



US President Dwight D. Eisenhower at the United Nations in December 1953 proposing the creation of an international atomic energy agency. See excerpts from the historic address on pages 8 and 9.

The IAEA, United Nations, and the new global nuclear agenda

Cooperative links in key areas have been strengthened in response to emerging challenges and opportunities

by Hans Blix

Radical changes in the global nuclear landscape after the Cold War have set the world on a compelling new course. Smaller nuclear arsenals, stronger bonds against the bomb's further spread, and renewed commitments for the atom's safe and peaceful use are all parts of the changing scene. The transformation is redefining the global nuclear agenda for the United Nations and the IAEA on the road to the next millennium.

Today's challenges and opportunities are rooted in the concerted international drive over the past half century to harness the atom and brighten prospects for a nuclear-weapons-free world. Despite positive steps and welcome shifts of attitude, there is a difficult distance to go. But key elements for sustaining progress are in place and the missing pieces are not hard to see.

The picture can be easily overshadowed by the many critical assessments and competing headlines of the day, especially in a year marking both the atomic bomb's horrific power and the anxious birth of the United Nations 50 years ago.

The UN and its system of organizations have come in for some particularly tough criticism. Whatever specific points at issue, the views are bound by common threads: the aspiration for a better and safer world, and the growing desire for greater confidence that one is being built. The UN was born as the world's instrument for international peace and security to meet humanity's highest hopes and greatest expectations, and in some ways it has been asked to carry out nearly impossible missions. As the "Atoms for Peace" organization within the UN system, the IAEA, too, is held to serve our highest standards and ideals. (See box, page 9.)

While some of the criticism and calls for reform are justified, many accusations are misplaced. Often discounted is the fact that no organization operates in a vacuum. Achievements, and shortcomings, are closely bound with fluid external events and internal realities of what members are willing to do, pay for, and politi-

cally support. At the global level, the members are sovereign States who do not always see eye-to-eye every step of the way. Efforts to bridge differences, build consensus, and coordinate actions can be a complex, lengthy process. While talking about problems is not enough, it is the first step to finding and implementing workable solutions for them.

Fortunately, the international climate now is more conducive to constructive action than during most of the UN's first half century. The polarized ideological debates of the cold war no longer threaten to deadlock the UN. The warmer climate has opened important new avenues of global cooperation, and is bringing new problems that must be solved to the tables of the UN and its family of organizations.

"The problems that confront the United Nations are also a challenge for the Member States that make up the United Nations and the peoples of the world whom the organization serves," UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali has recently written. "In these changed circumstances, there is a pressing need for governments and public opinion to decide what they want the United Nations to be, what they want it to do, and what they are willing to contribute to make it work."

In the past, a good deal of criticism has been directed at the lack of cohesion and coordination in the UN system. In my view, the criticism is not applicable to the IAEA and its relations with the UN in the nuclear sphere. Channels have long been in place for effective cooperative action in fields of nuclear non-proliferation and arms control, and the safe development of peaceful nuclear technologies.

Three events over the past decade — the Chernobyl nuclear plant accident in 1986, the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear-weapons

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programme in 1991, and the breakup of the Soviet Union into independent States in the 1990s — have particularly left their marks. The IAEA's agenda has adapted accordingly, to respond to new sets of problems and needs. Some programmes have been reoriented, others significantly strengthened. The overriding aim is to support States in building a stronger, more effective international framework for safe nuclear development. Allow me to more fully address some important aspects within the context of global developments and the Agency's roles within the UN system.

Securing a nuclear-weapons-free world

Most visibly in the 1990s, the IAEA and UN have demonstrated close, prompt, and effective interaction in areas of disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. The widely publicized nuclear inspections in Iraq — which the IAEA performs under the mandate given by the UN Security Council and with the cooperation of the UN Special Commission set up after the Gulf War — are a case in point. Through dozens of IAEA-led missions under the Council's mandate, inspectors discovered and mapped Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons programme, effectively moved to destroy or neutralize it, and activated a long-term monitoring and verification plan to prevent its revival.

The case tested the global community's resolve and the responsiveness of its mechanisms for sustained, coordinated and firm action. The IAEA's founders presciently vested the Agency with a right of direct access to the Security Council, where international authority for enforcement action is placed. The Council's determination to prevent proliferation was underscored in January 1992. In declaring that "the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security", the Council emphasized the integral role of effective IAEA safeguards in efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, and stated its readiness to take appropriate measures in the case of any safeguards violations notified by the IAEA.

