In 1995 it will be fifty years since the founding of the United Nations and twenty five years since the Non-Proliferation Treaty entered into force. For the International Atomic Energy Agency these anniversaries provide occasions to review its role in the UN system and under the NPT and to identify new needs and challenges.
Although it is an independent intergovernmental organization, now with 121 members, the Agency s Statute enjoins it to conduct its activities in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, and the Agency looks to the UN for policy guidance in the fields of arms control and disarmament and development and in acute political issues relevant to the UN family of organizations.
It is striking that the first resolution ever adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1946 dealt with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy . Already at that time, the tasks ahead were identified as the elimination of nuclear weapons and control of atomic energy to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes. Also mentioned - at that early stage - was the need for effective safeguards through inspection and for exchange of scientific information.
Despite the constraints of the Cold War, the IAEA was successful in pursuing some of the aims expressed in this resolution and in the subsequently proclaimed policy of Atoms for Peace . The Agency developed the safeguards system and it helped transfer nuclear science and technology relevant to agriculture, medicine, industry and electricity generation.
Since the Chernobyl accident in 1986, a major challenge for the IAEA has been to develop and consolidate international rules and measures relating to nuclear safety and radiation protection into a global nuclear safety regime. And after the discovery of clandestine nuclear activities in Iraq in 1991, another great challenge has been to strengthen the safeguards system so as to reduce the risk that any nuclear activity which should have been declared, remains undetected.
With the end of the Cold War new opportunities for nuclear disarmament and arms control have opened up. As a result there are new expectations and demands on the IAEA in the area of verification. Similarly, the goals of sustainable development and protection of the global environment mean new tasks and challenges for the IAEA. I shall now develop these themes beginning with the issue of non-proliferation.
Non-Proliferation
The seriousness with which the Security Council of the United Nations looks at the question of nuclear proliferation is reflected in the summit declaration of 31 January 1992, where it was squarely stated, inter alia, that
Pointing to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Members of the Council stressed the integral role in the implementation of that Treaty of fully effective safeguards and committed themselves to taking appropriate measures in the case of any violation notified to them by the IAEA.
The Security Council thus made clear that it regards the IAEA as instrumental to the fulfilment of its own task of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the cases of Iraq and the Democratic People s Republic of Korea (DPRK) demonstrated how the Council relies on the IAEA as the nuclear inspection arm of the United Nations system. For its part, the Agency naturally has looked to the Council as the political organ responsible for handling any violations of nuclear arms control agreements. It would be wise to build on this experience in the future. In these days of electronic communications, close and continuous liaison between Vienna and New York is not difficult. Between the Director General of the IAEA and the Secretary-General of the United Nations there is already a secure and direct communications link and if the Security Council so wished I am sure informal briefings by the IAEA by closed circuit television could be arranged.
As the non-proliferation regime moves further towards universality and as nuclear disarmament results in reductions in nuclear arsenals, it becomes increasingly important that commitments made under the NPT and other nuclear-related agreements be fully respected. The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, which will meet in New York next year, will have before it detailed reports from the IAEA about the way in which the Agency is strengthening the safeguards system in order to increase its detection capacity and, thereby, the level of assurance it can give about compliance by States with their international commitments. The Agency is also reporting to the NPT Conference on its activities in support of the transfer of nuclear science and technology for peaceful uses.
I shall now discuss IAEA verification activities in specific areas.
Iraq
Since May 1991, the IAEA has carried out 26 inspection missions in Iraq under the mandate of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). Based on these inspections and the analysis of documents, samples, procurement data and other information, the course of Iraq s clandestine nuclear weapons programme has been thoroughly investigated and charted. As also required by resolution 687, the IAEA has completed the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of Iraq s weapons-useable materials, facilities and equipment. We are confident that, as a result of these activities, no practical capability for the production of nuclear weapons remains in Iraq. Nevertheless the IAEA retains the right to investigate any further aspects of Iraq s former programme if new information should warrant such action.
Concurrently with these mapping and dismantling activities, the IAEA has been phasing in elements of its plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq s compliance with resolutions 687 and 707. All the elements of the IAEA s plan, which was approved by the Security Council in Resolution 715 (1991) and accepted by Iraq, are now in place and a continuing presence of IAEA inspectors in Iraq has been established at the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre (BMVC), with the assistance of the UN Special Commission. Monitoring and verification measures will continue to evolve as technical needs arise and advanced technologies become available.
