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**COMMUNICATIONS DATED 2 AND 6 JUNE 1994
RECEIVED FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF
THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA
TO THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY**

The attached texts of two telex communications, dated 2 and 6 June 1994, which the International Atomic Energy Agency received from the General Department of Atomic Energy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are being circulated to all Member States of the Agency at the request of the Permanent Mission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

These texts were received by the Secretariat before the withdrawal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from the Agency.

TELEX BY DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS
OF THE GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF ATOMIC ENERGY
OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Mr. BRUNO Pellaud
Deputy Director General
International Atomic Energy Agency

2 June, 1994

Dear Mr. Pellaud

I refer to your telex of 31 May, 1994.

I regret that the options proposed by your side in the telex are a repetition, in nature, of previous position related to selecting and securing of fuel rods.

The selecting and securing of fuel rods as the verification activities for completeness of initial report of nuclear material belong to the scope of ad hoc inspection activities.

At present we are in the unique status to suspend the effectuation of withdrawal from NPT.

Therefore, we can never permit the selecting and securing of fuel rods that belong to the scope of the ad hoc inspection activities.

What we can not but take more seriously is that the IAEA Secretariat denied the legality and objectivity of our unique status which is existing in reality, in your telex.

Our unique status is resulted from the nuclear threaten by the USA and the partiality of the Agency Secretariat, but not that we made ourselves for any self-interested purpose.

If the Agency Secretariat continues to impose inspections under the Safeguards Agreement pending on pressure without respect to the reality of our unique status, we could not but take decisive measures in response to it.

At the present the core discharge is conducted in a manner to preserve the technical possibility for later measurement of fuel rods anticipating the removal of our unique status.

Our core discharge is proceeding according to our

specified procedure and all its course is being recorded correctly on the accounting and operating records.

Although we did not reach an agreement at the Pyongyang consultation in last May, we are loading four channels per basket, taking account of the Agency's requirements sufficiently, and are recording the accounting and operating documents for the convenience of the Agency's later verification which are not necessary for the operators.

Therefore, the channel numbers of fuel rods in basket and the position of rods in the fuel channels can be reconstructed at any time.

This is the unique and reasonable discharge method as its practical use has been proved through experiment in the current situation.

All the facts indicate that the technical possibility is being preserved so that the Agency can be verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material in the reactor core at the time of the removal of our unique status.

We explained the scientific and technical possibility of our proposal to the Agency side in detail during the Pyongyang consultation.

The Agency side recognized theoretical possibility of our proposal and promised that they would inform us the results of their investigation after returning to Vienna.

Therefore the Agency naturally should have answered our proposal on the basis of scientific and technical investigation.

Nevertheless, the Agency Secretariat hurriedly transmitted its report to the UN Security Council, on the basis of its unfair assessment on our proposal without an investigation on it, with political prejudice, even before the consultation team returned to Vienna.

On the other hand, the UN Security Council, too, unreasonable urged the DPRK only to proceed with the discharge operation in accordance with the IAEA's requirements through the statement by the president of the Security Council.

These recall to the occasion when the Agency and UN Security Council made pressure racket against us with the results of the last March inspection.

It clearly shows that the Agency Secretariat is not in a position to resolve our nuclear issue fairly but a position to pursue the other political purpose from the first to

strangle us according to the scenario made in advance.

Our position to resolve the nuclear issue through dialogue is unchanged.

We think, fortunately, that the Agency Secretariat has proposed the telex consultation.

The Agency should give detailed scientific and technical answer to our proposal as the Agency consultation team promised that they would study our method to preserve the technical possibility for future measurements of fuel rods and inform us its results.

If the Agency side would make constructive comment on our proposal related to the above-mentioned, we review it carefully.

We expect your positive reply.

Yours sincerely.

Choi Jong Sun

Director, Department of External Relations
General Department of Atomic Energy
Democratic People's Republic of Korea

TELEX BY DIRECTOR GENERAL
OF THE GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF ATOMIC ENERGY
OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

6 June, 1994, Pyongyang

Attn: Mr. Hans Blix
General Director, IAEA
Vienna, Austria

Dear Mr. Blix,

I very much regret to know that you made "a hasty conclusion" that the Agency could not provide assurance about the non-diversion of nuclear material, alleging as if the technical possibility for later measurement of core fuel rods would have been lost at 5 MW Experimental Nuclear Power Plant.

We have agreed, a few days ago, to the Agency's DDG's proposal on the consultation by exchange of telexes in respect of the refuelling campaign and requested the Agency to provide us with a scientific and technical answer to the manner proposed by us which preserves the technical possibility for later measurement of fuel rods.

Nevertheless, you have not yet answered our proposal and transmitted to the UN Security Council an unreasonable report in which facts were misrepresented, speaking ill of us as if we had not yet replied to the Agency's letter.

Moreover, what we cannot but make an issue is that you have ignored our unique status based on the suspension of the effectuation of our withdrawal from the NPT.

This our unique Status has been created and recognized by the USA and IAEA.

