

A. Safeguards Statement for 2012

In 2012, safeguards were applied for 179 States^{1, 2} with safeguards agreements in force with the Agency. The Secretariat's findings and conclusions for 2012 are reported below with regard to each type of safeguards agreement. These findings and conclusions are based upon an evaluation of all the information available to the Agency in exercising its rights and fulfilling its safeguards obligations for that year.

1. One hundred and fourteen States had both comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force:

- (a) For 60 of these States², the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and no indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.**
- (b) For 54 of these States, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities. Evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for each of these States remained ongoing. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.**

2. Safeguards activities were implemented for 57 States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force, but without additional protocols in force. For these States, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.

While the Secretariat concluded that, for 2012, declared nuclear material in Iran remained in peaceful activities, it was unable to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran was in peaceful activities.³

3. As of the end of 2012, 13 non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) had yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency as required by Article III of that Treaty. For these States, the Secretariat could not draw any safeguards conclusions.

4. Three States had safeguards agreements in force based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, requiring the application of safeguards to nuclear material, facilities and other items specified in the relevant safeguards agreement. For these States, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of nuclear material or of the misuse of the facilities or other items to which safeguards had been applied. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, nuclear material, facilities or other items to which safeguards had been applied remained in peaceful activities.

¹ These States do not include the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), where the Agency did not implement safeguards and, therefore, could not draw any conclusion.

² And Taiwan, China.

³ See paragraph 23.

5. Five nuclear-weapon States had voluntary offer agreements and additional protocols in force. Safeguards were implemented with regard to declared nuclear material in selected facilities in all five States. For these States, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of nuclear material to which safeguards had been applied. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, nuclear material to which safeguards had been applied in selected facilities remained in peaceful activities or had been withdrawn from safeguards as provided for in the agreements.

B. Background to the Safeguards Statement and Summary

B.1. Safeguards conclusions

1. The *Safeguards Statement* reflects the safeguards conclusions resulting from the Agency's activities under the safeguards agreements in force. The Secretariat derives these conclusions on the basis of an evaluation of the results of its verification activities and of all the safeguards relevant information available to it. This section provides background to the *Safeguards Statement*.

2. In 2012, there were:

- 692 facilities and 625 material balance areas containing locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOFs) under safeguards;
- 183 767 significant quantities of nuclear material and 437 tonnes of heavy water under safeguards; and
- 1962 inspections, 604 design information verifications and 57 complementary accesses utilizing 11 859 calendar-days in the field for verification⁴.

3. A summary of the status of States' safeguards agreements and other information presented below is given in Tables 1 to 5 in Section B.7.

B.1.1. States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force

4. Under a comprehensive safeguards agreement, the Agency has the "right and obligation to ensure that safeguards will be applied, in accordance with the terms of the agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the State, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."⁵

5. Comprehensive safeguards agreements consist of Part I, Part II, and Definitions. Part I consists of general provisions and Part II describes the procedures for implementing those provisions. These procedures include the record keeping and reporting obligations of the State with regard to nuclear material, nuclear facilities and LOFs. They also include procedures related to Agency access to nuclear material, nuclear facilities and LOFs.

6. The procedures set out in Part II of a comprehensive safeguards agreement include certain reporting requirements related to the export and import of material containing uranium or thorium which has not yet reached the stage of processing where its composition and purity make it suitable for fuel fabrication or for isotopic enrichment. Nuclear material which has reached that stage of processing, and any nuclear material produced at a later stage, is subject to all the other safeguards procedures specified in the agreement. An inventory of such nuclear material is established on the basis of an initial report by a State, which is then verified by the Agency and maintained on the basis of subsequent reports by the State and by Agency verification. The Agency performs its verification and evaluation activities in order to confirm that these declarations by the State are correct and complete — i.e. to confirm that all nuclear material in the State remains in peaceful activities.

⁴ Calendar-days in the field for verification comprise calendar-days spent in performing inspections, complementary access and design information verification and in the associated travel and rest periods.

⁵ Paragraph 2 of INFCIRC/153 (Corrected).

Small quantities protocols

7. Many States with minimal or no nuclear activities have concluded a small quantities protocol to their comprehensive safeguards agreement. Under a small quantities protocol based on the original standard text⁶ submitted to the Board of Governors in 1974, the implementation of most of the safeguards procedures in Part II of a comprehensive safeguards agreement are held in abeyance as long as certain criteria are met. In 2005, the Board of Governors approved the revision⁷ of the standard text of the small quantities protocol. This revision changed the eligibility criteria for a small quantities protocol, making it unavailable to a State with an existing or planned facility, and reduced the number of measures held in abeyance. Of particular importance is the fact that, under the revised text of the small quantities protocol, the requirement that the State provide the Agency with an initial inventory report and the Agency's right to carry out ad hoc and special inspections are no longer held in abeyance.

Additional protocols

8. Although the Agency has the authority under a comprehensive safeguards agreement to verify the peaceful use of all nuclear material in a State (i.e. the correctness and completeness of the State's declarations), the tools available to the Agency under such an agreement are limited. The Model Additional Protocol⁸, approved by the Board of Governors in 1997, equips the Agency with important supplementary tools that provide broader access to information and locations. The measures provided for under an additional protocol thus significantly increase the Agency's ability to verify the peaceful use of all nuclear material in a State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement.

