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Board of Governors  
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# NUCLEAR SECURITY REPORT 2025

*Report by the Director General*



# Board of Governors General Conference

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Item 14 of the provisional agenda  
(GC/(69)/1 and Add.1)

# Nuclear Security Report 2025

*Report by the Director General*

## **Summary**

- Pursuant to resolution GC(68)/RES/9, a report covering activities undertaken by the Agency in the area of nuclear security and highlighting significant accomplishments within the framework of the Nuclear Security Plan during the reporting period is submitted to the Board of Governors and the General Conference for their consideration.

## **Recommended Action**

- It is recommended that the Board of Governors take note of this report.



# Nuclear Security Report 2025

*Report by the Director General*

## A. General

1. This report was produced for the 69th regular session (2025) of the General Conference in response to resolution GC(68)/RES/9, in which the General Conference requested the Director General to report on activities undertaken by the Agency in the area of nuclear security, and on other relevant developments in the intervening period. This report covers the period from 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025.

2. The responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with that State. In accordance with its central role in strengthening the nuclear security framework globally and in coordinating international activities in the field of nuclear security, the Agency continued to provide assistance, upon request, to States in their national efforts to establish and maintain effective and sustainable nuclear security regimes, while avoiding duplication and overlap.<sup>1</sup>

3. During the reporting period, the Agency continued to implement activities under the *Nuclear Security Plan 2022–2025*, approved by the Board of Governors in September 2021 and taken note of by the General Conference at its 65th regular session in September 2021.<sup>2</sup>

4. Throughout the reporting period, the Agency engaged with Member States in bilateral and multilateral meetings about the process and scope of the Nuclear Security Plan prior to the development of its next iteration, covering the period 2026–2029, and planned to be submitted to the Board of Governors in September 2025.<sup>3</sup>

5. This report is intended to complement the *Nuclear Security Review 2025*. In March 2025, a report by the Director General containing the draft *Nuclear Security Review 2025* was submitted to the Board of Governors. The final version of the *Nuclear Security Review 2025*, prepared in the light of discussions at the Board of Governors, is provided as an information document at the 69th regular session of the Agency's General Conference. The *Nuclear Security Review 2025* includes the global trends and the Agency's activities in 2024, highlighting significant accomplishments. It also presents priorities and related activities for 2025 and beyond, as identified by the Agency and its Member States, for strengthening nuclear security globally. These priorities are addressed in the *Nuclear Security Plan 2022–2025*, the draft *Nuclear Security Plan 2026–2029* and the Agency's Programme and Budget, including outcomes, outputs, timelines and performance indicators. The Agency conducted bilateral and multilateral meetings at which matters related to the Nuclear Security Review, the Nuclear Security

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<sup>1</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 1 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>2</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 4 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>3</sup> This relates to operative paragraphs 4 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.



Report and the Nuclear Security Plan were discussed. In consultation with Member States, the complementarity and timing of the issuance of the assorted reports, within their defined scopes and with an objective of minimizing duplication, has been considered in the development of the *Nuclear Security Review 2025* and the present report.<sup>4</sup>

## B. Responding to Current and Evolving Challenges and Risks to Nuclear Security



*An International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) team visiting Mihama nuclear power plant (NPP) in Fukui Prefecture, Japan, in July 2024. (Photo: Mihama NPP)*

6. With a view to developing technical guidance and publications, establishing research networks and databases, and facilitating training to support Member States in implementing measures that will effectively confront current and evolving challenges, risks and threats to nuclear security, the Agency continued to implement a variety of coordinated research projects (CRPs)<sup>5</sup> and hosted multiple consultancy meetings in this regard. The CRPs include:

- Advancing Maintenance, Repair, and Calibration of Radiation Detection Equipment;
- Enhancing Computer Security for Radiation Detection Systems;
- Enhancing Computer Security of Small Modular Reactors and Microreactors;
- Facilitation of Safe and Secure Trade Using Nuclear Detection Technology — Detection of RN and Other Contraband;
- Improving the Security of Radioactive Material throughout its Lifecycle, Associated Facilities, and Associated Activities;
- Nuclear Forensics Science to Bridge the Radiological Crime Scene to the Nuclear Forensics Laboratory;
- Nuclear Security for Research Reactors and Associated Facilities;
- Nuclear Security Implications of Counterfeit, Fraudulent, and Suspect Items; and

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<sup>4</sup> This relates to operative paragraphs 4, 8 and 22 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>5</sup> This relates to operative paragraphs 5, 32, 54, 56, 58 and 65 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

- Preventive and Protective Measures Against Insider Threats at Nuclear Facilities.

7. A new CRP entitled “Nuclear Security Implications of Uncrewed Aerial, Ground and Maritime Systems” was started in 2025 as a cross-cutting project to cover both the use of, and countermeasures against, uncrewed systems. Additionally, a new CRP entitled “Enhancing Computer Security of Artificial Intelligence Applications for Nuclear Technologies” was approved in 2025.<sup>6</sup>

8. During the reporting period, the Agency continued to place great emphasis on the planning and implementation of its advisory services and missions, including those under the International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ), the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) and the Regulatory Infrastructure for Radiation Safety and Nuclear Security (RISS). The assorted missions are conducted upon request and in coordination with Member States, enabling them to benefit from the comprehensive expertise of the Agency and peers in reviewing and providing advice on issues including, but not limited to, the identification of nuclear security framework requirements related to nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control; the implementation of international instruments; Agency guidance on the physical protection of nuclear and other radioactive material, associated facilities and associated activities; and the establishment and improvement of regulatory infrastructures for the security of radioactive material. During the reporting period, the Agency completed 1 INSServ, 5 IPPAS and 3 RISS missions.<sup>7</sup>

