Today I would like to talk to you about the role of the IAEA and its contribution to peace and development. The Agency was established 42 years ago to be the global intergovernmental organization for international co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The Statute outlines the twin objectives of the IAEA: to enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace and development; and to ensure, so far as it is able, that atomic energy is used at a high level of safety and exclusively for peaceful purposes.
In these areas and others, nuclear techniques often offer unique inputs to larger national and regional development programmes. Frequently they are used to obtain essential data for project planning or problem solving. Their value thus lies not only in their direct impact on developmental goals but also as a catalyst and a contributor to the efforts of others. For this reason, the Agency places high priority on establishing partnerships with other organizations in the field of development as well as fostering regional co-operative arrangements. An example of such regional arrangements is the Co-operative Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean (ARCAL).
The Agency transfers nuclear technology in many ways. It holds some 400 technical meetings on various topics in nuclear science and technology annually, including 10 to 14 major conferences, symposia and seminars. Most of these meetings deal with nuclear applications and techniques which are of direct benefit to developing countries. Many of them result in publications and technical documents which are widely disseminated to Member States.
Unique in the United Nations system, the IAEA operates its own research and service laboratories which contribute significantly to the transfer of nuclear technology. The Agency's laboratories near Vienna provide a wide range of technical services for programmes in physics, chemistry, hydrology, nuclear instrumentation and agriculture to assist developing countries address their problems. Similarly, the Agency's Marine Environment Laboratory in Monaco is dedicated to studies of pollution and radioactivity in the marine environment.
The Agency also transfers technology through the award of research contracts to scientists in its Member States. These contracts bring together researchers in developing and industrialized countries to interact and move forward towards common research goals.
But the majority of the IAEA's technology transfer activities are undertaken through the Technical Co-operation Programme which has a budget of over $80 million per year. The programme assists all developing Member States in the use of nuclear technologies relevant to their national development needs through training, expert advice and equipment procurement.
Peru has benefited from the Agency's Technical Co-operation Programme. Progress in the field of nuclear applications was made in the areas of health care, food preservation and environmental control.
Achievements such as the multi-purpose irradiation plant which is now successfully operating both for food irradiation and medical sterilization purposes, the establishment of a tissue bank where material for transplants is sterilized and preserved by irradiation, and the development of a better variety of barley which is being distributed now to farmers are good examples of the application of nuclear techniques for development in Peru. Technical Co-operation among Developing Countries (TCDC) is being pursued through two binational projects with neighbouring countries Bolivia and Chile - the one with Bolivia is for maintaining water balance in Lake Titicaca and the one with Chile is for the eradication of the fruit fly in the Tacna zone.
Peru has been active in ARCAL since its very inception and has participated actively in many of its projects. Indeed, Mr. Conrado Seminario, Executive Director of IPEN, is one of the founding members of ARCAL.
This might suggest that the share of nuclear power in global energy production will grow, or at least remain stable. However, projections point to a less conclusive situation. Today, in Western Europe and North America, nuclear power is at a standstill or almost in decline, though it continues to grow in a few rapidly developing countries in Asia and in parts of Eastern Europe. But the overall share of nuclear power as a proportion of global electricity production is projected to fall, to about 13% in 2010 and 10% in 2020.
Openness and transparency are key to public confidence. But equally if not more important is a demonstrated global record of safety in all activities throughout the nuclear fuel cycle. In recent years, since the Chernobyl accident, the global safety record for nuclear power plants has shown general improvement. However, continuous efforts are required to ensure that the technical and human requirements of safety culture are maintained at their optimum. This includes attention to effective management practices, continuous upgrading of safety features, the safe and secure control of all radiation sources, and the maintenance of a high degree of vigilance. The accident a few weeks ago at the Tokaimura Uranium Conversion Plant in Japan is a case in point. It is an example that such accidents can occur if the required level of vigilance decreases.
Safety is a national responsibility. But we learned the hard way after Chernobyl that international co-operation is indispensable. The contribution of the IAEA is through the development of a comprehensive nuclear safety regime consisting of binding international agreements, detailed safety standards, measures to provide for the application of those agreements and standards, and promotion of technological innovations.
In recent years, several important international conventions, negotiated under the IAEA's auspices, have helped to fill gaps in the international nuclear safety regime - conventions relating to physical protection, civil liability for nuclear damage, nuclear safety and the safety of waste and spent fuel management. And we continue to examine other areas in which the international community might benefit from binding norms. Detailed safety standards are also subject to continuous review to ensure that they are complete and up to date. And new technological improvements that could enhance safety are being pursued.
The provision of safety assistance services, however, is vital to the dissemination of best practices in the safety field. The IAEA provides a wide range of such services such as Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) missions that examine the adequacy of safety features at nuclear power plants.
