That many people in the Pacific Basin should be particularly conscious of the destructive power of nuclear energy is not surprising. In this vast region nuclear weapons - both fission and fusion - have been tested by four of the five nuclear-weapon States from the earliest times until just recently. And in this region two large cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, were devastated nearly 50 years ago by atomic bombs, one with highly enriched uranium, one with plutonium.
Today the outlook is fortunately much brighter. Tens of thousands of nuclear warheads are to be dismantled in a process that has already begun. There are no nuclear weapons tests in the Pacific and there is a realistic hope that a treaty can soon be concluded prohibiting all nuclear explosions. Particularly for the island countries of the Pacific, the recent global ban on the dumping of radioactive waste at sea is also welcome news.
I shall begin by examining the global prospects for ending the threat of nuclear weapons and then discuss what the peaceful uses of nuclear energy can contribute to sustainable development and to an environmentally sounder world.
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS IN PACIFYING THE ATOM
From the inception of the Atoms for Peace policy and the creation in 1956 of the IAEA it has been recognized that exploitation of the benefits of nuclear science and technology must be accompanied by efforts to contain its destructive potential. At one time many countries, including some in this region, maintained policies which held open the nuclear weapons option. Fewer and fewer do so today. The tide is moving towards good use of nuclear energy. Among the declared nuclear-weapon States the discussion today is not about mutually assured destruction but about how we can do away with existing nuclear arsenals and how we can prevent new nuclear weapons from coming into being.
The end of the Cold War has brought with it major initiatives to reduce nuclear arsenals and to contain other weapons of mass destruction. Recent agreements between the United States and Russia will see a radical reduction in the numbers of nuclear weapons held - from over 60 000 to around 3000 each by 2005. Discussion is now focussed on ways to control the fissionable material that this process will release and ways to use it or otherwise dispose of it. The agonizing fears of a nuclear conflagration which existed only a few years ago are fading. However, while the arsenals of the great powers are being drawn down, concern remains about the risk that further States may acquire nuclear weapons capacity and about those States that maintain ambiguity over their nuclear intentions. We must, indeed, recognize with realism the existence of some new threats and deal constructively with them, but we should also note that there has been much progress.
In the 1960s the world was faced with the possibility that a number of States, particularly in the industrialized world, might acquire nuclear capacities. An increase in the number of States with nuclear weapons was deemed - not unreasonably - to increase the risks of nuclear war. To permit the development of nuclear power and commerce while at the same time reducing the risk of weapons proliferation the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty was negotiated and came into force in 1970. For a quarter of a century, that treaty has remained at the heart of international efforts to curb the spread of nuclear weapons to further countries. The NPT and the safeguards verification regime which is linked to it and which is administered by the IAEA on behalf of the world community, were designed to create confidence about the non-proliferation commitments of States which might have been capable in the early 1970s to develop nuclear weapons - i.e. mainly industrialized countries. The security situation of these countries, however, has stabilized over time. Many of them have nuclear protection through alliances or other defence-related arrangements and have reliably discarded the option of acquiring nuclear weapons of their own. Others have concluded that in their particular geopolitical and security situation, it might be more dangerous to possess nuclear weapons than not to have them.
On the other hand, an increasing number of developing countries which did not 25 years ago possess the technological sophistication needed to make nuclear weapons, have come to acquire it and some of them may have perceived security reasons to have such weapons. Our specific experience in one such country, Iraq, demonstrated starkly that a determined proliferator could - with time, money, expertise and a relatively closed political system - evade not only international controls but also scrutiny from a range of national intelligence services in seeking a clandestine nuclear weapons capacity. As a result, foreign policy measures in the security field as well as nuclear related export controls have been strengthened and a broad consensus has emerged to bolster IAEA safeguards to provide confidence that countries are truly adhering to their safeguards undertakings. Our experience with the application of safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has shown the increasing ability of the IAEA safeguards system to detect potential problems. What is now at stake is rather the means for responding to problems which the safeguards system has identified.
While the case of the DPRK raises the most acute and sensitive proliferation question of the moment, several other cases have evolved positively. South Africa, which had developed a nuclear weapons capacity, dismantled six nuclear devices and allowed full international inspection of its nuclear activities. As a result of this development and of Algeria declaring its intention to join the NPT, the African continent may soon be declared a nuclear weapon free zone. In Latin America, Argentina and Brazil have agreed to full-scope safeguards arrangements which will involve verification of their commitment to non-proliferation. When, as expected, Cuba joins the Tlatelolco Treaty - that treaty, designed to keep South America free of nuclear weapons, may be brought fully into operation.
In some of the States of the former Soviet Union, problems still persist but we believe they will become parties to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States. They are progressively concluding agreements with the IAEA to allow international inspection. I am rather confident that this will be true also for Ukraine. Concerns persist that nuclear weapons materials and expertise might leak from the countries of the former Soviet Union and media often report on such events. However, until now the quality and quantity of materials confiscated have not been of proliferation significance - as far as we have been able to ascertain.
