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THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA
TO THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY**

The attached texts of an Interview by a Spokesman for the General Department of Atomic Energy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, dated 3 June 1994, and Relevant Information, are being circulated to all Member States of the Agency at the request of the Permanent Mission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

These texts were received by the Secretariat before the withdrawal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from the Agency.

I N T E R V I E W

BY A SPOKESMAN FOR THE GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF ATOMIC ENERGY
OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

3 June, 1994, Pyongyang

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has recently issued a press release that says to the effect that the Agency does not call into question the discovery of a large amount of undeclared plutonium in Japan.

This serves as a full revelation of the partiality and irresponsibility on the part of the IAEA.

Although the IAEA claims that it had already known the accumulation of a fabulous amount of the so-called "holdup plutonium" in the Tokai Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Plant in Japan, facts clearly show that the Agency had, in fact, been in the dark as to this.

News reports said that when the south Korean authorities asked Japan on May 12 for clarification of the background behind the discovery of this undeclared plutonium, Japan admitted it had discovered 70 kilogrammes of undeclared plutonium at its Tokai Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Plant.

Japan's Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (Donen), the operator of the Tokai Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Plant, told the Itar-Tass News Agency on May 10 that the plutonium in question was discovered in April this year by the IAEA inspectors during their scheduled inspections at the plant.

The Japanese newspaper "The Japan Times" said that if the confidential report from the U.S. Nuclear Control Institute had not tipped it off, the IAEA would never have known that the hidden material was being prepared by Japan to load into nuclear bombs.

The Director of the U.S. Nuclear Control Institute more explicitly pointed out that, although the plant is equipped with state-of-the-art equipment to monitor the amounts of plutonium held up in the plant, the acknowledged high degree of uncertainty of these measurements in combination with the shockingly large amounts of plutonium that presumably have been allowed to accumulate in this fashion, make it impossible for the IAEA to conclude with the required high level of confidence that one or more significant quantities of plutonium have not been diverted from the facility, and further that the problem is that IAEA safeguards really

cannot detect skilful diversions from plutonium processing plants.

This notwithstanding, the IAEA, without so much a proper clarification about the case, incongruously claims that it had already known of the plutonium in question at the Tokai Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Plant and that plutonium remains under the Agency's safeguards. We are quite surprised at this claim.

While maximizing and making an issue of a tiny amount of the DPRK's declared plutonium extracted for experimental purpose, the IAEA is zealously defending Japan's formidable amount of undeclared plutonium which is undeniably high in possibility of diversion and ignoring the demand of the international community for clarification of the truth by refuting it off-hand with a sheet of its press release.

Such irresponsible act has brought into bolder relief the partiality of the Agency and its application of double standards and makes us feel a stronger doubt as to its mission and credibility.

By defending the case, the Agency itself has, after all, given a strong impression that its inspections are governed by political considerations.

Since the case occurred at a time when Japan has not definitely renounced its excessive stockpile of plutonium and, worse still, its nuclear armaments programme has reached a danger line practically, the Agency must, as a matter of course, live up to its own mission by calling it into question and discussing the issue at a meeting of its Board of Governors and dispel the serious concerns on the part of the international community over Japan's nuclear armaments programme and its conversion into a military power by taking measures for overall and thorough inspections at all the facilities in Japan.

We will follow the moves of the Agency.

RELEVANT INFORMATION

- The 70 Kilogrammes of powder-like plutonium, found at the Tokai Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Plant, has not been declared to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA/Agency).

“Japan has admitted the fact that 70 kilogrammes of undeclared plutonium was discovered at the Tokai Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Plant, and informed our government of its position that Japan will probe into the real truth in the presence of a team of the IAEA experts.

A senior Foreign Ministry official said that this information came today from Japan through diplomatic channels, in response to our government’s request for clarification of the background behind the discovery of the undeclared plutonium.”

(“Christian Radio” (South Korea), May 12 1994)

“70 kilogrammes of the ‘unaccounted-for’ plutonium was discovered at one time in the reactors at the fissionable fuel fabrication plant in Tokaimura, the center of Japan’s atomic industry.

According to the information made available today to the Itar-tass correspondent by Japan’s Power reactor and nuclear Fuel Development Corporation to which this plant belongs, ... this plutonium was found in April by the IAEA inspectors during their scheduled inspection at this plant.

The pure and powder-like plutonium was stuck inside equipment and tubes of the production lines at the plant which has been in operation since 1988.

When the Itar-Tass correspondent asked why the monthly inspections could not detect such “secrete places,” the Japan-based IAEA inspection team refused to answer the question, on the pretext that the team was not authorized to comment on that question.

But, an article in the Japanese newspaper ‘The Japan Times’ pointed out that if a confidential report from the U.S. Nuclear Control Institute had not tipped it off, the IAEA would never have known that the hidden material was being prepared by Japan to loaded into nuclear bombs.”