In Iraq, the Council granted the IAEA inspectorate incomparably wider powers and access to more information than States normally do under its safeguards system. Lessons from the case have prompted States to accept verification measures, and to consider others, that greatly strengthen the Agency's confidential database and verification capabilities, especially with respect to detecting *undeclared* nuclear activities. The Agency's inspections to verify the nuclear material subject to safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) already have demonstrated that

these measures are working, albeit difficulties remain in securing the DPRK's full compliance with its safeguards agreement.

Overall, the Security Council has looked to the IAEA as the nuclear inspection arm of the UN system, and the IAEA has looked to the Council as the body politically responsible for ensuring compliance with nuclear non-proliferation undertakings. Building upon this established relationship is now of paramount importance as more arms-control agreements requiring verification are adopted or near completion, and the non-proliferation regime nears universality.

Forward movements. In May 1995, meeting at UN headquarters in New York, the 178 States party to the landmark Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) took important steps forward. (*See related article beginning on page 30.*) They indefinitely extended the NPT and confirmed that the NPT involved a commitment to nuclear disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States. They targeted 1996 for conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which is being negotiated under auspices of the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. States also called for an early conclusion of an agreement to cut off production of fissile materials for weapons purposes; they endorsed the creation of more nuclear-weapon-free zones; they expressed support for ongoing efforts aimed at more effective nuclear verification and IAEA safeguards; and they called for the provision of necessary resources for the Agency to meet its responsibilities under the NPT.

As the outcome of the NPT Conference made clear, there is near universal renunciation of the bomb. The overwhelming majority of States no longer see the acquisition of nuclear weapons as being in the best interests of their national security. Rather, these interests today are tied to social, environmental, and economic conditions where expensive nuclear *weapons* are useless tools but affordable *peaceful* nuclear techniques are valuable resources.

At the same time, more States are showing a readiness to make their nuclear programmes more transparent and open to IAEA inspection and verification. They are doing so in recognition of the need to provide credible assurance to their neighbours and the world that nuclear material and installations are used exclusively for peaceful purposes. Rather than limiting national sovereignty, nuclear transparency and verification are seen as means through which a State can enhance confidence in its non-nuclear weapon status and respect for its sovereignty.

Extremely positive moves have been made. South Africa rolled back its nuclear-weapons programme, joined the NPT, and fully cooper-

ated with subsequent IAEA verification measures. Both Argentina and Brazil have opened their nuclear sectors for inspection to each other and the IAEA, and nuclear-weapon-free zones pinned to IAEA verification are poised to come into being in Africa and into full force in Latin America and the Caribbean. Such a zone in the Middle East also is no longer just a utopian dream, in light of progress painstakingly achieved through the region's peace process.

Challenges. Not all States having significant nuclear activities have adhered to the NPT or accepted full-scope IAEA safeguards. That is one important missing piece of the non-proliferation regime. While these States do not say they house nuclear weapons or harbour ambitions to make them, they have so far not been willing to accept comprehensive international verification of their nuclear programmes. The hope for the future hinges on the resolution of underlying regional security problems and further progress in the nuclear disarmament field. A combination of measures will be needed, including those further reducing the nuclear arsenals of nuclear-weapon States, and fostering detente, security arrangements, and assurance that neighbours do not develop nuclear weapons. In the Middle East, for example, the IAEA is assisting States on future verification models and approaches within the framework of their desire to create a regional zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

Another challenge facing the global community is the anxiety over new risks following the breakup of the Soviet Union. In particular, the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials has raised concerns, both from the standpoint of radiation safety and nuclear security. Most of the cases reported and investigated so far, predominately in Europe, have involved material of an amount or nature not useful for weapons, and none has ultimately posed a serious proliferation or radiation risk. The illegal actions have set off an alarm, however, prompting strong countermeasures against such unauthorized and uncontrolled movement of nuclear material. States cooperatively are strengthening their internal and border surveillance systems, and the IAEA is executing an action plan to assist them in dealing with some aspects of the problem. The work includes the establishment of a databank on reported trafficking cases and advising States on effective systems of nuclear material accountancy and control. In July 1995, the President of the UN Security Council issued a statement underlining the Council's support for IAEA activities in this area.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union also gave rise to three new independent States with nuclear weapons on their territories, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. All three have joined the NPT as non-nuclear weapon States, and accepted

comprehensive IAEA safeguards. The actions reconfirm their commitments to remove all nuclear weapons from their territories, though these steps are envisaged over the longer term.

