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President: Dato' Adnan OTHMAN (Malaysia)

Later: Mr ANDEREYA (Chile)

Later: Dato' Adnan OTHMAN (Malaysia)

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Abbreviations used in this record:

AAEA	Arab Atomic Energy Agency
AFRA	African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
AP	additional protocol
ARCAL	Co-operation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
COP21	Twenty-first session of the Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change
CPF	Country Programme Framework
CNS	Convention on Nuclear Security
CPPNM	Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
CSA	comprehensive safeguards agreement
CSS	Commission on Safety Standards
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
E3+3	France, Germany and the United Kingdom plus China, the Russian Federation and the United States of America
ECAS	Enhancing Capabilities of the Safeguards Analytical Services
EPREV	Emergency Preparedness Review
EU	European Union
FORO	Ibero-American Forum of Radiological and Nuclear Regulatory Agencies
GCC	Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf
HEU	high enriched uranium
HTRs	high-temperature nuclear reactors
ICSANT	International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism
IFNEC	International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation

Abbreviations used in this record (continued):

INIR	Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review
INPRO	International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles
INSSP	Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan
IPPAS	International Physical Protection Advisory Service
IRRS	Integrated Regulatory Review Service
IWAVE	IAEA Water Availability Enhancement
JPA	Joint Plan of Action
JCPOA	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
LEU	low enriched uranium
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
NGSC	Nuclear Security Guidance Committee
NORM	naturally occurring radioactive material
NPP	nuclear power plant
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NSF	Nuclear Security Fund
NSSC	Nuclear Security Support Centres
NSS	Nuclear Security Summit
NWFZ	nuclear-weapon-free zone
PET-CT	positron emission tomography-computed tomography
PLWR	pressurized light water reactor
PUI	Peaceful Uses Initiative
R&D	research and development
ReNuAL	Renovation of the Nuclear Applications Laboratories
S&T	science and technology
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SEED	Site and External Events Design
SIT	sterile insect technique
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
TC	technical cooperation

Abbreviations used in this record (continued):

TCF	Technical Cooperation Fund
TCP	Technical Cooperation Programme
TRIGA	Training, Research, Isotopes, General Atomics
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WANO	World Association of Nuclear Operators
WENRA	Western European Nuclear Regulators' Association
WMD	weapons of mass destruction
WWER	water cooled, water moderated power reactor

7. General debate and Annual Report for 2015 (continued) (GC(60)/9 and additional information)

1. Mr ELMARKABI (Egypt), referring to the celebrations marking the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the Agency, commended the Agency for its support for the peaceful applications of nuclear energy in furtherance of peace, health and socioeconomic and human development.

2. Egypt was preparing to build NPPs to address major electricity-generation and water-supply obstacles to its sustainable development. It would use each new power plant to develop scientific research programmes and to boost local industrialization.

3. In October 2007, it had announced the launch of a programme to build four nuclear electricity-generating units and steps to build the first electricity-generating plant based on Egyptian expertise in cooperation with international partners and the Agency. Action had since been taken to improve the legislative, institutional and regulatory infrastructure for nuclear-energy activities, including the restructuring of the Supreme Council for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, the enactment in 2010 of Nuclear Act No. 7 and its implementing regulations, the establishment of an independent Nuclear and Radiological Regulatory Authority and the signing of a contract on project advisory services, technical and strategic studies and site studies in accordance with international and Agency requirements. The results of the studies had been incorporated in a handbook on technical conditions and specifications, which also contained expertise based on experiments undertaken by other countries.

4. A strategic partner had been selected to participate in the implementation of the NPP project. Pre-implementation enquiries into PLWR specifications and conditions had been sent to nuclear technology exporting States. The substantive ministers in the States concerned had been contacted with a view to preliminary negotiations on the construction of nuclear energy units on the El-Dabaa site. Some of those States had been willing to begin negotiations on the specific steps required to implement a peaceful nuclear programme in Egypt. Bilateral meetings had been held with each State, experts from the States concerned had visited the NPP site at El-Dabaa, Egypt's technical, economic and financial requirements had been provided to the delegations as inputs for comprehensive technical and financial project proposals, and some memoranda of understanding and agreements had been signed, while others were under discussion. The Russian Federation had been selected as the strategic partner for the implementation of the nuclear programme. Pending the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement, the two States had signed a programme development agreement in February 2015 and an intergovernmental agreement and an intergovernmental financial agreement in November 2015. Negotiations were still under way on the technical, financial and legal aspects of the Russian NPP design, equipment and construction proposal and on the import of nuclear fuel, operational advisory services and spent fuel management.

5. Egypt aspired to conduct all activities involving the peaceful use of nuclear energy transparently and in close cooperation with the Agency in order to comply with its international obligations, including the NPT, and with its comprehensive safeguards agreement. The application of safeguards should not, however, entail any supplementary obligations. All concerns should be taken into account and overseen in a manner that guaranteed non-discrimination between Member States and non-politicization of applicable standards.

6. Egypt underscored the importance of achieving sustainable development in the Middle East and of reaping the greatest possible benefit from the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It was essential to guarantee the right of the peoples in the region to be protected against the threat of nuclear weapons. Responsibility for achieving equality among States in the region and safety from nuclear threats lay with all States, pending the universal elimination of nuclear weapons and the use of nuclear energy solely for the development and benefit of humankind, in accordance with the Agency's Statute, which encouraged the Agency to further worldwide disarmament. Egypt continued to take serious action to establish an NWFZ in the Middle East and to have all nuclear facilities in every State of the region placed under Agency safeguards.

7. Egypt deplored the lack of political will to implement the 1995 resolution on the establishment of a zone free of WMDs in the Middle East. It called on the NPT depositary States to shoulder their responsibility and take vigorous action to implement the resolution, which was one of the pillars of the NPT regime. The need to rid the Middle East of WMDs was greater than ever before. Egypt called on all Member States to vote in favour of the draft resolution on the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East so that the international community could take the requisite steps to rid the Middle East of nuclear weapons.

8. Egypt commended the Agency for supporting Egypt's TCP projects on electricity generation and seawater desalination, for providing technical advice and for building the capacities of Egypt's human resources to manage and implement the programme. The projects included enhanced exploitation of the potential of Egypt's second multipurpose research reactor, use of nuclear technology for food contamination analysis at the reference laboratory, training of Egyptian nationals in safety procedures for the low-level radioactive waste incineration unit, removal of radioactivity from NORM-contaminated devices and equipment, and use of nuclear technology to study water resources and to build human capacities for nuclear power reactor projects.

9. Egypt had signed its third CPF for TC projects on key nuclear safety projects on the integrated management of radioactive sources, the application of quality assurance regulations in radioactive waste management and the training of human resources to respond to nuclear or radiological accidents.

