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Nuclear Security

Resolution adopted on 29 September 2023 during the 13th plenary meeting

The General Conference,

(a) Recalling its previous resolutions on measures to improve the security of nuclear and other radioactive material and on measures against the illicit trafficking of these materials,

(b) Taking note of the Nuclear Security Report 2023 submitted by the Director General in document GC(67)/14, as well as of the Nuclear Security Review 2023 taken note of by the Board of Governors in document GC(67)/INF/3, and of the Nuclear Security Plan 2022–2025 approved by the Board of Governors in document GC(65)/24,

(c) Asserting that the responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with that State, and mindful of the sovereign rights and the responsibilities of every Member State, in accordance with its respective national and international obligations, to maintain at all times effective and comprehensive nuclear security of all nuclear and other radioactive material,

c) bis Respecting that participating in and joining international nuclear security instruments is a voluntary and sovereign decision of a State, while noting efforts towards the widest possible participation in this regard,

(d) Reaffirming the common goals of nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of atomic energy, recognizing that nuclear security contributes to international peace and security, and stressing that progress in nuclear disarmament is critically needed and will continue to be addressed in all relevant fora, consistent with the relevant obligations and commitments of Member States,

(e) Recognizing that the terms and concepts addressed in this resolution are based on the Nuclear Security Series (NSS) documents agreed by consensus,

(f) Recognizing that physical protection is a key element of nuclear security,
(g) **Taking note** that physical protection is linked or, in many cases, interconnected with, but not limited to, other areas of nuclear security, such as nuclear material accounting and control, information security and computer security, nuclear security culture, and nuclear security measures for material out of regulatory control, while **acknowledging** the importance of prevention, detection, deterrence, access delay and response,

(h) **Remaining** concerned about existing, evolving and emerging nuclear security risks, challenges and threats, while **stressing** the need to address them, including those related to technological developments, without prejudice to the sovereign rights of Member States, and **reaffirming** that the responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with that State,

(i) **Recognizing** that addressing challenges associated with computer technology, as well as other new technologies, plays an increasing and vital role in ensuring the security of nuclear and other radioactive material and associated facilities,

(j) **Acknowledging** that advances in science, technology and engineering present opportunities to enhance nuclear security, and **noting** the potential areas for application and challenges of artificial intelligence,

(k) **Recalling** with appreciation the International Conferences on Nuclear Security (ICONS) in 2013, 2016 and 2020, and their related Ministerial Declarations, and **taking note** of valuable technical expert discussions reflected in the Presidents’ Reports,

(l) **Recognizing** the importance of maintaining and strengthening the dialogue between relevant government bodies and the nuclear industry at national level on nuclear security,

(m) **Underlining** the enduring need to raise awareness of nuclear security among all stakeholders, which include users of nuclear and other radioactive material and competent authorities in Member States and among the relevant staff of the Secretariat,

(n) **Acknowledging** that nuclear security may contribute to the positive perception, at a national level, of peaceful nuclear activities,

(o) **Recognizing** the central role of the Agency, as reaffirmed by IAEA Member States for instance at the 16th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 2012, in developing comprehensive nuclear security guidance documents and, on request, providing assistance to Member States in order to facilitate their implementation,

(p) **Emphasizing** the need for the involvement of all Member States of the Agency in nuclear security-related activities and initiatives in an inclusive manner, and **noting** the role that international processes and initiatives, including the Nuclear Security Summits, have played in the area of nuclear security,

(q) **Reaffirming** the central role of the Agency in facilitating international cooperation in supporting the efforts of States to fulfil their responsibilities to ensure the security of civilian nuclear and other radioactive material,

(r) **Reaffirming** the importance of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its 2005 Amendment extending its scope, **recognizing** the importance of acceptance, approval or ratification by further IAEA Member States, and **noting** the importance of their full implementation by the States Parties and universalization,

