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Safeguards Implementation Report 2014 Presented to Board of Governors

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IAEA Board of Governors meeting

The June meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors discussed several key developments and reports including the Safeguards Implementation Report for 2014. (Photo: D.Calma/IAEA)

Last year the IAEA verified 1,267 nuclear facilities and other locations under 181 safeguards agreements the Agency has in place with States. IAEA inspectors carried out 2,732 inspections on site, up by 7.5% from the year before. These were among the headline numbers of the 2014 Safeguards Implementation Report the IAEA Secretariat presented to the Agency’s Board of Governors today.

The document includes the safeguards findings and conclusions for all States in which the IAEA has implemented nuclear safeguards over the last year. The Report highlights a number of important developments, including the entry into force of additional protocols with India and St Kitts and Nevis, bringing the total number of additional protocols in force to 124 as of the end of 2014. 

Almost 1,000,000 nuclear balance reports were verified through more than 2,700 in-field inspections over almost 13,000 working days.

Key findings

For 65 of the 118 States with both comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force in 2014, the IAEA found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and no indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities. For the other 53 States, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities, while evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities remained ongoing.

In 2014, the IAEA verified 1,267 nuclear facilities and other locations under 181 safeguards agreements the Agency has in place with States.

For the 54 States with comprehensive safeguards agreements, but no additional protocols in force, the IAEA found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities.

It is only in countries with both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force that the IAEA has sufficient information and access to provide credible assurances to the international community of both the non-diversion of nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

In 2014, twelve non-nuclear-weapon States that are party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency as required by Article III of that Treaty. For these States, the IAEA could not draw any safeguards conclusions.

The Safeguards Implementation Report also noted that three States that were not party to the NPT had item-specific safeguards agreements in force, requiring the application of safeguards to nuclear material, facilities and other items specified in the relevant safeguards agreement. For these States, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of nuclear material or of the misuse of the facilities or other items to which safeguards had been applied.

Safeguards were implemented with regard to declared nuclear material in selected facilities in all five nuclear-weapon States under the NPT, which have voluntary offer agreements and additional protocols in force, concluding that nuclear material in these facilities remained in peaceful use or had been withdrawn from safeguards as provided for in the agreements. A voluntary offer agreement is an agreement concluded between the IAEA and an NPT nuclear weapon State covering some or all of their peaceful nuclear activities. The State may allow the IAEA to apply safeguards to some or all its nuclear material and/or facilities in its nuclear fuel cycle.

What are Safeguards?

Safeguards are a set of technical measures by which the IAEA seeks to verify that a state is living up to its international undertakings not to use peaceful nuclear programmes for weapons purposes. Under the NPT, non-nuclear-weapon states are required to sign a "contract" with the IAEA. This contract is called a comprehensive safeguards agreement that obliges states not to use nuclear material to make weapons or other explosive devices. This agreement can be further strengthened through an additional protocol. Countries with a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force have to declare all nuclear material and facilities to the IAEA. The IAEA then independently verifies these declarations. 

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