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Chair: Mr BENHOUCINE (Algeria)

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¹ GC(59)/25.

Abbreviations used in this record:

CRP	coordinated research project
EU	European Union
HEU	high-enriched uranium
ITDB	Incident and Trafficking Database
LEU	low-enriched uranium
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (earlier CSCE)
UN	United Nations

15. Nuclear security

(GC(59)/12; GC(59)/COM.5/L.4 and Add.1)

1. The CHAIR said that, as requested by the General Conference, the Secretariat currently produced an annual report on activities undertaken by the Agency in the area of nuclear security, highlighting significant accomplishments of the preceding year and indicating goals and priorities for the coming year.
2. The representative of the NETHERLANDS, introducing the draft resolution on nuclear security contained in document GC(59)/COM.5/L.4, said that it was traditionally prepared by EU Member States. The team comprised representatives from Finland, France, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom.
3. The team had begun work in June 2015 and had held three open-ended consultations and more than 40 bilateral consultations. Efforts had been made throughout the process to maintain a spirit of consensus by pursuing a conservative approach, while updating and adding elements of importance to Member States. The team had tried to accommodate transparently all comments received; four drafts had been circulated to Member States, each designed to enhance common understanding of issues and to move closer to consensus.
4. The team had identified further issues of importance to many Member States. Some delegations had expressed greater ambitions, for example, in the field of disarmament; in particular, Switzerland had proposed additions to the preamble of the draft resolution. From its consultations, the team had understood that the amendment, as worded, would be difficult for some Member States to accept within the Agency framework. Further work was required in order to strike a balance acceptable to all.
5. Two additional Member States — Montenegro and the Philippines — had joined the list of sponsors of the draft resolution, raising the total to 51.
6. The CHAIR proposed that that the draft resolution be considered paragraph by paragraph.
7. It was so agreed.
8. The representative of SWITZERLAND proposed to add paragraph (b) bis, reading as follows: “Recognizing that, to promote effective nuclear security in a comprehensive manner, and to strengthen international peace and security, progress is urgently needed in the area of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation as underlined, inter alia, by UN General Assembly resolution 69/39 on measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction”; and paragraph (b) ter, reading as follows: “Recognizing the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, including by terrorists, as well as the threat posed by any act of nuclear terrorism.”
9. The rationale for the proposed paragraph (b) bis was that nuclear security, a matter of major concern, should not be addressed in isolation or be limited to physical protection but should be viewed as an integral component of international peace and security, thus expanding the concept of nuclear security and taking a practical approach by linking it clearly to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Progress in nuclear disarmament and proliferation would lead to greater nuclear security. That approach applied not only to weapons but also to military fissile material, the theft of which constituted a worst-case scenario.

10. Links between nuclear security, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation had been recognized within the Agency at the 2013 International Conference on Nuclear Security, as set out in paragraph 5 of the Ministerial Declaration adopted at that Conference. They had also been recognized and accepted by nearly all States Members of the Committee in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. As the following International Conference on Nuclear Security was scheduled for 2016, it was appropriate to refer to those links in the draft resolution.

11. With regard to proposed paragraph (b) ter, the purpose of nuclear security was to prevent terrorist groups, in the worst-case scenario, from acquiring and detonating nuclear weapons, which would have catastrophic consequences. That point had already been recognized and accepted by nearly all States present.

12. The representative of EGYPT welcomed the proposals made by the representative of Switzerland, stating that proposed paragraph (b) bis could be more ambitious. The need for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation stemmed not only from General Assembly resolution 69/39 but also from a much broader set of international obligations that should be mentioned in the draft resolution in order to enhance its credibility. He therefore proposed that “and consistent with existing international obligations and aspirations in that regard” be added at the end of proposed paragraph (b) bis.