(s) **Recalling** the Director General’s role as depositary of the CPPNM and its 2005 Amendment (A/CPPNM) and the Agency’s role in promoting universalization of relevant legal instruments
and assisting Member States, upon request, in adherence to, and implementation of, relevant international legal instruments,

(t) Recognizing that highly enriched uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium in all their applications require special precautions to ensure their nuclear security and that it is of great importance that they be appropriately secured and accounted for, by and in the relevant States,

(u) Recognizing the importance of minimizing the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and using low enriched uranium (LEU) where technically and economically feasible,

(v) Noting United Nations Security Council resolutions 1373, 1540, 1673, 1810, 1977 and 2325, United Nations General Assembly resolution 71/38, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and international efforts in conformity with these instruments to prevent access by non-State actors to weapons of mass destruction and related material,

(w) Noting the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) relating to nuclear security,

(x) Recognizing the need to strengthen and improve cooperation in, and the coordination of, international efforts in the field of nuclear security in order to avoid duplication and overlap, and acknowledging the central role of the Agency in this respect,

(y) Emphasizing the need for Member States to continue providing appropriate technical, human and financial resources, including through the Nuclear Security Fund, for the Agency to implement its nuclear security activities and to enable the Agency to provide, upon request, the support needed by Member States,

(z) Recognizing that nuclear security and safety measures have the common aim of protecting human health, society and the environment, while acknowledging the distinctions between the two areas, and affirming the importance of coordination in this regard, and underlining the importance that, at the national level, both these areas are dealt with appropriately, by governments and their competent authorities according to their respective competencies,

(aa) Noting General Conference resolutions GC(XXIX)/RES/444 and GC(XXXIV)/RES/533 regarding attacks or threats of attacks against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes, and also noting the 2009 General Conference unanimous decision GC(53)/DEC/13, which recognized the importance attached to safety, security and physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, and, without prejudice to the views of Member States, noting the importance of the IAEA Director General’s “seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict, which derive from the IAEA safety standards and nuclear security guidance”, advanced on 2 March 2022,

(bb) Noting the relevance of the “five principles” presented by the IAEA Director General in the context of the ZNPP to the United Nations Security Council on 30 May 2023,

(cc) Noting the recommended requirements for measures to protect against sabotage of nuclear facilities and unauthorized removal of nuclear material in use, storage and transport included in IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13 (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5), using inter alia a graded approach, as well as the ongoing work by the Agency on further guidance on their implementation, including during the process of design, construction, commissioning, operation, maintenance and decommissioning of nuclear facilities,
(dd) Considering that Nuclear Security Fundamentals and Recommendations developed in the Nuclear Security Series apply to small modular reactors (SMRs),

(ee) Recalling the objectives of the voluntary and non-legally-binding Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, its supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources and its supplementary Guidance on the Management of Disused Radioactive Sources,

(ff) Acknowledging the 20th anniversary of the voluntary and non-legally-binding Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources,

(gg) Noting the importance of security in the transport of nuclear and other radioactive material and stressing the need to take effective measures to protect nuclear and other radioactive material during transport against insider threats, unauthorized removal, sabotage or other malicious acts,

(hh) Reaffirming and respecting each Member State’s choices and policies in nuclear technology, and calling upon the Agency to promote and facilitate technical exchanges of experience, knowledge and good practices on the use and security of high activity radioactive sources during their full life cycle, and inform Member States, within its mandate, of nuclear and radiation technology options which are technically feasible, economically viable and sustainable,

(ii) Noting the contribution of Member States’ systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material to preventing loss of control and illicit trafficking and to deterring and detecting the unauthorized removal of nuclear material,

(jj) Underlining the importance of Agency’s programmes for education and training in nuclear security, as well as other international, regional and national efforts to this end,

(kk) Recognizing the importance of considering nuclear security when organizing major public events, and commending the work done by the Agency in providing, upon request, technical assistance and expert support to countries hosting major public events,

