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President: Mr AZEEZ (Sri Lanka) **Later:** Mr BAILEY (Canada)

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Abbreviations used in this record:

AFRA	African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
ARCAL	Co-operation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean
CPF	Country Programme Framework
CPPNM	Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Early Notification Convention	Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident
EPREV	Emergency Preparedness Review
GDP	gross domestic product
GRULAC	Latin American and Caribbean Group
imPACT	integrated missions of PACT
INIR	Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review
INSServ	International Nuclear Security Advisory Service
INSSP	Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan
IPPAS	International Physical Protection Advisory Service
IRRS	Integrated Regulatory Review Service
Joint Convention	Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management
Joint Protocol	Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
OPANAL	Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
P5+1	the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany
РАСТ	Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy
Pelindaba Treaty	African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty

Abbreviations used in this record (continued):

PET	positron emission tomography
TCF	Technical Cooperation Fund
Tlatelolco Treaty	Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

7. General debate and Annual Report for 2013 (continued) (GC(58)/3 and Additional Information)

1. <u>Mr CARSWELL</u> (Mexico) said that his country highly appreciated the Agency's role in promoting international cooperation in nuclear applications, nuclear safety, disarmament and non-proliferation.

2. Under the leadership of President Peña Nieto, 11 structural reforms had been adopted transforming Mexico's development. They had included a reform of the energy sector seeking to affirm the State's ownership of natural resources, strengthen its role in regulating energy policy, and stimulate private sector participation and investment, which was being implemented in a timely fashion with a view to ensuring the solid and sustainable development of the energy sector as a whole.

3. Since Mexico had begun its nuclear activities almost 60 years previously, its nuclear sector had become recognized internationally. The National Institute for Nuclear Research, in particular, had contributed to the country's economic, social, scientific and technological development by promoting the responsible and peaceful use of nuclear energy, and its activities were largely a product of Mexico's extensive cooperation with the Agency. Noting that collaboration with the Agency provided an opportunity to strengthen the nuclear sector, he said that an office staffed by a representative of the Ministry of Energy had recently been opened at Mexico's permanent mission in Vienna.

4. Mexico, which attached particular importance to the Agency's technical cooperation programme, continued to operate all its facilities housing nuclear and radioactive materials, including the Laguna Verde nuclear power plant, in accordance with the highest safety standards.

5. Mexico attached importance to projects in such fields as nuclear power, radioactive waste management, nuclear applications concerning the health sector, agriculture, water resources management and protection of the environment.

6. Mexico, like other countries, was facing a shortage of human resources in the nuclear sector. It was grateful for the Agency's support, which it hoped would continue with a view to training more Mexicans in important areas such as radiation protection, licensing, and nuclear security.

7. His country participated actively in fellowship schemes, conferences, technical meetings and exchanges coordinated by the Agency. It sent and received an increasing number of experts and fellowship students, primarily from the Latin American and Caribbean region, and supported the Agency in hosting regional and international meetings and workshops in the field of nuclear safety, security and applications. Mexico therefore called on the Agency to continue strengthening the coordination and management activities of the Department of Technical Cooperation through the provision of additional financial resources without losing sight of efforts to improve its management.

8. Mexico highlighted the Agency's important work in promoting nuclear security and the action taken to prevent incidents involving nuclear and radioactive material. It recognized the importance of efforts to strengthen protocols concerning safety and transport, and the adoption of international best practices.

9. In April, Mexico had hosted a regional workshop to facilitate accession and implementation of the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM by countries of the Caribbean, during which eight countries and three international experts had shared their experience on implementation of the Amendment.

10. As part of the efforts to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials and nuclear terrorism, the National Laboratory for Nuclear Forensics Research had been inaugurated in July. A collaboration agreement had also been signed by the regulator, the National Institute for Nuclear Research, the Laguna Verde nuclear power plant and the police. Mexico welcomed the holding by the Agency of the International Conference on Advances in Nuclear Forensics: Countering the Evolving Threat of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control in July 2014.

11. Mexico highlighted the work of the Ibero–American Forum of Radiological and Nuclear Regulatory Agencies, which had been recognized by the previous session of the General Conference in resolution GC(57)/RES/9.

12. Mexico, a strong promoter of disarmament and non-proliferation, considered that the Tlatelolco Treaty, the first of its kind to ban nuclear weapons, served as an example to be followed by the international community. Mexico, which reaffirmed its commitment to the Agency and the NPT, continued to work constructively with Member States to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It attached high importance to cooperation concerning the application of safeguards and to efforts to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system.

13. Mexico recognized the important role that the Agency played with respect to nuclear disarmament. Given its scientific and technical experience and human capital, the Agency was an essential point of reference for the international community in preventing and responding to the catastrophic effects of nuclear weapons. Mexico, which had held the Second International Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons in February 2014, regarded the Agency's participation in the third such conference to be held in Vienna in December as essential.

14. His country also recognized the Agency's experience in the field of verification of nuclear disarmament and arms control. Its specific mandate made it uniquely placed to tackle future international political and technical challenges in that area.

15. <u>Mr ALKAABI</u> (United Arab Emirates) said that his country attached great importance to nuclear safety, and had undertaken a comprehensive safety assessment of the Barakah power reactors under construction following the Fukushima Daiichi accident. It had hosted a number of peer review missions, including IRRS and INIR missions, in order to strengthen its safety infrastructure. A number of other missions were scheduled to take place over the following two years including EPREV, OSART and IPPAS missions, and the UAE encouraged Member States to use such services to strengthen their national nuclear infrastructure.

16. His country commended the Agency's efforts in the area of nuclear safety. It looked forward to the IAEA Fukushima Report, which would provide a factual and balanced account of the causes, consequences of the accident and lessons learned.

17. The UAE attached high importance to international instruments in the area of nuclear safety and had submitted its second implementation report to the Sixth Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety in April 2014.

18. His country had hosted the International Conference on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources in October 2013. That Conference had marked the 10-year anniversary of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and highlighted the significant progress made by countries in implementing the provisions of the Code. The UAE had also endorsed the

Code of Conduct and its supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources and submitted its national implementation report.

19. The UAE recognized the importance of establishing a national liability framework and a harmonized international liability regime. In 2012, it had joined the Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the Joint Protocol. It had also recently ratified the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage.

20. His country highly appreciated the important work of the Department of Technical Cooperation in supporting national needs. The UAE had signed an integrated work plan with the Agency in 2013 to coordinate the technical support it received in such fields as nuclear energy, health and agriculture. It also continued to support the Agency's work through the sharing of experience and participation in various commissions, committees and technical meetings.

21. The UAE, which recognized the threat posed by nuclear terrorism and the existence of unsecured nuclear material and facilities, supported the Agency's activities in the area of nuclear security. It had participated in all the Nuclear Security Summits, most recently in The Hague.

