It is a great pleasure for me to be in India and to address this distinguished meeting at the India Habitat Centre. My subject today is Nuclear Energy in the Service of Development and Peace: the Role of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
In the public eye, the IAEA - or the 'Agency' as it is known in the United Nations system - is most often associated with its verification and safeguards activities in Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). However, these activities, despite their undoubted significance, represent only a small fraction of the Agency's total work in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
The IAEA was established in 1957 as the vehicle for international co-operation in the use of nuclear energy. It is guided by three complementary and equally important strategic objectives. These are: to assist Member States, particularly developing countries, in the use of nuclear technology; to promote radiation and nuclear safety; and to ensure to the extent possible that pledges related to the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy are kept.
As the only worldwide intergovernmental organization dedicated to nuclear science and technology, the Agency acts as an international focal point for technology sharing, the setting and application of standards and verification of non-proliferation undertakings. The reputation of the Agency - and therefore the value of the work that it does - depends on its scientific and technical competence and its objectivity. It is from this perspective that I make my remarks today under four headings: nuclear power; nuclear safety; transfer of technology; verification and illicit trafficking.
I begin with nuclear power. In 1998, some 437 nuclear reactors, operating in 31 countries, provided about 17% of global electricity supply and accounted for the avoidance of about 8% of global carbon emissions. The accumulated operating experience reached a figure of over 8500 reactor-years.
Rapidly increasing energy demand, together with growing concern about the impact of greenhouse gas emissions on global climate change, would suggest that nuclear power will continue to play a key role in energy strategies. It has to be remembered that energy produced from fossil fuels accounts for about half of human-made greenhouse gas emissions. While there are many hopes for alternative clean energy sources, at present only hydro - which has limited growth potential in most countries - and nuclear power are available as economically viable, minimal greenhouse gas emission options for large scale power generation.
However, as we approach the new millennium, the role of nuclear energy is under challenge and its future is at a crossroads. Three decades ago, nuclear energy was hailed as the energy of the future. Today, its growth is stagnant and its share in generating electricity is declining in North America and Western Europe, although it is expanding in parts of Asia and Eastern Europe. The fact is that in many countries the use of nuclear power is either uneconomical or heavily challenged, particularly by the general public, on the grounds of safety and the problem of radioactive waste.
Other challenges include apprehensions of nuclear weapon proliferation at the national and sub-national levels and, in an increasingly deregulated energy environment, the need to prove economic competitiveness. To my mind, a demonstrated safety record throughout all phases of the nuclear fuel cycle, including radioactive waste disposal, will be a determining factor in the contribution of nuclear power to the future global energy mix.
Nuclear safety is a national responsibility but a global issue. This was tragically demonstrated by the Chernobyl accident, which brought home to governments that "an accident anywhere is an accident everywhere". In this decade, the global safety record for nuclear power plants has shown continued improvement, with marked progress, for example, in Central and Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union. However, continuous efforts are required to ensure that technical and human related safety is maintained everywhere at the highest level.
The contribution of the IAEA in this sphere is made through the development of an extensive nuclear safety regime consisting of binding international agreements and comprehensive safety standards, and measures for the application of these agreements and standards.
In recent years, several important international conventions, negotiated under the auspices of the IAEA, have helped to fill gaps in the international nuclear safety regime - conventions relating to physical protection, civil liability for nuclear damage, notification of emergencies, radiological assistance, the safety of nuclear power stations and the safety of waste and spent fuel management. The Agency remains responsive to initiatives from its Member States concerning other areas in which the international community as a whole might benefit from binding norms.
The Agency's Safety Standards represent international consensus on safety norms. In the forthcoming programme and budget biennium we have undertaken the preparation or revision of the entire corpus of safety standards - a total of some seventy documents - to ensure that they are comprehensive, scientifically accurate and up to date.
However, the key to what is known as 'safety culture' is not just the conclusion of conventions or the adoption of standards, but the actual application of those conventions and standards. In this area, the Agency offers a wide range of services to assist Member States - various types of review missions, training, the fostering of scientific research, technical co-operation and information exchange. As an example, the Agency last year conducted its one hundredth Operational Safety Review Team, or 'OSART', mission to examine the adequacy of operational safety at nuclear power plants. These missions, undertaken upon invitation, help to share international expertise and formulate recommendations for improvements that not only benefit individual plants but foster the overall development of a strong safety culture. Promotion of education and training is also important, and here we have a large and successful programme - one to which India has provided valuable support. For instance, an IAEA post-graduate course on radiation protection was held recently in Trombay with the support and involvement of Indian experts.
