(The parts of the text in brackets were omitted in the oral delivery)
I much appreciate the opportunity to address the members of two Austrian societies which focus on international affairs and international organizations. In today's global village all are affected by decisions and events, however far away, and we need widespread knowledge and broad debate about international issues.
The main part of my comments relates to UN reform but I shall also focus on some points relating to sustainable development and nuclear arms control and disarmament.
UN Reform
Recent discussion about the UN system has often centered on alleged inefficiency and on the composition of the Security Council. Both questions may, indeed, call for reform but they tend somewhat to obscure other vital issues. They may also lead us to forget that much change has taken place recently and over the years.
The world in which we live today is vastly different from the world which existed at the end of the Second World War when the United Nations was established. It may be recalled that the Statute of the International Court of Justice directs this principal organ of the United Nations to apply inter alia "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations". The expression used reflects the relatively small world before the elimination of colonialism. At the first General Assembly session which I attended - as a student - that of 1950, there were less than 60 Member States. Today there are 185. In the colonialist time there were "civilized" States and territories which were under their rule. No longer. But today reference is sometimes made to a few units deemed outside the global community - to "rogue States", signifying States engaged in terrorism or other internationally unacceptable activities and to "failed States", signifying entities where the State organization has collapsed for some period of time, as in Cambodia and Somalia.
Today we do not talk of the laws of "civilized nations". Encouragingly we have begun rather to identify the criteria of a "civilized world". It is a world of human rights for all, and a world in which everybody's need of health, food, freedom and protection is recognized. Nevertheless, despite the universalization of many rules and values States are not disappearing. Indeed, the individual States remain the most important building blocks of the new world despite the globalization of markets, the global electronic environment and the indivisibility of the atmosphere and the high seas. How to organize States for joint action and for stable peaceful relations remain central questions for the UN system and similar challenges exist at the regional level. In a community of States comprising large numbers of mini-States alongside superpowers, the use of simple majority votes based on the rule "one State one vote" is problematic. In the European Union there is already a system in which the larger States have more votes than the smaller ones and further reform is expected. Large, populous, powerful States will not accept being outvoted by a majority consisting of mini-States. The United Nations is still facing this problem.
Giving five States permanent seats and a veto in the Security Council was one way of recognizing their special weight as victors of the Second World War and as dominant military powers. Today economic power may be as relevant as military power. It is an interesting reflection of that reality that Germany and Japan are the two States most frequently indicated as needed in the Council in order to give it greater power. However, such a simple enlargement will hardly respond to today's needs. Some will point to the increasing economic and political weight of States like India and Brazil. Others will ask whether a rapidly integrating Europe aspiring to a common foreign policy, including security policy, should really speak with three voices in the Security Council. Others still will want to make a limitation of the scope of the veto power a condition of any reform.
Although the world is certainly not ready for a reform introducing weighted voting in the General Assembly, the current rule clearly confines the Assembly to being a world tribune where all States can voice their aspirations and concerns and where some fundamental global consensus-based policies and norms are proclaimed. Majority votes do not carry much weight. It should be noted, however, that in the absence of weighted voting, a reform presented as procedural a few years ago - but in reality structural - requires that the budget of the organization must pass through a special committee in which consensus is required. Thus, in reality, an important financial veto has been introduced designed to protect the larger contributors.
It should also be noted that the big financial flows at the level of governments do not go through the United Nations but through organizations which have limited membership and voting rights based on financial contributions: the World Bank and the IMF.
We should perhaps further recognize, not least at this juncture, that another institution in which the big and strong act alone - the G-7, now with Russia growing into G-8 - is acquiring permanence and a standing apparatus for the preparation of a variety of issues, e.g. nuclear material trafficking, non-proliferation and nuclear power safety, to mention only a few which I have reason to observe. While the results of the summits are made highly visible, the preparations are not. One may have different views on how attractive a kind of "world directorate" is from the standpoint of the global community. However, in the absence so far of any UN organ in which the eight and other States participate in a way that takes cognizance of their different size, weight, contributions and responsibilities, it is almost inevitable that organs like the G-8 develop.