B.1.1.1. States with both comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force

Status of implementation

9. As of 31 December 2012, 114 States had both comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force.

10. Safeguards implementation involved, as appropriate, activities carried out in the field, at regional offices and at Agency Headquarters in Vienna. The activities at Headquarters included the evaluation of States' accounting reports and other information required under comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols and the evaluation of safeguards relevant information from other sources.

Deriving conclusions

11. A safeguards conclusion that all nuclear material has remained in peaceful activities in a State is based on the Agency's finding that there are no indications of diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and no indications of undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State as a whole. The Agency draws such a conclusion only where a State has both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force and the evaluations described below have been completed.

⁶ GOV/INF/276/Annex B.

⁷ GOV/INF/276/Mod.1 and Corr.1.

⁸ INFCIRC/540 (Corrected), Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards.

12. To ascertain that there are no indications of diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities in a State, the Agency needs to carry out a comprehensive evaluation of all safeguards relevant information available to it, which includes information provided by the State with regard to the design and operation of nuclear facilities and LOFs, the State's nuclear material accounting reports and the results of the Agency's in-field activities carried out to verify the State's declarations. In addition, the Agency evaluates the information acquired through the implementation of the State's additional protocol.

13. To ascertain that there are no indications of undeclared nuclear material or activities in a State, the Agency needs to carry out an evaluation of the consistency of the State's declared nuclear programme with the results of the Agency's verification activities under the relevant safeguards agreements and additional protocols and with all other safeguards relevant information available to the Agency. In particular, the Agency needs to have:

- conducted a comprehensive State evaluation based on all safeguards relevant information available to the Agency about the State's nuclear and nuclear related activities (including design information on facilities and information on LOFs, declarations submitted under additional protocols, and information collected by the Agency through its verification activities and from other sources);
- performed complementary access, as necessary, in accordance with the State's additional protocol; and
- addressed all anomalies, questions and inconsistencies identified in the course of its evaluation and verification activities.

14. When the evaluations described in paragraphs 12 and 13 above have been completed and no indication has been found by the Agency that, in its judgement, would give rise to a proliferation concern, the Secretariat can draw the broader conclusion that all nuclear material in a State has remained in peaceful activities. Subsequently, the Agency implements an integrated safeguards approach for that State whereby — due to increased assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for the State as a whole — the intensity of inspection activities at declared facilities and LOFs can be reduced. Integrated safeguards were implemented for the whole of 2012 in 51 States⁹, and for part of 2012 in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Ukraine.

15. In drawing safeguards conclusions, the Agency evaluates whether the safeguards activities carried out during the year have achieved certain performance targets. In those cases where integrated safeguards were not implemented for the whole year, the Agency's *Safeguards Criteria* function as performance targets.¹⁰ Under integrated safeguards — an optimized combination of measures under comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols — the performance targets are those set out in the State-level approach¹¹ developed for each State.

⁹ Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Palau, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Uruguay and Uzbekistan.

¹⁰ For those States in which integrated safeguards have not been applied, the Agency's *Safeguards Criteria* specify the activities considered necessary by the Agency to provide a reasonable probability of detecting the diversion of a significant quantity of declared nuclear material from declared facilities or LOFs.

¹¹ A State-level approach, although based on safeguards verification objectives common to all States, takes into account the features of the individual State's nuclear fuel cycle and other safeguards relevant State characteristics.

Overall conclusions for 2012

16. On the basis of the evaluations described in paragraphs 12 and 13, the Secretariat drew the conclusions referred to in paragraph 1(a) of the *Safeguards Statement* for 60 States² — Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark¹², Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Latvia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands¹³, New Zealand¹⁴, Norway, Palau, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay and Uzbekistan. For the Philippines and Turkey, the conclusion in paragraph 1(a) of the *Safeguards Statement* was drawn for the first time.

17. Because the evaluation process described in paragraph 13 had not yet been completed for 54 States, the conclusion drawn for these States relates only to declared nuclear material in peaceful activities. The conclusion in paragraph 1(b) of the *Safeguards Statement* was drawn for Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Guatemala, Haiti, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lesotho, Malawi, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Panama, Paraguay, Republic of the Congo, Republic of Moldova, Rwanda, Swaziland, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Togo, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania and Vietnam.

B.1.1.2. States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force but no additional protocols in force

Status of implementation

18. As of 31 December 2012, safeguards were implemented for 57 States in this category. Safeguards implementation involved activities in the field and at Headquarters, including the evaluation of States' accounting reports and other information required under comprehensive safeguards agreements and the evaluation of safeguards relevant information from other sources.

Deriving conclusions

19. For a State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement, the Agency's right and obligation are as described in paragraph 4 above. Although safeguards strengthening measures¹⁵ under such an

¹² This conclusion is drawn with regard only to that part of Denmark which is covered by INFCIRC/193 and INFCIRC/193/Add.8, i.e. Denmark and the Faroe Islands, which excludes Greenland. Denmark has concluded a separate comprehensive safeguards agreement for Greenland (INFCIRC/176), but has not yet concluded an additional protocol thereto.