13. The representative of BRAZIL supported the comments by the representatives of Switzerland and Egypt, stating that, without prejudice to the Agency’s mandate, in particular its technical work, nuclear security should be placed in the broader context of international peace and security. The amendment proposed by the representative of Switzerland was consistent with the 2013 Ministerial Declaration, General Assembly resolutions and documents adopted at the Nuclear Security Summits, all of which underlined the connection between nuclear security, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation; furthermore, it improved on the related wording in paragraph (r) of the draft resolution. With regard to the amendment proposed by the representative of Egypt proposal, he had assumed that “inter alia” had been used in the amendment proposed by the representative of Switzerland to indicate that General Assembly resolution 69/39 was not the only document calling for greater progress in nuclear disarmament. His delegation was, however, willing to consider the additional wording proposed by Egypt.

14. The representative of SOUTH AFRICA said that his country had consistently urged the international community to remain vigilant about the nuclear security risks inherent in the continued existence of nuclear weapons, in addition to the risks posed by nuclear terrorism, the illicit nuclear network, criminal acts and malicious use of nuclear and radioactive material. He therefore supported the inclusion of proposed paragraph (b) bis and was willing to discuss the related amendment proposed by the representative of Egypt. He also supported proposed paragraph (b) ter, considering that, until nuclear weapons had been completely eliminated, nuclear security was but one means of avoiding catastrophic humanitarian consequences.

15. The representative of the RUSSIAN FEDERATION said that nuclear disarmament was not relevant to the agenda of the Committee or of the General Conference; nor was it one of the Agency’s statutory objectives or functions. The Statute reflected the Agency’s founders’ aspirations and vision of what the Agency’s mandate should be. Through the Chair, he requested the Secretariat to circulate, as a working document, the definition of nuclear security set out in Agency documents, which would be a useful contribution to the discussion of the issue.

16. The representative of CHILE said that his country was one of the sponsors of the draft resolution but recognized that it could have been worded more strongly. Chile shared the broad vision of nuclear security expressed by previous speakers and therefore supported the amendments proposed

by the representatives of Switzerland and Egypt. Efforts to tackle nuclear security risks must be coordinated with other initiatives and measures, including the promotion of nuclear disarmament.

17. The representative of THAILAND supported the amendments proposed by the representatives of Switzerland and Egypt, which would strengthen the draft resolution. As the Agency was not working in a vacuum, it would be useful to link its work to the broader aspirations of the international community and, as proposed paragraph (b) bis was only part of the preamble, there was no cause for concern about its implications.

18. The representative of PAKISTAN said that the substance of the amendments proposed by the representative of Switzerland, albeit in a new form, had already been debated thoroughly, without any consensus being reached thereon. It exceeded the Agency's Statute, because the Agency's objectives and functions did not include disarmament or non-proliferation. Moreover, paragraph 5 of the 2013 Ministerial Declaration, which was already reflected in paragraph (r) of the draft resolution, represented the delicate balance that had been struck, for, even after it had been adopted, concerns had been voiced by some countries, including Pakistan, which had issued a ministerial statement at the time noting the Chair's confirmation that nothing in the Declaration reinterpreted, added to or subtracted from the Agency's Statute. His delegation could not, therefore, support the Swiss proposals.

19. The representative of MEXICO supported the amendments proposed by the representative of Switzerland, particularly since they built on the wording used in previous versions of the resolution.

20. The representative of INDONESIA said that her country attached great importance to consideration of the potential humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. Turning to the comments made by the representative of Pakistan, she said that the amendments related to the preamble and were thus not intended to change the Agency's mandate but merely to recognize additional factors relevant to nuclear security. Indonesia supported the amendments proposed by Switzerland and Egypt.

21. The representative of INDIA, reserving detailed comments for the informal consultations, said that he could not support the amendments proposed by the representative of Switzerland, which had already been discussed at length. Proposed paragraph (b) bis introduced new concepts that exceeded the Agency's mandate. Moreover, General Assembly resolution 69/39 was already mentioned in paragraph (r) of the draft resolution, which had been hotly debated during the negotiations on the previous year's resolution. His delegation had agreed to paragraph (r) at the previous session in a spirit of consensus, but it could not accept wording that went any further.