How well the composition and voting rules of international organs reflect the membership and their various interests is by no means an academic issue. It directly impacts on the roles these organs are allowed to play. However, one should have no illusions that attaining better "representativity" in such organs, e.g. by the adoption of weighted voting, will be easy. The European Union discussion today is an illustration of what I have said. I could also mention that only last week the Board of Governors of the IAEA devoted many hours of discussion - without agreement - on a reform to make the Board more representative - through enlargement. This is the easiest way. Regrettably, it is almost inevitable that where better "representativity" is attained simply by enlargement, effectiveness will suffer.
Let me now turn to the broader question of the UN and security - reserving the questions of nuclear disarmament to the last part of my address.
Today - some years after the end of the Cold War, the dismantlement of the Soviet bloc and the end of the division of the world on ideological lines - the security issues facing the United Nations are drastically different from those the organization faced earlier. Many international and internal conflicts vanished or subsided when the East-West competition disappeared, e.g. in Central America and Angola.
Many students of international affairs now believe that armed conflicts between great powers and blocs are a thing of the past and that future armed contests will be either domestic, local or regional. For the UN this would - and already does - raise several important questions. The UN has come a long way to flexibly interpret the Art. 2:7 charter ban on intervention in the internal affairs of a State where there is no clear threat to international peace and security. The Somalia action was a case in point. Nevertheless, or precisely for this reason, difficult policy questions remain as to when and how such interventions should be made.
World public opinion, moved by instant and ever present media reports, is likely to demand UN intervention, for instance to stop an ongoing genocide or other large-scale brutality or to bring order after the collapse of government structures. In such cases the UN and its overburdened Security Council must carefully consider, however, whether an intervention might risk leading the UN into a long-term engagement. It may be more difficult to get out than in. How the costs of an international action - of uncertain duration - are to be covered must also be determined. Not long ago we have witnessed how a practically bankrupt UN has been unable to pay poor countries, like Nepal, Jordan and Tunisia, for troops they have contributed to various peace-keeping operations. In effect, these countries have helped to cover the deficit of the organization.
Some trends and some reform ideas can be identified in the security field. First, it seems likely that there will be a greater reliance on regional organizations, like the Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe, perhaps in co-operation with NATO, or the Organization of African Unity. However, such solutions are currently not available for conflicts in the Middle East or Asia.
Second, it seems likely that some professional military units will be kept by various States on a stand-by basis to be made available on agreement with the Security Council. I stress "professional". It is hardly thinkable that conscript soldiers would be used for international armed action. Nor is it likely at the present time that there would be agreement on a standing UN commanded force.
Third, it seems likely that the Security Council may need military advice from some professional organ.
Fourth, there will be great reluctance to mount a UN force for large-scale armed enforcement. In Iraq-type cases, the Security Council may be more likely to legitimize actions by individual States, or groups of States.
If global detente continues one might hope, of course, that there will not be many cases like the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait. An encouraging fact is that the number of unresolved territorial claims seems to diminish. Among the remaining ones perhaps the most important is the one relating to Kashmir. Many others concern islands, e.g. in the South China Sea and in the Persian Gulf. It would be gratifying if the UN could induce the parties to such conflicts to resort to judicial settlement, where they fail to negotiate solutions. An example of a successful use of judicial settlement of an island dispute was the judgement of the International Court of Justice a few decades ago in the Channel Islands case between the UK and France.
Lastly, a cautionary word about so-called preventive action. It is, of course, better - and cheaper - to prevent conflict than to stop it. Regrettably, experience tells us that governments are reluctant to move before the house is on fire. The ambition to prevent conflicts should at least lead the UN to provide the Secretary-General and the Security Council with more assistance at the level of fact finding and analysis - to give them a better basis for quiet diplomacy.
One conspicuous change in the UN system is the increasing attention devoted to what used to be called "soft issues" as contrasted to the "hard" security issues. I have in mind development, human rights, environment, drugs, criminality. This change has not coincided with the end of the Cold War but has come gradually. Perhaps it has become more visible as the issues of global confrontation have subsided.
It is of course justified to observe that some of the "soft issues" are also responded to by "soft law and soft action". Human rights solemnly proclaimed by the UN are often violated in the most flagrant manner. Yet, it seems to me that the proclamation of these rights and their pursuit in established UN bodies and by established UN institutions, even where redress and respect is not secured, amount to a desirable assertion of the values of a nascent "civilized world". An attitude of resignation and silence in the face of foreseeable stonewalling and impossible enforcement seems to me worse than a verbal persistence with little hope of success.