¹³ This conclusion is drawn with regard only to that part of the Netherlands which is covered by INFCIRC/193 and INFCIRC/193/Add.8, i.e. the Netherlands in Europe, which excludes the Caribbean part of the Netherlands (the islands of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba), Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten. The Netherlands has concluded a separate comprehensive safeguards agreement that applies to its constituent parts mentioned above (INFCIRC/229), but has not yet concluded an additional protocol thereto.

¹⁴ This conclusion is drawn with regard only to that part of New Zealand which is covered by INFCIRC/185 and INFCIRC/185/Add.1; it is not drawn for the Cook Islands and Niue, which are covered by INFCIRC/185, but not by INFCIRC/185/Add.1.

¹⁵ Such measures include the early provision of design information, environmental sampling and the use of satellite imagery.

agreement have increased the Agency's ability to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities, the activities that the Agency may conduct in this regard are limited for a State without an additional protocol. Thus, the conclusion in the *Safeguards Statement* for a State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement alone relates only to the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful activities.

20. In the course of its evaluation, the Agency also seeks to determine whether there is any indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State which would need to be reflected in the *Safeguards Statement*. However, without the measures provided for in the *Model Additional Protocol* being implemented, the Agency is not able to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for the State as a whole.

Islamic Republic of Iran

21. During 2012, the Director General submitted four reports to the Board of Governors entitled *Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran* (GOV/2012/9, GOV/2012/23, GOV/2012/37 and GOV/2012/55).

22. In 2012, contrary to the relevant binding resolutions of the Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council, Iran did not: implement the provisions of its Additional Protocol; implement the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to its Safeguards Agreement; suspend its enrichment related activities; suspend its heavy water related activities; or address the Agency's serious concerns about possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme, in order to establish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

23. While the Agency continued throughout 2012 to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and LOFs declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement, as Iran did not provide the necessary cooperation, including not implementing its Additional Protocol, as required in the binding resolutions of the Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council, the Agency was unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran and, therefore, was unable to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran was in peaceful activities.

24. In resolution GOV/2011/69, adopted¹⁶ on 18 November 2011, the Board of Governors, inter alia, stressed that it was essential for Iran and the Agency to intensify their dialogue aimed at the urgent resolution of all outstanding substantive issues for the purpose of providing clarifications regarding those issues, including access to all relevant information, documentation, sites, material and personnel in Iran. In that resolution, the Board of Governors also called on Iran to engage seriously and without preconditions in talks aimed at restoring international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. In 2012, Agency and Iranian officials held seven rounds of talks in Vienna and Tehran, including during a visit by the Director General to Tehran in May 2012, to reach agreement on a structured approach to the clarification of all outstanding issues related to Iran's nuclear programme.

25. On 13 September 2012, the Board of Governors adopted¹⁶ resolution GOV/2012/50 in which it, inter alia, stressed that it was essential for Iran to immediately conclude and implement such an approach, including as a first step providing the access the Agency had requested to relevant sites.

¹⁶ Adopted by a vote.

Immediately following the adoption of that resolution, the Agency took steps to engage Iran in further talks¹⁷ aimed at finalizing the structured approach document.

26. While the Secretariat's commitment to continued dialogue is unwavering, it has not been possible to reach agreement with Iran on the structured approach or to begin substantive work on the outstanding issues, including those related to the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear programme.

Syrian Arab Republic

27. On 30 August 2012, the Director General submitted a report to the Board of Governors entitled *Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic* (GOV/2012/42). The Director General informed the Board that the Agency had not received any new information from Syria or other Member States that would have an impact on the Agency's assessment that it was very likely that a building destroyed at the Dair Alzour site was a nuclear reactor which should have been declared to the Agency by Syria.

28. The Board of Governors, in its resolution GOV/2011/41, adopted¹⁶ on 9 June 2011, inter alia, found Syria in non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement and reported this non-compliance to the United Nations Security Council. The Board called upon Syria to: remedy urgently its non-compliance; provide the Agency with updated reporting and access to all information, sites, material and persons necessary for the Agency to verify such reporting; and resolve all outstanding questions so that the Agency can provide the necessary assurances as to the exclusively peaceful nature of Syria's nuclear programme.

29. In February 2012, in response to an Agency proposal to hold further discussions to address all the outstanding questions, Syria indicated that it would provide a detailed response at a later time, noting the difficult prevailing security situation in the country. The Agency has taken note of Syria's position and has reiterated its request to Syria to hold further discussions to address all the outstanding questions.

30. For 2012, the Agency was able to conclude for Syria that declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.

Overall conclusions for 2012

31. On the basis of the evaluation performed and as reflected in paragraph 2 of the *Safeguards Statement*, the Secretariat concluded that for the 57 States¹⁸, declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities. This conclusion was drawn for Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominica, Egypt, Ethiopia, Grenada, Guyana, Honduras, Islamic Republic of Iran, Kiribati, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Malaysia, Maldives, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Tuvalu, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

¹⁷ Further rounds of talks were held in January and February 2013.

¹⁸ In addition, this conclusion is drawn for those territories of Denmark, the Netherlands and New Zealand referred to in footnotes 12, 13 and 14 for which the broader conclusion is not drawn – i.e. Greenland; the Caribbean part of the Netherlands (the islands of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba), Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten; and the Cook Islands and Niue, respectively.

B.1.2. States with no safeguards agreements in force

32. As of 31 December 2012, 13 non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) had yet to bring comprehensive safeguards agreements into force pursuant to the Treaty.

