General Conference

Plenary

Record of the Seventh Meeting

*Held at Headquarters, Vienna, on Thursday, 17 September 2015, at 10 a.m.*

**President:** Mr FORMICA (Italy)

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The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC(59)/INF/10.
Abbreviations used in this record:

ACMV | African cassava mosaic virus
AFRA | African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
ARCAL | Co-operation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean
ASEANTOM | ASEAN Network of Nuclear Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy
CANWFZ | Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
CGULS | Coordination Group for Uranium Legacy Sites
CNS | Convention on Nuclear Safety
CPF | Country Programme Framework
CPPNM | Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
CSA | comprehensive safeguards agreement
DPRK | Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
ENSREG | European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group
Eprev | Emergency Preparedness Review
EU | European Union
FORO | Ibero–American Forum of Radiological and Nuclear Regulatory Agencies
GAEC | Ghana Atomic Energy Commission
IARC | International Agency for Research on Cancer
imPACT | integrated missions of PACT
INSSSP | Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan
IPPAS | International Physical Protection Advisory Service
IRRS | Integrated Regulatory Review Service
ITDB | Incident and Trafficking Database
JCPOA | Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
MDGs | Millennium Development Goals
NPP | nuclear power plant
Abbreviations used in this record (continued):

NPT                      Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
OSART                     Operational Safety Review Team
PACT                      Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy
PAHO                      Pan American Health Organization
PIDF                      Pacific Islands Development Forum
PSIDS                     Pacific Small Island Developing States
RCA                      Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (for Asia and the Pacific)
SADC                      Southern African Development Community
SDGs                      Sustainable Development Goals
SEANWFZ                   Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone
SNAS                      School of Nuclear and Allied Sciences
S&T                       science and technology
STI                       science, technology and innovation
TC                        technical cooperation
TCF                       Technical Cooperation Fund
UNDP                      United Nations Development Programme
UNGA                      United Nations General Assembly
UNSC                      United Nations Security Council
WENRA                     Western European Nuclear Regulators’ Association
WHO                      World Health Organization
7. **General debate and Annual Report for 2014** (continued)

(GC(59)7 and Additional Information)

1. **Mr AYARIGA (Ghana)** said that while seeking maximum benefits from the safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear science and technology, Ghana had employed radioactive sources and nuclear materials for more than fifty years in the health care, mining, construction, industrial, agricultural and research sectors.

2. In accordance with best practice and its international obligations, Ghana had endeavoured constantly to improve its legal and regulatory framework to ensure safety of practices, workers and the environment, security of radioactive sources and nuclear material and safeguard of nuclear material, while assigning clear responsibility and liability to the various stakeholders in the nuclear field. An Act of Parliament had been passed on 25 June 2015 and had been given Presidential assent on 14 August 2015, providing for the establishment of an independent Nuclear Regulatory Authority to ensure not only the safety and security of nuclear material in Ghana but also effective implementation of the country’s international obligations.

3. Ghana had ratified the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage. Furthermore, with the support of the Agency, it had initiated and was implementing its INSSP.

4. A nationwide project was under way to confirm and update the inventory of radioactive sources and nuclear material maintained in the Regulatory Authority Information System, as were studies and initiatives to convert the core of the Ghana Research Reactor -1 (GHARR-1) from high enriched uranium to low enriched uranium. A physical protection system was in place at the GHARR-1 Centre, the Nuclear Radioactive Waste Management Centre, the Gamma Irradiation Facility, radiotherapy centres at two teaching hospitals and scanners at major entry points in the country.

5. The key objective was to safeguard the country’s nuclear material and radioactive sources, and Ghana welcomed the invaluable support provided by the Agency to enable Ghanaian personnel to interact with leading nuclear S&T personnel, thus enhancing its application and regulatory processes. As a nation committed to the peaceful use and advancement of nuclear technology, Ghana understood the need for deliberate, systematic and coordinated effort among highly trained and skilled stakeholders and, as a State, it would supervise and strengthen the coordination and harmony of nuclear S&T policies and programmes and associated regulations, while continuing to cooperate with the international community on all matters relating to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

6. The IAEA-developed borehole disposal concept for the disposal of the country’s sealed radioactive waste was being implemented, and the related site characterization report and safety case would be submitted to the National Regulatory Authority. If successfully implemented, the concept could be rolled out to other African countries, with Ghana playing pioneering roles.

7. Infrastructural arrangements and the national road map for Ghana’s NPP development were under consideration, as were stakeholder engagement, management system development and candidate area site selection. A memorandum of understanding and an agreement had been signed with development partners.
8. Nuclear technology had been used to complement the conventional breeding of staple food crops, and GAEC was about to conduct multi-locational trials of high-starch, low-cyanide cassava resistant to ACMV, and of high beta content mutant lines. GAEC had also produced a cassava hybrid with high tuber yield and resistant to ACMV.

9. Education, energy and nuclear S&T had been identified in Ghana’s national STI policy as key pillars for its development, and great importance was thus attached to nuclear education and training. Its SNAS, which was an IAEA African Regional Designated Centre for Professional Training and Higher Education in Nuclear Science and Technology and Radiation Protection, had recently been endorsed for Medical Physics Education. Ghana commended the Agency’s pivotal role in the implementation of human resource development initiatives and of a nuclear knowledge management programme at SNAS and looked forward to the extension of practical arrangements between GAEC and the Agency for nuclear knowledge management. It welcomed the Agency’s fellowship programme, which had built AFRA Member States’ capacities in the nuclear industry, regulatory activities and research in nuclear and radioactive source usage, safety, security and safeguards. Furthermore, most Ghanaians who had attended the Agency’s PhD Sandwich programmes had become SNAS faculty members. The country’s radiation and nuclear experts were developing national certification curricula, thus building skills, improving the safety and security of practices and ensuring the transmission of knowledge and expertise from the older to the younger generation.

