



# Nuclear non-proliferation: Survey of some recent publications

by Georges Delcoigne

Since the last NPT Review Conference in 1980 and especially in the past two to three years, an increasing number of studies, publications, and books have appeared on nuclear non-proliferation showing the wide range of political thinking on the matter mainly in the West, and particularly in the United States.

Under the title *The Arms Race in the 1980s*, edited by D. Carlton and C. Schaerf, (MacMillan Press Ltd., London, 1982), Ian Smart stresses that the best way to limit the risks of proliferation and ensure supplies is the establishment of multinational consortia for enrichment and reprocessing. Advancing another view, P. Lellouche warns about cartels and their image on potential customers in fuel-cycle services, while F. Calderon describes the Latin American nuclear-free-zone concept, and Platias and Rydell examine prospects for the Balkans.

Under nearly the same title as the reported conference, *Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s: Perspectives and Proposals*, edited by W. Kincade and C. Bertram, (MacMillan Press Ltd., London, 1982), organizationally follows what has become a familiar presentation: Part one analyses why nations go nuclear; part two describes the garrison States (P. Lellouche) and the prestige ones interested in joining the nuclear club. The final parts of the book indicate the limitations of various approaches and cover the NPT (Duffy) as seen from the developing world and its future. Missing, however, is a description of the safeguards system.

In *Controlling the Bomb: Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s*, (Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn.,

1982), L. Dunn covers the whole historical background up to present policies with their inherent contradictions. The arguments to contain the "outcropping" of proliferation as well as the possible courses of action are all reviewed before the presentation of a "three-fold strategy" (trade control, sanctions, security guarantees and confidence-building measures, particularly regional ones) to ensure a pattern of slow and limited proliferation, as was the case for the first decade of the NPT.

The difficulties in diplomacy and the conflicting views of industry are very clearly exposed in *Nuclear Power Struggles: Industrial Competition and Proliferation Control*, by W. Walker, W.B. Walker, and M. Lönnroth, (Allen & Unwin, London, 1983). This book presents perhaps the clearest expose of the interaction between industry and government. The authors' analysis leads them to a "dilemma to which there is no obvious solution" and that concerns the nuclear trade policy towards States not party to the non-proliferation regime.

The dilemma could lead to a very sombre outlook, which is presented by A. and L. Lovins and P. O'Hefferman in *The First Nuclear World War*, (W. Morrow & Co., New York, 1983). The authors combine fiction with analyses to promote, with their usual fervour, a world without nuclear nightmare and without nuclear power. Under this view, the IAEA could supervise the demise of the nuclear industry until nuclear power plants are phased out to be replaced by soft technologies.

The general commitment to non-proliferation as a key factor in world peace is evident in the work undertaken and the reports supported mainly by grants from private associations and foundations. The Stanley

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Foundation Report, *The US and the Future of the Non-Proliferation Regime*, (New York, 1984), focuses on IAEA safeguards, the non-proliferation regime, and the Third NPT Review Conference. It suggests that the non-proliferation regime should be "re-packaged" from a trade-off approach to promote the realization that a strong regime is of benefit to all nations. The progress under Article VI of NPT should be an essential part of the package, which would include the strengthening of the IAEA and the implementation of full-scope safeguards.

The United Nations Association (UNA) of the USA in *Nuclear Proliferation: Towards a Global Restraint*, (New York, 1984), finds that proliferation is a symptom of a larger illness – the continued use of violence or threats as a means of settling international disputes. The study, done after consultation of all UNA chapters in the country, recognizes that, while both the NPT and IAEA are the first bulwarks against proliferation, any agenda for future measures to deal with the problem must address the basic question of regional insecurities and conflicts. That is why it gives so much attention to confidence-building measures and nuclear-weapon-free zones and suggests a programme of regional conferences to discuss IAEA safeguards as one of a series of possible confidence-building measures.

*The Strategies for Managing Nuclear Proliferation, Economic and Political Issues*, edited by Brito, Intriligator, and Wick (Lexington Books, 1983), is a result of a 1982 conference at Tulane University in the United States that features reports from a number of noted experts in the field. G. Rochlin presents a series of economic-oriented strategies to prevent proliferation while T. Graham argues that economic costs would deter almost no nation from developing nuclear weapons. W. Potter highlights and assesses the prospects for super-power co-operation in this field, and K. Waltz summarizes his Adelphi Paper theory that a nuclear weapon spread would enhance international stability. G. Quester insists that the most powerful argument of all against proliferation is the potential emotional instability of some leaders. Also included is S. Meyer's study on minimizing the long-term risks of proliferation and evaluating alternative non-proliferation policies. His study is based on the interaction of nuclear propensity (evaluation of incentives and disincentives); salience (impact on regional stability); lag-time (time available for anti-proliferation interventions); and treatability (the degree to which a country is responsive to such intervention). This study previewed his more recent book on dynamics of nuclear proliferation, in which he uses mathematical models to analyse the nuclear technological capacity of certain countries and their political propensity to proliferate. He finds no support for the "technological imperative" hypothesis: relative capacity does not distinguish States that go nuclear from those that do not. Rather, a systematic analysis from the historical record strongly supports the motivational hypothesis and shows that many motivational profiles can influence proliferation decisions.