(ll) Stressing the essential importance of ensuring the confidentiality of information relevant to nuclear security,

(mm) Realizing that States have developed their national nuclear security regimes to ensure physical protection of nuclear and radioactive material and against nuclear terrorism and illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material,

1. Affirms the central role of the Agency in strengthening the nuclear security framework globally and in coordinating international activities in the field of nuclear security, while avoiding duplication and overlap;

2. Calls upon all Member States, within their responsibility, to achieve and maintain highly effective nuclear security, including physical protection, of nuclear and other radioactive material during use, storage and transport and of the associated facilities at all stages in their life cycle, as well as protecting sensitive information;

3. Notes the importance of computer security and the need for Member States to take measures within their responsibility to maintain computer security, and also taking into account insider threats, keeping in mind the importance of international cooperation in this respect;

4. Calls upon the Secretariat to implement the Nuclear Security Plan 2022–2025 (GC(65)/24) in a comprehensive and coordinated manner based on the priorities and needs expressed by Member States and acknowledges the efforts of the Secretariat in initiating consultations with Member States and
further calls on the Secretariat, in close consultation with Member States, to assess the development process and the scope of the Nuclear Security Plan, and draw lessons with a view to exploring a future process, under the leadership of Member States;

5. Encourages the Secretariat, in collaboration with Member States, to enhance its technical capabilities and keep abreast of scientific, technological and engineering innovations with a view to developing guidance and facilitating training that will support Member States, upon their request, in implementing measures that will effectively confront current and evolving challenges, risks and threats to nuclear security;

6. Requests the Secretariat, in close consultation with Member States, to continue identifying potential benefits and challenges of artificial intelligence in support of nuclear security, to explore the possibility of providing technical assistance to Member States upon request in this field and to keep Member States informed on any progress;

7. Welcomes the fact that the IAEA Secretariat and Member States have taken into account resolution GC(64)/RES/10 and also have considered the ICONS 2020 Ministerial Declaration in the consultations process between the Secretariat and the Member States during the development of the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Plan 2022–2025;

8. Welcomes the ongoing preparations for the ICONS 2024: Shaping the Future, encourages Ministers, policy-makers, senior officials and nuclear security experts from all Member States to participate with a view to achieving substantive outcomes which can further strengthen nuclear security, and further calls upon the Secretariat to continue to organize ICONS every four years;

9. Calls upon Member States that have not yet done so to establish or designate, and sustain a competent authority or authorities responsible for the implementation of the legislative and regulatory framework, which is or are functionally independent in its or their regulatory decision-making from any other bodies that deal with the promotion or utilization of nuclear or other radioactive material, and which has or have the legal authority and the human, financial and technical resources necessary for fulfilling its or their responsibilities;

10. Calls upon all States to ensure that measures to strengthen nuclear security do not hamper international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, the production, transfer and use of nuclear and other radioactive material, the exchange of such material for peaceful purposes and the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and do not undermine the established priorities of the Agency’s technical cooperation programme;

11. Takes note of the Agency’s Regulatory Infrastructure Development Projects (RIDP) as an effective regional technical assistance project that supports the establishment and enhancement of national regulatory infrastructures for security of radioactive material as well as for radiation safety in many countries and encourages efforts to implement RIDPs in regions and sub-regions in response to requests for assistance;

12. Calls upon all Member States to consider providing the necessary political, technical and financial support, as appropriate, to the Agency’s efforts to enhance nuclear security through various arrangements at the bilateral, regional and international levels, and recalls the decision of the Board of Governors on support for the Nuclear Security Fund;

13. Encourages all Parties to the CPPNM and its 2005 Amendment to fully implement their obligations thereunder, encourages States that have not yet done so to become party to this Convention and its Amendment, further encourages the Agency to continue efforts to promote further adherence to the Amendment with the aim of its universalization, reminds all Parties to inform the depositary of their
laws and regulations which give effect to the Convention without further delay, and requests the Director General of the IAEA, as the depositary, to continue communicating such information to all Parties;