Overall conclusions for 2012

33. As indicated in paragraph 3 of the *Safeguards Statement*, the Secretariat could not draw any safeguards conclusions for the following States: Benin, Cape Verde, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Federated States of Micronesia, São Tome and Principe, Somalia, Timor Leste and Vanuatu.

B.1.3. States with safeguards agreements in force based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2

34. Under safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, the Agency applies safeguards in order to ensure that nuclear material, facilities and other items specified under the safeguards agreement are not used for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon or to further any military purpose, and that such items are used exclusively for peaceful purposes and are not used for the manufacture of any nuclear explosive device.

Status of implementation

35. As of 31 December 2012, safeguards were implemented at facilities in India, Israel and Pakistan pursuant to safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2. In 2009, India signed an additional protocol, which has not yet entered into force.

Deriving conclusions

36. The conclusion described in paragraph 4 of the *Safeguards Statement* is reported for these three States, and relates to the nuclear material, facilities and other items to which safeguards were applied. To draw such a conclusion in respect of these States, the Agency evaluates all safeguards relevant information available, including verification results and information about facility design features and operations.

Overall conclusions for 2012

37. On the basis of the results of its verification and evaluation activities, the Secretariat concluded that the nuclear material, facilities or other items to which safeguards were applied in India, Israel and Pakistan remained in peaceful activities.

B.1.4. States with both voluntary offer agreements and additional protocols in force

38. Under a voluntary offer agreement, the Agency applies safeguards to nuclear material in those facilities that have been selected by the Agency from the State's list of eligible facilities in order to verify that the material is not withdrawn from peaceful activities except as provided for in the agreement. In selecting facilities under voluntary offer agreements for the application of safeguards, the Agency takes into consideration factors such as: (i) whether the selection of a facility would satisfy legal obligations arising from other agreements concluded by the State; (ii) whether useful experience may be gained in implementing new safeguards approaches or in using advanced equipment and technology; and (iii) whether the cost efficiency of Agency safeguards may be enhanced by applying safeguards, in the exporting State, to nuclear material being shipped to States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force. By implementing measures under the additional protocol in these five States with voluntary offer agreements, the Agency also seeks to obtain and verify information that

could enhance the safeguards conclusions in States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force.

Status of implementation

39. During 2012, safeguards were implemented at facilities selected by the Agency in the five States with voluntary offer agreements in force: China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (United Kingdom) and the United States of America.

Deriving conclusions

40. The conclusion contained in paragraph 5 of the *Safeguards Statement* is reported for the five States with voluntary offer agreements in force in which safeguards were applied to nuclear material in selected facilities. To draw the safeguards conclusion, the Agency evaluates all relevant information, including verification results and information about facility design features and operations.

Overall conclusions for 2012

41. On the basis of the results of its verification and evaluation activities, the Secretariat concluded for China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America that nuclear material to which safeguards had been applied in selected facilities remained in peaceful activities or had been withdrawn as provided for in the agreements. There were no such withdrawals from the selected facilities in the United Kingdom.

B.2. Democratic People's Republic of Korea

42. In August 2012, the Director General submitted a report to the Board of Governors and General Conference entitled *Application of Safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea* (GOV/2012/36–GC(56)/11), which provided an update of developments since the Director General's report of September 2011.

43. Since 1994, the Agency has not been able to conduct all necessary safeguards activities provided for in the DPRK's NPT Safeguards Agreement. From the end of 2002 until July 2007, the Agency was not able, and since April 2009 has not been able, to implement any verification measures in the DPRK and, therefore, could not draw any safeguards conclusion regarding the DPRK.

44. Since April 2009, the Agency has not implemented any measures under the ad hoc monitoring and verification arrangement agreed between the Agency and the DPRK and foreseen in the Initial Actions agreed at the Six-Party Talks. Statements by the DPRK about uranium enrichment activities and the construction of a light water reactor in the DPRK continue to be deeply troubling.

45. Although not implementing any verification activities in the field, the Agency continued to monitor the DPRK's nuclear activities by using open source information, satellite imagery and trade information. The Agency also continued to further consolidate its knowledge of the DPRK's nuclear programme with the objective of maintaining operational readiness to resume safeguards implementation in the DPRK.

B.3. Areas of difficulty in safeguards implementation

46. Although progress was made during 2012 in addressing some of the areas of difficulty in implementing safeguards, further work remains to be done.

47. The performance and effectiveness of State and regional systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material have significant impacts upon the effectiveness and efficiency of Agency

safeguards implementation. In 2012, some States still had not established national systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material, which are required under comprehensive safeguards agreements. Moreover, not all State and regional authorities have the necessary authority, resources, technical capabilities or independence from nuclear facility or LOF operators to implement the requirements of safeguards agreements and additional protocols. In particular, some State authorities do not provide sufficient oversight of nuclear material accounting and control systems at nuclear facilities and LOFs to ensure the required accuracy and precision of the data transmitted to the Agency.

48. In accordance with the decision of the Board of Governors in September 2005, States which have not amended or rescinded their small quantities protocols should do so as soon as possible. At the end of 2012, 48 States¹⁹ had operative small quantities protocols that had yet to be amended. Forty-six States²⁰ had amended their small quantities protocols; one of which²¹ was amended in 2012 (see Tables 1 and 2). In addition, two States²² rescinded their small quantities protocols.

