X
Cyprus ⁽¹⁾		193	01 May 2008		
Czech Republic ⁽¹⁾		193	01 October 2009	X	X
Democratic Republic of the Congo		183	09 April 2003		
Denmark ⁽²⁾		193 176	30 April 2004 22 March 2013	X	X
Dominican Republic	X(A)	201	05 May 2010		
Ecuador	X(A)	231	24 October 2001	X	X
El Salvador	X(A)	232	24 May 2004		
Estonia ⁽¹⁾		193	01 December 2005	X	X
Fiji	X	192	14 July 2006		
Finland		193	30 April 2004	X	X
Gabon	X (A)	792	25 March 2010		
Gambia	X(A)	277	18 October 2011		
Georgia		617	03 June 2003		
Germany		193	30 April 2004	X	X
Ghana		226	11 June 2004	X	X
Greece		193	30 April 2004	X	X
Guatemala	X(A)	299	28 May 2008		
Haiti	X	681	09 March 2006		
Holy See	X(A)	187	24 September 1998	X	X
Hungary ⁽¹⁾		193	01 July 2007	X	X
Iceland	X(A)	215	12 September 2003	X	X
Indonesia		283	29 September 1999	X	X
Iraq		172	10 October 2012		
Ireland		193	30 April 2004	X	X
Italy		193	30 April 2004	X	X
Jamaica		265	19 March 2003	X	X
Japan		255	16 December 1999	X	X
Jordan	X	258	28 July 1998	X	
Kazakhstan		504	09 May 2007		
Kenya	X(A)	778	18 September 2009		
Korea, Republic of		236	19 February 2004	X	X
Kuwait	X(A)	607	02 June 2003	X	
Kyrgyzstan	X	629	10 November 2011		
Latvia ⁽¹⁾		193	01 October 2008	X	X
Lesotho	X(A)	199	26 April 2010		
Libya		282	11 August 2006	X	X
Lithuania ⁽¹⁾		193	01 January 2008	X	X
Luxembourg		193	30 April 2004	X	X
Madagascar	X(A)	200	18 September 2003	X	X
Malawi	X(A)	409	26 July 2007		
Mali	X(A)	615	12 September 2002	X	X
Malta ⁽¹⁾		193	01 July 2007	X	X
Marshall Islands		653	03 May 2005		

State	SQP	INFCIRC	Additional protocol (date of entry into force)	Broader conclusion drawn	Integrated safeguards implemented
Mauritania	X(A)	788	10 December 2009		
Mauritius	X(A)	190	17 December 2007	X	
Mexico		197	04 March 2011		
Moldova, Republic of	X(A)	690	01 June 2012		
Monaco	X(A)	524	30 September 1999	X	X
Mongolia	X	188	12 May 2003		
Montenegro	X(A)	814	04 March 2011		
Morocco		228	21 April 2011		
Mozambique	X(A)	813	01 March 2011		
Namibia	X	551	20 February 2012		
Netherlands⁽³⁾		193	30 April 2004	X	X
New Zealand⁽⁴⁾	X	185	24 September 1998	X	
Nicaragua	X(A)	246	18 February 2005		
Niger		664	02 May 2007		
Nigeria		358	04 April 2007		
Norway		177	16 May 2000	X	X
Palau	X(A)	650	13 May 2005	X	X
Panama	X(A)	316	11 December 2001		
Paraguay	X	279	15 September 2004		
Peru		273	23 July 2001	X	X
Philippines		216	26 February 2010	X	
Poland⁽¹⁾		193	01 March 2007	X	X
Portugal		193	30 April 2004	X	X
Romania⁽¹⁾		193	01 May 2010	X	X
Rwanda	X(A)	801	17 May 2010		
Seychelles	X(A)	635	13 October 2004	X	X
Singapore	X(A)	259	31 March 2008	X	X
Slovakia⁽¹⁾		193	01 December 2005	X	X
Slovenia⁽¹⁾		193	01 September 2006	X	X
South Africa		394	13 September 2002	X	
Spain		193	30 April 2004	X	X
Swaziland	X(A)	227	08 September 2010		
Sweden		193	30 April 2004	X	X
Switzerland		264	01 February 2005		
Tajikistan		639	14 December 2004		
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	X(A)	610	11 May 2007	X	X
Togo	X	840	18 July 2012		
Turkey		295	17 July 2001	X	
Turkmenistan		673	03 January 2006		
Uganda	X(A)	674	14 February 2006		
Ukraine		550	24 January 2006	X	X
United Arab Emirates	X	622	20 December 2010		
United Republic of Tanzania	X(A)	643	07 February 2005		
Uruguay		157	30 April 2004	X	X
Uzbekistan		508	21 December 1998	X	X
Vanuatu	X(A)	852	In force: 21 May 2013		
Vietnam		376	17 September 2012		