[One remarkable change that we can notice is the now widespread use of international observers of national elections. It was not that long ago that Costa Rica was almost alone to invite such observers. Clearly, free elections and democracy - if not necessarily the Westminster type - are among the values demanded by the new "civilized" world. Again such demand - even when not likely to be heeded - is better than no demand.]
There is no doubt that non-governmental organizations have played - and continue to play - a very important and sometimes successful role in urging respect for rights of various kinds - civil rights, rights of women, protection of children, etc. They also provide very substantial humanitarian assistance and are very active in the field of disarmament and environment. An organization like Amnesty International which, as far as I know, seeks to base its reports on extensive fact finding and seeks to be impartial, has gained credibility and may, indeed, even be less subject to constraints than an official UN body. Groups like Pugwash have sometimes been helpful in bringing expert scientific advice to disarmament talks. Humanitarian organizations often alert and urge governments and intergovernmental organs to provide help to reduce suffering or promoting development.
Another feature is the increasingly active role of the community of NGOs - or the "civil society" as it is now collectively labelled - at big UN conferences. They now almost routinely have "parallel" NGO conferences. To the general praise of these developments I should like to add a few words of caution. First, most of the NGOs are much less universal in composition than the UN organs and it may be hard to assess how large and global an opinion they represent. Second, NGO demands are often not just one mile - but a hundred miles - ahead of what is politically possible to attain. This may reduce the relevance of their advice. Thirdly, as public pressure groups, they are a legitimate element in the process of policy formation. It does not follow, however, that they should participate directly in inter-governmental deliberations. It would be as if the Red Cross or Greenpeace were invited to address parliament on issues of interest to them. A separation between lobby and council room may still be wise.
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Let me now dwell on the issue of efficiency in the UN system. There has been criticism of the "bloated bureaucracy" of the UN. Generally this criticism is directed at the Secretariat rather than the bodies which are formed by government representatives. [This criticism, I think, has several roots - apart from the inefficiency to which it is directed.
You will recall that there was a great UN euphoria after the Gulf War. Aggression had been resolutely repelled under decisions by a Security Council which at long last functioned as originally foreseen in the Charter. There was talk of a new international order. The unanimities which became possible in the Council after the end of the Cold War did, indeed, result in lots of new peace-keeping operations. However, in conflicts where vital political and/or economic interests of the Western industrialized States were not perceived to be threatened as they had been in the case of the Gulf War, the operations mounted by the UN were sometimes half-hearted and, as a result, in the cases of Somalia and the earlier phases of Yugoslavia, failures. These experiences gave rise to disappointment, disillusion and criticism of UN effectiveness and efficiency. Although they should have prompted some soul-searching in capitals as to when and where the UN should be used as an instrument for collective action, they only too often led simply to criticism of the UN.. Another example was the criticism of the IAEA for not discovering the clandestine enrichment programme in Iraq. This failure was chiefly due to the limitations which member governments had set for the safeguards system - not much to the way the system was operated. Fortunately, many of the limitations have now been removed.]
Several matters are directly relevant for the efficiency - or inefficiency - of UN organizations. Like national governments these organizations lack the simple criterion of profit which is evidence of some efficiency in a competitive business environment. As substitutes we have to make do with surveillance and evaluation of how well resources have been spent. In the IAEA this is systematically done.
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The quality of the staff engaged in the operation of international organizations - whether on the Secretariat or government side - is fundamental for the efficient operation of the organizations. Member governments run UN organizations through their accredited representatives and delegates - with the assistance of the Secretariats. Incompetent staff on either side reduces efficiency. On the Secretariat side several factors influence quality. One is pay. [Although many competent professionals may be attracted to the idea of working for the good of the world, moving from a home country may have several drawbacks: children being uprooted from their schools, a spouse being obliged to leave a job, etc. The pay has to be attractive to outweigh such drawbacks. Regrettably the pay of professional staff in the UN system has gradually deteriorated and is considerably lower than in the OECD, the EU or the Bretton Woods institutions.]
Another factor influencing staff competence is the freedom of the management to select the best available candidates. While the active search by governments for candidates is welcome as assistance, governmental pressure for the selection of their candidates - without knowledge about other candidates - is less helpful. Today, advertising posts on our Internet home page gives many the opportunity to apply. This is welcome, but the work of sifting the resulting large number of well and not so well qualified candidates is often heavy.
