Communication dated 8 August 2005 received from the Resident Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom to the Agency

The Director General has received a communication from the Resident Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, dated 8 August 2005, attaching the text of a letter dated 5 August 2005 sent by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, and the High Representative of the European Union, to the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The letter transmits proposals for a Framework for a Long-Term Agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran and France, Germany and the United Kingdom, with the Support of the High Representative of the European Union.

The communication from the Permanent Missions and, as requested therein, the text of the letter and its enclosure, are herewith attached for the information of all Member States.
Permanent Mission of France
Permanent Mission of Germany
Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland

Vienna, 8 August 2005

Excellency,

We would like to inform you that on 5 August the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of our three countries and the High Representative of the European Union wrote to Dr Rouhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran transmitting proposals for a Framework for a Long-Term Agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran and France, Germany and the United Kingdom, with the Support of the High Representative of the European Union.

We attach a copy of the letter and its enclosure and would be grateful if you would arrange for these documents to be circulated to the Members of the Agency as an Information Circular.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of our highest consideration.

Patrick Villemur
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of France

Peter Jenkins
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland

Herbert Honswitz
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany

Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei
Director General
International Atomic Energy Agency
We agreed when we met you in Geneva on 25 May that we would put forward proposals at this time for a long term agreement between Iran and the E3/EU to address the outstanding issues in our negotiations. We have the pleasure of enclosing these proposals with this letter. They reflect extensive discussions among our Governments, and we hope you and your colleagues will study them carefully.

The proposals should be seen as a package. We have sought to take into account as many as we can of the points you and your negotiating team have made to us over the last months. In particular, the proposals:

- reaffirm Iran's inalienable rights to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, exercised in conformity with the NPT;
- offer Iran assurances of fuel supply for her light water power and research reactors;
- meet Iran's desire to expand international co-operation in the civil nuclear field;
- would lead to a new political and security relationship between Iran and Europe based on co-operation; and
- would create a new framework for expanded economic and technological co-operation.

We fully understand the importance of these issues for Iran, and that Iran will have further ideas that you and your colleagues will want to discuss in the negotiations. As ever, we remain open to discussion of all proposals which could lead to the conclusion of satisfactory long-term arrangements.
As we set out in our letter of 2 August, we were disappointed to learn that Iran had asked the IAEA to arrange for the removal of seals at the UCF at Esfahan with a view to restarting work on uranium conversion. We have therefore had no choice but to set in motion procedures for the convening of an extraordinary meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors. However, if Iran were to make clear that it will not proceed as it has indicated and will enter into discussions on the enclosed proposal, we are ready not to continue with this process.

We therefore hope that you will be ready to engage with our proposals, and that we can look forward to hearing your reactions at the proposed meeting of senior officials on 31 August in Paris, and we will be able to chart the way forward when we meet at ministerial level in New York in the margins of the UN General Assembly. Until we agree on new arrangements, the Tehran Joint Statement of October 2003 and the Paris Agreement of November 2004 will remain the basis for our work. Our aim remains to reach agreement on long term arrangements as soon as we practicably can, and to continue the process of building a new relationship between Iran and Europe.

PHILIPPE DOUSTE-BLAZY

JACK STRAW

JOSCHKA FISCHER

JAVIER SOLANA
FRAMEWORK FOR A
LONG-TERM AGREEMENT

BETWEEN

THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

AND

FRANCE, GERMANY & THE UNITED KINGDOM,
WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
I. PREAMBLE

1. The introduction would provide the political chapeau for the overall agreement, setting out the principles on which a long-term relationship between the E3/EU and Iran would be based. The E3/EU propose that it should comprise the following elements.

2. The E3/EU and Iran would:

   a. stress the importance of developing relations of trust and cooperation between the E3/EU and Iran for the preservation of international peace and stability;

   b. define the relationship between the E3/EU process and the EU/Iran negotiations on a Political Dialogue Agreement and a Trade & Cooperation Agreement as complementary and mutually reinforcing;

   c. commit themselves to establishing a long-term relationship in the security and political field based upon shared principles and conditional on both sides’ adherence to all the principles and commitments set out in the overall agreement;

   d. welcome Iran’s commitment that, in accordance with Article II of the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, it does not
and will not seek to acquire nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction;

e. recall that Article IV of the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons stipulates that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable rights of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty;

f. affirm that a final agreement on long-term arrangements providing objective guarantees that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes would lead immediately to a higher state of relations based on a process of collaboration in different areas;

g. underline their determination to strengthen their long-term relationship through an enhanced programme of economic and technological co-operation, particularly through early completion of negotiations between Iran and the European Union on a Trade & Co-operation Agreement, and the associated Political Dialogue Agreement.
II. **POLITICAL AND SECURITY CO-OPERATION**