10. In its drive to promote sustainability, GAEC had established a Technology Transfer and Marketing Centre to bridge the gap between scientific achievement and the commercialization of such achievement for use in industry in order to boost economic development. The Centre focused on training and on optimum means of marketing research results. Training workshops held under the TC project ‘Promoting the Sustainability and Networking of National Nuclear Institutions for Development’ would assist GAEC in achieving its goals and objectives.

11. Mr NAIQAMU (Fiji), welcoming the three new Member States, noted that Vanuatu’s membership had raised the representation of PSIDS to five and expected the number to increase in the coming years.

12. He acknowledged that the incidence of cancer-related mortality was high in the Pacific region, the majority of cancer victims being women. As there was no cancer radiotherapy centre in the region to provide essential preventive, early detection, diagnostic, treatment and palliative care services, he called on the international community represented in the Agency to recognize, as a moral obligation, affordable access by the forgotten millions worldwide to medical care provided as a basic service in the developed countries. Such access was consistent with SDG 3 which sought to “ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all, at all ages”.

13. Fiji had just signed its first CPF with the Agency for 2016–2021, which held out the prospect of the establishment in Suva of Fiji’s, and the PSIDS’, first cancer radiotherapy centre.

14. The Suva-based Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF), established in 2013 to champion the sustainable development priorities of the 14 PSIDS, was Fiji’s preferred regional vehicle to mainstream sustainable development strategies under the post-2015 development agenda. Under the PIDF constitution, which sought to “leave no one behind”, civil society groups, private-sector representatives, media organizations and other non-State actors joined government officials as partners in development on the 17 SDGs that were to be achieved by 2030. He noted that 13 SDGs were clearly linked to the Agency’s STI mandate.

15. Fiji recognized the important mandate proactively pursued by the Agency to maintain peace and security internationally and implement sustainable development strategies regionally and nationally through the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in such areas as climate change, food security, renewable
energy, human health, water resource management and sustainable agriculture. It looked to the Agency for sustainable climate change mitigation and adaptation solutions, as the very existence of some PSIDS was under threat from rising sea levels.

16. Noting that the Pacific was the most isolated and neglected region of the world, he appealed to development partners worldwide to engage with the region through South-South and triangular cooperation and thus enable Pacific peoples to rise out of poverty, survive the destructive impacts of climate change and live decent and honourable lives.

17. Mr NKANZA (Zambia) commended the Director General’s leadership in dealing with challenging nuclear situations, the Ebola outbreak in West Africa and the continued threat that nuclear proliferation posed to world peace. He urged the new Member States to stand by the norms and standards on which the Agency was premised, stressing that the harnessing of nuclear technology for the socioeconomic benefit of the people was the most important driver of Agency endeavours.

18. Zambia hoped to build on its achievements in the past 50 years as an independent State and to reinforce its post-Golden Jubilee agenda regarding the use of nuclear technology to improve life for its people in health, agriculture and industry, in consonance with the review of the MDGs, the agreed SDGs and the related agenda.

19. Zambia must find solutions for, and would therefore focus on, sustainable energy sources, food security and human and animal health, which could be enhanced through the use of nuclear technology in collaboration with the Agency and other developing countries, in particular those belonging to the SADC. It would also focus on human capacity development to those ends.

20. Zambia’s nuclear aspirations for the 50 years ahead were premised on progress achieved to date and on past Agency cooperation and support that had led to the establishment in Zambia of an advanced radiotherapy facility, the strengthening of its Radiation Protection Authority, the establishment of its Radiometric Laboratory and programmes for the improvement of crop yields and livestock productivity.

21. Zambia was at a landmark stage in its management, development and use of nuclear techniques for, while the harnessing of nuclear technology had been invaluable to its socioeconomic progress, the country was still grappling with the challenges of managing radioactive material from mining and related practices for which the Agency’s technical expertise would be invaluable.

22. Zambia’s future plans included progress in strengthening the Radiation Protection Authority, which had been fully established to regulate the import, export and local use of radioactive material and which had developed and finalized regulatory and safety guidelines. The Authority had developed and was implementing an inspection and an environmental monitoring programme and had engaged key stakeholders, such as customs authorities and research institutions, to enhance its regulatory mandate. The Agency had been supportive and instrumental in the procurement and supply of equipment to the Authority.

23. Zambia wished to enhance the radiotherapy facility, at which it continued to strengthen the application of nuclear medicine and to consolidate the delivery of cancer treatment. The Cancer Diseases Hospital, operational since 2006, had significantly improved cancer patients’ access to radiotherapy and chemotherapy, and human capacity had been built in those fields. Furthermore, with the Agency’s assistance, it had become a regional training centre for cancer control personnel, receiving fellowship holders from various African States. A 250-bed in-patient facility, which had an outpatient chemotherapy unit, a nuclear medicine unit and a brachytherapy unit, had been built and was being equipped. Zambia planned to establish one radiotherapy centre in each province, one of which would become the Epicentre of Cancer Control under the supervision of the Cancer Diseases
Hospital. It had sourced financing for the construction of the first two as from 2016, when it would begin to implement the National Cancer Control Strategy, with emphasis on retinoblastoma, breast, cervical and prostate cancer.