It is evident that a multinational workforce is needed in the Secretariats of UN organizations to give them a capacity to understand and grapple with problems involving many States. Recruitment must be on a broad geographical basis. Yet, obliging management to respect some quota system is, in my view, unwise and will almost inevitably lead to less than optimal recruitment. The same applies to setting quotas for the recruitment of women. Better training around the world and more female emancipation has already led to an improved international and gender mix and it will gradually further improve this mix.
[A special feature that has been of great value in the IAEA is the principle of rotation of staff. Traditional UN staffing policy was based on the idea of an international civil service made incorruptible and loyal to the organization by life-long employment. However, this has led not so rarely to mediocre staff remaining on posts for long times. The IAEA fortunately adopted the policy of severely limiting the number of permanent contracts. To get a continuous inflow of fresh talent from the world of nuclear science and engineering the Agency gave time fixed contracts and in exceptional cases long-term contracts after five to seven years service. This policy has served and continues to serve the Agency well. Over 40% of the professional staff are, in fact, long-term and these institutional memories are needed. However, the rotation of the remaining staff does help to recruit fresh talent and also yields the advantage that national institutions back home get professionals back who know how their countries can make best use of the IAEA.]
I cannot leave the question of efficiency in international organizations without mentioning a few further points:
First, the cost of translation of documents and interpretation of meetings is fairly large. In my view it should be possible to avoid some of this expense. [When it is possible to hold sensitive political talks between delegations in English and even to draft texts in English, it should be possible to limit the number of organized meetings and documents which have to be carried out in all official languages. Some delegations will invariably complain that this will handicap them by forcing them to work in a language not their own. My heart does not bleed for this argument. The fact is that most of us have to work in a language not our own all the time.]
The second point is this: most governments are faced with budget deficits at home and are eager to cut public expenses, including contributions to international organizations. Accordingly, they rarely forget to examine even the smallest projects and expenses. However, they sometimes seem unaware of the possibility to avoid large expenses by more radical organizational approaches. Within the EU the concept of "subsidiarity" is nowadays central. We should avoid asking international organizations to do what governments can do individually and what can be left to the private sector. We should also avoid duplication of work amongst international organizations - whether UN or others.
[Let me mention three concrete cases in which the IAEA experience suggests to me that a different macro-organizational approach could have saved much money. First, Euratom is operating an excellent nuclear inspection system with somewhat broader functions than that of the IAEA safeguards system. It existed already before the IAEA safeguards system was created and it is not likely to be abandoned soon. Yet, I am sure the world at large would be perfectly content with having only the IAEA verifying that non-proliferation commitments are respected by Euratom members. In essence the tax payers of the European Union are paying twice for nuclear inspection to assure the world that the Member States of the Union are not clandestinely diverting nuclear material for weapons.
Second, two years ago, the IAEA Secretariat calculated that if the secretarial function of the CTBTO had been placed on the IAEA rather than on a new, separate organization, some $8 million could have been saved. This was not done. The IAEA will extend all possible co-operation to the new CTBTO Secretariat by providing some services and this will hopefully bring some savings.
A third case: the small Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD has rendered and still renders excellent service, but it operates in areas which could be handled by the IAEA. Also its membership and clients begin to look more and more global. I am sure that moving its work one day to the IAEA could save money and would not bring many disadvantages.]
Let me lastly make a point that is more general. It relates to the siting of international organizations. There is a somewhat unfortunate inclination in the world to look at headquarters and offices of international organizations as a kind of adornment - an exotic feather in a national cap. I think the tax payers around the world should take a more prosaic and functional view. Headquarters should be placed where communications are good, where there are many foreign embassies/missions which can continuously follow and participate in the organizations' work. They should also offer good living conditions in order to be attractive to staff. In my view Vienna responds very well to these criteria.
Sustainable Development
Next week the General Assembly of the United Nations meets in special session - five years after the Rio Conference on Environment and Development. It will focus on "sustainable development". This concept, coined by the Brundtland Commission, denotes the idea that we must pursue economic and social development in ways which do not diminish the opportunity for succeeding generations to enjoy welfare and pursue development. We must not plunder and poison the earth for our own benefit leaving it barren and toxic to our offspring. Although some of the early shrill tones of, say, the Club of Rome about our rapid depletion of finite resources have subsided somewhat, the demands for less wasting of resources, for more recycling and for greater care about fragile environments are still full of meaning.