9. The Agency will continue to support the exploration of artificial intelligence (AI) applications in order to address challenges and help ensure secure uses of AI in nuclear technologies. Several AI-related meetings, at which nuclear security linkages were discussed, were held during the reporting period. These included a meeting of the Working Group on AI of the International Network on Innovation to Support Operating Nuclear Power Plants, at which the computer security challenges of AI applications were presented and discussed.<sup>8</sup>

10. During the reporting period, the Agency continued developing an IAEA Technical Document provisionally entitled *Safety and Security Implications of the Use of Artificial Intelligence in Nuclear Installations*. This publication will address the use of AI in nuclear power plants (NPPs), research reactors and fuel cycle facilities and will include security considerations regarding the use of AI in nuclear installations.<sup>9</sup>

11. The Agency participated in a National Workshop on Advancing Nuclear Security and Regulatory Frameworks: Integrating AI and Addressing Emerging Threats, in Riyadh in January 2025.<sup>10</sup>

12. Following the conclusion of the International Conference on Nuclear Security: Shaping the Future (ICONS 2024), held in Vienna in May 2024, the Agency has undertaken multiple activities to ensure that conference outcomes are captured for future use. To this end, the Agency conducted an impact survey in November 2024 to understand key conference outcomes from the perspective of attendees. Additionally, the Agency held a consultancy meeting on the outcomes of ICONS 2024 in a virtual format in February 2025, at which the chairs of all the technical sessions were invited to provide feedback and highlight key ideas. Comments received through the survey and consultancy meeting will be used to inform the planning of future ICONS and other nuclear security related conferences, including

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<sup>6</sup> This relates to operative paragraphs 5, 6, 54 and 58 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>7</sup> This relates to operative paragraphs 5 and 60 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>8</sup> This relates to operative paragraphs 5 and 6 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>9</sup> This relates to operative paragraphs 5, 6 and 28 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>10</sup> This relates to operative paragraphs 5, 6 and 18 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

the International Conference on Computer Security in the Nuclear World: Securing the Future, and the International Conference on the Safe and Secure Transport of Nuclear and Radioactive Material, both to be held in 2026. These conferences will look to consolidate the progress made in these rapidly evolving nuclear security domains. Further, outcomes of ICONS 2024 were considered in the development of the *Nuclear Security Plan 2026–2029*.<sup>11</sup>

13. To continue the dialogue on shaping the future of nuclear security that was started at ICONS 2024, in May 2025 the Agency announced the launch of a webinar series on Nuclear Security — Looking Beyond ICONS 2024.<sup>12</sup>

## C. Strengthening Legal Instruments, National Legislative and Regulatory Frameworks and International Cooperation



*The 10th Technical Meeting of the Representatives of States Parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its Amendment was held in Vienna in November 2024. (Photo: I. Khursid/IAEA)*

14. In November 2024, the Agency convened a Technical Meeting of the Representatives of Parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and the CPPNM Amendment (Points of Contact Meeting) in Vienna to facilitate discussions and experience sharing on various matters within the scope of the CPPNM and its Amendment (A/CPPNM).<sup>13</sup>

15. Immediately after the annual Points of Contact Meeting held in Vienna in November 2024, the Agency held a Technical Meeting to Promote the Universalization of the Convention on the Physical

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<sup>11</sup> This relates to operative paragraphs 8, 9, 44, 55 and 61 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>12</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 9 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>13</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 14 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.



Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its Amendment, enabling discussions on practical experiences and lessons learned in adherence to and implementation of the two instruments.<sup>14</sup>

16. During the reporting period, the Agency developed a variety of exercises for high-level scenario-based policy discussions to illustrate the importance of adherence to and implementation of the CPPNM and the A/CPPNM, addressing the unique challenges of different regions and tailoring assistance to the needs of Member States.<sup>15</sup>

17. Further, these exercises were used to update regional workshop materials, with a view to greater interactivity. A new session using the updated materials was included in the Regional Workshops to Promote the Universalization of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material conducted by the Agency in Luang Prabang, Lao People's Democratic Republic, in August 2024; in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in October 2024; in Havana in April 2025; and in Dar es Salaam in June 2025. In coordination with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was also discussed at these workshops.<sup>16</sup>

18. Meetings were held with parliamentarians and decision makers from the Gambia in February 2025 and from Zambia in May 2025 to raise awareness about the need for adherence to the CPPNM and the A/CPPNM, and to identify potential obstacles to national adherence, enabling tailored Agency assistance in Vienna. In addition, parliamentarians from the Gambia and Zambia participated in the International Conference on Stakeholder Engagement for Nuclear Power Programmes in May 2025.<sup>17</sup>

19. The repository of documents on the CPPNM and the A/CPPNM generated in the context of the 2022 Conference of the Parties to the A/CPPNM, including preparatory and outcome documents of the conference, is located on the Nuclear Security Information Portal (NUSEC) to ensure that it is easily accessible by Member States. During the reporting period, one country deposited their instrument acceding to the CPPNM — Liberia, in September 2024 and two countries deposited their instruments ratifying the A/CPPNM — Liberia, in September 2024 and Mongolia, in April 2025.<sup>18</sup>

20. During the reporting period, the Agency commenced preparations for the second A/CPPNM Conference, in line with Article 16.2 of the Convention. The conference will be held in Vienna in April 2027.<sup>19</sup>

21. The Agency assisted, upon request, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Honduras, Saint Lucia, Sri Lanka, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Viet Nam and Yemen in the development of national legislative and regulatory frameworks for nuclear security.<sup>20</sup>

22. The Agency held two Nuclear Security Information Exchange Meetings in Vienna in October 2024 and May 2025, which were attended by representatives of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and initiatives involved in nuclear security. The purpose of these meetings was to provide opportunities for the sharing of experiences and good practices and to identify areas of cooperation in