22. States developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes must comply fully with their safeguards obligations, cooperate with the Agency, take steps to address all international concerns and obligations, and implement relevant Agency and Security Council resolutions. Countries, whose safeguards implementation was in question, should therefore cooperate fully with the Agency to address all outstanding concerns, including those relating to possible military dimensions, and to restore confidence in the exclusive nature of their programmes.

23. The UAE supported the Agency's efforts to ensure the credibility and efficiency of the safeguards system. It welcomed the increase in the number of additional protocols brought into force, noting that an additional protocol together with a comprehensive safeguards agreement enabled the Agency to provide credible assurances regarding the exclusively peaceful nature of nuclear activities. His country therefore encouraged those Member States that had not yet done so to bring an additional protocol into force.

24. Noting that his country had recently hosted a successful Agency mission to assess its State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material, he said that the support provided to Member States by the Agency in the area of safeguards and non-proliferation implementation was invaluable.

25. The failure to convene a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in 2012 was a source of disappointment to his country and others in the region. The UAE continued to engage in consultations with the facilitator, the conveners and other countries of the region, and called for the conference to be held at an early date.

26. In closing, he thanked the Secretariat for the comprehensive reports made available to Member States and reaffirmed his country's full support of the Agency.

27. <u>Ms MEDINA</u> (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) said that her country, which firmly supported the NPT, the CTBT and the Agency's Statute, remained committed to maintaining international peace and security. In that regard, she recalled that the Venezuelan Constitution prohibited the entry into the country, manufacture and use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and that Venezuela had been a founding member of OPANAL. Her country had signed the Early Notification Convention and had deposited its instrument of accession to the Agency, as the depositary, on 22 September. The national authorities were considering joining other legal instruments within the framework of the Agency.

28. Her country had made considerable progress over the preceding 15 years in improving the standard of living of its population, including by reducing poverty, eliminating illiteracy, developing the housing and communications infrastructure and promoting social inclusion.

29. Venezuela, which had benefited from Agency technical projects, some of them implemented within the framework of ARCAL, considered that funding for technical cooperation — one of the Agency's statutory activities — must be sufficient, assured and predictable. It therefore believed that technical cooperation should be funded from the Regular Budget and that the reliance on extrabudgetary or footnote-a/ projects should cease.

30. Venezuela continued to attach high priority to closer cooperation among the States of Latin America and the Caribbean, strengthened South-South relations and promoting solidarity among peoples, and considered ARCAL and the Agency as favourable settings for pursuing those goals. To that end, ARCAL should remain free of discrimination and a forum where the Agency's technical objectivity prevailed to ensure that the requirements, plans and problems of each ARCAL State were addressed.

31. Her country, which fully supported the Agency's activities under the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, considered that the Agency should continue to play a leading role in the establishment of international codes, standards and norms providing for the highest levels of nuclear safety. Noting that capacity building in nuclear safety should remain a priority for the Agency, she said that Venezuela welcomed the various workshops, courses and seminars in that regard that had been held in 2013, and encouraged the Agency to continue and expand those activities.

32. The accident at Fukushima Daiichi and its aftermath remained a concern for the international community. Venezuela welcomed the activities undertaken by the Agency and the Government of Japan with regard to remediation and to learning from the accident.

33. As regards nuclear security, which was a State responsibility, Venezuela considered that the Agency should focus on helping countries that required assistance. It noted the activities implemented in 2013 to strengthen the international legal structure. Venezuela, for its part, was focusing its efforts on developing a home-grown security culture, and she drew attention to the importance of Agency assistance in that regard.

34. With regard to human resources development, a number of workshops had been held in Venezuela over the preceding year aimed at identifying possible threats to radioactive or nuclear material in the country, and at raising awareness of the basic national and Agency guidelines on nuclear security and the possible consequences of a criminal act involving radioactive sources.

35. Regarding the legal and regulatory framework, national efforts to legislate and regulate issues concerning import and export licences for radioactive sources and equipment generating ionizing radiation, the use of ionizing radiation and the transport of radioactive and/or nuclear material were at an advanced stage.

36. In the area of prevention, the Agency had undertaken various missions in coordination with national authorities to improve storage conditions and physical protection systems for radiotherapy sources. A project involving Venezuelan State institutions in the construction of a centralized store for disused sealed radioactive sources was in progress, as were efforts to design an automated system that could initially be used to compile an inventory of radioactive sources in industry and research.

37. An Agency follow-up mission had been undertaken in September 2014 to review work on improving physical protection systems in health centres. As part of that work, a tender process had been opened with a view to improving the security system in some hospitals housing Category 1 sources. Furthermore, in order to strengthen the national infrastructure for the detection of

nuclear and radioactive materials at the Port of La Guaira, the Agency had been informed of the agreement reached by national institutions concerned regarding the installation of two ionizing radiation detectors. Certain operational aspects needed to be discussed before the project was implemented.

38. A clear distinction must be drawn between nuclear safety and security. Nuclear security-related activities were not mandated by the Statute and should therefore be financed through extrabudgetary contributions. Cooperation in that regard should be provided without any conditions attached and taking into account the national interests of each State and the requirements of the Agency.

39. The Agency was the only competent authority in the area of verification; its verification activities should be based exclusively on technical and objective considerations, and free from discriminatory elements that could be used against countries wishing to develop peaceful nuclear programmes. Venezuela continued to have some reservations regarding the conceptualization and development of safeguards implementation at the State-level.

40. Her Government vigorously defended the sovereign right of States to develop nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes and welcomed the Agency's work to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. It therefore welcomed the Framework for Cooperation between the Agency and Iran and trusted that the differences that had arisen with regard to its application would be overcome at an early date. Venezuela was pleased that the dialogue between the P5+1 and Iran was continuing and hoped that it would be concluded successfully by 24 November.

41. The security situation in Syria had prevented the Agency from routinely carrying out its safeguards implementation activities at the miniature neutron source reactor. She hoped that peace would be established in Syria shortly.

42. Venezuela had always supported initiatives aimed at the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, which would be an effective means of bringing peace and stability to the region. The recent tragic events in the area had demonstrated that the establishment of such a zone should not be further postponed.

43. Turning to nuclear disarmament, she said that a fundamental aspect of the NPT was the commitment of the nuclear-weapon States to general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Those countries in possession of nuclear weapons therefore bore the greatest responsibility for taking steps to reduce and eliminate their nuclear arsenals in accordance with the spirit and letter of the NPT. Venezuela called for the initiation of negotiations, based on the principle of good faith, on a nuclear disarmament treaty that included the principles of verification, transparency and irreversibility and would constitute an essential element for strengthening world peace.

44. In order to strengthen the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime, the Agency should play an active role in informing Member States about disarmament-related matters, and Member States should intensify their efforts in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation. Venezuela welcomed the celebration of the first International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September.

