

### **General Conference**

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Item 16 of the agenda (GC(61)/25)

## **Nuclear Security**

# Resolution adopted on 21 September 2017 during the seventh plenary meeting

#### The General Conference,

- (a) <u>Recalling</u> its previous resolutions on measures to improve the security of nuclear and other radioactive material and on measures against the illicit trafficking of these materials,
- (b) Taking note of the Nuclear Security Report 2017 submitted by the Director General in document GC(61)/14 and of the Nuclear Security Plan for 2014–2017 approved by the Board of Governors in September 2013 and the Nuclear Security Plan for 2018–2021 approved by the Board of Governors, in document GC(61)/24,
- (c) <u>Reaffirming</u> the common goals of nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of atomic energy, <u>recognizing</u> that nuclear security contributes to international peace and security, and <u>stressing</u> that progress in nuclear disarmament is critically needed and will continue to be addressed in all relevant fora, consistent with the relevant obligations and commitments of Member States.
- (d) <u>Asserting</u> that the responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with that State, and <u>mindful of</u> the responsibilities of every Member State, in accordance with its respective national and international obligations, to maintain at all times effective and comprehensive nuclear security of all nuclear and other radioactive material,
- (e) <u>Confirming</u> the important role of science, technology and engineering in understanding and addressing current and evolving challenges to nuclear security,
- (f) <u>Recalling</u> with appreciation the International Conferences on Nuclear Security in 2013 and 2016 and their related Ministerial Declarations, and <u>taking note of</u> valuable technical expert discussions reflected in the Presidents' Reports,
- (g) <u>Recognizing</u> the importance of maintaining dialogue, as appropriate, between government bodies and nuclear industry at national level on strengthening nuclear security,

- (h) <u>Underlining</u> the enduring need to raise awareness of nuclear security among all stakeholders, which include users of nuclear and other radioactive material and competent authorities.
- (i) Recognizing the Agency's central role, as emphasized for instance by the 16th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) held in August 2012, in developing comprehensive nuclear security guidance documents and, on request, providing assistance to Member States in order to facilitate their implementation,
- (j) <u>Emphasizing</u> the need for the involvement of all Member States of the Agency in nuclear security-related activities and initiatives in an inclusive manner, and <u>noting</u> the role that international processes and initiatives, including the Nuclear Security Summits, have played in the area of nuclear security,
- (k) <u>Reaffirming</u> the central role of the Agency in facilitating international cooperation in supporting the efforts of States to fulfil their responsibilities to ensure the security of civilian nuclear and other radioactive material,
- (l) <u>Reaffirming</u> the importance of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its 2005 Amendment extending its scope, <u>welcoming</u> the entry into force of that Amendment, <u>recognizing</u> the importance of acceptance, approval or ratification by further States, and <u>noting</u> the importance of its full implementation and universalization,
- (m) Recognizing that highly enriched uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium in all their applications require special precautions to ensure their nuclear security and that it is of great importance that they be appropriately secured and accounted for, by and in the relevant State,
- (n) <u>Recognizing</u> the importance of minimizing the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and using low enriched uranium (LEU) where technically and economically feasible,
- (o) <u>Noting</u> United Nations Security Council resolutions 1373, 1540, 1673, 1810, 1977 and 2325, United Nations General Assembly resolution 71/38, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and international efforts in conformity with these instruments to prevent access by non-State actors to weapons of mass destruction and related material,
- (p) Noting the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) relating to nuclear security,
- (q) Recognizing the need to strengthen and improve cooperation in, and the coordination of, international efforts in the field of nuclear security in order to avoid duplication and overlap, and acknowledging the Agency's central role in this respect,
- (r) <u>Emphasizing</u> the need for Member States to continue providing appropriate technical, human and financial resources, including through the Nuclear Security Fund, for the Agency to implement its nuclear security activities and to enable the Agency to provide, upon request, the support needed by Member States,
- (s) Recognizing that nuclear security and safety measures have the common aim of protecting human health, society and the environment, while acknowledging the distinctions between the two areas, and reaffirming the importance of coordination in this regard, and underlining the importance that, at the national level, both these areas are dealt with

appropriately, by governments and their competent authorities according to their respective competencies,