22. Turning to proposed paragraph (b) ter, he noted that India had indeed participated actively in all three Conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, but considered that it was not appropriate to refer to humanitarian matters in an Agency resolution.

23. The representative of ALGERIA said, in support of paragraphs (b) bis and ter, that the relevance of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation to nuclear security was not a new idea and, as they were preambular paragraphs, they did not make any specific demands on the Agency since they merely stated facts. His delegation would express its views in greater detail in the informal consultations.

24. The representative of the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN supported the insertion of proposed paragraph (b) bis and the additional wording proposed by Egypt. The link between nuclear security and nuclear disarmament had already been generally noted, as reflected in the 2013 Ministerial Declaration.

25. The representative of CUBA said that it was appropriate to refer to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in the draft resolution, since a broader and more systemic approach should be taken to nuclear security. Furthermore, as long as nuclear weapons existed, there was a risk that they would be used by non-State actors. Cuba therefore supported the proposals made by Switzerland and Egypt.

26. The representative of FRANCE, noting that her country was one of the sponsors of the draft resolution, said that the amendment proposed by the representative of Switzerland linking nuclear security to nuclear disarmament had already been discussed at length. The sponsors had concluded that there was no consensus on the proposal and had therefore not included it in the draft. The concerns in question were, moreover, already covered by paragraph (r), which had been adopted by consensus at the previous session.

27. The representative of the UNITED KINGDOM, supporting the comments made by the representative of France on proposed paragraph (b) bis, said that her delegation could not support proposed paragraph (b) ter as currently worded.

28. The representative of INDIA said that the International Conferences on Nuclear Security and the Nuclear Security Summits mentioned by some speakers were processes occurring in a broader context than Agency processes. The reference in the 2013 Ministerial Declaration, for example, to the link between nuclear disarmament and nuclear security did not mean that such a reference was appropriate in an Agency resolution.

29. The representative of COLOMBIA said that her country supported the amendments proposed by the representative of Switzerland. Nuclear security, non-proliferation and disarmament were interconnected. The humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons were, moreover, important.

30. The representative of ARMENIA said that his country had some minor reservations about the wording in some preambular paragraphs and about similar language in the amendment proposed by the representative of Switzerland. He urged further consultations on the subject.

31. The representative of BRAZIL said that the Agency had taken an evolutionary approach to nuclear security and, for that reason, had established a Division of Nuclear Security. Great importance was attached to nuclear security although it was not a statutory function. As to whether disarmament formed part of the Agency's mandate, Article III.B.1 of the Statute provided that the Agency should "conduct its activities ... in conformity with the policies of the United Nations furthering the establishment of safeguarded worldwide disarmament". The drafters of the Statute had known that the Agency could not ignore developments and General Assembly resolutions on international peace and security and the promotion of nuclear disarmament.

32. With regard to the definition of nuclear security, it was important to consider which Board decisions had been noted and which had been adopted. The current definition of the term had been used for the purposes of nuclear security activities, but had never been endorsed by the Board and was used without prejudice to the current discussion on nuclear security in the broader context. The Agency's mandate was not at issue.

33. The representative of the RUSSIAN FEDERATION advised against attempting to interpret the Statute while discussing the draft resolution on nuclear security. The Statute, drawn up and agreed many years previously, had stood the test of time and had been applied in many situations. At no time had it been considered necessary to interpret the Statute. Speakers quoting the phrase "in conformity with policies of the United Nations furthering the establishment of safeguarded worldwide disarmament" should identify the "policies" to which Article III.B.1 referred. As no such policy had ever been formulated in any particular document, such language was counter-productive, speculative, and thus unacceptable.

34. To enhance general understanding of the term “nuclear security”, he again called on the Secretariat to assist by providing the definition of the term, as used in documents already agreed by the Member States, in particular, Agency documents, such as IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 20, that had been adopted by the Board.