45. Venezuela, a peace-loving nation, defended the inalienable right of States to develop the technology and knowledge to enable them to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes to promote development and the well-being of their peoples. In that connection, she recalled the Havana Declaration, adopted at the 11th Summit of the Community of Latin American and

Caribbean States, reaffirming the inalienable right of all States, in conformity with the NPT, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.

46. <u>Mr ALBESBAS</u> (Libya) said that his country had entered a new era, and was making every effort to develop the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and sciences, recognizing the contribution they could make to economic and social development. To that end, it had devised a strategy and an ambitious programme that sought to develop technical and human capabilities to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in full transparency and in accordance with international standards.

47. His country attached considerable importance to the technical cooperation programme and welcomed the steps taken by the Agency to promote the quality of project design and results-based implementation. To that end, Libya had submitted eight projects under the regional technical cooperation programme for the 2016–2017 cycle, covering such areas as agriculture, introduction of nuclear power and improving national oversight infrastructure. Seven of those projects had been approved and it was hoped that Libya would receive the requested support and technical assistance to complete the project planning stage and that the final approval for all the projects would be secured.

48. His country commended the Agency on its efforts to strengthen international cooperation in nuclear safety and security, radiation safety, transport safety and safe radioactive source and waste management. Libya was committed to ensuring nuclear safety and security and sought always to apply international nuclear safety standards, including those of the Agency. It had informed the Agency of its support for the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources as amended and had designated a focal point for that purpose.

49. Noting that his country and region attached great importance to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones by promoting cross-border cooperation and achieving lasting peaceful and secure cohabitation, he expressed regret that international efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East continued to be thwarted by the refusal of a single State, namely Israel, to make any effort towards that end, despite countless UN General Assembly resolutions and the final document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, which had set 2012 as the year to convene a conference on establishing a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons. Israel remained the only country in the region not to have acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon State and not to have placed its nuclear facilities under comprehensive Agency safeguards, a refusal which represented a threat at both regional and global levels. Libya called for the convening of the conference as soon as possible, since failure to do so would be a violation of the commitments agreed to during the 2010 NPT Review Conference and would cast a shadow on multilateral efforts to reach consensus and find a lasting solution in the area of disarmament.

50. Libya, which viewed international cooperation and political will as prerequisites for securing disarmament and a more prosperous world, reiterated its keen interest in meeting all its international disarmament obligations relating to weapons of mass destruction.

51. Although his country highly appreciated the Agency's efforts to increase the number of Secretariat staff members from developing Member States, there had been no tangible improvement in the representation of some countries, including Libya.

52. <u>Mr FARAONE MACHADO</u> (Uruguay) said that his country had continued to participate actively in the Agency, serving as a member of the Board of Governors from 2012 to 2014. It was grateful to the Director General and to members of other delegations who had agreed to attend the side event hosted by GRULAC to mark the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.

53. Uruguay strongly supported efforts to strengthen the disarmament and non-proliferation regime and to strike a balance among the three pillars of the NPT with a view to achieving a world without nuclear weapons and ensuring regional and global security.

54. His country was a member of the first nuclear-weapon-free zone established under the Tlatelolco Treaty and welcomed action in support of the establishment of other such zones. Highlighting the importance of efforts to strengthen the safeguards regime, he said that dialogue and multilateral negotiation offered the best means of resolving international tension in that area.

55. Uruguay, which welcomed the Agency's efforts to implement the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, remained committed to identifying synergies between safety and security and promoting international cooperation in that regard.

56. His country complied with international agreements in the nuclear arena. With regard to waste management, his country had ratified the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. A national strategy for the safe management of radioactive waste had also been approved, as had a national radiological emergency plan. In 2005, legislation had been enacted strengthening the technical autonomy of the national regulatory authority in the area of radiation protection. Efforts were also being made to strengthen the control of new medical equipment, such as the cyclotron and three PET cameras that had been installed at the Uruguayan Centre of Medical Imaging.

57. His country recognized the importance of the Agency's efforts to transfer technology through the technical cooperation programme, notably through the provision of equipment and expertise and the training of human resources. The Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mining was an active participant in the technical cooperation programme, and the number of professional and technical staff associated with Agency projects had increased significantly.

58. Uruguay considered that trilateral cooperation agreements within the framework of regional projects would help to consolidate strategic alliances, and that the establishment of electronic platforms, the development of new CPFs and guides for the preparation of the 2014–2015 cycle, would help to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Agency's technical cooperation programme. Given the needs of countries in the region in terms of food security, water resources, health and the environment, and that funding was insufficient, Uruguay considered that the TCF should not be dependent on voluntary contributions.

59. His country underlined the importance it attached to ARCAL, which it considered an irreplaceable mechanism for promoting cooperation in the Latin American and Caribbean region. Uruguay had implemented a number of projects within the framework of that Agreement, including in the fields of nuclear medicine, cancer treatment and agriculture.

60. Uruguay viewed PACT as an important tool to address the priorities identified by countries of the region concerning the diagnosis and treatment of cancer and in the field of nuclear medicine.

61. His country had taken an active role in the regional technical cooperation programme in Latin America and had benefited from a number of projects concerning the safety of medical exposure.

62. In recent years, Uruguay's economy had grown at an average annual rate of 6%, and his country now had the lowest poverty index in Latin America. In 2008, a 20-year energy policy had been agreed to by all the political parties represented in the national Parliament. As a result, annual investment in Uruguay's energy infrastructure during the period 2011–2015 would exceed 3% of GDP — five times the average for Latin America. Uruguay, which had no proven reserves of oil, natural gas or coal, had already constructed as many hydroelectric plants as the country's main rivers could power. However,

thanks to the energy transition now under way, renewable energy was being introduced and energy independence was being increased without any subsidies. His country aimed to ensure that, by 2015, 50% of its primary energy and 90% of its electricity would come from renewable sources such as hydropower, wind and solar power, biomass and biofuels, with a 30% reduction in generation costs. The Agency had assisted in that regard through a project on long-term energy planning.

63. <u>Mr TAGHI-ZADE</u> (Azerbaijan) said that his country acknowledged the Agency's leading role and authority and highly appreciated its work in preventing nuclear terrorism, ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and strengthening the nuclear safety regime.

64. Through its cooperation with the Agency and the international community, his country was taking the necessary steps to ensure that nuclear energy was used for exclusively peaceful purposes, to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive material and to combat nuclear terrorism.

65. Azerbaijan would continue to faithfully meet its obligations under the NPT and its safeguards agreement. His country recognized the importance of efforts to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system and had put in place the conditions to ensure that safeguards inspections could proceed in full and in a transparent manner. All the recommendations and suggestions of the safeguards inspectors were taken into account.

66. His country was convinced that action to prevent nuclear terrorism and ensure the security of radioactive sources and nuclear materials could be taken only with the cooperation of all countries and in accordance with international standards. Guided by that principle, and in accordance with the principles set out in the Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué, Azerbaijan had expressed its political support for the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and was taking steps to establish a normative and legal basis in accordance with the Code.