General Notes:

- In addition, safeguards, including the measures of the Model Additional Protocol, were applied in Taiwan, China. The broader conclusion was drawn for Taiwan, China, in 2006 and integrated safeguards were implemented from 1 January 2008.
- The Safeguards Agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/193 is that concluded between the non-nuclear-weapon States of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), EURATOM and the Agency.
- 'X' in the 'SQP' (small quantities protocol) column indicates that the State has an operative SQP. 'X(A)' indicates that the SQP in force is based on the revised SQP standardized text (see Section B, paragraph 6).
- 'X' in the 'broader conclusion drawn' column indicates that the broader conclusion has been drawn as described in Section B, paragraph 13.
- 'X' in the 'integrated safeguards implemented' column indicates that integrated safeguards were implemented for the whole of the year. X* in this column indicates that integrated safeguards were initiated during the course of the year.

Footnotes:

- (1) The date refers to accession to INFCIRC/193 and INFCIRC/193/Add.8.
- (2) The application of safeguards in Denmark under the bilateral NPT Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/176), in force since 1 March 1972, was suspended on 21 February 1977, on which date the Safeguards Agreement between the non-nuclear-weapon States of EURATOM, EURATOM and the Agency (INFCIRC/193) entered into force for Denmark. Since 21 February 1977, INFCIRC/193 also applies to the Faroe Islands. Upon Greenland's secession from EURATOM as of 31 January 1985, the Agreement between the Agency and Denmark (INFCIRC/176) re-entered into force for Greenland. The Additional Protocol to this Agreement entered into force on 22 March 2013 (INFCIRC/176/Add.1).
- (3) The Safeguards Agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/229 with regard to the Caribbean part of the Netherlands (the islands of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius, and Saba), Aruba, Curacao and Sint Maarten is pursuant to the NPT and Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. There is a small quantities protocol to this agreement. No additional protocol is in force for that agreement.
- (4) The Safeguards Agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/185 is applicable to the Cook Islands and Niue. The Additional Protocol reproduced in INFCIRC/185/Add. 1; however, is not applicable to the Cook Islands and Niue.

Table 2 – States with comprehensive safeguards agreements but no additional protocols in force

State	SQP	INFCIRC	Additional protocol
Algeria		531	Approved: 14 September 2004
Argentina		435	
Bahamas	X(A)	544	
Barbados	X	527	
Belarus		495	Signed: 15 November 2005
Belize	X	532	
Bhutan	X	371	
Bolivia	X	465	
Brazil		435	
Brunei Darussalam	X	365	
Cambodia	X	586	
Cameroon	X	641	Signed: 16 December 2004
Côte d'Ivoire		309	Signed: 22 October 2008
Democratic People's Republic of Korea⁽¹⁾		403	
Dominica	X	513	
Egypt		302	
Ethiopia	X	261	
Grenada	X	525	
Guyana	X	543	
Honduras	X(A)	235	Signed: 07 July 2005
Iran, Islamic Republic of⁽²⁾		214	Signed: 18 December 2003
Kiribati	X	390	Signed: 09 November 2004
Lao People's Democratic Republic	X	599	
Lebanon	X(A)	191	
Liechtenstein		275	Signed: 14 July 2006
Malaysia		182	Signed: 22 November 2005

