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Chair: Mr BENGU (South Africa)

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¹ GC(66)/COM.5/1

Abbreviations used in this record

ABACC	Brazilian–Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
CSA	comprehensive safeguards agreement
HEU	high enriched uranium
NPP	nuclear power plant
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT Review Conference	Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NSGC	Nuclear Security Guidance Committee
SQP	small quantities protocol
UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America

17. Strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of Agency safeguards (continued)

(GC(66)/13; GC(66)/COM.5/L.14; GC(66)/COM.5/L.18 and L.19)

1. The CHAIR recalled that, at its previous meeting, the Committee had been discussing the draft resolution contained in document GC(66)/COM.5/L.14. A number of proposals had been made with regard to paragraphs (j) and (n).
2. The representative of SOUTH AFRICA, supported by the representatives of PAKISTAN and INDIA, suggested replacing, in paragraph (n), the language referring to the additional protocol with the initial words of paragraph (j) — on CSAs — as originally drafted, to avoid giving more weight to one instrument than the other.
3. The representative of ARGENTINA stressed his delegation's opposition to the proposal to delete the references to the four anniversaries in paragraphs (j), (l), (m) and (n). He reiterated its support, however, for the proposal made by the representative of Egypt at the previous meeting to strengthen paragraph (j) using language from paragraph (n).
4. The representatives of FRANCE and ITALY said that their delegations could be flexible about the references to the anniversaries.
5. The representative of the RUSSIAN FEDERATION noted that the imbalance between paragraphs (j) and (n) could not be addressed by simply equalizing their emphasis, since the additional protocol, unlike the CSA, was not compulsory under the NPT. He suggested adding "noting that the Additional Protocol is voluntary in nature" to the end of paragraph (n).
6. The representative of the NETHERLANDS referred the representative of the Russian Federation to paragraph 15, which stated that, while the conclusion of an additional protocol was a sovereign decision, once it had entered into force its implementation became a legal obligation on a State.
7. The representative of the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, expressing support for the proposal by South Africa, said that all Member States were fully aware of the voluntary nature of the additional protocol.
8. The representative of BRAZIL, also expressing support for the proposal by the representative of South Africa, said that he too objected to the deletion of the references to the four anniversaries, in particular those of ABACC and EURATOM.
9. He also objected to any change to the order or nature of paragraphs (j) and (n). Although he understood the Russian Federation's point, he believed that attempts to allude in the text to the different nature of the two instruments would entail lengthy negotiations.
10. The representative of BELGIUM, supported by the representatives of SWEDEN, ITALY, SWITZERLAND and NIGERIA, said that the language of paragraph (n) — agreed upon in 2021 — was a red line and must not be changed.
11. The representative of UKRAINE, expressing support for the statement by the representative of Belgium, said that the anniversaries had been included only because of their importance for all Member States and, in that sense, the voluntary nature of the additional protocol was irrelevant.

12. The representative of JAPAN said that the language of paragraph (n) agreed in 2021 should be retained, as it reflected the voluntary nature of the additional protocol. Any extra focus on the essence of the instrument might discourage States from concluding one.

13. The representative of EGYPT, noting widespread support for the amendment to paragraph (j) that he had proposed at the previous meeting, said that those countries that rejected the reference to the importance of the CSA but had accepted the reference to the importance of the additional protocol — despite not having one — should reconsider their positions. He added that the proposal by South Africa for paragraph (n) was agreeable to his delegation.

14. The representative of the NETHERLANDS said that, although her delegation could be flexible about the references to the anniversaries, they were important for some countries and therefore should not be deleted.

15. She expressed her support for the views on paragraph (n) expressed by the representative of Belgium and others. The original language should be retained because, as the representative of Brazil had warned, attempts to make reference to the sensitive matter of the voluntary nature of the additional protocol would re-open lengthy discussions. The focus should therefore be on finding a solution for paragraph (j).

16. The representative of the UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, while understanding the rationale for trying to balance paragraphs (j) and (n), said that weakening the latter was not acceptable.

17. The representative of BRAZIL, supported by the representatives of PAKISTAN, INDIA and ARGENTINA suggested building on the amendment to paragraph (j) proposed by the representative of Egypt, by adding “for the implementation of NPT obligations” after “the importance of comprehensive safeguards agreements” to allay the concerns of non-parties to the NPT.