24. Zambia was committed to enhancing the capacity of the Radiometric Laboratory to assess and monitor radioactive contamination of ground and surface water, especially in mining areas, and welcomed the Agency’s assistance, under the TC programme and through a critical environmental mentoring project through which Zambia sought to establish regulatory limits for environmental radioactive contamination.

25. Considering that S&T were key to post-2015 sustainable development and strongly believing that its plans for the future required the harnessing of S&T in general and of nuclear technology in particular, Zambia was committed to supporting the Agency through TC and by honouring its financial obligations on time. Accordingly, all payments and obligations to the Agency had been met and all pledges had been lodged and would be met in time for the 2016 cycle. Furthermore, Zambia was committed to acceding to the sixth Five-Year Term of AFRA and to all related financial obligations.

26. Lastly, he called for support in ensuring that the Agency’s safeguards were applied most fairly and comprehensively in order to arrive at a just conclusion for all involved.

27. Ms GALLARDO (El Salvador) noted that the admission of the three new Member States was a significant step towards the universalization of IAEA agreements.

28. She welcomed the IAEA Annual Report 2014, appraising the Agency’s activities under the three key pillars of nuclear safety, non-proliferation regime and safeguards, and peaceful use of nuclear energy.

29. The Government of El Salvador firmly supported all instruments and initiatives that were conducive to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to the disarmament of weapons of mass destruction. It urged Members to accede to the NPT and called on all Members to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.

30. El Salvador had a safeguards agreement and a protocol in force with the Agency because it considered the safeguards agreement to be a reliable and vital instrument for verifying the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It therefore welcomed the JCPOA and supported the road map for the verification and monitoring of fulfilment of Iran’s JCPOA commitments in the light of UNSC resolution 2231 (2015).

31. It welcomed the Director General’s report on the Fukushima Daiichi accident. Nuclear safety had become a matter of vital importance to the international community, regardless of whether States had nuclear facilities. El Salvador did not have any NPPs, but it recognized the right of States to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as long as those States met their obligations to provide safety guarantees to those States that did not possess nuclear energy.

32. El Salvador supported the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, in particular with regard to the strengthening of emergency preparedness and response, the review and strengthening of IAEA safety standards and their application and evaluation of NPP safety vulnerabilities.

33. El Salvador recognized the Agency’s primordial role in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and its support to Member States under that head, in particular the provision of technical cooperation to developing countries.
34. The Government of El Salvador was convinced that joint endeavour, cooperation and the establishment of synergies among Members for the appropriate and peaceful uses of nuclear energy could yield excellent results conducive to scientific development that would increase quality health coverage, food production and supply, effectiveness in the prevention and mitigation of the impacts of climate change, and natural disaster preparedness, in addition to other high-priority aspects beneficial to people and leading to the achievement of genuine human development.

35. Nuclear energy was used mostly in health, radiotherapy and nuclear medicine and for the environment and water and soil management in El Salvador.

36. An ImPACT mission, coordinated by the Agency’s PACT programme in conjunction with WHO and IARC, had been conducted in April 2015. She thanked the Agency and the PACT programme for the mission, which had produced an assessment of cancer treatment in the country that would be used to formulate public policies, improve the existing oncology service infrastructure and thus provide more comprehensive and effective care for cancer patients.

37. The Government of El Salvador thanked the Agency for its cooperation with the country through the TCF in the form of projects, courses, training, workshops and exchanges of experts, both nationally and internationally, through which national institutional capacity for water, soil and environmental management, human health and nuclear medicine had been built. It acknowledged the high added value that the Agency brought to national capacity building and restated its interest in further strengthening cooperation with the IAEA in future cycles. It was confident that, owing to the Agency’s constant support and contribution, the country’s development goals would be achieved through projects in which it participated, the quality of life in El Salvador would be improved and the current five-year plan would be achieved.

38. Mr BENEDEJČIČ (Slovenia), highlighting milestones since the 58th session, touched on the signing of the agreement on the JCPOA which, he hoped, would be implemented in accordance with the agreed schedule to build confidence among the parties, and the 2015 NPT Review Conference, at which no outcome document had been adopted. In that connection, he appealed to all States to pursue non-proliferation efforts and cooperate fully with the Agency. He also appealed to nuclear-weapons States to continue to reduce their nuclear stockpiles and called on all States concerned to continue their efforts to organize and attend a conference that would launch negotiations on a treaty establishing the Middle East as a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

39. Slovenia was satisfied that the TC programme was being strengthened continuously and had been given due attention and importance. It stressed the need for strict implementation of safety, security and safeguards measures under the TC programme in order to prevent unnecessary risks to the health of citizens, workers, patients or the environment and ensure that nuclear material was not diverted for illegal purposes. Slovenia continued to cooperate with the Agency by providing training opportunities for many IAEA fellowship holders and scientific visitors and commended the scope of technical assistance provided by the Agency. Its experts frequently joined IAEA peer review missions to other countries and its Nuclear Safety Administration actively assisted regulatory bodies in non-EU States through EU projects.