49. In 2012, as in previous years, the number of samples collected was at the capacity limit of the Agency's Safeguards Analytical Laboratory and the other Network of Analytical Laboratories and some delays in the analysis of samples occurred. However, the situation is gradually improving, due to a collaborative effort between the Agency and the Network of Analytical Laboratories.

B.4. Strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of safeguards

50. The Agency has continued to improve the efficiency of safeguards implementation while maintaining or strengthening its effectiveness. During the past five years, the number of States with safeguards agreements in force increased by 10%, the number of States with nuclear facilities increased by 4%, the number of nuclear facilities and LOFs under Agency safeguards increased by 16%, and the quantities of nuclear material under safeguards increased by 16%.

51. The Agency has put greater resources into the collection, analysis and evaluation of State provided information, Agency verification data, and other safeguards relevant information available to the Agency, thereby significantly increasing the Agency's knowledge of the nuclear activities being conducted in States. As a result, safeguards have been implemented more effectively while it has been possible to reduce the number of calendar-days spent in the field for verification purposes by 16% over the past five years. While there has been a reduction of inspection effort in the field, the verification and evaluation activities at Headquarters that enabled the reductions have comparably increased. The number of regular staff in the Department of Safeguards decreased by 1% over the past five years.

¹⁹ Afghanistan, Andorra, Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brunei, Cambodia, Cameroon, Dominica, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jordan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao Peoples Democratic Republic, Maldives, Mauritania, Mongolia, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Sudan, Suriname, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, and Zambia.

²⁰ Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Republic of the Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Gambia, Guatemala, Holy See, Honduras, Iceland, Kenya, Lebanon, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Palau, Panama, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Rwanda, San Marino, Senegal, Seychelles, Singapore, Swaziland, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, and Zimbabwe.

²¹ Antigua and Barbuda.

²² Ghana and Nigeria.

52. During 2012, a comprehensive safeguards agreement entered into force for Togo. Additional protocols entered into force for five States with comprehensive safeguards agreements: Iraq, Namibia, Republic of Moldova, Togo, and Vietnam. At the end of the year, 119 of the 179 States^{1, 2}, where safeguards were applied, had additional protocols in force. Fifty-seven States¹ with comprehensive safeguards agreements, where safeguards were applied, and three States with safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 did not have additional protocols in force.

53. In 2012, progress continued in strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of Agency safeguards through strategic planning, evolving safeguards implementation, introducing integrated safeguards in additional States, developing safeguards approaches, strengthening the Agency's technical and analytical capabilities, and increasing cooperation with State and regional authorities. Significant progress was made as follows:

- The Agency continued to better integrate verification activities in the field and at Headquarters with State evaluation activities.
- The development and implementation of more effective and efficient safeguards approaches continued for: (a) new types of facilities (such as geological repositories, spent fuel encapsulation plants, laser enrichment facilities and pyroprocessing facilities); (b) unattended monitoring and surveillance systems; and (c) short notice or unannounced inspections to verify declarations of facility data and operational plans.
- The Agency continued modernizing technologies used for attended measurements and unattended monitoring and for the operation of such systems in the remote monitoring mode.
- The enhancement of information analysis capabilities continued, supported by the collection of open source information (including satellite imagery) and information on nuclear related trade, consolidation of State declarations, and advanced evaluation of verification data.
- The Agency's safeguards information system, which will contain all information resulting from Agency verification activities, was further developed to optimize security of information, integration of various types of information and collaboration of information analysts. The modernization of software continued to aid the analysis of data used in the State evaluation process.
- The Agency developed a highly secure internal information technology network and began transferring safeguards data on States and implementing analytical tools within it.
- In the Environmental Sample Laboratory of the Safeguards Analytical Laboratories at Seibersdorf, Austria, the Agency's first multi-collector inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometer was brought into service to further improve the precision of analysis of uranium or plutonium particles collected by environmental sampling.
- Construction of the Nuclear Material Laboratory building of the Safeguards Analytical Laboratories at Seibersdorf, Austria, progressed on schedule and within budget. The building is expected to be approved for operation in mid-2013.
- To support States in implementing their safeguards obligations, in March 2012 the Agency published a document entitled *Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols* and held training courses at national, regional and international levels.
- The quality management system continued to be implemented with a focus on document management, knowledge management, training, the cost calculation methodology, and tools to help improve processes, such as quality control reviews, internal audits and condition reports.
- In 2012, the Agency expanded its quality control reviews on the results of safeguards verification activities.

54. Member State Support Programmes and the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation continued to make substantial contributions to Agency safeguards through the provision of assistance and advice, respectively.

B.5. Safeguards expenditures and resources

55. This section provides information on the level and use of financial and human resources for safeguards implementation during 2012. Total expenditure for Major Programme 4 (Nuclear Verification) from the 2012 Operational Regular Budget amounted to €121.2 million at the United Nations exchange rates in 2012. In addition, €25.5 million was spent from extrabudgetary contributions received from Member States. Regular Budget implementation for Major Programme 4 was 98.6%, whereby €1.8 million remained unspent at the end of 2012 from the 2012 Regular Budget. Despite a significant increase in the level of extrabudgetary contribution expenditure in 2012, additional resources are still required to complete the modernization of the Safeguards Analytical Laboratories at Seibersdorf, Austria, including the supporting infrastructure and site security.

