Strengthening the effectiveness of the safeguards system has three major components: increased information, more extensive access and greater use of appropriate technology. Under the strengthened system, States are required to provide more detailed information covering all aspects of their nuclear and nuclear related activities. The system also provides for substantially broader access for inspectors. The State is required to provide access to all locations that are, or could be, engaged in nuclear fuel cycle related activities and, if this is not possible, to make every reasonable effort to satisfy Agency requirements without delay through other means.
With respect to technology, the Agency has the right to collect environmental samples anywhere it has a right of access. Results to date have suggested that such techniques are powerful tools for detecting undeclared activities and for providing unambiguous information about the full range of past and current nuclear activities at a specific site. The Agency is also preparing for extensive use of remote monitoring technology transmitting to IAEA Headquarters near-real-time images and results appropriately authenticated and encrypted.
To date, Additional Protocols have been signed with 44 States. A strengthened safeguards system is a fundamental requirement for an effective non-proliferation regime. Adherence should be global. Our goal is that by the year 2000 all States will have signed and brought into force their Additional Protocols.
But nuclear safeguards must be seen as only one part of the overall non-proliferation regime. The effectiveness of safeguards is a critical element in that regime. But it is not the only element. Other mutually reinforcing elements must all be at work. These include effective export/import controls, sustained efforts towards nuclear disarmament and functioning regional and global security arrangements. The latter is the best disincentive against the misuse of nuclear energy for military purposes.
In this context, the world has learned much from the historic pioneering work of Latin American and Caribbean countries in establishing regional and bilateral non-proliferation arrangements. This year we celebrate the 32nd anniversary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which was the first nuclear weapon free zone in a populated region. This treaty has not only helped to keep nuclear weapons out of Latin America but it has been a precedent and an encouragement to similar initiatives in other regions. The concept has now been established in the South Pacific, Africa and Southeast Asia. A major effort is under way to establish such a zone in Central Asia. In the Middle East, there is general agreement among all the States of the region that a nuclear weapon free zone will add to the stability and security of that region, in conjunction with a comprehensive peaceful settlement.
I would conclude my remarks on the role of the IAEA verification by mentioning other prospects for verification of nuclear arms control and reduction efforts that the Agency might be asked to perform in the future.
In August 1998, the Conference on Disarmament agreed to commence negotiation of a treaty prohibiting the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Should these negotiations prove successful, many countries would look to the IAEA to verify such a treaty. The Agency has been asked to be ready to assist the Conference on Disarmament in the development of the verification arrangements of such a treaty.
In addition, over the past three years, the Agency's Secretariat has been involved in discussions with the Russian Federation and the United States of America to develop modalities for IAEA verification that nuclear material transferred from the weapon sector in these two countries remained irreversibly in peaceful activities. Further progress was made last month when I met with Minister Adamov of the Russian Federation and Secretary Richardson of the USA to set goals for future work.
The Agency stands ready to contribute its verification and safeguards expertise and experience to the full realization of these important initiatives towards nuclear arms control and reduction. An important question, however, that still needs to be addressed is financing. In my view, the establishment of a nuclear arms control and reduction fund based on an agreed scheme of assessed contributions could be a viable option to finance these initiatives and possibly the verification of other future nuclear arms control and reduction measures.
At the end of the day, the success of the IAEA is the success of its Member States. Nuclear energy has always been met by a mixture of hopes and apprehensions. I believe that it is incumbent on us all to strengthen international co-operation to maximize the hopes and eliminate the sources of apprehension. This is a task to which the IAEA remains dedicated.