40. His delegation had always recognized the Agency safeguards system as a fundamental component of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime that verified nuclear material effectively and efficiently. It considered that the new State-level concept would raise the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards in all Member States and stood ready to support its development and implementation as a dynamic process.

41. Slovenia complied with the objective and essential points contained in the Agency’s Nuclear Security Fundamentals published in 2013 and did its utmost to ensure that its nuclear facilities,
radioactive sources and associated activities were secure. It cooperated with the Agency by making regular ITDB reports and by participating actively in the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee, among others. It looked forward to the forthcoming international nuclear security conference, scheduled for December 2016 in Vienna, which it regarded as complementary to the political nuclear security summit process.

42. Nuclear power remained indispensable to Slovenia’s energy mix. No significant nuclear safety event had affected the operation of Krško NPP. Krško NPP had produced more than 6 TWh of electricity in 2014, its best result ever, owing to stable operation, sufficient availability of cooling water from the Sava River and the lack of outages. The most important improvement concerned coolant up-flow conversion around the reactor core. The owners of Krško NPP had commissioned a feasibility study to justify long-term NPP operation economically. The study had confirmed that continued operation of the existing nuclear capacity was the most competitive option in the light of the price of other energy sources and that there were no objections to further investments in the Krško NPP safety upgrade programme. Accordingly, a 20-year extension to its operating lifetime until 2043 and the construction of a dry spent fuel store at the site had been approved.

43. At the ENSREG peer review workshop in Brussels in April 2015, Slovenia’s Post-Fukushima National Action Plan had been praised for good preparedness for severe accidents and speedy incorporation of updated WENRA Safety Reference Levels into Slovenia’s draft legislation, which should be adopted by the end of 2015.

44. The TRIGA research reactor at the Jožef Stefan Institute had operated safely and the scope of its research programme had been increased. The periodic ten-year safety review conducted in 2015 had shown that the reactor operated within safety limits and that there were no obstacles to its continued operation for another ten years.

45. Slovenia’s experts contributed actively to the Agency’s emergency preparedness and response activities by participating in consultancies, exercises, EPREV missions, the compilation of the relevant documents and the conduct of workshops and courses. In 2015, national stakeholders had reassessed emergency planning for Krško NPP, in close cooperation with representatives of the regulatory body of the Republic of Croatia, and had concluded that action, including the installation of a filtered vent system, had been taken at Krško NPP to reduce the probability of a large radioactive release, that the distances of planning zones should remain unchanged and that all protective action within the zones should be aligned with the updated international guidelines. A national full-scope exercise, involving all key organizations and organizations from neighbouring Croatia and Italy, had been conducted at NPP Krško in November 2014, during which the IAEA had tested its new capabilities for assessment and prognosis.

46. The Parties to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management had recognized at the May 2015 Review Meeting that Slovenia’s radioactive waste and spent fuel management system was well regulated, while pointing to challenges for the future. Progress had been achieved in activities for the construction of the low and intermediate level radioactive waste repository, as the site investigation was in its final stage and the design engineering company had been selected and had begun to work. Revision of the Krško NPP decommissioning programme and the new national radioactive waste and spent fuel management programme for 2015–2016 would be completed by the end of 2015.

47. The 2014 IRRS follow-up mission had reviewed the implementation of the action plan drawn up after the 2011 IRRS mission and had commended the action taken by Slovenia thereon. It had made two new recommendations, one on the adequacy of financial and human resources of the Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration and the other recommending stronger regulatory research and
development. Furthermore, Slovenia had decided to invite an EPREV mission to review national nuclear and radiation emergency preparedness and response, and an OSART, to the Krško NPP, both scheduled for 2017.

48. Ms FERTEKLIGIL (Turkey) noted that the Agency had played a central role in international nuclear cooperation and had contributed to global development and non-proliferation under its mandate to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy. As the Agency had kept abreast of developments and had remained relevant in the face of evolving challenges to non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear technology, it had remained a source of hope and prosperity for humanity and not a tool for destruction.

49. Turkey, which shared humanitarian and moral concerns about nuclear weapons, believed that achievement of the goal of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons hinged on successful and universal implementation of the NPT, which Turkey considered to be the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament, central to the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the guarantor of the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy. Turkey was, therefore, fully committed to its objectives, provisions, further strengthening and universalization.

50. Turkey was disappointed that no final document had been adopted at the 2015 NPT Review Conference, but noted that the 2010 Action Plan was still in place. Turkey believed that the long-term relevance of the NPT depended on its effective implementation and that unrelenting efforts were required to that end. It was party to all international non-proliferation instruments and export control regimes, advocated global disarmament and called on non-NPT nuclear-weapon States to sign the NPT and eliminate their military nuclear capabilities.

51. Turkey considered the Agency’s safeguards system to be a vital component of the global non-proliferation regime and that CSAs and additional protocols were essential to a solid verification standard. Turkey was therefore gratified that 126 States had additional protocols in force, with ratification pending in another 20 States. It called on States that had not yet done so, to sign, ratify and implement their CSAs and additional protocols.

52. Turkey welcomed the JCPOA and congratulated the parties on their commitment to reaching a mutually acceptable solution by diplomatic means. Turkey believed that uninterrupted and full implementation of the JCPOA in a manner that inspired confidence was crucial to peace, security and stability in the region. It acknowledged and supported the Agency’s central role in the implementation of the JCPOA and the road map, which was proof of the Agency’s importance to global security.

