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Abbreviations used in this record:

AAEA	Arab Atomic Energy Agency
ABACC	Brazilian–Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
AFRA	African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
AP	additional protocol
ARCAL	Co-operation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEANTOM	ASEAN Network of Nuclear Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy
AU-PATTEC	African Union’s Pan African Tsetse and Trypanosomosis Eradication Campaign
BSS	International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources
CANDU	Canadian deuterium-uranium reactor
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
CELAC	Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
CNS	Convention on Nuclear Safety
COP21	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
CPF	Country Programme Framework
CPPNM	Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
CSA	comprehensive safeguards agreement
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
CTBTO	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization
DPRK	Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
ECAS	Enhancing Capabilities of the Safeguards Analytical Services
EPREV	Emergency Preparedness Review

Abbreviations used in this record (continued):

E3+3	France, Germany and the United Kingdom plus China, the Russian Federation and the United States of America
E3/EU+3	France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the European Union plus China, the Russian Federation and the United States of America
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FORO	Ibero–American Forum of Radiological and Nuclear Regulatory Agencies
GICNT	Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
GIS	geographical information system
GTRI	Global Threat Reduction Initiative
HEU	high enriched uranium
HIV/AIDS	human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome
ICERR	International Centres of Excellence Based on Research Reactors
ICSANT	International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism
ICT	information and communication technology
ICTP	International Centre for Theoretical Physics
ILO	International Labour Organization
imPACT	integrated missions of PACT
INIR	Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review
INIS	International Nuclear Information System
INPRO	International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles
INSSP	Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan
IPPAS	International Physical Protection Advisory Service
IRRS	Integrated Regulatory Review Service
IWAVE	IAEA Water Availability Enhancement
JCPOA	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

Abbreviations used in this record (continued):

Joint Convention	Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management
JPA	Joint Plan of Action
LDCs	least developed countries
LEU	low enriched uranium
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NDT	non-destructive testing
NESA	Nuclear Energy System Assessment
NPP	nuclear power plant
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NSC	Nuclear Security Council
NSF	Nuclear Security Fund
NSGC	Nuclear Security Guidance Committee
NSS	nuclear security summit
OSLD	optically stimulated luminescence
PUI	Peaceful Uses Initiative
QUAADRIL	Quality Assurance Audit for Diagnostic Radiology Improvement and Learning
QUANUM	Quality Assurance in Nuclear Medicine
QUATRO	Quality Assurance Team for Radiation Oncology
P5+1	the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany
PACT	Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy
RCA	Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
ReNuAL	Renovation of the Nuclear Applications Laboratories
Rosatom	Federal Atomic Energy Agency of the Russian Federation
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals

Abbreviations used in this record (continued):

SEANWFZ Treaty	Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone
SIDS	small island developing States
SIT	sterile insect technique
SLC	State-level concept
SQP	small quantities protocol
SSAC	State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material
SSDL	Secondary Standards Dosimetry Laboratory
S&T	science and technology
STI	science, technology and innovation
TC	technical cooperation
TCF	Technical Cooperation Fund
TCP	Technical Cooperation Programme
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USA	United States of America
USIE	Unified System for Information Exchange in Incidents and Emergencies
WANO	World Association of Nuclear Operators
WENRA	Western European Nuclear Regulators' Association
WWER	water cooled water moderated reactor

7. General debate and Annual Report for 2014 (continued) (GC(59)/7 and additional information)

1. Mr VERWAERDE (France) said that France welcomed the JCPOA, which it had sought to strengthen, considering that it must be implemented fully and sustainably in order to restore confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. Full benefits of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes were but one of the advantages of reopening Iran's economy to the world. The JCPOA would enable Iran, from implementation day onwards, to engage in nuclear cooperation with the Agency and all States. To be successful, however, it must be implemented strictly. The Agency's role would be decisive, and France would follow the matter closely. The process of clarifying the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear programme must be credible. France would pay close attention to the implementation of the road map, to which Iran and the Agency had agreed, and called on Iran to cooperate fully with the Agency, noting that subsequent exchanges must be substantive rather than merely procedural. The JCPOA would increase the Agency's activities for a long period and would have substantial human and financial resource implications. France would contribute its share, as announced to the Board of Governors on 25 August 2015, but those operations must be financed under the Regular Budget as soon as possible. All Members had a stake in the success of the JCPOA and all must support its implementation.

2. He deplored the lack of progress on the implementation of the safeguards agreement with the Syrian Arab Republic, stressing that Syria remained responsible for facilities on its territory and must cooperate with the Agency to clarify its past activities at Al Kibar and related sites.

3. The nuclear or ballistic tests conducted by the DPRK gave cause for great concern. The DPRK must cooperate with the Agency and abandon its military nuclear programme.

4. France would host COP21 in Paris from 30 November to 11 December 2015. It was a major event for the international community and the negotiators believed that the conditions were much more conducive to agreement than in the past, for States, companies and non-governmental organizations had risen to the climate challenge. France was working transparently with all States in order to set a collective goal and meet the expectations of all States, especially the most vulnerable, through universal agreement. The goal of the Paris Climate Alliance, namely to maintain the rise in average world temperature below 1.5°C–2°C in relation to pre-industrial levels and enable societies to adapt to the existing imbalances, was achievable. The Agency would contribute to those ends through the cooperation that it encouraged.

5. The success of COP21 rested on all States' commitment to sustainable energy policies. France and other EU States had set ambitious goals. A new law on energy transition for green growth had entered into force in August 2015, reflecting national goals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, final energy consumption and fossil fuel consumption. France had thus reaffirmed its choice to diversify its energy mix by combining two low-carbon sources, namely nuclear power and renewable energy sources, in order to combat climate change and ensure security of supply. Nuclear power would provide 50% of electricity supplies by 2025. The President had decided to overhaul the nuclear sector, which was essential to France's energy independence, to the success of the energy transition through decarbonized energy production and to reaping the benefits of French and international technical and industrial know-how. EDF and AREVA reactor design, project management and marketing would be harmonized in order to build industrial synergies that would ensure capacity building in the French nuclear sector, with competitive products and services that met the highest safety standards.

6. France looked forward to the two major NSS events in 2016 and commended the expansion and implementation of the Agency's nuclear security activities as described in the Nuclear Security Report 2015, in particular the provision of training and advice to States.

7. One of the main priorities of cooperation between France and the Agency had been improved management of radioactive sources, as affirmed by the President of France at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit. It was an endeavour to which all exporting States could contribute.

8. France encouraged Member States to consider the development and use of alternative technologies to highly active radioactive sources, as available alternatives were both technically feasible and economically viable. France respected States' technological decisions, but considered that the long-term goal should be to minimize inventories of sources that were at greatest risk of being used maliciously.

9. France commended the Director General's Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident report, which had contributed significantly to learning lessons from the accident and to enhancing nuclear safety worldwide, and noted that the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety would be completed in the current year. It was important for the Agency to continue its nuclear safety work through a multi-year programme integrated into its regular work, covering all priority safety issues. It was in the interest of all to develop a genuine international safety culture at the decision-making and operational levels.

10. Good radioactive waste management was fundamental to responsible nuclear energy development. France stood ready to share with other Member States its experiential knowledge gained from the radioactive waste storage project at the Cigéo deep disposal centre.

11. France stressed the importance of accession by all States to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, the amended Paris Convention or the amended Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage.

12. As safeguards and TC had been central to the establishment of the Agency and as inspections were regarded as an essential feature of the Agency, France intended to continue to make its skills and expertise available to the Agency, in particular through its national safeguards support programme. All of France's civilian nuclear facilities, specifically those for power generation, had been placed under Euratom safeguards. France ascribed importance to progress towards an ambitious universal safeguards system and considered, pursuant to NPT Article III.1, that verification must be based on the application of a CSA and an AP, for it was only on the basis of an AP that the Agency could provide credible assurances that States complied with their NPT obligations.

13. France had sought, through multilateral cooperation, to make the necessary skills available to States, especially newcomer States, wishing to develop a civilian nuclear programme and had, therefore, proposed a capacity building initiative one year previously. It called on all interested States to participate in that initiative through the Agency. Specific action had already been taken to compile a global inventory of training available in the nuclear field and to develop the ICERR network. France was proud to have received its first ICERR accreditation from the Agency for its Jules Horowitz and ISIS research reactors.

14. Mr BOEHM (Canada) commended the efforts of the E3+3 in agreeing on the JCPOA, stressing that Canada continued to judge Iran by its actions and not its words, for Iran's track record did not instil confidence. Canada would continue to support the Agency's essential role of monitoring and verifying Iran's JPA and JCPOA commitments.

15. Canada was following with equal care the implementation of the road map for clarification of past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme. A meaningful resolution of the issue of the possible military dimensions was integral to ensuring that Iran's nuclear programme

would be exclusively peaceful in nature and to building the international community's confidence that such was indeed the case. The Director General's final assessment in December 2015 would be clear and unambiguous only if Iran cooperated fully with the Agency's investigation. Anything less than full and forthright cooperation by Iran would give cause for deep concern and would raise serious questions about Iran's ability and willingness to implement its JCPOA commitments.

16. Canada welcomed the Director General's recent report on the DPRK's worrisome proliferation activities since the 58th session and voiced concern at the possible restart of facilities at Yongbyon, including the operation of the 5 MW reactor, and at the construction of a light water reactor. Canada regretted the DPRK's continued acts of provocation, its threats to conduct further nuclear tests and its claim to have launched a submarine-based missile and to have miniaturized a nuclear weapon. Canada strongly condemned the DPRK's uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activities and urged the DPRK to return to full compliance with its NPT obligations and its IAEA safeguards agreement. Canada supported the Agency's continued efforts to monitor the nuclear situation in the DPRK and its preparedness to return to the DPRK to verify nuclear activities in that country. Canada called on all Member States to support, if they could, the Agency in that mission.

17. Noting that the Syrian authorities had failed to cooperate with the Agency, despite having had ample opportunity to do so in the past four years, Canada stressed that the situation in Syria, while grave and of deep concern to all, was no excuse for Syria's non-compliance with its safeguards obligations and that the Agency must remain seized of the matter relating to the clandestine construction of a nuclear reactor building at Dair Alzour until the unresolved questions of Syria's past activities had been definitively answered. Canada therefore called on Syria to comply fully with its NPT obligations and to cooperate with the Agency.

18. Canada welcomed the Secretariat's continuing efforts to enhance Member States' awareness of safeguards practices and procedures, which had improved understanding and had helped to dispel the remaining SLC myths. Considering that the SLC allowed the Agency to improve effectiveness while concentrating on areas of greater safeguards significance, Canada encouraged the Agency to pursue efforts to strengthen the safeguards system and ensure that it remained sustainable and cost effective.

19. In Canada's view, the Agency's endeavour to strengthen nuclear security and combat the threat of nuclear terrorism had been bolstered by the NSS process. In addition to honouring specific commitments made at the Summits, Canada had taken steps nationally and internationally that had demonstrated its ongoing leadership and commitment to nuclear security. It would host an IPPAS mission in the following month, which should again reveal the high level of physical protection of its nuclear material and its commitment to transparency. Besides, it had continued to support nuclear security programming and had contributed more than \$20.6 million to the NSF since 2004. The Agency would continue to be Canada's trusted partner in implementing its NSS commitments. Canada had actively supported the NSS process of drawing up action plans that transmitted NSS commitments to key international institutions that promoted nuclear security.

20. Nuclear power continued to be a key part of Canada's energy mix, currently contributing approximately 15% of its overall electricity supply. Nuclear energy was a reliable and cost-competitive contributor to Canada's energy supply, and played an important role in developing a clean energy future for Canada in support of its climate change mitigation action. Canada's nuclear power production had grown modestly between 2005 and 2012, but had contributed significantly to the recognition of its electricity system as one of the cleanest in the world because it already supplied nearly 80% of its electricity without any greenhouse gas emissions. The refurbishment of 10 CANDU reactors would begin in 2016 at a cost of some CAN \$25 billion and would add 25–30 years to each unit's operational lifetime.

21. Welcoming the Director General's Fukushima Daiichi accident report and hoping that the 45 observations and lessons could be prioritized through discussions in order to determine quickly which ones required action immediately, Canada called for a multi-year nuclear safety strategy setting priorities, expected results and timetables for the various Agency departments in order to facilitate the transition of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety to the Agency's regular activities. It had made financial and in-kind contributions to the drafting of the report and would continue to work with the Agency to strengthen nuclear safety. It congratulated Japan on its new lessons-based safety standards implemented in restarting its reactors.

22. The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission had continued to regulate the use of nuclear energy and material to protect the health, safety and security of all citizens and preserve the environment, and had held public hearings on the renewal of the operating licences for the Darlington and Bruce NPPs and on nuclear safety, drawing on various social media tools and its programme for providing financial assistance to participants. Canada urged all Member States to participate in international peer reviews and to make the results and national reports public in accordance with the CNS. Canada had continued to contribute significantly to international nuclear safety by conducting and hosting Agency review missions. It urged other Member States to do likewise and called on nuclear facility operators to take part in peer review missions through organizations such as WANO.

23. Canada welcomed the Vienna Declaration adopted by CNS Contracting Parties in order to strengthen the implementation of the Convention and would report on its application of the Convention at the Seventh Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties. As additional evidence of its commitment to openness and transparency in nuclear safety, Canada had nominated a candidate to chair the Conference, who, as first vice-president and head of regulation of operations at the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, had the requisite expertise and experience to conduct the conference and achieve its objectives.

24. Canada welcomed the establishment of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Standards Committee, in which it would participate fully. Canada also welcomed the entry into force of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage earlier in 2015. Canada welcomed the ongoing commitment to budgetary discipline, as evidenced by its programme and the draft budget for the coming biennium.

25. Mr BALIUKOVAS (Lithuania) said that nuclear safety would always be given high priority and that the Agency remained the key institution for setting nuclear standards worldwide. The IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety had yielded tangible results, including information sharing, greater transparency and confidence building. Member States' efforts to strengthen the CNS had led to the unanimously adopted Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety in 2015, which was a good example of joint solutions and shared responsibility. Challenges still lay ahead, however, in particular effective implementation of international conventions and of the highest nuclear safety standards.

26. He urged Member States to remain ambitious about safety at home and to persist in the pursuit of nuclear safety worldwide. Every State had the right to develop nuclear energy, but international nuclear safety obligations must be properly addressed and national decisions must be set in the broader context of transboundary implications. It was a matter of concern if nuclear energy facilities were constructed in the vicinity of sites of strategic importance, including State capitals, without proper implementation of international conventions, nuclear safety standards and dialogue with all neighbours.

27. All States developing nuclear energy, especially newcomers, must follow closely the principles of transparency and responsibility for the entire nuclear cycle, otherwise there would be no future for nuclear energy.

28. The electricity produced by NPPs constituted a reliable source of baseload low-carbon electricity, played an important role in energy security and contributed to the attainment of decarbonization targets. Lithuania was strongly committed to developing nuclear power in the most responsible way, giving pride of place, politically and technically, to nuclear safety.

29. Following the integration of Lithuania into the EU energy market and grids, Lithuania had begun to project its future energy sector scenarios, under which the development of Visaginas NPP was being assessed on the basis of its impacts on security of energy supply and on macroeconomic indicators. Plans had been made to update Lithuania's energy strategy by the end of 2015 and thus provide clarity about the future development of the energy sector. Lithuania would continue to cooperate closely with the Agency, too, in implementing the Visaginas NPP project and thanked the Agency for its comprehensive, competent and continuous support.

30. Ignalina NPP had been decommissioned as agreed with the Nuclear Regulatory Authority. All safety measures had been taken. Lithuania had spent nuclear fuel at the Ignalina NPP site and had actively participated in the EU stress tests.