10. Egypt had made its experts and research facilities available for AAEA, Agency and AFRA training programmes conducted in cooperation with the Agency for participants from Arab and African States. It called on the Agency and its policy-making organs to preserve the balance between statutory promotional and other non-promotional activities and to channel the Agency's financial, human and political resources in a manner that enabled it to perform its statutory tasks in furtherance of *Atoms for Peace and Development*, the newly coined 60th anniversary motto.

11. Egypt had conducted R&D activities on peaceful applications of nuclear energy in the areas of health, nutrition, agriculture, industry, water resources and mineral resources in order to promote sustainable development and serve society. Egyptian scientists and experts had participated in many Agency research projects and it had taken steps to build national capacity for the extraction of uranium and rare earth elements from phosphoric acid, thereby ensuring safe local production of such acid in support of major industries, such as the phosphate fertilizer and animal fodder industries. Egypt was, moreover, building national capacities for radiation monitoring in future nuclear power facilities. The primary nuclear applications involved the second multipurpose research reactor, radioisotopes and gamma radiation facilities.

12. Acknowledging that responsibility for nuclear security lay with individual States, Egypt stressed the importance of the Agency's role in implementing nuclear security activities and of a balanced approach to disarmament issues and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Egypt hoped that the

forthcoming International Conference on Nuclear Security would constitute a step towards achieving those goals and considered the elimination of nuclear weapons to be the only means of achieving an effective nuclear security regime internationally and of ensuring that such weapons were not acquired by non-State actors and were not used by States.

13. In an endeavour to cooperate closely with the Agency on nuclear security, Egypt had adopted an INSSP and a specific plan of action to implement the activities on which agreement on strengthening the nuclear security regime had been reached.

14. Mr MABIALA (Republic of the Congo), congratulating the Agency on its 60th anniversary, said that the Congo looked forward to a world in which nuclear energy would enhance the happiness and progress of humankind. The Agency had already made great strides in areas such as health, agriculture and the environment, and its growing influence had been reflected in the rise in the number of Member States.

15. As peaceful uses of nuclear energy made an invaluable contribution to world peace, security and development, atoms for peace and development should be a core objective in the years ahead. The Congo therefore welcomed the agreement concluded with Iran on its nuclear programme, which had demonstrated that the best results were achieved through negotiations and dialogue.

16. The Congo nevertheless voiced concern at the failure to achieve significant progress in disarmament and in the universalization of the NPT. As a State party to the NPT and to the Pelindaba Treaty that had established an NWFZ in Africa, it called on Member States that had not yet done so to accede to the NPT in order to achieve the shared dream of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

17. It had given high priority to multilateral cooperation with the Agency since becoming a Member in July 2009 and had built its capacity to implement policies in support of health care, improved agricultural output and management of the environment.

18. As nuclear safety and security were of the utmost importance to all, the Congo reiterated its political will to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy, combat nuclear, radiological and environmental terrorism and protect the air and land from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation. Articles 42 and 43 of its Constitution provided for the management and control of radioactive sources.

19. It was establishing an authority to regulate radiation protection and nuclear safety and security. It would control nuclear sources and material to prevent them from being acquired by malicious parties wishing to produce radiological dispersal devices, radiation exposure devices and improvised nuclear devices. It would promote a culture of nuclear safety and security, develop good practices, establish a mechanism to implement the Agency's guidelines and recommendations, ensure physical protection and combat trafficking in radioactive and nuclear sources and material over its borders and throughout its territory. Together with other Member States, the Congo sought political support for the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources, and intended to establish courts to prosecute perpetrators of breaches of nuclear regulations.

20. It ascribed great importance to technical cooperation with the Agency and had officially sought recognition as a venue for regional and subregional workshops, meetings and training courses on nuclear safety and security.

21. Mr BORGES (Angola) said that the 60th anniversary of the Agency, encapsulated in '60 Years of IAEA — Atoms for Peace and Development', marked a major milestone in the Agency's history and its contribution to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. Angola called on all Member States to respect the principles of the NPT in order to ensure that the assistance provided under the Agency's supervision or control was used for peaceful purposes only.

22. Angola had followed the successful implementation of the JCPOA and had joined the international community in welcoming the transparency displayed by the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Agency-led monitoring and verification process, which had assuredly laid the foundations for building peace in the Middle East.

23. Angola commended the Secretariat for its continuous, valuable and indispensable contribution under the TCP to the development and multifaceted strengthening of the use of nuclear technology in agriculture and health in the country.

24. In August 2016, Angola had hosted the first International Conference on Cancer, with emphasis on cancer prevention and treatment, which had been attended by national and international representatives and at which recommendations on preventive measures and methods, hospital care, community-based palliative care, educational messages, health awareness raising, cancer prevention and the training of specialists had been adopted. Angola hoped to receive technical assistance from the Agency in order to achieve those objectives.

25. The Agency was supporting feasibility studies on the use of SIT in area-wide integrated tsetse fly management, nuclear and molecular techniques to diagnose and control transboundary animal diseases, the expansion of radiotherapy services, national capacity building to improve human nutrition and health, the establishment of an isotope hydrology laboratory, NORM management and enhanced use of isotope hydrology in water resource planning, management and development.

26. Angola was gratified that the rate of attainment of TCF pledges had reached 94.1% in 2015 and called for Member States to retain the right to be TCP beneficiaries if they could not make any TCF contributions owing to an adverse change in their circumstances.

27. Angola supported the forthcoming International Conference on Nuclear Security wholeheartedly and considered that the Agency played a central role in strengthening international efforts to prevent the misuse of nuclear and other radioactive material and to build a more effective and robust international nuclear security system. It was fully committed to cooperating with the Agency in building a future of peace, progress and well-being, and in achieving prosperity for all peoples.

28. Monsignor CAMILLERI (Holy See) conveyed to all participants in the General Conference at its 60th session the best wishes of His Holiness Pope Francis, calling on the international community to work for a world free of nuclear weapons and to apply the NPT in full with a view to banning such weapons, considering that ethics and law based on the threat of mutual destruction, and possibly the destruction of all humankind, were self-contradictory and an affront to the entire framework of the United Nations, which would become nations united by fear and mistrust. In taking up the challenges of the 21st century, fear and mistrust must be replaced by the ethics of responsibility, which would foster a climate of trust conducive to multilateral dialogue through consistent and responsible cooperation within the international community.

29. Accordingly, the Holy See commended and supported all action taken by the Agency that had fostered international cooperation in the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and integral human development, prevented nuclear proliferation and contributed to nuclear disarmament. In its view, the Agency, which had strengthened safety culture after the Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi accidents, remained indispensable for promoting nuclear safety and security, but further work was required to reduce the risk of accidents, nuclear terrorism and the illicit spread of nuclear material. It called for major mechanisms such as UNSC resolution 1540, the NSS process, ICSANT and the Agency's codes of conduct on the safety and security of radioactive sources and on the safety of research reactors to be bolstered so that a more comprehensive, binding and effective global nuclear safety and security system could be achieved.