18. The representative of the NETHERLANDS, supported by the representative of BELGIUM, said that she endorsed the elegant solution proposed for paragraph (j) by the representative of Brazil.

19. The representative of FRANCE said that the proposal by Brazil could be built on further. Supported by the representative of the RUSSIAN FEDERATION, she said that adding the words “for the implementation of NPT obligations pursuant to Article III of the NPT” would provide the necessary legal precision.

20. The representatives of ARGENTINA and INDIA expressed support for the latest proposal made by France.

21. The representative of EGYPT requested more time, to hold further informal consultations and seek guidance from his national authorities on the proposals just made.

22. Turning to paragraph (i), the representative of UKRAINE said that reference should be made to the resolution adopted by the Board of Governors on the situation in his country. He proposed adding “as outlined in GOV/2022/17 of 3 March 2022” to the end of the paragraph, in order to clarify the specific background of the grave concern expressed in that paragraph.

23. The representative of the RUSSIAN FEDERATION said that the proposal by the representative of Ukraine was a preposterous attempt at politicization and would prevent consensus. No country-specific situation — no matter how serious — had ever previously been alluded to in a resolution on safeguards. The Board’s resolution, adopted by vote, had been drafted in an extremely unprofessional and biased manner and, moreover, was baseless. In his reports, the Director General had not mentioned any obstacles to safeguards implementation and had in fact confirmed his previous

conclusions on safeguards in Ukraine. The Board had simply succumbed to considerations of political expediency.

24. He proposed that paragraph (i) should instead read: “Expressing grave concern that attacks or threats of attack against nuclear facilities could impede the Agency from fully and safely conducting safeguards verification activities”, with the corresponding changes being made in paragraph 3. He explained that, although Ukraine was carrying out such attacks, notably against Zaporizhzhya NPP, the Agency had not yet been — but certainly could be — prevented from carrying out its safeguards activities. In addition, the expression “in the vicinity of” was vague.

25. Lastly, he repeated his proposal that the references to anniversaries in the draft should be deleted.

26. The representative of the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN said that he too rejected the reference to “vicinity” in paragraph (i) and paragraph 3. Not only was it ambiguous, but it did not appear in any UN General Assembly resolutions concerning attacks or threats of attack against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes.

27. In addition, his delegation proposed making an amendment to paragraph 11 and deleting paragraph 12 in its entirety.

28. The CHAIR recalled that — as pointed out when the draft resolution had been introduced the day before — paragraph 11 had been included in error and should be deleted.

29. The representative of the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN said that paragraph 11 should be retained instead and that the second clause should be amended to read “and requests the Secretariat to continue its outreach efforts and to assist States with SQPs”.

30. The representative of UKRAINE urged the representative of the Russian Federation to maintain a diplomatic tone when commenting on the proposals of other delegations and reminded him that voting was an established method of adopting Board resolutions.

31. With regard to paragraph (i), he proposed the addition, after the reference to the Board’s resolution of 3 March 2022, which he had proposed, of the words “and reaffirmed in GOV/2022/58 of 15 September 2022”. That would further substantiate the use in that paragraph of the expression “grave concern”.

32. The CHAIR, stressing that no agreement had been reached on paragraph (i), urged the Committee to refrain from making further amendments to it.

33. The representative of BRAZIL said that his delegation could agree to the additional language in paragraph (j) proposed by France. Brazil was happy with all the other paragraphs of the draft resolution contained in document GC(66)/COM.5/L.14. He recalled, however, that his delegation had reserved the right to propose amendments to the drafts contained in documents GC(66)/COM.5/L.18 and L.19 during informal consultations.

34. The representative of ARGENTINA expressed concern at attempts to create links between distinct paragraphs of the draft resolution and urged caution in that regard. He noted that his delegation had also reserved the right to make further proposals during informal consultations.

35. The representative of ROMANIA said that paragraph 11 should be deleted, as had previously been suggested, and that the Committee should concentrate on paragraph 12. When drafting the text, the authors had aimed to reflect the views expressed in open-ended working group meetings and produce a draft that was as close as possible to being approved by consensus. She therefore supported the text as tabled.

36. The representative of BELGIUM said that the language appearing in paragraph 12, proposed during the open-ended consultations, had received broad support. She was therefore surprised that it was being challenged.

