Communication dated 19 November 2021 from the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the Agency

1. The Secretariat has received a communication dated 19 November 2021 from the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the Agency.

2. As requested by the Permanent Mission, the communication is circulated herewith.
The Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna presents its compliments to the Secretariat of the International Atomic Energy Agency and has the honour to forward an unofficial document for the upcoming meetings of the IAEA Board of Governors (24–26 November 2021) containing the Russian Federation’s position on the AUKUS trilateral partnership and its implications. The Permanent Mission would be grateful if the enclosed document could be distributed as an IAEA Information Circular.

The Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Secretariat the assurances of its highest consideration.

Enc.: as indicated, 2 pages

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Vienna, 19 November 2021
For the session of the IAEA Board of Governors
(Vienna, November 24-26, 2021)

Approach of the Russian Federation to
AUKUS Trilateral Security Partnership and its implications

Russia continues to closely follow the developments regarding the creation of AUKUS Trilateral Security Partnership by Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States announced on September 15, 2021. The essence of this initiative and possible implications of its implementation raise numerous questions.

Establishment of AUKUS provokes tensions in the international security and creates environment for a new spiral of arms race not only in the Asia Pacific region, but in the much broader context.

Plans to use the framework of AUKUS to build nuclear-powered submarines for the Australian Navy by the United States and the United Kingdom have a destabilizing effect on the NPT regime. Australia will receive nuclear materials and facilities that, in the NPT non-nuclear-weapon states, should be placed under the IAEA safeguards. Full control and continuity of knowledge should be ensured with regard to nuclear materials and facilities that will be supplied to Australia, including by providing all the necessary access for the Agency’s inspectors. Uncertainties in such a sensitive area are fraught with risks for the entire system of the IAEA safeguards. Under any circumstances it is of utmost importance to ensure implementation of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement between Australia and the IAEA and its Additional Protocol.

It is of serious concern how this correlates with Australia’s obligations under the Modified Code 3.1 that requires countries to inform the Agency about construction of new nuclear facilities no later than when the relevant decision has been made. As far as we understand from the AUKUS Joint Leaders Statement of September 15, such decision has been taken already. If so, we are dealing with a serious violation of the Modified Code 3.1 obligations by Australia.
It remains unclear what kind of nuclear fuel will be used in these submarines' reactors. Should it be highly enriched uranium (HEU), that is currently more commonly used for nuclear naval propulsion, the question is how this correlates with the idea of HEU minimization that has been aggressively promoted by the US and Australia on the international arena. We have no doubt that while implementing the intentions indicated under AUKUS, Australia and the US will simply turn the blind eye to this inconsistency for the sake of straightening their own military capabilities.

We noted with concern statements by Australian officials regarding readiness to receive on its territory all types of the US military aircraft under AUKUS. In this context we would like to remind that the New START prohibits heavy bombers to be based outside the national territory of each Party.

AUKUS parties claim that the partnership will not be used to hand over nuclear weapons. However, the existing practice of the so-called "nuclear sharing missions" within NATO in violation of the NPT forces us to take into account the risk of such actions to be spread to Australia as well.

The plans by the US and the UK to build military infrastructure on the Australian soil raises questions with regard to Canberra's good faith as a State Party to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga). Deployment of troops and arms of nuclear-weapon-states in Australia puts into doubt the provision of this country with security assurances that it is entitled to as a participant of the nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ). Canberra's actions basically undermine confidence in the idea of NWFZ itself.

We assume that any verification arrangement to be made between the IAEA and AUKUS must be subject to the approval of the IAEA Board of Governors.