53. Turkey considered that the DPRK’s nuclear programme gave cause for serious concern and urged the DPRK to return to the Six Party Talks. Turning to the implementation of safeguards agreement in Syria, Turkey took note of the Director General’s report to the Board of Governors and trusted that continued engagement of and with Syria would assist the Agency in eliminating ambiguities and closing the case.

54. Turkey supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones wherever feasible, on the basis of freely concluded arrangements among States of the regions concerned. It was very disappointed that the international conference in 2012 for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East had not been convened.

55. Turkey considered that, while responsibility for nuclear security lay with the State, measures commensurate with the risk and consequences of nuclear terrorism could be achieved only through international cooperation. Accordingly, Turkey had always participated in the nuclear security summit process and believed that the summit in 2016 would be important in shaping the future for nuclear security institutionally. Moreover, recognizing the Agency’s central role in developing and enhancing
the nuclear security regime, it looked forward to the second International Nuclear Security Conference scheduled for December 2016.

56. Considering that priority should be given to the entry into force of the amendment to the CPPNM in order to curtail nuclear terrorism, Turkey had submitted its instrument of ratification of the 2005 amendment in July. It had made full use of the Agency’s services, drawing on its publications and review services to improve Turkey’s nuclear security infrastructure. It had hosted a national workshop to update its understanding of IPPAS and had requested the conduct of an IPPAS mission in Turkey.

57. Turkey followed the Agency’s nuclear safety standards and advice diligently and drew on international mechanisms such as the CNS to put sound nuclear safety measures in place. It had participated in the February 2015 CNS Diplomatic Conference and regarded the outcome as confirmation of the Contracting States’ resolve in the area of nuclear safety.

58. The report on the Fukushima Daiichi accident was a unique reference point for enhancing the resilience and robustness of NPP safety. The safety of aged NPPs was of particular concern to Turkey, which stressed that complacency only exacerbated the dangers and that no measures should be spared to eliminate the inherent risks of such NPPs.

59. Turkey ascribed the utmost importance to the Agency’s TC programme and considered that some of the Agency’s most direct and tangible services geared towards introducing and improving the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and promoting sustainable development worldwide were provided through TC projects. Cognizant of the need for adequate funding, Turkey met its TCF targets and resorted to government cost sharing for national TC projects. It supported the IAEA’s work on the revised guidelines to strengthen the application of the due account mechanism and called on all Member States to meet their TCF targets on time and in full.

60. Turkey had supported IAEA activities by hosting training courses, workshops and scientific visits and had provided experts for the Agency’s activities on nuclear power infrastructure development, siting of nuclear facilities, nuclear safety, nuclear security, nuclear material accounting and control, and use of radiation in plant breeding and environmental protection.

61. Radiation technologies were used widely in Turkey in medicine, agriculture, industry and environmental protection. A Proton Accelerator Facility, constructed in Ankara by the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority, had recently been licensed to produce radiopharmaceuticals for cancer diagnosis and treatment.

62. Nuclear power figured prominently in Turkey’s economic growth and Turkey had become one of the world’s fastest expanding energy markets. Owing to the scarcity of domestic energy resources, Turkey’s growing energy demand had resulted in dependency on energy imports, primarily of oil and natural gas, with nearly three quarters of its total energy demand being met by imports. In order to meet the immense growth in demand, sustain its dynamic economy and industry, offset the risks of energy dependency and ensure energy security, Turkey was integrating nuclear energy into its energy supply mix by building NPPs.

63. In 2010, Turkey and the Russian Federation had signed an agreement for the construction and operation of Akkuyu NPP, Turkey’s first NPP, in southern Turkey, as a build-own-operate project. The first unit, with a total capacity of 4800 MWe, was scheduled to be commissioned in 2021. Siting and pre-feasibility studies were under way for the second NPP, to be built at Sinop on the Black Sea, under an intergovernmental agreement with Japan. The third project was under consideration.

64. In the light of the Fukushima Daiichi accident, Turkey would take all necessary precautions in generating nuclear energy by employing state-of-the-art technologies and methods to achieve the
highest possible level of nuclear safety, by enhancing its human resources and nuclear knowledge
capacity, by updating its existing nuclear legislation and by taking into consideration updated safety
standards issued by the Agency.

65. Turkey was strengthening its national regulatory framework for the use of nuclear energy by
issuing new regulations and updating the existing ones and was drawing on the Agency’s review
services and assistance to enhance its infrastructure for nuclear power. It welcomed the priority given
by the Agency to ‘advanced newcomers’ and urged it to continue to guide, support and assist
Member States in establishing and maintaining adequate safety regulations and infrastructure, in
particular Member States wishing to develop nuclear power as part of their national energy strategy.

66. Mr. USUPOV (Kyrgyzstan) stressed the great importance that Kyrgyzstan ascribed to the
non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and its readiness to discharge its international
obligations in that regard and to take the necessary steps to control and eliminate the trafficking and
illicit transit of radioactive material through its territory.

67. It was the depositary for the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia
(CANWFZ), signed at Semipalatinsk and in force since March 2009, and for the protocol thereto,
signed by the nuclear powers in May 2014 and providing negative security assurances. Moreover,
Kyrgyzstan had acceded to the CPPNM in July 2015 and would shortly ratify the 2005 amendment
thereto.