Another aspect of nuclear safety concerns waste management. Through the assessment of different technologies and the dissemination of information, the Agency is supporting Member States to manage and dispose of their low and intermediate level waste. With respect to high level radioactive wastes, we are encouraging Member States to develop disposal plans and construct disposal facilities, nationally or in co-operation with each other. Only when permanent repositories for high level wastes have been built will the public accept that the high level waste issue has been resolved.
To be effective, a verification system should provide a high degree of assurance that States are in full compliance with their obligations. Until the early nineties, IAEA safeguards activities focused primarily on activities and material declared by the State. The shortcomings of this system were, however, highlighted in the Agency's experience in Iraq which made it clear that effective safeguards must be able not only to verify declared nuclear activities but also to detect possible undeclared activities at an early stage. The system needed to move beyond its original focus on nuclear material accountancy - essentially an audit system designed to keep track of material declared to the Agency - to one which affords the Agency a vantage point from which to develop a comprehensive picture of all nuclear activities so as to be able to detect any inconsistency or anomaly.
The IAEA Board of Governors approved in 1997 a Model Additional Protocol which provides the necessary legal authority for implementing new measures that will significantly strengthen the safeguards system. On the basis of the model, States are invited to conclude a Protocol additional to their existing safeguards agreement.
Strengthening the effectiveness of the safeguards system has three major components: increased information, more extensive access and greater use of appropriate technology. Under the strengthened system, States are required to provide more detailed information covering all aspects of their nuclear and nuclear related activities. The system also provides for substantially broader access for inspectors. The State is required to provide access to all locations that are, or could be, engaged in nuclear fuel cycle related activities and, if this is not possible, to make every reasonable effort to satisfy Agency requirements without delay through other means.
With respect to technology, the Agency has the right to collect environmental samples anywhere it has a right of access. Results to date have suggested that such techniques are powerful tools for detecting undeclared activities and for providing unambiguous information about the full range of past and current nuclear activities at a specific site. The Agency is also preparing for extensive use of remote monitoring technology transmitting to IAEA Headquarters near-real-time images and results appropriately authenticated and encrypted.
To date, Additional Protocols have been signed with 45 States. A strengthened safeguards system is a fundamental requirement for an effective non-proliferation regime. Adherence should be global. Our goal is that by the year 2000 all States will have signed and brought into force their Additional Protocols.
But nuclear safeguards must be seen as only one part of the overall non-proliferation regime. The effectiveness of safeguards is a critical element in that regime. But it is not the only element. Other mutually reinforcing elements have to be at work. These include effective export/import controls, sustained efforts towards nuclear disarmament and functioning regional and global security arrangements. The latter is the best disincentive against the misuse of nuclear energy for military purposes.
In this context, the world has learned much from the historic pioneering work of Latin American and Caribbean countries in establishing regional and bilateral non-proliferation arrangements. This year we celebrate the 32nd anniversary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which was the first nuclear weapon free zone in a populated region. This treaty has not only helped to keep nuclear weapons out of Latin America but it has set a precedent and been an encouragement to similar initiatives in other regions. The concept has now been established in the South Pacific, Africa and Southeast Asia. A major effort is under way to establish such a zone in Central Asia. In the Middle East, there is general agreement among all the States of the region that nuclear weapon free zone will add to the stability and security of that region, in conjunction with a comprehensive peaceful settlement.
I would conclude my remarks on the role of IAEA verification by mentioning other prospects for verification of nuclear arms control and reduction efforts that the Agency might be asked to perform in the future.
In August 1998, the Conference on Disarmament agreed to commence negotiation of a treaty prohibiting the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Should these negotiations prove successful, many countries would look to the IAEA to verify such a treaty. The Agency has been asked to be ready to assist the Conference on Disarmament in the development of the verification arrangements of such a treaty.
In addition, over the past three years, the Agency's Secretariat has been involved in discussions with the Russian Federation and the United States of America to develop modalities for IAEA verification that nuclear material transferred from the weapon sector in these two countries remained irreversibly in peaceful activities. Further progress was made last month when I met with Minister Adamov of the Russian Federation and Secretary Richardson of the USA to set goals for future work.
The Agency stands ready to contribute its verification and safeguards expertise and experience to the full realization of these important initiatives towards nuclear arms control and reduction. An important question, however, that still needs to be addressed is financing. In my view, the establishment of a nuclear arms control and reduction fund based on an agreed scheme of assessed contributions could be a viable option to finance these initiatives and possibly the verification of other future nuclear arms control and reduction measures.
At the end of the day, the success of the IAEA is the success of its Member States. Nuclear energy has always been met by a mixture of hopes and apprehensions. I believe that it is incumbent on us all to strengthen international co-operation to maximize the hopes and eliminate the sources of apprehension. This is a task to which the IAEA remains dedicated.