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Later: Mr ANDEREYA LATORRE (Chile)

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Abbreviations used in this record:

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| ARASIA | Co-operative Agreement for Arab States in Asia for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology |
| ARCAL | Co-operation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean |
| ASEAN | Association of Southeast Asian Nations |
| CPF | Country Programme Framework |
| CPPNM | Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material |
| CTBT | Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty |
| DPRK | Democratic People's Republic of Korea |
| E3+3 | France, Germany and the United Kingdom plus China, the Russian Federation and the United States of America |
| EU | European Union |
| Euratom | European Atomic Energy Community |
| HEU | high-enriched uranium |
| imPACT | integrated missions of PACT |
| INIR | Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review |
| INPRO | International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles |
| INSSP | Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan |
| IPPAS | International Physical Protection Advisory Service |
| IRRS | Integrated Regulatory Review Service |
| ITDB | Incident and Trafficking Database |
| Joint Convention | Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management |
| JPA | Joint Plan of Action |
| LEU | low-enriched uranium |
| MDGs | Millennium Development Goals |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NPCs | national participation costs |

Abbreviations used in this record (continued):

| | |
|----------|--|
| NPT | Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons |
| NSF | Nuclear Security Fund |
| NWFZ | nuclear-weapon-free zone |
| OECD/NEA | Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development |
| ORPAS | Occupational Radiation Protection Appraisal Service |
| OSART | Operational Safety Review Team |
| PACT | Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy |
| PET | positron emission tomography |
| PHWR | pressurized heavy water reactor |
| PUI | Peaceful Uses Initiative |
| QUATRO | Quality Assurance Team for Radiation Oncology |
| RCA | Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (for Asia and the Pacific) |
| SQP | small quantities protocol |
| TCF | Technical Cooperation Fund |
| UNSCEAR | United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation |
| WHO | World Health Organization |

7. General debate and Annual Report for 2013 (continued) (GC(58)/3 and Additional Information)

1. Mr KOÇI (Albania) said that since September 2013, considerable progress had been made in the implementation of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety. The recommendations of the February 2014 International Experts' Meeting on Radiation Protection after the Fukushima Daiichi Accident were promoting confidence and understanding, and the preparation of the report on the Fukushima Daiichi accident was also progressing well.

2. The review meetings of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention held in April and May 2014, in which Albania had participated, had shown that a consensus existed on the need to do more to strengthen nuclear safety worldwide. Albania was determined to cooperate fully with the Agency to fulfil its obligations in due time.

3. Albania, which supported the implementation of the Nuclear Security Plan 2014–2017, attached high importance to international cooperation in the field of nuclear security to prevent and combat illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials. It had ratified the amendment to the CPPNM and fully supported the Director General's call for other Member States to do so as soon as possible.

4. In April 2014, Albania had submitted its national report on the security of radioactive sources, which presented the status of management practices and regulatory inspections. The procedures for the review and approval of Albania's INSSP were currently being completed, and his country would welcome an IPPAS mission to strengthen the national nuclear security regime.

5. Some of Albania's border crossings had been supplied with equipment for inspecting nuclear and radioactive materials, and the appropriate infrastructure was being created at others. The Agency had been implementing a pilot project to improve radioactivity monitoring in Albania. His country was fully committed to the successful completion of a project on the establishment of a framework and pilot deployment of equipment to secure radioactive material out of State regulatory control.

6. Noting that all States should contribute to a strengthened verification regime, he said that Albania welcomed the Secretariat's efforts to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards implementation. Albania supported the State-level concept and thanked the Secretariat for the organization of technical meetings and for the comprehensive explanations provided on that subject.

7. Albania, which had a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force, joined the Director General's call for all Member States to conclude those instruments. His country was encouraged by the increasing number of additional protocols in force, and looked forward to the universalization of additional protocols.

8. Albania commended the Agency's continuing focus and professional and unbiased work on major verification issues regarding Iran, the DPRK and Syria. It called on those countries to cooperate fully and promptly with the Agency to resolve all outstanding issues.

9. His Government, which believed that the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East and other regions would contribute to achieving global nuclear disarmament, continued to hope that a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons would be organized soon.

10. Albania, which highly appreciated the essential role of the technical cooperation programme, was proud of its excellent cooperation with the Agency. The assistance it had received through its national programme was in line with the national development priorities, and covered such areas as the environment, agriculture and human health.

11. Albania, which was a PACT Model Demonstration Site, highly appreciated the assistance it was receiving from the Agency in the implementation of its national cancer control programme. The Agency's technical assistance had led to a significant improvement in diagnostic and therapeutic cancer services and had supported the establishment of the necessary radiation safety infrastructure. The radiotherapy service and the nuclear medicine service at the University Hospital Centre "Mother Teresa" were fully operational, and the hospital's radiation protection infrastructure was consistent with the Agency's safety standards. Albania was pleased that one of its technical cooperation projects in the area of cancer control had been highlighted as a success story at the General Conference.

12. Albania's efforts were currently focused on further enhancing comprehensive and sustainable cancer control, with an emphasis on children and women. Nuclear medicine services would be expanding their patient and educational activities, and radiotherapy services would be strengthened with the installation of a new electron beam accelerator. He called for Agency assistance regarding the introduction and consolidation of linear accelerator technology in oncology.

13. Mr D'UJANGA (Uganda) commended the remarkable achievements of the Agency in enhancing nuclear safety and security under the leadership of the Director General, including through its advisory role in the development and implementation of nuclear security programmes.

14. The technical cooperation programme had accelerated the effective introduction of the peaceful uses of atomic energy in many developing Member States. His country was benefiting in such areas as energy planning and infrastructure development, food and agriculture, human health, water resource management, nuclear and radiation safety, and human resource development. He thanked the Agency for its continued commitment to supporting technical cooperation activities in the country.

15. The partnership with the Agency in the effective utilization of atomic energy in the human health sector had played a pivotal role in the early detection, treatment and management of cancer. Uganda was particularly grateful for the invaluable assistance it had received over the years, notably in the field of human resource development and the establishment of radiotherapy and nuclear medicine facilities. A new radiotherapy machine was being procured for the Uganda Cancer Institute as one of the key steps for strengthening the national cancer management programme.

16. Uganda, which had embarked on a nuclear power programme in 2009, commended the Agency's support of the development of nuclear power infrastructure in Member States. It was grateful for the Agency's valuable assistance within the framework of the national project UGA/2/001 on supporting pre-feasibility studies for launching a first nuclear power plant, and for the continued support in building a competent and experienced human resource base for the successful and sustainable implementation of its nuclear power programme.

17. Uganda was currently preparing the roadmap for its nuclear power programme. Significant national efforts were being directed towards enhancing energy planning, strengthening the nuclear regulatory infrastructure, site selection, technology assessment, stakeholder engagement and human resources development.

18. Noting the importance of a sustainable supply of fuel resources for the successful development of any energy option, he said that a recent airborne geophysical survey by the Government of Uganda had indicated 80 geologically favourable targets for the discovery of uranium resources.

Uganda appreciated the Agency's support in strengthening national capacity for uranium exploration and evaluation, which would accelerate the process of quantifying the national uranium resources available.

19. Management of radioactive waste, in particular the final disposal of high-level waste, constituted one of the key global challenges of a civilian nuclear power programme. Uganda therefore welcomed the theme of the 2014 Scientific Forum and would closely follow the discussions to understand advances made in science and technology for the management of radioactive waste.

20. In light of the increasing use of atomic energy in Uganda and the recommendations from the recently concluded IRRS mission, Uganda was working to strengthen its national infrastructure for the control of radiation sources in human health, food and agriculture, water resource management and industrial sectors. Special consideration was also being given to strengthening the governmental and regulatory infrastructure in preparation for nuclear power.

21. Uganda, which was firmly committed to the development and promotion of peaceful uses of atomic energy for sustainable socioeconomic development, was grateful to the Agency staff whose hard work had contributed to enhanced service delivery to Uganda.

22. Mr FOO Kok Jwee (Singapore) said that the NPT remained a vital instrument for promoting international peace and security. All three of its pillars, namely nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, were equally important and mutually reinforcing. It was regrettable that no consensus had been reached at the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference convened in New York in 2014 on the recommendations to be submitted to the Conference, and Singapore hoped that all States Parties would continue to engage in constructive dialogue in the run-up to the Review Conference in order to find ways to narrow their differences.