A mechanism for monitoring future sales and supplies of designated items to Iraq has been jointly developed with the UN Special Commission in consultation with the Security Council s committee on sanctions against Iraq. Once approved by the Council, this mechanism will form an integral part of the ongoing monitoring and verification system.
Implementation of Safeguards in the DPRK
In the DPRK, the IAEA has found evidence suggesting the existence of some nuclear material - plutonium - which has not been reported by the DPRK to the Agency. No progress has been made in the Agency s consequent effort to secure access to additional information and locations, as requested by the Agency in 1993. Further, the problem has been aggravated by the discharge of spent fuel from the 5 megawatt Experimental Nuclear Power Reactor without the appropriate safeguards measures requested by the Agency. Valuable information about the history of the spent fuel was thereby irretrievably lost.
In June 1994 the DPRK withdrew from IAEA membership. However, this does not affect its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and under the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. Although access for certain periodic safeguards verification activities in the declared facilities was denied to the Agency s inspectors during July and August, most of these activities are currently not subject to restrictions and the Agency has been enabled to maintain inspection coverage of the discharged spent fuel at the 5 megawatt reactor on a continuous basis - in keeping, inter alia, with a statement by the President of the Security Council on 30 May this year.
So long as the DPRK is not providing full nuclear transparency through full acceptance of safeguards, it will not be possible to verify the completeness of the nuclear inventory which it declared in 1992. To the extent that effective safeguards on declared installations are accepted by the DPRK, the Agency can verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from these installations.
Safeguards in the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union (NIS)
An important development of the past year was the successful negotiation of comprehensive safeguards agreements with Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union having significant nuclear facilities. NPT-type safeguards agreements have been approved with eight of those States. Ukraine, although not yet an NPT party, has also signed a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency, pledging that all nuclear material under its control will be used only for peaceful purposes.
Safeguards in Latin America
In Latin America, Argentina, Brazil and Chile have ratified the Tlatelolco Treaty for the denuclearization of Latin America and Cuba has recently declared that it intends to adhere to the Treaty. We can therefore expect that the Treaty will soon enter into force and that the IAEA will apply comprehensive safeguards in the entire region.
Safeguards in Africa
South Africa's roll-back from the possession of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon status and its accession to the NPT constitute a major development. The IAEA has carried out a great number of safeguards missions to South Africa under the NPT Safeguards Agreement since October 1991. After thorough investigation the Agency has found no reason to doubt the veracity of South Africa s initial declaration of nuclear material. Full membership rights in the IAEA have now been restored to South Africa.
Another recent positive development in Africa is the declaration by Algeria of its intention to accede to the NPT.
The creation of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone should now be at hand. The IAEA has continued to assist the African States in their efforts towards this end. The text of a treaty for an African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, which has been submitted to the current session of the General Assembly for consideration, entrusts the IAEA with the responsibility for safeguards verification under the treaty.
Safeguards in the Middle East
At the request of its General Conference the IAEA has been engaged in activities to promote the role of safeguards in the Middle East. I have personally pursued consultations with a number of States in the Middle East about the early application of Agency safeguards to all relevant activities in the region. Further, in the context of the Middle East peace negotiations, the Agency has provided expert assistance to the participants in the Multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security. Lastly, the Agency organized in 1993 a workshop for experts from Middle East countries on the modalities for the application of safeguards in the Middle East region. As a follow up, and in the context of the Multilateral Working Group, a visit by representatives of Middle East States was arranged to a nuclear power plant in Western Europe. The purpose of this visit was to demonstrate how regional verification activities can complement international verification efforts. In the coming year I propose to continue my consultations with countries in the Middle East.
Strengthening Safeguards
Following the discovery in Iraq of undeclared nuclear material, installations and activities, considerable efforts have been made in the IAEA to strengthen the Agency's detection capability. Some measures have already been introduced, such as the request for the early provision of design information on nuclear installations and for reporting on the export and import of nuclear material and specified equipment and non-nuclear material over and above the reporting requirements of safeguards agreements. Furthermore, a comprehensive programme to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the safeguards system is being developed for submission to the Board of Governors in March 1995. It is designed to strengthen the Agency s access to information and access to sites for inspection. It will include innovations in detection techniques and technologies such as environmental monitoring as well as recommendations to remove various restrictions imposed by States on inspections. It is paradoxical, for instance, that States which have accepted international inspection in order to demonstrate their openness and compliance with non-proliferation commitments, still demand that inspectors apply for visas before coming!