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<sup>14</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 14 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>15</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 14 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>16</sup> This relates to operative paragraphs 14, 17 and 18 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>17</sup> This relates to operative paragraphs 14 and 18 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>18</sup> This relates to operative paragraphs 14 and 16 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>19</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 15 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>20</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 18 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

nuclear security, with a view to ensuring effective use of resources and avoiding duplication and overlap, and to further strengthen cooperation.<sup>21</sup>

23. An Interregional Workshop on Nuclear Security Information Exchange and Cooperation for Mediterranean States was held in Tunis in October 2024. One Regional Workshop on Nuclear Security Information Exchange and Cooperation was conducted during the reporting period, for West Africa, in Cotonou, Benin, in May 2025. The objective of the workshops was to strengthen national, regional and international capacities for preventing and combating illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material, as well as other nuclear security events, through enhanced information exchange and coordination.<sup>22</sup>

24. In April 2025 in Vienna, the Agency hosted the 37th Meeting of the Border Monitoring Working Group. Participants continued to coordinate on topics related to combatting the illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control.<sup>23</sup>

## D. Improving Communication and Developing Agency Nuclear Security Guidance



*The IAEA presented about emerging global nuclear security challenges and opportunities in a workshop on nuclear security in the Middle East and North Africa, hosted by the Jordan Atomic Energy Commission and the Nuclear Threat Initiative, under the patronage of His Royal Highness Prince El Hassan Bin Talal. (Photo: R. Busquim e Silva/IAEA)*

25. The Agency continued communication and outreach about its nuclear security activities through the available platforms, including the Agency website, social media and NUSEC. Specifically, the Agency issued 7 press releases, 18 articles and 2 videos on nuclear security-related topics on its website, as well as 60 announcements on NUSEC. All IPPAS and INSServ missions conducted in Member States

<sup>21</sup> This relates to operative paragraphs 20 and 33 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>22</sup> This relates to operative paragraphs 20, 33 and 50 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>23</sup> This relates to operative paragraphs 20, 33 and 50 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

were communicated to the media and the public through press releases, subject to confidentiality requirements between the Agency and Member States. New security-related publications were communicated to a broad audience through the Agency's social media accounts.<sup>24</sup>

26. The Agency developed new communications materials focused on nuclear security during the reporting period, including an infographic edition entitled *Nuclear Security Plan 2022–2025: Achievements and milestones*, and updated other existing security-related communication materials such as brochures, including the addition of a section in the Rays of Hope brochure presenting the Agency's Nuclear Security Training and Demonstration Centre (NSTDC) course for skill building for the secure use of high activity radioactive sources in medicine. Moreover, the Agency published on its website a video entitled "How the IAEA Advises Countries on the Protection of Nuclear Sites" and a virtual tour of the IAEA's Nuclear Security Detection and Monitoring Equipment Laboratory.<sup>25</sup>

27. The Agency presented its nuclear security programme to national stakeholders as part of official visits to Brazil in September 2024, Thailand in October 2024 and Cambodia in February 2025. It also presented its nuclear security programme and activities during an event entitled "Nuclear Security in the Middle East and North Africa: Keeping Pace with an Evolving World", organized by Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Jordan Atomic Energy Commission in Amman in April 2025.<sup>26</sup>

28. During the reporting period, outlets around the world engaged with the Agency to feature information on nuclear security. These included an interview on the Agency's Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) in the December 2024 edition of *1540 Compass*, an e-journal published by the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute; an interview for the podcast of the United Arab Emirates Federal Authority of Nuclear Regulation entitled "Nuclear security from the IAEA perspective" in December 2024; and interviews with international media channels, including a podcast about detection technology<sup>27</sup>

29. Nuclear security considerations were discussed at multiple international conferences hosted by the Agency, including the International Conference on Nuclear Knowledge Management and Human Resources Development: Challenges and Opportunities, held in Vienna in July 2024; the International Conference on Small Modular Reactors and their Applications, held in Vienna in October 2024; the International Conference on Research Reactors: Achievements, Experience and the Way to a Sustainable Future, held in Vienna in November 2024; the International Conference on Enhancing Nuclear Safety and Security Through Technical and Scientific Support Organizations (TSOs): Challenges and Opportunities in a Rapidly Changing World, held in Vienna in December 2024; and the International Conference on Stakeholder Engagement for Nuclear Power Programmes, held in Vienna in May 2025. Inclusion of nuclear security-related topics at these conferences underscores the importance of nuclear security in enabling the peaceful uses of nuclear technologies.<sup>28</sup>

30. The Agency convened the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee in Vienna, with the option of virtual attendance, in December 2024 and June 2025. At these meetings, decisions on proposals for revision of existing Nuclear Security Series publications were made, draft publications to be submitted to Member States for comments and drafts for publishing were approved, and new proposals and draft

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<sup>24</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 21 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>25</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 21 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>26</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 21 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>27</sup> This relates to operative paragraphs 21 and 50 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>28</sup> This relates to operative paragraphs 21, 28 and 45 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

publications in the IAEA Safety Standards Series that have interfaces with nuclear security were cleared. Additionally both of these meetings included a session on the safety–security interface.<sup>29</sup>

31. The Agency continues to focus efforts on enhancing the set of Nuclear Security Series publications, with particular attention given to the Nuclear Security Fundamentals publication *Objective and Essential Elements of a State's Nuclear Security Regime* (IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 20) and three Recommendations in the Nuclear Security Series (Nos 13, 14 and 15). During the reporting period, the Agency conducted two rounds of consultancy meetings, comprising a total of eight meetings — two for each of the top-tier Nuclear Security Series publications<sup>30</sup>:

- Two consultancy meetings on the revision of Nuclear Security Series publication, *Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities* (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5) (Nuclear Security Series No. 13), in Vienna in April and May 2025;
- Two consultancy meetings on the revision of Nuclear Security Series publication, *Nuclear Security Recommendations on Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities* (Nuclear Security Series No. 14), in Vienna in April and June 2025;
- Two consultancy meetings on the revision of Nuclear Security Series publication, *Nuclear Security Recommendations on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control* (Nuclear Security Series No. 15), in Vienna in March and May 2025; and
- Two consultancy meetings on the revision of the IAEA Nuclear Security Series Fundamentals publication, *Objective and Essential Elements of a State's Nuclear Security Regime* (Nuclear Security Series No. 20), in Vienna in February and May 2025.