The global regime of control of nuclear activities is supported and strengthened by several regional and bilateral arrangements. In addition to the Treaty of Rarotonga, I have mentioned both the Tlatelolco Treaty for Latin America and a treaty in the making that would declare Africa a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The Middle East and South Asia remain the major unresolved areas of concern. In the context of the peace effort for the Middle East we may nevertheless expect proposals for a nuclear-weapon-free zone.
In all the agreements which I have mentioned, global or regional, the IAEA is the arm of the international system entrusted with the task of providing verification of the undertakings to use nuclear technology exclusively for peaceful purposes. At the same time as the safeguards system is being strengthened the use of it for further verification roles in the nuclear area is being weighed in negotiations now taking place. I have in mind the discussions of a ban on the production of weapons-usable fissile material (a so-called “Cut-Off” agreement) and of an agreement to end tests of nuclear weapons (the “Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban”). Given the complementarity of the various systems of nuclear verification there is much to be said for such functions being vested in the IAEA. It would also help limit the costs of international verification which, while clearly worth paying and modest compared to the benefits it brings, are deservedly being watched carefully. At present the regular budget costs of IAEA safeguards are about $US 70 million per year.
The question of the extension of the NPT will be considered next spring. While there were earlier complaints that the nuclear-weapon States had not lived up to their commitments to negotiate nuclear disarmament, that criticism is fading. The recent advances in arms control and disarmament and the achievements of the treaty in the last twenty five years provide a sound foundation for a strong re endorsement and prolongation of the treaty and for a renewed commitment to the continued strengthening of its means of verification.
While describing the efforts which we make to give IAEA safeguards sharper teeth, it must be understood that a political climate of detente - globally and regionally - is fundamental to remove possible incentives to acquire nuclear weapons.
Can we hope to move toward a world free of nuclear weapons? Today these weapons have come to be seen as increasingly obsolescent and irrelevant to the political and security concerns of the 21st century. However, it will still be many years before the declared nuclear-weapon States fully discard their arsenals. It will require an international security system that is far more developed than the rudimentary system that we have in today's United Nations. We should be very pleased nevertheless that today, nearly 50 years after the creation of the United Nations, it appears meaningful to think and speculate about a more effective system of global governance and control of the atom. It was not long ago that such discussion appeared totally naive.
PEACEFUL UTILIZATION OF NUCLEAR ENERGY
Mention of a more advanced future security role for the UN leads me naturally to turn to another vital role of the UN system, namely to promote sustainable economic development as an essential foundation for a safer and more equitable world order. The Pacific region has rightly acquired a reputation for dynamic economic growth and for tackling development issues with necessary vigour and imagination. However, here as elsewhere, the welcome growth is being increasingly accompanied by concern that development should also be sustainable. International aspirations in this regard were embodied in the Declaration of the Rio Conference on Environment and Development and its comprehensive action plan, Agenda 21.
In my view none of the technologies currently available to mankind ought to be overlooked in pursuing the goals that have been defined for sustainable development. It is thus appropriate to consider what contribution nuclear technology is making and can make. We do not often focus on the many non-power uses of nuclear energy and yet increasing reliance is in fact being made on them. They already have established and acknowledged roles in agriculture, industry, and medicine. Who questions radiation therapy for treatment of cancer, or the use of isotopes for research into water resources and to track the spread of pesticide residues or carbon-14 dating for historical or archeological purposes? In all uses of radiation, the techniques used must obviously comprise appropriate radiation protection measures. There must be proper workplace practices and a national regulatory infrastructure and legislation on radiation protection. There must also be safe management and disposal of waste. This is not questioned by the nuclear industry or by other responsible users of nuclear technology. The IAEA for its part is helping to build appropriate infrastructures and is actively engaged in transferring nuclear technology and know-how for use in the developing world. The IAEA Regional Co-operation Programme for Asia and the Pacific is a mechanism for such technology transfer and it is pleasing to note that it continues to enjoy active participation from countries throughout the region as well as strong financial backing from Australia and Japan amongst others.
Increasing emphasis is being placed on the contribution that nuclear techniques can make to tackling environmental problems. A wide range of work is already being done in national research institutes, and the IAEA is actively collaborating with several international bodies to implement the various elements of Agenda 21. Our isotope hydrology team is collaborating with the World Meteorological Organization in preparing studies on climate patterns for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Our Marine Laboratory at Monaco - the only one of its kind in the UN system - is collaborating with scientists from the relevant regions to assess the impacts of radioactive waste dumping in the Arctic Sea and the Sea of Japan. We have a major programme in Poland for using electron beams to reduce emissions from coal-fired power stations and to turn the resulting residues into fertilizer. Our agricultural unit, operated jointly with the FAO, is contributing to the eradication of insect pests in Africa and elsewhere using the Sterile Insect Technique, thus improving human health and increasing agricultural productivity. And preservation of food by irradiation holds out the prospect of more food reaching more consumers in domestic and foreign markets unspoiled.