68. In discharging its obligations under those international instruments and to the Agency,
Kyrgyzstan worked regularly with international donors to control the movement of radioactive
material across its borders and had adopted various governmental programmes and action plans to
resolve national and regional radiation safety issues, harmonize its legislation with international
obligations, build the capacities of specialized bodies and train their staff. Furthermore, on the
initiative of Kyrgyzstan, UNGA resolution 68/218 on the role of the international community in
averting the radiation threat in Central Asia had been adopted in 2013.

69. An intergovernmental programme was being implemented successfully in States Members of
the Eurasian Economic Community to remediate legacy uranium production sites for the period
2013—2018. Moreover, a project was under way in Kyrgyzstan, with the support of the Russian
Federation and UNDP, for the socioeconomic development of municipalities located near uranium
tailings dumps in Kyrgyzstan in order to raise the standard of living of people in those depressed areas
by developing the social infrastructure, assisting private enterprise, providing high-quality services
and instituting the micro-credit system for the achievement of initiatives by the local people. Such
action was crucial to future endeavours to resolve issues relating to the technical remediation of
uranium tailings dumps and ensuring radiation safety.

70. The IAEA Coordination Group for Uranium Legacy Sites (CGULS) was taking effective and
successful action to avert radiation threats in countries in the region. He welcomed and supported
the strengthening of the Agency’s coordinating role in the area of radiation safety, commended the
opportunity afforded to exchange views and state the country’s position when setting radiation safety
standards and mechanisms, and stressed the need for further cooperation on the socioeconomic aspects
of radiation safety issues.

71. Considering that the Agency was able and willing to provide coordination assistance and
expertise to Kyrgyzstan in resolving uranium tailings dump issues, he urged the Agency to give
priority attention within CGULS, in conjunction with other participants, to the problem of radioactive
waste-burial sites located in Kyrgyzstan and to building the country’s capacity to install modern
continuous monitoring systems and take post-remediation measures in order to restore the
environment at those sites. He also urged the Agency and other interested participants to cooperate in building the country’s nuclear medicine capacities.

72. Lastly, in action aimed at ensuring radiation safety, he stressed the need for further close cooperation within innovative and high-technology circles in industry and medicine, including those using radioactive sources for peaceful purposes.

73. Mr PHOMMAXAY (Lao People’s Democratic Republic) said that Lao PDR recognized the crucial role played by the IAEA in promoting peace, security and the peaceful use of nuclear energy for socioeconomic development and prosperity and reaffirmed full support for the Agency’s activities to those ends.

74. Lao PDR fully supported the peaceful use of nuclear technology and had concluded various nuclear-related instruments such as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. Lao PDR was contemplating internal legal procedures for effective implementation of the IAEA Additional Protocol signed in November 2014.

75. Furthermore, in order to fulfil its obligations and achieve its nuclear safety, security and safeguards objectives, it was drafting nuclear legislation, establishing the basic radiation and nuclear safety and security infrastructure, introducing nuclear applications in areas such as rice products and soil and water management and availing itself of IAEA programmes to develop human resources and build capacity in nuclear fields.

76. The Government of Lao PDR was considering internal legal procedures for accession to the amendment to the CPPNM, noting that its early entry into force would help to strengthen the Agency’s nuclear security regime.

77. With a view to effective coordination and cooperation with the IAEA, a coordination office had been established under the Ministry of Science and Technology in order to prepare for the establishment of the National Atomic Regulatory Authority. A Nuclear Legal Committee had been formed to draft a nuclear law for submission to the National Assembly and due consideration had been given to the skills, expertise and capacity-building required for the regulatory team and to the need to raise public awareness and support the establishment of a national response team in preparedness for nuclear and radiological emergencies.

78. Lao PDR had developed a CPF for 2014–2018 in support of its national development objectives in health, food and agriculture, nuclear applications, water resource management, sustainable energy, industry, and radiation safety and security. Three national TC projects were being implemented in Lao PDR under the 2014–2015 cycle in order to establish a national radiation safety infrastructure, establish a national quality and safe diagnostic radiology service and enhance food security through best fit soil–water nutrient management practices with mutation induction for drought-resistant rice. The projects had yielded positive results such as the building and development of human resource capacity, nuclear infrastructure, improvement of human health and agricultural production for food safety and security through participation in related workshops and training courses organized under the Agency’s TC programmes.

79. Under the RCA, to which it had acceded in March 2015, Lao PDR would promote nuclear S&T research and development and the peaceful use of nuclear applications in Asia and the Pacific region. It hoped to expand its technical cooperation in the region in human health, food, agriculture, water, the environment and industrial applications.

80. Committed to regional nuclear cooperation, Lao PDR had signed SEANWFZ and, in promotion of safety, security and safeguards, it had participated actively in the activities of ASEANTOM, a new
network of nuclear regulatory bodies with an annual meeting at which two-year action plans were discussed. Lao PDR, which would host the fourth ASEANTOM meeting in 2016, called on the Agency, the international organizations and networks to continue to support ASEANTOM’s regional and national activities.

81. Mr FARAONE MACHADO (Uruguay) said that Uruguay defended the inalienable right of States to the peaceful use of nuclear energy within the IAEA-established framework and pursuant to safeguards enshrined in the Statute. International standards and national regulations together set clear limits for that right and reflected the pivotal character of the Agency as the authority identified by the community of nations.