**GENERAL PRINCIPLES**

3. This section would define the principles on which the long-term relationship would be based. The E3 and Iran would reaffirm their commitment to the Charter of the United Nations, and recall the United Nations Millennium Declaration and other appropriate international instruments. The E3/EU propose that, within the context of an overall agreement, this section could include, inter alia, the following mutual commitments in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations:

   a. to fulfil in good faith obligations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, under the generally recognised principles and rules of international law, and under relevant international agreements;

   b. to the principle of the resolution of disputes by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law;

   c. to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations;
d. to the principle of the sovereign equality of all States;

e. to co-operation between States in the various spheres of international relations;

f. to promote respect for and observance and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction of any kind;

g. to affirm their commitment to prohibiting discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status; and

h. to establish conditions under which justice and respect for States’ obligations under treaties and international law can be maintained;

4. Within the context of an overall agreement and Iran’s fulfilment of its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the United Kingdom and France would be prepared to reaffirm to Iran the unilateral security assurances given on 6 April 1995, and referred to in United Nations Security Council Resolution 984 (1995).

Specifically:
a. the United Kingdom and the French Republic would reaffirm to Iran that they will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons except in the case of an invasion or any attack on them, their dependent territories, their armed forces or other troops, their allies or on a State towards which they have a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State; and

b. the United Kingdom and the French Republic would recall and reaffirm their intention, as Permanent Members of the Security Council, to seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear weapon State, party to Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, that is a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.
AREAS OF CO-OPERATION OF SPECIAL INTEREST

5. As part of an overall agreement the E3/EU propose that both parties should make commitments in the following areas.

Non-proliferation

6. The E3/EU and Iran would:

a. recall the statement of the President of the United Nations Security Council on 31 January 1992 and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) and reaffirm that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security; express grave concern that illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery and related materials, which adds a new dimension to the issue of proliferation of such weapons and also poses a threat to international peace and security; co-operate to take appropriate and effective measures against such activities; and stress the importance of effective national export controls;

b. reaffirm their commitment to abide by security and non-proliferation treaties to which they are party, and recall the need for
more consistent monitoring, effective implementation and, where necessary, firmer enforcement of such treaties;

c. stress the importance of universal adherence to and full implementation of and compliance with disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and of the full implementation of the IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols; work towards the conclusion of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty; where it has not already been done, conclude an Additional Protocol; become party to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; and subscribe to the Hague International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation;

d. reaffirm their commitment to the objective of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, biological and chemical, and their means of delivery, consistent with the resolution on the Middle-East adopted at the 1995 NPT review and extension conference, United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly.

e. confirm that the prevention of proliferation of WMD should not hamper international co-operation for peaceful purposes, in accordance with the relevant international obligations, while
underlining that the goal of peaceful utilisation must not be used as a cover for proliferation.

**Regional security**

7. The E3/EU recognise that they share a number of specific security concerns and interests with Iran and the important role Iran can potentially play in ensuring regional security and stability. As part of an overall agreement, the E3/EU would welcome an expanded dialogue and relationship on these issues. To this end, the E3/EU would, as part of an overall agreement, commit to working with Iran to encourage confidence-building measures and regional security arrangements. Such discussions would take place in close consultation with all the States of the region. The E3/EU and Iran would recognise that any regional security arrangements must take account of the legitimate interests of all the countries in the region, thus contributing to the stability and security of the region as a whole.

8. In this context, the E3/EU would recall their and Iran’s past and present contributions to the reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq, and reaffirm their determination to strengthen co-operation in these areas, and to work together to support the political process in both these countries with the goal of establishing democratic and stable states, based on the rule of law, which coexist with their neighbours, and by preventing any support and encouragement for groups that use violence for political ends.
Terrorism

9. The E3/EU and Iran would commit themselves to supporting the declaration on terrorism proposed by the Secretary General for the United Nations Millennium Summit, recognising that this definition might evolve before or during the Summit itself. This states that ‘the targeting and deliberate killing of civilians and non-combatants cannot be justified or legitimised by any cause or grievance, and … that any action which is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population or to compel a government or an international organisation to do or to abstain from any act constitutes an act of terrorism’. To this end, the E3/EU and Iran would commit themselves to:

   a. combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts;

   b. complement international co-operation by taking additional measures to prevent and suppress, through all lawful means, the financing and preparation of any act of terrorism, in the framework of full implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373; and
c. refrain from organising, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organised activities in their territories directed towards the commission of such acts.