23. Noting developments over the previous year that were not compatible with the provisions or objectives of the NPT, Singapore urged States to comply strictly with their Treaty obligations. It also called for greater efforts to promote the universalization of the NPT, which would help to ensure that the NPT regime remained credible and sustainable.

24. With regard to nuclear verification and safeguards, he said that Singapore had been encouraged by the implementation of the first two phases of the Framework of Cooperation by Iran. However, Iran had not implemented two of the five practical measures in the third phase of the Framework of Cooperation, or responded to the Agency's request to propose new practical measures for the next phase. Singapore strongly encouraged Iran to implement all agreed measures in good time and in good faith, and hoped that agreement on the next set of practical measures would be reached soon.

25. Noting the extension of the deadline for negotiations between the E3+3 and Iran under the Joint Plan of Action to 24 November 2014, he said that Singapore hoped that all parties involved would exercise political will and work constructively to forge a comprehensive and lasting agreement. It called on Iran to comply fully with its obligations under the relevant Security Council and Board resolutions.

26. The DPRK's nuclear programme remained an issue of international concern. The DPRK should take the necessary steps to address the international community's concerns, comply fully with the relevant Security Council resolutions, return to the NPT and resume all cooperation with the Agency immediately.

27. Nuclear material accountancy and in-field verification must remain the core of the Secretariat's work in safeguards implementation. Singapore reiterated its strong support for the Agency's verification and safeguards implementation activities, which were critical for

the establishment of a robust, global nuclear non-proliferation regime. However, the Secretariat could not carry out its work effectively without the support of Member States. Singapore welcomed the clarifications provided by the Secretariat in the Supplementary Document to the Report on The Conceptualization and Development of Safeguards Implementation at the State Level contained in document GOV/2014/41. It noted, in particular, that the State-level concept was applicable to all States and that the implementation of safeguards at the State level did not entail the introduction of any additional rights and obligations on the part of either States or the Agency, nor any modification in the interpretation of existing rights and obligations.

28. In order to ensure the continued credibility of the Agency, the Agency's safeguards conclusions must be based on a meticulous, objective and independent evaluation of all available safeguards-related information and free from political influence. Singapore welcomed the Secretariat's promise to continue engaging all Member States in an open dialogue on matters related to safeguards, including progress in the development and implementation of safeguards at the State level.

29. Singapore had always been a strong proponent of nuclear safety, which should not be undermined by commercial or other considerations. It encouraged all Member States that had not yet done so, in particular countries that were embarking on or already had a new nuclear power programme, to join the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The Sixth Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties to that Convention had adopted important decisions to strengthen the international nuclear safety framework, including on convening a diplomatic conference to discuss a proposed amendment to Article 18 of the Convention. Singapore strongly supported the Swiss proposal, which sought to update the Convention, adopted 20 years previously, and urged all Contracting Parties to do likewise.

30. Singapore understood that the Secretariat intended to wind down the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety adopted three years previously and merge elements with its regular programmes. Noting that the strengthening of nuclear safety was a long-term effort and that there was no room for complacency, he expressed the hope that the Secretariat would continue to place emphasis on the 12 actions in the Action Plan.

31. Singapore looked forward to the publication of the Agency's comprehensive report on the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident later in the year. It hoped that the Secretariat would provide a comprehensive analysis of the accident and propose recommendations for follow-up actions to prevent a recurrence of such an accident.

32. As more countries embarked on new nuclear power programmes or expanded existing ones, the development of human resources in the nuclear field was an increasing challenge for the international community. Efforts should be made to explore how the Agency and countries with relevant expertise could work together to develop a sustainable and competent pool of nuclear experts, which would benefit countries with existing nuclear power plants as well as those considering, and seeking to embark on, a nuclear power programme.

33. In South-East Asia, efforts had been made to strengthen cooperation in nuclear safety through collaboration in fields such as emergency preparedness and response, and through the sharing of radiation monitoring data via the ASEAN Network of Nuclear Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy (ASEANTOM) platform. Singapore was grateful to the European Commission for supporting a feasibility study on regional cooperation in emergency preparedness and response in South-East Asia.

34. International cooperation was critically important to strengthen the global nuclear security architecture, and Singapore hoped that future discussions on that important subject would involve all relevant countries and cover all nuclear material, whether in civilian or military holdings, with a view to building a robust and comprehensive global nuclear security framework. The Agency had a central role to play in coordinating such international efforts and in promoting greater nuclear security.

35. Singapore, which recognized the importance of legally binding instruments in strengthening nuclear security, had deposited its instrument of accession to the CPPNM and its instrument of acceptance of its 2005 amendment at the Treaty Event on 22 September 2014. It strongly encouraged Member States that had not yet done so to do likewise.

36. Turning to the peaceful application of nuclear science and technology, he said that Singapore had to date organized 23 scientific visits, 93 fellowship attachments and 29 regional training events concerning nuclear medicine, radiotherapy and radiation protection. It would continue to seek new areas of cooperation with the Agency in order to provide relevant technical assistance to Member States where needed.

37. Mr EL-KHOURY (Lebanon) encouraged the Agency to continue protecting the inalienable right of States party to the NPT to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. Lebanon also emphasized the need for the Agency to respect the principles of balance and coordination among its activities when preparing the programme and budget.

38. The use and continuous development of nuclear technology in the areas of food security, disease prevention, management of water resources and the environment had become a vital necessity that should be made available to all peoples, and Lebanon welcomed the Agency's continuous efforts to develop its scientific and administrative potential to meet new challenges. Lebanon, as a developing country, urged the Agency to focus on capacity building, using both traditional means and new procedures developed through modern techniques, such as web-based seminars and interactive electronic modules.

39. While the Agency's reports indicated that the operational safety of nuclear power plants was high, that finding should not promote a tendency to disregard possible risks. Many nuclear power plants in different parts of the world had been operating for between 30 and 40 years or more, and the management of such plants in the longer term would present challenges requiring particular attention by the countries concerned. Noting that the global role of nuclear energy was likely to increase in the future, he said that countries introducing nuclear energy must, at the design stage, undertake detailed assessments of external risks, and establish a sound monitoring framework as well as a skilled, effective and independent regulatory body. Lebanon relied heavily on the Agency's services concerning the development and publication of safety standards, capacity building for emergency preparedness and response, and enhancement of peer review services.

40. Lebanon looked forward to the publication in the near future of the comprehensive report on the Fukushima Daiichi accident which, it had no doubt, would be extremely objective and transparent.

41. While Lebanon appreciated the various efforts and initiatives that had focused on nuclear security in specific countries, it reaffirmed the Agency's vital role in strengthening the global nuclear security regime. It had welcomed the convening of the International Conference on Nuclear Security under the Agency's auspices in Vienna in July 2013, which had been attended by all Member States without exception, and also looked forward to the successful implementation of the Agency's Nuclear Security Plan 2014–2017.

42. There was a fundamental link between disarmament and nuclear security since the elimination of existing weapons and nuclear materials designed to serve military purposes would prevent criminal or terrorist groups gaining access to them.

43. Turning to the application of safeguards, he said that Lebanon commended the Agency's interaction with Member States in clarifying the State-level concept and had taken careful note of the Director General's recent report on the subject. Lebanon, which was eager to ensure that safeguards were applied as effectively as possible, believed that there were certain basic principles to be respected

in adopting any new concept, namely: non-politicization; consistency with States' legal obligations; avoidance of double standards; transparency and clarity; non-circumvention of the Agency's policy-making bodies; respect for States' credibility; and recognition of the State concerned as the basic source of information for the Agency. The Agency was entitled to conduct analyses and draw conclusions but that right should not be abused.

44. The additional protocol remained voluntary and should not be considered a measure of a State's transparency and commitment with regard to exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. States that were not signatories to the NPT or had signed comprehensive safeguards agreements were not held accountable but still benefited from all the Agency's services, which was incompatible with the spirit of the Agency's Statute and an outright negation of the principle of justice.