37. The representative of GUATEMALA said that the Committee should be working to find solutions to issues already raised and complete its discussion under the current agenda item, rather than raising new issues. While he had no intention of making any new proposals, he reserved the right to comment on any proposals that were not in line with the Statute or established practice. He urged the Committee not to link paragraphs that were distinct and unrelated, to progress with its work in a more organized manner and to exercise flexibility. Important issues were at stake.

38. The representative of AUSTRALIA expressed support for the draft resolution as tabled and, for the reasons given by the representative of the Netherlands, did not support the Russian Federation's proposed amendments to paragraph (n).

39. His delegation, along with those of the UK and the USA, had carefully noted comments made the previous day in relation to document GC(66)/COM.5/L.18 and also to the proposed paragraphs contained in document GC(66)/COM.5/L.19 — and understood that those paragraphs could serve as basis for ongoing discussions. He took note, in particular, of the proposal made by the representative of the Russian Federation aimed at improving the wording of the proposed paragraph 36 bis. However, the phrase “with a view to providing the highest possible confidence of non-diversion of nuclear material” should be further improved to read “with a view to providing the highest possible verification standards”.

40. The representative of SAUDI ARABIA, referring to paragraph 12, said that the phrase “as the original SQP is not adequate for the current safeguards system” should be replaced with “as the revised SQP was approved by the Board of Governors in 2005 to strengthen safeguards implementation”.

41. The representative of FRANCE, supporting comments made by the representative of Belgium, said that amending paragraphs that had been deleted or already agreed upon during informal consultations was a waste of time. She called on delegations not to revisit wording that had been subject to lengthy negotiations and stressed that separate paragraphs should not be linked.

42. The CHAIR said that an informal session would be held before the Committee's fifth meeting to discuss outstanding issues. It was important that the Committee work diligently to reach a consensus on that text before referring it to the General Conference meeting in plenary. The Committee could subsequently return to its consideration of the proposals contained in documents GC(66)/COM.5/L.18 and L.19.

43. The representative of the RUSSIAN FEDERATION said that the draft resolution before the Committee could be used as a working basis for discussions, but that all proposals, notably those made by the representatives of Iran and Saudi Arabia in relation to paragraphs 11 and 12, should be addressed.

44. Stubborn attempts by the representative of Ukraine to exacerbate the situation by proposing the inclusion of references to yet another politicized Board of Governors resolution — one that distorted reality — would force his delegation to address paragraphs relating to the State-level approach and the State-level concept.

45. He did not support the suggestion to hold an informal session and was of the view that there was sufficient time to continue working in the current setting — so that all discussions were reflected in the official records. If informal talks were to be held, however, they should end before the fifth meeting of the Committee was scheduled to begin.

46. The representative of the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, referring to comments made by the representative of France, said that the text before the Committee had not been agreed upon — his

delegation had proposed amendments to several paragraphs during the open-ended consultations, but those proposals had not been reflected in the document under discussion and should therefore be revisited.

47. The representative of BRAZIL said that he had very strong reservations with regard to the amendment to document GC(66)/COM.5/L.19 just proposed by the representative of Australia, but would raise those concerns during the informal session.

48. The representative of ARGENTINA said that he understood that the informal session was intended to provide an opportunity to discuss documents GC(66)/COM.5/L.18 and L.19 and expressed support for that approach, which would allow the Committee to make further progress. Echoing the comments made by the representative of Brazil, he stressed that the amendment to document GC(66)/COM.5/L.19 proposed by the representative of Australia was not acceptable to his delegation.

49. The CHAIR said that the informal session was intended to allow the Committee to further discuss the draft contained in document GC(66)/COM.5/L.14 and progress efficiently with its work. Noting that there was a separate agenda item relating to AUKUS before the General Conference meeting in plenary, he suggested that the proposals contained in documents GC(66)/COM.5/L.18 and 19 be revisited at a later juncture, as the Committee was evidently a long way from reaching a consensus on those documents. A further informal session could be organized in order to discuss those proposals, if deemed necessary by the Committee.

50. The representative of the NETHERLANDS said that she fully supported the approach suggested by the Chair.

51. The representative of GUATEMALA said that he supported all efforts to ensure that the Committee progressed with its work in an effective and efficient manner and stood ready take part in informal talks.