A number of other challenges emanate from emerging needs for effective verification in areas of nuclear disarmament and arms control.

New verification roles. The CTBT, cut-off agreement, and nuclear disarmament accords already reached or in sight will all require effective verification systems.

The nuclear test ban treaty will involve various types of verification measures and approaches, some of which States have noted could effectively be carried out by the IAEA. The treaty's obligations, for instance, will considerably overlap relevant provisions of the NPT, under which the IAEA already implements verification measures in non-nuclear weapon States. Some States envisage the IAEA being entrusted with further verification tasks under the CTBT.

The cut-off agreement foresees a non-discriminatory ban on the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons purposes. Here, too, the IAEA's relevant experience is being recognized. Under the NPT, the Agency applies safeguards to the types of installations that would be subject to verification under a cut-off agreement.

Under disarmament agreements, large amounts of nuclear material will arise from the dismantling of nuclear warheads. While the nuclear-weapon States will verify actual dismantlement of weapons, that is not necessarily the case for verification of the recovered plutonium and highly enriched uranium. Since late last year, the IAEA has been safeguarding some stored quantities of weapons-usable nuclear material in the United States, and it could provide similar verification in Russia or other nuclear-weapon States as decisions are taken.

Stockpiles of plutonium and enriched uranium are projected to grow considerably in years ahead, both as a result of weapons dismantlement and commercial nuclear operations. The Agency already is working with States on methods and approaches that are needed for effectively safeguarding these materials — whether they are kept in storage, disposed of as waste, or recycled as fuel in nuclear plants for electricity generation.

Expanding legal framework. In all these areas of non-proliferation and arms control, the established legal nuclear framework will expand as new agreements are reached. We know from experience, however, that agreements cannot be built on trust alone. They invariably call for confidence-building measures, notably effective verification. The more that armed forces and armaments are reduced, the more States will need to be confident that commitments are being

observed, respected, and credibly verified.

The IAEA's efforts to strengthen its verification system aim at providing more credible assurances about the correctness and completeness of declared nuclear inventories under NPT safeguards agreements, and thus about the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. Measures already in place and planned call for greater cooperation from States. That governments are supporting them signals the growing importance they place upon raising the world's level of nuclear security, and reinforcing confidence in its global guardians.

Nuclear safety & sustainable development

As in the safeguards field, new challenges and opportunities are influencing directions to ensure safe nuclear development. Many activities greatly contribute to realizing global objectives for sustainable development under Agenda 21 adopted at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development.

High on the agenda are issues of nuclear and radiation safety. Since the devastating Chernobyl accident in 1986, States have adopted three safety-related international conventions under IAEA auspices and are now working on others. The adopted agreements, which all set legally binding rules, cover the early notification of nuclear accidents; the provision of assistance in the case of nuclear emergencies; and fundamental requirements and mechanisms for ensuring the safety of nuclear power plants. Under preparation is a convention covering the safe management of radioactive waste, and a revision of the Vienna Convention on liability for nuclear damage. Additionally, parties to the London Convention, under auspices of the UN's International Maritime Organization, have adopted an international ban on the dumping of radioactive waste at sea, assigning the IAEA new responsibilities.

These global steps do not transfer jurisdiction from national authorities who remain chiefly responsible for nuclear and radiation safety. They do, however, underline the growing awareness among States that safety levels must be high everywhere, and that basic rules should be respected by all.

In many instances, the work draws upon and augments the IAEA's extensive base of safety standards and services. Over the past years, for example, fundamental standards for nuclear power plants, and for radiation protection in fields of medicine, agriculture, and industry, have been revised. International organizations ranging from the World Health Organization (WHO) to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and International Labour Office

(ILO) have been involved in these efforts. In 1996, the IAEA will be updating its recommendations covering the safe transport of radioactive materials, which regulators apply worldwide for shipments on land, by sea, and by air.

The effects of radiation releases on human health and the environment also are drawing close attention. Building upon its sponsorship of the International Chernobyl Project in the early 1990s, the IAEA is organizing with WHO and the European Commission a major international symposium in April 1996, a decade after the accident. The scientific meeting will factually assess Chernobyl's radiological consequences, in light of continuing speculation over its health and environmental effects.