30. The Holy See commended the Agency's TCP as a primary instrument for transferring nuclear S&T to Member States in furtherance of social, economic and integral development because it had improved the quality of life of millions of people by being tailored to the needs of the recipient States and to national priorities in addressing urgent problems of poverty, health and environmental degradation, and by enabling States to make headway towards achieving their development goals and responsible stewardship of human and natural resources. The Agency's contribution, through nuclear technology, to improvements in agriculture, pollution control, water management, nutrition, food safety, cancer control and infectious disease control had been particularly noteworthy and invaluable.

31. The Holy See called for the Agency's contributions to sustainable development to be supported and enhanced to meet the many remaining challenges, especially in the developing world, and for nuclear disarmament to be viewed from the standpoint of the poor rather than from that of the powerful, for inequality and nuclear weapons were interwoven inasmuch as nuclear weapons expenditure squandered the wealth of nations and constituted a misallocation of resources that would be better invested in integral human development, education, health and the reduction of extreme poverty.

32. The Holy See held no illusions about the inherent challenges of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons, because little progress had been achieved through the NPT, the CTBT, START, New START, unilateral initiatives and other measures. It therefore called on the nuclear powers to renew arms control and disarmament processes and for the entry into force of the CTBT as the best means of halting nuclear proliferation and spearheading progress on nuclear disarmament.

33. Commending the Agency's verification and monitoring of the JCPOA nuclear-related commitments of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Holy See considered that the agreement could strengthen mutual trust, contribute to greater peace and security in the region and promote dialogue and cooperation on other issues, since conflict resolution in the Middle East lay in dialogue and negotiation rather than confrontation.

34. Gravely concerned at the situation in the DPRK, the Holy See supported the international community's continuing efforts to revive negotiations on denuclearization and to enable the Agency to resume its nuclear verification and monitoring role in the DPRK as the basis of regional peace and stability and the integrity of the non-proliferation regime. The Holy See called for new global ethics of responsibility, solidarity and cooperative security, in which nuclear technology would be used for peaceful purposes only and would not pose any threat. It also called for the definition of "national security" used by States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, to be reviewed urgently, holistically and transparently, inasmuch as each country's future security depended on guaranteeing peace, security and stability in all other countries.

35. The Holy See ascribed great importance to the Agency's work with relevant international organizations to ensure that nuclear technology was used safely, securely and peacefully, and to the Agency's indispensable role in ensuring international security and in promoting a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms of all persons could be fully realized.

36. Mr MIKHADZIUK (Belarus) said that in the 60 years following its establishment, the Agency had become the world's focal point for coordinating peaceful nuclear cooperation, ensuring nuclear safety and security, preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and combating nuclear terrorism, and its Members had accomplished a great deal through the application of safeguards, the peaceful use of nuclear technology and safe nuclear applications.

37. Belarus had been the first country to sign the NPT and it had voluntarily and without any preconditions relinquished the legacy of nuclear weapons after the collapse of the USSR. The NPT was vital to international security and stability. It fully supported action taken to strengthen and

develop the Agency's safeguards system and to ensure that it remained comprehensible, objective, apolitical and technically based, while reflecting the rights and obligations of the parties to the safeguards agreements. It welcomed open and constructive dialogue between the Member States and the Secretariat on ways and means of improving the safeguards system and verification mechanisms.

38. It welcomed the Agency's multifaceted efforts to promote research and the use of nuclear and radiation technology in medicine, industry and agriculture. It supported the continued development of the nuclear energy services provided by the Agency to newcomer countries, in particular the INIR missions, and it considered that the Agency's approach, set out in *Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power*, would be improved if it included experience gained from cooperation with the Member States. Belarus hoped to host an INIR mission for the third stage of its national nuclear energy programme.

39. Belarus had capitalized on the Agency's TC projects to improve training for its operator and its regulatory staff. In 2016, it had hosted several expert missions to build operator skills and to conduct a training programme that had comprised training materials and full-scale simulation of the future NPP. Computer simulators of plant equipment and a modular computer training system developed under TC projects had been crucial in staff training, and Belarus stood ready to share its experience with all interested parties. It commended the Department of Technical Cooperation for the efficiency and effectiveness displayed, and stressed that it had made its TCF contributions in full and on time.

40. Belarus had expended vast resources in the thirty intervening years to mitigate the consequences of the Chernobyl NPP accident, but pressing issues remained, such as comprehensive health monitoring of the affected population, the development of agriculture and forestry in a contaminated zone, fire prevention and firefighting. The Agency had contributed invaluable through studies on the consequences of the accident, recommendations on radiation protection and the rehabilitation of affected areas. Belarus was promoting an initiative to achieve the SDGs in the affected regions through partnership, innovation and investment, and regarded the Agency as a strategic partner in that programme.

41. Belarus considered that the Chernobyl and Fukushima nuclear accidents had shown that the highest priority should be given to nuclear safety, that the Agency had rightly taken the lead in organizing the work of the international community to that end and that most of the provisions of the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety remained relevant as guidelines for the future.

42. The Agency's peer reviews and evaluation missions had been conducive to improvements in nuclear safety and security, and the Agency had been instrumental in developing national nuclear safety infrastructure and in raising the effectiveness of national regulators in Member States embarking on nuclear energy programmes. Several seminars, training events and expert visits had been conducted in 2016 in Belarus. INIR and SEED missions had been scheduled, and an EPREV mission and a preliminary mission to assess the operational safety of the future NPP would be conducted.

43. Belarus had worked with all interested partners, such as the Regulatory Cooperation Forum; it had been granted observer status at the Co-operation Forum for WWER Regulators and WENRA and had joined WANO. The first stage of stress tests on its NPP would be completed by the end of 2016.

44. Welcoming the entry into force of the 2005 amendment to the CPPNM, Belarus called on all States and the Agency to take cooperative action to deal with the universal risks and threats to nuclear security. It was implementing internal government procedures to bring the amendment into force and would participate actively in the forthcoming International Conference on Nuclear Security.

45. Belarus commended the Agency's achievements during the period under review and called for the Annual Report for 2015 to be approved.

46. Mr PIOTROWSKI (Poland) said that Poland's nuclear power programme, which constituted a roadmap for the development of the nuclear energy sector for 2014–2024 and provided for the construction of its first two power plants, with combined capacity of 6000 MW(e) to supply 50 TW·h of electricity per year, was under review. Some 36 trillion tons of CO₂, or one quarter of current annual emissions from Poland's electricity sector, would be saved yearly. The site, reactor technology, strategic partners and financing model would be selected before a decision-in-principle on the project would be issued. The energy-trading business model, once selected, would influence the support mechanism.