52. The representative of CHINA, expressing support for the Chair's suggestion to hold an informal session, said that her delegation was not in a position to use document GC(66)/COM.5/L.19 as a basis for discussions. Her delegation had submitted and circulated a revised version of document GC(66)/COM.5/L.18 that took into account comments made the previous day and would welcome any further comments and proposals.

53. The representative of AUSTRALIA said that his delegation would be guided by the Chair in relation to the organization of the Committee's discussions. Cautioning against linking the safeguards resolution to other agenda items, he stressed that, as naval nuclear propulsion was undoubtedly a safeguards issue, any reference to it should appear in the corresponding resolution. He noted in that regard the proposed standalone resolution on AUKUS submitted by China and contained in document GC(66)/L.1. His delegation strongly opposed that text, which contained veiled attacks on the integrity and independence of the Director General and proposed the establishment of structures parallel to the safeguards regime that threatened to undermine the non-proliferation regime as a whole.

54. The representative of CHINA recalled that the standalone resolution on AUKUS was to be discussed by the General Conference meeting in plenary, and not by the Committee. She added that it had not been China's original intention to table amendments to the safeguards resolution; it had done so, however, in response to the amendments proposed by the three AUKUS States in document GC(66)/COM.5/L.19, with which it strongly disagreed.

55. The CHAIR proposed that the Committee suspend its discussion under agenda item 17 and take up item 14.

56. It was so agreed.

14. Nuclear Security

(GC(66)/8; GC(66)/COM.5/L.17)

57. The CHAIR said that the Committee had before it a report by the Director General on nuclear security, contained in document GC(66)/8, and a draft resolution on nuclear security, contained in document GC(66)/COM.5/L.17.

58. The representative of the NETHERLANDS, speaking on behalf of the European Union and introducing the draft resolution on nuclear security contained in document GC(66)/COM.5/L.17, welcomed the support shown for the text and expressed appreciation to the Member States that had asked to be added to the list of sponsors — Canada, Georgia, Iceland, Montenegro, New Zealand, Nigeria and North Macedonia.

59. As the use of nuclear technology increased around the world, so did the amount of nuclear and radioactive material that needed to be secured. All countries benefited from the Secretariat's guidance on such matters.

60. The text before the Committee was based largely on language appearing in previous NPT Review Conference documents, General Conference resolutions, NSS publications and other relevant authoritative sources. Four sessions of open-ended consultations had been held in recent weeks, which the European Union had approached in a transparent, inclusive and consensual manner. Following extensive discussions and having heard a wide range of views from Member States, the authors had done their utmost to arrive at language that could be agreed upon and were of the view that the text was broadly acceptable.

61. Following the tabling of the draft resolution, further consultations had been held and amendments made to a number of problematic paragraphs. For example, in paragraph (g), the word "Acknowledging" had been replaced with "Taking note" and the word "accountancy" replaced with the word "accounting". In addition, paragraph (h) had been enhanced by adding the words "through international cooperation and dialogue, without prejudice to the sovereign rights of Member States and while reaffirming that the responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with that State".

62. Lastly, in paragraph 4, the word "process" had been added after "development", the word "developing" had been replaced with "exploring" and the phrase "in cooperation with Member States" had been replaced with "under the leadership of Member States".

63. She expressed appreciation to all Member States for their constructive approach and active participation in the consultation process and thanked the Secretariat, in particular the Division of Nuclear Security, for its support.

64. The representative of the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN expressed concern that language agreed upon during recent open-ended working group meetings was not reflected in the draft before the Committee — an unprecedented practice. Noting in particular that his delegation had previously opposed the inclusion of the phrase "and associated facilities" in paragraphs (e) and (q) and that its proposal had not met with any opposition, he expressed consternation that the phrase remained in the current draft.

65. Likewise, whereas there had been no objection to the proposal to delete the phrase "and emerging nuclear security threats" from paragraph (h), that wording appeared to have been reintroduced.

66. Both needed to be rectified so that the Committee could engage constructively in its deliberations.

67. The representative of the RUSSIAN FEDERATION said that there was a long way to go before achieving a consensus on the draft before the Committee. It was odd to refer to a country-specific issue — namely the situation in Ukraine — in such a resolution. His delegation opposed in particular the wording contained in paragraph (mm) and called for its deletion. Indeed, all paragraphs relating to Ukraine would need to be discussed in depth.