31. In 2014–2015, Lithuanian institutions had reviewed the Lithuanian National Programme for the Management of Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste, taking into account the requirements of the EU Directive on the management of radioactive waste and spent fuel, in order to manage radioactive waste safely and sustainably, with emphasis on high-level nuclear and radiation safety in managing spent fuel and radioactive waste from Ignalina NPP and on long-term strategic guidelines on preparations for the construction of a geological repository and the disposal of spent fuel and long-lived waste. Lithuania had followed the Agency's recommendations and safety principles closely.

32. Implementation of Agency safety guidance and standards on radiation protection in public, occupational and medical exposure in Lithuania had been essential to reducing doses to the population. Lithuania was concerned about the rise in the population's medical exposure owing to the introduction of new medical technologies. Great attention had therefore been paid to the justification and optimization of medical exposure. Lithuania was continuing to implement a national TC project on the long-term recording of patient doses and exposures, which had contributed to the monitoring of medical exposure and to the implementation of the justification and optimization principles in medicine.

33. Lithuanian institutions had prepared actively for the April 2016 IRRS mission by reviewing all legislative acts in order to evaluate their compliance with Agency standards.

34. Acquisition of nuclear material by terrorists was currently the most immediate and extreme threat to global security. Nuclear terrorism, a real and present danger to all States, could be prevented. The current focus on nuclear security through voluntary action was not, however, commensurate with either the risk or consequences of nuclear terrorism. National and international nuclear security measures must be in place in order to secure nuclear material and counter nuclear trafficking and nuclear terrorism. Lithuania called on States that had not yet done so to accede to and implement fully the relevant international instruments, in particular the amendment to the CPPNM.

35. Three nuclear security summits had driven far-reaching initiatives that had together strengthened nuclear security worldwide, reduced the threat of nuclear terrorism and secured vulnerable nuclear and radiological material. Lithuania was contributing to preparations for the forthcoming summit and had hosted a preparatory high-level NSS meeting in Vilnius in June 2015.

36. Lithuania continued to improve its legal framework for the security of nuclear facilities and nuclear material. Amendments to the Law on Nuclear Energy had been drafted to improve the

regulations on physical security of the construction site of a nuclear facility and on clearance for persons gaining access to the nuclear facility.

37. Lithuania welcomed the JCPOA, which had been endorsed unanimously by the United Nations Security Council, and applauded the perseverance and determination of all who had been involved in that diplomatic endeavour. It was convinced that, if implemented fully and in good faith, the JCPOA would become the mainstay of confidence building between Iran and the international community, paving the way to a steady improvement in relations with Iran and positively contributing to regional and international peace and stability.

38. The international non-proliferation regime, based on the Agency's verification and safeguards system, had stemmed the spread of nuclear weapons, but proliferation and the risk of non-State actors obtaining nuclear material or radioactive sources constituted a serious threat to international security.

39. Lithuania highly valued the TCP and its role in building, strengthening and maintaining capacities for the safe, peaceful and secure use of nuclear technologies. In cooperation with the Agency, it was implementing national projects on radioactive waste management, institutional capacity building and radiation protection and welcomed the opportunity provided to Lithuanian institutions to strengthen skills in nuclear safety and security, radiation protection and management of radioactive waste.

40. Considering that climate-friendly nuclear energy could be safe only if developed responsibly and that intensive international collaboration on and oversight of nuclear technologies were absolute necessities, Lithuania strongly supported global efforts designed to strengthen nuclear safety and security and fully supported the Agency's programmes.

41. Mr MIKHADZIUK (Belarus) said that his country and Rosatom were constructing the country's first NPP, consisting of two units with a total power of 2400 MW. Unit 1 would be commissioned at the end of 2018 and Unit 2 in the middle of 2020. The construction of both units was on schedule. Contracts had been concluded for the supply of equipment under a long-term manufacturing cycle. Work would begin on installing the nuclear reactor, turbines and steam generators in Unit 1 in 2016. The NPP was being constructed in accordance with the most welcome updated experience-based version of *Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power*, issued by the Agency and of the utmost assistance to States launching national nuclear power programmes.

42. Belarus paid close attention to the training of well-qualified staff for the future plant, which was crucial to future operational safety. Its experts had been undergoing training at NPPs in the Russian Federation since 2014. The Belarus NPP study and training centre would be opened in late 2015.

43. Belarus, which had been mitigating the consequences of the Chernobyl NPP accident for some 30 years, had contributed to the compilation of the Fukushima Daiichi accident report, which contained an evaluation of the causes and consequences and lessons learned. Belarus shared the Director General's opinion that although nuclear safety was a State responsibility, international cooperation on nuclear safety was of the essence, owing to the cross-border effects of nuclear accidents. Belarus was guided by that principle of nuclear safety assurance.

44. Belarus attached the utmost importance to strengthening its regulatory body. Its Department for Nuclear and Radiation Safety was cooperating actively with the Russian Federation, several EU States, the European Commission and the Regulatory Cooperation Forum; it had participated in WENRA events and held observer status at the Forum of the State Nuclear Safety Authorities of the Countries Operating WWER-type Reactors. The Regulatory Cooperation Forum had participated in the high-level seminar on the development of a safety culture held in December 2014 in Minsk.

Furthermore, owing to active international participation by Belarus's regulator, past experience had been studied, advanced training had been provided to the Department's experts and Belarus had displayed openness and transparency in implementing its national nuclear power programme.

45. Belarus and the Agency had cooperated fully on nuclear and radiation safety. Belarus was implementing Agency instruments and mechanisms. The Belarusian regulator was making preparations for an IRRS mission in early 2016 and was receiving substantial support under the Agency's TCP.

46. The achievements of the Department of Technical Cooperation in managing ongoing projects and in thoroughly preparing national and regional projects for the 2016–2017 cycle had been most commendable. The TCP was of special value and standing and should continue to be geared to assisting States in developing nuclear power and applications. Belarus had paid its TCF contributions in full and on time and undertook to continue to do so in 2016.

47. Belarus supported the Agency's efforts to strengthen nuclear security worldwide and paid the closest attention to the practicalities of ensuring nuclear security and the physical protection of nuclear material, which had become particularly relevant in connection with the construction of the Belarus NPP. In 2015, it would work with the Agency to revise the Belarus INSSP, in which strong emphasis would be laid on the security of the future NPP and the training of the highly professional staff required. In October 2015, an expert mission would assess the capacity of Belarus to detect and respond to any trafficking in nuclear and radioactive material across its borders.

48. One of the cornerstones of the foreign and security policy of Belarus was fulfilment of its NPT obligations and support for international disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. Belarus fully supported the Agency's safeguards system and attached great significance to strengthening and improving it in strict compliance with existing international agreements on peace and stability, duly taking into account the interests of Member States. Belarus strongly supported ratification of an AP. Its nuclear material accountancy and control system was being improved, legislation was being enacted and officials were being trained. The Department of Safeguards was to be commended for its assistance, including a training seminar on the application of safeguards held in Minsk in June 2015, and for its constructive cooperation on preparations for the application of safeguards at the Belarus NPP.

49. Mr PUKITIS (Latvia) said that his country, fully committed to promoting the universality of agreements on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, called on the States that had not yet done so to accede to the NPT and to abide by its terms. The NPT remained the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime. Even though the 2015 NPT Review Conference had concluded without consensus, States were still committed to implementing the action plan adopted at the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

50. Latvia regretted that the conference on the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East had not been held and considered that it was of vital importance to build on the excellent and tireless work of the conference facilitator and to engage with all States in the region to pave the way towards a meaningful conference.

51. Latvia commended the Agency for its indispensable work on the safeguards system, which was crucial to the nuclear non-proliferation regime and to NPT implementation. It firmly supported the continued evolution of safeguards, in particular the development of the SLC to strengthen safeguards further.

52. Latvia welcomed the JCPOA as an important step towards ensuring that Iran's nuclear programme was peaceful in nature. Latvia would continue to support the Agency's task of verifying

and monitoring Iran's nuclear commitments and looked forward to the further implementation by Iran of the agreed steps, which would lead to a comprehensive long-term settlement conducive to regional and international peace and security.

53. Latvia, which attached great importance to the worldwide implementation and continuous improvement of the highest nuclear safety standards, welcomed the unanimous adoption of the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety as a major development in 2015, stressing that the safe construction, use and maintenance of nuclear facilities had a bearing not only on the security of the installation State, but also on that of its neighbours.

54. The Department of Technical Cooperation had commendably provided invaluable support to Member States, in particular guidance on regulatory adjustments in order to enhance safety standards, security and safeguards. Latvia planned to improve radiation safety nationally through additional training and educational activities under the 2016–2017 TC cycle, with special emphasis on public awareness-raising and increasing society's understanding of radiation safety.

55. Latvia had striven to maintain the highest standards in its supervision of the use of ionizing radiation and had continued to introduce new medical techniques by advancing the development of cyclotron technology. It had given priority to maintaining safety standards at medical institutions, to radiation control on its borders and to monitoring radiation more broadly. It had further improved the monitoring of its radiation protection infrastructure in order to maximize the protection of public health and safety and had promoted high nuclear safety standards among operators by raising their awareness and broadening their responsibility for ionizing-radiation risk management.

56. Pursuant to the Agency's recommendations and safety principles, Latvia was concentrating on speedy implementation of the EU Directive on the management of radioactive waste and spent fuel. It attached great importance to further collaboration with the Department of Technical Cooperation and the ongoing exchange of best practices with international radiation security and nuclear safety experts.

57. As a Member of the Board of Governors in 2015–2017, Latvia would give priority to the promotion of worldwide implementation and continuous improvement of the highest standards of nuclear safety and to Agency safeguards activities, in particular JCPOA implementation

58. Mr SANTANA (Cuba) said that, mindful of the "atoms for peace" slogan, Members must work hard to achieve age-old aspirations to the supreme objective of peace.

59. Cuba was satisfied that a balance had again been struck among nuclear technology and applications, nuclear safety, nuclear security, nuclear verification and technical cooperation.

60. Technical cooperation was an essential statutory pillar that required priority attention. Cuba welcomed the increase in TC resources for 2016–2017, which would facilitate capacity building in developing countries and boost synergies between scientific and technical components in Member States. Cuba set great store by the application of nuclear technology in such vital areas as human health, agriculture, nutrition, hydrology and environmental conservation. During the 2014–2015 project cycle, more than 63 expert missions and more than 86 technical meetings had been held in Cuba, and 63 people had attended international congresses and conferences. Cuban specialists had participated in 129 training courses, and Cuba had hosted six regional events and had participated in more than 20 regional projects. It had attained an implementation rate of 99.4% under the TCP in 2014.

61. Cuba attached particular importance to cooperation among developing countries. It had therefore supported the five-year extension of ARCAL, for ARCAL was essential to promoting cooperation on nuclear matters among Latin American and Caribbean States. Cuba supported all efforts to strengthen the Department of Technical Cooperation and to increase its efficiency as

prerequisites for the successful implementation of the TC strategy. It endorsed the 2016–2017 TCF target which it would endeavour to attain.

62. Cuba attached great importance to the application of nuclear technologies, through international cooperation, in key economic and societal areas, such as human health — especially on cancer control — food security, agriculture and environmental protection, primarily water resource management.

63. Considering that nuclear security must be achieved inclusively, Cuba supported the adoption within the Agency framework of international standards regulating nuclear security based on intergovernmental, multilateral, transparent and inclusive negotiations. Cuba welcomed the Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Security to be held in December 2016 and supported the triennial scheduling of such events to ensure that agreements were followed up. It supported the Agency's nuclear security endeavours, while stressing States' primary responsibility in that area. Cuba continued to participate in activities on the implementation of the CPPNM and the amendment thereto and had cooperated with the Agency in implementing projects on enhanced nuclear security for border monitoring and facilities with category 1 and 2 radioactive sources. Following the second INSSP review, the first stage had been completed and the second was under way. New projects had been designed for the third INSSP stage.

64. Cuba recognized the Agency's efforts to strengthen radiation safety, transport infrastructure and the management of radioactive waste and emergencies in countries in order to ensure the safe use of radioactive sources. During a 2015 visit to Cuba by the Director of the Division of Radiation, Transport and Waste Safety, Cuban authorities had stressed Cuba's readiness to cooperate with Member States in strengthening governance and regulatory frameworks to improve compliance with the new BSS requirements. They had discussed the likelihood of establishing a regional training centre in Cuba for specific subjects such as the control of radioactive sources.

65. Cuba acknowledged the important achievements of FORO, which, in 2015, had contributed to radiation protection in medical applications by compiling guides jointly with the Agency on patient protection and on probabilistic safety analysis in radiotherapy, by conducting the activity on the radiation safety culture and by determining the nuclear reactor safety skills, profile and training required for staff in regulatory agencies.

66. In Cuba's opinion, the progress achieved in implementing the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety had been most commendable, as had been all action taken to strengthen the global legal nuclear liability framework and national regulatory bodies. Cuba had received double certification for eight consecutive years and had obtained satisfactory results in Agency inspections. It had repeatedly criticised the manipulation and politicization of safeguards, and the double standards that certain Member States were trying to impose. It considered that the principle of confidentiality in the Agency's safeguards activities must always be strictly observed and that exclusively voluntary decisions must not be deemed to be obligations. It supported the efforts to improve the efficiency of safeguards as long as such efforts did not affect States' legitimate rights or establish discriminatory or selective practices, and considered that safeguards activities must never be promoted to the detriment of support for the TCP.

67. Cuba welcomed the conclusion of the JCPOA and the road map as outcomes that clearly showed that dialogue and negotiation were the optimum means of settling disputes and concluding agreements satisfactory to all parties involved. It reaffirmed its support for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East and regretted that no conference had been convened for that purpose. It considered that the failure to adopt a final document at the 2015 NPT Review Conference had jeopardized the credibility of the entire NPT system.

68. The economic, commercial and financial blockade against Cuba by the USA had affected the implementation of Cuba's TCP with the Agency, despite the Agency's efforts to achieve success. The blockade had hampered the procurement of essential equipment and materials, such as radiopharmaceuticals, approved for TC projects, thus delaying project implementation and raising costs. Restrictions had been imposed on Cuban experts' participation in Agency training activities or meetings held in the USA, with Cuban experts being barred from training courses, under regional project RLA6072, on basic physical and administrative aspects of radiation oncology and on the selection, procurement, acceptance and commissioning of radiotherapy equipment, both conducted in the USA in the second half of 2014. The Agency had endeavoured to mitigate by sending Cubans to other countries for training.

69. Owing to the restoration of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the USA on 20 July 2015, the normalization of relations had begun but, so long as the blockade remained in place, normal relations between Cuba and the USA were inconceivable. Cuba had acknowledged President Obama's appeal to the United States Congress to raise the blockade against Cuba and hoped that he would continue to use his executive powers to dismantle aspects of that policy that had harmed and deprived the people of Cuba.

70. Cuba called for greater efficiency and effectiveness in the Agency's decision-making process, for the General Conference to be strengthened as the supreme legislative body in which all Member States participated and for an in-depth analysis of the composition and functions of the Board of Governors under Article VI of the Statute.

71. A crucial moment had been reached in international affairs. The United Nations was celebrating its 70th anniversary and its Member States were negotiating the post-2015 development agenda. The Agency should be pivotal in designing strategies to seek a solution to the structural problems of the economies of developing countries, as suggested by the Director General, by focusing on atoms for peace and development. Nuclear applications and TC programmes should contribute to the elimination of disparities societally, regionally and internationally.