Safeguards are not a form of intrusion on States sovereignty but rather an opportunity for States to demonstrate their compliance with international obligations. Safeguards are an institutionalized means of nuclear transparency to create confidence.
Let me now briefly describe the IAEA's recent engagement in some verification issues which go beyond our traditional safeguards activities.
Verification of Nuclear Material from Weapons
As a result of the current dismantling of nuclear weapons by the United States and Russia and the ongoing reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel in several countries, substantial quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) are recovered. On the issue of fissionable material from dismantled weapons, President Clinton and President Yeltsin agreed in January 1994 to establish a joint working group to consider, inter alia:
I can report to you that for its part the United States has begun a process for the eventual submission to IAEA inspection of all US fissile material no longer needed for defence purposes. Storage locations for such material have been identified and the legal, technical and financial aspects of safeguards are being considered. A first inspection has already taken place.
Further, there seems to be broad agreement that plutonium and highly enriched uranium from the civilian sector should be stored under conditions of greater transparency, adequate physical security and nuclear safety and with a high degree of assurance against possible diversion for weapons purposes. The Agency can assist in building further on existing measures if requested by the relevant States and if adequate resources are made available.
Cut-Off of Production of Fissionable Material for Weapons Use
Last year the General Assembly adopted, without a vote, a resolution which recommended the negotiation of a verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. Also, the Assembly requested the IAEA "to provide assistance for examination of verification arrangements for such a treaty as required". In compliance with this request I have established a working group within the IAEA Secretariat to examine the verification problem and to prepare background papers which may be of use in the negotiations between States.
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
Negotiations are well under way at the Conference on Disarmament on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Although the scope of the treaty and the modalities for its verification are not yet agreed, a number of States seem to support a significant role for the Agency, having in mind the cost-effectiveness of using an existing organization with relevant experience and infrastructure, and also the mutually reinforcing nature of verifying non-proliferation and CTBT pledges. Violation of a commitment not to test would simultaneously constitute a violation of a non-proliferation commitment to use nuclear material only for peaceful purposes.
Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Material
The recently reported increase in illicit trafficking in nuclear materials is a matter of concern. During the past year the IAEA has recorded many cases which have warranted followup. Fortunately each of these cases has turned out to involve only small quantities of nuclear material, and in no instance does this material appear to have come from a nuclear weapons stockpile. However, the uncontrolled movement of fissionable material involves both radiation and proliferation risks, and it suggests that control and supervision at some installations authorized to possess and use such material are currently inadequate.
These problems have been the subject of much discussion between governments lately and several measures are being taken. A primary condition to prevent trafficking is that institutions handling nuclear material should have adequate systems of accountancy and control and of physical protection. In these regards the IAEA can step up advice and technical assistance - if resources are made available. Further, although activities such as the conduct of police investigations are beyond the IAEA s competence, the Agency could significantly improve its continuous collection, verification and analysis of information obtained from the media and from Member States, to separate fact from fiction and report the real extent of the problem. The IAEA General Conference last month invited me to convene a group of experts designated by Member States and competent international organizations to examine the options available for a strengthened Agency role in that area. This will take place in November and the Board of Governors of the IAEA will take up the issue again in December.
Nuclear Power
I now turn to the IAEA s work on the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, both nuclear power generation of electricity and other applications.
Nuclear power has been stagnating in the Western industrialized countries, partly as a result of a comfortable electricity supply situation in several of these countries, and partly as a result of public opposition - especially after the Chernobyl accident. A major growth area is now in East Asia, where a number of countries are moving ahead with vigorous construction programmes.
As demand for electricity begins to accelerate worldwide, a continued stagnation of nuclear power could be problematic. Ambitious energy saving and the greater use of renewable sources of energy - like solar and wind power and biomass - will not be enough to meet the demand for increased base load electricity which everyone predicts. In some places more hydro power may be developed but generally the easiest way to meet the increased demand dictated by population increase and economic expansion will be through the burning of more fossil fuels - notably coal and gas. However, as this is bound to add to the pollution of the world s atmosphere, such a choice would present policy-makers with a serious dilemma. At a cost, sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides may be removed from flue gases, but governments are committed also to reducing, or at least stabilizing, the level of carbon dioxide emissions in order to try to ward off global warming. In this regard a shift from coal to gas may be welcome as gas gives rise to less carbon dioxide per energy unit produced. However, the current trend is toward a global increase not only in the use of gas but in use of all fossil fuels and consequently a global increase in CO2 emissions.