14. Requests the Secretariat to take the Outcome Document of the 2022 Conference of the Parties to the Amendment to the CPPNM into consideration in line with the Member States’ respective legal obligations, including convening a follow-on Conference, in line with Article 16.2 of the Convention;

15. Notes the online repository of documents on the CPPNM, its 2005 Amendment, and relevant Review Conferences as updated after the 2022 Conference, and requests the Secretariat to continue to update it as appropriate;

16. Encourages States that have not yet done so to become parties to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), also recognizing the ongoing efforts with regard to its universalization and effective implementation;

17. Encourages the Secretariat to continue to assist Member States, upon request, in their development of national legislative and regulatory frameworks and, in consultation with Member States, to consider ways of further promoting and facilitating the exchange, on a voluntary basis, of information on the implementation of the international legal instruments relevant to nuclear security;

18. Calls upon all Member States to fully implement their respective obligations under international legally binding instruments relevant to nuclear security;

19. Takes note that regional organizations of regulatory authorities can strengthen regional cooperation through the exchange of information, experience and technical expertise, and encourages the Secretariat to provide assistance to such fora, on request;

20. Requests the Secretariat to continue improving communication with the public and Member States about its nuclear security activities, such as advisory services, development of non-legally-binding guidance, assistance and training, and how these activities assist Member States to improve nuclear security globally, and welcomes the efforts by Member States to contribute to raising the awareness of the Agency’s nuclear security activities, with due respect to confidentiality;

21. Notes the Nuclear Security Review 2023 which includes the Secretariat’s analysis of some global trends, the Agency’s activities in 2022 and its priorities for 2023, as identified by the Secretariat and Member States, requests the Secretariat to assess, in collaboration with Member States, its value and complementarity with the Nuclear Security Report issued in response to the General Conference Resolution, and further requests the Secretariat to enhance its efforts in coordinating the Nuclear Security Review with the Nuclear Security Report and the Nuclear Security Plan 2022–2025;

22. Recognizes and supports the key role of the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee (NSGC), including through coordination and priority-setting in the development and periodic review, when necessary and in a timely manner, of the Nuclear Security Series publications, encourages all Member States to actively participate in the NSGC and the review process of the Nuclear Security Series publications, and requests the continued assistance of the Secretariat to enable representatives of all Member States to participate in the work of the NSGC;

23. Encourages all Member States to take into account, as appropriate, the Nuclear Security Series publications, and to make use of them at their national discretion in their efforts to strengthen nuclear security;

24. Takes note of the progress made in the Nuclear Security Series (NSS) guidance development and recognizes the need for their timely publication in all United Nations languages;
25. **Notes** the efforts of the Secretariat and the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee (NSGC) to make nuclear security guidance and the terminology used therein more consistent across the different elements of nuclear security;

26. **Welcomes** the upcoming revision of the NSS Nuclear Security Fundamentals (NSS 20) and Recommendations (NSS 13, 14 and 15), and **requests** the Secretariat to further facilitate the revision process as recommended in order to ensure consistent use of terminology and to take into account new and emerging threats, while ensuring stability;

27. **Requests** the Secretariat, while recognizing the distinction between nuclear safety and nuclear security, to continue facilitating, in close cooperation with Member States, a coordination process to address their interfaces in a timely manner, **encourages** the Agency to continue to develop safety and security publications, to ensure consistency and to foster culture accordingly;

28. **Calls upon** all Member States to be mindful of the importance of nuclear safety and security regarding peaceful nuclear facilities and materials in all circumstances, and, without prejudice to the views of Member States, **notes** the importance of the IAEA Director General’s “seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and nuclear security during an armed conflict, which derive from the IAEA safety standards and nuclear security guidance”, advanced on 2 March 2022;