32. The Agency included all newly issued nuclear security guidance documents in the Nuclear Safety and Security Online User Interface platform. All Nuclear Security Series publications are available in full, are up to date and can be searched as a uniform knowledge base on this platform.<sup>31</sup>

33. The Agency continued developing a first-of-its-kind joint Safety Guide and Nuclear Security Implementing Guide on managing the interface between nuclear and radiation safety and nuclear security.<sup>32</sup>

34. During the reporting period, the Agency continued developing three Technical Reports Series publications on safety and security interfaces, provisionally entitled *Use of Safety Analysis Approaches to Support Nuclear Security at Nuclear Installations*; *Safety, Security and Safeguards by Design in Small Modular Reactors*; and *Design Safety and Security Considerations for Floating Nuclear Power Plants*.<sup>33</sup>

35. The Secretariat continued collecting technical feedback and lessons learned regarding the challenges faced at nuclear facilities in the practical application of Agency safety standards and nuclear security guidance during an armed conflict.<sup>34</sup>

36. Nuclear security is being considered in the Agency's Nuclear Harmonization and Standardization Initiative (NHSI). National nuclear security experts are engaged in all aspects of the initiative, including

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<sup>29</sup> This relates to operative paragraphs 23 and 28 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>30</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 27 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>31</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 28 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>32</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 28 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>33</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 28 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>34</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 30 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

the development of an IAEA Technical Document related to a multinational pre-licensing regulatory review that could include nuclear safety and security aspects of a reactor design. In October 2024, the establishment of a nuclear security working group within the NHSI was announced. This working group will aim to enhance international collaboration in regulatory reviews by identifying nuclear security topics of shared interest among participating States and sharing regulatory approaches, good practices and lessons learned related to the security of small modular reactors (SMRs). The working group will also develop common approaches for regulatory reviews of SMR security, including computer security requirements, leveraging shared experiences through regulatory cooperation. The first virtual meeting of the working group was held in March 2025 and an in-person meeting was held in Vienna in June 2025. Additionally, a virtual meeting between the working group and all other NHSI Regulatory Track groups was conducted in April 2025 to share updates, foster knowledge exchange and facilitate collaboration and discussions among safety and security experts.<sup>35</sup>

37. At the International Conference on Small Modular Reactors and their Applications, held in Vienna in October 2024, multiple sessions were dedicated to the topic of nuclear security considerations for SMRs. The conference featured a dedicated track on nuclear security for SMRs, covering both physical protection and computer security for nuclear security, which included four sessions focused on nuclear security regulations, computer security, nuclear security by design, and stakeholder perspectives on SMR security.<sup>36</sup>

## E. Promoting Nuclear Security Culture and Strengthening Education and Training



*Participants at the FLO network meeting held in Egypt in October 2024 shared innovative approaches to strengthening detection capabilities (Photo: Egyptian Nuclear and Radiological Regulatory Authority)*

<sup>35</sup> This relates to operative paragraphs 28 and 32 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>36</sup> This relates to operative paragraphs 28 and 32 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.



38. The Agency held a National Workshop on Nuclear Security Culture in Practice in Belgrade in September 2024.<sup>37</sup>

39. During the reporting period, the Agency continued to focus on enhancing its offering of train the trainers courses and workshops in order to amplify capacity building efforts through increased impact.<sup>38</sup> The Agency conducted several train the trainers events, including:

- A Train the Trainers Course on Nuclear Security Measures and Emergency Response Arrangements for Major Public Events at the NSTDC in July 2024;
- A Train the Trainers Course on Contingency Response Planning for Facilities Using or Storing Nuclear Material at the NSTDC in September–October 2024;
- Two Train the Trainers Courses on Major Public Events for Equipment Specialists at the NSTDC in September–October 2024 and June 2025;
- An International Training Course on Adult Learning and Instructor Skills Development in Islamabad in December 2024;
- A National Train the Trainers Course on Transport Security of Nuclear and Radioactive Material for Sudan in Vienna in April 2025; and
- A Train the Trainers Course on Nuclear Security Measures and Emergency Response Arrangements for Major Public Events at the NSTDC in June 2025.

40. The Agency continues to deliver e-learning modules and to hold some technical events in either a fully virtual or hybrid format. During the reporting period, 6 400 e-learning modules were completed by more than 4 000 users. During the same period, the Agency implemented 144 nuclear security training events, of which 8 were held in either a fully virtual or hybrid format.<sup>39</sup>

41. During the reporting period, Technical Meetings of Regional Networks of the International Network for Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres (NSSC Network) were held for the Asia Regional Network in Daejeon, Republic of Korea, in July 2024; for the Southeast Asian Nations Sub-Regional Group in Bangkok in September 2024; for the Arab States of the Asia Sub-Regional Group in Vienna in October 2024; and for the Africa Regional Network at the NSTDC in May 2025. The participants worked together to finalize the terms of reference for the regional groups in order to identify and prioritize activities for 2024–2025, including collaboration opportunities.<sup>40</sup>

42. The NSSC Network leadership meeting was held in January 2025. NSSC Network Bureau members prioritized and planned events for the current year, including the annual meeting to be held in Egypt, as well as planning for workshops, training courses and multilateral technical exchanges to be held through 2028.<sup>41</sup>

