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## Nuclear Security Plan 2014–2017

*Report by the Director General*

**Summary**

The first concerted nuclear security plan was approved in March 2002 by the Board of Governors (GOV/2002/10), which also approved the creation of a voluntary funding mechanism, the Nuclear Security Fund (NSF). The Board approved the current Nuclear Security Plan 2010–2013 (GOV/2009/54) in September 2009. This Plan will be concluded at the end of 2013. The Agency convened the International Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing Global Efforts at the Agency's Headquarters from 1 to 5 July 2013. On 1 July, Ministers adopted a Declaration which, *inter alia*, urged the Agency to take account of the Declaration in finalizing its Nuclear Security Plan for 2014 to 2017. This Plan builds on General Conference resolutions, the Ministerial Declaration and, where appropriate, the conclusions and recommendations from the Conference. In addition, it consolidates activities set out in the Nuclear Security Plan 2010–2013, taking into account new and modified priorities of Member States.

**Recommended Action**

It is recommended that the Board of Governors:

- a. Approve the Nuclear Security Plan 2014–2017;
- b. Approve the continuation of voluntary funding for the activities included in the Nuclear Security Plan 2014–2017, without targets, and call upon all Member States to continue contributing on a voluntary basis to the Nuclear Security Fund; and
- c. Transmit the Plan to the General Conference with a recommendation that the Conference takes note of the Nuclear Security Plan 2014–2017 and calls upon Member States to contribute to the Nuclear Security Fund.



# Nuclear Security Plan 2014–2017

*Report by the Director General*

## A. Introduction

1. The risk that nuclear or other radioactive material could be used in criminal or intentional unauthorized acts remains a matter of concern internationally and continues to be regarded as a threat to international security<sup>1</sup>. It is well recognized that the responsibility for nuclear security<sup>2</sup> rests entirely with each State and that appropriate and effective national systems for nuclear security are vital in facilitating the peaceful use of nuclear energy and enhancing global efforts to combat nuclear terrorism. Significant growth is anticipated over the coming years in the use of nuclear applications in general and nuclear power programmes in particular by several countries. This will require a sustained focus on nuclear security infrastructure to enable the continued secure use of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy.
2. The Agency has provided, upon request, assistance to States and supported their national efforts to establish and improve nuclear security regimes since the early 1970s when it began providing ad hoc training in physical protection. In 1975, the Agency issued Recommendations for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and these have subsequently been revised five times. In 1997, following reports of illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material, the Security of Material Programme was established. The Agency's first comprehensive plan of action to protect against nuclear terrorism<sup>3</sup> was approved in March 2002 by the Board of Governors, which at that time also approved the creation of a voluntary funding mechanism, the Nuclear Security Fund (NSF), in order to help implement the Plan. Further Nuclear Security Plans were approved by the Board of Governors in 2005<sup>4</sup> and 2009<sup>5</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> See, for example, the Ministerial Declaration from the International Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing Global Efforts, 1 July 2013 (Annex of document GOV/INF/2013/9-GC(57)/INF/6), Preamble and Para. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Nuclear security focuses on the prevention of, detection of, and response to, criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving or directed at nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated facilities, or associated activities. (See Nuclear Security Fundamentals *Objective and Essential Elements of a State's Nuclear Security Regime*, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 20).

<sup>3</sup> GOV/2002/10.

<sup>4</sup> GOV/2005/50.

<sup>5</sup> GOV/2009/54-GC(53)/18.

## B. Background

3. A number of developments, summarized below, occurred over the four year period of the implementation of the Nuclear Security Plan 2010–2013. Lessons learned from these developments were taken into account in drawing up the Plan set out below. In addition, the Ministerial Declaration<sup>6</sup> and other results of the International Conference on Nuclear Security convened at the Agency's Headquarters in Vienna on 1–5 July 2013 were taken into account, where appropriate, in finalizing the Plan.

### B.1. Review of Developments 2010–2013

4. From the adoption of the Nuclear Security Plan 2010–2013 to date, a number of additional areas relevant to nuclear security have emerged. In particular, the Agency has noted a growing recognition of the need for comprehensive security systems, through an adequate and effective nuclear security infrastructure covering the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including nuclear facilities, and the whole life cycle of facilities and activities using other radioactive material. The areas of cybersecurity and nuclear forensics have also appeared as important tools that can assist States to enhance their ability to prevent and respond to a range of nuclear security events. For effective nuclear security, a well-developed nuclear security culture has been identified as fundamental. Nuclear Security Support Centres (NSSCs) have emerged as recognized comprehensive capacity building vehicles that can be valuable at the national, regional or international levels for guaranteeing sustainability of national nuclear security regimes, and for fostering the transfer of nuclear security knowledge and for exchanging best practices. Other developments during the period from 2010 to 2013 include the following:

- Sustained political attention has been paid to nuclear security. Nuclear security has continued to take a prominent position in global diplomatic activity. Statements in several fora have steadily confirmed, *inter alia*, that the responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with that State and that the Agency has a central role in strengthening the nuclear security framework globally, in particular through providing assistance to States, on request, and in leading the coordination of international activities in the field of nuclear security<sup>7</sup>.
- Increased international activities in the field of nuclear security have prompted the need to ensure coordination, including with relevant United Nations bodies and other international initiatives and organizations with a view to avoiding duplication and overlap.
- The endorsement, for the first time, by the Board of Governors of the Nuclear Security Fundamentals<sup>8</sup> reflected the importance being given by the Agency's Policy Making Organs to the establishment of internationally accepted nuclear security guidance that would be available for States that wish to use such guidance to strengthen their nuclear security.
- The vulnerability of sensitive nuclear security information remained a concern to Member States, specifically information, in whatever form, including software, the unauthorized disclosure, modification, alteration, destruction, or denial of use of which could compromise nuclear security.