Some special needs have arisen in countries of Central and Eastern Europe. They include upgrading levels of safety at nuclear plants of Chernobyl design, as well as other types of power reactors; improving regulation and control of radiation sources and their safe use; and coordinating actions to strengthen global cooperation with Russia in areas of radioactive waste management and environmental restoration.

Nuclear power and energy needs. Greater attention to issues of global safety should not mask the overall nuclear record, which is excellent. The world's 432 nuclear power plants, for example, generate about 17% of the world's total electricity, and far higher shares in many countries. Their normal operation has little environmental impact. As the environmentally conscious Club of Rome has noted and many States have realized in practice, nuclear power is a greener option than those emitting carbon dioxide and other gases as waste products threatening the atmosphere.

As sustainable development brings better living conditions to a growing world population, greater use of energy, especially electricity, will be demanded. Where will it come from? Extensive analyses of energy options are needed to factually frame answers. The IAEA and several other international organizations are assisting in comparative assessments of the benefits and problems of different electrical power options, including nuclear energy.

Nuclear techniques and development. Most States do not have nuclear power plants, but they do apply nuclear techniques in many other ways. Being emphasized today are applications targeted at improving the production and preservation of food, health care services, industrial production processes, and fresh water supplies, a problem of growing magnitude.

Working with a range of UN partners, the IAEA is carrying out projects to improve crop yields and pest controls in Bangladesh, China,

and Mali, for example, and to strengthen health screening programmes of newborn infants in Tunisia and Uruguay. At the same time, desalination of seawater is drawing attention from countries in North Africa and the Middle East confronted with serious water needs. Agency specialists are examining the technology's potential. Studies include analysis of possible coupling schemes with nuclear reactors to meet both desalination's energy requirements and the electricity needs of local factories, households, and businesses.

Throughout these and other IAEA-supported projects, countries are building up their capacity and skills for safely applying nuclear techniques to achieve key development goals. To maximize project benefits, stretch its limited resources, and bring the needed scientific expertise to bear on specific problems, the Agency is now reinforcing its ties with national and regional development agencies and banks, as well as with other global organizations.

Building for the future

As we critically reflect upon the changing world in this commemorative year, loud headlines should not obscure the quiet achievements of global cooperation. The record reflects substantial progress, giving us much to build upon.

In a climate favouring nuclear cooperation rather than confrontation, renewed efforts to uplift human standards of living have a greater chance of fruition. Disarmament is integral to the pace of progress. So, too, are advances in other fields — notably telecommunications, biotechnology, and branches of science and medicine that will expand our access to knowledge and understanding of earth and human life systems.

We have learned first hand that the world's security cannot be defined by the military dimension alone. At the personal level, human security fundamentally embodies safety from threats of hunger and disease.

The military side of the equation has tended to dominate thoughts — and national budgets. That is starting to change, as countries cut back military spending, overall at a 3% annual rate since 1987. The UN has estimated that the reduction — the so-called peace dividend — has amounted to an estimated US \$935 billion worldwide between 1987-94. Unfortunately so far, not much of that peace dividend has been rechanneled for social and environmental development — or for what might be called "sustainable disarmament".

Coming decisions will greatly influence capabilities to meet the needs of global human

security, in all its growing dimensions. In the next century — as we heard so dramatically at the United Nations Conference on Population and Development in Cairo — there will be millions more citizens of the world. The headlines tell us the population bomb is ticking, that it took 10,000 generations for the world to reach two billion people but only 46 years — about the UN's lifetime — for the population to triple.

The future is clear in its problems. Yet as UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali has noted, it is in many ways more uncertain and complicated as to solutions. Hard work, greater cooperation, and resources are demanded. This is especially true in the nuclear sphere, where the global foundation — tested and strengthened over the past decade — must now be even more firmly supported to meet the challenges and opportunities before us. □

IAEA-supported projects are helping countries use nuclear techniques for their social and economic development.



ATOMS FOR PEACE

Forty-two years ago this December, US President Dwight D. Eisenhower made an historic address to the 8th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. On 8 December 1953, President Eisenhower proposed the creation of an international atomic energy agency. That proposal led to the IAEA. Excerpts follow:

I feel impelled to speak today in a language that in a sense is new, one which I, who have spent so much of my life in the military profession, would have preferred never to use. That new language is the language of atomic warfare.