It was said recently by someone that for thousands of years the peoples on our planet tried to destroy each other, but they are now joining hands to destroy the planet.
The resource and environmental problems would be more manageable if we were not so numerous. Impeding nuclear proliferation has been a surprisingly successful enterprise. Restraining human proliferation is by no means a success story yet. It has been calculated that at the time of Christ there were about 350 million people on the planet. By the year 1900 there were 1.5 billion; in 1990 there were 5 billion and in the year 2000 we shall be around 6 billion. Thus in the last ten years of this century we increase by almost as much as we did in the first 1900 years after the birth of Christ. It is true that the prognosis has been adjusted downward in the last decade, but it will take much more effort, much education, much enlightenment and considerable time to turn this trend around. The "standing room only" world is not an attractive perspective. In my view, we should aim at decreasing the global population, just as already some advanced countries now expect their populations to decrease. However, before we ever get fewer we shall be many more and this will strain our resources of fresh water, food and energy.
Let me point to how some nuclear techniques can be of some help in this awesome perspective. Food production can be increased by the application of many nuclear techniques: the development of more productive strains of plants and more saline resistant plants can be brought about through mutations provoked by the irradiation of seeds; the application of the optimal amount of fertilizer can be achieved through measurements using radioisotope tracers; some insect pests, like the tse tse fly, can be eradicated through the so-called sterile insect technique, which involves radiation; and the irradiation of foodstuffs can prolong shelf life and help prevent spoilage.
Fresh water resources can be mapped and measured by using radioisotopes as tracers; water sludge can be disinfected by radiation; and salt water can be desalinized by using heat from nuclear power.
Globally the vision of sustainable development will require much more energy. Yet, we must note that pollution, destruction of land and the risk of climate change has much to do with our excessive burning of fossil fuels and the ways in which we burn these fuels. The emissions of sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides from the burning of coal and oil lead to acid rains, dying forests and lakes. Technical means do exist to cut these emissions by 90% or more - but it adds substantially to the cost of the energy generated. In many technologically advanced countries, "scrubbers" and other devices are increasingly used in electricity generation to reduce pollution from coal and oil. Modern cars have catalyzers in industrialized States. In most developing countries this is not yet the case. The most difficult problem caused by our current level of use of coal, oil and gas, however, is the increasing rate of carbon dioxide which it yields in the atmosphere. There is no viable means in sight to reduce these emissions which result from the burning of the fuels. So what shall we do?
There is a certain tendency in the Western industrialized world to consider our guilt in bringing all this destruction and dangers as a reason for turning our backs on science and technology - for turning to bicycles, windmills and "bioproducts" cultivated without fertilizers and insecticides. Understandable as this reaction is and possible as it is to reduce the volumes of fertilizers and insecticides, we should focus on effective, rational and meaningful measures. People who live in opulence in rich countries can perhaps allow themselves to preach zero growth policies or a reduced use of electricity. People in poor countries and many poor people in rich countries will not do that. It is particularly ill advised to go against an increased reliance on electricity as this, by all experience, leads to a more efficient use of energy. We should have more electric trains, trams, trolley buses and subways and less diesel trucks thundering across our continents, less aeroplanes and cars on medium distance routes.
An important question - and one intensely studied in the IAEA - is how all the electricity that the world needs is to be generated. Most of it is now by the burning of coal and oil. 17% is by hydro and almost the same is by nuclear power. There is not the slightest doubt that electricity use will increase, especially in the developing world. China uses today 1000 kWh per person and year; Japan 7500; Sweden 15 000. In China electricity has had an average increase of 10%/year over the last 10 years and the future demand looks set to expand at the rate of 16 GW/year, which corresponds to 16 power plants of 1000 MW, i.e. plants a bit larger than the Austrian plant at Dürnrohr which compensated for Zwentendorf. Like this Austrian plant many - probably most - of the Chinese plants will be coal fired. Indeed, all over the world new coal fired and gas fired and some oil fired plants are going up to generate more electricity. How does this square with the need to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide which is the most important of the greenhouse gases?