In *International Nuclear Technology Transfer, Dilemmas of Dissemination and Control*, (Croom Helm, London, 1984), B. Schiff argues that the existing range of benefits and sanctions that make up the present international nuclear non-proliferation regime will not be able to persuade countries to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons. His analysis of IAEA safeguards and of their linkage to transfer of technology leads him to conclude that the biggest threat to the regime is a decreasing willingness by the consumer States to tolerate limitations on their concept of sovereignty.

In *Non-Proliferation: The Why and the Wherefore*, edited by Joseph Goldblatt, (SIPRI, Stockholm, 1985), a series of authors examine the attitudes of a selection of countries towards nuclear non-proliferation – those that, with varying degrees of popular support, have been in favour of acquiring nuclear weapons or at least of keeping open the option to do so, and those that have decided that their interests are best served by joining the NPT. A critique of motivation and incentives, as well as suggestions, are put forward on how to attract the holdouts and thereby strengthen the non-proliferation regime. Data on the activities of the 15 selections (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, Egypt, France, India, Israel, Pakistan, the Republic of Korea, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, as well as Taiwan, China) are given in detail.

This same kind of description arises from Leonard Spector's book, *Nuclear Proliferation Today*, (New York, 1985), although more from a US point of view. This work, supported by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, is very thorough and runs 478 pages so that one wonders where the material can be found to make it an annual event, as is proposed. The assertion that "a Pakistani nuclear capability would mean that the non-proliferation regime had proven impotent" is difficult to support logically. How can a treaty be rendered impotent by the actions of a non-party?

In contrast, it is interesting to note that G. Rochlin has differentiated the NPT as a formal treaty whose original purpose was to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to those countries which, in the mid-1960s, were moving rapidly towards the capability of nuclear-weapon production (the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Sweden). That these countries were not seeking the capability is not the point. Rather, the point, as he says, is that the NPT has succeeded in reinforcing the will of over 120 States not to seek nuclear weapons and in providing mutual reassurance among that group. The other regime which Rochlin describes as a less formal one concerns the small group of States which stand outside a formal commitment. The NPT regime cannot force States to eschew nuclear weapons. Its purpose is mainly to reinforce a prior decision to do so.

These discussions about motivations and disincentives are not entirely absent from two more recent books. One is entitled *Safeguarding the Atom, A Critical Appraisal*, by D.A.V. Fischer and Paul Szaz, and edited by

J. Goldblatt, (SIPRI, Stockholm, 1985), and is a study of IAEA's safeguards system. Its detailed review reveals a series of shortcomings both avoidable and unavoidable. In particular, it proposes ways of improving existing safeguards procedures and adapting them to the political and technological changes in recent years. The point is made that the nuclear safeguards system is of interest for arms control in general and for the verification of compliance in particular.

The other book is *Nuclear Connection*, edited by A. Weinberg, M. Alonso, and J.N. Barkenbus, (Paragon House Publishers, New York, 1984). This book includes a chapter on national policy issues written by D.A.V. Fischer, the co-author mentioned above and formerly with the IAEA, in which a more broadly based consensus on firmer nuclear supply policies as a partial solution to proliferation is sought. As Fischer says, "The ability of the original inventors to control the spread of any new technology erodes with time."

The more political analysis, *Nuclear Proliferation: Facing Reality*, edited by J.J. Holst and H. Müller for the Centre for European Policy Studies (Brussels, 1985), insists on how essential superpower co-operation is for the non-proliferation regime. Facing reality means admitting that a certain degree and kind of proliferation, namely the spread of nuclear-weapon options among a handful of countries, is a fact of life. At the same time, it means that proliferation remains dangerous and that nuclear non-proliferation policy is both necessary and not without chances of success — if we are to judge from past experience. It also means that the easy ways out — re-defining proliferation as benign, wishing away nuclear power, and freezing the *status quo* through

denial — are wishful thinking. The editors contend that such a policy cannot be separated entirely from major trends in world politics, particularly North-South relations, and that ironically the proliferation problem cases of today are needed to preserve the non-proliferation regime of tomorrow.

As is evident, literature on the subject is not lacking — at least two other major publications on these issues have been announced for publication before the end of 1985, and one of them will appear only after the Third Review Conference on the NPT.

Throughout the publications reviewed here — which in general show a more realistic approach than comparable literature of the end of the 1970s — the following themes recur in one form or another:

- The necessity of superpower co-operation to ensure the continued success of the NPT
- The need for national authorities to consider the issue of non-proliferation in the wider context of foreign policy issues
- The usefulness of international safeguards both as a confidence-building measure and as a possible example for other arms control agreements

Is there anything missing from this broad picture?

Over the past decades, there has been a notable increase in the number of independent States and nuclear armaments, as well as easier access to nuclear military technology at lower costs. During this same lapse of time, however, the nuclear non-proliferation regime has grown. Perhaps what is needed is an assessment of the reasons for the success of the present non-proliferation regime.