Nuclear Power
Nuclear energy's most spectacular and controversial form - nuclear power - has played a significant part in the rapid economic development in the Asian region and will continue to do so. It is a major source of electricity for some of the largest Asian economies and remains a serious option for others. In many other parts of the world, however, the role of nuclear energy is stagnating and it is difficult to predict when a revival will come. In Finland, for example, despite a need for more electricity and the excellent record built up by four nuclear reactors over many years, the Parliament recently rejected a government proposal for another nuclear plant.
While the outlook for nuclear power is uneven, the latest OECD/IEA forecasts for electricity demand are clear. Global demand for electricity is expected to increase by perhaps 75% by the year 2010. In the Asia region, however, the cumulative growth by then is expected to be as much as 192%. How is this electricity to be generated? Many countries are making major investments in expansion of fossil fuel generating capacity. It is difficult to see how this trend can be reconciled with the expressed view of governments that action must now be taken to reduce global CO2 emissions and to address other environmental concerns. There are no credible indications that new and renewable sources of energy - like solar power, wind power or commercial biomass - will be able to supplant existing technologies in this generation or even the next to meet these massive projected increases in baseline energy needs. These sources now give a fraction of a percent of the world's energy and their further development, however desirable, remains hypothetical.
Nuclear power, on the other hand, constitutes 5% of the world's total energy and is a proven technology capable of expansion. It is therefore essential that the nuclear option remain open and that its greater utilization be fostered. While each country must decide for itself what energy mix it will have, it is important for those governments who see a place for nuclear in their energy mix to tackle constructively the obstacles to greater acceptance of nuclear power. Information and safety are the most important factors. The Chernobyl accident did immeasurable damage to the reputation of nuclear power, but it has also led to considerable efforts to prevent any recurrence in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and to bring about a safety culture accepted by all. Within months of the Chernobyl accident, the international community concluded two conventions concerning the early notification of a nuclear accident and the provision of assistance in the case or a nuclear accident or a radiological emergency. Safety standards and practices have been reviewed at other plants and improvements have been made. An international convention is now being worked out under the auspices of the IAEA and may be opened for signature this year to provide international safety rules and peer review of the safety of nuclear power plants. It is obvious that nuclear safety must remain the ultimate responsibility of national governments, but acting through the IAEA and other mechanisms, governments can collectively prepare international standards, provide training and advice, and offer reviews to ensure that best practice is followed.
While safety is the key, costs, including a quantification of the comparative health and environmental impacts of different energy sources, must be demonstrably acceptable. In many countries nuclear power is competitive in traditional economic terms. Cradle-to-grave cost comparisons of the health and environmental impacts of different energy systems should also be examined to promote informed decisions on future energy mixes. The IAEA is working with several international and national agencies to develop methodologies and databases for such comparative assessments. Some simple and established data are already striking and deserve wider publicity. A nuclear plant generating 1000 MW electricity - enough to meet the needs of one million people - would need 27 tonnes of slightly enriched uranium per year, i.e. a few truckloads derived from 160 tonnes of natural uranium. The equivalent coal fired plant would need 2.6 million tonnes - or five trains a day - carrying 1400 tonnes of coal. An oil fired plant would require 2 million tonnes of fuel oil per year, that is about 10 super tanker loads. Taking a look at annual waste production, we find that a nuclear plant would generate the following:
- as high level waste: 27 tonnes of spent fuel; once reprocessed/vitrified, about 3 m3;
- as intermediate level waste: 310 tonnes;
- as low level waste: 460 tonnes; plus
- some low level radioactive gases, without public health significance; and, for completeness,
- tailings from uranium mines and ore processing plants.
- 6.5 million tonnes of CO2;
- 44 000 tonnes of SO2;
- 22 000 tonnes of NOx;
- 320 000 tonnes of ashes, containing about 400 tonnes of toxic heavy metals such as arsenic, cadmium, lead and mercury; and tailings as well.
I would like to end on an optimistic note. With the Cold War behind us, but admittedly with national conflicts still an everyday reality, we are beginning to see a blueprint emerge for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measures that should become reality in the current decade and the years beyond. Australia's voice in this regard is both valued and respected. Peaceful nuclear technology applications across a broad spectrum will certainly continue to play their part to improve the lives of people in the developed and developing worlds alike. And, for those countries with expanding economies, with expanding energy needs and with a readiness to include the option of nuclear power, that option will provide a substantial, readily available, increasingly reliable and environmentally benign source of energy.