State	SQP	INFCIRC	Additional protocol
Maldives	X	253	
Myanmar	X	477	Signed: 17 September 2013
Nauru	X	317	
Nepal	X	186	
Oman	X	691	
Papua New Guinea	X	312	
Qatar	X(A)	747	
Saint Kitts and Nevis	X	514	Approved: 10 September 2013
Saint Lucia	X	379	
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	X	400	
Samoa	X	268	
San Marino	X(A)	575	
Saudi Arabia	X	746	
Senegal	X(A)	276	Signed: 15 December 2006
Serbia		204	Signed: 03 July 2009
Sierra Leone	X	787	
Solomon Islands	X	420	
Sri Lanka		320	
Sudan	X	245	
Suriname	X	269	
Syrian Arab Republic		407	
Thailand		241	Signed: 22 September 2005
Tonga	X	426	
Trinidad and Tobago	X	414	
Tunisia		381	Signed: 24 May 2005
Tuvalu	X	391	
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of		300	
Yemen, Republic of	X	614	
Zambia	X	456	Signed: 13 May 2009
Zimbabwe	X(A)	483	

General Notes:

- The Safeguards Agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/435 is that concluded between Argentina, Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material (ABACC) and the Agency.
- 'X' in the 'SQP' (small quantities protocol) column indicates that the State has an operative SQP. 'X(A)' indicates that the SQP in force is based on the revised SQP standardized text (see Section B, paragraph 6).

Footnotes:

- (1) In a letter to the Director General dated 10 January 2003, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea stated that the Government had "decided to lift the moratorium on the effectiveness of its withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" and that "its decision to withdraw from the Treaty will come into effect from 11 January 2003 onwards."
- (2) Iran implemented provisionally its Additional Protocol between December 2003 and February 2006.

Table 3 – States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons without safeguards agreements in force

State	SQP	Safeguards agreement	Additional protocol
Benin	X(A)	Signed: 07 June 2005	Signed: 07 June 2005
Cabo Verde	X(A)	Signed: 28 June 2005	Signed: 28 June 2005
Djibouti	X(A)	Signed: 27 May 2010	Signed: 27 May 2010
Equatorial Guinea	X	Approved: 13 June 1986	
Eritrea			
Guinea	X(A)	Signed: 13 December 2011	Signed: 13 December 2011
Guinea-Bissau	X(A)	Signed 21 June 2013	Signed 21 June 2013
Liberia			
Micronesia, Federated States of			
São Tome and Principe			
Somalia			
Timor-Leste	X(A)	Signed: 06 October 2009	Signed: 06 October 2009
<p>General Note:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 'X' in the 'SQP' (small quantities protocol) column indicates that the State has an SQP. 'X(A)' indicates that the SQP is based on the revised SQP standardized text (see Section B, paragraph 6). In both cases the SQP will come into force at the same time as the safeguards agreement. 			

Table 4 – States with INFCIRC/66/Rev.2-type agreements

State	INFCIRC	Additional protocol
India	211 260 360 374 433 754	Signed: 15 May 2009
Israel	249/Add.1	
Pakistan	34 116 135 239 248 393 418 705 816	

Table 5 – States with voluntary offer agreements

State	INFCIRC	Additional protocol
China	369	In force: 28 March 2002
France ⁽¹⁾	290	In force: 30 April 2004
Russian Federation	327	In force: 16 October 2007
United Kingdom ^{(2), (3)}	263	In force: 30 April 2004
United States of America ⁽⁴⁾	288	In force: 06 January 2009

Footnotes:

- (1) The Safeguards Agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/718 between France, EURATOM and the Agency is pursuant to Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. There is a small quantities protocol to this agreement. No additional protocol to that agreement has been concluded.
- (2) The Safeguards Agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/175, which remains in force, is an INFCIRC/66/Rev.2-type safeguards agreement, concluded between the United Kingdom and the Agency.
- (3) The Safeguards Agreement between the United Kingdom, EURATOM and the Agency pursuant to Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco was signed but has not entered into force. There is a small quantities protocol to this agreement. No additional protocol to that agreement has been concluded.
- (4) The Safeguards Agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/366 between the United States of America and the Agency is pursuant to Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. There is a small quantities protocol to this agreement. No additional protocol to that agreement has been concluded.