68. He expressed regret that his delegation's proposal to strengthen wording related to HEU was not reflected in the current draft, stressing that various developments in recent years had demonstrated the importance of minimizing the use of HEU.

69. Given that a number of paragraphs needed to be reformulated, he suggested that the Committee consider the text paragraph by paragraph.

70. The representative of the NETHERLANDS said that only two delegations had reservations regarding the draft resolution. With regard to paragraphs (e) and (q), she said that the reference to associated facilities was broadly accepted by Member States and taken directly from NSS publications. She encouraged the delegation of Iran to refer to those publications.

71. The phrase “emerging nuclear security threats” in paragraph (h) had been debated at length and a number of Member States had been in favour of retaining it.

72. The HEU issue had also been widely debated during the open-ended working group meetings and she called on the delegation of the Russian Federation to yield to consensus.

73. With regard to paragraphs relating to Ukraine, she would follow the Chair's guidance.

74. The representative of the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN appealed to the sponsors of the draft resolution to work in a constructive and transparent manner and ensure that the text reflected what had been agreed upon in previous consultations. His delegation had been instructed by its national authorities to address specific concerns during the open-ended working group meetings, and certain issues remained outstanding. Mindful of the need to progress in a timely manner, he nevertheless stressed that his delegation's concerns must be properly addressed.

75. The CHAIR said that, given that the representatives of Iran and the Russian Federation wished to propose a number of amendments to the draft resolution, and bearing in mind appeals by several delegations for the Committee to approach its deliberations in a more structured manner, the text should be considered paragraph by paragraph.

76. Referring to paragraph (d), the representative of the RUSSIAN FEDERATION said he was not convinced that all the terms and concepts addressed in the draft resolution were based on the NSS documents. Furthermore, the order in which the document numbers had been set out in the paragraph was illogical. Therefore, in order to avoid confusion, he proposed the deletion of the paragraph.

77. The representative of the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN said that, although his delegation supported the rationale behind the paragraph, he needed more time to ensure that all the documents listed were relevant and that the wording was correct.

78. The representative of EGYPT said that his delegation attached utmost importance to the paragraph and recalled that, during the negotiations in the open-ended working group, there had been an understanding that paragraph (d) was of critical importance as it would put into context all the new terms and concepts that had been introduced into the draft resolution. Moreover, the addition of the paragraph was inextricably linked to the negotiations on the text as a whole.

79. The representative of GUATEMALA proposed the deletion of the numbers “13, 14, 15, 17, 20 and 21”. That would obviate the need for an extensive list of documents and would allow delegations to choose for themselves which documents were relevant to them.

80. The representative of the RUSSIAN FEDERATION said that, in his view, the proposed deletion of the numbers took the Committee further away from consensus as the NSS was a collection of dozens of documents. Stating that the terms and concepts addressed in the draft resolution were based on some of those documents served only to expand the list of relevant documents.

81. He proposed that the paragraph could be replaced with the following text: “Emphasizing the importance of developing agreed upon terms and concepts in nuclear security”. Language would then have to be introduced in the operative section of the draft resolution appealing to the Secretariat to speed up the development and publication of a glossary on nuclear security.

82. The representative of the NETHERLANDS said that she would need to consult with other delegations on the amendments proposed.

83. The representative of BRAZIL said that her delegation also attached utmost importance to paragraph (d), which had direct implications for subsequent paragraphs in the draft resolution, especially paragraph (g). Moreover, she cautioned against including a reference to a glossary, which might be problematic, whereas States knew where they stood in terms of the NSS.

84. The representative of UKRAINE said that his delegation could support the reference to specific NSS documents as they were clearly related to the various terms and concepts addressed in the draft resolution. Moreover, he recalled that the phrase “as well as other relevant IAEA documents” had been included in the paragraph so as to address the concerns regarding the sheer number of security-related documents that had been published under the auspices of the Agency.

85. The representative of the NETHERLANDS, noting that a number of delegations had supported retaining the original wording of the paragraph, urged the Russian Federation to do the same. Delegations were familiar with the content of the NSS documents; paragraph (d) contained language that they had accepted.

86. The representative of the RUSSIAN FEDERATION pointed out that paragraph (d) had been newly introduced into the draft resolution and the wording contained therein had not been agreed by all delegations. His delegation had stated on numerous occasions during the informal consultations that reference should be made to the importance of accelerating work on the nuclear security glossary, yet there was no reflection of that in the draft resolution.