The answer is that it does not square at all. At the Rio Conference five years ago, a target was set for industrialized countries to get back to the 1990 level of CO2 emissions by the year 2000. The reality is that these emissions are going up everywhere, except perhaps in the former Soviet areas because of the current economic slump. Rhetoric and the reality are going in opposite directions. The advice we get from those who consider themselves the most concerned guardians of the environment is threefold: (i) increase energy efficiency; (ii) use more modern renewable sources (solar, wind and biomass); and (iii) use modern technical means to reduce emissions and pollution from fossil fuels. While this advice is well meant, it is, in my view, inadequate. To generate 1000 MW electricity - the large plant I spoke of a moment ago - you would need some 50-60 km2 of solar cells or the same area of wind farms. Even so you do not always have the power, because the sun is not shining and the wind not blowing all the time. To grow biomass enough to fire a 1000 MW plant you would need an area of 3000-5000 km2. At present the commercial renewable sources yield some 2% of the world's commercial energy, a tiny amount of it in the form of electricity. Even though the renewable sources improve in efficiency and cost and do have their special niches of use, they are not likely to reduce our growing fossil fuel addiction.
To wave the nuclear power flag in front of an Austrian audience, which has been kind to come and listen to me, is perhaps discourteous. However, I would be less than honest if I were not to tell you that if the some 430 nuclear power plants in the world were to be closed and the electricity they produce were to be generated by coal, there would be an increase of some 9% in the emissions of CO2 coming from fossil fuels. Hence, the question of growth or death of nuclear power is not insignificant for the issue of global warming.
[Other numbers which may illustrate the relevance of nuclear power use are those which compare emissions of CO2 per kWh generated in different countries. For instance, in the UK, where about 50% of electricity was generated by coal in 1994, emissions of CO2 per kWh was about 519 g. In France, where about 75% of the electricity was generated by nuclear the same year, the CO2 emissions per kWh were about one tenth of the UK value, or 50 g. In Austria, with a good deal of hydro power and the rest thermal, the figure was 181 g per kWh.]
I shall not tire you with more figures, nor do I submit to you that nuclear power is a panacea for the problem of CO2 and the risk of global warming. What I do know is that it could be a significant part of the response and that if it is phased out, it will not be replaced by wind or solar power or biomass but by the burning of more fossil fuels. The ambition in the IAEA is not to persuade anybody to use nuclear power - energy decisions are the prerogative of sovereign governments. The ambition is rather to help strengthen further and on a global basis the safe operation of nuclear plants, the safe disposal of nuclear waste and to help prevent nuclear proliferation. There are today in force or in final drafting conventions and standards which form a comprehensive international legal infrastructure for nuclear activities. And there are available international services through which any State conducting such activities can obtain top level international advice and assistance. Much use is made of such services - not least in Russia and the former Soviet bloc.
Nuclear Disarmament
I come now to my third and last subject - nuclear disarmament. During the Cuban missile crisis, the United States and the Soviet Union were facing the possibility of a nuclear duel leading to MAD - mutually assured destruction. The experience reinforced the conclusion that nuclear wars cannot be won and must not be fought. With the end of the Cold War and developing detente this conclusion seems to be leading to an arms race in reverse. I shall come back to that in a moment.
Long before the nuclear superpowers had concluded that they could not use nuclear weapons against each other, they had concluded that the world would be an even more dangerous place if there were many nuclear-weapon States with fingers on the nuclear trigger. Superpower support for non-proliferation has been one reason why the policy - and regime - of non-proliferation has been so successful, that the declared nuclear-weapon States have remained at five and that the States with significant nuclear capabilities outside the non-proliferation treaties - the so-called "threshold" States - are only three.
But many other factors and efforts have contributed. The first barrier against proliferation lies in foreign policies which seek to remove security incentives for a State to acquire nuclear weapons. This may be achieved through detente or through alliances in which members may have their security protected by the nuclear umbrella of nuclear-weapon State members. Some States, like Sweden, have concluded that it was more dangerous to have nuclear weapons than not to have them. Most developing countries still do not have the technological capacity to develop nuclear weapons and those States who do have that capacity - the technology holders - have taken steps to prevent export of relevant technologies.