Combating drug trafficking

10. The E3/EU recognise that Iran has been and will continue to be a key international partner for the EU in stemming the flow of opiates to Europe and therefore commit to developing co-operation on issues related to: illicit drug production, drug trafficking, chemical precursors trafficking, money-laundering, drug demand reduction, preventative and educational measures, treatment and rehabilitation of drug abusers, and assistance in drafting national legislation.

11. In support of this goal the E3/EU will:

a. actively support efforts to establish an EU Action Plan with Iran, building on the ‘EU commitments to action’;

b. actively support international programmes designed to tackle Iran’s drug problem;

c. take steps with Iran to implement joint projects in close consultation with Afghanistan and Iraq to establish border police structures, training of police officers and border management. As a first step,
the E3/EU will focus their co-operation on enhancing capacities for Afghan/Iranian co-operation in the fields of cross-border police co-operation, intensified communication on both sides of the border, as well as the training of customs officers, and on the development of projects on demand and harm reduction in Iran.

IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISM

12. In the course of the negotiation the E3/EU and Iran would establish an appropriate consultation and co-operation mechanism with a view to developing a long-term relationship on political and security issues, taking into account the continuing EU-Iran negotiations on a Political Dialogue Agreement.

13. To this end, the E3/EU propose the creation of a high-level committee on political and security issues, which would be made up of representatives from respective Foreign Affairs and Defence authorities. This Committee, which would meet periodically, would review progress on this part of the agreement and provide a forum for discussing issues of regional, international and mutual interest. The Committee would report regularly to the appropriate EU bodies and to the Government of Iran.
III. **LONG-TERM SUPPORT FOR IRAN’S CIVIL NUCLEAR PROGRAMME**

**PRINCIPLES**

14. The E3/EU recognise Iran's rights under Article IV of the NPT to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy without discrimination in conformity with its obligations under the NPT.

15. The E3/EU recognise Iran's right to develop a civil nuclear power generation programme to reduce its dependence on oil and gas and to choose the most appropriate mix of energy sources to meet its needs as it perceives them, consistent with its international obligations.

16. The E3/EU therefore declare, within the context of an overall agreement and a mutually acceptable agreement on long-term arrangements, their willingness to support Iran to develop a safe, economically viable and proliferation-proof civil nuclear power generation and research programme that conforms with its energy needs.

17. The E3/EU fully support long-term co-operation in the civil nuclear field between Iran and Russia.
FRAMEWORK

18. Within the context of an overall agreement, co-operation between the E3/EU and Iran in the civil nuclear field would move forward within the following framework:

a. Iran would have access to the international nuclear technologies market where contracts are awarded on the basis of open competitive tendering, recognising the right of companies to determine their own commercial strategies and choices;

b. co-operation would be conditional on Iran’s full implementation of its relevant international obligations and commitments, including the long-term arrangements agreed between the E3/EU and Iran, resolution by the IAEA of all questions raised under Iran's Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, and continued co-operation with the IAEA;

c. under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, and based on respective national, European and international norms, the E3/EU and Iran are obliged to implement export controls. The E3 would commit themselves to implementing these controls in a non-discriminatory way, bearing in mind the new context that would be created by the confidence building measures and commitments undertaken by Iran under an overall agreement.
IRANIAN ACCESS TO THE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL MARKET AND CO-OPERATION IN NUCLEAR ENERGY

19. In line with these principles, and in the context of an overall agreement and growing confidence between the E3/EU and Iran, the E3 would support the development of Iran’s civil nuclear programme in the following areas:

   a. in the field of civil nuclear research through implementation of the E3/EU’s offer of an expert mission to help identify the requirement for a research reactor in Iran and how best to meet that requirement. The E3/EU would ensure Iran faced no discriminatory obstacles to filling the requirements jointly identified; and

   b. in other fields of peaceful use of nuclear energy, excluding fuel-cycle related activity, the E3/EU would commit themselves not to impede participation in open competitive tendering.