35. The representative of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA said that the language in paragraph (r) was the result of a hard-fought compromise that addressed the issues to an appropriate extent. It seemed unlikely that further informal discussions would lead to a consensus. The issues were important but would be better addressed in other contexts.

36. The representative of EGYPT, stating that the meaning of Article III.B.1 in its entirety was very clear, reiterated his delegation’s support for the amendment proposed by the representative of Switzerland and requested that “and consistent with existing international obligations and aspirations in that regard” be added thereto. That constituted a clear reference to disarmament against the background of some worrying developments, for, although it was clearly the Agency’s role to ensure non-proliferation pursuant to the NPT, some had failed to acknowledge the role of the NPT in disarmament, which was the prime objective of the Treaty. The Agency had been mandated to conduct its activities in conformity with relevant agreements and, as it played a role in non-proliferation, its role in nuclear disarmament, too, must be taken seriously. The Agency played a proven and constructive role in nuclear disarmament, as exemplified by the voluntary offer agreements and the submission by States of material to the Agency to be secured after the dismantling of nuclear weapons.

37. If the Agency’s activities must be conducted in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations to promote peace and international cooperation, then nuclear disarmament was the highest objective in the area of international security, which the Agency could not disregard.

38. It was, moreover, also completely incorrect to say that nuclear disarmament exceeded the scope of the General Conference or the Committee of the Whole. Disarmament had been mentioned in Agency resolutions, which had contributed considerably to their credibility because that had shown that the Agency was aware of the wider context and had a broader vision and awareness of the objective pursued. It was therefore unacceptable to downplay the issue of disarmament in the context of nuclear security.

39. In the context of the NPT Review Conferences and processes, no nuclear-weapon State had said that it was completely opposed to disarmament. Rather, the concerns voiced had related to the disarmament time frame and conditions. The amendment proposed by the representative of Switzerland, as further amended by his delegation, had no bearing on those points and was couched in realistic, constructive language that accommodated all views. It did not refer to undertakings by nuclear-weapon States or to the objective of a world free of nuclear weapons, unlike many United Nations General Assembly resolutions and the consensus outcome documents of numerous other bodies.

40. The proposed amendment must be included in the light of the 2015 NPT Review Conference, which had failed owing, in part, to lack of progress on nuclear security because of obstructive positions taken on disarmament, despite the success achieved on nuclear safety and security and other issues in Main Committee III of the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

41. The amendment did not rest on a desire to advance work on nuclear security out of context. As it referred to “aspirations”, States not Parties to the NPT had no cause for concern about any implied obligations; they had spoken openly at the United Nations about the objective of a nuclear-weapon free world and they supported a nuclear weapons convention, subject to certain conditions, within their political groups. It would be detrimental to the Agency’s work to disregard such a strong backdrop.

42. The representative of AZERBAIJAN said that his delegation had some reservations about the preambular paragraphs and looked forward to the informal consultations.

43. The representative of the RUSSIAN FEDERATION, alarmed at the speculation about what had been adopted by consensus at the 2013 International Conference on Nuclear Security, proposed that “including statements and reservations expressed at its adoption” be added after “and its related Ministerial Declaration” in paragraph (c).

44. He also proposed that “taking note of valuable expert discussions reflected in the President’s Summary Report” be deleted because there had been many new developments in the Agency, other important discussions and other presidents’ reports since 2013.

45. The representative of PAKISTAN, responding to the amendment proposed by the representative of the Russian Federation, again referred to his country’s statement on the Chair’s confirmation that nothing would add to, subtract from or reinterpret the Agency’s Statute.

46. The representative of SWITZERLAND, supported by the representatives of BRAZIL, CHILE, COLOMBIA, SOUTH AFRICA, SINGAPORE, EGYPT and MEXICO, proposed that “which includes nuclear material used for military purposes” be added after “and other radioactive material” at the end of paragraph (d).