45. The technical cooperation programme was one of the Agency's key historical achievements. It helped to improve the image of nuclear energy throughout the world and enhanced the Agency's prestige. It also contributed to the sustainable development of countries and the transfer of scientific knowledge. Any attempt to marginalize the programme or the TCF was unacceptable. It was important to ensure that the resources of the TCF were sufficient, assured and predictable, and the General Conference resolution requiring the same percentage increases in the TCF as in the Regular Budget must be implemented soon in order to bridge the widening gap between them. Lebanon hoped that the requisite action would be taken in that regard.

46. His country thanked the Department of Technical Cooperation for its sustained close cooperation and transparency. Lebanon, which had achieved an implementation rate of almost 100%, expressed appreciation of the Agency's support for projects under the Co-operative Agreement for Arab States in Asia for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (ARASIA), which it was currently chairing. It supported the continuous development of regional cooperation and an increase in Agency support for projects implemented in that context.

47. Lebanon, which looked forward to more active participation in the technical cooperation programme, hoped that its experts could become more closely involved in the implementation of programmes and projects in the Agency and the Arab region.

48. Developments in recent years in the area of nuclear disarmament had failed to live up to Lebanon's expectations. Most of the decisions of the 2010 NPT Review Conference had not been implemented and no progress had been made in the Conference on Disarmament consultations in Geneva. Nuclear arsenals remained a threat to the peoples of the world, and steps were being taken to develop even more lethal weapons. Moreover, there appeared to be little prospect of the CTBT entering into force in the near future.

49. It was a relatively gloomy picture, and as far as the Middle East was concerned there was a need to use international forums to reveal the truth. In the 1950s Israel had launched a nuclear programme, supposedly for peaceful purposes. Within a short time, however, the programme had become military, undercover and supported by certain major powers enabling Israel to refrain from acceding to the NPT and to develop a large nuclear arsenal that had become a source of serious threat to the region as a whole. Given the current situation in the Middle East, every effort should be made to reduce tensions, yet a vicious cycle persisted. Certain major powers, in order to promote their geopolitical interests and alliances, were ignoring the resolutions of the international community calling upon Israel to accede to the NPT, place all its nuclear installations under Agency safeguards, and engage in negotiations on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

50. Experience in recent months, for example with respect to the Iranian nuclear dossier, had shown that, where a sincere will existed among the parties concerned, it was possible to achieve a breakthrough in complex non-proliferation cases. However, the lack of will on the part of Israel and its

unconditional supporters to reach an agreement on an NWFZ in the Middle East encouraged them to place obstacles in the way of the preparatory negotiations, thereby threatening to have the Helsinki conference postponed indefinitely.

51. No State was entitled to consider itself unaccountable and exempt from compliance with resolutions adopted by the international community. Lebanon therefore joined the other Arab States in resubmitting a draft resolution on Israeli nuclear capabilities to the General Conference. Although Lebanon was convinced that the resolution would not change anything on the ground under the existing circumstances, it was nonetheless convinced of the need to continue raising its voice in relevant international forums in order to defend its legitimate cause.

52. Mr SPRUOGIS (Lithuania), noting that the Agency remained the key institution for the supervision of nuclear safety worldwide, said that the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety had already produced concrete results, including an increase in the transparency and effectiveness of peer review missions, the strengthening of the role of regulatory bodies, and a review of safety standards and the international emergency preparedness framework. However, the international community still needed to intensify its efforts to address public demand for information and raise awareness of the safety measures implemented.

53. Each country had the right to develop nuclear energy provided that the principles of transparency and responsibility were followed, international obligations on nuclear safety were properly addressed and national decisions were seen in a broader context of possible transboundary implications. Lithuania was therefore concerned about the nuclear energy facilities being constructed in close proximity to the EU border without proper implementation of international conventions, nuclear safety standards and dialogue with neighbours. The lack of transparency and essential information, especially on site selection, seismic evaluation and emergency preparedness plans, was disturbing.

54. Implementation of the Agency's safety standards, adherence to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, and cooperation with specialized Agency missions throughout the lifetime of an installation should become an integral part of any nuclear power programme in order to build confidence and ensure the highest levels of safety.

55. Lithuania was pleased to note that the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context had recently adopted a declaration on the application of the Convention to nuclear safety issues emphasizing the importance of the treaties under the auspices of the Agency, and had called for the strengthening of capacities to ensure precise environmental assessment and the highest level of safety in the nuclear energy field. Noting that the Convention also recognized Agency missions, including Site and External Events Design (SEED) missions, as confidence-building measures, he said that Lithuania called on all countries implementing nuclear energy projects to use the instruments provided by the Agency and under other international conventions from the very beginning of the project in ensure maximum levels of safety.

56. With regard to major achievements in Lithuania's nuclear-related activities since the last General Conference, he said that the important Visaginas nuclear power plant project was contributing to the security of energy supply in the Baltic Region and to the full integration of the Baltic States into the internal European energy market. The Parliament of Lithuania had committed to providing the necessary political support and pursuing the development of Visaginas nuclear power plant project, and a memorandum of understanding had been signed between the Ministry of Energy and Hitachi Ltd. in July 2014 on the establishment of the interim project company organization in the near future. Lithuania continued to cooperate closely with the Agency on the project and thanked the Agency for its comprehensive and competent support.

57. In 2013, Lithuania had organized a State-level civil protection exercise and had also participated in a joint Nordic–Baltic emergency preparedness exercise.

58. In response to the Fukushima accident and following stress tests, the emergency preparedness plan of the Ignalina nuclear power plant had been updated the previous year and emergency preparedness functional training had been performed in July 2014. The final decommissioning plan of the Ignalina nuclear power plant had been updated in 2014, and nuclear fuel from both units would be moved to the new interim spent fuel storage facility by 2022. Decommissioning activities were being carried out in accordance with the projects and programmes agreed upon with the nuclear regulatory authority, and all the necessary technical and management measures to assure safety in that work.

59. As a member of the EU, Lithuania had an obligation to arrange periodic self-assessments of its national safety framework and competent authorities, and invite an international peer review. It had already conducted a self-assessment of the national safety framework and was planning to invite an IRRS mission to Lithuania in 2016.

60. Implementation of the Agency's safety guidance and standards concerning public, occupational and medical exposure in Lithuania was essential in order to lower the doses received by the population. Medical exposure monitoring programmes were being implemented for radiography, fluoroscopy, mammography, computed tomography and interventional radiology procedures with a view to reducing medical exposure.

61. Lithuania was continuing to improve its legal framework for the physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials. In accordance with the Law on Nuclear Energy and legislation relating to the Design Basis Threat, threats to nuclear materials and nuclear facilities had been reviewed and reassessed in 2013, including with regard to the transportation of fresh and spent nuclear fuel.

62. Noting that proliferation, as well as the risk of non-State actors gaining access to nuclear materials or radioactive sources, still represented serious threats to international security, he said that national and international nuclear security measures must be in place to secure nuclear materials and counter illicit nuclear trafficking and nuclear terrorism. Lithuania called on those countries that had not yet done so to adhere to and implement fully relevant international instruments.

63. The three nuclear security summits had given considerable impetus to far-reaching initiatives that collectively strengthened nuclear security, reduced the threat of nuclear terrorism and secured vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials. Lithuania was strongly committed to enhancing its institutional capacities in the field of nuclear security and had invited an IPPAS mission to the country in 2016, the third such mission since 1999.

64. In 2013, Lithuania's Nuclear Security Centre of Excellence had had organized training events for more than 225 participants from Lithuania and EU Eastern Partnership Countries. Lithuania was grateful to its partners, particularly the Secretariat, for their support of the Centre's activities.

65. Since it had joined the Agency, technical cooperation had played a key role in enhancing Lithuania's nuclear energy infrastructure. In cooperation with the Agency, Lithuania was conducting three national projects in the fields of radioactive waste management, institutional capacity building and radiation protection. Lithuania was pleased that the project LIT/6/005 on establishing the national biological dosimetry laboratory in Lithuania, which would further enhance Lithuania's radiation safety infrastructure for emergency preparedness and response, had been selected as one of the success stories within the Agency's technical cooperation framework.

66. In closing, he said that Lithuania strongly supported global efforts to strengthen nuclear security and would intensify its cooperation with other countries to that end.