67. Efforts to improve nuclear security in the country were continuing. The integrated plan of action to ensure the physical protection of nuclear materials developed with assistance from specialists from the Department of Nuclear Safety and Security identified the strategy for cooperation between Azerbaijan and the Agency in that field, and served as the basis for national efforts in the context of bilateral and multilateral treaties with other international organizations and donors. Under the United States Global Threat Reduction Initiative, a series of measures were being undertaken to ensure the physical protection of sources of ionizing radiation, find radioactive sources and re-establish control over them and strengthen control over movement of nuclear and radioactive materials across the border. Facilities where radioactive and nuclear materials were kept had been equipped with modern high-tech physical protection systems, and border checkpoints had been equipped with effective means of detecting and identifying nuclear and radioactive materials.

68. Despite all the measures taken, the unresolved Nagorno–Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan and Armenia's continuing occupation of 20% of Azerbaijan's territory represented a serious threat to nuclear safety in the region. As Azerbaijan was unable to control that part of its territory and its international borders, that area could become an arena for organized crime and illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive material. Furthermore, Armenia's decision to extend the operation of its Metsamor nuclear power plant until 2027 was a cause of concern. Azerbaijan had repeatedly highlighted the threat that the technically outdated reactor posed to the region and to Armenia's neighbours in particular.

69. Technical cooperation activities, which reflected national priorities, facilitated the development of peaceful nuclear technology. Current national projects related to strengthening the regulatory infrastructure, emergency preparedness, nuclear medicine, radiation metrology, and development of waste management technologies.

70. The State Agency for the Regulation of Nuclear and Radiation Activities under the Ministry of Emergency Situations was continuing its work to improve national legislative instruments in order to ensure full compliance with international standards, conventions and other relevant requirements for nuclear and radiation safety.

71. The first technical cooperation project between the State Agency for the Regulation of Nuclear and Radiation Activities and the Agency on support for the preparation of a national radiological emergency plan had been successfully completed. Under the project, a national plan for responding to radiological emergencies, which clearly identified the roles and obligations of all State bodies and organizations, had been developed.

72. Regional Agency technical cooperation projects continued to play an important role in the development of the normative and legal infrastructure in the field of nuclear and radiation safety, and in the training of staff. His country was taking part in 54 regional projects, some of which addressed important staff training issues.

The development of the legislative framework and regulatory system was one of the country's 73. main priorities. The skilful integration of the various international instruments governing cooperation with international organizations and bilateral and multilateral agreements was facilitating a comprehensive approach in that regard. Together with Lithuanian partners, his Government was undertaking a twinning project financed by the EU to develop a radiation safety culture, infrastructure and auxiliary services based on best practices in use in the EU and on international rules, primarily those contained in Agency recommendations. As part of that project, and in the light of the conclusions and recommendations of various Agency missions that had visited the country, legislation in the area of nuclear and radiation safety had been reviewed, a Government programme for enhancing nuclear and radiation safety in Azerbaijan had been developed, a new draft law on radiation and nuclear safety had been prepared, a new structure for the regulatory body and revised internal procedures had been proposed, and systems of radiation safety measurement and of monitoring and evaluating emergency situations had been devised. Azerbaijan was grateful to the Agency for its assistance in reviewing the new draft law. Particular attention was being accorded to the inclusion, in the legislative framework and regulatory system, of requirements contained in international conventions and agreements to which Azerbaijan was party, as well as to the identification of other international legal instruments to which Azerbaijan could or needed to adhere.

74. In addition to efforts to improve the legislative and regulatory system, other activities aimed at raising the level of radiation safety and introducing new radiation technologies were under way in the country.

75. Azerbaijan continued to attach particular importance to projects on environmental remediation. During the current year, the Ministry of Emergency Situations had successfully completed one of the longest projects to improve the ecological situation in the country, which aimed to completely rehabilitate land contaminated with natural radionuclides at the site of a former iodine plant located on the Absheron Peninsula. In 2014, work had also been completed to rehabilitate the site of another plant located near the city of Neftchala. Throughout the project, international experts had, through the Agency's technical cooperation programme, provided assistance in evaluating the results of the studies conducted; formulating recommendations on technology for clean-up operations, transport and storage of waste; developing criteria for clean-up operations; and developing guidelines for ensuring radiation safety during the rehabilitation process. The results of the monitoring of the rehabilitated land carried out during the current month by an Agency group had shown the effectiveness of the work undertaken. His country was highly grateful to the Agency for its cooperation and assistance during the implementation of the project, which had greatly added to Azerbaijan's experience in the rehabilitation

of land contaminated with natural radionuclides. His country was now in a position to share its experience with others.

76. Between 2010 and 2012, the Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences and Swedish specialists had completed a scientific research project studying the problem of radon in the country. A radon register had been compiled and maps of the average radon activity in dwellings highlighting areas of anomalous concentration had been drawn up. During the previous year, pilot activities had been undertaken to reduce high concentrations of radon in dwellings and, on the basis of the results of the project, a programme of action had been adopted to study and reduce the danger of radon in Azerbaijan from 2014 to 2018.

77. His country was working in close cooperation with the Agency to improve radioactive waste management, which was an important part of efforts to ensure the radiation safety of the population and the environment. It was pleased with the progress being made on the technical cooperation project concerning the establishment of technology for the management of spent radioactive sources being carried out at the national radioactive waste management enterprise Izotop. The construction of a process chamber for manipulating closed sources of ionizing radiation, which was the key element of new technology for preparing radioactive sources for long-term storage, had been completed. The Government had funded the construction of a new administrative building and auxiliary structures, as well as the repair of the industrial buildings, laboratories and facility site. The site as a whole and the buildings were equipped with modern active and passive physical protection systems.

78. Since the very beginning of its cooperation with the Agency, Azerbaijan had always attached particular attention to the use of nuclear technologies in medicine. The National Cancer Centre had been established in a relatively short period of time with assistance from the Agency, and a number of projects had been developed to improve the diagnosis and treatment of cancer. In the current technical cooperation cycle, a project was being implemented jointly by the Agency and the National Cancer Centre on the introduction of PET–CT in clinical practice. The construction of a building to house the PET–CT and cyclotron complex was nearing completion. Given the project's high importance, Azerbaijan was grateful to the Agency for agreeing to extend its duration by one year.

79. The radiation hygiene laboratory of the Republican Centre for Hygiene and Epidemiology that had been equipped with technical support from the Agency was working well and conducting monitoring activities, including of occupational exposure, food, agricultural products and consumables. National hygiene standards for food products regulating permissible levels of radionuclides had been established. Azerbaijan looked forward to further cooperation with the Agency with a view to developing the laboratory's capacities in areas such as analysis and quality control.