Waste management is an important aspect of nuclear safety and one which is the cause of much concern to the public. In this area, the Agency assists Member States in their management of low and intermediate level waste through the assessment of different technologies and information dissemination. With respect to high level radioactive wastes, we are encouraging Member States to develop disposal plans and construct disposal facilities nationally or in co-operation with each other. I believe that the availability and practical demonstration of technical solutions for the safe and permanent disposal of high level wastes are prerequisites for public acceptance of the advantages of nuclear power.
International co-operation in the safe use of nuclear energy should not be perceived as an intrusion on national sovereignty but, on the contrary, as a prerequisite for a State to exercise its sovereign right to use nuclear energy and nuclear technology. I would like to see more States, including India, fully utilizing the Agency's safety services and other forms of assistance.
The third area I wish to touch upon is nuclear technology transfer for development. Meeting the needs and aspirations of the world's growing population requires the application of the best available technologies, including nuclear technology where appropriate. The goal of the IAEA's technical co-operation - or technology transfer - strategy is to promote the achievement of development priorities of participating countries.
The role of the Agency in this regard is threefold: to ensure that nuclear technology is the most effective and appropriate technology to address a particular problem; that the recipient country has adequate infrastructure to adopt and sustain such technology; and that this technology is transferred safely, in the most efficient and effective manner.
Unique in the UN system, the IAEA operates its own research and science laboratories to facilitate scientific and technical analysis and programme delivery - particularly in the technology transfer process. For example, the Agency's laboratory at Seibersdorf, near Vienna, provides a wide range of technical services in physics, chemistry, agriculture and nuclear instrumentation. Let me acknowledge, in this connection, the generous donation by the Government of India of scientific instruments, which have been of great assistance in training fellows from a range of Member States as well as in research activities. The Agency also operates a Marine Environment Laboratory in Monaco, which is dedicated to studies of pollution, including radioactivity, and the effects of human activities on the marine environment
Nuclear techniques are often just one component of larger national and regional development programmes. They are frequently used to gather essential scientific data for project planning or to test results, thus acting as a catalyst and a contributor to the results obtained by other techniques. For this reason, the Agency places high priority on partnerships for development with other organizations.
The technical co-operation programme of the Agency is driven by the requests of Member States for assistance in practically all aspects of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It comprises national, regional and interregional projects. In order to support common interests between countries and permit better use of resources, we also foster regional co-operative agreements for technical co-operation among developing countries. I am pleased to acknowledge India's valuable contribution to such efforts through its active participation in a number of projects under the Asian Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology. Experts from the Nuclear Power Corporation of India have been actively sharing their experience in a regional technical co-operation safety project involving four countries operating nuclear power plants - China, the Republic of Korea, Pakistan and India. The project focuses on strengthening the operational safety management of the plants through regional co-operation. India has hosted several workshops and has contributed to the preparation of a Reference Book on Good Operational Safety Management, which is intended as training material for staff in the region.
The Agency's technical co-operation programme is funded by Member States through voluntary contributions to the Technical Co-operation Fund. The size of the programme is modest - about US $80 million per year - but the results in areas such as health, food security, pollution control, water resources management and safe and sustainable energy production have been outstanding. [I would like to mention just a few examples of very successful projects.
In the area of food security, the use of biofertilizer technology to improve nitrogen fixation in soil tilled by small farmers in Bangladesh has yielded increases in soybean production of more than 400% while reducing dependency on chemical fertilizers. This success has attracted the interest of a private company, which is taking over the production and distribution of biofertilizers to farmers throughout Bangladesh.
The use of the sterile insect technique (SIT) - a technique to which the Agency has made major contributions - for the area wide eradication of agricultural pests is increasing. On the basis of the results of first phase activities in tsetse fly eradication on Zanzibar island, the IAEA is supporting the Ethiopian Government in a project to eradicate the tsetse fly in the southern Rift Valley. In the Philippines, the SIT has been used for integrated control of the Oriental fruit fly, resulting in a 60% reduction in the number of flies to date.