43. During the reporting period, four new members from Hungary, Lebanon, Nigeria and Senegal, joined the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) bringing the total INSEN Network membership to 214 institutions from 75 Members States and 14 observers. The Agency held two INSEN technical meetings, including the working group meeting in Vienna in August 2024 and the annual meeting which was held virtually in October 2024. Key topics discussed at the annual meeting included presentations from INSEN members, nuclear security considerations for SMRs, the role of AI in nuclear security education, the nuclear knowledge management approach to nuclear security education, and gender equality in nuclear security. The meeting also focused on the development of

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<sup>37</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 34 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>38</sup> This relates to operative paragraphs 35, 44 and 57 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>39</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 36 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>40</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 37 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>41</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 37 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

working groups action plans for 2024–2025 and discussions on and the approval of the revised INSEN terms of reference. Additionally, at the meeting 3 new members were welcomed.<sup>42</sup>

44. The 2025 INSEN Leadership Meeting was held in Vienna in February 2025. During the meeting, participants reviewed the progress of the INSEN action plan for 2025 and discussed activities of the nuclear security working groups. Initial preparations for the 2025 Annual INSEN Meeting were discussed. The meeting emphasized the strengthening of the nuclear security community through enhanced partnerships among INSEN, the NSSC Network and the International Network of Front Line Officers and Organizations for Nuclear Security Detection (FLO) Network. Furthermore, to celebrate INSEN's 15th anniversary, the INSEN for Youth competition was launched in April 2025. Aiming to nurture future nuclear security specialists through education, training and research initiatives offered by INSEN and its members, winners of the competition will be invited to the 2025 INSEN annual meeting and will receive international recognition and opportunities for networking, personal growth and professional development.<sup>43</sup>

45. Three meetings of the FLO Network were held during the reporting period — an international meeting in Luxor, Egypt, in October 2024; the Third Meeting of the FLO Network Working Group for the Latin America Region in Santiago in May 2025; and the Fourth Meeting of the FLO Network Working Group for the Africa Region in Rabat in June 2025.<sup>44</sup>

46. The Agency continues to enhance training offerings at the NSTDC to help strengthen countries' abilities to tackle nuclear terrorism. During the reporting period, 46 events were held at the centre for over 700 participants and experts. The Agency continues to consider all aspects related to the NSTDC's long term sustainability, including financial resource planning, and to keep Member States informed. During the reporting period, 35 NSTDC visits and briefings were conducted for 575 visitors to ensure that Member States are kept informed of progress.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> This relates to operative paragraphs 6, 32, 37 and 62 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>43</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 37 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>44</sup> This relates to operative paragraphs 37 and 56 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>45</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 38 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

## **F. Assisting in the Development and Implementation of Integrated Nuclear Security Sustainability Plans, and Supporting Member State Needs**



*A virtual event held with El Salvador in February 2025 to raise awareness among national decision makers about how to develop, maintain and sustain a national nuclear security regime. (Photo: D. Calma/IAEA)*

47. The Agency continues to assist with efforts around the world to establish effective and sustainable national nuclear security regimes, including obligations under relevant international legal instruments. Integrated Nuclear Security Sustainability Plan (INSSP) missions and awareness-raising missions for senior officials are key tools that the Agency uses for these efforts.<sup>46</sup>

48. During the reporting period, the Agency conducted 15 INSSP review missions, to Burkina Faso, Chad, Ghana, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Mauritania, Montenegro, Nigeria, Paraguay, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates; and 1 INSSP finalization mission, to Colombia. In addition, the Agency conducted one progress review mission on the INSSP implementation plan for Albania.<sup>47</sup>

49. The Agency conducted three INSSP awareness-raising missions targeting decision makers, in Burkina Faso, El Salvador (in a virtual format) and Mauritania. These events raised awareness of nuclear security among senior government officials and decision makers from the respective countries, providing an overview of how to develop, maintain and sustain a national nuclear security regime, with a focus on the context and needs of the respective countries and potential Agency assistance.<sup>48</sup>

50. In June 2025, the Agency launched an online self-assessment questionnaire, hosted on the Nuclear Security Information Management System and aligned with the INSSP framework, to support Member States in identifying key areas for nuclear security improvements.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> This relates to operative paragraphs 39 and 42 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>47</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 42 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>48</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 42 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>49</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 42 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

51. The Agency continued its efforts to develop a voluntary mechanism to match Member State requests for assistance with Member State offers of assistance, highlighting urgent needs and with due regard to confidentiality.<sup>50</sup>

## G. Supporting Continued Dialogue on the Security of Nuclear and Radioactive Material and New Technologies



*A training session during the “Introduction to Life Cycle Security of Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities in Cancer Care” course conducted at the NSTDC in November 2024. (Photo: N. Reguigui/ IAEA)*

52. During the reporting period, the Agency addressed requests related to strengthening physical protection at facilities with high activity radioactive sources in use and storage in 12 States (30 facilities), including 1 new request (3 facilities). The Agency assisted in the removal of 9 high activity disused radioactive sources from 1 State, continued to support the ongoing removal of 12 high activity disused radioactive sources in 6 States and initiated the preparatory work for the removal of an additional 8 sources from 6 States.<sup>51</sup>

53. The Agency continued its efforts to support States in maintaining the security of radioactive sources and disused radioactive sources, including during transport, through several events,<sup>52</sup> including:

- A Regional Training Course for New Regulators in Radiation Safety and Security of Radioactive Material, held over the course of six weeks in Accra in May–July 2024 for English-speaking African States;
- An International Training Course on Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems for Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities in Obninsk and Saint Petersburg, Russian Federation, in July 2024;

<sup>50</sup> This relates to operative paragraphs 43 and 67 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>51</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 44 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>52</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 44 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