80. The Agency's technical cooperation programme had played an invaluable role in the establishment of the Secondary Standards Dosimetry Laboratory at the National Metrology Centre. Such close cooperation with the Agency had facilitated the establishment of the laboratory, staff training and preparation of the necessary documentation in a very short period of time. The laboratory was now fully functioning and a new project concerning the establishment of a spectrometry laboratory had been launched.

81. Work on the establishment of a sterilizing complex for radiation processing of materials and foodstuffs was nearing completion, with the bunker for the gamma irradiator having been built. Under a trilateral contract concerning the supply of an industrial panoramic gamma irradiation facility, preparations were being made for the import of a cobalt-60 source with a total activity of 300 kCi. The dosimetry and microbiology laboratory building and other elements of the infrastructure of

the complex had been designed, and the complex, which was expected to be completed in 2015, would be used primarily for sterilizing various types of products and for research purposes.

82. In the current year, a project on improving sanitary and radiological control over transported goods at customs border check points had been launched.

83. The experience his country had acquired in the area of nuclear research in cooperation with the Agency and research establishments in other countries had enabled it to enter a new stage in the development of nuclear technologies. In May, the President had signed an order providing for the establishment of a closed joint stock company — the national centre for nuclear research. The centre would use nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes in accordance with national interests, strengthen the infrastructure for nuclear technologies and develop the potential of highly qualified staff. The Presidential Order provided for the establishment of a research reactor and the supply of the necessary modern equipment for the centre. Close cooperation with the Agency was seen as a prerequisite for the successful development and operation of the centre.

84. The new national projects proposed for the 2016–2017 technical cooperation cycle would cover strengthening regulatory infrastructure, emergency preparedness, introduction of reactor technologies, further development of cancer diagnosis and treatment.

85. His Government greatly appreciated the assistance that it had received under the technical cooperation programme and was firmly committed to meeting its financial, technical and institutional commitments to the Agency, whose work it highly valued.

86. <u>Mr MOKOTEDI</u> (Botswana) that his country appreciated the Agency's efforts to ensure the sustainable peaceful uses of nuclear technology. It remained fully committed to honouring its obligations to the organization, including through the full and timely payment of its assessed contributions and pledges to the TCF.

87. The technical cooperation programme was helping his country to meet some of its development goals. The assistance Botswana had received from the Agency in the agricultural sector in such areas as crop production and management of livestock diseases had had a positive impact on the country's social and economic development.

88. Botswana had benefited through cooperation with the Agency and under AFRA, which had recently celebrated its 25th anniversary. His country would continue to work in partnership with the Agency to develop sustainable programmes and promote regional cooperation.

89. His country remained committed to the work of the Department of Safeguards and called on all Member States to act transparently with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear materials. Botswana supported efforts to strengthen the Agency's safeguards capabilities and called on those non-nuclear-weapon States that had yet to do so to conclude and bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol and, where applicable, to amend their small quantities protocol.

90. Nuclear terrorism was a growing concern and Botswana had requested an expert mission to facilitate the review and updating of its INSSP, and an INSServ mission to identify gaps in the country's nuclear security regime. His country recognized the importance of ratifying the Amendment to the CPPNM and was committed to depositing its instrument of ratification with the Agency in the not too distant future.

91. National regulatory bodies, which played a crucial role in ensuring nuclear safety, must be as effective as possible, genuinely independent, adequately funded and appropriately staffed. Legislation concerning radiation protection and safety would be revised in his country with a view to

strengthening the independence of the regulatory authority and ensuring a holistic approach with regard to the issues of safety, security and safeguards. Member States should make full use of the Agency's IRRS missions in making their regulatory frameworks more effective and efficient.

92. Use of radioactive sources in Botswana was increasing, particularly in mining, mineral exploration and construction, and the management of radioactive waste needed to be properly coordinated. Botswana was proceeding with the construction of a centralized radioactive waste management facility to ensure the proper storage of vulnerable sources despite the challenges it was facing in connection with the land allocated for that project. It called on the Agency to monitor closely the trade in radioactive sources from cradle to grave, particularly as some sources were not sold directly to the end user by the manufacturer but by agents, thus creating a gap in terms of accountability at the end of their useful life.

93. <u>Mr MPAY</u> (Cameroon) said that the fact that 72 new reactors had been under construction at the end of 2013 despite the Fukushima Daiichi accident, the reduction in the price of natural gas and the increased use of renewable energy, showed that nuclear energy was increasingly an option for achieving energy security, sustainable development, and for combating climate change.

94. Cameroon was pleased to note that improving the effectiveness and efficiency of nuclear power technology was one of the Agency's foremost priorities. It remained committed to all Agency initiatives aimed at improving the safety of nuclear power plants, sharing experience at the international level, and developing safer and cheaper nuclear power technologies.

95. The Agency should continue its efforts to train national experts in the use of energy planning tools, since such capacity building assistance was essential in helping Member States to develop effective and sustainable nuclear power programmes.

96. Cameroon, which welcomed the importance attached by the Agency to the development of human resources, had hosted a regional workshop on capacity building organized by the Forum of Nuclear Regulatory Bodies in Africa (FNRBA) with Agency assistance in December 2013. His country had assumed the presidency of the Forum in March, and thanked all those, including the Agency, the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, and the University of Texas, that were helping to achieve the Forum's goals.

97. Cameroon called on the Agency to ensure that all uranium producer countries and potential producer countries were involved in initiatives concerning the management of uranium resources, given the importance of those resources for the sustainable development of nuclear energy. Africa faced particular challenges in terms of technology, safety and the environment, since the uranium production cycle was not yet regulated and managed effectively. Cameroon therefore welcomed the Agency's decision to hold regular workshops for African countries on uranium prospecting, extraction and processing, and would be hosting the second such regional workshop in November 2014.

98. His country welcomed the progress made by the Agency in implementing the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety.

99. In the area of nuclear security, Cameroon had been developing an INSSP with Agency assistance and had hosted an INSServ mission at the beginning of 2014.

100. Noting that radioactive waste management and concerns about orphan sources remained an obstacle to the expanded use of nuclear applications, he said that Cameroon welcomed a joint initiative between the Agency and France that had included a mission in September 2013 during which the Agency and the French Atomic Energy Commission had verified the spent or orphan sources included in the inventory of the National Radiation Protection Agency.

101. Cameroon welcomed the Agency's efforts concerning the establishment of national nuclear security systems in Africa. His delegation had noted with satisfaction the signing, in the margins of the 57th regular session of the General Conference, of a practical arrangement between the Agency and the FNRBA providing for the development and harmonization of national safety and security infrastructures on the African continent.

102. Cameroon welcomed the wide variety of areas covered by the Agency's technical cooperation programme, such as human health, agriculture, water resources management, industrial applications of ionizing radiation, sustainable energy development and nuclear and radiation safety and security, which were important for socioeconomic development. It had hosted an imPACT team in June, and would draw on the team's conclusions when updating the national cancer control programme.