The atomic age has moved forward at such a pace that every citizen of the world should have some comprehension, at least in comparative terms, of the extent of this development, of the utmost significance to every one of us. Clearly, if the peoples of the world are to conduct an intelligent search for peace, they must be armed with the significant facts of today's existence.

My recital of atomic danger and power is necessarily stated in United States terms, for these are the only incontrovertible facts that I know. I need hardly point out to this Assembly, however, that this subject is global, not merely national in character.

On 16 July 1945, the United States set off the world's biggest atomic explosion. Since that date in 1945, the United States of America has conducted forty-two test explosions. Atomic bombs are more than twenty-five times as powerful as the weapons with which the atomic age dawned, while hydrogen weapons are in the ranges of millions of tons of TNT equivalent.

Today, the United States stockpile of atomic weapons, which, of course, increases daily, exceeds by many times the total equivalent of the total of all bombs and all shells that came from every plane and every gun in every theatre of war in all the years of the Second World War. A single air group whether afloat or land based, can now deliver to any reachable target a destructive cargo exceeding in power all the bombs that fell on Britain in all the Second World War.

In size and variety, the development of atomic weapons has been no less remarkable. The development has been such that atomic weapons have virtually achieved conventional status within our armed services. In the United States, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Marine Corps are all capable of putting this weapon to military use.

But the dread secret and the fearful engines of atomic might are not ours alone.

In the first place, the secret is possessed by our friends and allies, the United Kingdom and Canada, whose scientific genius made a tremendous contribution to our original discoveries and the designs of atomic bombs.

The secret is also known by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has informed us that, over recent years, it has devoted extensive resources to atomic weapons. During this period the Soviet Union has exploded a series of atomic devices, including at least one involving thermo-nuclear reactions.

If at one time the United States possessed what might have been called a monopoly of atomic power, that monopoly ceased to exist several years ago. Therefore, although our earlier start has permitted us to accumulate what is today a great quantitative advantage, the atomic realities of today comprehend two facts of even greater significance. First, the knowledge now possessed by several nations will eventually be shared by others, possibly all

others. Second, even a vast superiority in numbers of weapons, and a consequent capability of devastating retaliation, is no preventive, of itself, against the fearful material damage and toll of human lives that would be inflicted by surprise aggression...

I know that in a world divided, such as ours today, salvation cannot be attained by one dramatic act. I know that many steps will have to be taken over many months before the world can look at itself one day and truly realize that a new climate of mutually peaceful confidence is abroad in the world. But I know, above all else, that we must start to take these steps — now...

There is at least one new avenue of peace which has not been well explored — an avenue now laid out by the General Assembly of the United Nations. In its resolution of 28 November 1953 (resolution 715 (VIII)) this General Assembly suggested: "that the Disarmament Commission study the desirability of establishing a sub-committee consisting of representatives of the Powers principally involved, which should seek in private an acceptable solution and report...on such a solution to the General Assembly and to the Security Council not later than 1 September 1954.

The United States, heeding the suggestion of the General Assembly of the United Nations, is instantly prepared to meet privately with such other countries as may be "principally involved", to seek "an acceptable solution" to the atomic armaments race which overshadows not only the peace, but the very life, of the world. We shall carry into these private or diplomatic talks a new conception.

The United States would seek more than the mere reduction or elimination of atomic materials for military purposes. It is not enough to take this weapon out of the hands of the soldiers. It must be put into the hands of those who will know how to strip its military casing and adapt it to the arts of peace. The United States knows that if the fearful trend of atomic military build-up can be reversed, this greatest of destructive forces can be developed into a great boon, for the benefit of all mankind. The United States knows that peaceful power from atomic energy is no dream of the future. The capability, already proved, is here today. Who can doubt that, if the entire body of the world's scientists and engineers had adequate amounts of fissionable material with which to test and develop their ideas, this capability would rapidly be transformed into universal, efficient and economic usage?

To hasten the day when fear of the atom will begin to disappear from the minds the people and the governments of the East and West, there are certain steps that can be taken now.

I therefore make the following proposal.

The governments principally involved, to the extent permitted by elementary prudence, should begin now and continue to make joint contributions from their stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable materials to an international atomic energy agency. We would expect that such an agency would be set up under the aegis of the United Nations. The ratios of contributions, the procedures and other details would properly be within the scope of the "private conversations" I referred to earlier.