56. Figure 1 shows the revised Regular Budget and expenditures of Major Programme 4 since 2008.



Figure 1. Major Programme 4 (Nuclear Verification) budget and expenditures, 2008–2012

B.6. Further activities supporting the nuclear non-proliferation regime

57. During 2012, the monitoring scheme approved by the Board of Governors in 1999 regarding separated neptunium and americium continued. The Agency received information from eight States^{2, 23} and the European Commission about separated neptunium or americium. Facilities in Japan and Germany continued to be subject to flow sheet verification. By the end of 2012, evaluation of the information that had been obtained under the monitoring scheme and from open and other sources had not indicated any issue of proliferation concern.

²³ Czech Republic, France, Japan, Republic of Korea, Norway, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

58. The Agency was requested in 2010 by the Russian Federation and the United States of America to undertake a verification role under the *Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation*, as amended.²⁴ During 2012, two technical meetings regarding verification activities related to the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement were held in Moscow. In addition, the Agency organized a technical seminar in Vienna on Agency equipment that could be used for verification under such an agreement.

B.7. Status of safeguards agreements (as of 31 December 2012)

59. This section contains information — presented in the five tables below that conform with the structure of the *Safeguards Statement* — on safeguards agreements that provide the basis for the Agency's implementation of safeguards in 2012. It does not include agreements under which the application of safeguards has been suspended in the light of implementation of safeguards pursuant to another agreement. For full details see the Agency's website:

http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/documents/sir_table.pdf.

Table 1 – States with comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force

State	SQP	INFCIRC	Additional protocol (date of entry into force)	Broader conclusion drawn	Integrated safeguards implemented
Afghanistan	X	257	19 July 2005		
Albania		359	03 November 2010		
Andorra	X	808	19 December 2011		
Angola	X(A)	800	28 April 2010		
Armenia		455	28 June 2004	X	X
Australia		217	12 December 1997	X	X
Austria		193	30 April 2004	X	X
Azerbaijan	X(A)	580	29 November 2000		
Bangladesh		301	30 March 2001	X	X
Bahrain	X(A)	767	20 July 2011		
Belgium		193	30 April 2004	X	X
Botswana		694	24 August 2006	X	
Bulgaria⁽¹⁾		193	01 May 2009	X	X
Burkina Faso	X(A)	618	17 April 2003	X	X
Burundi	X(A)	719	27 September 2007		
Canada		164	08 September 2000	X	X
Central African Republic	X(A)	777	07 September 2009		
Chad	X(A)	802	13 May 2010		
Chile		476	03 November 2003	X	X
Colombia		306	05 March 2009		
Comoros	X(A)	752	20 January 2009		
Congo, Republic of the	X(A)	831	28 October 2011		
Costa Rica	X(A)	278	17 June 2011		
Croatia	X(A)	463	06 July 2000	X	X

²⁴ The Agency received a letter dated 30 August 2010 from the Permanent Missions of the Russian Federation and the United States of America, transmitting the text of the Joint Letter from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the United States Secretary of State addressed to the Director General on the *Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation*, as amended. In this letter, it was requested that the Agency undertake a verification role under the amended agreement.

State	SQP	INFCIRC	Additional protocol (date of entry into force)	Broader conclusion drawn	Integrated safeguards implemented
Cuba		633	03 June 2004	X	X
Cyprus⁽¹⁾		193	01 May 2008		
Czech Republic⁽¹⁾		193	01 October 2009	X	X
Democratic Republic of the Congo		183	09 April 2003		
Denmark⁽²⁾		193	30 April 2004	X	X
Dominican Republic	X(A)	201	05 May 2010		
Ecuador	X(A)	231	24 October 2001	X	X
El Salvador	X(A)	232	24 May 2004		
Estonia⁽¹⁾		193	01 December 2005	X	X
Fiji	X	192	14 July 2006		
Finland		193	30 April 2004	X	X
Gabon	X	792	25 March 2010		
Gambia	X(A)	277	18 October 2011		
Georgia		617	03 June 2003		
Germany		193	30 April 2004	X	X
Ghana		226	11 June 2004	X	X
Greece		193	30 April 2004	X	X
Guatemala	X(A)	299	28 May 2008		
Haiti	X	681	09 March 2006		
Holy See	X(A)	187	24 September 1998	X	X
Hungary⁽¹⁾		193	01 July 2007	X	X
Iceland	X(A)	215	12 September 2003	X	X
Indonesia		283	29 September 1999	X	X
Iraq⁽³⁾		172	10 October 2012	X	X
Ireland		193	30 April 2004	X	X
Italy		193	30 April 2004	X	X
Jamaica		265	19 March 2003	X	X
Japan		255	16 December 1999	X	X
Jordan	X	258	28 July 1998	X	
Kazakhstan		504	09 May 2007		
Kenya	X(A)	778	18 September 2009		
Korea, Republic of		236	19 February 2004	X	X
Kuwait	X	607	02 June 2003	X	
Kyrgyzstan	X	629	10 November 2011		
Latvia⁽¹⁾		193	01 October 2008	X	X
Lesotho	X(A)	199	26 April 2010		
Libya		282	11 August 2006	X	X
Lithuania⁽¹⁾		193	01 January 2008	X	X
Luxembourg		193	30 April 2004	X	X
Madagascar	X(A)	200	18 September 2003	X	X
Malawi	X(A)	409	26 July 2007		
Mali	X(A)	615	12 September 2002	X	X
Malta⁽¹⁾		193	01 July 2007	X	X
Marshall Islands		653	03 May 2005		
Mauritania	X	788	10 December 2009		
Mauritius	X(A)	190	17 December 2007		
Mexico		197	04 March 2011		
Moldova, Republic of	X(A)	690	01 June 2012		
Monaco	X(A)	524	30 September 1999	X	X
Mongolia	X	188	12 May 2003		
Montenegro	X(A)	814	04 March 2011		
Morocco		228	21 April 2011		
Mozambique	X(A)	813	01 March 2011		