29. **Calls upon** all Member States to take into account information security, considering the balance between security and transparency as provided for in IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 23-G, with a view to further strengthening and improving relevant national mechanisms that handle information pertaining to nuclear or other radioactive material, associated facilities and activities, as well as material encountered out of regulatory control;

30. **Notes** the Agency-wide Platform on SMRs and their Applications and **encourages** further work by the Secretariat to provide support to interested Member States, upon their request, in applying, from the design stage, the Nuclear Security Fundamentals and Recommendations for SMRs;

31. **Encourages** the Secretariat to continue, in coordination with Member States, to actively fulfil its central and coordinating role in nuclear security activities among international organizations and initiatives, taking into account their respective mandates and memberships, and to work jointly, as appropriate, with relevant international and regional organizations and institutions, **welcomes** regular IAEA Information Exchange Meetings and **requests** the Secretariat to keep Member States informed in this regard;

32. **Encourages** the Secretariat to continue promoting international exchanges of experience, knowledge and good practices regarding ways to develop, foster and maintain a robust nuclear security culture compatible with States’ nuclear security regimes, and **encourages** the Secretariat to continue organizing workshops on sustaining a nuclear security culture;

33. **Encourages** the Secretariat, in consultation with Member States, to increase its assistance to States, upon request, to develop, foster, and maintain a robust nuclear security culture, including publishing guidance, providing training activities and offering related self-assessment support and training materials and tools;

34. **Encourages** the Secretariat, in cooperation with Member States, to continue its training and train-the-trainers programmes taking into account the IAEA Nuclear Security Series, and to adapt the courses as appropriate, within its mandate, to meet the evolving needs of Member States;

35. **Encourages** the Agency to continue to conduct e-learning and some technical events in hybrid or virtual formats when appropriate or when physical meetings may not be feasible – recognizing Member
States’ preferences and their request for equal access to such events, to ensure resilience of the implementation of the Agency’s nuclear security programme,

36. Encourages ongoing initiatives of Member States, in cooperation with the Secretariat, to further enhance nuclear security culture, in the framework of organizational culture in a balanced, risk informed manner, through the development of skills and knowledge of personnel, dialogue and cooperation with the nuclear industry as well as international and regional networks, as appropriate, including through centres of excellence, the International Network for Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres (NSSC Network) and the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN), and requests the Secretariat to continue to report to the Board of Governors on its activities in this respect;

37. Welcomes the planned opening of the Nuclear Security Training and Demonstration Centre (NSTDC) at Seibersdorf and calls upon the IAEA to ensure that activities at the NSTDC complement, and avoid overlap and duplication of the activities of Member States’ Nuclear Security Support Centres, and encourages the Secretariat, in close consultation with Member States and the Friends of the NSTDC, to develop strategies to mobilize the financial and technical resources to enable the long-term sustainability and operation of the NSDTC, and notes the Secretariat’s progress in reviewing its ability to apply programme support costs from extrabudgetary contributions related to the NSTDC to its continued operations, and calls on the Secretariat to keep Member States informed on progress made on the NSTDC, including through regular briefings and the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Review and Nuclear Security Report;

38. Recognizes and supports the Agency’s continuing work to assist, upon request, States’ efforts to establish effective and sustainable national nuclear security regimes, to fulfil their obligations under United Nations Security Council resolutions 1540 and 2325, provided that the requests are within the scope of the Agency’s statutory responsibilities;

39. Recognizes and supports the Agency’s continuing work to assist, upon request, States’ efforts to ensure the security of their nuclear and other radioactive material, including assistance in the implementation of Agency Nuclear Security Fundamentals and Recommendations when radioactive material is supplied by the Agency;

40. Encourages States to make further use of assistance in the field of nuclear security, including, as appropriate, through the establishment of Integrated Nuclear Security Sustainability Plans (INSSPs), and similarly encourages States in a position to do so to make such assistance available;