(Tokyo, May 10, 1994, Itar-Tass)

“At the end of pressmen’s inspection tour of the plutonium fuel fabrication plant, that belongs to the Power

Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (Donen), ... an Associated Press correspondent from the United States dispatched a stern news report saying that 'the Japanese side has sworn by the gods of heaven and earth that it has no unreported plutonium.

But it has failed to give a clear-cut answer to the question of why the secret (that as much as 70 kilogrammes of plutonium remains uncollected) had gone unknown as long as six year." ("Mainichi shimbun," May 21, 1994)

"Pressure and investigation by a US institute have compelled Japan to admit that it has hidden as much as 154 pounds of plutonium in a storage, and the Japanese government had to accept this fact.

... Japanese officials admitted that they had known the fact that undeclared plutonium continued to accumulate since 1988.

Japan had not reported this fact by failing to register this plutonium inventory and kept it secret until a Washington-based institute finally disclosed it." ("CBS," May 10, 1994)

"Everybody has been astonished by the fact that more than 150 pounds of plutonium has accumulated in Japan's nuclear reactor, as unreported to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The result came from an inconsistency between the input and output amounts of radioactive material into and from the reactor.

... Japan had admitted the fact that it has not volunteered to disclose this case. A Japanese official said 'we have never weighed on whether or not it is appropriate to disclose it (stockpile of plutonium)." ("Christian Science Monitor," May 11, 1994)

- The amount of undeclared plutonium at the Tokai Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Plant monstrously exceeds the limits set by the Agency.

"Recently, the IAEA informed Japan that a clear-out inventory of the plant is necessary because the amount of plutonium held up in the processing equipment of the plant exceeds the limits set by the Agency to ensure the effective application of Safeguard Agreement against unauthorized diversion of plutonium.

It is my understanding that the amount of plutonium recently unaccounted for at the plant is on the order of the 70 kilogrammes or about nine (significant quantities) of this

weapons-usable nuclear material.

This is an astounding figure, constituting 10 % of annual plutonium throughput of the plant. (Letter from the Director of U.S. Nuclear Control Institute to the U.S. Secretary of State, May 4, 1994)

- The Agency's Safeguards lack credibility.

"Although the plant is equipped with state-of-the-art equipment to monitor the amounts of plutonium held up in the plant, the acknowledged high degree of uncertainty of these of plutonium that presumably have been allowed to accumulate in this fashion, make it impossible for the IAEA to conclude with the required high level of confidence that one or more significant quantities of plutonium have not been diverted from the facility.

... The problem is that IAEA safeguards really cannot detect skilful diversions from plutonium processing plants." (Ibid)

"The amount of plutonium held up in the glove box area during the facility's operation is to be measured by neutron instrumentation.

The error of instrumentation is known to range between 5 and 10 %, and it is hardly possible to detect the missing plutonium equivalent to the amount enough to make one atomic bomb, for example, if the holdup amounts to 70 kilogrammes.
(Mainichi Simbun, "May 10, 1994)

"Despite any verification by measuring equipment of a non-diversion of plutonium, any technical error cannot be ruled out.

... It were true that the IAEA was unable to identify or find out the right place of plutonium, other countries would assume that Japan might have diverted plutonium."
("Christian Science Monitor," May 11, 1994)

- 70 kilogrammes of plutonium is not all that remains undeclared.

"The amount is said to have been extracted only from 3 glove boxes out of 17 at the Tokai Nuclear Power Plant." (Italian Newspaper "Il manifesto," May 14, 1994)

"... The discovery of this situation inevitably raises the following questions:

Since the reactors have been in operation for 7 years at Tokaimura, was only the discovered 70 kilogrammes of plutonium what remained 'stuck'?

Before a Japanese government committee's conclusion came, the 'Nihonkeizai shimbun' carried the views of some unidentified experts who believe that it is in fact indispensable to ascertain whether the already accumulated plutonium had been hidden in such a way.

The prevailing situation causes a particular concern over Japan's de facto possession of all the technical equipment needed for the manufacture of nuclear weapons, despite Japan's declared commitment to be faithful to its non-nuclear policy and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of non-nuclear policy and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). (Tokyo, May 10, 1994, Itar-Tass)

- The Agency must take a fair position.

Jinzaburo Takaki a Physicist and chief of the non-governmental Nuclear Information Center of Japan, said that North Korea has been attacked over suspicions about alleged acquisition of less amount of plutonium than hidden by Japan.

Such act of Japan deserves punishment." ("CBS", May 10 1994)

"The IAEA cannot be more lenient in enforcing safeguards on one NPT party than another." (Letter from the Director of U.S. Nuclear Control Institute to the U.S Secretary of State, May 4, 1994)