103. His country was grateful for the assistance it had received from the Department of Technical Cooperation in finalizing its CPF for the period 2014–2018, which it would be signing in the margins of the current session of the General Conference.

104. Cameroon called on the Agency to take constructive and relevant action in combating Ebola virus disease, as it had done with respect to trypanosomiasis, malaria and tuberculosis. It welcomed the establishment under AFRA of regional centres, particularly those specializing in communicable diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis, and continued to call on donors to maintain or even increase their contributions to the AFRA programme, which was an important vehicle for promoting the dissemination of nuclear techniques in Africa.

105. Comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols were prerequisites for non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The African Commission on Nuclear Energy established under the Pelindaba Treaty would help to verify compliance with Treaty obligations, and he called on the international community to provide support for attainment of the Treaty's objectives.

Mr AZEEZ (Sri Lanka), President, took the Chair.

106. <u>Ms WIJAYATILAKE</u> (Sri Lanka) said that the IAEA Annual Report 2013 and other documents on thematic issues gave an impressive account of the Agency's work in the fields of nuclear energy, technology and applications, safety and security, safeguards and verification and technical cooperation.

107. The International Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Power in the 21st Century, held in St Petersburg in June 2013, and the International Conference on Fast Reactors and Related Fuel Cycles: Safe Technologies and Sustainable Scenarios, held in Paris in March 2013, had provided a forum for discussion of key issues including energy security, sustainable energy and climate change, and had also focused on strategic and technical options for deploying fast reactors.

108. Sri Lanka supported the global and regional initiatives being pursued to enhance nuclear security, including the work of the Agency. Noting that no effort should be spared in addressing all aspects of nuclear security given the threat of nuclear terrorism, she acknowledged the assistance provided by the Agency in training security officials for the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting held in Sri Lanka in 2013. Sri Lankan officials would now be able to assist other nations if called upon to do so.

109. The Agency's work on strengthening nuclear safety after the Fukushima Daiichi accident was highly appreciated, in particular in disseminating the lessons learned in respect of emergency preparedness, response and mitigation. Sri Lanka commended the Government of Japan on its tireless efforts to address safety, environmental and other concerns.

110. Despite the clear dangers illustrated by the accident, 2013 had seen the largest number of nuclear reactors under construction since 1989, reflecting the growing global energy demand and a belief that the potential for adverse consequences could be managed. Noting the growing realization among developing nations of the need to achieve the correct energy mix in order to ensure energy security, she said that Sri Lanka, which had built capacity in the area of human resources and in the use of energy planning tools with Agency support, would be considering the possibility of using nuclear power as an option to meet its growing energy requirements.

111. Nuclear energy needs could not be considered separately from nuclear safety and safeguards. International cooperation was necessary to ensure that nuclear materials and technological capabilities were not diverted from peaceful uses.

112. Nuclear disarmament was essential for achieving lasting international peace and security. Sri Lanka looked forward to contributing to the success of the 2015 NPT Review Conference, but emphasized that all aspects of the package agreed upon at previous conferences should be implemented to the fullest possible extent. It would join other delegations in celebrating the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September.

113. She commended the Working Group on Financing the Agency's Activities on achieving a consensual outcome and welcomed the recommendations made, which sought to ensure that resources for the TCF were sufficient, assured and predictable. Sri Lanka thanked the permanent representatives of France and Kenya for their successful leadership of the Group.

114. Sri Lanka was conscious of the need to strengthen technology and research institutions and enhance capacity to meet current challenges and harness the potential of nuclear energy for development. The Ten Year Horizon Development Framework launched under the leadership of the President sought to achieve accelerated economic growth and national advancement, including through the development of nuclear science and technology.

115. Sri Lanka would shortly be enacting a new nuclear law providing for the comprehensive regulation of nuclear energy, and for the establishment of the Atomic Energy Board and the Atomic Energy Regulatory Council. The assistance from the Office of Legal Affairs in formulating the new law had been appreciated.

116. The first Government-owned multipurpose gamma irradiation facility had been established during the year and provided irradiation services for industrial and food products. Her Government was grateful for the technical assistance it had received from the Agency in that connection.

117. Turning to the Agency's technical cooperation programme, she said that her country remained committed to working with the Agency on mutually beneficial programmes with a view to enhancing skills and capabilities. Over the preceding 12 months, the Atomic Energy Authority of Sri Lanka had hosted seven Agency events, and regulatory staff had been trained in the licensing and inspection programme and in formulating codes of conduct, rules and procedures for the regulatory regime. The project on upgrading nuclear medicine diagnostic imaging facilities at the University of Peradeniya had been particularly valuable for patients in rural areas. Her country was grateful for the technical assistance it was receiving, including concerning the establishment of national centres for nuclear for non-destructive testing that was to become operational the following month. Sri Lanka was pleased that technical assistance would be forthcoming for the establishment of a regional centre for research and training in medical and molecular entomology under the 2016 biennium programme.

118. In closing, she expressed her country's deep appreciation of the assistance it had received from the Director General and his staff over the previous year and looked forward to further meaningful cooperation in the year ahead.

119. <u>Mr BERDENNIKOV</u> (Russian Federation), exercising his right of reply to comments made two days earlier by the representative of Ukraine with regard to the status of nuclear facilities and material in the Crimea and Sevastopol, said that the application of the Agreement of 21 February 1985 between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the additional protocol thereto of 22 March 2000 had extended to the whole of the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol since 18 March 2014. On 7 July 2014, the Russian Federation had notified the Agency that the IR-100 research reactor and the uranium aqueous subcritical assembly at the Sevastopol National University of Nuclear Energy and Industry had been added to the list of peaceful nuclear facilities. The addition had taken effect on the date of the notification. The Russian Federation had also expressed its willingness to enable the Agency, if it wished, to verify fully that the source material or special fissionable material used at those facilities was not withdrawn except as provided for in the Agreement of 21 February 1985.

120. The Russian Federation continued to note the worrying comments being made by high-ranking Ukrainian government officials and politicians about withdrawing from the NPT and acquiring nuclear weapons. The international community should certainly not turn a blind eye to that.

121. Turning to the Annual Report for 2013, he said that his country noted the general positive trend in the Agency's work. Russia would continue its steady support for the Agency's activities and found that the Agency's work in 2013 was on the whole deserving of high praise. However, the comments by the Russian Federation on the application of Agency safeguards and on nuclear security, which it had made to the Board in June 2014 and submitted to the Secretariat in writing, had not been reflected in the final version of the report. Disregarding Member States' comments was counterproductive and contravened the decision by the Board that the Secretariat would take due account of the comments and suggestions made when finalizing the report. The Russian Federation called on the Director General to work closely with all Member States in preparing the Annual Report and to hold consultations before submitting the draft report to the Board, and to discontinue the practice of submitting documents that had not been fully agreed to the General Conference for approval. His country requested that that be reflected in the resolutions taken at the current General Conference session.