47. The amendment was part of a package that included the two amendments proposed earlier by his delegation. Nuclear security worldwide could be strengthened only if military material were taken into account. In view of the highly destructive potential of military material, accounting for nearly 85% of the world’s nuclear material, military material merited as much attention as civilian radioactive material and sources. The more nuclear material was safeguarded, the fewer the risks of diversion to terrorist groups. Emphasis to date had been on minimizing HEU in the civilian sphere.

48. The text of the amendment had been modelled on the agreed wording in the Ministerial Declaration adopted at the 2013 International Conference on Nuclear Security, which had also been adopted at the ministerial level in the framework of the Agency. That approach should be highlighted with a view to the second International Conference on Nuclear Security scheduled for 2016.

49. All representatives knew that multilateral instruments, treaties, final declarations and resolutions contained a preamble, reflecting developments, facts or current circumstances, and an operative part. The amendments proposed by his delegation did not refer to the Statute or the mandate and contained nothing that entailed modifying the Agency’s mandate. The proposed addition to paragraph (d), which dealt with State responsibility, was designed to encompass their responsibility for military material. The Agency’s mandate was therefore not at issue and there was no ground for debate on that point. He did, however, understand why the debate had taken such an undesirable turn.

50. The representative of PAKISTAN, noting that the wording in paragraph (d) was the outcome of a hard-fought compromise at the previous session, proposed that “all” in the phrase “to maintain effective nuclear security of all nuclear and other radioactive material” be replaced by “civilian” in order to be consistent with paragraph (g) and with the position that the wording proposed by the representative of Switzerland exceeded the Statute and scope of the Agency. No attempt should be made in the Committee’s discussions to reinterpret any part of the Statute.

51. The representative of BRAZIL said that the wording of the amendment proposed by the representative of Switzerland, taken from the Ministerial Declaration, was the outcome of a very hard-fought consensus. It was important to build on that consensus at the next International Conference.

52. Turning to the amendment proposed by the Russian Federation, he said that no Agency resolutions referred to statements and reservations. The text adopted by consensus was what mattered.

53. He opposed the proposal to delete the reference to technical expert discussions, stressing that they constituted the bulk and the main focus of the conference.

54. The representative of INDIA said that the amendment proposed by the delegation of Switzerland had already been thoroughly discussed two years previously, and no consensus could be found then; his delegation did not support the proposed amendment.

55. The International Conference on Nuclear Security had considered ideas that had been relevant to the Agency and others that had been relevant to national responsibilities and commitments. Military nuclear material was not a relevant issue in the Agency context.

56. The representative of CHILE said that, as military nuclear material accounted for 85% of the nuclear material in the world, all military material, and not only civilian material, must be considered when addressing nuclear security risks and threats.

57. His country had participated actively in the negotiation and drafting of the Ministerial Declaration adopted at the 2013 International Conference on Nuclear Security. As it had been difficult to achieve a consensus, that compromise should not be called into question.

58. The representative of COLOMBIA said that, as diversion of nuclear material for terrorist purposes must be prevented, the resolution must cover all such material.

59. The representative of SOUTH AFRICA considered that the proposal by the representative of Switzerland added value.

60. The representative of EGYPT said that the amendment proposed by the representative of Switzerland clarified matters because the draft resolution already referred to “all ... material”. His delegation did not support the proposal by the representative of Pakistan, which would narrow the scope of the draft resolution; nuclear security did not pertain to the civilian sphere only, and such an amendment would require the revision of many other elements. The prospect of nuclear-weapon States’ fissile material falling into the hands of terrorists must be addressed and a serious approach to nuclear security must also include the military sphere.

61. The representative of MEXICO said that the proposal by the representative of Switzerland was important because most nuclear material worldwide fell within the military sphere. The proposed amendment was therefore important and substantive.

62. The representative of the RUSSIAN FEDERATION, noting that the issues had been debated exhaustively in previous years, quoted Article II of the Statute, which provided that the Agency “shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose”. It was therefore clear that material under the Agency’s control should not be used for military purposes. That did not mean that military nuclear material did not exist. The matter was addressed in paragraph (d) of the draft resolution, which stated that “... responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with that State”. That answered all questions on the scope of the Agency’s mandate in relation to different types of nuclear material, which had already been considered carefully by the founders of the Agency. The limits of what was possible in paragraph (d) had already been reached at the previous session.