20. The E3 Governments also support the development of co-operation in the following main areas, to be included in a final agreement:

   a. in fields such as radio-isotope production, basic research and the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the fields of medicine and agriculture, subject to further expert discussion between the two sides;
b. in establishing co-operation between regulatory authorities in the E3/EU and Iran and the IAEA in order to assist with the design and implementation of international standard nuclear safety and security regimes. This could include formalised co-operation between regulators to share developed expertise and offering advice on security aspects such as the implementation of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, after Iran’s accession to the Convention in its amended version. These areas of co-operation could be refined during the proposed visit of Iranian experts to the E3/EU.

21. To this end, the E3/EU will actively support commencement of negotiations on an agreement between EURATOM and Iran. This would create a framework for closer co-operation between Iran and all EU Member States.

**FUEL ASSURANCES**

22. The E3/EU recognise that Iran should have sustained access to nuclear fuel for the Light Water Reactors forming Iran's civil nuclear industry. These arrangements are currently provided for through bilateral agreements and contracts with states/companies with which it is engaged in nuclear co-operation. The E3/EU note that under the Iran/Russia
agreement on nuclear co-operation, Russia has committed itself formally to supplying nuclear fuel for the life-time of Russian-built reactors in Iran. But the E3/EU stand ready to explore additional ideas in this context.

23. In order to provide Iran with additional assurances that external supplies of fuel could be relied upon in the long term, the E3/EU would propose to develop with Iran a framework which would provide such assurance, without prejudicing any future multilateral arrangements developed under IAEA auspices.

24. Both the E3/EU and Iran would aim to have IAEA (or possibly other international) endorsement for any framework developed, and the IAEA might be invited to monitor the operation of the mechanism and certify its operation on objective principles.

25. Any fuel provided would be under normal market conditions and commercial contracts and subject to proliferation proof arrangements being agreed for safety, transport and security of the fuel, including the return of all spent fuel.

26. The framework could involve a combination of the following mutually reinforcing measures:
a. **E3/EU – Iran ad hoc mechanism**

27. This would involve establishment of a specific mechanism to be agreed between the E3/EU and Iran should the contracted supplier not be in a position to provide the fuel pursuant to its agreements with Iran for non-commercial reasons not connected with proliferation or safeguards related concerns and Iran faced serious difficulty in procuring the nuclear fuel necessary for the safe and sustained functioning of its Light Water reactors. In such an event, the E3/EU and Iran would immediately convene an ad hoc senior officials meeting to assess the situation, and identify and review relevant measures. The E3/EU Governments would, in parallel convene a meeting with relevant companies to review what action could be taken to avoid any shortage of energy. The IAEA could, as appropriate, be invited to such meetings for advisory purposes.

28. The mechanism might seek initially to restore fuel supplies from the contracted supplier. If this was not possible, it could seek to identify an alternative fabricator capable of producing the required design of reactor fuel. If no such fabricator could be identified, possibilities would be investigated to establish and licence a new fabrication line, outside Iran, able to meet the future fuel supply needs at market prices. Any such alternative supply mechanism would be dependent on satisfactory arrangements being established for long-term management of spent fuel outside Iran.
29. The E3/EU would commit themselves to exploring ways with industry to provide assured enrichment services at market prices for fuel fabrication outside Iran if the usual enrichment services provider were unable to meet its contractual obligations for non-commercial reasons; how such a commitment would be formally presented remains to be defined.

b. Establishment of a buffer store

30. In order to provide the necessary time for a solution to be found through the E3/EU – Iran ad hoc mechanism without adversely impacting the operation of Iran's nuclear power reactors, the E3/EU commit themselves to assisting in the establishment of a buffer store of fuel, sufficient to maintain supplies at the contracted rate for a period of 5 years. This store would be physically located in a mutually acceptable third country, and would be available to draw from while long-term arrangements are put in place. The E3/EU would welcome early discussion with Iran on establishment, maintenance and use of the buffer store.

c. Multilateral arrangements

31. The E3/EU and Iran would engage with the IAEA and others to develop international mechanisms following on from the ideas identified in the “Multilateral Nuclear Approaches” report on security of fuel supply.
CONFIDENCE BUILDING

32. The E3/EU reaffirm Iran’s inalienable right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, exercised in conformity with the NPT. In this context, the support of E3 countries for expanding international co-operation in Iran’s civil nuclear sector and for the development of a safe, economically viable and proliferation proof civil nuclear power generation and research programme will present Iran with new opportunities.