122. Mr KASIANOV (Ukraine) said that, as a result of the aggression by the Russian Federation in February and March 2014, parts of the sovereign territory of Ukraine - the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol - had been occupied and illegally annexed. Ukraine did not recognize the illegitimately proclaimed, so-called 'Republic of Crimea' and its illegal annexation by the Russian Federation. The UN General Assembly had affirmed its commitment to the sovereignty, political independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine in resolution 68/262 of 27 March 2014. The actions of the Russian Federation had violated internationally recognized principles and norms of international law, Russia's obligations under the Charter of the UN and bilateral and multilateral treaties that guaranteed the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders of Ukraine. The Russian Federation had flagrantly violated the security assurances it had made to Ukraine together with the United States and the United Kingdom in the Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine's Accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The ongoing occupation of part of the territory of Ukraine, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, where nuclear facilities and material belonging to Ukraine were located, undermined the international non-proliferation regime and destroyed the existing cooperation mechanism with the Agency.

123. According to the Constitution of Ukraine and the Ukrainian law on securing the legal rights and freedoms of citizens and the legal regime on the temporarily occupied Ukrainian territory, the sovereignty of Ukraine remained in effect throughout its entire territory, which was indivisible and inviolable within the existing borders. Ukraine retained jurisdiction over all nuclear facilities and material, including the IR-100 research reactor and the other nuclear facilities of the Sevastopol National University of Nuclear Energy and Industry, which were the property of Ukraine and located on the temporarily occupied territory. The provisions of the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remained in full force and applied to those nuclear facilities and material. Ukraine fully supported the Agency's principled position on continuing to apply safeguards to nuclear facilities and material in Ukraine, in accordance with the norms of international law and the Statute of the Agency, based on the understanding that the Autonomous Republic of Crimea was an integral part of Ukraine.

124. Ukraine also strongly objected to any actions taken by the Russian Federation, including within the framework of the Agency, to legitimize the occupation of sovereign Ukrainian territory in the Crimea. It was Ukraine's firm position, in accordance with international law, that the Russian Federation should exercise control over nuclear facilities only in accordance with its safeguards agreement with the Agency of 21 February 1985 and the additional protocol thereto, as was the case in the past.

125. Turning to the allegations of the Russian Federation that Ukraine had 'violated' its non-nuclear status, he said that Ukraine was complying fully with its NPT obligations. The Minister of Defence of Ukraine had stated that the issue of re-establishing nuclear weapons in Ukraine was not under consideration. As usual, the Russian Federation was dealing in distorted quotations taken out of context. The Russian Federation was attempting to conceal the fact that Ukraine's status as a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT had already been genuinely jeopardized by two circumstances: first, the Russian Federation's unilateral denunciation of its agreement with Ukraine of 28 May 1997 governing the status of the Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine, which meant that the Russian Federation was in violation of the terms of that agreement that prohibited it from stationing nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory, and second, the simultaneous presence on Ukrainian territory of nuclear weapon delivery systems belonging to the Russian Federation, which were in the hands of its military units deployed on the temporarily occupied territory of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol.

126. Meanwhile, those actions taken by the Russian Federation calling into question Ukraine's non-nuclear-weapon status were not consistent with statements by officials from Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In particular, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Ryabkov had stated on 16 September 2014 that the Russian Federation was proceeding on the understanding that Ukraine's non-nuclear-weapon status as a State party to the NPT had been permanently established and was not subject to review.

127. It was now up to the international community to prevent the Russian Federation from stationing its nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles in the parts of the sovereign territory of Ukraine that it had temporarily occupied, the Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, as that would result in a direct violation of Ukraine's non-nuclear-weapon status under the NPT.

128. <u>Mr BERDENNIKOV</u> (Russian Federation) said that it was regrettable that the Ukrainian delegate had raised issues that were not within the Agency's remit. The Russian Federation had already provided detailed information on those issues that did lie within the Agency's remit.

23. Examination of delegates' credentials

(GC(58)/26)

129. The <u>PRESIDENT</u> said that the General Committee had met earlier that day as a credentials committee to examine the credentials of all delegates, as provided for in Rule 28 of the Rules of Procedure. Since the meeting of the General Committee that morning, the Secretariat had received credentials in due form for the delegates of Cuba and Uganda. After discussion, the Committee had recommended the adoption by the Conference of the draft resolution contained in paragraph 8 of its report, with the reservations and positions expressed in the report.

130. <u>Mr NAJAFI</u> (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that adoption of the draft resolution as recommended by the Committee did not imply recognition of the Israeli regime by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

131. <u>Mr OMARI</u> (Jordan) said that the approval by his country of the credentials of the delegate of Israel did not imply recognition of Israel's occupation since 1967 of Arab territories, including the Arab part of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights.

132. <u>Mr SHAMAA</u> (Egypt) said that acceptance by the General Conference of the Committee's recommendation did not imply recognition of Israel's occupation since 1967 of Arab territories, including the Arab part of Jerusalem, the Golan Heights and the Shebaa Farms.

133. The <u>PRESIDENT</u> took it that, with the reservations expressed, the Conference wished to adopt the draft resolution contained in paragraph 8 of document GC(58)/26.

134. It was so decided.

8. Election of Members to the Board of Governors (GC(58)/4 and GC(58)/23)

135. The <u>PRESIDENT</u> recalled that in 1989 the General Conference had approved a procedure whereby, when there was agreement regarding the candidate or candidates from a particular area, no secret ballot would be held. Balloting would take place only in respect of those areas for which there was no agreed slate. That procedure considerably facilitated the rational use of the Conference's time.

136. However, Rule 79 of the Rules of Procedure, which provided that elections to the Board should be by secret ballot, would need to be suspended in respect of the areas for which no secret ballot was to be held.

137. Given that all area groups had reached agreement on their candidates for the vacancies to be filled, he took it that the Conference wished to suspend Rule 79 in order to dispense with the need to hold a secret ballot.

138. It was so agreed.

139. The <u>PRESIDENT</u>, after thanking all area groups for their efforts in reaching agreement, drew attention to document GC(58)/4, containing the names of the Member States which the Board had designated to serve on the Board from the end of the fifty-eighth (2014) session of the Conference until the end of the fifty-ninth (2015) session.

140. Recalling that, under Rule 83 of the Rules of Procedure, the presiding officer must indicate to the General Conference those elective places on the Board which must be filled, he referred the Conference to document GC(58)/23, paragraph 2 of which indicated, for each of the geographical areas, the number of Member States which must be elected so as to ensure that the Board would be constituted in accordance with Article VI.A of the Statute.

141. There were 11 seats to be filled: 3 for Latin America, 2 for Western Europe, 1 for Eastern Europe, 2 for Africa, 1 for the Middle East and South Asia, 1 for South East Asia and the Pacific and 1 - the so-called floating seat — that it was the turn of a Member State in the area of South East Asia and the Pacific to fill.