63. The CHAIR noted that there were clearly two divergent views on paragraph (d), which would require further discussion.

64. The representative of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA said that, while there were two opposing views, a third approach would consist in retaining the existing language of the resolution, which was the outcome of a compromise reached after extensive and exhaustive debate in previous years.

65. The representative of ARMENIA regretted that his concerns about paragraph (j) had been ignored. He had expressed his views twice during the informal consultations and had proposed that “such as terrorists and other criminal groups” be added after “non-State actors”. Unfortunately, that addition had not been included. He then requested that a reference to Security Council resolution 1267 (1999) be inserted.

66. The representative of PAKISTAN said that the proposal by the representative of Armenia would create ambiguity in the text that had been agreed at the previous session. He requested that the text from the previous year’s resolution be retained.

67. The representative of AZERBAIJAN, strongly supporting the wording already used in the Security Council resolution, agreed to “non-State actors”, but without any qualifiers, advising against setting a precedent for reconsidering wording that had already been used. He requested that the paragraph in the previous year’s resolution be retained.

68. The representative of ARMENIA requested that the text be amended as he had proposed. The wording was not new and had been used in various international documents, such the OSCE Ministerial Declaration. It was clear to everyone that non-State actors included terrorists and criminal groups; there should therefore be no objections.

69. The representative of AZERBAIJAN said that there were many groups and illegal regimes and thus, potentially, too many qualifiers. If any qualifiers were to be inserted, he would insist on others to include extremist regimes and occupation regimes. Alternatively, the paragraph could be left unchanged.

70. The representative of the RUSSIAN FEDERATION, referring to paragraph (l), wished to understand why so much attention was being devoted to computer security issues. Superfluous words should be deleted from the paragraph, in which it should simply be stated that the IAEA International Conference on Computer Security in a Nuclear World was held in June 2015. The introductory phrase was too general and more a figure of speech than a reflection of any agreed positions. While he did not object to conferences that were important to the Agency’s activities, more balanced language should be used to avoid exaggerations about the success of a conference. It was a major success that the conference had taken place, but no agreed decisions had been made. The basic principles were yet to be determined, and it was for States themselves to determine what instruments they needed inasmuch as computer security problems had not been eliminated.

71. The representative of EGYPT said that he valued paragraph (m), and would not recommend mentioning the failure to advance that cause in 2015. The paragraph should be placed earlier in the sequence because it commanded far more importance.

72. The representative of BRAZIL had no objection to the goal sought in paragraph (q) and, while he supported the idea of providing adequate resources to the Agency in order to perform its nuclear security activities, he considered that the wording differed from that used in resolutions adopted by the General Conference and was not quite balanced. The long-term effects of such a call gave cause for concern in view of the Agency’s zero real growth budgeting, as nuclear security activities could thus encroach on other activities in the Department of Safeguards and on all other Agency activities. He

suggested that “emphasizing” be toned down to “noting” and proposed that the paragraph be amended by adding “with due consideration to the need to have an adequate balance between the activities of the Agency in the promotional and non-promotional areas” after “support for Member States”. That point had been stressed frequently by the Group of 77 and China, and the Agency as a whole sought such a balance. Statements calling for greater resources for nuclear security should be balanced with the overall activities of the Agency. He had no objection to the paragraph, but it should be placed in its proper context, if retained at all, there being no similar paragraph in any other resolution.

73. The representative of the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN said that he had always objected to the inclusion of “Nuclear Security Summits” in paragraph (p), since the second half of the paragraph was in contradiction to the first. The first half of the paragraph emphasized the inclusiveness of initiatives, which was a principle of internationalism and international organizations, but the insertion of “Nuclear Security Summits” contradicted that principle. There had not been perfect agreement on that paragraph at the previous session, but a compromise had been reached. He called for that compromise to be preserved.