- A Regional Workshop on the Development and Implementation of Procedures for Authorization and Inspection of Radioactive Sources in Montevideo in July 2024;
- Two National Training Courses on the Security of Radioactive Material in Use and Storage in Rawalpindi, Pakistan in July 2024 and in Brussels in September 2024;
- Three Transport Security Tabletop Exercises, in Tbilisi in July 2024, in Bogotá in November 2024 and in Lusaka in December 2024;
- A Regional Workshop on Organization and Staffing of an Effectively Independent Regulatory Body, held in Vienna in August 2024 for the Caribbean States;
- A Regional Training Course on Introduction to Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems for Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities in Nairobi in September 2024;
- Two Regional Workshops on Conducting a Transport Security Inspection, in Havana in September 2024 and in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, in September 2024;
- An International Workshop on Transport Security Planning in Beijing in October 2024;
- A Regional Training Course on the Security of Nuclear Material in Transport in the Europe Region in Almaty, Kazakhstan, in October–November 2024;
- An International Training Course on Introduction to Life Cycle Security of Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities in Cancer Care, at the NSTDC in November 2024; and
- An Interregional Training Course on the Security of Nuclear Material in Transport in Accra in March 2025.

54. The Agency supported the Third Meeting of the Project on Nuclear Security during the Transport of Radioactive Material, held in Santiago in March 2025, at which a draft technical guide was completed. This joint IAEA–Ibero-American Forum of Radiological and Nuclear Regulatory Agencies (FORO) publication contains recommendations regarding the development and establishment of nuclear security requirements for the internal transport of radioactive material in FORO member countries. Furthermore, the document discusses the impact of these recommendations on safety requirements, and the safety requirements that contribute to security.<sup>53</sup>

55. The Agency continued its support for the implementation of borehole disposal systems in Ghana and Malaysia, a solution that combines financial affordability and technological feasibility, ensuring that disused sealed radioactive sources can be safely, securely and permanently emplaced.<sup>54</sup>

56. As of 30 June 2025, 153 States had made a political commitment to implement the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, of which 140 had also notified the Director General of their intention to act in a harmonized manner in accordance with the Code's supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. A total of 153 States have nominated points of contact to facilitate the export and import of radioactive sources. In addition, 75 States have notified the Director General of their intention to act in a harmonized manner and in accordance with the Code's supplementary Guidance on the Management of Disused Radioactive Sources.<sup>55</sup>

57. The Agency held two Regional Technical Meetings of the Points of Contact for the Purpose of Facilitating the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources in Accordance with the Guidance on the

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<sup>53</sup> This relates to operative paragraphs 20, 28 and 44 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>54</sup> This relates to operative paragraphs 44 and 45 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>55</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 46 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.



Import and Export of Radioactive Sources, for the Africa region in Windhoek in September–October 2024, and for the America region in Buenos Aires in June–July 2025.<sup>56</sup>

58. The Agency held two Regional Technical Meetings to Share Experiences and Lessons Learned in Implementing the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its Supplementary Guidance, in Abu Dhabi in October 2024 and in Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, in November 2024.<sup>57</sup>

59. The Agency held two Regional Workshops on the Development of National Policies and Strategies for the Management of Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources, in La Paz in October 2024 and in Tashkent in April 2025. An Interregional Workshop on the same topic was held in Vienna in June–July 2025.<sup>58</sup>

60. The Agency held the Open-ended Meeting of Technical and Legal Experts on States' Implementation of the Guidance on the Management of Disused Radioactive Sources in Vienna in June 2025.<sup>59</sup>

61. The Agency conducted two expert missions on the national inventory of radioactive sources and the establishment of a temporary safe and secure storage for disused sealed radioactive sources, in Kingston in February 2025, and in Dushanbe in May 2025.<sup>60</sup>

62. The Agency continues to advise and support Member States, upon request, in minimizing civilian stocks of high enriched uranium and in using low enriched uranium where technologically and economically feasible.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 46 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>57</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 46 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>58</sup> This relates to operative paragraphs 46 and 47 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>59</sup> This relates to operative paragraphs 46 and 47 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>60</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 47 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>61</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 59 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

## H. Using the Incident and Trafficking Database and Advising on Threat Assessment



*More than 100 national ITDB points of contact met in Vienna in October 2024. (Photo: V. Tafili/IAEA)*

63. The Agency provided quarterly ITDB analytical summary reports and in February 2025 issued its annual factsheet summarizing ITDB incidents for public information.<sup>62</sup>

64. The Agency held the Triennial Meeting of States' Points of Contact for the Incident and Trafficking Database in Vienna in October 2024. The meeting was attended by 99 participants from 76 Member States and 6 international organizations. The meeting resulted in a suggestion to increase the frequency of the meeting and of the points of contact training event, to increase the online activities of the ITDB in the area of training and capacity building, and to organize consultancy meetings to review some of the operational structures for reporting to the ITDB.<sup>63</sup>

65. During the reporting period, the Agency processed 204 Web Incident Notification Forms in a timely manner, 8 reports in support of major public events (MPEs), and numerous ad hoc requests for ITDB data and analysis. The Agency further conducted outreach to Member States not participating in the ITDB to encourage their participation through invitations to regional workshops and through the incorporation of ITDB-related information into other programmes such as INSSP, IPPAS, INSServ and various Agency nuclear security-related training activities.<sup>64</sup>

66. The Agency held the International Training Course on Insider Threats Using the Shapash 3D Model at the NSTDC in August 2024, March 2025 and May 2025.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 50 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>63</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 50 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>64</sup> This relates to operative paragraphs 21 and 50 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>65</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 52 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

67. The Agency participated in an International Best Practices Workshop on Mitigating the Cyber Insider Threat in the Nuclear Sector, hosted by the World Institute for Nuclear Security in Vienna in September 2024.<sup>66</sup>