142. Paragraph 3 of that document contained a list of 24 Member States which had been either elected by the General Conference in 2013 in accordance with Article VI.A.2 of the Statute, and which would therefore continue to serve on the Board until 2015, or designated by the Board in June 2014 for membership of the Board pursuant to Article VI.A.1 of the Statute for the one-year period 2014–2015.

143. In order to facilitate the election, delegates had been furnished with a note showing the results of consultations among the area groups regarding their candidates for the vacant seats as far as they were known. The note was purely informal in character and provided information insofar as it had been made available to the President and to the Secretariat.

144. He took it that the General Conference wished to elect Brazil, Chile and Mexico to the three vacant seats for Latin America.

145. Brazil, Chile and Mexico were duly elected.

146. The <u>PRESIDENT</u> took it that the General Conference wished to elect Ireland and Switzerland to the two vacant seats for Western Europe.

147. Ireland and Switzerland were duly elected.

148. The <u>PRESIDENT</u> took it that the General Conference wished to elect the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the one vacant seat for Eastern Europe.

149. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was duly elected.

150. The <u>PRESIDENT</u> took it that the General Conference wished to elect Egypt and Nigeria to the two vacant seats for Africa.

151. Egypt and Nigeria were duly elected.

152. The <u>PRESIDENT</u> took it that the General Conference wished to elect Saudi Arabia to the one vacant seat for the Middle East and South Asia.

153. Saudi Arabia was duly elected.

154. The <u>PRESIDENT</u> took it that the General Conference wished to elect Malaysia to the one vacant seat for South East Asia and the Pacific.

155. Malaysia was duly elected.

156. The <u>PRESIDENT</u> took it that the General Conference wished to elect New Zealand to the floating seat, which it was the turn of a Member State in the area of South East Asia and the Pacific to fill.

157. <u>New Zealand was duly elected</u>.

158. The <u>PRESIDENT</u> recalled that, under Article VI.D of the Statute, the eleven Member States just elected to the Board would hold office from the end of the current, 58th, session of the General Conference to the end of the 60th regular session, in 2016.

Interim oral report by the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole

159. <u>Mr STUART</u> (Australia), Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, presented the outcome of the Committee of the Whole's deliberations on agenda items 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16 and 22.

160. Under item 9, "The Agency's Financial Statements for 2013", the Committee recommended that the Conference adopt the draft resolution in document GC(58)/5.

161. Under item 10, "The Agency's Budget Update for 2015", the Committee recommended that the Conference approve a regular budget figure for 2015 of €356 483 299, comprising €348 177 059 for the operational portion of the Regular Budget, and €8 306 240 for the capital portion of the Regular Budget, and accordingly adopt draft resolution A in document GC(58)/2, entitled "Regular Budget Appropriations for 2015"; that the Conference approve a target for voluntary contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund for 2015 of €69 797 000 and accordingly adopt draft resolution B in document GC(58)/2, entitled "Technical Cooperation Fund Allocation for 2015"; and that the Conference approve the level of the Working Capital Fund in 2015 at €15 210 000 and accordingly adopt draft resolution C in document GC(58)/2, entitled "The Working Capital Fund in 2015".

162. Under item 11, "Amendment to Article XIV.A of the Statute", the Committee recommended that the Conference adopt the decision contained in document GC(58)/L.4.

163. Under item 12, "Scale of assessment of Members' contributions towards the Regular Budget", the Committee recommended that the Conference adopt the draft resolution contained on page 3 of document GC(58)/7.

164. Under item 13, "Measures to strengthen international cooperation in nuclear, radiation, transport and waste safety", the Committee recommended that the Conference adopt the draft resolution contained in document GC(58)/L.3.

165. Under item 15, "Strengthening of the Agency's technical cooperation activities", the Committee recommended that the Conference adopt the draft resolution contained in document GC(58)/L.7.

166. Under item 16, "Strengthening the Agency's activities related to nuclear science, technology and applications", the Committee recommended that the Conference adopt the draft resolutions contained in document GC(58)/L.5, as follows: A. Non-Power nuclear applications (1. General; 2. Development of the sterile insect technique for the control or eradication of malaria-, dengue- and other disease-transmitting mosquitoes; 3. Support to the African Union's Pan African Tsetse and Trypanosomosis Eradication Campaign (AU–PATTEC); 4. Plan for producing potable water economically using small and medium-sized nuclear reactors; 5. Strengthening the support of Member States in food and agriculture; 6. Renovation of the Agency's Nuclear Applications Laboratories at Seibersdorf); B. Nuclear power applications (1. General; 2. Agency activities in the development of innovative nuclear technology); and C. (Nuclear knowledge management).

167. Under item 22, "Elections to the Agency's Staff Pension Committee", the Committee recommended that Mr Daniel Balzer from the delegation of the United States of America be elected as a member and that Mr Eduardo Von Glasenapp from the delegation of Paraguay and Ms Abimbola Raji from the delegation of Nigeria be elected as alternate members to represent the General Conference in the Agency's Staff Pension Committee.

The Agency's Financial Statements for 2013 (agenda item 9)

168. As recommended by the Committee of the Whole, the draft resolution set out in document GC(58)/5 was adopted.

The Agency's Budget Update for 2015 (agenda item 10)

169. <u>As recommended by the Committee of the Whole, draft resolutions A, B and C set out in document GC(58)/2 were adopted.</u>

Amendment to Article XIV.A of the Statute (agenda item 11)

170. <u>As recommended by the Committee of the Whole, the decision set out in document GC(58)/L.4</u> was adopted.

Scale of assessment of Members' contributions towards the Regular Budget (agenda item 12)

171. As recommended by the Committee of the Whole, the draft resolution set out on page 3 of document GC(58)/7 was adopted.

Measures to strengthen international cooperation in nuclear, radiation, transport and waste safety (agenda item 13)

172. As recommended by the Committee of the Whole, the draft resolution set out in document GC(58)/L.3 was adopted.

Strengthening of the Agency's technical cooperation activities (agenda item 15)

173. <u>As recommended by the Committee of the Whole, the draft resolution set out in document GC(58)/L.7 was adopted.</u>

Strengthening the Agency's activities related to nuclear science, technology and applications (agenda item 16)

174. As recommended by the Committee of the Whole, the draft resolution set out in document <u>GC(58)/L.5 was adopted</u>.

Elections to the Agency's Staff Pension Committee (agenda item 22)

175. <u>As recommended by the Committee of the Whole, Mr Daniel Balzer of the United States of</u> <u>America was elected as a member and Mr Eduardo Von Glasenapp of Paraguay and</u> <u>Ms Abimbola Raji of Nigeria were elected as alternate members of the Agency's Staff Pension</u> <u>Committee</u>.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.