72. Mr CARDOZO ROMAN (Paraguay) said that his country had promulgated Law No. 5169 establishing the Radiological and Nuclear Regulatory Authority in an endeavour to improve the effectiveness of the radiological and nuclear legal and regulatory regime nationally and to promote exchanges on activities regionally and internationally. The law aimed to establish standards, guidance and codes of practice and safety, to regulate activities involving nuclear technology and all radiation sources in the country and to ensure that those texts were updated periodically to reflect technological developments and the Agency's recommendations. A directorate had been established in order to implement and enforce legal and regulatory standards governing the authority's activities and the treaties signed and ratified by Paraguay. An executive secretariat had been appointed to represent the authority legally. Paraguay had subsequently sought to strengthen mechanisms institutionally to support nuclear energy for peaceful uses — all in close cooperation with the Agency.

73. Paraguay had initiated negotiations with the Government of Spain on the establishment of bilateral relations with the NSC and would develop relations with other States in order to exchange best nuclear-safety practices and experiences.

74. Paraguay, which was committed to the use of nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes and to nuclear security, urged other States to consider ratifying the amendment to the CPPNM, which it was about to ratify. The Agency should encourage all signatories to act in accordance with the aim and purpose of the amendment until it entered into force and to apply legally binding and non-legally binding international nuclear security instruments.

75. Paraguay had given priority to capacity building, stronger national poverty-reduction activities and socioeconomic development based on the national development plan and had supported the extension of ARCAL, which had entered into force for Paraguay on 5 September 2015 and would so remain until 4 September 2020.

76. Regional and national priority had been given to information policies and the transfer of practical knowledge to nuclear technology professionals working to tackle real needs and improve the people's well-being. Paraguay wished such transfers to be as effective and efficient as possible and encouraged all States to facilitate the exchange of information, while observing international law and carrying out such activities in good faith. Paraguay supported continuous cooperation activities among States and interaction with civil society in order to find effective and transparent nuclear energy solutions; it encouraged the exchange of appropriate and timely information among all stakeholders.

77. Paraguay welcomed the Agency's increased and sustained support delivered through TC projects in the areas of health, food security, the environment and radiation protection; it was participating in regional and national projects geared to technical and technological capacity building through fellowships, training courses, workshops, scientific visits, expert missions and equipment.

78. Reaffirming its commitment to making an efficient contribution through nuclear energy for peaceful uses, Paraguay urged States that had not yet done so to accede to the Agency's international nuclear instruments that contributed to international peace and security in accordance with the SDGs and to worldwide endeavours to achieve socioeconomic and environmental development.

79. Mr GAYE (Senegal) was fully satisfied with the Agency's endeavours to promote peaceful nuclear technology, nuclear safety and security and to strengthen the application of safeguards. Senegal was committed to using the peaceful applications of nuclear energy transparently, safely and sustainably. It had ratified most international conventions and agreements on nuclear safety and had acceded to the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and could thus participate fully in strengthening international cooperation on transport control and in combating nuclear terrorism and trafficking in radioactive sources and nuclear material.

80. Senegal intended to participate actively in strengthening the international nuclear safety and security and non-proliferation regimes and had made the necessary arrangements to ratify the 2005 amendment to the CPPNM and the AP to its safeguards agreement. It had hosted an advisory mission and had participated in several Agency workshops and conferences on awareness-raising and on the importance of the additional protocol. With the assistance of the Office of Nuclear Security, it had adopted an INSSP in 2014 and was actively involved in various initiatives designed to strengthen nuclear security internationally, such as GTRI, through which Senegal had acquired equipment to search for orphan sources and had initiated a programme to strengthen the physical protection of material at specific hospital sites, which clearly reflected Senegal's commitment to the sustainable management of nuclear security.

81. Senegal welcomed the USA's initiative to bring the amendment to the CPPNM into force, thus promoting nuclear energy for safe and peaceful uses, and commended the JCPOA concluded between Iran and the E3+3, urging all concerned to abide by its terms.

82. Senegal had in 2011 established the Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Authority, its national body tasked with nuclear material regulation, whose independence was assured by legal mechanisms. It had received Agency support regularly in the form of equipment and advice for implementing its projects and programmes. Senegal had increased its participation in INIS activities and in USIE. Although nuclear safety was an individual State responsibility, regional and global

interest in nuclear safety must be increased and sustained through collective action and ongoing international cooperation. The establishment of the Agency's NSGC was therefore of the essence.

83. Senegal was considering nuclear power as an option in its energy mix and had subscribed to the aims of INPRO, while participating actively in the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation and in the AFRA project on energy planning capacity building.

84. Senegal's TCP covered most of the areas in which it had requested the Agency's assistance, namely training of qualified staff under national and regional (AFRA) projects, technology transfer or the exchange of experts, support and advisory missions under PACT, the supply of medical equipment for radiotherapy and nuclear medicine, and the provision of inspection and monitoring equipment in the area of radiation protection and nuclear safety to support research on water resources management, energy planning, enhanced agricultural productivity, the development of stockbreeding and malnutrition control.

85. Senegal fully supported the ReNuAL project. The Seibersdorf laboratories had contributed to the training and capacity building of many scientists from Africa and from developing countries. It welcomed the launch in 2015 of the first professional MSc degree course in nuclear energy at the University of Manchester, complementing the training offered by the jointly organized IAEA-ICTP Nuclear Energy Management School, under which more than 350 young professionals from 70 countries had been trained in nuclear science. On the initiative of the President of Senegal, the City of Knowledge was being established for S&T development, including nuclear medicine and nuclear power.

86. Senegal would spare no effort in developing its already excellent cooperation with the Agency through a proactive nuclear S&T policy for socioeconomic development. It reaffirmed full commitment to the Agency's peace and security ideals through active participation in the promotion of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and in strengthening the Agency's non-proliferation and verification regimes. It was unwaveringly committed to working with the international community to achieve world peace and stability.

87. Mr MYAT (Myanmar) said that the Agency had made a unique and long-standing contribution to Member States' achievement of their national development goals. TC projects had played a significant role in the promotion of nuclear energy for peaceful uses in Myanmar in such areas as nuclear medicine, food security, agriculture, livestock breeding, health, water resource management, industrial applications, environmental conservation and radiation safety. The Agency had provided much-appreciated assistance and support in a host of TCP initiatives through expert missions, equipment, fellowships, scientific visits, technical support, hands-on experience and special training courses.

88. Myanmar attached great importance to the RCA, which had played a leading role in promoting collaborative nuclear S&T activities through RCA projects that had contributed significantly to regional socioeconomic development. It was participating in 11 national projects and dozens of interregional RCA and non-RCA projects.

89. Myanmar had participated in the INSSP since 2013 in order to support global nuclear security and fulfil its international obligations. It had hosted workshops and meetings to promote nuclear security activities and human resource capacity building.

90. In collaboration with the United States Department of Energy, Myanmar had taken part in the GTRI programme. It had organized radioactive source security awareness seminars and a national training course on the physical protection and security management of radioactive sources. In October

2015, it would host a subregional meeting on nuclear security information exchange and coordination for Asia, thus attesting to its continued support for regional nuclear security efforts.

91. Myanmar had been an NPT State Party since 1992 and had signed a safeguards agreement and an SQP in 1995. As an ASEAN Member, it had acceded to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in 1995, which had entered into force in 1997. It had signed the CTBT in 1996. Moreover, it had joined the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network and played an active role in ASEANTOM.

92. Myanmar was taking an incremental approach to its AP implementation. In cooperation with the Agency and the United States Department of Energy, it had participated in the International Safeguards and Engagement Program. It had held national capacity-building and experience-sharing workshops on its AP, which it had signed on 17 September 2013.

93. Myanmar had drafted a Comprehensive Nuclear Safety Law in order to strengthen its national regulatory system. It had established an SSAC system in order to facilitate its AP implementation.

94. The CPF for 2016–2021 would increase capacity building in fields such as agriculture, livestock, human health, the environment, radiation safety, industry and water resource management to the benefit of the people of Myanmar which had requested the Agency's assistance in implementing national TCP-relevant development priorities and activities.

95. The Government of Myanmar was focusing on investment to develop nuclear infrastructure, strengthen the national regulatory body, promote the application of nuclear medicine, secure the transfer of technology, obtain hands-on experience and enhance international cooperation on nuclear safety, security and safeguards. Moreover, Myanmar would continue to engage in bilateral cooperation on nuclear security and safeguards, including with the USA.

96. Mr AL-MANSOURI (Qatar) said that the Agency continued to play a pivotal role in providing technical support for the development of peaceful applications of nuclear energy in Member States. It served as a preeminent global forum for the sharing of knowledge and nuclear techniques among the peoples of the world. The international community had been inspired by its relentless efforts to fulfil its mandate under the NPT, which was the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the mainstay of nuclear disarmament.

97. Qatar commended the Agency's dedicated efforts in support of the advancement of humankind, as reflected in the Director General's reports to the General Conference. It called on all Member States to increase their support for the Agency by providing it with the requisite human and material resources to meet States' growing demand for its assistance in facilitating the safe and sustainable use of nuclear energy. The post-2015 sustainable development agenda, which would be adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in September 2015, depended to a large extent on peaceful applications of nuclear energy for the achievement of socioeconomic and environmental development and poverty reduction.

98. Qatar had adopted peaceful applications of nuclear energy as a basic and sound option in its sustainable development plans, which formed part of the Qatar National Vision 2030. It had formulated ambitious and wide-ranging programmes, which had provided for the establishment of the requisite technical, scientific, administrative and organizational infrastructure, including the development of an appropriate legislative and regulatory framework. Qatar looked forward to cooperating closely with the Agency in implementing its programmes and projects, particularly in building national capacities and training human resources. Nuclear energy would be applied peacefully, primarily in the areas of industry, human health, the environment, water resource management, support for the nuclear safety infrastructure and the planning and management of NPPs.

99. The current instability and uncontrollable outbreaks of violence in the Middle East region had had adverse repercussions on other parts of the world. Serious action must therefore be taken to remedy the situation, to eliminate the sources of tension and to redress the lack of balance in the implementation of international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament obligations.

100. As Qatar had advocated a diplomatic and political solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, it welcomed the adoption of the JCPOA between the P5+1 and Iran and of UNSC resolution 2231 (2015). It also welcomed the Agency's commitment to the faithful, professional, independent and impartial implementation of the JCPOA and the road map. Furthermore, Qatar considered that swift and serious action was required to implement the commitments set forth in international resolutions and the resolutions of the NPT Review Conferences concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, particularly since the current stagnation and retrogression posed an escalating threat to regional and international peace and stability and to the credibility of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Ms PETRICK CASAGRANDE (Peru) took the Chair.

101. Mr SRISAMOOT (Thailand) said that the conclusion of the JCPOA between the E3/EU+3 and Iran had been a momentous step that should build cooperation, trust and confidence, and that the failure to adopt an outcome document at the 2015 NPT Review Conference had reflected a loss of confidence by the international community and persisting differences on important issues. As the depositary State of the Bangkok Treaty establishing SEANWFZ, Thailand regarded such zones as the building blocks of a nuclear weapon-free world and as important confidence-building mechanisms, and accordingly called for a resumption of meaningful negotiations on the conference on the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

102. Thailand welcomed the international community's substantive dialogue on the humanitarian consequences of the impact of nuclear weapons, for it believed that every responsible member of the international community yearned for a nuclear future in which atomic energy was harnessed only for safe, secure and peaceful uses beneficial to the planet and to future generations. The humanitarian pledge was crucial to such a future. As the lead agency on nuclear issues, the Agency must adapt to Member States' needs, requirements and common aspirations.

103. Thailand had continued to promote nuclear safety, security and safeguards internationally, regionally and nationally, playing an active and constructive role in upholding the Agency's underlying principles. Internationally, it had hosted a Sherpa Meeting preparatory to the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, which would hopefully contribute to stronger nuclear security worldwide. Thailand would continue to highlight the critical need to bridge nuclear security capacity gaps and to engage all key stakeholders in raising awareness of nuclear security culture. Regionally, Thailand had pursued endeavours to strengthen nuclear safety, security and safeguards through ASEANTOM and had extended cooperation and training opportunities to neighbouring countries. As the first ASEAN State to provide OSLD personal monitoring, it had covered such personal monitoring in neighbouring countries, to which it could provide calibration services within Agency framework. It had provided support and clinical training for medical physicists from Viet Nam, Myanmar and Laos and had trained radiation oncologists under Agency fellowships from neighbouring States. It had also provided training in order to strengthen radiation protection in diagnostic radiology and to promote the audit and safe use of diagnostic radiation for medical uses. Its Chulalongkorn University had striven to expand and modernize its curriculum and facilities to accommodate the influx of applicants from South-East Asia attending nuclear education programmes, and hoped to cooperate with partners and with the Agency on joint degree opportunities and cooperative research.

104. Nationally, Thailand had sought to strengthen nuclear safety, security and safeguards. As its amended Draft Nuclear Energy Act had been approved by the Cabinet and would be submitted to Parliament, action could be taken shortly to ratify the remaining international conventions. Its Office of Atoms for Peace (OAP), Institute of Nuclear Technology and Ministry of Public Health were implementing several Agency TC projects and would explore areas for future cooperation. The OAP had established a nuclear forensics laboratory, at which officials from the police, customs services and others agencies had already been trained, and would invite Agency and EU nuclear forensics experts to conduct a regional training course for ASEAN Member States. It had embarked on a joint project to enhance the capacity and effectiveness of regulatory bodies and to formulate a national waste management strategy for 2015–2017.

105. Thailand had been gratified to receive, under the EU CBRN border monitoring project, much-needed radiation detection instruments for its frontline agencies.

106. In 2015, the Government had provided a budget of approximately €13 million to the OAP for the construction of a nuclear and radiation support centre to support the regulation of the safety and security of nuclear material. The centre would consist of laboratories for standards metrology, nuclear forensics, biodosimetry, nuclear and radiation monitoring and safeguards work. Consideration was already being given to enhancing the centre's capacity in those fields.

107. The Thailand Institute of Nuclear Technology wished to cooperate with the Agency in mass rearing and SIT, while the OAP wished to cooperate with the Agency in the areas of health science, nuclear education, nutrition, soil fertility, nutrient enhancement, water management and soil erosion control.

108. Thailand valued its cooperation with the Agency and aimed to continue to promote nuclear safety, security and safeguards nationally, regionally and internationally, given the importance of cooperation in the face of current setbacks and challenges and the unavoidable transboundary impact of nuclear accidents and threats.

109. Mr DE SALAZAR SERANTES (Spain) considered that the universality of the NPT, together with the CSAs and the APs, constituted the necessary framework for preserving global confidence in nuclear energy for peaceful uses. The Government of Spain welcomed the agreement reached in Vienna between Iran and the E3/EU+3 and the adoption of UNSC resolution 2231, which had laid the foundations for ensuring that the purpose of Iran's nuclear programme was exclusively peaceful, thus strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The JCPOA had confirmed that negotiation and dialogue were the only means of settling disputes, especially when it was necessary to restore confidence. Spain stood ready to cooperate in JCPOA implementation, inasmuch as full implementation was the only means of restoring confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme and of reintegrating Iran fully into the international community.

110. Noting that the issue of the undeclared nuclear facility in Syria was still pending, Spain stressed the need to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and to achieve a world free from nuclear weapons. Spain called on the DPRK to comply with UNSC resolutions and voiced support for a diplomatic negotiation that would enhance security on the Korean Peninsula.

111. The threats to nuclear security required new measures based on principles reflected in the resolution co-sponsored by Spain and the EU and submitted for consideration at the 59th session. Considering the entry into force of the amendment to the CPPNM to be crucial to nuclear security, Spain urged Parties to the Convention that had not yet done so to ratify the amendment. As a sign of its commitment, Spain currently chaired the UNSC 1540 Committee and participated actively in GICNT.