33. Effective long-term co-operation between Iran and the international community in the civil nuclear field along the lines set out in this document will, however, require the continued building of confidence over a significant period.

34. As Iran will have an assured supply of fuel over the coming years, it will be able to provide the confidence needed by making a binding commitment not to pursue fuel cycle activities other than the construction and operation of light water power and research reactors. This commitment would be reviewed jointly in line with the review mechanism envisaged in Paragraph 58.

35. The E3/EU would expect Iran to invite the IAEA to agree a mechanism to verify the implementation of the final agreement.
36. As an essential element of this mechanism for international confidence building, Iran would undertake to:

a. make a legally binding commitment not to withdraw from the NPT and to keep all Iranian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards under all circumstances;

b. ratify its Additional Protocol, in accordance with its existing commitment, by the end of 2005;

c. in the meantime, fully implement the Additional Protocol pending its ratification and to co-operate proactively and in a transparent manner with the IAEA to solve all outstanding issues pursuant to the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol including by allowing IAEA inspectors to visit any site or interview any person they deem relevant to their monitoring of nuclear activity in Iran; and

d. agree arrangements for the supply of fresh fuel from outside Iran and commit to returning all spent fuel elements of Iranian reactors to the original supplier immediately after the minimum cooling down period necessary for transportation.

37. In line with IAEA Board Resolutions, the E3/EU would also expect Iran to stop construction of its Heavy Water Research Reactor at Arak, which gives rise to proliferation concerns. The E3/EU repeat their existing offer
to send an expert mission to Iran to help identify research requirements and the most suitable type of equipment to meet those requirements.

38. The E3/EU would work with Iran to establish a group to identify alternative uses for the equipment, installations, facilities and materials whose use, construction, testing or development would not form part of Iran's long-term civil nuclear industry. The group could consider alternative areas of employment for the scientists, technicians and workers currently employed in these facilities.

CONSULTATION MECHANISM

39. The E3/EU and Iran would conduct regular consultations on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the development of the Iranian civil nuclear programme through a specific consultation mechanism to be agreed.
IV. ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL CO-OPERATION

PRINCIPLES

40. The E3/EU consider that an overall agreement would lead to the development of a programme of economic and technological co-operation with Iran, complementing the envisaged EC/Iran Trade & Co-operation Agreement, which will constitute the main vehicle for the long-term development of economic relations between Europe and Iran.

ENERGY CO-OPERATION

41. The E3/EU would recognise the fundamental importance of energy co-operation to their long-term relationship with Iran. As part of an overall agreement:

a. the E3/EU and the European Commission would be prepared to issue a policy declaration that they regard Iran as a long-term source of fossil energy for the European Union and recognise the growing importance of Iranian gas supplies to Europe in the coming years;
b. the E3/EU and the European Commission would commit to developing a strategic energy partnership through the Trade and Co-operation Agreement and in this context through the High Level Working Group on Energy;

c. in the context of the High Level Working Group on Energy and in the framework of the Memorandum of Understanding of 19 October 2002 between the European Commission and the Iranian Ministry of Petroleum on co-operation in the energy sector, the European Commission would explore the possibility of opening the EU-Iran Management and Technology Centre with a view to commissioning joint studies on areas in which the EU and Iran can develop co-operation in the energy sector as well as providing technical support for the implementation of the policy declaration mentioned in Paragraph 41a;

d. the E3/EU and Iran, as well as the Commission, would discuss possible future oil and gas pipeline projects.

PROMOTION OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT

42. The E3/EU recognise the importance of the proposed EC/Iran Trade & Co-operation Agreement to developing the long-term commercial and economic relationship between the EU and Iran, noting that this will
facilitate market access, promote commercial exchanges, and open up a wide range of further co-operation activities in the economic, commercial and other fields.

43. As part of any overall agreement the E3/EU would therefore commit themselves to working to bring the current negotiations between Iran and the European Community on a Trade & Co-operation Agreement, and the associated Political Dialogue Agreement, to an early conclusion.

44. The E3/EU and Iran would agree to continue and strengthen mutually beneficial practices in the areas of export credits and investment guarantees, particularly in light of the additional confidence that an overall agreement and a closer political and economic relationship would give to investors and export credit agencies alike.