State	SQP	INFCIRC	Additional protocol (date of entry into force)	Broader conclusion drawn	Integrated safeguards implemented
Namibia	X	551	20 February 2012		
Netherlands⁽⁴⁾		193	30 April 2004	X	X
New Zealand⁽⁵⁾	X	185	24 September 1998	X	
Nicaragua	X(A)	246	18 February 2005		
Niger		664	02 May 2007		
Nigeria		358	04 April 2007		
Norway		177	16 May 2000	X	X
Palau	X(A)	650	13 May 2005	X	X
Panama	X(A)	316	11 December 2001		
Paraguay	X	279	15 September 2004		
Peru		273	23 July 2001	X	X
Philippines		216	26 February 2010	X	
Poland⁽¹⁾		193	01 March 2007	X	X
Portugal		193	30 April 2004	X	X
Romania⁽¹⁾		193	01 May 2010	X	X
Rwanda	X(A)	801	17 May 2010		
Seychelles	X(A)	635	13 October 2004	X	X
Singapore	X(A)	259	31 March 2008	X	X
Slovakia⁽¹⁾		193	01 December 2005	X	X
Slovenia⁽¹⁾		193	01 September 2006	X	X
South Africa		394	13 September 2002	X	
Spain		193	30 April 2004	X	X
Swaziland	X(A)	227	08 September 2010		
Sweden		193	30 April 2004	X	X
Switzerland		264	01 February 2005		
Tajikistan		639	14 December 2004		
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	X(A)	610	11 May 2007	X	X*
Togo	X	840	18 July 2012		
Turkey		295	17 July 2001	X	
Turkmenistan		673	03 January 2006		
Uganda	X(A)	674	14 February 2006		
Ukraine		550	24 January 2006	X	X*
United Arab Emirates	X	622	20 December 2010		
United Republic of Tanzania	X(A)	643	07 February 2005		
Uruguay		157	30 April 2004	X	X
Uzbekistan		508	21 December 1998	X	X
Vietnam		376	17 September 2012		

General Notes:

- In addition, safeguards, including the measures of the Model Additional Protocol, were applied in Taiwan, China. The broader conclusion was drawn for Taiwan, China, in 2006 and integrated safeguards were implemented from 1 January 2008.
- The Safeguards Agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/193 is that concluded between the non-nuclear-weapon States of the European Atomic Energy Community, the European Atomic Energy Community, and the Agency.
- 'X' in the 'SQP' (small quantities protocol) column indicates that the State has an operative SQP. 'X(A)' indicates that the SQP in force is based on the revised SQP standardized text (see Section B, paragraph 7).
- 'X' in the 'broader conclusion drawn' column indicates that the broader conclusion has been drawn as described in Section B, paragraph 13.
- 'X*' in the 'integrated safeguards implemented' column indicates that integrated safeguards were implemented for the whole of the year. X* in this column indicates that integrated safeguards were initiated during the course of the year.

Footnotes:

- (1) The date refers to accession to INFCIRC/193 and INFCIRC/193/Add.8.
- (2) The Safeguards Agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/176 is applicable to Greenland as of 31 January 1985. No additional protocol is in force for Greenland.
- (3) Iraq implemented provisionally its Additional Protocol from 17 February 2010 until entry into force.

State	SQP	INFCIRC	Additional protocol (date of entry into force)	Broader conclusion drawn	Integrated safeguards implemented
<p>(4) The Safeguards Agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/229 with regard to the Caribbean part of the Netherlands (the islands of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius, and Saba), Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten is pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. There is an SQP to this agreement. No additional protocol is in force for that agreement.</p> <p>(5) The Safeguards Agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/185 is applicable to the Cook Islands and Niue. The additional protocol reproduced in INFCIRC/185/Add. 1, however, is not applicable to the Cook Islands and Niue.</p>					

Table 2 – States with comprehensive safeguards agreements but no additional protocols in force