47. Specific institutional tasks, time frames, funding, needs, goals, an inventory of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel, and estimates of future quantities of waste had been included in Poland's national radioactive waste and spent fuel management plan. Preparatory geological site studies were under way for a surface repository for low- and intermediate-level waste.

48. The IPPAS mission to Poland in early 2016 had found that major steps had been taken to strengthen the country's nuclear security regime and that good practices were in place in the national nuclear security regime and at the visited facilities; it had recommended further improvements.

49. To develop its nuclear power sector, Poland required a tailored organizational and legislative approach that incorporated an optimal technical, managerial and communication culture and, as it gave precedence to the safe and secure operation of nuclear facilities, its nuclear power would be generated wholly in accordance with international law, EU regulations and safety standards issued by the Agency and other international bodies.

50. The 2016 follow-up INIR mission to Poland had found that all recommendations made during the 2013 mission had been fully implemented. Poland expected to host a Phase II INIR mission in 2017 and would be the first State to host an ENRESA mission. It had made significant progress in implementing the recommendations and suggestions of the 2013 IRRS mission and expected a follow-up IRRS mission in 2017.

51. A new advisory committee to the Minister of Energy was *inter alia* studying the market potential of HTRs, for use primarily as a source of industrial heat, which would reduce imports of natural gas significantly. The related licensing framework was being drawn up and the relevant foreign partners were being contacted.

52. Poland attached the utmost importance to preserving the highest standards of nuclear security and supported action taken by the Agency to that end. In addition to participating in the NSS process, Poland had strengthened the security of its nuclear facilities by eliminating HEU from research reactors on its territory, which were currently fuelled by LEU only, the recovered ²³⁵U being reserved for peaceful purposes such as NPPs. Firmly committed to international rules on the non-proliferation of WMDs, it undertook to continue to support efforts to minimize the use of HEU in civilian applications.

53. It had taken action to convert its national nuclear regulatory authority into a modern, professional and fully transparent regulatory body, capable of taking up new tasks relating to the planned construction of the country's first NPP, and had accordingly sent 13 staff members of its regulatory body for in-service training with regulatory authorities abroad; a total of 24 experts would be so trained in 11 partner countries in 2016 and 2017.

54. Poland's CPF for 2016–2021 reflected its long-term goal of developing its nuclear power sector and its desire to participate actively in all TCP aspects.

55. Poland congratulated the Agency on its 60th anniversary. It commended the Director General for his impressive work and dedication and fully supported his continued leadership at the helm of the Secretariat.

56. Mr HERDAN (Germany) said that Germany had decided to phase out nuclear power by the end of 2022 but respected each State's sovereign right to choose its own energy mix and supply. Germany's energy policy goals remained very ambitious and its energy supply would consist predominantly of renewable energies. In the endeavour to meet agreed COP21 targets, the main pillars of Germany's energy system were higher energy efficiency, a greater proportion of renewables, a more flexible future energy system and renovation of the grid infrastructure. Germany would nonetheless continue to be involved in nuclear power for several decades inasmuch as nuclear safety, including that of foreign plants, remained highly relevant to Germany which attached great importance to cooperation with its partners on nuclear safety. It would maintain and, if necessary, enhance its high level of nuclear security.

57. As it currently focused on the back end of the fuel cycle, it had appointed a commission to review the funding of the phase-out process and secure funding for decommissioning, dismantling and waste disposal at a time when NPP operators faced financial instability. In its final report issued in April 2016, the commission had proposed that operational obligations be combined with financial responsibility for nuclear waste. The operators would thus remain responsible for organizing and funding decommissioning, proper packaging of nuclear waste and dismantling of the plants, while the government would organize the storage and disposal of radioactive waste and spent fuel, for which purposes the operators would pay a lump sum, including a risk premium, into a newly launched public fund. A legislative package to implement the system was being developed and the process would be finalized by the end of 2016.

58. Germany would continue to strive for a leading position in the use of nuclear technology in other areas such as industry and medical or other research. The research reactor at the Technical University in Munich was crucial to that endeavour. Germany had developed and produced innovative high-technology components and materials for nuclear applications, such as basic research, material development, medicine, energy storage and semiconductor production.

59. Germany advocated zero nominal growth in the budgets of all international organizations in order to balance its public expenditure owing to the continuing global financial uncertainty and additional budgetary burdens. In addition to its Regular Budget contribution, Germany had, since 2011, donated some €5 million to the NSF and would contribute a further €1 million to nuclear security projects by the end of 2016. It had contributed more than €6.5 million to the ECAS project to modernize the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory in Seibersdorf and had supported the ReNuAL project since 2014 by making an extrabudgetary contribution of €2.3 million; it appealed to all Member States that were in a financial position to do so to contribute financially to ReNuAL.

60. As effective and efficient safeguards were of the utmost importance, Germany had funded one of the first national support programmes for Agency safeguards. The 39th anniversary of the German Support Programme would be celebrated in the autumn of 2016. Germany was gratified that the Agency applied safeguards in 181 States and that 128 States had an additional protocol in force. It urged all States that had not yet done so to conclude an additional protocol and it welcomed the Secretariat's efforts to improve the implementation of safeguards. It supported the further structured and objective evolution of individual State-level approaches, under which both States' technical situation and their institutional structures were taken into consideration, and called for greater cost-effective safeguards measures within each State.

61. Germany strongly encouraged cooperation among nuclear safety regulators and the establishment of a worldwide system of mutual controls, which had proven to be an important pillar of the international nuclear safety regime. It supported the revision of the IRRS Guidelines and the self-assessment questionnaire and looked forward to the completion of the revision process in January 2017. It also supported the Agency's CSS activities and the Safety Standard Committees.

62. In the light of the growing terrorist threat, Germany had highlighted the Agency's pivotal role in coordinating global action to bolster nuclear security and would continuously support the Agency's endeavours to that end. Germany welcomed the long-awaited entry into force of the amended CPPNM, which constituted a legally binding basis for nuclear security; it called on the international community to continue to strive for universalization of the amended CPPNM as the most important instrument for enhancing nuclear security worldwide.

63. Noting that computer security and protection against cyberattacks were major challenges to nuclear security, Germany highlighted the successful outcome of the June 2015 International Conference on Computer Security. It maintained a high standard of nuclear security and was ready to share its experience. It would host an IPPAS mission to one of its NPPs in 2017.

64. Germany commended the Agency for the invaluable TCP assistance provided to Member States in the areas of health, water management, agriculture and environmental protection.

65. As a founding Member of INPRO, Germany commended the INPRO team for its achievements as a key forum for information exchange on national approaches to nuclear infrastructure, with emphasis on long-term strategic planning and global dialogue.