- (t) Noting the recommended requirements for measures to protect against sabotage of nuclear facilities and unauthorized removal of nuclear material in use, storage and transport included in IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13 (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5), using inter alia a graded approach, as well as the ongoing work by the Agency on further guidance on their implementation, including during the process of design, construction, commissioning, operation, maintenance and decommissioning of nuclear facilities,
- (u) <u>Reaffirming</u> the importance and the value of the non-legally-binding Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, as approved by the Board of Governors in 2003, and <u>underlining</u> the important role of the revised supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources, as approved by the Board of Governors in 2011,
- (v) <u>Noting</u> the importance of security of transport of nuclear and other radioactive material and <u>stressing</u> the need to take effective measures to protect nuclear and other radioactive material during transport against unauthorized removal or sabotage,
- (w) <u>Reaffirming and respecting</u> each Member State's choices in nuclear technology, and <u>encouraging</u> the Agency to promote and facilitate technical exchanges of experience, knowledge and good practices on the use and security of high activity radioactive sources,
- (x) <u>Noting</u> the contribution of Member States' systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material to preventing loss of control and illicit trafficking and to deterring and detecting the unauthorized removal of nuclear material,
- (y) Recognizing physical protection as a key element of nuclear security,
- (z) <u>Underlining</u> the importance of Agency programmes for education and training in nuclear security, as well as other international, regional and national efforts to this end, and <u>encouraging</u> the Secretariat to continue the coordinated research projects (CRPs) in the field of nuclear security and to provide further information in this respect,
- (aa) <u>Commending</u> the work done by the Agency in providing, upon request, technical assistance and expert support to countries hosting major public events, and
- (bb) <u>Stressing</u> the essential importance of ensuring the confidentiality of information relevant to nuclear security,
- 1. <u>Affirms</u> the central role of the Agency in strengthening the nuclear security framework globally and in coordinating international activities in the field of nuclear security, while avoiding duplication and overlap;
- 2. <u>Calls upon</u> all Member States, within their responsibility, to achieve and maintain highly effective nuclear security, including physical protection, of nuclear and other radioactive material during use, storage and transport and of the associated facilities at all stages in their life cycle, as well as protecting sensitive information;
- 3. <u>Calls upon</u> the Secretariat to continue to implement the Nuclear Security Plan 2014–2017 (GC(57)/19 and Corr.1) and to implement the Nuclear Security Plan 2018–2021 (GC(61)/24) accordingly and in a comprehensive manner;

- 4. <u>Encourages</u> the Agency to enhance its technical capabilities and keep abreast of scientific and technological innovations with a view to confronting current and evolving challenges and risks to nuclear security;
- 5. <u>Calls upon</u> the Secretariat to continue to organize International Conferences on Nuclear Security every three years and <u>encourages</u> all Member States to participate at ministerial level;
- 6. <u>Calls upon</u> Member States that have not yet done so to establish or designate, and sustain a competent authority or authorities responsible for the implementation of the legislative and regulatory framework, which is or are functionally independent in its or their regulatory decision-making from any other bodies that deal with the promotion or utilization of nuclear or other radioactive material, and which has or have the legal authority and the human, financial and technical resources necessary for fulfilling its or their responsibilities;
- 7. <u>Calls upon</u> all States to ensure that measures to strengthen nuclear security do not hamper international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, the production, transfer and use of nuclear and other radioactive material, the exchange of nuclear material for peaceful purposes and the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and do not undermine the established priorities of the Agency's technical cooperation programme;
- 8. <u>Calls upon</u> all Member States to consider providing the necessary political, technical and financial support to the Agency's efforts to enhance nuclear security through various arrangements at the bilateral, regional and international levels, and <u>recalls</u> the decision of the Board of Governors on support for the Nuclear Security Fund;
- 9. <u>Encourages</u> all Parties to the CPPNM and its 2005 Amendment to fully implement their obligations thereunder, <u>encourages</u> States that have not yet done so to become party to this Convention and its Amendment, <u>further encourages</u> the Agency to continue efforts to promote further adherence to the Amendment with the aim of its universalization, <u>welcomes</u> the organization by the Secretariat of CPPNM meetings and <u>encourages</u> all States Parties to the Convention to participate in relevant meetings;
- 10. <u>Encourages</u> all Member States that have not yet done so to become parties to the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as soon as possible;
- 11. <u>Encourages</u> the Secretariat, in consultation with Member States, to consider ways of further promoting and facilitating the exchange, on a voluntary basis, of information on the implementation of the international legal instruments relevant to nuclear security;
- 12. <u>Calls upon</u> the Secretariat to further develop, with coordination and priority-setting by the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee (NSGC), the publication of Nuclear Security Series guidance documents to facilitate the implementation of the Nuclear Security Fundamentals (IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 20) and Recommendations, and <u>encourages</u> further efforts of the Secretariat to enable representatives of all Member States to participate in the work of the NSGC;
- 13. <u>Requests</u> the Secretariat, while recognizing the distinction between nuclear safety and nuclear security, to continue facilitating, in close cooperation with Member States, a coordination process to address their interfaces in a timely manner, and <u>encourages</u> the Agency to develop safety and security publications, to ensure consistency and to foster culture accordingly;
- 14. <u>Calls upon</u> all Member States to take into account information security, considering the balance between security and transparency as provided for in IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 23-G with a view to further strengthening and improving relevant mechanisms that handle information pertaining to nuclear or other radioactive material encountered outside of regulatory control;

