It has been a busy and productive period for the Secretariat since the Board last met in June. During this time a number of important Agency meetings took place, the Secretariat was actively engaged in the strengthening of the safeguards system and in the management of other verification activities; further work was undertaken to deal with the year 2000 computer system problems; and there were a number of in-house activities that required adjustment and streamlining.
On 29 September, the Organizational Meeting of Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety will be held here in Vienna to prepare for the first Review Meeting of the Convention next April. The first day of the Organizational Meeting is also the deadline for Contracting Parties to submit their national reports on compliance with nuclear safety obligations. The coming months, therefore, will provide the first test for the Convention's system of national reports being subject to international peer review, and we await the results with interest.
I also wish to inform the Board that, upon a joint request by the Slovak and Austrian Governments, the Agency is assembling an independent group of internationally recognized experts to examine concerns raised about embrittlement of the reactor pressure vessel in the Mochovce Unit 1 nuclear power plant. The experts are meeting this week to review technical data and formulate their findings. The Slovak Government has also requested the Agency to carry out a review of the design modifications which have been made to the plant. An independent review and evaluation will be conducted later this month.
In Latin America, a technical and political review by Member States of ARCAL (Co-operative Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean) further promoted the concept of a regional intergovernmental agreement. Today I wish to welcome the successful conclusion of this agreement. I hope it will open new perspectives by further reinforcing inter-governmental co-operation among the participating Member States of ARCAL.
With respect to contributions to the Technical Co-operation Fund (TCF), I am very pleased to welcome a number of promising developments. Several major contributors, such as India, Japan, Netherlands, UK and the USA, paid their contributions before the end of July. In addition, some Member States, both new and long standing - such as Armenia, Georgia, Latvia and Monaco - contributed to the TCF for the first time while some others, such as Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Singapore, Uganda and Venezuela, resumed their contributions to the TCF. Moreover, several Member States, such as Algeria, Armenia, Peru, Romania, Ukraine and Uruguay made substantial payments to clear their arrears of assessed programme costs. In addition, one Member State (Belgium) will resume its contributions to the TCF from 1999 onwards.
I wish to thank those Member States which have heeded the pleas of the Board and myself for more pledges and payments. I continue to encourage those of you not yet meeting their targets to find ways to do so.
The strengthened safeguards system is a fundamental condition for an effective non-proliferation regime. With the ten Additional Protocols already signed, and the Protocols for a further twenty-two States which may be signed in the coming weeks, a considerable portion of the world's nuclear fuel cycle, which is under comprehensive safeguards, would be subject to the strengthened system. But that is not enough.
One of the main purposes of the strengthened safeguards system - to provide assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in States with legally binding non-proliferation commitments - can only be achieved with global adherence. I would therefore urge all States to accelerate their consideration of the Model Additional Protocol and to enter into consultations with the Agency at the earliest possible opportunity. The Secretariat for its part will continue its work to initiate and conduct consultations for the early conclusion of Protocols using all channels of communication at its disposal for this purpose.
As you are aware, the Conference on Disarmament finally agreed last month to commence negotiations on a FMT. While the issues to be confronted in developing such a treaty are complex and the negotiations are likely to be lengthy, it is time to confront the issues head on. In light of United Nations General Assembly Resolution (GA/RES/48/75 of 16 December 1993) I wrote to the President of the Conference on Disarmament on 28 August, to offer the assistance of the Agency in developing the technical verification arrangements for such a treaty.
With regard to the reduction of existing stockpiles, you would recall that in March I briefed the Board on progress with respect to the offers of the Russian Federation and the United States to submit to IAEA verification, fissile material from the military sector. Discussion between them and the Secretariat has centred on technical, legal and financial issues. Some progress was made but many issues still need to be resolved. Minister Adamov of the Russian Federation, Secretary Richardson of the USA and I will meet next week to review progress and set goals for future work. I will continue to keep you informed of any developments.
An important issue that has been prompted by these initiatives is the financing of nuclear arms reduction verification. This issue should be addressed without delay if the Agency is to be able to respond positively to these and other requests for verification of nuclear arms reduction. As I mentioned before, a way of financing such undertakings could be through the establishment of a Nuclear Arms Control Verification Fund based on an agreed scheme of assessed contributions.
In reporting to the Board in June on the implementation of safeguards in the DPRK, I noted that a number of key technical issues remained unresolved. I regret to have to report that the tenth round of technical discussions between the DPRK and the Agency's technical team, which took place in the DPRK from 24 to 26 June 1998, made no progress on the key issues.
The situation, as summarized in the document for the General Conference (GC(42)/16) remains unchanged, except that the inspectors on site have observed that the main maintenance activities at the reprocessing plant have been suspended, for the time being. The Secretariat will continue to closely follow any information on activities in the DPRK that could have implications for our safeguards obligations.
The Agency's inspection and verification activities in Iraq, pursuant to the mandate given to it by the Security Council in 1991, have resulted in the development of a technically coherent picture of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme. A degree of uncertainty remains as to the completeness of this picture, due to the inherent uncertainty inevitable in any countrywide verification process that seeks to prove the absence of readily concealable objects or activities. This uncertainty is not helped by the lack of full transparency on the part of Iraq with regard to the provision of certain information.
It should, however, be recognized that this uncertainty does not prevent full implementation of the IAEA's plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) of Iraq's compliance with its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions. Indeed, as stated in document GOV/1998/44 - GC(42)/14, this uncertainty is factored into the OMV plan, which takes into account the extensive technological expertise developed by Iraq in the course of its clandestine nuclear programme, particularly regarding the production of weapon-usable nuclear material.
The Agency continues to focus most of its resources on the implementation and technical strengthening of its OMV plan. As part of these activities, the IAEA will continue to exercise its right to investigate further any aspect of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme through the follow-up of any new information that comes to its knowledge.
The recent decision by Iraq to suspend its co-operation with the IAEA and the United Nations Special Commission and to provide access only to "declared sites" means that Iraq will not facilitate the Agency's inspection of any new location, nor will it respond to any investigation of its clandestine nuclear programme. Under these circumstances, the IAEA is not able to implement in full its OMV plan - particularly the measures needed to ensure that the past programme will not be revived. Ongoing monitoring and verification constitute an integral whole and the assurances derived depend on the implementation of all the measures. At present, the level of assurance regarding Iraq's compliance with its obligations is significantly reduced.
Pursuant to resolution GC (41)/RES/25 of 3 October 1997... I have continued the consultations of my predecessors with States of the region to obtain additional and more detailed views on the early application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all nuclear activities in the region, as well as about the kind of material obligations which might eventually feature in a Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) Agreement...
Although commitment to nuclear non-proliferation continues to be voiced by all the parties concerned, including commitment to the objectives of the CTBT, views still differ with regard to the conditions and timing of applying full-scope safeguards to all nuclear activities in the region, and to the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East. Nonetheless, I will continue my consultations with the States concerned with the hope that tangible progress can be achieved.