State	SQP	INFCIRC	Additional protocol
Algeria		531	Approved: 14 September 2004
Antigua and Barbuda	X(A)	528	
Argentina		435	
Bahamas	X(A)	544	
Barbados	X	527	
Belarus		495	Signed: 15 November 2005
Belize	X	532	
Bhutan	X	371	
Bolivia	X	465	
Bosnia and Herzegovina⁽¹⁾		204 Signed: 06 June 2012	Signed: 06 June 2012
Brazil		435	
Brunei Darussalam	X	365	
Cambodia	X	586	
Cameroon	X	641	Signed: 16 December 2004
Côte d'Ivoire		309	Signed: 22 October 2008
Democratic People's Republic of Korea⁽²⁾		403	
Dominica	X	513	
Egypt		302	
Ethiopia	X	261	
Grenada	X	525	
Guyana	X	543	
Honduras	X(A)	235	Signed: 07 July 2005
Iran, Islamic Republic of⁽³⁾		214	Signed: 18 December 2003
Kiribati	X	390	Signed: 09 November 2004
Lao People's Democratic Republic	X	599	
Lebanon	X(A)	191	
Liechtenstein		275	Signed: 14 July 2006
Malaysia		182	Signed: 22 November 2005
Maldives	X	253	
Myanmar	X	477	
Nauru	X	317	
Nepal	X	186	
Oman	X	691	
Papua New Guinea	X	312	
Qatar	X(A)	747	
Saint Kitts and Nevis	X	514	
Saint Lucia	X	379	
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	X	400	
Samoa	X	268	
San Marino	X(A)	575	
Saudi Arabia	X	746	

State	SQP	INFCIRC	Additional protocol
Senegal	X(A)	276	Signed: 15 December 2006
Serbia		204	Signed: 03 July 2009
Sierra Leone	X	787	
Solomon Islands	X	420	
Sri Lanka		320	
Sudan	X	245	
Suriname	X	269	
Syrian Arab Republic		407	
Thailand		241	Signed: 22 September 2005
Tonga	X	426	
Trinidad and Tobago	X	414	
Tunisia		381	Signed: 24 May 2005
Tuvalu	X	391	
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of		300	
Yemen, Republic of	X	614	
Zambia	X	456	Signed: 13 May 2009
Zimbabwe	X(A)	483	

General Notes:

- The Safeguards Agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/435 is that concluded between Argentina, Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material and the Agency.
- 'X' in the 'SQP' (small quantities protocol) column indicates that the State has an operative SQP. 'X(A)' indicates that the SQP in force is based on the revised SQP standardized text (see Section B, paragraph 7).

Footnotes:

- The NPT Safeguards Agreement concluded with the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (INFCIRC/204) continues to be applied in Bosnia and Herzegovina to the extent relevant to Bosnia and Herzegovina. INFCIRC/204 would remain in force for the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina until superseded by a new agreement. A new comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol for Bosnia and Herzegovina were approved by the Board of Governors and signed by Bosnia and Herzegovina on 6 June 2012.
- In a letter to the Director General dated 10 January 2003, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea stated that the Government had "decided to lift the moratorium on the effectiveness of its withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" and that "its decision to withdraw from the Treaty will come into effect from 11 January 2003 onwards."
- Iran implemented provisionally its Additional Protocol between December 2003 and February 2006.

Table 3 – States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons without safeguards agreements in force

State	SQP	Safeguards agreement	Additional protocol
Benin	X(A)	Signed: 07 June 2005	Signed: 07 June 2005
Cape Verde	X(A)	Signed: 28 June 2005	Signed: 28 June 2005
Djibouti	X(A)	Signed: 27 May 2010	Signed: 27 May 2010
Equatorial Guinea	X	Approved: 13 June 1986	
Eritrea			
Guinea	X(A)	Signed: 13 December 2011	Signed: 13 December 2011
Guinea-Bissau	X(A)	Approved: 06 March 2012	Approved: 06 March 2012
Liberia			
Micronesia, Federated States of			
São Tome and Principe			
Somalia			
Timor-Leste	X(A)	Signed: 06 October 2009	Signed: 06 October 2009
Vanuatu	X(A)	Approved: 08 September 2009	Approved: 08 September 2009

General Note:

- 'X' in the 'SQP' (small quantities protocol) column indicates that the State has an SQP. 'X(A)' indicates that the SQP is based on the revised SQP standardized text (see Section B, paragraph 7). In both cases the SQP will come into force at the same time as the safeguards agreement.

Table 4 – States with INFCIRC/66/Rev.2-type agreements

State	INFCIRC	Additional protocol
India	211	Signed: 15 May 2009
	260	
	360	
	374	
	433	
	754	
Israel	249/Add.1	
Pakistan	34	
	116	
	135	
	239	
	248	
	393	
	418	
	705	
	816	

Table 5 – States with voluntary offer agreements

State	INFCIRC	Additional protocol
China	369	In force: 28 March 2002
France ⁽¹⁾	290	In force: 30 April 2004
Russian Federation	327	In force: 16 October 2007
United Kingdom ^{(2), (3)}	263	In force: 30 April 2004
United States of America ⁽⁴⁾	288	In force: 06 January 2009
Footnotes:		
<p>(1) The Safeguards Agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/718 between France, the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the Agency is pursuant to Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. There is a small quantities protocol to this agreement. No additional protocol to that agreement has been concluded.</p> <p>(2) The Safeguards Agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/175, which remains in force, is an INFCIRC/66/Rev.2-type safeguards agreement, concluded between the United Kingdom and the Agency.</p> <p>(3) The Safeguards Agreement between the United Kingdom, Euratom and the Agency pursuant to Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco was signed but has not entered into force. There is a small quantities protocol to this agreement. No additional protocol to that agreement has been concluded.</p> <p>(4) The Safeguards Agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/366 between the United States of America and the Agency is pursuant to Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. There is a small quantities protocol to this agreement. No additional protocol to that agreement has been concluded.</p>		