Status of Integrated Safeguards
The development and implementation of integrated safeguards continues to be a high priority within the Secretariat. As a follow-up to the initial status report provided to the Board in March, you have before you a more detailed report on the Development of Integrated Safeguards (GOV/INF/2000/26), describing the work at hand and the way ahead. Deputy Director General Goldschmidt will introduce the paper in detail. Let me just say that we are pursuing the development and implementation of integrated safeguards with a balance of urgency and thoroughness. We will continue to keep the Board informed of progress in this area.
Plan of Action for Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols
I am pleased to submit to the Board for its approval a draft safeguards agreement between Andorra and the Agency, a draft Protocol Additional to that agreement, and a draft Protocol Additional to Latvia’s safeguards agreement with the Agency. Overall progress, however, remains slow: with your approval of these 2 new Additional Protocols, only 57 will have been approved by the Board since the adoption of the Model Protocol in May 1997; and 51 States still have not met their obligations under the NPT to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency. This lack of progress underlies the request — which appeared both in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference and in a resolution from our General Conference in September — for the IAEA and Member States to consider additional means of promoting and facilitating the conclusion and entry into force of safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols.
With this in mind, the Secretariat has enhanced its action plan for this purpose. The enhanced plan will strengthen communication, training and assistance to maximize the use of all Agency resources available to assist Member States with all legal, technical and administrative aspects relevant to the conclusion and implementation of safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols. In recent months, we have organized and participated in a number of national and regional seminars and workshops, in Thailand, Viet Nam and Belarus. Further regional meetings are planned — in Japan for Asia, in Peru for Latin America, and in Africa.
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
A new round of technical discussions with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) took place in Vienna on 6–9 November. During this meeting, the Agency explained to the DPRK representatives that the work required to verify that all nuclear materials subject to safeguards in the DPRK have been declared to the Agency and placed under safeguards will take 3–4 years, and will require full co-operation on the part of the DPRK, which at this stage is not forthcoming. We also stated that we are ready to start the process at the earliest possible date.
In response to a request from the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), the Secretariat plans to carry out a design safety review for the Korean Standard Nuclear Power Plant model to be provided by KEDO to the DPRK. This review is consistent with our statutory functions relevant to applying Agency safety standards. We expect that an agreement between the Agency and KEDO can soon be signed, to regulate the necessary technical, legal and financial arrangements for the review, which would include an assessment of the site in the DPRK where the reactor is to be built.
I would now like to turn to a number of technology and safety issues.
Results of COP6
Last month, the 6th Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Climate Change was held in the Hague. As you are all aware, the Conference did not reach a conclusion and was suspended. Given the range of contentious issues, it remained unclear whether nuclear power would ultimately be eligible as a Clean Development Mechanism technology for greenhouse gas reduction. During the conference, Deputy Director General Waller presented the case for the need to keep the nuclear option open and to give nuclear power a full and fair hearing. Meanwhile, the debate will go on. In this context, I would like to refer to a statement by the Secretary-General of the OECD, Donald Johnston, two weeks ago in which he stated:
International Project on Innovative Reactor and Fuel Cycle Technologies
As I have mentioned in my statement to the United Nations General Assembly in November, we are faced with a dilemma in the area of nuclear power — on the one hand, conclusions by experts that a total reliance on fossil fuels is not sustainable, and that the current position of nuclear power needs to be stabilized, with the possibility of future expansion — and on the other hand, the significant scepticism among some governments and parts of the public about nuclear power as a sustainable source of energy, with the result that most projections now show a near term decrease in the share of nuclear power as a source of global electricity supply.
In my view, the solution to this dilemma may depend heavily on the development of new, innovative reactor and fuel cycle technologies that are inherently safe, proliferation resistant, economically competitive and adaptable to a wide range of end-user needs and applications. For the past two years, the Agency has been discussing the formulation of a project in this area that would support the broad ranging needs of our Member States. In keeping with this year’s General Conference Resolution (GC(44)/RES/21), we convened a meeting last week to launch the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO), with the participation of 17 countries and 5 international organizations.