112. Spain's energy policy was based on a diversified, balanced and sustainable mix that included all available energy sources, and its NPPs would continue to contribute to the energy supply, optimize costs and reduce greenhouse gas emissions so long as those NPPs met regulatory safety requirements. Its nuclear infrastructure ranked 12th globally and, in 2014, seven reactors provided 20.5% of the electricity generated in Spain. Its NSC had issued a favourable report on the siting of a centralized temporary storage installation for spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste, pending issuance of the environmental impact assessment.

113. Spain's NSC had contributed actively to Agency activities such as planning, drafting and revising IAEA standards, in which Spanish best practices had been incorporated. Spain was in favour of strengthening the Agency's promotional and supervisory roles to ensure that all Member States voluntarily implemented standards and conducted peer reviews. Spain honoured its obligations under the main international conventions, welcomed the Agency's efforts to update them and had detailed experts of the highest calibre to the Agency for the preparation and conduct of IRRS missions and other specific reviews and consultancies because such missions undeniably made national nuclear safety and security regulatory frameworks more effective. To ensure, however, that such missions remained useful without further burdening regulators' already arduous tasks, Spain considered that the level of detail of future missions must be adapted to each State's distinctive features, previous mission findings must be considered and facilitation of mission preparation must be maximized.

114. Spain, as a strategic partner that had implemented interesting projects jointly with the Agency in order to identify the region's needs for nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, was substantively committed to ARCAL.

115. Agency-supported activities under a joint action plan provided for the mutual reinforcement of Spain's and Morocco's security. The Gate of Africa exercise on maritime transport security was under preparation and could be rolled out as a model to other States.

116. Spain's NSC had been involved in recent years in financing, planning and developing TC programmes designed to improve the regulatory infrastructure in Latin America and North Africa and had led interregional activities to control radioactive sources in the Mediterranean area.

117. FORO, to which Spain's NSC and Latin American regulatory authorities belonged, had been acknowledged as a good example of regional cooperation. Most outstandingly, FORO had contributed during the year to radiation protection and medical applications by drawing up guidelines jointly with the Agency on patient protection and safety assessment applied to radiotherapy, it had completed a project on radiation safety culture and it had determined the skills, profiles and training in nuclear reactor safety required for regulatory staff. Its experts had concluded that NPP safety in Member States had improved owing to FORO stress tests, and its guidelines on the extension of NPP lifetime had been well received by the Agency and several States. Stressing that the value of FORO's activities had been acknowledged in General Conference resolutions, Spain called on the Agency to strengthen cooperation with FORO and other regional regulatory organizations and to disseminate those organizations' technical documents and project results more widely.

118. Spain stressed adaptation to new scenarios as the only means of successfully pursuing common interests.

119. Mr VINHAS (Brazil) said that his country attached great importance to the peaceful applications of nuclear energy in areas ranging from human health, medicine and the production of radioisotopes to the nuclear fuel cycle, power generation, industry, agriculture and environmental protection. In addition to fulfilling the Agency's main statutory functions, the Secretariat's activities were crucial to ensuring compliance with NPT Article IV.

120. Brazil was convinced that nuclear technology could play a very important role in implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. As highlighted in the outcome document of the Rio+20 Conference, sustainable development must be achieved by integrating economic, social and environmental aspects. The applications of nuclear energy had made an impact on those three dimensions.

121. Brazil greatly valued ARCAL as a good example of a mechanism for South-South cooperation that had contributed significantly to translating nuclear technologies into concrete benefits for sustainable development. Brazil therefore welcomed the five-year extension of ARCAL.

122. Brazil welcomed the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety, which had reinforced significantly the Convention's peer review mechanism and had established principles to guide Contracting Parties in their endeavours to prevent accidents and mitigate radiological consequences.

123. Brazil highlighted FORO's activities, its increasing cooperation with the Agency and its establishment of criteria for licensing and inspecting cyclotrons used to produce radioisotopes for medical applications and research.

124. Brazil fully supported the Agency's efforts to apply safeguards more efficiently and effectively. Efforts must continue to ensure that States met their obligations and that the Agency operated strictly within the established legal parameters, taking into account the differing scopes and related safeguards measures under the various categories of agreement signed by Member States. Accordingly, Brazil appreciated the 2014 supplementary document on the SLC, which had heightened accountability and transparency on the part of the Secretariat and had involved Member States more closely in the formulation of new policies. Brazil commended the two technical meetings held in 2015 on the implementation of safeguards and encouraged the Secretariat to further its dialogue on that issue with Member States. Future SLC steps must be taken in close consultation and coordination with Member States, and results must be consolidated in a document for consideration by the Board of Governors.

125. Brazil welcomed the conclusion of the JCPOA by the E3/EU+3 and Iran, for it had staunchly supported a diplomatic solution to ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme and the normalization of Iran's relations with the international community. Brazil also welcomed the conclusion by the Agency and Iran of a road map for the clarification of past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme. Throughout the discussions on the implementation of safeguards in Iran, Brazil had consistently stressed that States' legal obligations arising from their respective safeguards agreements must be distinguished from confidence-building measures or agreements voluntarily entered into in a specific context. Brazil had therefore been gratified that the JCPOA had acknowledged that all of its provisions and measures served the purpose of its implementation between the parties only and must not be regarded as setting precedents for any other State.

126. Brazil acknowledged the Agency's central role in strengthening the nuclear security framework globally, inclusively, transparently and multilaterally. The Ministerial Declaration adopted at the 2013 Nuclear Security Conference had provided high-level guidance on future endeavours. Brazil looked forward to the 2016 Nuclear Security Conference as another major opportunity for high-level consideration of issues in that field.

127. Brazil was convinced that nuclear security efforts must be pursued in tandem with the international community's broader efforts to promote nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. A sustainable global nuclear security strategy required much more than mere adoption of physical protection measures for civilian facilities; it must also encompass nuclear-weapon States' huge stockpiles of HEU and separated plutonium for military applications.

Brazil and many other non-nuclear-weapon States considered that nuclear security was underpinned by that comprehensive view and was of little relevance if disconnected from global endeavours to promote peace and security by eliminating all nuclear arsenals. A world that accepted nuclear weapons would always be insecure. Accordingly, Brazil deeply regretted the failure of the 2015 NPT Review Conference to agree on a final document, despite States Parties' and the President's efforts to achieve a successful outcome. Brazil remained fully committed to the implementation of all NPT objectives and commitments undertaken in its review process and would continue to engage constructively in international bodies to achieve the shared goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. Synergy between UNGA resolutions, the NPT's three interrelated pillars and the Agency's statutory functions, including that of conducting its activities in conformity with United Nations policies in furtherance of safeguarded worldwide disarmament, was increasingly apparent.

128. The Agency had conducted essential verification activities in the past, either in country-specific situations or pursuant to requests from interested States Parties to disarmament agreements. That role, which had been welcomed in successive General Conference resolutions, must be supported and pursued so that the Secretariat would be ready to perform such tasks in future.

129. Brazil was proud to be a Party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and valued the successful partnership with Argentina that had led to the Quadripartite Agreement with the Agency and the ABACC. Those achievements had been good examples for other endeavours, in particular the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Brazil hoped that all stakeholders would resume consultations and intensify efforts to convene a conference on the establishment of that zone at the earliest opportunity.

130. Brazil strongly supported action taken to raise awareness of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, including the successful conference sponsored by the Austrian Government in December 2014.

131. The year 2015 marked the 70th anniversary of the dawn of the nuclear age and the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Subsequent nuclear tests had increased the number of victims of nuclear activities for weapons purposes, with long-term effects. To honour those victims, the international community must avoid further delaying the adoption of international instruments for the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

132. The 20th anniversary of the opening for signature of the CTBT would be marked in 2016. For nearly two decades, the world had awaited the Treaty's entry into force. Brazil reiterated its long-standing call on all remaining States to sign and ratify the Treaty, especially the eight States required for its entry into force. Nuclear-armed States' voluntary moratoria on testing, however welcome, could not substitute for a legally binding treaty. To promote the entry into force of the CTBT, it must be seen to be a credible and meaningful disarmament tool. The international community expected the CTBT to be a genuinely comprehensive test ban treaty, putting an end to the upgrading and development of new nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon technologies, thus contributing to the ultimate elimination of all nuclear arsenals.

133. Noting that the General Conference fell between the International Day against Nuclear Tests, celebrated on 29 August 2015, and the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, marked on 26 September 2015, Brazil called on the Agency, among others, to endeavour to convert the symbolism of those Days into tangible steps towards a nuclear-weapon free world.

134. Ms ANGELL-HANSEN (Norway) said that disarmament and non-proliferation remained key issues in her country's foreign policy. The achievement of a world free of nuclear weapons would require nuclear disarmament and a strong and universal NPT. Real commitment was required and full use must be made of available opportunities and tools.

135. The Agency's safeguards system was a fundamental component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. A standardized, universal regime was the best guarantee against nuclear proliferation. Norway therefore called for universal accession to the NPT and for all Member States to conclude a CSA and to sign and ratify an AP.

136. Norway commended the Agency for its implementation of its safeguards mandate, which was crucial as it endeavoured to keep abreast of constant developments in nuclear energy use worldwide and to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards without compromising the results, which was particularly relevant at a time when many Member States faced funding restraints. It noted that SLC principles had already been applied in Norway for more than a decade.

137. Norway welcomed the conclusion of the JCPOA by the P5+1 and Iran, which boded well, if properly implemented, for the international non-proliferation regime and could strengthen the international safeguards regime. Norway would provide €1.5 million for the implementation of JCPOA verification and monitoring activities in Iran and would continue to uphold its responsibility in that regard. Full cooperation by Iran with the Agency and the inspectors was crucial if the Agency were to make a satisfactory assessment of all outstanding issues — thence the necessity of AP ratification and implementation.

138. Norway voiced grave concern at the DPRK's failure to abide by the NPT, its self-declaration as a nuclear-weapon-State and its statements on its alleged need to bolster its nuclear deterrence, and called on the DPRK's leaders to refrain from further acts of provocation.

139. Noting that the Board had reported Syria's non-compliance with its safeguards agreement to the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly, Norway called on Syria to comply at the earliest possible date with the Board's resolution of June 2011 and bring an additional protocol into force.

140. Enjoining both the Agency and States to build capacities for safety and emergency preparedness, enhance coordination to make effective use of existing expertise and seek universal accession to the nuclear safety conventions, Norway welcomed the Director General's Fukushima Daiichi accident report and Member States' efforts to follow up on the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety. The adoption of the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety had been an encouraging sign. Norway looked forward to the continued implementation of the recommendations in the international action plan for strengthening the international preparedness and response system for nuclear and radiological emergencies.

141. While considering the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident to be crucial to nuclear safety, Norway ascribed great importance to its continued close bilateral cooperation on nuclear safety with the Russian Federation, with which it had just signed a joint protocol for bilateral notification mechanisms in the event of a nuclear accident.

142. Norway, a coastal State, attached the utmost importance to transport safety and, accordingly, commended the June 2015 table-top exercise between coastal and shipping States on the use of best practice guidelines for voluntary and confidential communications on the transport of radioactive materials by sea. Norway looked forward to discussions on the future of that important tool.

143. Deploring the slow progress towards the entry into force of the 2005 amendment to the CPPNM, which it considered to be key to nuclear security, together with ICSANT, Norway urged all States to sign and ratify those instruments and was gratified that the USA had brought them into force.

144. Norway, which continued to give priority to HEU minimization, noted that significant progress had been achieved in the civilian sector and stressed the need to address the continued use of HEU and the related security concerns in all applications. Referring to the recent occurrence of serious security

incidents involving highly radioactive sources, it called for greater consideration to be given to the use of alternative technologies with lower proliferation risks and for greater progress in reducing the use of highly active radioactive sources.

145. Ever committed to multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, Norway congratulated the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Agency on the host State agreement signed to establish the IAEA LEU Bank in Ulba and, as one of the LEU Bank's sponsors, looked forward to its realization.

146. Acknowledging that the Agency was the cornerstone of international nuclear security cooperation, Norway looked forward to the nuclear security discussions in Washington in 2016. It supported nuclear security through other international bodies and provided funding for the NSF and for work to ensure full implementation of UNSC resolution 1540 (2004).

147. Peaceful uses of nuclear technology extended far beyond electricity generation to safe water supplies, better crops, nuclear diagnostics and medicine, energy planning and pest control, which were but a few areas in which the Agency provided assistance. Norway supported the Agency's TCP, paid its full TCF share and welcomed other States' experts to Norway on scientific visits.

148. Norway acknowledged the Agency's role in the achievement of the SDGs, for 13 of the 17 goals could be linked directly to the Agency's activities.

149. Norway fully recognized NPT Article IV and respected the sovereign right of every nation that complied with the highest standards of safety and security to choose its own energy mix, noting that the challenges faced as the use of nuclear energy expanded worldwide comprised a higher risk of accidents, the need for adequate safety measures and emergency preparedness, nuclear security implications and non-proliferation issues.

150. Norway considered that it was crucial for the Agency to be properly equipped and to have the requisite authority, expertise and resources to fulfil its mandate in strengthening nuclear non-proliferation, in guaranteeing the safety and security of nuclear power generation and in advancing nuclear technology for the benefit of all. As funding for statutory Agency activities was still inadequate, it was important that its Regular Budget be increased in proportion to its tasks in order to ensure sustainable nuclear safety and security efforts, while optimizing the use of the Agency's resources. Over the years, Norway had provided substantial support for the NSF, the ECAS project, the Agency's efforts to strengthen safety in newcomer developing countries and work on emergency preparedness by the Incident and Emergency Centre.

151. Norway stressed that it was important for the Agency to be prepared for potential verification tasks under nuclear disarmament or arms control agreements, as set out in the Medium Term Strategy 2012–2017. The joint Norway–United Kingdom exercise on the supervised disarmament of a nuclear warhead had illustrated how robust verification mechanisms could be developed, while addressing nuclear-weapon States' concerns. The International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification built on experience gained in that field, and an international coalition, comprising both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, was emerging. Norway was gratified to host the second plenary meeting of the partnership in November 2015.

152. Mr ANDEREYA (Chile) said that Chile, which had signed and ratified international conventions on security, disarmament and non-proliferation, advocated non-proliferation and the general and complete disarmament of weapons of mass destruction. It shared with other Latin American and the Caribbean States a common vision of nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes. Accordingly, they had signed and ratified the NPT and the Treaty of Tlatelolco, under which the region had been the first in the world to be declared free of nuclear weapons. Chile would therefore continue to support the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones in other regions and any

endeavour conducive to that goal. Accordingly, it regretted deeply the failure of the NPT Review Conference to adopt a final document and considered that the action plan adopted by the 2010 Review Conference remained fully in force.

153. Considering that the nuclear hazard faced by humanity was posed by nuclear weapons, he stressed that the majority of NPT States Parties had undertaken to use nuclear power exclusively for peaceful purposes while the nuclear-weapon States had undertaken to eliminate such weapons. More than 40 years on, however, the latter undertaking had still not been honoured. There was no excuse for nuclear proliferation, nor was there any excuse for attempting to perpetuate a so-called nuclear peace while deferring the elimination of nuclear arsenals, for not only were those arsenals being modernized, but new types of nuclear weapons were being developed, contrary to the agreements.

154. Chile, which had resolutely honoured its disarmament and non-proliferation commitments, considered that although controls exercised by groups such as the NSG were necessary and important, the current non-proliferation system, based on sanctions rather than incentives, was unsustainable and horizontal proliferation could not be controlled while there was no political will to control vertical proliferation.

155. Chile had ratified the CTBT which, on its entry into force after signature and ratification by all Annex II States, would be vital to the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Chile had supported a variety of non-proliferation initiatives, considering disarmament and non-proliferation to be inseparable, for it was crucial to make headway on both fronts and not only on non-proliferation. Chile had therefore resolutely supported and signed the humanitarian pledge, out of conviction that nuclear weapons were absolutely incompatible with international humanitarian law. It hoped that all would agree to a new international model free of nuclear weapons, with nuclear energy harnessed for humanity's well-being and not its destruction.