For these reasons, they agreed to the inspection for the continuity of safeguards knowledge, and so far the Agency has conducted not the routine and ad hoc inspection under the Safeguards Agreement but the inspection for the continuity of safeguards knowledge.

At present, the refuelling campaign, too, is conducted in presence of the IAEA inspectors and under IAEA surveillance and containment on the basis of above mentioned principles.

The IAEA inspectors, too, who are present during the

refuelling have recognized that there is no diversion of nuclear material from the reactor.

Speaking of the verification of the core history alleged by the Agency, the matter will be resolved automatically if our unique status will be removed.

At present, we are conducting the refuelling campaign preserving the technical possibility for later measurement of fuel rods on the assumption that our unique status will be removed.

The fuel discharge operation has been carried out channel by channel, channel group by channel group, in sequence and 40 rods from 4 channels have been discharged into one basket.

All the operations of core discharge including the identification numbers of baskets and channels, sequence of rods in a channel, position of baskets in the spent fuel pond have been kept on the accounting and operating records by operators and confirmed by the AIEA inspectors every day.

This shows that the refuelling operation is conducted in a manner which preserves the possibility to be able to reconstruct the channels of fuel rods and the sequence of rods in the channel, if necessary.

The adequacy of the manner which preserves the technical possibility for later measurement has been proved not only theoretically but also experimentally.

This is only the rational method suitable to our unique status.

All the facts show that the Agency can verify whether the nuclear material from the reactor has been diverted in the past at the time when our unique status is removed.

Nevertheless, it was referred in your reports to the IAEA Board of Governors and the U.N. Security Council that “any future measurement of that fuel would have no practical value because they would have to be based on operators’ records which are unverifiable and also because it would not be possible to reconstruct the configuration of fuel rods in the core.”

This shows that you seem to have no interest in a fair solution of “our nuclear issue”, in keeping your political prejudiced view in advance.

Our practical experience got from the past Agency inspections shows that the more we accepted IAEA inspections with the best goodwill and generousness, the more the Agency

made artificial obstacles to the solution of our issue and led us to serious situation, in attaching an unreasonable condition to us every time.

We made our position clear during the February Board Meeting in 1993 that the inconsistencies could be clarified if the Agency verifies the fuel rods from the core during the refuelling campaign.

However, at that time, the IAEA Secretariat objected to our proposal, alleging that the inconsistencies could not be resolved in such a manner and made board to adopt the resolution of “special inspection of two ordinary military sites.”

After the last March inspection, the IAEA Secretariat transmitted to the U.N. Security Council the matter of the “non-completed inspection activities” alleging that it is indispensable for the Agency to carry out the smear taking from the glove boxes and gamma mapping in the building 3 at the Radiochemical Laboratory in order to verify non-diversion of nuclear material, upon returning to Vienna just after the Agency inspection team had completed the activities for the continuity of safeguards knowledge.

When we permitted the Agency to conduct “non-completed inspection activities” as a special exception, the Agency this time said to us that it is indispensable to measure the fuel rods from the core, which was a matter already denied by the Agency in the past.

On one hand, the Agency inspection team cancelled the agreement on the achieves samples for clarification of the inconsistencies during the past inspection, and on the other hand, the Agency says that it is indispensable for the Agency to make “special inspection of two ordinary military sites” to verify non-diversion of nuclear material.

This shows that the IAEA Secretariat continues to join the USA in their hostile policy towards the DPRK to make our ordinary military sites open one by one under the pretext of the inspection.

The current development of the refuelling campaign bears resemblance to the IAEA’s pressure campaign arised in the beginning of 1993 that the Agency cooked up the “inconsistencies” which was not existed on the basis of the false intelligence information provided by 3rd party and imposed on us the so called “special inspection of two ordinary military sites” on the basis of the “inconsistencies”.

I think such unreasonable acts of the IAEA are unprecedented events in the history of safeguards.

I would like to remind you that, for these reasons, we could not but have withdrawn from the NPT last year.

In the light of the above, we can not but make a doubt about whether our nuclear issue, indeed, can be resolved through further consultations with the IAEA.

Recently the IAEA Secretariat has made obstacles to our normal nuclear activities concerning the refuelling operation at the beginning of the campaign, intentionally avoiding the presence of the IAEA inspection team.

On the other hand, at present they have made another obstacle to smooth solution of our nuclear issue, making a hasty conclusion that the Agency could not provide assurance about the non-diversion of nuclear material all these are very irresponsible and hasty behaviour that objective reality has been intentionally misrepresented.

Accordingly, the IAEA Secretariat will have to hear the full responsibility for all the consequences arising from such wrong conclusion and unreasonable behaviour.

If the IAEA Secretariat will transmit our nuclear issue to the U.N. Security Council and continues to resort to only pressure on the basis of "hasty conclusion" that the technical possibility for later measurement of the fuel rods has been lost, widening its unfairness and partiality, we will not be feeling any longer the need that we are subject to the unreasonable binding of the IAEA Secretariat and can not but transfer the next process of our peaceful nuclear activity.

Pak Yong Nam
Director General
General Department of Atomic Energy
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Pyongyang