However, the confidence that States continue to fulfil their declared formal commitments not to develop nuclear weapons status - whether such commitments are made under the NPT or a nuclear weapon free zone treaty - is crucial to security - or at least governments' perception of security. Therefore, on site inspection has been demanded by most exporting countries since the exporting of nuclear technology began. It has fallen to the IAEA to perform these inspections worldwide on the basis of agreements concluded by the inspected States. Israel, India and Pakistan have not been willing to make non-proliferation commitments and to submit all their nuclear installations to IAEA verification. This led to their being denied further nuclear exports from most technology holders. This is still so.
The development of the IAEA safeguards verification system was a pioneering effort. It is not surprising that some 25 years ago States insisted upon various limitations on these inspections. The system established and developed was, in effect, geared to discover any diversions of nuclear material from declared nuclear installations and it was well designed and operated to achieve this. With the discovery after the Gulf War that Iraq was clandestinely developing a capacity to enrich uranium and to make weapons, it was realized that the IAEA would have to be given the task of verifying also that there are no hidden nuclear activities and that all materials and facilities that should have been declared are, indeed, declared.
This, clearly, is a much more difficult task. Even if permitted, sending inspectors to look at random in large countries is neither practical nor effective. However, since 1991 the Agency - both the Board of Governors and the Secretariat - have worked hard to give the safeguards system more teeth - a much greater chance to discover possible secret activities. The principal methods are access to more information and greater physical access to sites where nuclear related activities are or may be pursued. New advanced techniques, like satellite photography and analysis of environmental samples are also of great importance. They are powerful new tools of verification. A few weeks ago the Board of Governors of the IAEA approved a model protocol which States with NPT-type safeguards will be asked to accept to give the Agency additional inspection rights and to assume the obligation to provide the Agency with much more information. It will take some years before the strengthened system is fully and generally operative, but it will happen.
Will this system be 100% tamper-proof? No, but a State may think twice before cheating, because the risk of discovery or at least suspicions arising will be considerable. Hence the system's deterrent effect may increase. A State determined to develop a nuclear weapon might prefer to denounce its adherence to NPT - and this might give time for political and diplomatic action.
One must be aware, however that the safeguards verification system, strengthened as it is, still has limitations. Like a radar scanning the horizon and it can tell us that here and now there is no sign of diversion of nuclear material. Just as a doctor cannot really give a patient "a clean bill of health" - only conclude after examination that there is no sign of illness, so the safeguards system can only conclude that there is no sign of nuclear diversion. The confidence which these conclusions inspire is directly related to the comprehensiveness and effectiveness of the examination. It would be possible to make an even more fine-meshed system, but it would be expensive and so intrusive that States would not voluntarily accept it. The kind of inspection that the IAEA performs in Iraq cannot be extended to the rest of the world. It may well be, however, that if inspection systems were to be designed for possible future nuclear weapon free zones in the Middle East, on the Indian subcontinent or on the Korean peninsula, they will need to be even more far-reaching than the system which we have now developed for NPT.
It should be noted that the IAEA is not a police force, but rather an international watchdog. We inspect and if we are denied inspection rights or discover irregularities we report to the Security Council. That is where the executive enforcement power of the UN is vested. The Council has declared that it would view the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in violation of commitments as a threat to the peace.
The heading of this part of my address is "nuclear disarmament" and I must admit that, to be precise, non-proliferation is arms control rather than disarmament. However, with the development of detente there is now a growing race toward nuclear disarmament. The US and Russia are dismantling nuclear weapons at such a pace that management and storage of the freed plutonium and highly enriched uranium pose problems. In this context, in September last year, I reached an agreement with the Russian Minister of Atomic Energy and the US Secretary of Energy on discussions as to how the IAEA could verify that nuclear material that is transferred out of the defence sector in the US and Russia does not go back into nuclear weapons. Several rounds of talks have already taken place. Such a verification function for the Agency raises many new technical, political and legal questions. The challenge is great but in one sense less difficult than the one that the IAEA faces in non-nuclear-weapon States. The task is not to verify a nuclear-weapon-free status - only to verify that declared quantities of nuclear material remain out of the military sector from which they have been removed, or that they are burnt up to generate electricity or otherwise rendered harmless. Even so the task embarked upon aims at bringing about the first international verification of nuclear disarmament.
It will take some years before the nuclear-weapon States will decide to reduce their stocks to zero. They and the world community and the IAEA have time to consider how verification can be developed to give confidence that the nuclear weapon arsenals of the US and Russia have been eliminated and that no nuclear-weapon State has, by chance, forgotten a few bombs somewhere.