67. Mr VAN WULFFTEN PALTHE (Netherlands) said that non-proliferation and disarmament were and would remain the cornerstones of his country's foreign policy, with the NPT as a basis and the 2010 action plan as a roadmap. His country called upon those States that had not yet done so to join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States as soon as possible.

68. The Agency's safeguards system was a fundamental component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the Netherlands appreciated the way in which the Secretariat was implementing its mandate in that field. Like many other Member States, the Netherlands recognized a comprehensive safeguards agreement together with an additional protocol as the international verification standard, and welcomed the fact that the number of additional protocols in force was growing. His country was providing support for the implementation of safeguards through its Member State Support Programme and had contributed €100 000 to support the universalization of the additional protocol.

69. The Netherlands commended the Agency on the progress made in the development and implementation of safeguards in the context of the State-level concept, and was convinced that the State-level approach, which was currently implemented in 53 States, would lead to a more efficient and effective application of safeguards in all Member States. His country recognized that the development and implementation of safeguards at the State level was a dynamic process and stood ready to work with the Agency in that regard. It welcomed the broad discussions held on that issue over the previous year, the seriousness with which the Agency had consulted with and informed its members, and the readiness of the Agency to consider different suggestions, points of view and opinions. He commended the Director General and Deputy Director General for Safeguards on the results achieved and looked forward to continued dialogue and consultations.

70. The Agency's reports on situations in countries with compliance issues had been independent, technical and factual, as expected.

71. The Netherlands wholeheartedly supported the ongoing diplomatic negotiations between the E3+3 and Iran on the Iranian nuclear programme. Progress had been made over the previous year under the Joint Plan of Action, and the Netherlands had contributed a total of €375 000 in support of the Agency's monitoring and verification of nuclear-related measures set out in the JPA. He hoped that a comprehensive solution would be reached before 24 November. The Netherlands commended the Agency's efforts under the Framework for Cooperation. It noted that Iran had not yet fulfilled all its commitments under that Framework, and called on Iran to increase its efforts to resolve international concerns regarding its nuclear programme.

72. The Netherlands remained very concerned about the lack of response and appropriate action by the DPRK to the strong message by the international community that it should adhere to its international obligations. Renewed activities at the Yongbyon nuclear facilities were of particular concern. His delegation was convinced of the Agency's essential role in verifying the application of safeguards in the DPRK and urged the DPRK to authorize the early return of Agency inspectors.

73. The Netherlands hoped that Syria would respond positively and without delay to the Director General's request to resolve all outstanding issues and bring into force an additional protocol as soon as possible. The grave security situation in Syria was not an excuse for the failure of the Syrian Government to do its utmost to resolve the outstanding issues.

74. In March 2014, the Netherlands had hosted the Nuclear Security Summit, at which the leaders of 53 States had engaged in interactive discussions on a wide range of security-related topics. Important steps had been taken and commitments made regarding, among other things, the reduction of the amount of dangerous nuclear material, the minimization of plutonium stockpiles and the improvement of international cooperation for nuclear security. The Summit Communiqué emphasized the Agency's central role in nuclear security.

75. Two other summits had been held in the Netherlands in conjunction with the Nuclear Security Summit: the Nuclear Industry Summit and the Nuclear Knowledge Summit. The results achieved at all three events contributed to and supported the Agency's work in the area of nuclear security and would benefit all Member States.

76. In a joint statement on strengthening nuclear security implementation, 35 countries had committed themselves to incorporating the objectives of the Nuclear Security Fundamentals in national rules and regulations, including recommendations set out in specific Nuclear Security Series documents. The Netherlands had already implemented several measures, including its recent contribution to the Nuclear Security Fund of €1 million for the implementation of the Agency's Nuclear Security Plan. He encouraged all Member States to support the joint statement.

77. The Netherlands had hosted IPPAS missions at all its installations, and highly recommended those missions, which increased confidence in the security of nuclear installations, to other Member States. Furthermore, it fully supported the Agency's efforts to promote the entry into force of the 2005 amendment to the CPPNM and had provided funding for the organization of regional outreach workshops to assist countries in their national ratification processes.

78. In the area of radiological security, the Netherlands was committed to working jointly with France, Germany and the United States on a roadmap of actions for the following two years to strengthen the international security framework, promote alternatives to radioactive sources and enhance the efforts of supplier countries.

79. IRRS missions were a useful tool enabling States to strengthen their national regulatory infrastructures and discharge their national and international responsibilities relating to nuclear safety and security in the best possible way. His country looked forward to receiving an IRRS mission in November.

80. The number of Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety currently stood at 77, only one more than the previous year. He called upon all States that were not yet Contracting Parties to accede to that innovative and important safety mechanism and called on the remaining 10 signatory States to ratify the Convention as soon as possible.

81. The Agency's role in advancing nuclear technology to the benefit of all could not be overstated. It was therefore crucial that the Agency had the material and financial resources it needed to fulfil its mandate. In that regard, his delegation welcomed the agreement on the budget for 2015.

82. The Netherlands, which had welcomed the visit of the Deputy Director General for Technical Cooperation earlier in the year, was a strong supporter of the Agency's technical cooperation programme, through which the Agency was able to make a unique contribution to sustainable national and international development, including in the context of the MDGs. Rigorous implementation of safety, security and safeguards measures in the technical cooperation programme was essential to prevent unnecessary health risks and to ensure that nuclear material did not fall into the hands of terrorists. The Netherlands welcomed the Agency's clear commitment in that regard and recommended that, when nuclear material was provided, the Agency should offer assistance in the implementation of its guidance and recommendations.

83. With regard to the funding of technical cooperation activities, he said that the Netherlands, which had pledged its full target share to the TCF for 2015, supported all efforts to make the technical cooperation programme more efficient and effective. In order to make more funds available to least developed countries, those Member States in a position to do so should reimburse the Agency for the assistance received. Member States should also move away from receiving assistance as soon as their

national situations allowed them to do so, and the Netherlands thanked those States that had taken such steps in the past.

84. Mr WLODARSKI (Poland) said that his country was party to all significant conventions and treaties regarding nuclear safety and security, radiation protection, non-proliferation and radiation monitoring. It also supported all efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism and had ratified both the amended CPPNM and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. The implementation of the Agency's Nuclear Security Plan and the organization of nuclear security summits were very useful measures and Poland fully intended to cooperate further within those frameworks.

85. The seventh shipment of HEU spent fuel from Polish research reactors to the Russian Federation had recently been completed. The remaining HEU spent fuel assemblies would be shipped to the Russian Federation in 2016. Since September 2014, the Maria reactor had been operating exclusively on LEU fuel.

86. In January 2014, his Government had adopted the Polish nuclear power programme, a strategic document that included a roadmap for launching nuclear power in Poland and defined the roles and responsibilities of particular stakeholders. It also included measures to ensure nuclear safety and radiological protection in Poland and addressed the issue of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste management.

87. Poland intended to build two nuclear power plants with a total installed capacity of 6 000 MW(e). The first reactor was expected to be operational by 2025 and the country's largest energy company had been designated as the lead investor.

88. Site characterization and environmental impact assessments were currently being undertaken at two sites in northern Poland in accordance with Polish law and international standards and best practices. According to current plans, the selection of the site and conclusion of the construction contract would be completed by the end of 2016.

89. Turning to the legislative changes necessary for the introduction of nuclear power in Poland, he said that the Atomic Law had been amended in 2011 and again in 2014. The amended law gave absolute priority to safety, ensuring that the investor could choose only from the most up-to-date technologies that met the highest possible safety requirements, and that responsibility for nuclear safety was correctly assigned at all stages. It also included a requirement stating that the construction, commissioning, operation or decommissioning of nuclear facilities could not be carried out without a licence issued by the regulatory body.

90. The main challenge concerning the implementation of the nuclear power programme for the nuclear regulatory authority related to the authority's transformation into a modern, professional and fully transparent regulatory body that was capable of assuming new responsibilities. The organizational structure and management system had been adjusted to the new mandate and the number of staff had been significantly increased.