66. Germany praised the Agency for its key role in reassuring the world of the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme through its monitoring and verification activities under the Vienna agreement between the E3+3 and Iran and called for strict monitoring, verification and reporting in order to ensure that all aspects of the Vienna agreement were implemented. As adequate funding was crucial to enabling the Agency to perform its tasks, Germany had contributed €2.35 million under the JPA and an additional €0.75 million under the Vienna agreement in 2016; it would continue to make substantial contributions.

67. Germany deplored the acts of provocation committed by the DPRK in conducting nuclear and ballistic missile tests, in violation of UNSC resolutions, and in trading in related technologies with other countries. Accordingly, it called on the DPRK to abandon its nuclear, ballistic missile and WMD programmes immediately, verifiably and in accordance with international law.

68. Germany supported the candidacy of the Director General for another term of office at the helm of the Secretariat.

69. Mr BALIUKOVAS (Lithuania) said that three fundamental lessons had been learned from the Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi accidents, two of the worst disasters in the history of nuclear power.

70. Firstly, countries that developed nuclear power must implement international nuclear and environmental safety requirements and standards strictly and newcomer countries must resolutely follow rules and good practices fostered by the more experienced countries. The international nuclear safety regime consisted of working documents that reflected the most recent developments in nuclear technologies, challenges inherent in climate change and emerging threats such as terrorism. Lithuania commended the Agency and EU nuclear safety institutions for promoting international nuclear safety standards among their Member States and internationally, for that was the only means of developing nuclear power while preserving the well-being of the people.

71. Secondly, the Chernobyl accident had demonstrated most patently that nuclear accidents and radiological emergencies knew no boundaries. The development of a nuclear power programme was therefore a matter that concerned not only the implementing State, but also the international community in its entirety and neighbouring States in particular. The fourth fundamental safety principle was of prime importance and a nuclear facility could not be considered to be justified if the risks outweighed the benefits.

72. Thirdly, a nuclear facility must be constructed, operated and decommissioned in an environment of openness and transparency, and the government, solely responsible for the safety and security of any nuclear facility on its territory, must honour its obligations to its own public, its neighbours and the international community. Each State had the right to develop nuclear power but was duty bound to take its international nuclear-safety obligations into account and to set national decisions in the broader context of cross-border implications.

73. Strict international nuclear security would be essential to eliminating the threat of terrorism involving WMDs. Lithuania hoped that the December 2016 International Conference on Nuclear Security, in which it would participate, would further international efforts to that end. The NSS process had led to great progress in strengthening nuclear security. Lithuania, which had contributed to the NSS process, strongly supported its main objectives and its continuity, and was committed to contributing to the NSS Gift Baskets initiative.

74. It continued to strive to build capacity to address the threats of trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials and other actions by non-State actors involving such material. The ultimate goals of its Nuclear Security Centre of Excellence were to build staff capacities to detect and respond efficiently to a nuclear security event and to enhance multi-agency cooperation and coordination for such events. The Centre, which implemented regional projects in cooperation with foreign partners in order to provide capacity-building support to countries in the region, had been a member of the NSSC network and had participated in some of its projects.

75. Lithuania welcomed the entry into force of the amendment to the CPPNM as one of the most important steps in strengthening nuclear security worldwide.

76. It had long been committed to non-proliferation and fully supported the Agency's verification and safeguards system and action taken to strengthen the effectiveness of that system through the State-level concept.

77. It was strongly committed to developing nuclear power as responsibly as possible, with emphasis on nuclear safety. Accordingly, Ignalina NPP was being decommissioned under projects and programmes agreed with the Nuclear Regulatory Authority to ensure an adequate level of safety. Lithuania had participated actively in EU-led stress tests on all nuclear fuel facilities, and recommended safety improvements had been made in Lithuania by the end of 2015. Furthermore, following an IRRS mission in April 2016, the Agency's team of experts had concluded that Lithuania's nuclear and radiation safety regulation institutions were committed to providing effective oversight.

78. It had achieved significant progress by incorporating into its national legislation EU Council Directive 2011/70 Euratom on responsible and safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste and by adopting the national radioactive waste development programme, providing for key guidelines on radioactive waste management in the country and setting milestones for their implementation.

79. Lithuania was highly appreciative of the TCP and its role in building, strengthening and maintaining capacities to use nuclear technology safely, peacefully and securely, while contributing to SDG achievement. It was grateful to the Agency for its close cooperation on Visaginas NPP project

implementation, for building Lithuanian institutions' skills and capacities in nuclear safety and security, radiation protection and radioactive waste management and for providing comprehensive, competent and continuous support.

80. Lithuania called for intensive international collaboration on and strict oversight of nuclear technology because nuclear accidents and radiological emergencies knew no borders. It considered that, while each State had the right to develop nuclear energy, it also held full State responsibility to do so safely and securely. Lithuania therefore strongly supported worldwide efforts to strengthen nuclear safety and security and fully supported the Agency's programmes.

81. Mr MUCINŠ (Latvia) said that compliance with high safety standards and with nuclear security guidance was important to the development and application of new technologies, and thus to advancement in many fields, as exemplified by the use of cyclotron technology at Latvia's new Nuclear Medicine Centre for timely cancer diagnosis. Noting that NPP construction was similarly strictly regulated by international agreements and standards, Latvia highlighted the importance of stress tests and the principles enshrined in the 2015 Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety on safety assessment of existing NPPs. Global nuclear safety rested on transparency, international cooperation and efficient information exchange among neighbouring countries.

82. Latvia strongly condemned the DPRK's illegal, provocative and irresponsible nuclear tests in the year to 9 September 2016, for they had threatened regional security and international peace. It commended the Agency for maintaining its readiness to resume nuclear verification activities in the DPRK.

83. Latvia was strongly in favour of strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards and its central role in the implementation of the JCPOA, which included verification measures and long-term monitoring. It had made extrabudgetary contributions in the previous two years to enable the Agency to monitor and verify Iran's nuclear activities.

84. It considered opportunities for knowledge and experiential sharing under the Agency's TCP to be beneficial to all States. Its national priorities for the 2016–2017 cycle had comprised effective application of new medical technologies, improvement of knowledge, training for government experts and educational activities relating to inspections, emergency situations and radiation control along its borders. Three regional training courses would be held in Latvia for nuclear safety experts and medical personnel from Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia in 2016.

85. It was honoured to be a Member of the Agency's Board of Governors and to chair the Open-Ended Working Group tasked with drafting the Agency's Medium Term Strategy 2018–2023.

86. It commended the Agency for promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, for strengthening nuclear safety and security, for implementing safeguards agreements and for promoting non-proliferation, all of which had proven the effectiveness of international cooperation and dialogue as the best approach to the resolution of complex issues in furtherance of international peace and security.