- 15. <u>Encourages</u> all Member States to take into account, as appropriate, the Nuclear Security Series publications, including the Nuclear Security Fundamentals, and to make use of them at their national discretion in their efforts to strengthen nuclear security;
- 16. <u>Encourages</u> the Agency to continue, in coordination with Member States, to play its central and coordinating role in nuclear security activities among international organizations and initiatives, taking into account their respective mandates and memberships, and to work jointly, as appropriate, with relevant international and regional organizations and institutions, <u>welcomes</u> regular IAEA Information; Exchange Meetings and <u>requests</u> the Secretariat to keep Member States informed in this regard;
- 17. <u>Encourages</u> the Secretariat, in cooperation with Member States, to promote international exchanges of experience, knowledge and good practices as regards ways to develop, foster and maintain a robust nuclear security culture compatible with States' nuclear security regimes, and <u>encourages</u> the Secretariat to organize an international workshop on nuclear security culture;
- 18. <u>Encourages</u> the Secretariat, in consultation with Member States, to increase its assistance to States, upon request, on the development and consolidation of a nuclear security culture, including through publishing guidance, provision of training and related self-assessment and training materials and tools;
- 19. <u>Encourages</u> the Secretariat, in cooperation with Member States, to continue its training and trainthe-trainers programmes taking account of the IAEA Nuclear Security Series, and to adapt the courses as appropriate, within its mandate, to meet the needs of Member States;
- 20. <u>Encourages</u> ongoing initiatives of Member States, in cooperation with the Secretariat, to further enhance nuclear security culture, as well as skills and knowledge of personnel, with a view to developing and building human resources in this regard, through nuclear security education and training, and through dialogue with the nuclear industry and collaborative international and regional networks, as appropriate, including through centres of excellence, Nuclear Security Support Centres (NSSCs) and the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN), and taking into account and promoting relevant Nuclear Security Series publications, and <u>requests</u> the Secretariat to continue to report to the Board of Governors on its activities in this respect;
- 21. <u>Recognizes and supports</u> the Agency's continuing work to assist, upon request, States' efforts to establish effective and sustainable national nuclear security regimes, to fulfil their obligations under United Nations Security Council resolutions 1540 and 2325, provided that the requests are within the scope of the Agency's statutory responsibilities;
- 22. <u>Recognizes and supports</u> the Agency's continuing work to assist, upon request, States' efforts to ensure the security of their nuclear and other radioactive material, including through the offer of assistance in the implementation of Agency Nuclear Security Fundamentals and Recommendations when radioactive material is supplied by the Agency, and through the provision of such assistance when requested;
- 23. <u>Encourages</u> States to make further use of assistance in the field of nuclear security, including, as appropriate, through the establishment of Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans (INSSPs), and similarly <u>encourages</u> States in a position to do so to make available such assistance;
- 24. <u>Encourages</u> the Secretariat to assist Member States, upon request, in the development of implementation strategies of their INSSPs in close consultation with the concerned Member State;
- 25. <u>Encourages</u> the Secretariat to further develop, in close consultation with Member States, a voluntary mechanism to match Member States' requests for assistance with other Member States' offers of assistance, and highlighting, in cooperation with the recipient State, the most urgent needs for assistance, with due regard to the confidentiality of information relevant to nuclear security;