41. Encourages the Secretariat to assist Member States, upon request, in the development of implementation strategies of their INSSPs in close consultation with the concerned Member State;

42. Requests the Secretariat to continue developing, in close consultation with Member States, a voluntary mechanism to match Member States’ requests for assistance with other Member States’ offers of assistance, and highlighting, in cooperation with the recipient State, the most urgent needs for assistance, with due regard to the confidentiality of information relevant to nuclear security and asks the Secretariat to keep Member States informed of progress;

43. Calls upon the Agency to support continued dialogue on the security of radioactive sources and disused radioactive sources, including during their transport, and to promote research and development in this field;

44. Calls upon the Agency, within its mandate, to inform Member States of nuclear and radiation technology options which are technically feasible, economically viable and sustainable, while respecting Member States’ choices and policies in nuclear technologies;
45. Takes positive note of the 20th anniversary of the voluntary and non-legally-binding Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and encourages all Member States to make political commitments to the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its two supplementary Guidelines on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources and on the Management of Disused Radioactive Sources, and to implement these, as appropriate, in order to maintain effective safety and security of radioactive sources throughout their life cycle, and requests the Secretariat to continue supporting Member States in this regard upon request;

46. Calls upon all Member States to ensure that there is adequate provision for safe and secure storage and disposition pathways for disused radioactive sealed sources so that such sources within their territories remain under regulatory control, notes the support provided by the Agency to implement disposal solutions which combine financial affordability and technological feasibility, where disused sealed radioactive sources can be safely, securely and permanently emplaced, and encourages all Member States to develop arrangements, as practicable, to permit the return of disused sources to the supplier States or consider other options including the reuse or recycling of sources whenever possible;

47. Calls upon all States to improve and sustain, based on national security threat assessments, their national capabilities to prevent, detect, deter and respond to illicit trafficking and other unauthorized activities and events involving nuclear and other radioactive material throughout their territories and to meet their relevant international obligations, and calls upon those States in a position to do so to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity building in this regard;

48. Encourages Member States, as appropriate, to conduct national and regional exercises and to strengthen their capacities to prepare and respond to a nuclear security event involving nuclear or other radioactive material;

49. Notes the utility of the Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) as a voluntary mechanism for the international exchange of information on incidents and illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material, encourages the Agency to facilitate, including through designated Points of Contact, the timely exchange of information including through secured electronic access to information contained in the ITDB, and further encourages all States to join and participate actively in the ITDB programme in support of their national efforts to prevent, detect and respond to nuclear and other radioactive materials that may have fallen out of regulatory control;

50. Calls upon States to continue efforts on their territory to recover and secure nuclear and other radioactive material that has fallen out of regulatory control;

51. Calls upon all Member States to continue to take appropriate steps, consistent with the national legislation and regulation, to prevent, detect, and protect against insider threats at nuclear facilities, and calls upon the Secretariat to advise Member States, upon request, on taking further preventive and protective measures against insider threats to enhance nuclear security, including through the Use of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control for Nuclear Security Purposes at Facilities (IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 25-G);

52. Calls upon all Member States to continue to take appropriate steps, consistent with the national legislation and regulation, to prevent, detect, and protect against insider threats at facilities using radioactive sources, and during transport;

53. Notes the Agency’s efforts to raise awareness of the threats of cyber-attacks, and their potential impact on nuclear security, encourages States within their responsibility to take effective security measures against such attacks, and requests the Secretariat to continue its efforts to strengthen computer security, to improve international cooperation, to bring together experts and policy-makers to promote the exchange of information and experiences, to develop appropriate guidance and to assist Member
States, upon request, in this area by providing training courses and hosting further expert meetings specific to the computer security of nuclear facilities;

54. **Welcomes** the Agency’s 2023 International Conference on Computer Security in the Nuclear World: Security for Safety and **requests** the Secretariat to take into consideration the recommendations from the Conference in the planning of a future programme of work;