82. He reaffirmed Uruguay’s unwavering commitment to universal and full disarmament within the multilateral framework. Uruguay had always supported the disarmament of all forms of conventional, chemical, biological and, above all, nuclear weapons.

83. As a non-nuclear State, as a Member of the first nuclear weapon-free zone established under the Treaty of Tlatelolco and as an NPT State Party, Uruguay was strongly committed to strengthening the disarmament and non-proliferation regime and thus advocated the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones worldwide, in the quest for peace for its inhabitants.

84. It was crucial to continue to strengthen the Agency’s safeguards regime in order ultimately to make it robust and capable of dealing with the risks of proliferation and achieving progress on the disarmament front. Uruguay, which had honoured its commitment to nuclear safeguards and verification processes, stressed that multilateral dialogue and negotiations were the appropriate means of resolving international tensions in those areas.

85. On those fundamental bases, Uruguay continued to participate actively in the IAEA and had applied again for membership of the Board of Governors in 2015–2017 on completion of its 2012–2014 term on the Board.

86. As identified by the IAEA, improvement of nuclear safety was the most important factor in contingency plans of States, which must require that operators hold the highest qualifications and skills and ensure that material and facilities were protected, safe and secure. Accordingly, the delegation highlighted the Agency’s pivotal role in strengthening the nuclear safety framework worldwide and in boosting international cooperation geared to the fulfilment of State responsibility in that regard. It also highlighted the Agency’s achievements under the nuclear safety action plan and commended the Director General’s report, underlining major advances in key areas such as the strengthening of safety standards, the Agency’s peer review services, enhancement of emergency preparedness and response, the bolstering of infrastructure development and capacity building.

87. Uruguay faithfully applied international agreements and ascribed the utmost importance to radiation protection and safety and to the strengthening of security. The Government of Uruguay had therefore established an independent Regulatory Authority to monitor all types of equipment using ionizing radiation. It had adopted a national strategy for safe radioactive waste management and a national radiological emergency plan, and had doubled the number of technical staff in order to strengthen the monitoring of new medical equipment.

88. Uruguay drew attention to FORO activities designed to maintain the highest level of radiological and nuclear safety in Member States and, by extension in the Ibero–American region. FORO had contributed during the year to radiological protection in medical applications through dissemination in IAEA and PAHO workshops, guidelines on patient protection and the SEVRRA-mediated probabilistic safety analysis applied to radiotherapy, thus achieving tangible results in radiological protection.
89. It was gratifying to report that nuclear safety had been improved in FORO Member States’ NPPs, owing to the implementation of FORO-planned stress testing, and that the NPP lifetime extension guide had had a great effect in the Agency and in several countries. Uruguay supported FORO as a regional regulatory initiative and urged the IAEA to continue to cooperate and support it in order to ensure success in its health, radiological and nuclear safety and security activities.

90. Uruguay recognized the importance of the Agency’s transfer of technology under its TC programme and its collaboration in resolving problems facing States. Technology transfer had taken the form of equipment, expertise and training. Uruguay’s Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mining (MIEM) participated in the various types of TC projects approved for the country.

91. It acknowledged the invaluable contribution that nuclear applications could make to various areas of development in all countries, including health and agriculture, thus improving citizens’ well-being. Ionizing radiation was used in Uruguay for medical diagnosis and therapy, in particular in oncological pathologies and X-rays. In 2010, a Molecular Imagery Centre had been installed for computer-aided tomography and positron-emission tomography, as had a cutting-edge linear accelerator in late 2013 for radiotherapeutic treatment and a standard secondary metrology laboratory for dosimetry equipment, which could provide services nationally and regionally.

92. The delegation considered that the PACT programme was a fundamental mechanism for channelling the region’s priorities concerning the use of ionizing radiation in cancer diagnosis and treatment and in nuclear medicine.

93. Uruguay was especially satisfied with the regional PACT projects implemented in Latin America and the Caribbean, four of which had been executed under ARCAL. Accordingly, Uruguay stressed the importance of ARCAL as an irreplaceable instrument for regional cooperation and for regional projects. Uruguay had implemented various TC agreements under ARCAL, which was committed to implementing regional or subregional projects aimed at strengthening the regulated infrastructure and the protection and safety of patients, workers and the general public. Nuclear medicine, the determination of chemical agents in agricultural food for domestic consumption and export, and efficiency gains in the milk production sector, were cases in point.

94. Uruguay believed that the promotion of trilateral cooperation agreements for regional projects would contribute to stronger strategic alliances with multiplier beneficial effects.

26. Report by the Credentials Committee

(GC(59)/29)

95. The PRESIDENT said that the General Committee had met earlier in the day as the Credentials Committee to examine the credentials of all delegates, pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Procedure. He noted that the Secretariat had received credentials for the delegates of Uruguay in due form in accordance with Rule 27 of the Rules of Procedure. The Secretariat had subsequently received credentials in due form for the delegates of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the United Arab Emirates. After discussion, the Committee had recommended that the General Conference adopt the draft resolution contained in paragraph 8 of its report, with the reservations and positions expressed therein.

96. The General Committee had also considered an additional item under ‘Any Other Business’, as requested by the delegate of Peru, in connection with the organization of the list of speakers at the
General Conference. The Secretariat had taken note of the comments, which would be addressed when organizing the 60th regular session of the General Conference.