156. Chile would continue to cooperate in order to strengthen and universalize the AP and thus boost the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system. It would also continue to support safeguards implementation by the State, through which safeguards implementation resources could be optimized.

157. Chile attached great importance to the strengthening of the legal nuclear security regime and had therefore acceded to and ratified the CPPNM and its amendment; it had undertaken to promote accession to the amendment in Latin America through seminars and other outreach activities, while continuing to cooperate with the Agency and other States in common endeavours to achieve the entry into force of the 2005 amendment. Chile considered that the NSS process had raised public and governmental awareness of the gravity of the threats to nuclear security. It would establish, with the Agency's assistance, a support and training centre in order to provide specialized nuclear security training for all national organizations with nuclear security responsibilities as from late 2015.

158. Chile had sought to strengthen its legal system and had taken initiatives to raise safety levels. Accordingly, it had attended the Diplomatic Conference convened to amend the CNS and considered the Vienna Declaration to be an important basis for raising safety levels and adopting more stringent guidelines.

159. Chile considered that the safe transport of nuclear material must be kept on the Agency's agenda. It ascribed the utmost importance to the dialogue between coastal and shipping States and had chaired a table-top exercise, commendably supported by the Agency, on 17 June, simulating an incident on a vessel carrying radioactive material, in which experts from coastal and shipping States had participated actively, in order to test communications between the governments of coastal and shipping States in the event of an emergency. Trust had been built among the authorities involved. Accordingly, Chile welcomed the entry into force of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation

for Nuclear Damage, which would contribute to the formation of a genuinely international network to protect States from the likely consequences of a nuclear accident, and looked forward to the Agency's action plan on the subject.

160. The Agency had cooperated with Chile in the area of health by enhancing the sustainability of diagnostic capacity in nuclear medicine through the production and autonomous national supply of radioisotopes and radiopharmaceuticals for medical use, primarily cancer diagnosis and treatment, thus contributing significantly to the attainment of public health goals, with emphasis on preventive health controls. Equally important had been the development of new products for early diagnosis and early definition of therapies involving, in particular, the use of radio-labelled antibodies.

161. Chile, which had supported the Agency's endeavours to ascertain that nuclear material and technology had not been diverted to non-peaceful purposes in Iran, welcomed the JCPOA and the progress towards its implementation. Chile awaited with interest the Director General's report on outstanding road-map issues and urged Iran to continue to cooperate with the Agency and the international community and to comply with its obligations in order to dispel all remaining doubts so that it might exercise its alienable right to the benefits of nuclear energy for peaceful uses.

162. Chile shared the international community's concern at the third nuclear test carried out by the DPRK and appealed to the DPRK to return to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State, to dismantle its non-peaceful nuclear programme completely and to allow the Agency to perform its verification tasks.

163. Ms NOLAN (Ireland) said that her country was fully committed to working with its partners in the international community in order to make progress on each of the three NPT pillars. The current situation, marked by significant progress on non-proliferation and on nuclear technologies for peaceful uses and disappointingly limited progress on disarmament, must not continue. Ireland enjoined States that had not yet done so to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States.

164. Since joining the United Nations, Ireland had been committed to playing a positive and constructive role in the maintenance of international peace and security. Support for the NPT, as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime, had been central to Ireland's foreign policy. Ireland deeply regretted the failure of the 2015 NPT Review Conference and considered that the current session of the General Conference provided an important opportunity for all to reflect, take stock and consider the best way forward.

165. The year 2015 had marked the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War and the terrible devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Ireland commended the Governments of Norway, Mexico and Austria for their leadership in hosting major international conferences on the catastrophic humanitarian impact of a nuclear detonation.

166. Ireland welcomed the historic agreement by the E3/EU + 3 and Iran and paid tribute to all those who had contributed to that outcome. The JCPOA was entirely consistent with NPT principles and underlined what could be achieved within the framework of that Treaty. Ireland expected all parties to implement the JCPOA in full, for diplomacy and dialogue were the only acceptable means of resolving differences between States. Ireland commended, in particular, the JCPOA verification and monitoring tasks performed by the Agency and its staff and would make an extrabudgetary contribution to assist the Agency in fulfilling its JCPOA responsibilities.

167. Ireland deplored the failure of the NPT Review Conference to make any meaningful progress towards the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, considering that international peace and security would be much strengthened by progress towards the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, as would the NPT, which had been extended indefinitely in 1995 as part of a package deal of agreements that included the

Middle East Resolution. It was therefore important that all sides remain open to dialogue and engagement and that every effort be made to avoid steps that would make matters more difficult.

168. Ireland supported the Agency's ongoing efforts to enhance nuclear safety, such as the Fifth Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Joint Convention, at which States had asserted their support for the objective of achieving and maintaining a high level of safety worldwide. It commended the Agency for supporting dialogue between coastal and shipping states on greater communication on the maritime transport of radioactive materials, which was of particular interest to Ireland, an island State. It had participated in the June 2015 table-top exercise and welcomed the dissemination of the lessons learned.

169. Ireland looked forward to receiving the final report of an IRRS mission that had just been conducted, at the requested of its Government, on its regulatory framework for nuclear and radiation safety in the light of international standards; the review report would be used for the further development of the action plan drawn up by the regulator as a result of its pre-mission self-analysis.

170. Ireland, which had played a key role in the intergovernmental negotiations that had led to the agreed outcome document on the 17 SDGs, recognized the Agency's vital contribution to the new goals and its work in the area of atoms for peace and development.

171. Noting that cancer killed more people every year than HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria combined, it highlighted the Agency's work in radiation medicine and agreed with the Director General that cancer was increasingly treatable in developed countries, while many developing countries lacked the equipment and human resources to respond effectively to the growing cancer epidemic. Accordingly, in 2013 Ireland had made a voluntary contribution to the PUI, in support of PACT, of €125 000, which had been for imPACT in Madagascar, Mauritania, Mozambique and Rwanda.

172. Ireland, which attached great importance to the promotion of gender equality at the Agency, stressed that gender equality was not a women's but an organizational issue. Diversity was good for decision-making, but progress to date had been too slow and gender parity would not be reached at the Agency until 2037, at the current rate of change. There was, therefore, no room for complacency.

Mr OTHMAN (Malaysia) took the Chair

173. Mr WLODARSKI (Poland), recognizing the importance of peaceful nuclear cooperation, nuclear safety and security, reaffirmed his country's full support for the Agency in accomplishing its mission. Poland had signed all significant conventions and treaties on broad aspects of nuclear safety and security, radiation protection, non-proliferation and radiation monitoring and was developing various peaceful applications of ionizing radiation in medicine, industry and research under proper supervision in order to optimize radiation protection and security. It actively pursued effective physical protection of radioactive sources and looked to the Agency for guidance.

174. The ten-year extension of the operating licence of the MARIA research reactor would allow Poland to continue to supply molybdenum to the world medical radioisotope market and to participate in and expand knowledge of nuclear sciences. The shipment of spent HEU fuel from the MARIA research reactor to the Russian Federation had been completed in 2015 and the remaining spent HEU fuel, which had been stored in the reactor technological pool, would be shipped to the Russian Federation in 2016. The MARIA research reactor had been operating on LEU fuel only since September 2014.

175. The Polish Nuclear Power Programme had been adopted in early 2015. The Government had amended all relevant legal acts and had established a comprehensive legal framework for the siting, construction and operation of the first Polish NPP. Poland intended to build two NPPs with four to five

units and a combined output of 6000 MW(e) by the mid-2030s. The first unit was scheduled to go on line in the mid-2020s, and the integrated tender for the technology supplied for the nuclear power programme would be launched at the end of 2015. Poland would adopt a national radioactive waste management plan in 2015 and a human resources development plan to meet nuclear power requirements and a public campaign plan were being finalized. Recent opinion polls had shown that 58% of respondents supported nuclear power in Poland, while 70–80% of respondents had been in favour of the potential sites selected for the construction of the plants.

176. INIR and IRRS missions had been conducted in the past two years, and the recommendations and suggestions on the implementation of the Polish nuclear power programme were being addressed. A follow-up IRRS mission had been scheduled for 2017. To ensure that Poland met the highest physical protection system requirements in line with international guidelines and best practices, an IPPAS mission would be conducted in the first quarter of 2016 primarily to assess the solutions applied for the security of nuclear facilities.

177. A major challenge under the Polish nuclear power programme had consisted in strengthening the position of the Polish nuclear regulatory authority as a modern, professional and fully transparent regulatory body, capable of taking up new tasks relating to the planned construction of the first NPP. To meet that need, innovative training in the form of in-service training in other States' regulatory bodies had been provided for the Polish regulatory authority's experts in 2015 in the fields of nuclear licensing, inspection and emergency preparedness. Cooperation with the Regulatory Cooperation Forum, too, had afforded staff training opportunities.

178. Poland had always attached great importance to the Agency's TC and aimed to conduct, under the 2016–2017 cycle, three national programmes that were crucial to the achievement of national nuclear safety and nuclear energy priorities. Poland was active nationally and regionally in TC projects on human health and industrial applications of isotope and radiation technology.

179. Poland strongly supported the due account principle and was fully committed to paying its TCF share and its national participation costs on time and in full. It was concerned, however, at the significant increase in its total contribution to the Agency. If the trend continued, it would become increasingly difficult to cover its share of the contribution.

180. Poland considered that, despite the lack of a successful outcome to the 2015 NPT Review Conference, the matters covered by Main Committee II and Main Committee III had contributed constructively to the legacy of the 2015 review process and could be used to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system and the application of nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes. Furthermore, it believed that both the JCPOA and the road map would be thoroughly implemented and that full and effective use of verification measures and provision of the necessary resources would be instrumental in the positive fulfilment of the JCPOA.

181. Mr OUATTARA (Côte d'Ivoire) commended all statutory action taken by the Agency to achieve international peace and security and promote economic and social development. He stressed that the adoption of the resolution on the application of safeguards by consensus, without a vote at the end of the 58th session, had constituted a positive signal and must be perceived as major progress. The resolution had strengthened the Agency's primordial safeguards implementation tools for monitoring nuclear energy for peaceful uses and combating nuclear-weapon proliferation. Côte d'Ivoire had spared no efforts to discharge its international obligations and, being resolutely committed to complying with the NPT, had concluded a CSA and an AP, the latter being under ratification. Côte d'Ivoire called on all Member States to sign and ratify an AP if they had not yet done so, for CSAs and APs that were both in force enhanced the Agency's verification capacity. Côte d'Ivoire looked forward to the December 2016 conference on nuclear security as an opportunity to appraise

progress achieved and to draw up a road map for the future, in cooperation with other Member States. It called on the international community to remain ready to bolster the international non-proliferation regime that rested on the NPT.

182. Côte d'Ivoire was committed to the entry into force of the 2005 amendment to the CPPNM and had ratified both on 6 December 2011. It called on all States that had not yet done so to follow suit.

183. Côte d'Ivoire commended the Agency's TCP, which contributed to its Members' socioeconomic development in agriculture, health, natural resource management and other fields. Its Government wholly and actively supported TC projects implemented by the Agency on its soil and hoped that the TCP would be conducted efficiently and effectively in close coordination with other specialized bodies of the UN system and other partner institutions, to meet its people's requirements and interests. Owing to the Agency, Côte d'Ivoire had continued to build its human resource capacities in agriculture, the environment, scientific research, energy planning, livestock production, animal health, radiation pharmacy, radiation therapy and, above all, nuclear medicine. Côte d'Ivoire's radiation therapy centre at the Institute of Nuclear Medicine was an Agency-financed flagship project, very dear to the heart of the President of the Republic.

184. The Agency had continued to provide expert services and financing for the Institute of Nuclear Medicine, in particular assistance in rapid diagnosis of the Ebola virus at the outbreak of the epidemic and the provision and installation of a Mediso gamma camera. Owing to the Agency's assistance and support, the Pasteur Institute of Côte d'Ivoire had built the capacities of veterinary and other specialists for rapid diagnostics, while optimizing safety, and Côte d'Ivoire's experts had just attended a capacity-building seminar for national surveillance teams in Cameroon.

185. The Agency had commendably awarded fellowships for staff training, it had dispatched experts to the country in connection with the soil fertilization project and had provided practical assistance and equipment in order to boost food production and thus reduce poverty in Côte d'Ivoire.

186. Côte d'Ivoire considered that the Agency had thus demonstrated its will to contribute to the economic and social development of peoples and had displayed great flexibility in conducting its mission.

187. Mr CABAL SANCLEMENTE (Colombia) highlighted the importance of legal instruments and international institutions and reiterated Colombia's strong commitment to nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, as a principle of its foreign policy. Underlining the pressing need to universalize the disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regimes, Colombia called for the effective implementation of each of the three pillars, namely disarmament, non-proliferation and nuclear energy for peaceful uses, their joint purposes being to protect humanity from the scourge of nuclear war and to preserve international peace and security.

188. Noting that 45 years after the NPT had entered into force, its disarmament provisions were still pending and that the nuclear threat subsisted because nuclear weapons were widespread, Colombia stressed the need for significant progress towards full compliance with NPT obligations, in particular under Article VI, deplored the lack of agreement on an outcome document at the 2015 NPT Review Conference and highlighted the need for progress towards compliance with commitments made at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 conferences.

189. Colombia considered that general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control was not only an NPT commitment and a priority objective, but also a moral imperative, owing to the devastating global and cross-border effects of the use of nuclear weapons and the international community's inability to handle such an emergency. Accordingly, it had participated

in the Oslo, Nayarit and Vienna international conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons and had joined other CELAC States in signing the humanitarian pledge, a welcome initiative by Austria. Colombia called on all States, civil society and international organizations to commemorate International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September.

190. Colombia, a State Party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, under which a nuclear-weapon-free zone had been established in Latin America and the Caribbean, considered that such zones must be established in regions on the basis of agreements freely reached by States, as a contribution to international and regional peace and security. It therefore supported the call to convene a conference on the establishment of a zone free from nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems in the Middle East at the earliest possible date, as agreed at the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

191. Colombia stressed the importance of the Agency's three statutory pillars and supported its work in each pillar. It was especially interested in TC designed to strengthen radiological protection and, under an ongoing project, would establish regulatory infrastructure for X-ray equipment. It was a State Party to ARCAL which had just been extended for another five years.

192. In regard to nuclear safety, its Ministry of Mines and Energy had publicized the hotline for radiological emergencies through its website and direct communication with all users. Colombia commended FORO's work to maintain nuclear and radiological safety in all Latin American Member States and FORO's contribution in 2016 to radiological protection in medical applications through the guides drafted jointly with the Agency, through its activity on radiological safety culture and its determination of the specific staff skills, profile and training required.

193. Colombia, which had participated in the simulation and communications test on the maritime transport of radioactive waste, held on 17 June as part of the dialogue and consultations between coastal States and shipping States, called for the Agency to participate in and support the dialogue in future.

194. Colombia highlighted the importance of commitment and concerted action by all States and of international cooperation on nuclear security. Under its MOU with the United States Department of Energy, security mechanisms had been installed in all of its category 1, 2 and 3 facilities. The Government of Colombia had therefore formulated specific Agency-consistent regulations on the security of facilities and had begun to improve safety in the transport of radioactive material. Action had been taken to sign a MOU with the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission under which a training scheme for assessors and inspectors could be designed. Colombia had ratified the amendment to the CPPNM and looked forward to its entry into force.

