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Information Circular

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Communication dated 11 January 2017 to the Agency sent on behalf of High Representative Mogherini in her capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission established under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

1. The Director General has received a communication dated 11 January 2017 from the European External Action Service (EEAS) referencing the letter sent by the EEAS to the Director General on 21 December 2016 (contained in INFCIRC/907 of 23 December 2016) and attaching an additional document endorsed by all participants of the Joint Commission.
2. As requested, the communication and the attached document are herewith circulated for the information of all Member States.



Brussels, 11th January 2017
Ares(2017)

Dear Director General,

With reference to my letter sent to you on 21 December 2016, I am herewith transmitting one additional document, which has been endorsed by all participants of the Joint Commission.

The submission of this document is subject to the modalities set out in my letter of 21 December 2016.

Yours sincerely,



Helga Maria Schmid

H.E. Mr Yukiya Amano
Director General
International Atomic Energy Agency

Enclosed: Joint Commission Document of 10 January 2017

**Decision of the Joint Commission
Established by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action**

Iran briefed the Joint Commission on its plan, following the IAEA's safeguards-related nuclear material accountancy activities in the Enriched UO₂ Powder Plant (EUPP). The Joint Commission has considered and approved the plan in accordance with the parameters below, under its authority in consulting and providing guidance on implementation matters. This decision of the Joint Commission represents a common understanding of the scope of the relevant commitments of the JCPOA.

1. Low enriched uranium (LEU) hold up in the EUPP equipment, which is deemed unrecoverable in accordance with the process described below, is not part of Iran's enriched uranium stockpile as specified in the JCPOA provided that Iran does not build or operate any facility capable of recovering LEU from such hold up for 15 years starting from Implementation Day. If, in the future, Iran introduces enriched uranium into the EUPP equipment, the process described below may be used to deem future equivalent EUPP hold up in the portions specified in paragraph 2 as unrecoverable.
2. LEU hold up at the EUPP will be deemed unrecoverable once the IAEA verifies that Iran has fed depleted uranium through the portion of the EUPP equipment that converts uranyl fluoride solution to uranium dioxide and the scrap processing system until the output material from each portion is at the level of natural uranium or less. Any enriched uranium in the resulting output material does not count against Iran's enriched uranium stockpile as specified in the JCPOA, provided that Iran downblends such material to the level of natural uranium or less within the timeframe specified below.
3. The estimated amount of enriched uranium in the EUPP equipment and the output material from the process described in paragraph 2 do not count against Iran's enriched uranium stockpile as specified in the JCPOA while such process is ongoing, but for no more than 120 days from the start of the process.
4. The Joint Commission at experts' levels will engage with Iran's concerns about the enriched uranium stockpile, as defined in paragraph 56 of Annex I of the JCPOA.