74. Turning to paragraph (q), he said that “emphasizing” had been used to highlight the inclusive approach to the initiatives, and he was prepared to discuss the matter with the representative of Brazil.

75. The representative of SOUTH AFRICA said that he had been considering introducing similar language to that in the amendment to paragraph (q) proposed by the representative of Brazil.

76. The representative of SWITZERLAND supported the amendment proposed by the representative of Brazil.

77. The representative of CUBA, while not objecting to the agreed wording in paragraph (p), stressed that the Nuclear Security Summits excluded the majority of States and that Summit results could not be regarded as an international consensus and should thus not be included in the draft resolution. It was not acceptable to imply that the Summits should supplant the Agency in those matters. The Summits were not transparent because they marginalized a large component of the international community, nor were they the appropriate mechanism for addressing terrorism, including weapons of mass destruction or similar weapons. Nuclear Security Summits did not necessarily further international efforts to that end.

78. The representative of the RUSSIAN FEDERATION said that paragraph (p) focused on the future and referred to international processes and initiatives that could play a role in nuclear security. Nuclear Security Summits belonged to the past, and so he questioned the appropriateness of mentioning them in that context. He did not object to the need to strike a balance between the various branches of the Agency’s activities, including those relating to the promotion of nuclear energy, but he wished to know whether such a balance should be maintained only in respect of the resources provided by Member States or also in the overall function of the Agency and whether it was required for nuclear security only or also for other areas. The amendment to paragraph (q) proposed by the representative of Brazil gave the impression that Member States were expected to continue to provide support to the Agency, but that they should concomitantly be measured in the provision of resources. He wondered whether that was an appeal to the Agency to moderate its appetite in the field of nuclear security.

79. The representative of AUSTRALIA said that paragraph (q) was important for the reason highlighted in view of the extrabudgetary nature of the nuclear security work. Care should be taken when making direct connections with other resolutions, for each resolution must be considered in the context of the relevant issues.

80. The representative of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA said that paragraph (q) was important and should focus specifically on the security element. No division in the Agency was as dependent on in-kind contributions as the Division of Nuclear Security.

81. The representative of the RUSSIAN FEDERATION requested that the text in paragraph (s) after “in this regard” be deleted because it was superfluous and covered concepts that fell within the national jurisdiction. States themselves determined how to conduct their work in nuclear security and safety, and practice varied significantly among States. Turning to paragraph (t), he noted some changes in comparison with resolution GC(58)/RES/11, paragraph (q) of which referred to the preparation by the Agency of guidance, much awaited by Member States. He appreciated the Agency’s current work in that area, but preferred to see the results of such work before “welcoming” it. He therefore considered it premature to replace “looking forward to” by “welcoming”, and he proposed that the previous year’s wording be retained. Furthermore, he considered it advisable to refer to a more comprehensive document, Nuclear Security Series No. 20, rather than the narrower INFCIRC/225/Rev.5.

82. The representative of INDIA said that paragraph (w) implied that nuclear security considerations should lead to a decision on technologies selected by Member States. In his view, however, technologies should be selected first, and nuclear security considerations should be applied afterwards. He suggested that paragraph (w) be reworded as follows: “Recognizing the importance for Member States to consider security aspects of nuclear technologies selected by them.”

83. The representative of EGYPT said that that paragraph stated the obvious for Member States that used nuclear technologies. Member States would not select technologies that were expected to create nuclear security problems. Wondering how a “holistic approach” would differ from a “comprehensive approach”, he proposed that the entire paragraph be deleted. He was, however, willing to work along the lines proposed by the representative of India.