87. The representative of EGYPT proposed amending the paragraph to read as follows: “Recognizing that the terms and concepts addressed in this resolution are based on the Nuclear Security Series (NSS) documents, agreed by consensus”.

88. With regard to the note of caution expressed by the representative of Brazil, he said that there was no need to consider the issue of the glossary on nuclear security.

89. The representative of ARGENTINA said that his delegation could support the amendment proposed by the representative of Egypt. Paragraph (d) was of great importance to his delegation, especially taking into account the references made throughout the rest of the draft text. He shared the views expressed by the representatives of Brazil and Egypt concerning the inclusion of a reference to a glossary, which he found very problematic. For that reason, his delegation could not support the amendment proposed by the representative of the Russian Federation.

90. The representative of CANADA said that the proposals made by the representatives of Egypt and Guatemala would be acceptable to her delegation. In view of its importance to other delegations, paragraph (d) should be retained.

91. The representative of the RUSSIAN FEDERATION said that the wording proposed by Egypt was not entirely accurate, as it would create the impression that the definitions included in the draft resolution had been agreed upon at a political level, whereas they had, in fact, been agreed upon by experts of the NSGC. For that reason, he suggested that the proposed wording be amended as follows: “agreed by consensus at the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee”.

92. Responding to the statement by the representative of Argentina, he asked whether it would be acceptable to refer to the suitability of developing a glossary on nuclear security in the future.

93. The representative of GERMANY said he supported retaining the reference to the NSS documents on which the terms and concepts in the draft resolution had been based and shared the concerns regarding the inclusion of a reference to a nuclear security glossary — it was better to wait until such a glossary was published.

94. The SECTION HEAD OF THE PROGRAMME DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION SECTION, responding to the comments regarding the process for approving NSS documents, said that the preparation of the review of NSS publications was a consensus-based process involving the Secretariat, experts from Member States and the NSGC, which reviewed and approved draft applications. Where appropriate, open-ended technical meetings were also held during the process. Once a draft had been finalized, it was submitted by the Secretariat to Member States for a period of 120 days for formal review. In other words, it was not only the NSGC that approved the documents.

95. The representative of the NETHERLANDS said that, in view of the Secretariat’s explanation, her delegation could agree to the insertion of the words “agreed by consensus” and to the deletion of “13, 14, 15, 17, 20 and 21” so that the paragraph would read as follows: “Recognizing that the terms and concepts addressed in this resolution are based on the Nuclear Security Series (NSS) documents, agreed by consensus, as well as other relevant IAEA documents”.

96. The representative of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, stressing the importance that his delegation attached to paragraph (d), agreed that it was important to note that the NSGC guidance process was agreed upon by consensus. He therefore did not support the wording proposed by the representative of the Russian Federation, as any language that suggested that the terms and concepts had not been agreed upon by consensus could not be accepted.

97. The representative of EGYPT, supported by the representatives of CHINA, NORWAY, the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN and FRANCE, said that, with the insertion of the words “agreed by consensus”, he did not believe that it was necessary to retain the wording “as well as other relevant IAEA documents”. Nor was it necessary to add a reference to any specific body, such as the NSGC.

98. The representative of the RUSSIAN FEDERATION said that, to help speed up the negotiations, he could support the deletion of the words “as well as other relevant IAEA documents” — for clarity’s sake, it would be necessary to spell out exactly which documents were referred to. He would, however, need to consult with his national authorities with regard to the proposed insertion of “agreed by consensus”.

99. The representative of the NETHERLANDS said that, in order to avoid prolonging the discussion, she would prefer to place the words “as well as other relevant IAEA documents” in square brackets so that she could consult with other delegations. While she agreed that the reference was vague, it had been inserted as a means of avoiding having to enumerate each and every relevant document, including General Conference resolutions and decisions.

100. The representative of GUATEMALA voiced his support for the proposal made by the representative of Egypt. The reference to “other relevant IAEA documents” was vague and could relate to any kind of Agency document, including those not agreed by consensus; it should therefore be deleted. The words “agreed by consensus” referred to the NSS documents that — as clarified by the Secretariat — had been approved by Member States at various levels.

101. The CHAIR took it that the Committee agreed to place the words “as well as other relevant IAEA documents” in square brackets.

102. It was so agreed.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.