Although nuclear power is essentially emission-free, and although uranium resources and existing industrial capacity would allow a vast expansion of nuclear generating capacity, it is not suggested that nuclear power, alone, can be the solution to this dilemma. It is very difficult on the other hand to see that there can be a solution to the dilemma without a substantial nuclear component in the world energy mix.
Governments are beginning to grapple with this problem as a part of the implementation of the Framework Convention on Climate Change adopted at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, set up by UNEP and WMO, is examining response scenarios to the threat of global climate change. From these scenarios it can be seen that future energy mixes with a substantial nuclear power component offer a chance for restraining carbon dioxide emissions. It is not surprising, therefore, that the World Energy Council stated in 1993 that there is a need to continue to seek a way of exploiting the immense energy reserves of nuclear power [in a way] which is publicly acceptable across the whole fuel cycle from procurement and processing through disposal.
The obstacles to general public acceptance of nuclear power relate to three major issues: the proliferation risk, safety and waste.
I have already described the proliferation situation, which is moving in a positive direction. With accelerated nuclear disarmament and the prospect of non-proliferation approaching universality, one might hope that the peaceful use of nuclear power may at long last be decoupled in people s minds from the anxiety they have felt about the threat of nuclear weapons.
On safety, governments are not only focussing on the weaknesses of some reactors of Soviet design. They are also making broad efforts to develop an international safety culture. In this regard a major element was completed this year with the conclusion of the International Convention on Nuclear Safety. The Convention covers power reactors and establishes binding general rules, and the implementation of these rules will be promoted by a peer review process. The Convention has already been signed by 47 States. Other elements in the international safety culture are the Paris and Vienna Conventions on liability in the event of a nuclear accident, the IAEA s safety-related audits at individual nuclear plants and agreed International Basic Radiation Safety Standards developed by six organizations, including WHO, ILO and IAEA. I should mention, lastly, that an International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) has been established and adopted by most States operating nuclear power to help define the severity of incidents in an easily understandable way.
Thus, just as safety in the air and safety at sea have long been legitimate international concerns regulated by international instruments, safety in the operation of nuclear power plants the world over is increasingly subject to international rules, guidelines and advice. We know that an accident anywhere can result in radioactive fallout across borders and even when this is not the case, the psychological fall-out is instantaneous - hence the efforts to ensure that nuclear power plants everywhere in the world are operated at a high level of safety. The IAEA is at the centre of the emerging international legal infrastructure surrounding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Agency is also expanding its range of international services designed to strengthen safety. Nevertheless, supervision and enforcement of nuclear safety rules remain the prerogative of national governments.
The results of the intensified work - national and international - on nuclear safety are positive. The number of unplanned stoppages in nuclear power plants is going down generally and the trend is toward lower doses of radiation for workers in nuclear power plants. Nevertheless, probably only years of nuclear operations without serious accidents will reduce the concern of a public which is prepared to accept much less risk in the nuclear area than in many others. To give only one example let me mention that a report of the ILO last April estimating that 3.5 to 5 million persons per year are poisoned by pesticides, of whom 40 000 die, does not appear to have aroused the public.
A third concern affecting public acceptance of nuclear power, relates to nuclear waste. The concern is not only about highly radioactive waste resulting from power plants but even about low- or medium-level radioactive waste, sometimes raising problems for further use of modern nuclear techniques in medicine! It is probable that these concerns will be allayed only when governments and industry have actually established repositories for wastes of different levels of radioactivity. From the scientific and technical standpoint there are no serious obstacles to the building of such repositories, and several countries have done so or are preparing to do so. Nor are there usually any financial problems connected with the disposal of radioactive waste from civilian activities, as these are accustomed to carry the cost of disposal. However, as the selection of disposal sites often meets opposition, a very open dialogue with the public is needed. Experience in several countries shows that this is possible.
Although the disposal of radioactive waste is clearly a local matter, the extremely long periods during which some waste remains active creates a common international interest that radioactive waste anywhere on the planet be responsibly handled. This is also the reason why there is not only an increasing international exchange of experience in this field, but also a development of internationally agreed legal rules and guidelines. We expect that work will soon commence in the IAEA on a binding Convention on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.
