Mr. Olli Heinonen, IAEA Deputy Director General of Safeguards, has underlined the importance of the workplan recently agreed between Iran and the IAEA on the Modalities of Resolution of the Outstanding Issues, saying that it represents a significant step forward in the process of verifying the country´s nuclear programme. "What we have in front of us is a report that includes what we think is an important step because, for the first time in a couple of years, we have been able to agree with the Iranians a working arrangement on how to resolve the outstanding issues that triggered all the Security Council procedures sometime ago," he commented. "In this working arrangement we have the actual modalities of the work, the procedural steps to be taken as well as some fine lines defined and how we are going to address these. When you read the plan you see this is not an open-ended timeline: there are certain linkages in this approach, but it´s important that it is not open-ended," he said.
"The key now is that Iran adheres to this timeline, provides us with the information that we need and access to the information. This means access to the documentation, supporting documentation, equipment, sample taking, persons if needed, etc. Making a small nuance, this is the first time that Iran also has agreed to address the issue of alleged studies which are in paragraph E of the report - this relates to issues such as the Green Salt, etc. If we look at what happens next, Iran is now facing is the litmus test: that it can provide in a timely manner answers and the supporting information to the IAEA´s questions, which have been lacking particularly during the period 2004-2005 of our investigations. All these measures which you see there for resolving our outstanding issues go beyond the requirements of the Additional Protocol," he said.
On the issue of the agreed workplan (INFCIRC/711) from 21 August 2007, General Understandings, Para 2, Mr. Heinonen´s comments were: "When you read the agreement you can see that we are making questions. If the answers are not satisfactory, we are making new questions until we are satisfied with the answers and we can conclude technically that the matter is resolved - it is for us to judge when we think we have enough information. Once the matter is resolved, then the file is closed."
"The plutonium experiments issue is an example of this process. The marching plan regarding this issue was agreed at the beginning of July. We have gone through this process and you can see what the result was: they [the Iranian authorities] provided additional information. We made questions and we received answers. We had access to the people, information and documentation which we had never seen before. As a result, we were able to do what is stated in Paragraphs 9 and 10. This was the litmus test for the process."