91. Staff members were receiving professional training, including through national and regional technical cooperation activities. Polish experts participated actively in the work of international organizations involved in the field of nuclear and radiation protection, and many took part in bilateral and multilateral exchanges of knowledge and experience and peer review missions. Polish specialists had gained experience in regulating non-power facilities. In addition, the Polish regulatory authority had developed an action plan for the implementation of on-the-job training in cooperation with Regulatory Cooperation Forum, under which a number of Polish professionals would receive long-term training in 2015 in the regulatory bodies of countries with extensive experience of

nuclear programmes. That initiative would be funded from the budget of the national technical cooperation programme and the Polish regulatory authority.

92. In order to accelerate the exchange of experience in the area of nuclear safety, bilateral regulatory cooperation was constantly being developed.

93. An integrated work plan had been adopted with a view to implementing all the suggestions and recommendations of the INIR and IRRS missions to Poland. His country, which sought to strengthen its nuclear power programme infrastructure, also intended to host an IPPAS mission in the near future.

94. Poland, which had always attached great importance to technical cooperation between the Agency and Member States, aimed to participate actively in the technical cooperation programme at the national, regional and interregional levels. It strongly supported the application of the due account mechanism and was fully committed to paying its NPCs and share of the TCF target on time and in full. Noting that nuclear energy and safety were two priorities reflected in Poland's Country Programme Note for 2016–2017, he said that Poland had proposed a regional project concept on the strengthening of the licensing capabilities of regulatory authorities in countries that were introducing or expanding their nuclear power programmes, and was also involved in national and regional technical cooperation projects concerning human health and the application of isotopes and radiation technology in industry.

95. Mr SINHA (India) said that the Indian atomic energy programme had achieved several important milestones in 2014: the Department of Atomic Energy had completed 60 years of service; it had been 50 years since the country's first plutonium reprocessing plant had been commissioned; and India had celebrated the 40th anniversary of the commissioning of its first gamma radiation processing plant for the sterilization of medical products.

96. On 6 August 2014, Unit 5 of Rajasthan Atomic Power Station had achieved a record of 765 days of continuous operation, the longest operational period of any nuclear power unit worldwide for two decades and the second longest in the history of nuclear power. Over approximately four and a half years of commercial operation, the plant's construction costs had been recovered through the sale of electricity, and some 4.25 million tonnes of carbon dioxide emissions had also been avoided.

97. Unit 1 of the Kudankulam nuclear power plant, which had achieved first criticality in July 2013, was operating close to its full power of 1000 MW(e). Unit 2 was at an advanced stage of commissioning.

98. The construction of a 500 MW(e) prototype fast breeder reactor at Kalpakkam was nearing completion and all critical, permanent in-core components had been installed. The reactor was expected to achieve first criticality in approximately six months.

99. The following month, India would be hosting an Agency technical meeting on the construction and commissioning of fast reactors at the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research.

100. India continued to prioritize research and development concerning all aspects of thorium-related reactor technologies and related fuel cycles. It was in the advanced stages of selecting a site for the construction of an advanced heavy water reactor.

101. Several Indian fuel cycle facilities had achieved their highest levels of performance the previous year. PHWR fuel production had increased by 18% and the highest ever production of heavy water had been achieved with the lowest specific energy consumption.

102. India's additional protocol had entered into force on 25 July 2014.

103. His country was committed to implementing the highest standards of safety at nuclear power plants, and had organized national and international peer reviews. The OSART follow-up mission to Units 3 and 4 of the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station that had taken place in February 2014 had concluded that, in many cases, the plant had surpassed its expectations. Preparations were in progress for the IRRS mission planned for March 2015 and a preparatory team was expected to visit in October. In March 2014, the Indian Atomic Energy Regulatory Board had held a workshop with Agency experts in order to prepare the documents and meet other requirements for the IRRS mission.

104. India welcomed the significant progress made by INPRO over the years. The INPRO methodology for assessment provided an opportunity to establish acceptance criteria for new designs, such as innovative capabilities for enhanced safety.

105. India welcomed the theme of the 2014 Scientific Forum on meeting the challenge of radioactive waste. His country's policy of employing a closed nuclear fuel cycle not only ensured better utilization of nuclear fuel resources, but also greatly minimized the quantity of waste.

106. With the commissioning of an actinide separation demonstration facility in Tarapur, India had become one of two advanced nuclear countries that could demonstrate the separation of minor actinides from high-level waste. Such an approach would help reduce substantially the life of radioactive waste and the volume of high-level waste requiring long-term storage. Proven technology had also been developed for the removal of highly radioactive caesium-137 and its conversion for use in low-dose radiation applications.

107. Non-power applications of nuclear and radiation technologies in the areas of health care, water, industry and environmental protection continued to expand, delivering important benefits to society, and he drew attention in that regard to food preservation technology developed by the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre. India remained a strong supporter and contributor to RCA initiatives and had been the lead country in the area of industrial applications and cancer treatment for several years.

108. India's Department of Atomic Energy was continuing to develop cost-effective and efficient methods for early cancer diagnosis and treatment. One technique developed by the Tata Memorial Centre to deliver radioisotopes to specific sites had been particularly effective in cases of Non-Hodgkin lymphoma, reducing treatment duration from nine months to one month.

109. India welcomed the Agency's sustained efforts to support cancer management, in particular through PACT, and looked forward to the continued expansion of activities under that Programme.

110. His country also appreciated the efforts of the Director General to mobilize support for the proposed modernization of the Agency's Nuclear Applications Laboratories.

111. In addition to activities related to nuclear energy and non-power applications, India continued to make progress in developing high-level technologies in other important areas such as nuclear fusion and accelerators.

112. As part of the arrangement concerning India's voluntary contribution to the NSF, his country was providing the services of a cost-free information security expert to the Division of Nuclear Security.

113. Under the auspices of the Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership, a regional training course on vulnerability analysis of physical protection systems had been held the previous week in Mumbai.

114. In the area of emergency preparedness, he drew attention to tools developed to screen potentially affected individuals and measure internal contamination in the event of a radiological

emergency, and to remote controlled systems that could be used to assess the spread of radioactive contamination.

115. Recalling the role that nuclear energy was destined to play in meeting energy and other requirements and the need for concerted efforts to pool international knowledge and resources to find safe, economical and sustainable solutions, he highlighted the importance of developing a scientific basis for the radiation protection regime. Given the current status of development and the availability of advanced research, his delegation was convinced that, given the required resources, a well-founded scientific recommendation could be made in order to remove any undue conservatism relating to radiation protection limits. He referred in that connection to studies of 160 000 newborns from Kerala, a state whose population was continually exposed to higher than average natural background radiation emanating from the monazite-bearing sands, which had not yet revealed any significant differences in rates of malformation or stillbirth.

116. Accelerated and conclusive scientific research on the health-related effects of radiation would allay any perceived concerns regarding nuclear energy and would lead to the more widespread use of affordable, life-saving, radiation-based diagnostic modalities, such as PET imaging. The Agency should take the lead in that regard, along with other international bodies such as UNSCEAR, the International Commission on Radiological Protection and WHO, by organizing an international symposium in order to reach consensus on the effect of low-dose radiation on human health and identify areas requiring further research.

117. Lastly, he announced that his country's maiden mission to Mars had successfully entered the planet's orbit that day, representing an historic moment for the Indian space programme.

118. Mr AZZOPARDI (Malta) said that his country was a strong advocate of disarmament and non-proliferation and was committed to full compliance with the NPT. Malta supported the universalization of the NPT and called on States that had not yet ratified it to do so without further delay.

119. Malta, which did not use nuclear power to meet its energy needs, recognized the right of every State to develop, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, fully respecting safety standards. It highly valued the Agency's indispensable verification activities and called upon States to sign and ratify a comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol, which enabled the Agency to confirm that a State was meeting its international commitments and built confidence among the international community.

120. The adoption and implementation of safety and security standards should not be limited to land. As an island State and a leading maritime flag State, Malta considered that such standards should also be applied to the maritime industry, in particular to the shipment of radioactive cargo. Malta encouraged dialogue between coastal and shipping States involved in the transportation of radioactive material and welcomed the timely provision of information by shipping States in advance of radioactive shipments.

121. Turning to events in the southern Mediterranean, he said that the establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction would strengthen the non-proliferation regime and build confidence in the region. Malta welcomed the informal meetings held in Switzerland, and fully supported the tireless efforts of the facilitator, Mr Laajava. It hoped that a conference on that topic would be held as soon as possible.