87. Latvia supported the Director General's candidacy for another term at the helm of the Secretariat.

88. Mr YBÁÑEZ RUBIO (Spain) said that the Agency had largely succeeded in achieving the goals of building trust, security and cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for which it had been established 60 years previously under the *Atoms for Peace* motto. Significant challenges remained, however, in areas such as non-proliferation, disarmament, security and universal access to the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear technology under the new *Atoms for Peace and Development* motto, which reflected current goals and the MDGs.

89. Nuclear power, which accounted for 20% of Spain's energy output, had been crucial to the assurance of Spain's electricity supply, the optimization of energy costs and the reduction of greenhouse gases, with emphasis currently laid on the safe and effective operation of its seven nuclear reactors and skills building in the decommissioning of nuclear installations. ENRESA, the national radioactive waste corporation, was decommissioning two nuclear reactors and was cooperating with the Agency on technical matters, which had led to the International Conference on Advancing the Global Implementation of Decommissioning and Environmental Remediation Programmes, held in Madrid in 2016.

90. Spain considered that the TCP met the challenges facing the international community by covering the peaceful uses of nuclear applications and addressing the related security and transparency requirements. Spain had sought to support and participate actively in the TCP and other efforts to develop and promote technology, implement international standards, provide services and promote training and education.

91. Its Nuclear Security Council was an active member of FORO, participated in regional projects and promoted many radiation safety projects in Latin America and other regions. Its Research Centre for Energy, Environment and Technology had formed a strategic partnership with ARCAL and its Medical Colleges Organization had signed an agreement with the Agency for nuclear-medicine knowledge and technology transfer and capacity building in the region.

92. Spain, a State Party to the CNS, remained committed to nuclear safety and had accordingly approved the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, supported the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety and taken action to ensure that its NPP safety standards met the new criteria. It commended the Secretariat for its efforts to analyse and prioritize the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident systematically and comprehensively.

93. As Chair of the UNSC 1540 Committee, Spain was coordinating the comprehensive review of the implementation status of resolution 1540 (2004). Together with the EU, it had submitted to the General Conference for adoption a resolution setting out principles that should inform measures to counter threats to the security of nuclear and radioactive installations and material. It called on all Parties to the CPPNM to ratify the amendment thereto if they had not yet done so. It had taken standard-setting action to ensure that the CPPNM and the amendment thereto would be implemented properly and it had continued to work with its partners to improve its response to sabotage or terrorist attacks involving nuclear and radioactive material and installations, the joint Gate to Africa exercise with Morocco and the Agency in October 2015 being a case in point. Furthermore, an agreement had been signed that very day by Spain's Guardia Civil and the Agency on capacity building in Member States to combat nuclear terrorism and contribute to the development of security systems, in particular in Latin America. Spain would be represented at the highest level at the December 2016 International Conference on Nuclear Security, which it regarded as a welcome opportunity for dialogue and experiential exchange.

94. Spain believed that the NPT and the safeguards agreement and the additional protocol thereto constituted the necessary framework for preserving trust in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and it called for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMDs in the Middle East.

95. Commending the Agency for its role in the progress achieved on Iran's nuclear programme pursuant to UNSC resolution 2231 (2015), Spain called for scrupulous fulfilment of all aspects of the JCPOA and undertook, as a UNSC facilitator, to work towards that goal. It noted that nuclear issues were still outstanding in the case of Syria, and, in the case of the DPRK, strongly condemned the September 2016 nuclear test conducted in violation of UNSC resolutions and urged the DPRK to comply with its Agency safeguards agreement.

96. Spain noted that, in the previous 60 years, there had been a growing demand by Member States for Agency-led activities and cooperation that were responsive to modern-world realities, development objectives and the need for stability and trust, which had fostered the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a climate of trust, security and cooperation, and in the service of peace and development.

97. Ms GUEVARA (Philippines) said that the Agency had contributed, primarily through the TCP, to her country's development. The government had convened the Third Philippine Nuclear Congress on meeting challenges through nuclear S&T for sustainable growth in December 2015, which had been attended by 500 representatives and experts, including the Director General and some Agency officials.

98. The Philippines had effectively harnessed nuclear S&T for development over the years and was working to achieve the SDGs. It was proud to have developed, under an IAEA project, a carrageenan plant growth promoter that would increase rice yield by 30% and would be made available to rice farmers and to the private sector in pursuit of the goal of zero hunger. Moreover, it was one of the pioneers of the IWAVE project, under which PUI funds had been used to integrate isotope techniques into the national groundwater assessment programme. It had hosted the Regional Conference on Prospects for Nuclear Power in the Asia-Pacific Region, co-sponsored by the Agency and IFNEC and attended by more than 150 participants and experts from 15 States, which had sparked public discussion of nuclear power as a long-term affordable and clean energy option for the Philippines.

99. Its Nuclear Research Institute had been re-designated as an IAEA Collaborating Centre for the study of harmful algal bloom in the 2016–2020 period. The Philippines was ready to implement the mutually agreed work plan and to host Agency trainees.

100. Feasibility studies had been conducted on the establishment of an accelerator facility and a new nuclear research reactor in 2016, and the first Philippine Research Reactor and its TRIGA fuel elements would be used for training and education under a concurrent project supported by Japan's Atomic Energy Agency. The Philippines was leading the development of a compendium of nuclear S&T resources and activities for secondary schools under a regional TC project during the 2018–2019 cycle, covering both East and West Asia and designed to raise young people's awareness and understanding of nuclear and radiation applications.

101. Owing to its international partners' support and the Agency's TCP, the Philippines had made great strides in promoting the peaceful applications of nuclear S&T and looked forward to achieving the SDGs in partnership with the Agency and to participating in the International Conference on the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme in 2017. It had contributed to the TCP in 2016 by hosting nine regional training courses and workshops and three fellowship holders. It called on Member States to make adequate and timely TCF contributions.

102. The Philippines voiced concern at the inadequate representation of developing countries on the Secretariat staff, including at the senior and policy-making levels, and urged the Secretariat to take action to achieve a more balanced representation from developing countries among its professional staff, including the pool of safeguards inspectors.

103. It had kept its territory free of nuclear weapons and was committed to the NPT and to preserving a community free of nuclear weapons and all other WMDs in accordance with its Constitution and the ASEAN Charter. Voicing grave concern at the DPRK's nuclear and ballistic missile tests in violation of many UNSC resolutions, the Philippines urged the DPRK to abandon all of its nuclear weapons and nuclear programmes, return to the NPT and cooperate with the Agency in implementing its CSA.

104. The Philippines acknowledged the Agency's work in strengthening the global nuclear safety regime, enhancing the global nuclear safety framework and promoting nuclear safety worldwide. Together with the Agency, it was establishing a real-time nationwide environmental radiation monitoring network of sixteen monitoring stations to enhance its nuclear or radiological emergency preparedness and response. It was committed to fulfilling nuclear regulation requirements and strongly supported the establishment of a separate and independent nuclear regulatory body.