68. The Agency held an International Workshop on Threat Assessment and Design Basis Threat at the Pakistan Centre of Excellence for Nuclear Security in Chakri, Pakistan, in December 2024. The Agency also held two Regional Workshops in Dakar in August 2024 and in Nairobi in May 2025, as well as four National Workshops, in Colombo in August 2024, in Chisinau in October 2024, in Yaoundé in March 2025, and in Tashkent in June 2025, on the same topic.<sup>67</sup>

69. The Agency held a National Training Course on Preventive and Protective Measures Against Insider Threats to Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities in Dakar in October 2024.<sup>68</sup>

## I. Strengthening Information and Computer Security



*Participants during a practical session of the Regional Workshop on Drafting Computer Security Regulations in Daejeon, Republic of Korea, in October 2024. (Photo: M. Hewes/IAEA)*

70. The Agency conducted several training courses related to computer security during the reporting period.<sup>69</sup> These courses included:

- Regional Training Courses on Computer Security Fundamentals for Nuclear Security in Harare in July 2024, in Paris in December 2024 and in Istanbul, Türkiye, in June 2025;

<sup>66</sup> This relates to operative paragraphs 52 and 54 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>67</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 52 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>68</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 52 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>69</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 54 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

- An International Training Course on Computer Security Fundamentals for Nuclear Security in Vienna in August 2024;
- National Training Courses on Computer Security Fundamentals for Nuclear Security in Riyadh in September 2024, in Manila in September 2024, in Chakri in November 2024 and in Jakarta in February 2025;
- Regional Workshops on Drafting Computer Security Regulations in Bogotá and in Daejeon, Republic of Korea, in October 2024 and in Ankara in April 2025;
- A Regional Training Course on Computer Security for Industrial Control Systems for Nuclear Security in Vienna in December 2024;
- A Regional Training Course on Conducting Computer Inspections for Nuclear Facilities in Ibaraki, Japan, in March 2025; and
- A National Training Course on Computer Security Incident Response for Nuclear Security in Amman in May 2025.

71. Preparations are under way for the International Conference on Computer Security in the Nuclear World: Securing the Future, to be held in Vienna in May 2026. Conference preparations will be informed by recommendations from both the International Conference on Computer Security in the Nuclear World: Security for Safety, which was held in Vienna in June 2023, and ICONS 2024. During the reporting period, two Programme Committee meetings were held to inform the planning of the conference.<sup>70</sup>

## J. Assisting in Building Capacity in Nuclear Forensics



*The International Integrated Workshop on Radiological Crime Scene Management and Nuclear Forensics was held at the NSTDC in April 2025. (Photo: Z. Yuan/IAEA)*

<sup>70</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 55 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

72. During the reporting period, the Agency conducted several training courses related to nuclear forensics.<sup>71</sup> These courses included:

- Five Regional Workshops on Radiological Crime Scene Management, in Yaoundé in July 2024, in Tbilisi in November 2024, in Gaborone in December 2024, in Buenos Aires in May 2025 and in Manila in June 2025;
- Two International Integrated Workshops on Radiological Crime Scene Management and Nuclear Forensics at the NSTDC in July–August 2024 and April 2025;
- A Regional Peer-to-Peer Workshop on Nuclear Forensics in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, in August 2024;
- Two Regional Training Courses on Practical Introduction to Nuclear Forensics, in Paris and in Budapest, both in September–October 2024;
- An International Training Course on Nuclear Forensics Methodologies in Karlsruhe, Germany, in October 2024; and
- Two Regional Training Courses on Introduction to Nuclear Forensics, in Cairo in November 2024 and in Accra in May 2025.

73. The Agency hosted two webinars aimed at engaging personnel from around the world in developing capacity in nuclear forensics. The webinar entitled “The First Week of a Nuclear Forensic Examination” was hosted in February 2025 with the Office of Atoms for Peace in Bangkok. The webinar entitled “The First Two Months of a Nuclear Forensic Examination” was held in April 2025 with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in the United States of America. Both webinars informed participants of the details of conducting a nuclear forensic investigation.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 56 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>72</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 56 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.



## K. Providing Technical Assistance for MPEs and Detecting Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control



*The Agency conducted a national workshop on developing and implementing nuclear security measures for major public events in Mexico in February 2025. (Photo: B. Kaboro/IAEA)*

74. During the reporting period, the Agency provided support for four MPEs.<sup>73</sup>

75. The Agency held a Technical Meeting on Lessons Learned from 20 Years of IAEA Support to Major Public Events in Dubai in the United Arab Emirates in November 2024. Co-hosted by the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation and Dubai Police, the event drew more than 150 participants from 54 Member States. The meeting provided an international forum for discussion, interaction and exchange of experience on lessons learned, good practices and challenges faced by Member States during the planning, development and implementation of nuclear security systems and measures for MPEs.<sup>74</sup>

76. The Agency utilized the capabilities of the NSTDC in December 2024 to host two events related to MPEs — a Training Course on Developing and Implementing Nuclear Security Systems and Measures for Major Public Events: An Overview and Technical Demonstration and an International Workshop and Technical Demonstration for Senior Officials on Nuclear Security Measures for Major Public Events.<sup>75</sup>

77. In March 2025, the Agency published *IAEA Support to Cameroon for Nuclear Security Measures at the Africa Cup of Nations 2021* (IAEA-TDL-012). The document is intended to be used by State

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<sup>73</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 57 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>74</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 57 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>75</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 57 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

authorities such as law enforcement, customs officials, security services and competent technical organizations in their efforts to establish and implement nuclear security measures during an MPE.<sup>76</sup>

78. The Agency continued to support Member State requests for loaned or donated handheld radiation detection equipment in support of their detection systems, including nuclear security assistance for preparation and support for MPEs, and training in radiation detection equipment operation, frontline maintenance and calibration. During the reporting period, 5 Member States received equipment through a loan process; 428 items of equipment in total were loaned from over 1590 items of nuclear security detection and monitoring equipment maintained by the Agency.<sup>77</sup>