122. Malta was deeply concerned about the DPRK's nuclear weapons and missile programmes and about that country's decision to cease all cooperation with the Agency. It called on the DPRK to comply fully and unconditionally with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council

and the Agency without delay and denounced the DPRK's provocative action, which constituted a serious challenge to the international non-proliferation regime.

123. His country also remained concerned that Syria had not provided the requested cooperation with the Agency. Syria should comply fully with the Board's 2011 resolution (GOV/2011/14), remedy its non-compliance and bring into force an additional protocol without delay.

124. Malta viewed positively the steps taken by Iran under the Framework for Cooperation and the discussions that had taken place between Iran and the Agency. However, it was concerned that not all the commitments under the Framework had been fulfilled and that the Agency had not been able to confirm that the Iranian nuclear programme was exclusively for peaceful purposes. In order to build the confidence of the international community, Iran should cooperate fully with the Agency in order to meet the agreed deadlines, provide access to Parchin, resolve all outstanding issues and bring into force an additional protocol.

125. Malta's participation in the Agency's technical cooperation programme at the national and regional levels had been highly positive. His country had recently implemented national projects in the fields of radiotherapy and cultural heritage and participated in various regional training programmes. It was currently implementing a national project aimed at strengthening the regulatory framework for radiation safety. Malta thanked the Agency for all its technical support and assistance and looked forward to participating in future projects.

126. Ms PETRICK (Peru), welcoming the progress made over the previous year in implementing the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, said that Peru was committed to strengthening nuclear safety worldwide in light of the lessons learned at Fukushima, and eagerly awaited the completion and publication of the Fukushima Daiichi report. While Peru acknowledged that primary responsibility for nuclear safety lay with States, it considered that the Agency played an important role in promoting international cooperation and coordinating efforts to strengthen the global nuclear safety regime, by virtue of its mandate, technical expertise and broad membership. Her country, which was committed to non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and efforts to prevent malicious acts involving nuclear material, considered that the Agency's central role must be maintained.

127. Although the use of nuclear energy in Peru was limited largely to research activities and applications in agriculture, human health, hydrology and industry, her country was committed to ensuring high standards of nuclear safety. It would continue to participate constructively in preliminary discussions relating to the 2015 diplomatic conference to discuss a proposal to amend the Convention on Nuclear Safety.

128. Peru, which recognized that nuclear security was the responsibility of each State, had approved a nuclear security plan for 2014–2017 and launched a series of capacity building and training activities such as a regional workshop on IPPAS, which would be held in Lima from 3 to 5 November 2014. It had ratified the amendment to the CPPNM in March 2014 and had already initiated activities in accordance with that instrument. Peru appreciated the Agency's efforts to implement the Nuclear Security Plan for 2010–2013 welcoming, in particular, the assistance provided to Member States in such areas as capacity building, guidance, human resources development, sustainability, risk reduction and the strengthening of cooperation.

129. She welcomed the assistance provided to States to ensure their adherence to international legal instruments, including those relating to nuclear security, and drew attention to the visit of an IAEA expert mission to Peru in April 2014 as part of the Agency's legislative assistance programme.

130. Peru welcomed the efforts of the Secretariat to draw up biennial reports on the information collected through the ITDB and attached importance to the Nuclear Security Information Portal, the Nuclear Security Information Management System and the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee.

131. Peru noted the initiatives to strengthen nuclear security at the global level, such as the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague in March 2014, which had followed the summits in Washington and Seoul.

132. Turning to technical cooperation-related issues, in particular nuclear energy applications, she said that, in order to address the needs of developing countries adequately the Agency should focus on specific areas, including cancer, since there was an urgent need to build national capacities through the training of professionals and provision of equipment for diagnosis and treatment. Her Government had declared that comprehensive cancer care and improved access to cancer services were of national interest. Peru welcomed the impACT mission conducted in 2014, which had enabled an assessment of cancer treatment in the country with a view to implementing future cooperation programmes with the Agency and WHO, and the inclusion of a project on strengthening human resources for cancer prevention, diagnosis and control in the 2016–2017 TC cycle. Other priorities for that cycle included: the remediation of soil contaminated by illegal gold mining; nuclear analytical and related techniques; the identification of possible causes of high levels of erosion; the use of Be-7 in environmental studies; environmental radioactivity mapping and determination of radiological risk; the molecular characterization of type-4 receptors and selection of a molecular marker for disease resistance in Alpacas.

133. Under its CPF for 2012–2016, which had been developed taking into account national plans and the regional priorities set out in the Regional Strategic Profile up to 2021, Peru was helping to design national as well as regional cooperation projects, including under ARCAL. It was participating in regional projects to address highly important thematic areas, such as training of human resources to ensure the sustainable operation of nuclear research reactors in the region.

134. Peru had joined the Ibero-American Forum of Radiological and Nuclear Regulatory Agencies in 2010. As the current chair of that body, Peru would work to promote nuclear and radiological safety by continuing the excellent work done by its predecessors.

135. She expressed her Government's appreciation to the Agency's Incident and Emergency Centre and to the Governments of Brazil and France for their valuable assistance in mitigating the consequences of a radiological accident that had occurred in Lima in February 2014. At the request of the Peruvian Institute of Nuclear Energy (IPEN), the Agency's Response and Assistance Network had been activated and medical assistance had been provided.

136. She drew attention to a number of events organized by IPEN, including the fourth research coordination meeting on improving nutritional quality in crops, in April 2014; a preparatory meeting concerning the development of an instrument to help Member States analyse regulatory deficiencies with respect to the new International Basic Safety Standards, in June 2014; a regional meeting on new trends in radioactive waste management, in June 2014; and an ORPAS mission carried out the previous week, the recommendations of which would be vital in improving radiological safety in medical and industrial centres.

137. Peru thanked the Agency for its support concerning the renewal of fuel elements at the IPEN research reactor.

138. Turning to nuclear verification, she said that Peru supported the Agency's safeguards activities and its efforts to enhance efficiency in that regard, including through the State-level concept. Peru was

one of 53 countries in which the State-level safeguards approach was being applied satisfactorily. She encouraged the Agency to pursue its verification activities.

139. With regard to the application of safeguards in Iran, she noted with interest that Iran had continued to provide information and clarifications, and was pleased that the Agency could verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in that country. Despite the positive developments, Peru was concerned that the Agency was not yet in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. It called on Iran to cooperate fully with the Agency to clarify all outstanding issues relating to the possible military dimensions of its nuclear programme.

140. It was regrettable that the DPRK had ceased cooperation with the Agency, and that the Agency was unable to carry out its monitoring and verification measures relating to the Yongbyon nuclear facility.

Mr Andereya Latorre (Chile), Vice-President, took the Chair.

141. Mr ILIOSKI (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) noted with satisfaction that his country would be a member of the Board of Governors for the period September 2014–2016.

142. Special consideration should be given to nuclear terrorism and preventing the misuse of nuclear materials. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia had joined the most important instruments embodying international efforts to strengthen the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities and the non-proliferation regime. It encouraged those Member States that had not yet done so to ratify those instruments in the near future, and called for consistent efforts to secure negotiated peaceful solutions to urgent problems.

143. In view of his country's aspiration to join the European Union, it had developed and implemented a wide range of measures to strengthen its nuclear regulatory framework and infrastructure over the previous decade. Effective instruments had been put in place to protect its border against illicit trafficking in radioactive and nuclear materials. His country would continue to build capacity to further improve the physical protection of nuclear applications, border control management and regulatory infrastructure.

144. The law on ionizing radiation protection and safety, which had been promulgated in 2002 and regulated cooperation between the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the European Commission in the field of nuclear safety and radiation protection, had been amended in 2007 to bring it into line with the International Basic Safety Standards, the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources, and European directives. His country was committed to managing radioactive waste in a safe, secure and sustainable manner in accordance with internationally recognized nuclear and radiation safety and security principles.

145. The Radiation Safety Directorate established in 2002 as an independent regulatory body had made significant progress, with Agency assistance, in building national capacity for effective radiation protection and nuclear safety. Achievements had included the adoption of several volumes of rules aligned with European Union legislation, and the adoption of the strategic plan for 2014–2016, which set out directions and objectives for the integration of the country into the European Union and NATO.