195. Colombia supported the safeguards system and acknowledged the Agency's crucial verification tasks, as it alone had the authority to grant safeguards and give assurances as to the exclusively peaceful nature of nuclear programmes, thus contributing to non-proliferation, the maintenance of trust and therefore to international peace and security. Colombia's CSA and AP were in force, which could but strengthen the safeguards system.

196. Colombia noted that dialogue, good faith and consultation had prevailed in the negotiations between the E3/EU+3 and Iran that had led to the historic JCPOA, preserving Iran's right to nuclear power for peaceful uses, while ensuring that its nuclear programme was exclusively peaceful. The JCPOA was a significant step towards international peace and stability and had proven the worth and effectiveness of diplomacy as a means of settling disputes and ensuring peaceful coexistence among States. Colombia welcomed the road map for the clarification of past and present issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme and hoped that all issues would be solved within the established time frames.

197. Ms EDUARDS (Sweden) said that Sweden welcomed the JCPOA, which had been dubbed a victory for diplomacy. The Agency would play a key role in verifying compliance with the agreement, pursuant to the Board's decisions in August 2015 and under the road map agreed with Iran. Sweden fully supported the Agency in its important work and had decided to contribute SEK1 million towards the Agency's additional JCPOA verification costs.

198. Sweden attached great importance to gender equality in the Secretariat. The full and equal participation of men and women, including at the highest levels, remained essential and beneficial to the Agency, its employees and, consequently, its Member States. Sweden commended the Director General's efforts to encourage women to apply for senior Secretariat posts and to implement the gender policy in preparation for the Agency's 2016–2017 programme and budget, but was disappointed that, at the current pace, the Agency would not achieve gender equality until 2040. Sweden urged the Secretariat to strengthen its effort to achieve gender equality much earlier, noted the report submitted to the General Conference and supported the Secretariat's efforts to recruit women to posts in the Agency.

199. The strengthened Agency safeguards system was a fundamental part of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. CSAs and APs together constituted the foundation of a robust, effective and efficient safeguards system and should be considered to be the current verification standard pursuant to NPT Article III.

200. Sweden welcomed the entry into force of Djibouti's NPT safeguards agreement and AP, and Cambodia's AP and encouraged States that had not yet done so to bring into force their NPT safeguards agreements and AP without delay and to ensure that their SQPs were consistent with the current standard. Member States must provide the necessary support to enable the Agency to verify that State declarations were correct and complete. Sweden welcomed the Agency's efforts to apply the SLC to all States with a safeguards agreement in force, as part of the continuing evolution of safeguards implementation.

201. Stressing the importance of international cooperation and of common approaches to nuclear safety, Sweden reaffirmed its commitment to implementing the principles and objectives emphasized in the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety and looked forward to further discussions at future CNS Review Meetings.

202. The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority had decided that robust and permanent stationary means of emergency core cooling independent from existing emergency core cooling functions must be installed in all operating nuclear power reactors by 2020 in order to increase the robustness of the plants against extreme situations. Sweden welcomed and supported the Agency's efforts to improve radiation protection worldwide and commended the Agency and ILO for holding the International Conference on Occupational Radiation Protection in Vienna in December 2014. Sweden welcomed the ongoing work on safety guides to the implementation of the new International BSS.

203. Sweden fully supported the Agency's emergency preparedness and response activities. The Fukushima Daiichi accident had pointed to the need for close international collaboration in an emergency situation. Sweden welcomed the Board's March 2015 decision to establish new emergency preparedness and response safety requirements and would participate actively in the newly established Emergency Preparedness and Response Standards Committee.

204. Sweden was actively engaged in international cooperation on radioactive waste management, including several Agency's activities and work under the Joint Convention. An application by the Swedish nuclear power industry for permission to construct a deep geological repository for spent nuclear fuel was under review. Preliminary review findings would be published by the Radiation

Safety Authority in 2015. In Spring 2016, the authority would submit a statement to the Land and Environment Courts on the environmental impact assessment.

205. Sweden remained committed to cooperation with the Agency on traditional and emerging security matters. The pilot security exercise held in Sweden in May 2014, had provided a good opportunity to test and evaluate the new Agency guide to planning, conducting and evaluating transport security exercises.

206. Nuclear security remained high on the international community's agenda. The Agency had played a central role in continuously strengthening the nuclear security framework worldwide and in coordinating international nuclear energy activities. Peer review mechanisms, such as IPPAS missions, could further strengthen nuclear security and build confidence. There was scope for further use of that tool. The Agency had carried out an IPPAS mission in 2011 in Sweden, which would request a follow-up mission in 2016. Sweden encouraged others to invite missions regularly, follow up the findings and share results more generously.

207. Sweden had cooperated with States in Central and Eastern Europe in addressing nuclear legacy issues and currently cooperated with Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, the Russian Federation and Ukraine on safeguards implementation, radioactive waste management, seizure of orphan sources, combating trafficking in radioactive and nuclear material, and nuclear safety at NPPs. Those efforts and efforts by other States and the Agency together constituted a net contribution to nuclear safety, non-proliferation and security in the States with which the Agency cooperated.

208. Sweden had participated actively in the 2015 NPT Review Conference, not least in the negotiations on nuclear disarmament. While it regretted that consensus had not been reached on a final document, it had been gratified by strong support expressed for the Agency's mandated work on nuclear energy for peaceful uses, nuclear safety, nuclear security and Agency safeguards.

209. Mr OYUGI (Kenya) said that Kenya was committed to the Agency's goal of ensuring the safe, secure and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to its verification mandate to ensure that all nuclear material and facilities in the world were used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

210. Kenya strongly supported the Agency's promotional activities delivered through the TCP. The peaceful application of nuclear energy contributed to Member States' socioeconomic development and to the achievement of internationally agreed development goals. The TC programmes were the window through which developing countries, in particular, found a tangible beneficial entry into the Agency, and they imparted to developing countries a true sense of being a stakeholder in the Agency.

211. Kenya had long-standing ties with the Agency in areas such as human health, food, agriculture, livestock production, water resource management, industrial development, environmental management and nuclear energy development. Kenya looked forward to renewed cooperation with the Agency under the post-2015 development agenda and during the implementation of its national development blueprint, Vision 2030, designed to transform Kenya into a middle-income economy by 2030.

212. Kenya was an active Member of AFRA, which had made a positive socioeconomic impact on the country through regional TC projects by enhancing Kenya's human resource capacity in atomic energy for peaceful uses.

213. The Agency's participation in the ninth Stop Cervical, Breast and Prostate Cancer in Africa Conference (SCCA), held in July 2015 in Nairobi by the Forum of African First Ladies Against Breast and Cervical Cancer together with the Princess Nikky Breast Cancer Foundation, had been highly appreciated. It had been attended by more than 3000 African delegates and dignitaries and had raised

awareness of Africa's heavy cancer burden, exacerbated by the high cost of equipment, medicines and vaccines that many cancer sufferers in Africa could not afford. The Conference had adopted the Nairobi Declaration, calling for the development, strengthening and implementation of evidence-based health policies through integrated health systems, and had underlined the need for continued and innovative public-private partnerships to facilitate access to quality health services by promoting healthy lifestyles, the prevention, early detection and treatment of cervical, breast and prostate cancer in Africa, and the provision of care and palliative care.

214. Kenya welcomed the Agency's continued focus on human health to enhance Member States' capabilities to prevent, diagnose and treat diseases by applying nuclear techniques. It appreciated partnership with the Agency in the early detection, control and management of cancer, including the training of health care professionals. Owing to the Agency's support for the supply of equipment, Kenya had strengthened and expanded its radiotherapy and nuclear medicine capacity and facilities. The Agency's support in upgrading the Kenyatta National Hospital Cancer Centre and in establishing a cancer centre at Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital had been much appreciated. Kenya planned to establish Agency-assisted training programmes for medical physicists, radiation oncologists and oncology nurses in support of the national cancer control programme.

215. Recognizing the importance of energy security to sustainable development, Kenya applauded the Agency's role in promoting nuclear energy for peaceful uses, in establishing safety standards and security guidance, and in promoting international cooperation to strengthen global nuclear safety, nuclear security and safeguards. In its endeavour to achieve energy security, it had included nuclear power in its energy strategy and commended the Agency for its invaluable support, under the TCP in collaboration with various partners and through PUI, for human resource capacity building and expert missions in order to develop the country's nuclear power infrastructure.

216. The outcome of the recently conducted phase I INIR mission would contribute significantly to Kenya's progress in developing its nuclear power infrastructure and in preparations for phase II activities. Kenya noted that four good practices that could benefit other countries in the first phase of their nuclear power programmes had been identified during the INIR mission. Moreover, the findings of the March 2015 EPREV mission to Kenya would lead to improvements in existing arrangements for emergency preparedness and response in the light of the proposed nuclear power programmes.

217. The Agency had consistently supported Kenya's regulatory infrastructure for radiological sources through capacity building and the provision of equipment to the Radiation Protection Board. Kenya appreciated the Agency's commitment and looked forward to the IRRS mission scheduled for July 2016. Kenya wished to make its legal and regulatory framework strong and effective in support of the nuclear power programme and, with the Agency's support and technical advice, was drafting comprehensive nuclear legislation to establish a regulatory body with independent authority over nuclear and radiation safety, security and safeguards. With the Agency's assistance, too, the first phase of the central radioactive waste processing facility had been completed and handed over to the Radiation Protection Board, which would assist the country in the effective management of radioactive materials and sources.

218. Collaboration between the Government of Kenya and the Agency in establishing a radiotracer measurement laboratory, which had been equipped with radiotracer flow rig equipment, had been much appreciated. Kenya's SSDL had been recognized by the Agency's SSDL Network. Kenya looked forward to further collaboration with the Agency in capacity building and in equipping the proposed Radiotherapy Standards Laboratory. An NDT laboratory, established under Kenya's Bureau of Standards, through a national TC project, had been using a range of variant testing methodologies and had become a member of the African Federation for Non-Destructive Testing. Furthermore, an

NDT laboratory had been established at the University of Nairobi, leading to the integration of NDT methods into its Engineering curricula.

219. Mr BUDIMAN (Indonesia) welcomed the Agency's recognition of Indonesia's assistance to Nepal within the framework of South-South cooperation, stating that Indonesia stood ready to assist other developing countries, especially in the field of nuclear applications and technology.

220. Indonesia welcomed the JCPOA signed by the E3+3 and Iran, the adoption of UNSC resolution 2231 and the signing of the road map for the clarification of past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme — all positive developments attesting to the success of dialogue and diplomacy in the peaceful settlement of disputes.

221. Indonesia commended the unanimous adoption of the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety in February 2015 as a landmark event in international efforts to enhance nuclear safety, for it reaffirmed the international community's strong determination to prevent accidents in future and mitigate radiological consequences should any occur. Indonesia noted the completion of the implementation of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety and welcomed the publication of the Agency's final Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident report.

222. Considering that the elimination of nuclear weapons was the only means of ensuring humanity's survival, Indonesia welcomed the conclusions of the Oslo, Nayarit and Vienna Conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons. It regretted that the 2015 NPT Review Conference had failed to agree on a final document, which had further eroded the relevance, integrity and credibility of the NPT, and that no progress had been achieved despite efforts to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

223. Indonesia welcomed the establishment in Kazakhstan of the IAEA LEU Bank to provide nuclear fuel to Member States in an assured and predictable manner and it commended technological developments, such as small modular reactors and co-generation.

224. Progress and developments in health, food, agriculture, industries and the environment and the Agency's continuing effort to expand its capacity and services to Member States, including ReNuAL, had been most welcome.

225. Reaffirming that nuclear safety was primarily a State responsibility, Indonesia welcomed the Agency's continued assistance in strengthening national nuclear safety infrastructure. Nuclear safety was crucial to boosting national confidence and public belief in the safety of nuclear power, as Indonesia was about to embark on its nuclear power programme under its plans to make greater use of new and renewable energy resources, including small and medium size reactors, to support economic growth and competitiveness. In 2014, Indonesia had launched a new initiative to develop a 30 MW multipurpose power reactor with co-generation capacity in order to enhance Indonesia's nuclear power technology capacity and serve as a pilot for electricity generation from nuclear power or the introduction of nuclear power into Indonesia's energy mix. In addressing the sustainability of its nuclear energy development, Indonesia had conducted an Agency-supported NESAs, which had informed action taken to introduce a sustainable nuclear energy system and provide a cost-free expert.

226. Indonesia had officially opened the Indonesia Centre of Excellence on Nuclear Security and Emergency Preparedness (1-CoNSEP) as a centre of excellence in nuclear security and emergency preparedness and was strengthening its nuclear and radiological emergency preparedness infrastructure in order to support the South-East Asian States' EU-sponsored environmental radiation monitoring. It had ratified ICSANT in 2014. It was conducting the second nuclear security culture self-assessment, covering reactors, fuel and radioactive waste facilities, by applying the Agency's assessment methodology in full. In 2014, it had hosted the first regional nuclear security course, which

had been attended by 36 participants from 11 Member States from Asia and the Pacific. Indonesia hoped that, with the Agency's assistance, the programme would be sustainable.

227. Indonesia welcomed the various steps and initiatives taken to strengthen the Agency's TCP, including efforts to ensure that programme implementation resources were sufficient, assured, and predictable. Indonesia supported the action taken to complement the TCF through extrabudgetary and in-kind contributions and government cost sharing. It had long been a TCP beneficiary, especially in the areas of food and agriculture, health and industry and stood ready to provide TC to other developing countries, through the collaborating centre established in January 2015 during the Director General's visit. It continued to support PUI-mediated TC activities and would contribute in 2015 to the revitalization of the Seibersdorf Laboratories in order to support knowledge exchange and experience in nuclear application technology in agriculture among the Joint FAO/IAEA Division Member States and the dispatch of cost-free nuclear security and nuclear application experts.

228. It had successfully disseminated nuclear S&T applications in the fields of health, agriculture, industry and the environment. Its Ministry of Health had adopted the Agency's QUATRO for implementation in public hospitals in Indonesia and, after impACT in Indonesia, QUANUM and QUAADRIL guidelines were being implemented.

229. Indonesia welcomed the Agency's support in the field of agriculture, in particular plant mutation breeding, for which Indonesia had been granted an outstanding achievement award under the Joint FAO/IAEA programme. Indonesia would assist other developing countries through South-South cooperation and in conjunction with PUI, and was ready to receive participants under the programme as from 2015.

230. In promoting nuclear safety, security and safeguards in the region, Indonesia continued to support ASEANTOM and endorsed the need to establish a regional network of radiation monitoring in South-East Asia as part of the Agency's radiation monitoring network.

231. Noting that several amendments made after the IAEA Statute had entered into force on 29 July 1957 had not yet entered into force, Indonesia considered that the long-overdue ratification and acceptance of those amendments showed that the Agency must assess whether those amendments remained valid and whether other amendments were required. It also considered that every Member State should have the equal opportunity to take part in decision making at the Agency.

232. Mr OIDEKIVI (Estonia), recognizing the Agency's leading role in strengthening the nuclear security framework and the non-proliferation regime and in ensuring the safe and secure development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses, said that the Agency's safeguards system was essential to NPT implementation. The Agency's safeguards benefited all NPT Parties, built confidence and facilitated the fullest possible international cooperation on nuclear energy for peaceful uses.

233. Estonia welcomed the historical agreement reached as a result of negotiations between the E3/EU+3 and Iran on a comprehensive settlement regarding the Iranian nuclear programme. That agreement had proven that diplomatic efforts could help to provide a peaceful and constructive solution, even to extremely complicated international issues, Estonia called on Iran to implement the JCPOA in full and thus contribute to the gradual alleviation of tensions in the region. Estonia strongly supported the Agency's long-term mission to verify and monitor Iran's nuclear-related commitments and announced yet another voluntary contribution in support of JCPOA verification and monitoring.