97. **Mr BADAWY (Egypt)** said that acceptance by Egypt of the report of the Credentials Committee did not imply recognition of the occupation by Israel of Arab territories, including the Arab part of Jerusalem, the Golan Heights and the Shebaa Farms.

98. **Mr OMARI (Jordan)** said that Jordan’s acceptance of the credentials of the delegation of Israel did not imply recognition of Israel’s occupation since 1967 of Arab territories, including Jerusalem, the Golan Heights and the Shebaa Farms. Jordan considered that Israel’s borders did not extend beyond the borders of 4 June 1967, as set down in peace agreements with Jordan and Egypt.

99. **Mr ESHRAGHI JAHROMI (Islamic Republic of Iran)** said that acceptance of the report of the Credentials Committee did not imply recognition of the Israeli regime by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

100. The **PRESIDENT** took it that, with the reservations expressed, the General Conference wished to adopt the draft resolution contained in paragraph 8 of document GC(59)/29.

101. It was so decided.

8. **Election of Members to the Board of Governors**  
   (GC(59)/8 and GC(59)/26)

102. The **PRESIDENT** recalled that in 1989 the General Conference had approved a procedure whereby, when there was agreement regarding the candidate or candidates from a particular area, no secret ballot would be held. Balloting would take place only in respect of those areas for which there was no agreed slate. That procedure considerably facilitated the rational use of the time available to the General Conference.

103. Rule 79 of the Rules of Procedure, which provided that election of Members of the Board should be by secret ballot, would accordingly be suspended in respect of areas for which no secret ballot was to be held.

104. He was pleased to report that all area groups had agreed on their candidates for the vacancies to be filled and, after thanking all area groups for their efforts in reaching agreement, drew attention to document GC(59)/26, containing the names of the Member States which the Board had designated to serve on the Board from the end of the 59th (2015) session of the Conference until the end of the 60th (2016) session.

105. Recalling that, under Rule 83 of the Rules of Procedure, the presiding officer must indicate to the General Conference those elective places on the Board that must be filled, he referred to document GC(59)/26, paragraph 2, which indicated, for each geographical area, the number of Member States that must be elected so as to ensure that the Board would be constituted in accordance with Article VI.A of the Statute.

106. There were 11 seats to be filled: 2 for Latin America, 2 for Western Europe, 2 for Eastern Europe, 2 for Africa, 1 for the Middle East and South Asia, 1 for the Far East, and 1 — the floating seat — that it was the turn of a Member State from the Far East Group to fill.

107. The 24 Member States that had been either elected by the General Conference in 2014 under Article VI.A.2 of the Statute, which would therefore continue to serve on the Board until 2016, or
designated by the Board in June 2015 for membership of the Board pursuant to Article VI.A.1 of the Statute for the one-year period 2015–2016 were listed in document GC(59)/26, paragraph 3.

108. In order to facilitate the election, an informal note showing the results of area group consultations on their candidates for the vacant seats had been distributed to delegates. The note contained information that had been provided to the President and to the Secretariat.

109. The President took it that the General Conference wished to elect Paraguay and Uruguay to the two vacant seats for Latin America.

110. Paraguay and Uruguay were duly elected.

111. The President took it that the General Conference wished to elect Spain and Turkey to the two vacant seats for Western Europe.

112. Spain and Turkey were duly elected.

113. The President took it that the General Conference wished to elect Belarus and Latvia to the two vacant seats for Eastern Europe.

114. Belarus and Latvia were duly elected.

115. The President took it that the General Conference wished to elect Ghana and Namibia to the two vacant seats for Africa.

116. Ghana and Namibia were duly elected.

117. The President took it that the General Conference wished to elect Pakistan to the one vacant seat for the Middle East and South Asia.

118. Pakistan was duly elected.

119. The President took it that the General Conference wished to elect the Philippines to the one vacant seat for the Far East.

120. The Philippines was duly elected.

121. The President took it that the General Conference wished to elect the Republic of Korea to the floating seat, which it was the turn of a Member State from the Far East to fill.

122. The Republic of Korea was duly elected.

123. The President recalled that, under Article VI.D of the Statute, the eleven Member States just elected to the Board would hold office from the end of the 59th session of the General Conference to the end of the 61st regular session, in 2017.
11. Appointment of the External Auditor
   (GC(59)/4, GC(59)/4 Add.1, Mod.1 and Mod.2)

124. The President said that, as the tenure of the Agency’s current External Auditor would end on completion of the audit of the Agency’s accounts for 2015, an External Auditor must be appointed to audit the Agency’s accounts for the 2016 and 2017 financial years.

125. The matter had been considered by the Board of Governors at its meeting in June, but the Board had not made a recommendation to the General Conference. He understood that there was currently only one candidate, the Chairman of the Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia, for the office of External Auditor.

126. He took it that the General Conference wished to appoint the Chairman of the Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia as the External Auditor to audit the Agency’s accounts for the 2016 and 2017 financial years.

127. It was so decided.

128. Mr AKBAR (Indonesia) thanked Member States for the confidence that they had placed in his country by entrusting the Chairman of the Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia with the important task of auditing the Agency’s accounts. Indonesia would strive to maintain the high quality of audit services provided by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India in the previous four years, with a view to further enhancing accountability and transparency in the Agency’s work to promote the safe, secure and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

   The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.