146. Macedonia strongly supported strengthening Agency technical assistance, which was indispensable, primarily for developing countries. The Agency's expertise, training, education, and provision of necessary equipment, were crucial for achieving goals in such fields as nuclear

safeguards, safety and security, regulatory infrastructure, radiation medicine and diagnostics, and agriculture.

147. His country's nuclear development priorities were focused on areas in which Agency technical cooperation activities could contribute and took into account its increased efforts to comply with the relevant requirements for European Union membership and relevant international development assistance.

148. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia thanked the Agency for its assistance under the technical cooperation programme. Its forthcoming CPF would be implemented through both national and regional technical cooperation projects and would be driven by the progress of existing programmes and plans addressing priority sectors of development. Ongoing projects were fully consistent with the country's new CPF for the period 2013–2017. His country continued to participate extensively in regional and interregional technical cooperation projects promoting the development of nuclear institutions and human resources, human health, radiation protection, and nuclear applications. It had also contributed actively to the technical cooperation programme by hosting workshops, scientific visits, fellowships, and by offering its expertise to other Member States.

149. His country had begun the process of systematically and comprehensively gathering the information required to make a decision on embarking on a nuclear power programme. A national energy strategy had been prepared, including the use of nuclear power alongside other energy sources, as one of the options to meet energy demand by 2030 and beyond. Financial and technical assistance from the Agency were required to properly implement all of the steps for that work, including an assessment of the work plan and results, and to ensure that the programme was in compliance with international and Agency guidelines and requirements in all necessary areas. The new national project concept for the 2016–2017 cycle concerning preparation activities for making a decision on entering into a new nuclear energy programme in Macedonia was being further developed into a project design.

150. Recognizing the importance of nuclear technologies in medicine, he drew attention to the project MAK/6/011 on introducing positron emission tomography (PET) in clinical practice, which was being implemented with substantial government cost sharing. It would be followed up in the mid-term through the use of newly established diagnostic capabilities to further develop therapeutic procedures in nuclear medicine. Radiotherapy services at the University Clinic of Radiotherapy and Oncology in Skopje had been upgraded, and the clinic had been recommended as a centre of competence following an Agency Quality Assurance Team for Radiation Oncology (QUATRO) mission. The clinic would serve as the main training provider for the expansion of national cancer treatment capacity, and he drew attention in that regard to the ongoing project MAK/6/014 on strengthening 3D conformal radiation therapy and intensity-modulated radiation therapy at the clinic and to an approved new national project concept on strengthening brachytherapy and advanced external beam therapy techniques.

151. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia fully supported the Annual Report for 2013 and the budget planned for 2015. It would remain committed to the efforts of the Agency to address the challenges arising from the peaceful use of nuclear energy for the benefit of all people.

152. Mr DAAG (Sweden) said that during its three-year term as a member of the Board, his country had focused on guarding and strengthening the international non-proliferation regime, supporting the safe and peaceful use of nuclear technology, and fostering the transfer of knowledge and technology. Sweden had also aimed to ensure that, to the extent possible, the Agency focused on the technical issues at hand and had encouraged Member States to avoid unnecessary polarization.

153. The Agency had always been much more than a nuclear watchdog, and Sweden had worked actively to spread knowledge about its diverse activities. His country strongly supported the Agency's

technical cooperation activities in such areas as human health, food security and water management. In addition to its full target share of the TCF, Sweden had made voluntary contributions to programmes such as the PUI and had provided financial assistance in support of the water resources project in the Sahel region.

154. In order to achieve general support and broad consensus among Member States, it was important to strike an appropriate balance between safeguards, safety and security, research and development and technical cooperation.

155. Undertakings made at previous NPT Review Conferences, notably in the year 2000 and 2010, must be implemented in order to ensure the success of the 2015 Review Conference. Sweden supported a forward-looking outcome document with concrete commitments on all three pillars of the NPT, namely disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

156. The strengthened Agency safeguards system was a fundamental part of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The additional protocol and comprehensive safeguards agreement constituted a robust and effective system that should be considered as the current verification standard. Sweden encouraged all States that had not yet done so to bring into force an additional protocol without delay and to ensure that their SQPs were in accordance with the current standard.

157. Sweden was supportive of the Agency's efforts to adapt its safeguards activities in an effective, efficient and evolving system, including through the development and application of the State-level concept. He noted that the Agency had developed tailor-made approaches for Sweden's nuclear facilities.

158. Sweden fully supported the ongoing diplomatic efforts to seek a long-term, viable diplomatic solution with Iran, including through voluntary contributions for verification purposes. Iran needed to address the international community's concerns and make every effort to establish confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its programme. It welcomed the steps that Iran had taken towards implementing the measures agreed under the Joint Plan of Action, as well as under the Framework for Cooperation, and called upon Iran to make further progress.

159. It was deeply regrettable that the Agency had not been able to implement any safeguards measures in the DPRK since April 2009. Sweden urged that country to comply with its international obligations fully, unconditionally and without delay.

160. Sweden regretted Syria's non-compliance with its NPT safeguards agreement. Noting the lack of progress in resolving outstanding issues, he said that the issue should remain on the Board's agenda. His country urged Syria to cooperate with the Agency and to remedy its non-compliance.

161. Sweden reaffirmed its support for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in the Middle East. It encouraged all Member States to support the efforts of the facilitator, Mr Laajava, and called on all States in the region to engage constructively and in good faith.

162. Radioactive waste management was an important and relevant topic, which the current Scientific Forum was addressing. During a visit to Sweden, the Director General had been introduced to his country's extensive programme for the management of spent nuclear fuel, including the central interim storage facility for spent nuclear fuel and the Hard Rock Laboratory, where local political and public support was of particular interest. Sweden would continue to contribute to international cooperation under the CPPNM using its experience and knowledge, including that accumulated from the ongoing licensing and creation of a deep geological repository for spent nuclear fuel.

163. Major nuclear accidents could only be fully understood by recognizing the interplay between human, technological and organizational aspects, including the need for an effective safety culture at all levels. Sweden commended the Agency for its support to Member States in that regard. It had organized an information meeting on human and organizational factors and would continue to be engaged in that area.

164. Sweden recognized the importance of high safety standards globally, regionally and nationally, and the need for international cooperation and the development of common approaches with respect to nuclear safety. Sweden welcomed the revised Euratom Nuclear Safety Directive and would continue to support the development of Agency safety standards. He noted that the Agency's safety requirements had formed the most important international basis for the work to update the European basic safety standards and enhance the safety levels applied within the EU.

165. Sweden welcomed the amendments to the guidelines under the Convention on Nuclear Safety resulting from Sixth Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties to that Convention. It looked forward discussing the Swiss proposal to amend the Convention on Nuclear Safety at the diplomatic conference early in 2015.

166. Noting that the Fukushima accident had also pointed to the need for closer international collaboration in emergency situations, he said that Sweden continued to support fully the Agency's activities regarding emergency preparedness and response. The cooperation between the Nordic countries in that area, which had resulted in rules and procedures with respect to accident management in nuclear facilities, had received international interest.

167. Sweden welcomed the Nuclear Security Summit process and would continue to engage in the preparatory process for the summit to be held in the United States in 2016. At the 2014 Summit in The Hague, Sweden and Norway had committed themselves to providing support to Ukraine in the area of nuclear safety and security. Over the summer, the content of that assistance had been developed and the first projects had been initiated.

168. Sweden had been active in developing Agency model exercise material for nuclear transport security, which aimed to assist Member States in the practical implementation of Agency transport security recommendations. In 2015 Sweden planned to conduct a pilot table-top exercise followed by a field exercise.

169. Sweden attached great importance to gender equality within the Secretariat and called for the full and equal participation of women, including at the highest levels. It commended the Director General's efforts to encourage women to apply for senior positions in the Secretariat and looked forward to further achievements in that connection.

170. Mr LEKO (Bosnia and Herzegovina) said that, his country, which was currently a member of the Board of Governors, called on the countries that remained outside the NPT to join the Treaty in order to achieve the goal of a safer world.

171. His country fully endorsed the budget proposal for the forthcoming period, and trusted that the overall budget framework would enable all the specified activities to be undertaken.