79. The Agency held two Regional Workshops on Developing a National Framework for Managing the Response to Criminal or Intentional Unauthorized Acts Involving Nuclear or Other Radioactive Material, in Rio de Janeiro in September–October 2024 and in Manama in June 2025, and an International Workshop on the same topic in Chiang Mai, Thailand, in March 2025.<sup>78</sup>

## **L. Strengthening Agency Internal Planning and Improving Workforce Diversity**



*An International School on Nuclear Security was held for fellows of the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellowship Programme (MSCFP) in Vienna in August 2024. (Photo: O. Hakam/IAEA)*

80. During the reporting period, the Agency continued to strengthen its results based management approach to support internal planning. The Agency implemented pre- and post-training knowledge tests for selected courses to quantify the increase in knowledge resulting from instruction. Follow-up surveys were distributed six months after the training to assess how trainees applied the training in practice. Additionally, the Agency conducted a comprehensive assessment to evaluate the effectiveness and

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<sup>76</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 57 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>77</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 57 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>78</sup> This relates to operative paragraphs 18 and 65 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

impact of its nuclear security programme, including the NSSC Network, INSEN, the FLO Network, the ITDB, and the equipment loan and donation project. The data obtained highlights specific results and informs further programme planning, including updates to course materials.<sup>79</sup>

81. Furthermore, the findings from the surveys provide stakeholders, including donors, with evidence of impact and accountability. By following results based management principles, the Agency ensures training is impactful, relevant and aligned with Member State needs. The nuclear security programme's comprehensive approach to results based management is noted in the Agency's *Programme Performance Report for 2022–2023*, dated August 2024.<sup>80</sup>

82. During the reporting period, the Agency continued to focus on gender parity in nuclear security by including sessions on the topic in training courses, nuclear security schools and the INSEN meetings. Additionally, the Women in Nuclear Security Initiative (WINSI) held a webinar on “Enabling Gender Equality and Diversity in Nuclear Security by Supporting Women’s Careers” in December 2024.<sup>81</sup>

83. During the reporting period, 21 fellows of the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellowship Programme (MSCFP) continued their enrolment in master’s degree programmes related to nuclear security, and 5 were placed in the Division of Nuclear Security for their internships.<sup>82</sup>

84. During the reporting period, the Agency held two International Schools on Nuclear Security: one in Vienna in August–September 2024 for fellows of the MSCFP and one in Trieste, Italy, in April 2025. The schools provide early career professionals from Member States with the basic knowledge of nuclear security. Participants explored a broad spectrum of topics in nuclear security through a combination of presentations, groups discussions, scenario analyses, hands-on exercises and technical visits. The schools also included specific sessions related to gender parity in nuclear security, including panels organized by the WINSI.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 61 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>80</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 61 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>81</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 62 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>82</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 62 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>83</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 62 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.



## M. Supporting Infrastructure and Technology Upgrades and Associated Training Needs



*An International Workshop on Developing a National Framework for Managing the Response to Criminal or Intentional Unauthorized Acts Involving Nuclear or Other Radioactive Material was held in Chiang Mai in March 2025 (Photo: Office of Atoms for Peace (OAP), Thailand)*

85. The Agency held a Consultancy Meeting on the International Nuclear Security Advisory Service Self-Assessment Questionnaire and Report Template in Vienna in February 2025. Participants reviewed and made recommendations for changes to the INSServ self-assessment questionnaire that is completed by Member States and that serves as a basis for INSServ experts during the preparation and conduct of missions. Participants also reviewed the INSServ report template that is used by experts when drafting the mission report.<sup>84</sup>

86. The Agency held four International Training Courses on the Use and Maintenance of Handheld Detection Instruments at the NSTDC — two basic courses in August 2024 and March 2025 and two advanced courses in July 2024 and May 2025.<sup>85</sup>

87. The Agency held two Regional Workshops on the Evaluation of Nuclear Security Detection Architecture, in Amman in September 2024 and in Zagreb in December 2024.<sup>86</sup>

88. The Agency continued to support Member States in their efforts to develop and implement national response plans for criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving nuclear or other radioactive material out of regulatory control. The Agency held a consultancy meeting related to Sudan's response plan in Vienna in March 2025 and conducted missions to Da Nang, Viet Nam, in April 2025 and to Nusa Dua, Indonesia, in May 2025 related to those countries' respective plans.<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 64 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>85</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 65 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>86</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 65 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>87</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 65 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

89. During the reporting period, the Agency continued to develop and update science and technology tools and mobile applications that support Member State requirements for strengthening nuclear security regimes. These tools — the Mobile-Integrated Nuclear Security Network, the Minimum Detectable Quantity and Alarm Threshold Evaluation Tool, the Personnel Alarm Assessment Tool, and the Tool for Radiation Alarm and Commodity Evaluation phone and desktop applications — enhance the prevention, detection and response capabilities of Member States.<sup>88</sup>

## **N. Conclusions**

90. All Agency activities related to nuclear security continue to be undertaken in a prioritized manner within available resources and with due regard to the protection of confidential information.<sup>89</sup>

91. The Agency will continue to produce this report and the Nuclear Security Review on an annual basis as complementary documents, within their defined scopes and minimizing duplication, in response to nuclear security resolutions and in consultation with Member States.<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 65 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>89</sup> This relates to operative paragraphs 61, 67 and 69 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.

<sup>90</sup> This relates to operative paragraph 68 of resolution GC(68)/RES/9.



# Annex

## Table of Concordance

Table of Concordance Between Resolution GC(68)/RES/9 Operative Paragraphs (OPs) Associated with Agency Action and Paragraphs of this Report

OP	Report Paragraph	OP	Report Paragraph
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35	39	67	51, 90
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