105. The Philippines was committed to the principles outlined in the Communiqué adopted at the fourth Nuclear Security Summit. It participated in the NGSC and was contributing to global nuclear security by installing radiation detection monitors at its major ports, thus building capacity to monitor and detect illicit radioactive material. It played an active role in strengthening the nuclear security architecture nationally, regionally and internationally and it looked forward, while chairing ASEAN in 2017, to opportunities to increase nuclear security and safety in that part of the world.

106. It was committed to the Agency's goals and would continue to be a constructive and dynamic partner in the coming years. It appreciated the Director General's initiatives and would support his continued leadership of the Secretariat.

107. Mr TAGHI-ZADA (Azerbaijan) congratulated the Agency on its 60th anniversary and commended it for its efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, combat nuclear terrorism and strengthen nuclear safety. Close international cooperation founded on dynamic international legal instruments was the only means of countering nuclear terrorism, preventing nuclear proliferation and ensuring the security of nuclear material. Azerbaijan had ratified the 2005 amendment to the CPPNM and hoped that the Agency would assist States Parties in meeting their new obligations and in instituting an effective national security regime for nuclear material. Azerbaijan's efforts to strengthen nuclear security and its cooperation strategy flowed from its INSSP, which would be reviewed and updated to reflect the new obligations arising from the amendment to the CPPNM during a forthcoming mission to Azerbaijan by staff from the Agency's Department of Nuclear Security.

108. Azerbaijan had implemented its NPT and safeguards obligations scrupulously as important and effective means of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It was implementing its activity plan to improve the national safeguards system, which provided for leadership training, the training of staff to draft CSA and AP declarations, electronic nuclear material accountancy and improvement of the State's nuclear material registry. A regional training course on safeguards implementation in States with nuclear installations that conducted research and had locations outside facility had been held in Baku in May 2016 and had been attended by 23 experts from seven Caucasus and Central Asian States.

109. Azerbaijan had always given priority to health care and, owing to successful TC projects, its Oncological Centre had fully mastered ionizing radiation and nuclear medicine techniques for cancer diagnosis and treatment. The Nuclear Medicine Centre had introduced PET-CT in clinical practice and had established a modern PET-CT centre and a cyclotron facility that had met all quality and safety standards, and the Agency for Regulation of Nuclear and Radiological Activity had held a seminar on medical exposure control and quality control assurance in medical radiation procedures for radiologists from the country's leading medical institutions.

110. A resistant cotton variety would be developed under a TC project proposed for 2018-2019 in Azerbaijan, which had continued to implement a project to establish a research reactor at the National Nuclear Research Centre in strict compliance with the Agency's recommendations. Emphasis had shifted to infrastructural and regulatory development as a precondition for the successful introduction, development and use of nuclear technology in furtherance of the priorities and goals set in Azerbaijan's CPF.

111. Acknowledging the Agency's leading role in ensuring global nuclear safety, Azerbaijan had supported cooperation with the Agency and the international community in order to promote sustainable development, benefit from the implementation of nuclear technologies in the country, prevent trafficking in radioactive and nuclear material and combat nuclear terrorism, which had become matters of great urgency owing to the growing threat of international terrorism. Azerbaijan had established an effective multilateral export monitoring system to prevent the illicit transport of nuclear material through its territory, but such a system could not be established regionally, owing to recurrent attempts to smuggle nuclear material into States sharing a border with Armenia and the large number of traffickers in radioactive and nuclear materials.

112. In response to the previous day's statement in which Armenia had asserted that it had established systems to ensure the security of nuclear and radioactive materials and prevent cross-border trafficking, Azerbaijan recounted instances in which Armenian citizens had been caught smuggling or attempting to smuggle nuclear material and questioned the transparency of Armenia's nuclear activities following claims by a minister that Armenia possessed nuclear weapons. Azerbaijan referred to Armenia's history of aggression towards it and feared that a solid regional nuclear safety mechanism could not be constructed unless occupied Azeri territories that harboured Armenian traffickers had been liberated and unless the effects of occupation had been neutralized.

113. Azerbaijan voiced grave concern at the continued operation, under a lifetime extension, of the aged Metsamor NPP in a seismically active zone, with limited access to water, and at the planned construction of a reactor unit in the same seismically unstable zone, which seriously endangered the entire region.

114. Mr BOZHKO (Ukraine) commended the Agency for its key role in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in contributing to the international community's efforts to achieve the SDGs and in maintaining the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Ukraine supported the Agency's efforts to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system and welcomed the action taken to prevent the diversion of nuclear energy to military purposes.

115. Ukraine was committed to the NPT objectives and complied with its CSA and additional protocol. It had introduced a nuclear material accountancy and control system in Ukraine and the Agency had drawn the broad conclusion for Ukraine in 2015 on determining that all nuclear material in Ukraine remained in peaceful activities. Ukraine was determined to continue to fulfil its CSA obligations in accordance with international law for all nuclear facilities and material located on its territory within its internationally recognized borders.

116. The 30th anniversary of the Chernobyl NPP accident had been marked on 26 April 2016 by tributes to the first responders and victims. It had highlighted the complex problem of recovery and the needs of the affected areas, while mobilizing international assistance to complement national mitigation efforts and calling to mind the tragic consequences of technological failures. The most important lesson learned from the accident was that nuclear and radiation safety must be improved sustainably worldwide. Experts had drawn on the practical and theoretical knowledge gained from the disaster in considering the causes and consequences of the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi accident.

117. The Agency's TCP was a powerful tool for nuclear knowledge sharing and capacity building in Member States, and Ukraine and the EU would give priority to nuclear safety, nuclear medicine, decommissioning, radioactive waste management and nuclear security in the near future. The Agency's regional and national TC projects had contributed significantly to nuclear safety in Ukraine and had raised the effectiveness of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy there. Particular importance had been ascribed to the assistance provided under the national TC project on Chernobyl NPP decommissioning and radioactive waste management, regional projects on radiation management in

areas abandoned after the accident and the dissemination of information on Chernobyl NPP. The Agency's efforts to improve the safety and security of nuclear and radioactive materials and to prevent trafficking had been most laudable.

118. Ukraine's 15 operational power units at four NPP sites constituted one of the largest nuclear energy programmes in Europe. Attainment and implementation of the highest nuclear safety and nuclear security standards were of the utmost importance to Ukraine, which had bolstered the physical protection of its nuclear facilities and material by introducing a comprehensive sabotage or emergency response plan at all NPPs, by undertaking projects to modernize associated physical protection systems and by incorporating them into its 2016–2018 INSSP.

119. Ukraine commended the Agency for its crucial role in strengthening the international nuclear security architecture and in implementing NSS outcomes. It regarded the forthcoming International Conference on Nuclear Security as an opportunity for officials and experts to discuss nuclear security threats and challenges facing the world community.