234. Estonia attached great importance to the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety and was convinced that the Declaration would play an important role in further international efforts to strengthen nuclear safety. It welcomed the Director General's report on the Fukushima Daiichi accident and fully agreed that although nuclear safety remained a State responsibility, nuclear

accidents transcended national borders and effective international cooperation was therefore of vital importance.

235. Cooperation geared to finding an effective international solution to the long-term management and disposal of radioactive waste and spent fuel was important to Estonia, which had no nuclear installations but produced a small quantity of radioactive waste yearly. The establishment of a final disposal facility in Estonia was under consideration.

236. Estonia considered that the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety had already yielded tangible results, such as the strengthening of the role of regulatory bodies, quantitative and qualitative improvement of peer review missions and the revision of many international safety standards.

237. Recognizing the Agency's important role in strengthening the international nuclear security framework by promoting the implementation of the relevant legal instruments, enhancing international cooperation and assisting States in nuclear security capacity building, Estonia welcomed the Agency's Nuclear Security Plan for 2014–2017 and undertook to continue to contribute yearly to the NSF.

238. Estonia supported all action taken nationally and internationally to maximize nuclear safety and raise security standards and called on Member States to ensure the highest levels of safety and security of nuclear installations directly affecting their own and neighbouring States. Transparency was of the essence before construction and during the operation of nuclear facilities.

239. Estonia highly valued the Agency's TCP and its role in contributing to sustainable development and in building skills for the safe use of nuclear technology among Member States. The programme had been central to the development of Estonia's nuclear infrastructure, as priorities had been selected carefully. At Estonia's request, an IRRS mission would be conducted in 2016, and the mission's outcomes should significantly inform the strengthening of Estonia's regulatory infrastructure and its radiation and nuclear safety. Estonia was determined to cooperate with the Agency, to achieve the highest level of nuclear safety and to be a solid partner for the Agency and its Member States.

240. Mr RIZZO ALVARADO (Honduras) said that the Government of Honduras had keenly observed the Agency's participation in discussions on the SDGs and enjoined it to continue to contribute to States' development by facilitating access to nuclear S&T in matters relating to food production, agriculture, water management, environment and energy, cancer control and capacity and infrastructure building.

241. Highlighting the importance of nuclear technology and knowledge transfer in areas crucial to development, Honduras had, in 2015 alone, received under PACT and the regional programme designed to strengthen national radiological emergency response, a full emergency response kit which, together with the recently established dosimetry laboratory, had been key to improving its national capacities. It urged the Agency, Member States and partner organizations to continue to support PACT. Progress had been achieved in the installation of new brachytherapy facilities, in the drafting of a national radiological protection programme, in drawing up new regulations on the management of radioactive waste and on the transport of radioactive material — thus strengthening the hand of the national regulatory authority — and in compiling its draft CPF for 2016–2021.

242. Honduras stressed the importance of ARCAL, an instrument for cooperation under which resources had been pooled, knowledge, experience and technology had been exchanged and shared issues had been addressed through joint activities. It was gratified to have adopted the five-year extension of the agreement.

243. The Government of Honduras believed in the vital importance of continuously strengthening the safeguards system in order to tackle the risks of proliferation and make headway on disarmament in furtherance of the Agency's peaceful purposes. Ratification of the AP to its safeguards agreement was

nearly complete. Honduras reaffirmed its commitment to the safeguards and verification systems as the foundations of international peace and security.

244. Considering that nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and nuclear energy for peaceful uses together protected humanity from the devastation of nuclear war and preserved international peace and security, Honduras commended the Agency's verification role under the JCPOA as further proof of the value of dialogue in laying the foundations for a more peaceful and stable future in that region and in the world. Honduras supported, moreover, the road map proposed for the implementation of the inspections and transparency.

245. Mr HENNIS (Netherlands) said that non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament had been cornerstones of his country's foreign policy which had been firmly rooted in the NPT-based international non-proliferation regime. The Agency therefore played a crucial role as the global supervisor of the regime and as the central organization for the promotion of peaceful nuclear cooperation worldwide.

246. The Netherlands had been disappointed at the inability of the 2015 NPT Review Conference to adopt a final declaration. The discussions had nonetheless been productive and had informed the development of new ideas and initiatives.

247. Considering reliable safeguards to be essential to non-proliferation goals, the Netherlands encouraged the continuing development of the Agency's safeguards system in order to cope with its growing safeguards burden, while maintaining its ability to guarantee that States complied with their international obligations. Noting that NPT Article III, adopted in 1968, provided for verification standards to evolve over time with technological and political developments, the Netherlands recognized that a CSA together with an AP constituted the current verification standard for the non-proliferation regime. Full implementation of NPT Article III therefore required States to ratify both a CSA and an AP. The Netherlands commended the Agency's formulation of the SLC in a bid to maintain its capacity to verify the non-diversion of nuclear material, for the state-level approach betokened greater effectiveness and efficiency. Commitment to safeguards and their implementation was reflected in the support that the Netherlands displayed for the Member State's support programme and for endeavours to universalize the Model Additional Protocol.

248. The Netherlands, which had wholeheartedly supported the negotiations between the E3+3 and Iran, welcomed the JCPOA as proof of the virtues of international diplomacy and the rule of law. If successfully implemented, the JCPOA would resolve lingering Iranian safeguards issues, strengthen the applicable international legal framework, reaffirm the authority and continued relevance of NPT rights and obligations and denote willingness to settle peacefully any conflict on the issue.

249. The Netherlands called on Iran to comply with and implement the JCPOA and regarded the Agency as an indispensable actor in the verification and ultimate success of the JCPOA. It commended the Agency's JPA efforts and was confident in the Agency's ability to supervise the terms of the JCPOA. As the Agency required not only political but also financial support, the Netherlands would contribute a further €600 000 to ensure effective JCPOA verification.

250. The Netherlands remained convinced of the Agency's essential role in verifying the application of safeguards in the DPRK, urged it to allow the Agency's inspectors to return and voiced deep concern at its lack of response to the international community's demands.

251. The Netherlands welcomed the Director General's report on Syria and hoped that Syria would respond positively to the request to resolve all outstanding questions and bring an AP into force at the earliest possible date.

252. The Netherlands pointed to the need to raise nuclear-security awareness to ensure that all Member States were fully informed of the risks and challenges involved. The Netherlands called for the results of the final summit in the NSS process to be circulated to all of the Agency's Member States. Concerned that the amendment to the CPPNM had not yet entered into force, the Netherlands called on all States that had not done so to ratify the amendment at the earliest possible date. As the GICNT coordinator, the Netherlands invited all Agency Member States to join that community by signing the initiative's Statement of Principles.

253. Highlighting the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation issued by 35 States that had undertaken to embed the objectives of the Nuclear Security Fundamentals in national rules and regulations and to meet the intent of the recommendations in specific Nuclear Security Series documents, the Netherlands encouraged all IAEA Member States to subscribe to the Joint Statement and thus demonstrate the importance of strengthening nuclear security.

254. The recommendations and suggestions of the November 2014 IRRS mission would enable the Netherlands to strengthen its regulatory infrastructure further and optimize the discharge of its national and international nuclear safety and radiation protection responsibilities. The mission had backed the decision by the Government of the Netherlands to establish an independent Authority for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection. A follow-up mission had been scheduled for 2018.

255. The Netherlands highlighted the importance of the CNS and of the unanimously adopted Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety. The national reports to be submitted at the seventh CNS Review Meeting should explicitly consider the principles contained in the Vienna Declaration, which would make the review meetings even more effective and stimulating.

256. The Netherlands believed that sufficient resources must be provided to the IAEA and accordingly welcomed the Programme and Budget for 2016–2017. It strongly supported the Agency's TCP and would pledge its full TCF target share for 2016, thus enabling the Agency to contribute to sustainable national and international development, the MDGs and the post-2015 development agenda. It stressed, however, the importance of rigorous implementation of safety, security and safeguards measures under the TCP. While the Netherlands supported all efforts to raise TCP efficiency and effectiveness, it pointed out that the current target-setting mechanism had resulted in unsustainable increases in target shares for States such as the Netherlands and invited IAEA Member States to discuss possible remedies.

257. The Netherlands encouraged Member States that were in a position to do so to reimburse assistance that they had received to the Agency, which would increase the funds available for LDCs. It also encouraged Member States to desist from receiving assistance as soon as their national situation so permitted — such welcome decisions having been taken by individual Member States in the past.

258. The Netherlands announced that it was a candidate for a UNSC seat in 2017, which reflected its deep commitment to international peace, security and development — principles that were enshrined in the Agency's work. It would work to achieve those goals in the face of current and future challenges.

259. Mr CHIKONDO (Zimbabwe) said that Zimbabwe attached great importance to the Agency's mandate and work, in particular to the multifaceted assistance and support that it provided to Member States. Zimbabwe's CPF-mediated collaboration with the Agency had grown from strength to strength in such diverse areas as nuclear medicine and cancer treatment, animal disease control and tsetse-fly eradication, energy planning and capacity building, through which had citizens' livelihoods and general well-being had been improved.

260. During the 2014–2015 programming cycle, Zimbabwe’s Crop Breeding Institute had received support in order to develop drought and disease tolerant/resistant grain legume varieties. The Agency had collaborated with Zimbabwe on disease surveillance and control of transboundary animal diseases, such as foot and mouth disease, under national and regional projects. Owing to such support, the Central Veterinary Laboratory had acquired an atomic absorption spectrophotometer, technologists had been trained in testing residues in animal products and sensitive, specific nuclear-based diagnostic tests and research tools for transboundary animal diseases had been introduced — all with spectacular and very practical results and tangible benefits. Zimbabwe welcomed the Agency’s decision to fund, under the 2016–2017 programming cycle, a national project for the surveillance of disease of economic and zoonotic importance.

261. The Agency had contributed through technical advice, fellowships and the provision of equipment to cancer control in Zimbabwe, the establishment of the first training centre for oncology nurses, the upgrading of cancer diagnosis treatment infrastructure and the installation of advanced equipment.

262. Under the INSSP, Zimbabwe had received support for a one-week training course on the security of radioactive sources and strategies for detecting unregulated materials.

263. Zimbabwe looked forward to technical cooperation with the Agency on human health, the re-establishment of nuclear medicine, pest control, training facilities at Zimbabwean universities, the use of isotope hydrology in water management, energy planning and climate change.

264. The November 2014, IRRS mission had identified good practices, and its recommendations and suggestions would be addressed with the Agency’s assistance.

265. Zimbabwe was gratified that its Agency-capacitated Radiation Protection Authority had performed so well since its inception in 2009 that it had been identified by the Agency as a centre for the placement of fellowship holders from other African States.

266. Noting that only the NPT’s non-proliferation pillar had attracted the keen interest and active attention of the powerful States that possessed weapons of mass destruction, Zimbabwe considered that it had been vindicated by events since 1995, when it had firmly opposed the unconditional and indefinite extension of the NPT, because there was currently no pressure and no willingness to disarm.

267. Zimbabwe supported the agreement reached between Iran and the E3/EU3+3 because it believed in the positive role of cooperation and peaceful coexistence and in the inalienable right of all States to nuclear energy for peaceful uses. Zimbabwe had steadfastly supported Iran’s right to pursue its civil nuclear programme and had condemned the sanctions imposed on Iran. It agreed, as stated by Iran on the previous day, that diplomacy, dialogue and negotiations could yield more positive results than sanctions and military threats.

268. Mr NODJITOLOUM (Chad) reaffirmed Chad’s commitment to the promotion of radiation safety and nuclear security in accordance with international safety standards, as the instruments of choice for gradually applying safety standards at all levels, and called for the operator peer review mechanism to be strengthened. Chad totally supported the Agency’s objectives, in particular nuclear energy for peaceful uses only, safeguards, nuclear security and radiation safety standards, and had therefore endeavoured to promote the peaceful use of nuclear techniques and technologies and to strengthen the international legal framework. It was committed to working in solidarity and complete synergy with all Agency Member States in order to establish a peaceful and secure world free of all weapons of mass destruction and to strengthen the radiation safety and nuclear security regimes. It had accordingly cooperated with all of the Agency’s advisory missions.

269. Chad commended TC achievements in the field of human health, in particular cancer control, for its ministries of agriculture, environment and public health had been strengthened, capacities for sustainable groundwater resource management had been built and its radiation protection and nuclear security agency had been bolstered. Chad intended to use isotope techniques to study phenomena in the sandstone aquifer that it shared with Egypt, Libya and Sudan and the aquifers of other Saharan Member States, in particular the Lake Chad Basin aquifer.

270. Chad intended to participate actively through AFRA in nuclear S&T training, research and development, and had held national training workshops on the detection of sources of ionizing radiation moving across its borders, on the safe transport of radioactive substances and awareness raising among hospital and petroleum company directors in order to establish a genuine culture of radiation safety and nuclear security.

271. Chad's CPF, signed in 2010, had been implemented appropriately and had contributed to the implementation of several ongoing projects and to the formulation of relevant and beneficial TC projects.

272. Mr MCCOOK (Jamaica) welcomed Turkmenistan and the CARICOM States of Antigua and Barbuda, and Barbados to the Agency, noting that the growing number of Members from CARICOM attested to the importance of the Agency's support for the application of nuclear energy for safe and peaceful uses as a development tool for developing countries and, in particular, for small island developing States.

273. As the date of adoption of the new sustainable development agenda approached, Jamaica welcomed the recognition of the Agency's role and of the contribution of S&T to the attainment of States' development goals.

274. Jamaica was pleased to note the continuing priorities identified in the Programme and Budget for 2016–2017, for they were closely aligned with its own priorities, and it urged all Member States to continue to contribute to the TCF, if they could, so that its resources would suffice to meet the growing demand for assistance from an ever larger number of Members.

275. Jamaica noted the report contained in document GOV/INF/2015/13-GC(59)/INF/5 and was gratified that the Agency had retained implementation of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety as a priority and that significant advances had been made in the twelve key areas. It called nonetheless on the Agency and its Member States to focus on ensuring full implementation of the action plan.

276. Jamaica announced that it had passed the Nuclear Safety and Radiation Act in July 2015 as the legal framework for the regulation of activities, practices and facilities involving radiation and nuclear technology, designed to protect human health and the environment, while harnessing the benefits of nuclear technology.

277. Jamaica was heartened to learn that the material involved in the 16 reported incidents of illicit possession and attempted sale of nuclear material had been seized by the relevant authorities, but was concerned that the dangerous sources stolen in the two theft cases had not yet been recovered.

278. Jamaica maintained a strong interest in the Agency's TC programmes and welcomed the move to synergize national development priorities and Agency assistance within the UNDAF.

279. It commended the July 2015 emergency preparedness and response mission that had appraised its readiness to act in the event of an emergency triggered by its Safe Low Power Critical Experiment (SLOWPOKE) II research reactor. It had welcomed the team's report and had noted the recommendations and suggestions.

280. Owing to the additional project capacity to convert the fuel used in the reactor from HEU to LEU, more research could be done on food safety, food security, and water and air quality, and the region's additional research needs could be accommodated. In that regard, the critical role of ARCAL, which Jamaica viewed as crucial to TC in the region, could not be overemphasized. Noting that human health was a priority area of development, Jamaica welcomed the Agency's contribution through PACT and highlighted the ongoing programme to re-establish public nuclear medicine services in Jamaica.

281. As an NPT State Party, Jamaica had given priority to the Treaty's three pillars of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. It urged States to accede to legally binding international conventions, if they had not yet done so, and to enter into negotiations on the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Jamaica abided by the terms of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which had established a nuclear-weapon-free zone and had declared the region a zone of peace.