WTO ACCESSION

45. The E3/EU welcome Iran’s successful application to open WTO accession talks, recalling that this has been a significant benefit of the dialogue initiated by the Paris Agreement.

46. The E3/EU confirm their continued political support for Iranian accession to the WTO and their willingness to offer technical support to assist Iran in making the necessary technical adjustments to its economy. Working
with the WTO Secretariat and Commission, the E3 would agree to offer assistance to help Iran with WTO compliance, including on tariff structures, technical barriers to trade, rules of origin, intellectual property, and other areas as appropriate.

PROMOTING TRADE AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY: EXPORT CONTROLS

47. The E3/EU note that enhanced confidence regarding the civilian end-use of goods transferred to Iran, including through the establishment of export control systems, would facilitate decisions on individual licences. The E3/EU also recognise that effective export control systems will make a significant contribution to developing mutually beneficial economic relations and state that they apply international export control regimes and respective national and European regulations on a non-discriminatory basis. The E3/EU therefore agree to convene a joint export control workshop in Tehran, which would allow for exchanges on the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 and national/EC laws.

48. As a follow up the E3/EU is also prepared to offer support to Iran in establishing an efficient system of export controls.
49. Civil aviation. The E3/EU would continue to promote the sale of aircraft parts to Iran and be willing to enter into discussion about open procurement of the sale of civil passenger aircraft to Iran.

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL CO-OPERATION

50. Recognising the benefits of scientific and academic co-operation to both sides, the E3/EU commit to developing long-term scientific co-operation with Iran.

51. In this context, the European Union, through the Commission, would agree to send an expert team to Iran to draw up Iran’s ‘Scientific Profile’, within the context of the EC/Iran Trade & Co-operation Agreement.

52. The E3/EU would agree to facilitate Iran’s access to advanced technologies, respecting national law and international commitments regarding export control; they would strengthen existing and encourage new scientific co-operation between scientists, universities and scientific institutes. This co-operation should cover both fundamental and applied research.

53. In the field of environmental technologies, the E3/EU would be prepared to develop co-operation with Iran in the fields of water supply, waste
management, protection of natural habitats and preparedness for natural disasters.

54. In the field of communications and information technology, the E3/EU would be prepared to co-operate with Iran to improve internet connection stability.

55. The E3/EU would also be interested in developing and deepening co-operation with Iran through relevant international fora, particularly in the field of air pollution.

56. Education and vocational training. The E3/EU would be prepared, through their relevant agencies, to co-operate with Iran in developing its system of vocational education.

BUILDING A STRUCTURE OF ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL CO-OPERATION

57. The E3/EU and Iran would look to invigorate co-operation through a mechanism, to be agreed, to complement any wider EU/Iran structures agreed under the Trade & Co-operation Agreement, and cover other areas of mutual interest, although of lower priority than those set out above, including but not exclusively:
- Air transport safety. The E3/EU would co-operate in the fields of air traffic management, certification, accident, investigation and airport security.

- Railway transport. The E3/EU would co-operate with Iran in establishing a transport master plan; they will encourage and support co-operation with Iran in the area of railway rolling stock, signalling and high speed technology.

- Maritime transport. The E3/EU would facilitate the negotiation of a maritime transport agreement with Iran.

- Seismology and seismic mapping. The E3 would, through their relevant institutions contribute to a seismic mapping exercise, with a focus on the most densely populated areas of Iran and work to develop co-operation in the fields of risk and disaster management.

- Infrastructure. The E3/EU would facilitate access to European technology related to constructing earthquake resistant buildings.

- Agriculture and food industry. The E3/EU would be prepared to offer co-operation in ecological agriculture, including natural herbicides and pesticides, food safety; and the regulations and trade aspects of sanitary and phytosanitary standards.
- Tourism. The E3/EU would be prepared to assist Iran in developing its reputation as a tourist destination and support co-operation in the development of new tourist resorts.
V. REVIEW MECHANISM

58. The E3/EU and Iran would agree to implement the agreement in good faith. The agreement would be subject to review, at Ministerial level, every ten years. Any change to these arrangements would be subject to explicit agreement by both the E3/EU and Iran.

59. The E3/EU would be willing to circulate the final agreement as an IAEA Information Circular (INFCIRC) and UN Document for information and with a view to possible endorsement by the international community.