172. Although Bosnia and Herzegovina was a non-nuclear country and had no plans to build any nuclear facilities given its ample hydropower potential and sizeable coal deposits, it had an obligation to ensure that the various ionizing radiation sources that were used in the country, primarily in medicine, industry and agriculture, were safe and secure. Since his country had joined the Agency in 1995, it had initiated a series of activities to strengthen nuclear and radiation safety and security, as well as safeguards.

173. The Act on Radiation and Nuclear Safety in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had been in force since 2007, incorporated the highest international technical and legal standards. The regulatory body, the State Regulatory Agency for Radiation and Nuclear Safety, which played a pivotal role in radiation safety, had enacted a number of regulations consistent with international standards in such fields as radiation safety, the use of radiation sources and nuclear security.

174. Turning to the domestic legislative and regulatory framework, he said that a law on liability for nuclear damage, which was consistent with the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the 1997 Protocol amending the Convention, had been adopted in 2013.

175. A policy on the safety of ionizing radiation sources, which was based on fundamental safety and security principles and aimed to establish an effective and transparent system to protect against the harmful effects of ionizing radiation, had been adopted and a radioactive waste management strategy law in Bosnia and Herzegovina had also been passed.

176. His country was committed to the international system for nuclear safety and security, non-proliferation and civil liability for nuclear damage and met its obligations under the many legally-binding international instruments it had adopted, including the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Joint Convention, the amendment to the CPPNM, amendments to Article VI and Article XIV.A of the Agency Statute and the Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage. Bosnia and Herzegovina had also brought an additional protocol into force and had expressed full and unequivocal political support for the implementation of the non-legally binding Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive sources and supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.

177. Bosnia and Herzegovina had initiated activities to adopt an INSSP with a view to improving the security of radioactive materials. It was committed to strengthening its regulatory body and other nuclear safety and security institutions, for which it would continue to require the Agency's technical assistance, as well as support from the European Union and other international partners.

178. National priorities for the coming period included the continuation of activities relating to the safety of sources, radioactive waste safety, the implementation of an emergency plan and the strengthening of nuclear security, including prevention, detection and response.

179. In conclusion, he said that Bosnia and Herzegovina fully supported the work and mission of the Agency and would continue to be an active member of the Board during its term of office.

180. Mr BELIC (Serbia) said that his country supported the Agency's programme and budget for 2015 and the Annual Report for 2013.

181. Serbia, which remained firmly committed to the application of nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes, continued to support the Agency's efforts to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of its verification activities, including through the development of integrated safeguards. It attached great importance to the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and to the suppression of nuclear terrorism, and had undertaken a number of preparatory actions in that regard prior to its ratification of the additional protocol, including raising awareness of nuclear security.

182. Serbia supported the Agency's efforts and activities to promote the safe and secure use of nuclear energy. In line with its aspiration to join the EU, Serbia was making efforts to meet all the obligations arising from the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, with particular emphasis on nuclear safety and safeguards. On 21 January 2014, the first EU–Serbia Intergovernmental Conference had taken place, signalling the formal start of Serbia's accession negotiations to the European Union.

183. In order to strengthen safety and security, as well as international cooperation, Serbia had undertaken steps to accede to the Convention on Nuclear Safety and to the Joint Convention. His country had initiated preparations for the ratification and implementation of the amendment to the CPPNM and had requested technical assistance from the Agency and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in that regard. It had hosted a national workshop, which had raised awareness of the amendment among a wide range of relevant government agencies and opened the way for further administrative progress.

184. Serbia was strengthening its national nuclear security regime and developing a legislative and regulatory framework that complied with Agency requirements. The development of national regulations in the field of nuclear security had provided a legal basis for the development of the Design Basis Threat, a physical protection system for operators, as well as long-term plans and goals. Future plans included approving an INSSP, and further implementing the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.

185. Serbia's efforts in capacity building and enhancing infrastructure in the field of radiation protection and nuclear safety had been supported by the Agency through several national and international projects, which provided relevant expertise, advice and technical assistance.

186. His country was strongly committed to making its national nuclear legal and regulatory system more comprehensive and consistent with international safety standards and practices, including the body of European Union rights and obligations. It recognized the importance of the Agency's technical assistance in achieving progress in that regard. Serbia also supported the Secretariat's efforts to further improve international safety standards, recommendations and relevant international legal and political documents.

187. Mr GARRIBBA (Euratom), speaking on behalf of the European Commission, welcomed the role that the Agency played in nuclear and radiation waste and transport safety as well as in emergency preparedness and response.

188. After the Fukushima Daiichi accident, the European Council had called on the Commission to review the European Union's legislative nuclear safety framework. In July 2013, the EU had adopted a revised nuclear safety directive, which built on the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident and the EU's stress tests as well as on the safety requirements of the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association. It provided for the strengthening of the power and independence of national regulatory authorities, the introduction of high-level EU-wide safety objectives, the establishment of a European system of peer reviews every six years from 2016, as well as increased transparency, enhanced accident management and on-site emergency preparedness and response, and the promotion of an effective nuclear safety culture.

189. Radiation protection legislation had also been overhauled in the first major review since 1996. The revised directive took into account recent international recommendations and standards and brought together seven different pieces of legislation in a single document. It covered all relevant radiation sources, including natural sources; addressed the protection of workers, members of the public, patients and the environment; and took into account all exposure situations.

190. To further enhance the cooperation between the European Commission and the Agency, meetings of senior officials from both organizations were held to discuss priorities in such areas as nuclear safety, security, applications technical cooperation and safeguards. The memorandum of understanding signed by the Commission and the Agency at the previous session of the General Conference served to strengthen the relationship between the two organizations.

191. The Commission fully supported the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety and welcomed the Agency's efforts to strengthen its nuclear safety standards. He noted that the Commission, had, through its Joint Research Centre, participated actively in the revision of the Agency's General and Specific Safety Requirements, which had been initiated to incorporate the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident.

192. The Commission cooperated closely with the Agency on the implementation of nuclear safety projects in third countries and provided considerable support for technical cooperation programmes and in the implementation of the IAEA Action Plan.

193. The Commission welcomed the Agency's organization of IRRS missions to EU member States as envisaged in the European Union nuclear safety directive.

194. Euratom members would play their part in the forthcoming diplomatic conference concerning the Convention on Nuclear Safety.

195. In the area of emergency preparedness and response, he said that the EU strived to facilitate a coherent international response to a nuclear accident and had operated a system for quick and automatic exchange of environmental radiation data for a long time. He welcomed the recent collaboration with the Agency to expand the use of such technology to other parts of the world.

196. The Commission supported all measures to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system, including the State-level concept, which would enable the Agency to focus its efforts on areas of greatest proliferation risk. It welcomed the Director General's recent report on the subject.

197. The EU remained a key donor to the Nuclear Security Fund, having contributed more than €40 million since 2004. It had closely coordinated its support to third countries, mainly through the border monitoring working group.

198. A practical arrangement signed in December 2013 would strengthen technical cooperation in nuclear security by promoting close cooperation between the EU's chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear centres of excellence and the Agency's Network for Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres.

199. The EU strongly believed that nuclear safety had to be promoted beyond its borders. Neighbouring countries that operated or owned nuclear installations or had nuclear power development plans had associated themselves in the stress tests.

200. The Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation had been adopted at the end of 2013 with a financial reference amount of some €225 million for the next seven years that would enable the EU to continue to support nuclear safety and safeguards in non-EU countries worldwide.

201. After the adoption of the directive on spent fuel and radioactive waste management in 2011, the European Commission had focused on reviewing its implementation in national legislation. All EU member States were developing action plans concerning the handling of radioactive waste.

202. Despite the initiatives undertaken by the Commission and the Euratom Supply Agency to improve the security of supply of medical radioisotopes, capacity remained fragile. The issue must be considered fully by EU institutions, member States, regulators, industry representatives and international organizations, including OECD/NEA and the Agency.

203. The general objectives of the Euratom research and training programme for 2014–2018 emphasized continuous improvement of nuclear safety, including waste management and emergency preparedness; security, including safeguards; and radiation protection. The support provided directly

by the Commission's Joint Research Centre focused on research and training and on increasing excellence in the nuclear science.

204. In concluding, he said that the Commission would be interested in sharing the EU's safety and legal framework as a model for other countries.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.