282. Jamaica's commitment to international peace and security had been reaffirmed in the declaration by CELAC Heads of State and Governments in January 2015 in Belén, Costa Rica, which had reiterated complete, transparent, irreversible and verifiable nuclear disarmament as a major CELAC goal and the total elimination and prohibition of nuclear weapons as the only effective guarantee against the use or threat of use of such weapons. Jamaica therefore supported the call for negotiations on a universal legally binding instrument proscribing nuclear weapons within a multilaterally agreed time frame and encouraged other regions to pursue that goal in their global commitment to international peace and security.

283. Jamaica renewed its commitment to the safe and effective uses of nuclear technology for the global good and, accordingly, pledged its full cooperation with and support for the Agency's work in collaboration with other Members and partners in fulfilment of its mandate.

284. Mr TIBALEKA (Uganda) recalled and commended the Agency's assistance to the African region following the outbreak of Ebola in West Africa in 2014, including support for a nuclear-derived diagnostic technique for rapid identification of the Ebola virus and the provision of high-quality training and cutting-edge equipment for the rapid and safe diagnosis of infectious and deadly zoonotic diseases.

285. Uganda appreciated the Agency's continued commitment to supporting successful TCP implementation. Uganda's priorities for the peaceful uses of atomic energy under the 2016–2017 TC cycle comprised cancer management, food safety, nuclear and radiation safety, development of nuclear power for electricity production and improvement of agriculture.

286. Uganda had significant oil and gas resources and had identified 80 targets that contained invaluable uranium resources. Agency-supported efforts were being made to strengthen the national uranium exploration and evaluation capacity.

287. Uganda had embarked on its Agency-assisted nuclear power programme in 2009. It had completed energy planning studies and preliminary NPP site surveys and was strengthening the nuclear regulatory infrastructure, stakeholder engagement and human resource development.

288. Atomic energy applications in the country had risen significantly and Uganda was strengthening its national nuclear safety, security and safeguards infrastructure. Uganda asserted its strong commitment to the development and promotion of atomic energy for peaceful uses and sustainable socioeconomic development.

289. Ms NGIRABLOSCHE (Palau) said that her Government faced many challenges and, as a new Agency Member State, lacked the necessary promotional and regulatory structure and infrastructure

for the safe and secure use of nuclear S&T for socioeconomic development. Palau would therefore continue to request the Agency's and other partners' support and assistance.

290. Palau appreciated the Agency's in-depth consultation on the potential contribution of nuclear S&T to the attainment of its national development objectives, taking into account the current state of nuclear applications and their usage in Palau.

291. The Government of Palau, in consultation with the Agency, had focused on its sectoral priorities, namely human health, food and agriculture, water resource management, sustainable energy development, environmental protection, legislative framework, radiation safety and nuclear safety and security and human capacity development for cooperative activities.

292. After becoming a Member of the Agency in March 2007, Palau had initiated TC with the Agency in 2012 through off-cycle national projects on radiation safety, fruit fly control and diagnostic radiology, and one RCA project on the marine environment.

293. Palau commended the best practices, lessons learned, cooperation and effective services provided by the Agency and, in seeking the Agency's support for sustainable development, would focus on biodiversity and environmental protection, waste management, affordable and reliable energy and water resource management.

294. Mr CONFIADO (Philippines) said that the Philippines lauded the Agency's active involvement in the post-2015 development agenda discussions, in which it had advocated the inclusion of S&T and of strong national STI institutions in the SDGs, noting that 13 of the 17 SDGs related directly to the Agency's areas of competence.

295. Its Electron Beam Irradiation Facility, established with the Agency's assistance and with support from the Governments of Japan and the USA, was fully operational and was being promoted industrially.

296. The Philippines had demonstrated the use of radioisotopes and stable isotopes to determine the best practice for fertilizer and water application in the production of rice and corn, inasmuch as related best practices had increased fertilizer utilization, improved crop water use efficiency and minimized losses. Similar studies were being replicated in the production of coffee and sugar cane.

297. The Philippines appreciated its selection as a pilot country for the project on supporting sustainability and networking of national nuclear institutions in Asia and the Pacific region, designed to develop young people's interest in nuclear S&T by adopting the best science education practices for secondary schools and using an Agency-devised compendium of resources and activities to raise high-school teachers' and pupils' awareness of nuclear concepts and applications and to encourage more pupils to opt for science, engineering and mathematics.

298. During his visit earlier in the year, the Director General had seen the country's latest advances in nuclear S&T by visiting the various facilities and had interacted with pupils, teachers and officials at the two pilot schools implementing the Agency's outreach programme. The Director General would be the guest of honour at the third Philippine Nuclear Congress, which would provide a platform for state-of-the-art information exchange on nuclear S&T applications for development and inclusive growth nationally, regionally and internationally.

299. The Philippines took pride in participating in IWAVE, a PUI-funded pioneering project in its final implementation stage. Most project outcomes had been achieved and the Philippines commended the Agency's partnership in building the country's capacity to assess and manage water resources, thus improving access to clean and safe drinking water.

300. The Philippines supported ReNuAL, to which it intended to contribute.

301. It gave high priority to the Agency's TCP, which it had endeavoured to strengthen. It had participated in fellowships, scientific visits, consultancies and expert missions and had hosted regional meetings, workshops and training courses. It joined other States in calling for adequate resources and timely contributions from Member States.

302. The Philippines supported the Agency's work in strengthening the global nuclear safety regime, enhancing the global nuclear safety framework and promoting nuclear safety worldwide. It welcomed the six new safety requirements that were to be established as Agency safety standards and supported the establishment of the new Emergency Preparedness and Response Standards Committee in which it would participate actively. The Philippines commended the Agency's Fukushima Daiichi accident report, in which experts from the Philippines had been involved. It attached great importance to nuclear safety for the promotion of nuclear energy, noting that the introduction of nuclear power had continued apace since the Fukushima Daiichi accident and that there were several newcomer States. Nuclear power remained under consideration in the Philippines as a long-term alternative source of energy and the people were being informed of its benefits.

303. It would join other Member States that were considering nuclear power in the forthcoming project cycle under the TC project on assessing the development of a nuclear power programme and urged the Secretariat to continue to assist Member States that were embarking or planning to embark on a nuclear power programme, thus maintaining or strengthening the global safety regime.

304. The Philippine Government was establishing, jointly with the Agency, an online environmental radiation monitoring system that would ultimately comprise 16 stations and cover the entire country in a drive to enhance the country's capability to cope with nuclear or radiological emergencies.

305. A new law establishing the Philippine Nuclear Regulatory Commission, as a separate nuclear entity, was being enacted and parliamentarians had exchanged views with the Agency's legal experts on the requisite legislative and legal framework for safety in the use of nuclear and radioactive materials.

306. The Philippines fully supported a global nuclear liability regime based on treaty relations among all States that might be affected by a nuclear accident and would take action to join the regime. The Philippines would promote the ratification of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage.

307. Owing to its NSGC involvement, the Philippines had contributed to the establishment of internationally agreed nuclear security guidance through the Nuclear Security Series. It had participated actively in INNSP implementation.

308. In 2014, the Philippines had signed the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation, undertaking to meet the intent of the essential elements of a nuclear security regime. The Philippines thanked the Agency, the EU and the Governments of the USA and Canada for their assistance in nuclear security capacity building and development. A nuclear security support centre was being established, with the Agency's assistance, in order to sustain nuclear security activities in the Philippines and a radiation portal monitor for the training of frontline and border control officers was being provided by the EU and the United States Department of Energy. The Philippines thanked the Canadian Government for its assistance in upgrading the physical protection system of the Philippine Research Reactor under a MOU.

309. Mandated by its Constitution to pursue a nuclear-weapon-free policy, the Philippines had promoted a nuclear-weapon-free world and the maintenance of international and regional peace and

stability. Moreover, under the ASEAN Charter, it was committed to maintaining and preserving South-East Asia as a nuclear-weapon-free zone free of all weapons of mass destruction.

310. The Philippines commended Iran and the E3/EU+3 for agreeing to the JCPOA, which reflected the collective desire to promote regional and international security, stability and peace.

311. The Philippines voiced grave concern at recent developments on the Korean Peninsula, including the ballistic missile launches. It urged the DPRK to abandon all of its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes, to return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards and to cooperate with the Agency in implementing comprehensive safeguards.

312. Mr MAHJOUR (Arab Atomic Energy Agency) said that the AAEA had sought to foster bilateral and collective cooperation among Arab States in various peaceful uses of nuclear energy in accordance with the applicable Arab strategy that had been adopted by Arab leaders as an ambitious Arab programme to promote that crucial field, which was a key driver of economic and social development and prosperity.

313. The AAEA had recorded significant achievements and had made excellent progress in implementing programmes under the strategy. One of its primary goals had been to build human capacity, with emphasis on skill building through training courses, workshops, seminars, symposia, conferences and other activities. In 2014, it had conducted more than 30 activities involving more than 500 participants, mostly skilled young people and recent graduates, who had acquired knowledge and expertise in agriculture, industry, medicine, water and environmental resource management and nuclear safety and security. It had held the twelfth Arab Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in collaboration with the Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority in Sharm el-Sheikh in May 2015. The conference, attended by some 200 scientists and researchers from eight Arab States, had covered basic nuclear science, radioactive isotope applications, accelerators, nuclear reactors, materials science, nuclear safety and security and the environment and had adopted recommendations on the achievement of economic development in the Arab States.

314. During the year, many joint activities had been implemented with the Agency which had supported AAEA activities by sending a significant number of experts and specialists to provide training, deliver lectures, present working papers and review the results of the most recent developments and applications in nuclear science.

315. The AAEA had conducted, in partnership with the Agency, training activities and expert meetings attended by more than 200 trainees and experts. At the invitation of the Agency, the AAEA had participated in Agency meetings on various topics, including those relating to the Arab Network of Nuclear Regulators, supported by the Agency as a contribution to building Arab human resource capacities for nuclear safety and security.

316. Records on the content of AAEA literature and publications had been compiled and submitted to INIS for circulation among scientists and specialists worldwide. Since 2009, 124 records on AAEA publications had been compiled. The AAEA Scientific Documentation Section had contributed an article to the 45th INIS Anniversary Newsletter issued to mark the occasion, and the AAEA had received a certificate of appreciation from the head of the Agency's Nuclear Information Section in recognition of its efforts in organizing the event.

317. The AAEA called on international and regional organizations and the Agency's Member States to assist the Arab States in education, training and human capacity building, thanked the Republic of Korea, China, the USA and the EU for the support provided to the AAEA and Arab States and called on other States and organizations to collaborate with the Arab States in general and the AAEA in particular. The AAEA was fully prepared to discuss all problems and forms of international

collaboration in order to expedite and expand the contribution of nuclear energy to peace, development, health and social and economic well-being.

318. Some Arab States had launched plans to develop national nuclear programmes, to build electricity-generating reactors and to desalinate sea water and hoped that the Agency would assist them in addressing the safety and security issues associated with nuclear energy and the safe and secure management of spent fuel.

319. The AAEA and Arab States hoped that an effective procedure would be identified for securing long-term nuclear fuel supplies for States that had recently introduced nuclear power programmes, without undermining global security.

320. As Israeli nuclear capabilities posed a real danger to the States in the Middle East, the AAEA firmly demanded that pressure be brought to bear on Israel to place all of its facilities under Agency safeguards and to accede to all nuclear non-proliferation treaties and protocols in order to achieve peace.

321. The Arab States were still eager to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The resolution adopted by the NPT Review Conference was still in force and the AAEA supported its aims and purposes. It called on States Parties to take all necessary steps to fulfil their aspiration to build confidence and achieve peace for the peoples of the region.

322. While the Arab States aspired to a world in which harmony, stability and development prevailed, with nuclear energy playing a pivotal role in achieving prosperity for its peoples, they reaffirmed the intrinsic right of all peoples to make use of nuclear science and its applications exclusively for peaceful purposes. Any exceptions or double standards constituted a violation of the global nuclear security regime and diverted the international community from the fundamental human goals of development and a better life for all of the world's peoples.

323. Mr LI (Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization) noted that 2016 would mark the 20th anniversary of the CTBT which, with 183 States Signatories and 164 ratifying States, was close to universality. Its verification regime had been further strengthened by the installation of more than 90% of IMS facilities. The integrated field exercise held in Jordan in November and December 2014 had further underlined the readiness of the verification regime. Those developments, however significant and welcome, should not be a cause for celebration but should inform further action.

324. Owing to many initiatives, backed by strong political will, nuclear weapon stockpiles had decreased, further development had halted and the spread of nuclear weapons had been reduced. Recent developments had shown that multilateral cooperation and coordination, together with sustained dedication and efforts, were critical to progress in non-proliferation and arms control, even when progress seemed elusive and agreement impossible. Individual and multilateral initiatives must be galvanized and expanded urgently to create conditions for the urgent entry into force of the CTBT.

325. The CTBTO and the Agency shared the vision and responsibilities of working to create a safer and more secure world, free from the threat of nuclear weapons, but were united by the very principles and methods that underpinned their work. Multilateralism, verification and cooperation had formed the bases for many of the Agency's accomplishments in the field of non-proliferation. The CTBTO similarly relied on the same concepts to discharge its mandate and serve its Member States. In the same way as challenges had been met with stronger multilateral endeavour on the IAEA side of the building, it would take renewed multilateral commitment and engagement in open exchange and meaningful dialogue for the CTBT to become international law.

326. The 70th anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the observance of the International Day against Nuclear Tests had reminded everyone that the threat of nuclear weapons and nuclear testing was as real as the existing restraint mechanisms. Political will and the technical tools existed for IAEA safeguards and for the CTBT and its monitoring system. By joining forces to bring the CTBT into force, the international community would add an essential and long-awaited pillar to the legal edifice that had been established in past decades to draw closer to the world that everyone wished to bequeath to future generations.

327. Mr DONA (Sovereign Order of Malta)* said that the Sovereign Order of Malta, the oldest humanitarian entity worldwide, with headquarters in Rome, had been recognized as a sovereign subject of international law, which had enabled it to help those in need, while remaining independent and neutral, irrespective of political allegiances, and had thus paved the way for humanitarian diplomacy. The Order maintained bilateral diplomatic and official relations at ambassadorial level with more than 105 States, most of which were Agency Member States, and the EU, and multilateral relations with the United Nations, at which it held permanent observer status pursuant to UNGA resolution 48/265 of 24 August 1994, which had been supported by all Members; it also held observer status at all other UN organizations.

328. The Sovereign Order of Malta had since 1998 supported the Agency's nuclear S&T activities, with emphasis on health. It had signed a practical arrangement under PACT in order to support progress in comprehensive, multidisciplinary cancer capacity building in low- and middle-income countries, starting in Albania. The Mission of the Order had committed funds to support breast cancer control activities in an integrated, comprehensive manner through international cooperation that would enhance relations between the Sovereign Order of Malta and the Agency.

329. The Order's activities in countries threatened by civil war and in developing countries had been noteworthy. Malteser International, the Order's worldwide relief agency for humanitarian aid, with more than 100 projects annually on all continents, including assistance programmes for migrants and refugees, deserved special mention. Furthermore, the Order worked with the Italian coastguard to provide a rescue-at-sea service for migrants heading for the southern coast of Italy.

330. Major worldwide changes in recent decades had shown that, with humanity at arduous crossroads, the need for commitment to supporting non-proliferation and to encouraging the use of peaceful and safe nuclear technology for development, respect for the environment and care for the most disadvantaged people was ever more present and pressing.

331. That approach, always taken by the Agency in playing its important and significant technical role of maintaining peace and security and in promoting the development of peoples, could be secured by serious multilateralism based on a collective sense of security, which could build a genuine climate of peace and trust for everyone, in the tradition of the Sovereign Order of Malta which cared, in particular, for the sick, the poor, the needy and the most marginalized members of society.

The meeting rose at 9.26 p.m.