- 26. <u>Calls upon</u> the Agency to support continued dialogue on the security of radioactive sources and disused radioactive sources, and to promote research and development in this field;
- 27. <u>Invites</u> States that have not yet done so to make political commitments to implement the non-legally-binding Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the revised supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources, and <u>encourages</u> all States to further implement these instruments to maintain effective security of radioactive sources throughout their life cycle;
- 28. <u>Welcomes</u> the approval by the Board of Governors of supplementary guidance to the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources regarding the management of disused sealed sources;
- 29. <u>Calls upon</u> all Member States to ensure that there is adequate provision for safe and secure storage and disposition pathways for disused radioactive sealed sources so that such sources within their territories remain under regulatory control, and <u>further encourages</u> all Member States to develop arrangements, as practicable, to permit the return of disused sources to the supplier States or consider other options including the reuse or recycling of sources whenever possible;
- 30. <u>Calls upon</u> all States to improve and sustain, based on national security threat assessments, their national capabilities to prevent, detect, deter and respond to illicit trafficking and other unauthorized activities and events involving nuclear and other radioactive material throughout their territories and to meet their relevant international obligations, and <u>calls upon</u> those States in a position to do so to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity building in this regard;
- 31. <u>Encourages</u> Member States to organize exercises to strengthen national capacities to prepare and respond to a nuclear security event involving nuclear or other radioactive material;
- 32. <u>Notes</u> the utility of the Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) as a voluntary mechanism for the international exchange of information on incidents and illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material, <u>encourages</u> the Agency to further facilitate, including through designated Points of Contact, the timely exchange of information including through secured electronic access to information contained in the ITDB, and <u>encourages</u> all States to join and participate actively in the ITDB programme in support of their national efforts to prevent, detect and respond to radioactive and nuclear materials that may have fallen out of regulatory control;
- 33. <u>Encourages</u> States to continue efforts on their territory to recover and secure nuclear and other radioactive material that has fallen out of regulatory control;
- 34. <u>Calls upon</u> all Member States to continue to take appropriate steps, consistent with the national legislation and regulation, to prevent, detect, and protect against insider threats at nuclear facilities, and <u>calls upon</u> the Secretariat to advise Member States, upon request, on taking further preventive and protective measures against insider threats to enhance nuclear security, including through the use of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control for Nuclear Security Purposes at Facilities (IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 25-G);
- 35. <u>Calls upon</u> all Member States to continue to take appropriate steps, consistent with the national legislation and regulation, to prevent, detect, and protect against insider threats at facilities using radioactive sources, and during transport;
- 36. <u>Notes</u> the Agency's efforts to raise awareness of the threat of cyber-attacks, and their potential impact on nuclear security, <u>encourages</u> States to take effective security measures against such attacks, and <u>encourages</u> the Agency to continue its efforts to strengthen computer security, to improve international cooperation, to bring together experts and policy-makers to promote the exchange of

information and experiences, to develop appropriate guidance and to assist Member States, upon request, in this area by providing training courses and hosting further expert meetings specific to the computer security of nuclear facilities;

- 37. Welcomes the Agency's work of promotion and support in the field of nuclear forensics, including through the development of guidance, <u>further requests</u> the Secretariat to assist interested Member States, upon their request, through the provision of education and training, and <u>encourages</u> Member States to make available experts, to share experiences, knowledge and good practices, in nuclear forensics with due regard of the principle of protection of sensitive information, and, if they have not yet done so, to consider establishing, where practical, national nuclear material databases or national nuclear forensics libraries:
- 38. <u>Encourages</u> the Member States concerned, on a voluntary basis, to further minimize highly enriched uranium (HEU) in civilian stocks and use low enriched uranium (LEU) where technically and economically feasible;
- 39. <u>Encourages</u> Member States to voluntarily use, and make available experts to the Agency to carry out, the Agency's nuclear security advisory services for exchanges of views and advice on nuclear security measures, <u>welcomes</u> the increased recognition of the value of IPPAS (International Physical Protection Advisory Service) and INSServ (International Nuclear Security Advisory Service), missions by Member States, and <u>notes with appreciation</u> the organization by the Agency of meetings, including the IPPAS 20th anniversary meeting in London, to allow interested Member States to share experience and lessons learned, with due regard of the principle of confidentiality, and to make recommendations for improvements of IPPAS and INSServ missions;
- 40. <u>Encourages</u> the Secretariat, in cooperation with Member States, to continue to develop and promote self-assessment methodologies and approaches that are based on Nuclear Security Series documents and can be used by Member States on a voluntary basis to ensure effective and sustainable national nuclear security infrastructure;
- 41. <u>Encourages</u> Member States to make use of the IAEA Nuclear Security Information Management System (NUSIMS), on a voluntary basis;
- 42. <u>Supports</u> the steps taken by the Secretariat to ensure confidentiality of information relevant to nuclear security and <u>requests</u> the Secretariat to continue its efforts to implement appropriate confidentiality measures in conformity with the Agency's confidentiality regime and to report as appropriate to the Board of Governors on the status of the implementation of the confidentiality measures;
- 43. Requests the Director General to submit an annual Nuclear Security Report to the General Conference at its sixty-second (2018) regular session on activities undertaken by the Agency in the area of nuclear security, and on external users of ITDB and on past and planned activities of educational, training and collaborative networks, as well as highlighting significant accomplishments of the previous year within the framework of the Nuclear Security Plan and indicating programmatic goals and priorities for the year to come; and
- 44. <u>Requests</u> the Secretariat to implement the actions called for in this resolution in a prioritized manner within available resources.