In the area of health and life expectancy, where women and children in developing countries are most vulnerable, nuclear techniques will be used to help evaluate an $18 million community nutrition programme in Senegal, supported by the World Food Programme and the World Bank. In Indonesia, joint project formulation with UNICEF has led to an isotope based study on the efficiency of iron and zinc supplementation to reduce anaemia and growth faltering in infants. And, in co-operation with national and regional public health authorities in five Latin American countries, isotopic evaluations to improve national nutrition interventions - targeting over 10 million women and children - are being introduced with Agency assistance.
The scarcity of freshwater is a problem that could affect two thirds of the world's population by the year 2025. The Agency is helping to meet this challenge through its isotope hydrology programme. For example, environmental isotopes and artificial tracer techniques are proving particularly effective in the investigation of water leakage in dams and reservoirs and in the assessment of water resources.
The use of nuclear power to desalinate sea water and produce potable water competitively is the subject of much ongoing research and development. At the IAEA's General Conference last September, Member States adopted a resolution expressing support for the strengthening of the Agency's programme relating to nuclear desalination and the development of small and medium size reactors. This programme includes the promotion of international information exchange and co-operation and assistance to developing countries in planning and implementing demonstration projects. In this context, I might mention the project on integrated nuclear power and desalination system design, in which India is participating. Indeed India has offered its Nuclear Desalination Demonstration Project training facility for this purpose.]
I turn now to the role of the IAEA in the area of verification and I will divide my remarks under four headings: the broad outlook for nuclear disarmament, the strengthened IAEA safeguards system, the present activities of the Agency and future prospects.
The IAEA is mandated to promote non-proliferation in conformity with the policies of the United Nations to further safeguarded worldwide disarmament. I have to say here that it is my view that nuclear weapons do not increase security. On the contrary, they encourage dangerous arms races with incalculable outcomes and are a diversion from development. I was therefore pleased to note the declarations of intent to adhere to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty which the Prime Ministers of both India and Pakistan made in the United Nations General Assembly last September. I very much hope that both Governments will be able to act on those declarations in the course of this year in order to build regional confidence and to advance the goal of worldwide nuclear disarmament. I also very much hope that all States, particularly those with nuclear weapon capability, will join efforts to accelerate the process of arms control and nuclear disarmament. The world expects nothing less. The IAEA stands ready to contribute to this process in whatever way States might consider appropriate. States, particularly those with nuclear weapon capability, will join efforts to accelerate the process of arms control and nuclear disarmament. The world expects nothing less. The IAEA stands ready to contribute to this process in whatever way States might consider appropriate.
In the pursuit of the goals of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, the role of the IAEA, through its verification and safeguards activities, is to provide the necessary assurance that States are complying with the nuclear non-proliferation and arms control commitments they have undertaken.
Since 1991, and as a result especially of the Agency's experience in Iraq, it has become clear that effective safeguards must provide assurance not only about the nuclear activities declared by a State, but also - in States with comprehensive safeguards agreements - about the absence of any undeclared activities. To do this, the system needs to move beyond its focus on nuclear material accountancy - essentially a quantitative audit system designed to keep track of material declared to the Agency - to a system based on more qualitative assessments. A system, in short, which affords the Agency a better vantage point from which to develop a more comprehensive picture than before of all nuclear activities in a State and to detect and verify possible non-peaceful activities at an early stage. This has entailed development in three major directions: more information, wider access to locations and greater use of advanced technology.
In order to introduce the strengthened safeguards system, the IAEA Board of Governors approved in 1997 a Model Additional Protocol which provides the necessary legal authority for implementing the new measures. On the basis of the model, States are invited to conclude a Protocol additional to their existing safeguards agreement. To date, Additional Protocols have been signed for 35 States and other Parties. I hope that adherence would be global and our goal is that by the year 2000 all States will have concluded an Additional Protocol.
The introduction of the strengthened safeguards system will raise substantially the level of assurance, but it must be recognized that, even with full implementation, safeguards cannot provide 100% guarantees. As our experience in Iraq has shown, some uncertainty is inevitable in any country-wide verification system that aims to prove the negative, that is to prove the absence of concealable objects or activities.
For this reason, while safeguards are a key element, they must be supplemented by other mutually reinforcing non-proliferation components. These include export control and, most importantly, regional and global security arrangements which aim at removing the incentives to acquire nuclear weapons.