Non-Power Applications of Nuclear Energy
So far only a few developing countries have a technological level and infrastructure that would allow them to make use of the present types of nuclear power reactors. For their electricity generation they will have to rely on technologically less demanding solutions, mostly involving the burning of fossil fuels, which in turn will make it desirable that technologically advanced nations make greater use of nuclear power. For the future it may be hoped that simpler-to- operate, smaller and less costly nuclear reactors will become available for wider use by developing countries in the generation of electricity for their fast growing urban centres, and also perhaps in the desalination of water to compensate for scarce fresh water resources. Developing country members of the IAEA are keenly interested in these questions.
Meanwhile the IAEA is intensely and successfully engaged in the transfer of many nonpower nuclear techniques to developing countries. Emphasis is being placed on techniques which will contribute to sustainable development - food production and preservation, the harnessing of fresh water resources, industrial uses and the promotion of human health. Let me give you just a few examples of what the Agency is engaged in.
In the field of food production, the Agency is promoting the use of the so-called sterile insect technique, which relies on the release of large numbers of radiation-sterilized male insects to mate with fertile females, thereby gradually reducing the population of, for instance, tsetse flies and Mediterranean fruit flies. Interest in this technique, which has long been used in North and South America, is now growing in many countries, and the IAEA - together with the FAO - is trying to respond to it.
Still in the field of food production, much use is being made of radiation to induce mutants of crops such as rice, grain and bananas and to create strains which may be more resistant to pests or adverse climatic conditions.
The use of tracer radioisotopes for the mapping of exploitable water resources is another technique promoted by the IAEA s technical co-operation programme, especially in arid and semi-arid areas.
In the field of medicine, the use of radiation is a principal method of combatting cancer, and the IAEA is much involved, inter alia, in the transfer of such techniques and in assisting recipient States in the field of dosimetry to ensure that the radiation doses delivered are appropriate. A very common use of radiation for medical purposes is the sterilization of surgical instruments and of skin grafts and here, too, the Agency is providing assistance.
Concluding Remarks
Let me conclude with some remarks about the prospects for and constraints on the ability of the IAEA to play its full role in meeting the growing demands on the international system.
The United Nations has an overall responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security and for the promotion of development. As the Agenda for Peace and the Agenda for Development show, there is an obvious link between peace and development. Such a link is also at the heart of the mandate of the IAEA, which is to be the nuclear verification arm of the UN system and at the same time an agency for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful development. Both tasks are likely to increase in importance as nuclear disarmament accelerates and as emphasis is placed on sustainable development.
Despite the constraints of the zero-real-growth budgeting over many years, the IAEA has been able to deliver an expanding programme and to respond promptly to new challenges. This is due partly to the strong support - including extrabudgetary support - from Member States and partly to the enthusiasm, dynamism and versatility of the Agency s staff. I would be less than frank, however, if I did not admit that we are now facing serious problems in both respects. While we need to attract the best nuclear specialists in the world to remain on top of the problems referred to us, the pay and conditions of service offered by the United Nations Common System have deteriorated. The loss of competitiveness is creating a recruitment problem for the IAEA and for the Common System. As regards financial resources, a decade of severe budgetary constraint combined with delays in governments payments of contributions is perpetuating the sense of financial crisis.
This problem is of course not unique to the IAEA. But it is clear that for the IAEA a more adequate, timely and predictable resource base is necessary to meet expanding obligations in the area of nuclear verification and to undertake tasks requested to ensure the safe use of nuclear power and the transfer of nuclear technology in support of development. As we approach the fiftieth anniversary of the first, and we trust last, use of nuclear weapons in war, and with at last the prospect of major steps towards reducing and perhaps eliminating nuclear arsenals, it is all the more vital that effective verification mechanisms are in place. It would be deplorable if short-term concerns over resources reduced the opportunity to secure the major advances in the field of nuclear arms control which now seem to exist. Arms control and disarmament undoubtedly yield a peace dividend in terms of reduced military spending. However, disarmament, like development, must be sustainable and reliable verification is indispensible. A small part of the peace dividend must be invested in such verification.
Let me, in closing, record the thanks of the IAEA to the Government of Austria for maintaining its tradition as an excellent host to all the international organizations which are located in Vienna.