55. **Welcomes** the Agency’s work of promotion and support in the field of nuclear forensics, including through the development of guidance, **further requests** the Secretariat to assist interested Member States, upon their request, through the provision of education and training, and **encourages** Member States to make available experts, to share experiences, knowledge and good practices, in nuclear forensics with due regard to the principle of protection of sensitive information, and, if they have not yet done so, to consider establishing, where practical, national nuclear forensics libraries;

56. **Encourages** the Agency to continue to provide, upon request, technical assistance, including procurement and capacity building, to Member States hosting major public events, and to share, on a voluntary basis, good practices and lessons learned after such events, as appropriate;

57. **Requests** the Secretariat to continue the implementation of and to report on the coordinated research projects (CRPs) in the field of nuclear security and to provide further information in this respect;

58. **Encourages** the Member States concerned, on a voluntary basis, to further minimize highly enriched uranium (HEU) in civilian stocks and use low enriched uranium (LEU) where technically and economically feasible, and **requests** the Agency to continue to advise and assist Member States, upon request, in this regard;

59. **Encourages** Member States to voluntarily use, and make available experts to the Agency to carry out, the Agency’s nuclear security advisory services for exchanges of views and advice on nuclear security measures, **welcomes** the increased recognition of the value of International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS), International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ) and INSSP missions by Member States, and notes with appreciation the organization by the Agency of meetings, to allow interested Member States to share experience and lessons learned, with due regard to the principle of confidentiality, and to make recommendations for improvements to these missions;

60. **Requests** the Secretariat to improve, in close consultation with Member States, the effectiveness of the management of the nuclear security programme, including the Nuclear Security Fund, giving due consideration to the recommendations contained in the evaluation by the Office for Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) as contained in document GOV/2023/15, Annex 1, with the aim to strengthen internal planning and results-based management of the nuclear security programme, while keeping Member States updated and informed;

61. **Requests** the Secretariat to continue paying due regard to the principle of professionalism and to promote workforce diversity, including gender equality and women’s empowerment and geographical diversity, in the context of its nuclear security activities, and **encourages** Member States to establish an inclusive workforce within their national nuclear security regimes, including providing equal access to education and training;

62. **Notes with appreciation** the IAEA Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellowship Programme (MSCFP), Lise Meitner Programme and the Women in Nuclear Security Initiative (WINSI) and **encourages** Member States in a position to do so to contribute to them;

63. **Encourages** the Secretariat, in cooperation with Member States, to continue to develop and promote self-assessment methodologies and approaches that are based on Nuclear Security Series
documents and can be used by Member States on a voluntary basis to ensure effective and sustainable national nuclear security infrastructure;

64. **Encourages** the Secretariat to further develop assistance to States, upon their request, in the relevant areas of importance to them to include prevention, detection, deterrence, access delay and response;

65. **Encourages** Member States to make use of the IAEA Nuclear Security Information Management System (NUSIMS), on a voluntary basis;

66. **Supports** the steps taken by the Secretariat to ensure confidentiality of information relevant to nuclear security and **requests** the Secretariat to continue its efforts to implement appropriate confidentiality measures in conformity with the Agency’s confidentiality regime and to report as appropriate to the Board of Governors on the status of the implementation of the confidentiality measures;

67. **Requests** the Director General to submit an annual Nuclear Security Report to the General Conference at its sixty-eighth (2024) regular session on activities undertaken by the Agency in the area of nuclear security, and on external users of the ITDB and on past and planned activities of educational, training and collaborative networks, as well as highlighting significant accomplishments of the previous year within the framework of the Nuclear Security Plan and indicating programmatic goals and priorities for the year to come;

68. **Encourages** the Secretariat, in close consultation with Member States, to continue its work in reviewing nuclear security guidance to identify challenges in applying Nuclear Security Series in armed conflict situations;

69. **Requests** the Secretariat to implement the actions called for in this resolution in a prioritized manner within available resources.