Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Resolution adopted on 22 September 2017 during the ninth plenary meeting

The General Conference,

(a) Recalling previous reports by the Agency’s Director General titled Application of Safeguards in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) regarding nuclear activities in the DPRK, as well as relevant resolutions of the Agency’s Board of Governors and General Conference,

(b) Recalling with deep concern the steps taken by the DPRK which led the Board of Governors to find that the DPRK was in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement and to report the DPRK’s non-compliance to the United Nations Security Council,


(d) Conscious that a Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons would contribute positively to regional and global peace and security,

(e) Recognizing the importance of the Six-Party Talks, in particular all the commitments made by the Six Parties in the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement, and on 13 February and 3 October 2007, including the commitment to denuclearization,

(f) Recalling the important role that the Agency has played in monitoring and verification activities at the Yongbyon nuclear facilities, including as agreed in the Six-Party Talks, in accordance with its mandate,
(g) **Noting with deep concern** the DPRK’s decision to cease all cooperation with the Agency, its demand on 14 April 2009 that Agency inspectors leave the DPRK and remove all Agency containment and surveillance equipment from its facilities, and the subsequent actions announced by the DPRK, including the reactivation of all facilities at Yongbyon, reprocessing of spent fuel and weaponization of the extracted plutonium, the development of uranium enrichment technology, and the construction of a light water reactor,

(h) **Noting** that the Agency unfortunately was not able to conduct monitoring and verification activities in the DPRK following the discontinuation of the DPRK’s invitation to the Agency in 2012, and **noting** that the Agency’s knowledge of developments in the DPRK’s nuclear programme is limited,

(i) **Reiterating** support for the IAEA’s efforts to maintain preparedness to conduct monitoring and verification in the DPRK, **stressing** the importance of a complete understanding of the DPRK’s entire nuclear programme through the collection and evaluation of safeguards relevant information, and **welcoming** the Director General’s intention to enhance the Agency’s readiness to play an essential role in verifying the DPRK’s nuclear programme, as noted in the Director General’s report (GC(61)/21),

(j) **Noting** the Director General’s report that the continuation and further development of the DPRK’s nuclear programme are a cause for grave concern, including indications consistent with the operation of the Yongbyon Experimental Nuclear Power Plant (5 MW(e)) reactor, the use of the reported centrifuge enrichment facility and associated construction work, the fabrication of certain reactor components at the light water reactor site, construction activities at other locations within the Yongbyon site, and ongoing uranium mining, milling and concentration activities at Pyongsan, and **noting** that such actions are clear violations of relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions,

(k) **Recalling with grave concern** the DPRK’s announcements that it readjusted and started normal operation of all nuclear facilities at Yongbyon including the uranium enrichment facility and the 5 MW(e) reactor, that it reprocessed spent nuclear fuel rods removed from the Yongbyon nuclear reactor and is producing highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons, its 6 January 2016 claim that it had conducted an “H-bomb” test, that it had tested a “nuclear warhead that has been standardized,” and **stressing** that the DPRK’s policy of building its nuclear forces and its statements asserting the need to bolster and diversify its nuclear deterrent capability, including claiming advances in the areas of nuclear warhead miniaturization, are contrary to its denuclearization commitments,

(l) **Expressing grave concern** that on 3 September 2017 the DPRK conducted its sixth nuclear test, which it claimed was a “hydrogen bomb for ICBM”,

(m) **Noting** the Director General’s report that contrary to the requirements of relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, the DPRK has not abandoned its existing nuclear programme in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner or ceased all related activities,

(n) **Reiterating** the international community’s firm opposition to the DPRK’s possession of nuclear weapons, and

(o) **Having considered** the Director General’s report contained in document GC(61)/21,

1. **Condemns** in the strongest terms the six nuclear tests conducted by the DPRK, including on 3 September 2017, in violation and flagrant disregard of the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions;
2. **Calls upon** the DPRK to refrain from conducting any further nuclear tests, pursuant to the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions;

3. **Strongly deplores** all the DPRK’s ongoing nuclear activities, as outlined in the Director General’s report, including the operation of the 5 MW(e) reactor and of the uranium enrichment facility, the fabrication of certain reactor components at the light water reactor site, construction activities at Yongbyon, and uranium mining, milling and concentration activities at Pyongsan; and **urges** the DPRK to halt all such activities, and any efforts to readjust or expand its nuclear facilities, aimed at the production of fissile material, including reprocessing activities;

4. **Stresses** its desire for a diplomatic resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue so as to achieve the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula;

5. **Reiterates** the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia at large;

6. **Supports** the Six-Party Talks as an effective mechanism for dealing with the DPRK nuclear issue, **stresses** the importance of the full implementation of the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement, and **underscores** the need for continued efforts by all the parties concerned in this regard, with a view to creating the favourable conditions for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks aimed at achieving substantive progress towards the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and maintaining peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula and north-east Asia;

7. **Strongly urges** the DPRK to renounce its policy of building its nuclear forces, and to honour its commitment to denuclearization and the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks;

8. **Strongly urges** the DPRK to fully comply with all its obligations under United Nations Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and other relevant resolutions, and to take concrete steps to fulfill its commitments under the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, including abandoning all its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes, and immediately ceasing all related activities;

9. **Stresses** the importance of all Member States implementing their obligations pursuant to relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions fully, comprehensively, and immediately;

10. **Reaffirms** that the DPRK cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon State in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), as stated in United Nations Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), and in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT;

11. **Calls upon** the DPRK to come into full compliance with the NPT and to cooperate promptly with the Agency in the full and effective implementation of Agency comprehensive safeguards, including all necessary safeguards activities provided for in the safeguards agreement, which the Agency has not been able to conduct since 1994, and to resolve any outstanding issues that may have arisen due to the long absence of Agency safeguards and the lack of Agency access since April 2009;

12. **Deplores** the DPRK’s actions to cease all cooperation with the Agency, **strongly endorses** actions taken by the Board of Governors, **commends** the impartial efforts of the Director General and the Secretariat to apply comprehensive safeguards in the DPRK, **supports** the Secretariat’s intention to enhance its readiness to play an essential role in verifying the DPRK’s nuclear programme, including the capability to re-establish implementation of safeguards-related activities in the DPRK, and **encourages** the Director General to continue to provide the Board with relevant information about these new arrangements;
13. **Supports and encourages** the international community’s peaceful and diplomatic efforts and initiatives in all available and appropriate forums to address the challenge posed by the DPRK; and

14. **Decides** to remain seized of the matter and to include the item “Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement between the Agency and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” in the agenda for its sixty-second (2018) regular session.