84. The representative of the RUSSIAN FEDERATION said that the root of the problem in the wording was that nuclear security was considered to be embedded in nuclear technologies and that the import of the wording was that nuclear technologies should be selected on the basis of how secure they were. No absolute security existed, whether for a nuclear power plant or nuclear fuel. Nuclear security was primarily a matter of regulation and measures adopted at the State level for such facilities and material. Only the State pursued a responsible nuclear security policy that could guarantee the highest possible level of nuclear security for a particular facility. Nuclear security was acquired as a State built up its own relevant infrastructure, and was an inextricable part of the infrastructure. Emphasis should be placed not on technologies, but on the need for a Member State to establish the nuclear security infrastructure before formulating a nuclear power programme. Every nuclear facility must be protected and other applicable measures must be in place. It was a question of whether a State was capable of protecting its facilities and technologies, irrespective of their origin.

85. The representative of PAKISTAN, supporting previous comments on paragraph (w), wished to know what “holistic approach” meant in the context. He emphasized that it was the responsibility of Member States to ensure nuclear security once a particular nuclear technology had been selected: security considerations should not hamper the selection of technology, as the Group of 77 and China had stated elsewhere. He preferred the paragraph to be deleted, but was willing to discuss suggestions along the lines proposed by the representative of India.

86. The representative of INDONESIA echoed the suggestion to delete paragraph (w), but was willing to be flexible in that regard and to consider wording based on the proposal made by the representative of India.

87. The representative of INDIA said that he could agree to the deletion of the paragraph if consensus were to emerge to that effect.
88. The representative of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA said that he preferred to retain paragraph (w). Different technologies had different nuclear security requirements that must be taken into account during the selection process.
89. The representative of SOUTH AFRICA echoed the concerns expressed by some speakers: if paragraph (w) were to be retained, then some changes must be made.
90. The representative of INDIA considered that that paragraph (y) could be deleted, as it dealt with matters — physical protection and accountancy and control — that were covered elsewhere in the draft resolution.
91. The representative of the RUSSIAN FEDERATION said that the vital importance of physical protection to nuclear security and the Agency's role in that regard were and should remain central to the draft resolution. He therefore argued strongly in favour of retaining the first part of paragraph (y) and deleting the second half as from "and recognizing".
92. Turning to paragraph (z), he said that nuclear forensics was a much less important issue that fell largely outside the scope of the Agency's mandate and expertise, and that the paragraph might be deleted accordingly.
93. The representative of INDIA said that he could agree to retain the first part of paragraph (y), in view of the strong views expressed in that respect, but not the second part.
94. The representative of AUSTRALIA said that, while he respected the position of the representative of the Russian Federation, a delicate balance had been struck between paragraphs (y) and (z). If the reference to physical protection were to be retained in the former, the latter, too, should be maintained.
95. The representative of EGYPT, referring to paragraph (aa), expressed concern at any comparison of coordinated research projects (CRPs) with the Agency's education and training programmes, which were quite different, and requested that mention of CRPs be deleted.
96. The representative of INDIA, referring to paragraph (dd), suggested that the phrase "nuclear and other radioactive material outside of regulatory control" be amended to "nuclear and other radioactive material which has fallen outside regulatory control".
97. The representative of the RUSSIAN FEDERATION suggested that paragraph (dd) be deleted in its entirety. The international information exchange to which it referred had not been formally institutionalized by any decision of the international community. The Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) had been established in the 1990s as a means of promoting transparency, rather than as an official information exchange mechanism, and the data that it contained should be approached with caution as they had not been verified by the Agency or any other body. Member States were free to make their own enquiries of one another concerning the information held in the database, and they did so bilaterally and not under the Agency's mandate.
98. The representative of the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN suggested that, in paragraph 5, the words "or designate" be inserted between "to establish" and "and sustain", in line with the wording of fundamental principle D set out in IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13. He further suggested that the first operative verb in paragraph 7 be changed from "calls upon" to "encourages".

99. The representative of AUSTRALIA, responding to the second suggestion made by the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, cautioned against weakening the wording of the paragraph in comparison with previous years' resolutions.

100. The representative of the RUSSIAN FEDERATION drew attention to a potential inconsistency in paragraph 12, for, while Member States were encouraged to provide the Agency with potentially sensitive information in the context of verification and emergency preparedness and response activities, paragraph 12, as drafted, appeared to advise against so doing.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.