

Information Circular

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Communication from the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the Agency

1. On 14 July 2025, the Secretariat received a Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the Agency.
2. As requested, the Note Verbale is herewith circulated for the information of all Member States.

ПОСТОЯННОЕ ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЬСТВО
РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ
ПРИ МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫХ ОРГАНИЗАЦИЯХ
В ВЕНЕ



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The Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna presents its compliments to the Secretariat of the International Atomic Energy Agency and has the honour to request to circulate among all IAEA Member States as soon as possible the comments on the June report of the IAEA Director General “Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in Ukraine” (GOV/2025/26).

The latest report of the IAEA Director General R.Grossi still contains the distortions regularly highlighted by the Russian side: extensive quotations from anti-Russian resolutions of the UN General Assembly and the Agency's policy-making organs, statements that the Zaporozhskaya NPP (ZNPP) allegedly belongs to Ukraine and that it is subject to the Ukraine's safeguards agreement, as well as refusal to acknowledge that the Kiev's actions are the real source of threats to the plant.

The document ignores objective Russian data on Ukraine's provocations against the ZNPP and is largely based on false claims by Kiev. In particular, the unsubstantiated statements of the Ministry of Energy of Ukraine about the alleged Russian responsibility for damage to the power transmission line in the area of the “Ferrosplavnaya” electrical substation are cited (paragraph 49). In this regard, we encourage the IAEA Member States to use the relevant Russian information circulars as a reference.

The visits by the IAEA Secretariat experts to Ukrainian energy infrastructure facilities mentioned in section B.1.2 of the report fall far beyond the objectives and

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functions of the Agency set out in the Statute, which does not give the organization any authority to assess the state of a country's energy infrastructure, especially in situations of armed conflict. Thus, such visits by the Secretariat experts cannot be considered as activities within the scope of the IAEA's statutory functions.

We note the repeated references in the document to a so-called “ISAMZ”, namely “the IAEA Support and Assistance mission to the ZNPP”. There are no “IAEA missions” at this Russian plant. The Secretariat experts are at the ZNPP upon the invitation of the Russian side solely as a gesture of our goodwill.

In the context of rotations of the IAEA Secretariat specialists at the ZNPP, we recall that Ukraine has repeatedly attempted to disrupt them, resorting to the provocations and direct attacks on the Secretariat experts and Russian personnel accompanying them. It was therefore decided, that further on rotations of the Secretariat specialists would be conducted exclusively through the Russian territory. The timeframe for the provision of security assurances and the modalities for ensuring the safe presence of the Secretariat experts at the ZNPP are determined by the Russian side.

We note that the report is still built around the idea of monitoring the implementation of the “seven pillars” previously articulated by the Director General R.Grossi for ensuring nuclear safety and security of nuclear installations during an armed conflict and the “five principles” for protecting the ZNPP. The IAEA Secretariat gives a free interpretation of these provisions and in every possible way moves away from identifying that the only source of threats to the ZNPP are provocations from Ukraine. The so-called “seven pillars” are further discredited by the lack of condemnation by the IAEA Secretariat of the Israeli and USA missile and bomb attacks against nuclear facilities in Iran.

The document still contains the distortions that are in the reporting by Secretariat experts at the ZNPP, who continue to complain about the alleged lack of full and unrestricted access to all plant facilities, but at the same time carefully list all minor flaws they noticed, such as untied screws. We consider such criticism from

the Secretariat experts to be completely unfounded, especially against the backdrop of the unprecedented level of transparency in the history of the IAEA, that is demonstrated by the Russian side. The report openly obscures the efforts of the Russian authorities and organizations in modernizing the ZNPP equipment and ensuring its safety and effective functioning.

The Secretariat's comments regarding the lack of interaction between the management of the ZNPP and the Ukrainian nuclear regulatory authority look absurd. On the territory of the Russian nuclear facility – the ZNPP – our competent authority, Rostekhnadzor, carries out constant federal state supervision. It is also authorized to conduct inspections at the plant, and Secretariat experts regularly participate in these activities. As of June 2025, Rostekhnadzor specialists conducted 110 control and supervision procedures at the plant, 39 of them in the presence of IAEA Secretariat specialists. Communication between the ZNPP and Rostekhnadzor is carried out on a 24-hour basis.

We note the inaccuracies in the information provided by the IAEA Secretariat regarding the number of staff at the ZNPP. The report indicates “approximately 2100 persons on working days, and approximately 300 persons on weekends and designated holidays” (paragraph 44). In fact, as of June 2, 2025, the total number of personnel at the ZNPP with whom employment contracts have been concluded, is 4817, of which 1012 are operational personnel.

We are puzzled with regard to the detailed listing of drones that were allegedly observed near Ukrainian nuclear power plants, especially considering the apparent silence about the threats that Ukrainian UAVs, missiles and artillery pose to the ZNPP. It is completely unclear on what basis the Agency Secretariat experts draw conclusions about the “increased stress” among the personnel of the Chornobyl, Khmelnytsky, Rivne and South Ukraine NPPs, given the lack of appropriate medical qualifications, and why in this case the report does not mention the psychological pressure on the employees of the ZNPP and their family members from the Ukrainian military and special services.

We note that on May 21 and June 5, 2025, the armed forces of Ukraine (AFU) carried out a series of attacks against the ZNPP training center using UAVs, as a result of which the roof of this facility was damaged. On June 27, 2025, the AFU attacked with the use of UAVs a group of the ZNPP employees, who were carrying out activities on the plant's hydrotechnical constructions. Regrettably, these provocations by Kiev did not receive due condemnation by the Agency's leadership.

Thus, such reports demonstrate political bias and do not add credibility to the leadership of the IAEA.

The Permanent Mission requests the Secretariat to promptly circulate this Note Verbale as IAEA information circular.

The Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the IAEA Secretariat the assurances of its highest consideration.

Vienna, " 14 " July 2025