120. Ukraine believed that the Annual Report for 2015 was consistent with international law and UNGA resolution 68/262 on the territorial integrity of Ukraine inasmuch as it had been drawn up on the basis of international law standards, the Agency's Statute and the relevant safeguards agreements.

121. Mr ALHAJERI (Bahrain) commended the Agency for the achievements set out in the Annual Report for 2015.

122. The 60th session of the General Conference marked the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the Agency and had been convened under the *Atoms for Peace and Development* motto. Bahrain held the Agency in high esteem, for it had played an indispensable role since its establishment, especially in the light of the calamities and tragedies inflicted on humankind during the Second World War, the gruesome loss of life, the displacement of peoples and the obliteration of landmarks of civilization in many parts of the world. Those events should serve as catalysts for a united stance and for transparent cooperation to prevent a repetition of such calamities and to consolidate international support for renewed development and a secure and prosperous future for all peoples. The challenges would not be easy to tackle. It would be a lengthy and arduous task, requiring continuous, joint and comprehensive action to surmount the many difficulties.

123. Bahrain hoped to reap further benefits from the exchange of nuclear knowledge and technology between the industrialized and developing countries, and would promote the safe and peaceful use of nuclear energy in order to maximize the benefit derived from action taken by the Agency to achieve the goals of nuclear safety and security, promote S&T and effectively conduct safeguards and verification.

124. Bahrain commended the Agency for ensuring effective safeguards, which were essential to mutual confidence building in the Middle East and to initiatives designed to establish an NWFZ there. It reaffirmed States' right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to promote human welfare in all areas.

125. Bahrain would shortly sign its CPF with the Agency and would draw up a plan for its future nuclear energy requirements for peaceful purposes. The TC projects implemented to train national experts to use the regulatory and supervisory authority's information system in order to manage and monitor occupational radiation exposure, establish a national registry to monitor such exposure and build national radiation and nuclear emergency preparedness and response capacities as well as radio-analytical capabilities had been most commendable. Bahrain had been gratified that the Agency had dispatched experts to the University of Bahrain to integrate nuclear applications into the Master's degree course in the Department of Physics.

126. Bahrain had participated in Agency-led activities such as the joint workshop held by the National Committee for the Prohibition of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Agency, the national training programme on the medical response to radiation and nuclear emergencies, the workshop on the comprehensive national plan to support nuclear security in Bahrain and the workshop on training in sampling and in taking radiation measurements of environmental samples. It had also participated in conferences, meetings and other events on all aspects of nuclear energy and in the Vienna coordination meeting on the project on radiation and nuclear emergency preparedness and response capacity building in GCC States.

127. Bahrain hoped that Member States at the General Conference would achieve the common goal of harnessing nuclear energy in the service of peace, redouble efforts to preserve the environment and help to achieve peoples' aspirations for development, security and peace.

128. Mr ANDEREYA (Chile) said that his country supported the non-proliferation and the general and full disarmament of all WMDs. It had signed and ratified international conventions on security, disarmament and non-proliferation and would accede to conventions and initiatives that strengthened those commitments.

129. Chile and its neighbours believed that nuclear energy must be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and had accordingly signed and ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco, under which Latin America and the Caribbean had been the first densely populated region to be declared an NWFZ. Chile called for such zones to be established in other regions until the ultimate goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world had been achieved.

130. Considering that there was no excuse for nuclear proliferation or for perpetuating nuclear peace, Chile hoped that the commitments made more than 40 years previously when signing the NPT would be honoured. It was disheartened that, 20 years on, all Annex II States had still not signed the CTBT to permit its entry into force. Chile decried the complacent maintenance of the *de facto* moratorium on nuclear testing, the lack of will to take action to end nuclear peace and, contrary to the spirit of the CTBT, the use of subcritical testing to develop new and more sophisticated nuclear weapons.

131. Chile had participated actively in the NSS process and considered that the summits had merely marked the beginning of a process in which all States and civil society would participate and would enjoy full legitimacy. It hoped that States at the forthcoming International Conference on Nuclear Security would strengthen all aspects of nuclear security, rather than merely air concerns about identified threats, and that the Conference would lead to multilateral action to adopt a legally binding international convention on nuclear security and a comprehensive declaration covering all nuclear material, including the 85 per cent of nuclear material that was used for military purposes.

132. As Chile ascribed great importance to strengthening the legal nuclear security regime, it had acceded to the CPPNM and the amendment thereto, and it called for the universalization of the CPPNM.

133. It supported the strengthening and universalization of the additional protocol as a means of substantially improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system. It welcomed Iran's collaboration with the Agency in the verification of its JCPOA compliance, as reported by the Director General. It encouraged Iran to continue to collaborate constructively with the Agency and the international community in order to dispel all lingering doubts and exercise its inalienable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

134. Chile strongly condemned the September 2016 nuclear test conducted by the DPRK and urged the DPRK to formalize its status as a non-nuclear-weapon State under the NPT, open its nuclear installations to the Agency's safeguards inspections and ratify the CTBT at the earliest possible date.

Chile called for the DPRK's situation, including its human rights status and the humanitarian impact of its nuclear programme, to be holistically assessed and for credible talks to be resumed in good faith in order to denuclearize the DPRK fully and verifiably.

135. Chile's Energy 2050 policy, introduced in December 2015, did not provide for the inclusion of nuclear power in its energy mix, but that decision was subject to review. The Radiological Emergency Security Commission, too, had been established in December 2015 as a standing technical presidential advisory committee comprising 18 bodies and a technical secretariat that included the Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission and the Ministry of Health. It had been tasked with assessing and supporting institutional capacity building to prevent and respond to nuclear and radiation events affecting public security, personal safety and the environment. The Commission was implementing a project on the detection of radioactive material at specific points along the country's border.

136. Chile gave high priority to nuclear material transport safety and urged that it be kept on the Agency's agenda. As sustained cooperation and the exchange of information among stakeholders were crucial to the protection of coastal States' rights in the event of an accident during the maritime transport of highly radioactive nuclear material, Chile had participated actively in the informal dialogue, which had built information sharing and trust between coastal and shipping States.

137. The Agency's TC activities were important to Chile, which was developing projects to determine the effect of pesticides, heavy metals and pollutants on aquatic ecosystems of value to agriculture and agro-industry. Owing to action taken by the Agency to enhance public safety, technical capacity had been built and microanalysis equipment had been acquired for Chile's investigative police. Chile would continue under the TCP to enhance human health by developing new products for early disease diagnosis and applicable therapies.

138. Commending the Agency for its role in fostering peace through its implementation of the NPT, safeguards and TCP-assisted development activities, Chile reiterated its commitment to disarmament, non-proliferation and nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful uses in order to improve human well-being and achieve peace, international security and development.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.