This project will be funded primarily by extrabudgetary resources offered by interested Member States and will likely consist of two phases. The first phase will consist of: the compilation and review of the different concepts and approaches for new, innovative reactors and fuel cycles; the selection of criteria and the development of methodologies to compare these different concepts and approaches; the determination of user requirements; and the examination of the different technologies against the criteria and requirements. Depending on the outcome of Phase I, a second phase could then examine the feasibility of an actual international co-operative project and identify the appropriate technologies that could form the basis for it.
Various national and international initiatives are under way to develop evolutionary and innovative approaches to reactor and fuel cycle design; however, in most cases these initiatives are limited in scope. INPRO will seek to bring together all interested Member States — both technology holders and technology users — and to draw from and complement other relevant national and international initiatives. We will be prepared to start Phase I of the project as soon as extrabudgetary funds are provided for its support.
Use of Belgian Underground Research Laboratory
On the subject of technology, I am pleased to note that the Belgian Nuclear Research Center has offered the use of its HADES Underground Research Laboratory to promote international co-operation and exchange of experience related to geological disposal of radioactive waste. As with the recent Canadian offer for the use of their Lac du Bonnet laboratory, I believe this will offer the international community through the Agency an opportunity to share knowledge, conduct joint research, development and demonstration projects, and build international consensus on key disposal issues.
Depleted Uranium
The Agency participated, from 6 to 19 November, in a preliminary field mission to Kosovo, led by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). The goal of the mission was to survey for depleted uranium (DU) at selected sites in order to evaluate the possible environmental and health impacts of the use of DU during the Kosovo conflict. The team visited 13 sites — where, according to information provided by NATO, DU ammunition has been used — and carried out initial measurements and took samples of soil, water and vegetation. These samples are currently being analysed in various laboratories, including the Agency’s Laboratories Seibersdorf. However, in our view, the level of field research completed and the limited data available are not yet sufficient to warrant a conclusive scientific report on possible current or future health and environmental risks.
Safety Standard Discussions with ICAO
As you are aware, the Secretariat has been conducting a major effort to update and complete the Agency’s body of safety standards. You may recall that in my statement to the General Conference I expressed the wish that, as in the aviation field, where standards are promulgated under the auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), our Agency standards, once agreed upon, should be uniformly applied by all States.
Over the past 3 years, in response to challenging developments in the aviation field, ICAO has devised an enhanced safety oversight programme, endorsed by consensus a voluntary self-imposed safety regime, and instituted a systematic auditing mechanism on the national implementation of safety related ICAO standards. Given some of the similarities between our two agencies in this area, I recently discussed this issue with the ICAO Secretary-General, Mr. Costa Pereira, and we agreed to have the relevant staff of the two Secretariats meet, to share their experience with a view to identifying possible options for strengthening the nuclear safety regime.
Completing the update and review of the Agency’s body of safety standards is important because we use these standards as the benchmark for all relevant Agency safety missions and peer reviews. A major step forward would be the acceptance by Contracting Parties to the Nuclear Safety Convention to use these standards in judging performance under the convention, in setting criteria for evaluation of safety performance, and other similar activities.
Exchange of Regulators or Other Safety Personnel
Recent discussions have suggested two additional opportunities for enhancing the way in which we share knowledge and expertise in the safety area. The first involves the exchange of regulators or other safety personnel between national or international organizations. This arrangement has been used among European countries and in other regions, with great benefit both to the individuals and the organizations they represent. While we have sponsored a number of brief exchanges of this sort, I would like to explore having the Agency, on a broader scale, sponsor a programme for co-ordinating such exchanges, with a view to sharing hands-on experience and expertise and transfering "best practices" among national programmes.
Emergency Response Co-ordination
Secondly, I have had the opportunity recently to visit emergency response centres that operate under national nuclear programmes, and I have been impressed with the high standards of these facilities. I believe an opportunity exists for the Agency to promote an enhanced network of communication among these centres — particularly those associated with suppliers of nuclear facilities — especially for immediate assistance during nuclear emergencies. The Agency, on its part, will explore all opportunities to use new technologies to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of emergency communications.