The United States is prepared to undertake these explorations in good faith. Any partner of the United States acting in the same good faith will find the United States a not unreasonable or ungenerous associate.

Undoubtedly, initial and early contributions to this plan would be small in quantity. However, the proposal has the great virtue

that it can be undertaken without the irritations and mutual suspicions incident to any attempt to set up a completely acceptable system of world-wide inspection and control.

The atomic energy agency could be made responsible for the impounding, storage and protection of the contributed fissionable and other materials. The ingenuity of our scientists will provide special safe conditions under which such a bank of fissionable material can be made essentially immune to surprise seizure.

The more important responsibility of this atomic energy agency would be to devise methods whereby this fissionable material would be allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind. Experts would be mobilized to apply atomic energy to the needs of agriculture, medicine and other peaceful activities. A special purpose would be to provide abundant electrical energy in the power-starved areas of the world.

Thus the contributing Powers would be dedicating some of their strength to serve the needs rather than the fears of mankind.

The United States would be more than willing — it would be proud to take up with others “principally involved” the development of plans whereby such peaceful use of atomic energy would be expedited. Of those “principally involved” the Soviet Union must, of course, be one.

I would be prepared to submit to the Congress of the United States, and with every expectation of approval, any such plan that would, first, encourage world-wide investigation into the most effective peacetime uses of fissionable material, and with the certainty that the investigators had all the material needed for the

conducting of all experiments that were appropriate; second, begin to diminish the potential destructive power of the world’s atomic stockpiles; third, allow all peoples of all nations to see that, in this enlightened age, the great Powers of the earth, both of the East and of the West, are interested in human aspirations first rather than in building up the armaments of war; fourth, open up a new channel for peaceful discussion and initiative, at least a new approach to the many difficult problems that must be solved in both private and public conversations if the world is to shake off the inertia imposed by fear and is to make positive progress towards peace.

Against the dark background of the atomic bomb, the United States does not wish merely to present strength, but also the desire and the hope for peace.

The coming months will be fraught with fateful decisions. In this Assembly, in the capitals and military headquarters of the world, in the hearts of men everywhere, be they governed or governors, may they be the decisions which will lead this world out of fear and into peace. To the making of these fateful decisions, the United States pledges before you, and therefore before the world, its determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma — to devote its entire heart and mind to finding the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life.

The IAEA and United Nations

Within the UN system, the IAEA is an autonomous organization in its own right. Often thought of as the “Atoms for Peace” organization, the Agency traces its origins to the vision of US President Dwight Eisenhower. In December 1953, Eisenhower proposed to the UN General Assembly in New York the creation of an international atomic energy agency to harness the atom for the benefit of humanity. In 1954, the General Assembly set the proposal in motion, and a group was formed to define the new agency’s mandate.

The IAEA Statute was approved on 26 October 1956 at an international conference held at UN headquarters in New York, and the Agency came into existence in Vienna, Austria, on 29 July 1957. In November 1957, the General Assembly approved an agreement on the IAEA’s relationship with the UN. The IAEA reports annually to the General Assembly and, whenever necessary, to the Security Council, which has primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, and the Economic and Social Council, which coordinates developmental work of the UN and its specialized agencies.

Today, the Agency has 122 Member States who are directly involved in most aspects of nuclear energy’s global development. The global role of the IAEA is basically twofold: One, to help interested countries put peaceful nuclear technologies to work for beneficial applications in fields such as electricity production, health care, agricultural development, and industry. And two, to monitor civil nuclear activities, at the request of a State, to verify that safeguarded nuclear materials are not diverted to military purposes. This dual role has many dimensions. The IAEA’s technical cooperation programme comprises nearly 1400 projects in about 90 developing countries, at a value of about US \$50 million. Additionally, some 150 IAEA-supported research programmes are in some phase of operation around the world. Nearly 3000 experts are sent each year to developing countries to run training courses, for example, and more than 1000 scientific fellows and visiting scientists receive hands-on experience each year, at national or regional institutes, or at one of the IAEA’s three research centres and laboratories.

Activities related to safeguards and verification are fundamentally based on the Agency’s Statute and safeguards agreements concluded with States. At the end of 1994, there were 843 nuclear facilities under safeguards, including facilities and other locations containing nuclear material. Safeguards agreements have been concluded with 118 States, including 102 States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, under which the IAEA is the designated inspectorate.