Over 180 States have undertaken to accept IAEA safeguards on their nuclear material and activities. In 1997, the Agency was applying safeguards at over 900 facilities involving more than 10 000 person days of inspection. While the vast majority of these activities proceeded without unusual difficulty, two special cases, as I mentioned above, did arise - in Iraq and the DPRK.
In 1991, the Agency was mandated under Security Council resolution 687 to carry out on-site inspections of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons programme and destroy, remove or render harmless the components of that programme. These inspection and verification activities have resulted in the development of a technically coherent picture of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme. We have reported to the Security Council that clarification of the few remaining questions and concerns regarding the completeness of this picture can be addressed as part of our ongoing monitoring and verification plan. Before the most recent break in our activities in Iraq, the Agency was focusing mainly on the implementation and technical strengthening of this plan. We await the outcome of the Security Council's deliberations which, we hope, will result in resumption of Agency verification activities in Iraq.
In the DPRK, the Agency continues to assert its right to perform inspections under the safeguards agreement concluded pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons - the NPT. Since 1994, at the request of the Security Council, we have maintained a continuous presence of inspectors in the DPRK for the purpose of verifying a 'freeze' of the DPRK's nuclear programme as negotiated bilaterally with the United States of America under the so-called 'Agreed Framework'. The situation has remained stable and we have been able to confirm that the 'freeze' continues. However, we have not made any progress on long standing and important issues of the DPRK's compliance with its safeguards agreement.
Thus far I have dealt with the development of the new safeguards system and with the present safeguards and verification responsibilities of the Agency. I would conclude my remarks on the role of IAEA safeguards by mentioning the work we are undertaking with respect to several other prospects for verification of nuclear arms control and reduction agreements.
In addition to a complete ban on nuclear testing, two actions have always been identified as being indispensable to nuclear arms reduction and nuclear disarmament: freezing the production of fissile materials for weapon purposes and gradually reducing the stockpiles of such materials. I am pleased to note that measures are being taken on both fronts.
Last August, the Conference on Disarmament finally agreed to commence negotiation of a treaty prohibiting the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In furtherance of a UN General Assembly Resolution, I wrote to the President of the Conference on Disarmament to offer the assistance of the Agency in developing the technical verification arrangements for such a treaty.
Over the past two years, the Agency's Secretariat has been involved in an initiative with the Russian Federation and the United States of America to develop modalities for IAEA verification that nuclear material transferred from the military sector in the two countries remained irreversibly in the peaceful sector. This activity would be the first specific mission for the IAEA in the international verification of steps taken by nuclear weapon States towards nuclear disarmament.
An important question that still needs to be addressed is the financing of the work associated with new responsibilities. In response to a request from our Board of Governors, the Secretariat is preparing an options paper on this subject. In my view, the establishment of a Nuclear Arms Control Verification Fund based on an agreed scheme of assessed contributions could be a viable option to finance verification of nuclear arms control and reduction measures.
Finally, a brief word on illicit trafficking. The potential threat to public safety and the danger of nuclear weapons proliferation from the illicit trafficking in nuclear material and other radioactive sources is an area of major international concern. While there are no known cases where weapons or weapons components have been stolen, there have been cases of theft of nuclear material. In the past 15 months, the Agency's Illicit Trafficking Database programme has recorded 17 incidents involving nuclear material (mostly in insignificant quantities) and 22 involving other radioactive sources. The prevention of illegal movements is a national responsibility but regional and international co-operation is essential. Through information exchange, training, technical assistance and other support services, the Agency is assisting Member States to prevent, detect and respond to theft, diversion and other unauthorized uses of nuclear material and other radioactive sources. Through a technical co-operation project, we are assisting 52 Member States to strengthen and improve their national regulatory infrastructures with regard to all aspects of safety of radioactive sources.
As is evident from this brief overview of just a small selection of the activities and programmes of the IAEA, the international nuclear agenda is growing rather than shrinking. Nuclear science and technology have always drawn two reactions: hope that their safe and peaceful application would help us along the path to a better future; and apprehension that their misuse could have catastrophic effects. I believe that it is incumbent on all of us to strengthen international co-operation in order to maximize the hopes and eliminate the sources of apprehension. This is a task to which the IAEA remains dedicated.