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<sup>6</sup> Annex of document GOV/INF/2013/9-GC(57)/INF/6.

<sup>7</sup> See, for example, paragraph 17 of the Ministerial Declaration.

<sup>8</sup> GOV/2012/39.

- Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans (INSSPs) have become widely recognized as useful tools by States that wish to identify their nuclear security needs, as well as to coordinate improvements to their nuclear security with the Agency and potential donors<sup>9</sup>.
- There has been increased involvement of Member States in the development process for international nuclear security guidance. The path has been set for the completion of the Nuclear Security Series of guidance publications through the establishment of the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee (NSGC)<sup>10</sup>, a standing Committee open to all Member States. The new review and approval process for draft guidance has confirmed the status of the Nuclear Security Series (NSS) as international consensus guidance.
- There has been growing recognition that safety measures — or the failure of such measures — could also have implications for nuclear security, and vice versa.
- A mechanism has been established, with an associated Interface Group comprising the Chairs of the Safety Standards Committees and four members of NSGC, to identify interfaces between safety and security in publications being developed in the IAEA Safety Standards Series and the IAEA Nuclear Security Series, reflecting the common overarching aims of safety and security while recognizing the distinctions between the two areas.
- International activities to strengthen the security of nuclear and other radioactive material under regulatory control and their associated facilities have made marked achievements, for instance in physical protection upgrades to nuclear facilities and to facilities housing other radioactive material.
- Increased awareness of the international community of the risks associated with nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control has highlighted the need to provide further assistance to States that so request to bring such material under appropriate control. Improvement in States' abilities to detect and recover material out of regulatory control has been achieved through the donation of detection instruments to States together with associated training.
- In applying the physical protection Recommendations in Nuclear Security Series No. 13 (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5), several States have required nuclear facility operators to develop contingency plans to assist in the recovery of lost or stolen nuclear and other radioactive material as part of their national response plans.
- There have been a growing number of requests for International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) and International Nuclear Security Service (INNServ) missions, including from States having large nuclear programmes. This points the way to such missions, while remaining voluntary, becoming widely used as an important tool to improve nuclear security and to build confidence in both the international community and the general public with regard to the effectiveness of national nuclear security regimes. In response to requests from States for a more flexible approach to such services, the Agency has developed a number of modules designed to address specific needs.
- The important, albeit modest, increase of funds provided in the Agency's Regular Budget to the nuclear security programmes and sustained support of the Nuclear Security Plan 2010–2013, in large part through extrabudgetary contributions, reflects the importance given by

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<sup>9</sup> See, for example, paragraph 6 of the Ministerial Declaration.

<sup>10</sup> GOV/INF/2012/3.

Agency Member States to strengthening the Agency's capacity to contribute to global efforts to achieve effective nuclear security.

## B.2. Lessons Learned

- As recognized in the Nuclear Security Fundamentals, the responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with that State. However, a nuclear security event or a weakness in nuclear security measures in one State has the potential to involve or affect other States, and there is a growing recognition among States that nuclear security is a global issue that needs to be addressed on a global basis. In this context, the Agency offers an accepted global platform for the development of nuclear security guidance, and an international forum where best practice, information, education and training can be shared.
- Potential adversaries have demonstrated an ability to plan their activities globally. Therefore, those who seek to prevent and mitigate criminal or intentional unauthorized acts with global aspects must plan for, and be prepared to participate in, a global response.
- The increase in the number of States looking to institute programmes for the peaceful use of nuclear and other radioactive material calls for the planning of nuclear security at the earliest stages of development of such programmes. Nuclear security is an essential element of such programmes and should be an enabling tool rather than an impediment to the development of peaceful nuclear applications.
- Nuclear security involves entities in a State beyond the traditional Agency constituency in the planning and execution of nuclear security activities. These include, for example, customs officials, administrators of medical facilities, border guards and law enforcement organizations. Feedback from the practical use of Agency guidance will enable the sharing of best practices.
- The involvement of all Member States in Agency activities and initiatives relating to nuclear security is needed. Participation by their representatives and experts in the NSGC and in Agency-sponsored activities can involve Member States more closely and provide an opportunity for a greater sense of ownership in the development and application of nuclear security guidance documents as well as increasing their acceptance.
- Implementing sustainable nuclear security in States requires adequate time for the institutionalization of a functioning nuclear security culture. This requires a sustained commitment from all concerned.
- Consistent Agency support for the long term development of nuclear security globally will continue to depend upon the Agency having sufficient funding.

## B.3. International Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing Global Efforts, 1–5 July 2013

5. The International Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing Global Efforts was convened at the Agency's Headquarters in Vienna on 1–5 July 2013. This was the first Agency conference of its type, with participation by: government ministers; senior officials and policy makers responsible for nuclear security; experts and representatives from a wide range of technical disciplines and specialist organizations that contribute to nuclear security; representatives of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations with relevant competences; regulatory bodies and other national competent authorities; national security and crisis management agencies; law enforcement and border control agencies; and industry and other entities engaged in activities relevant to nuclear security. The

Conference attracted more than 1300 registered participants from 125 Member States, 34 of which were represented at ministerial level, and 21 organizations. On 1 July, Ministers adopted a Declaration which, inter alia, recognized and supported the Agency's continuing work to assist States, upon request, in their efforts to establish effective and sustainable national nuclear security regimes, and affirmed the Agency's central role in strengthening the nuclear security framework globally and in leading the coordination of international activities in the field of nuclear security.

6. The six Main Sessions of the Conference covered broad areas of nuclear security at a policy-oriented level, and 12 Technical Sessions addressed a range of technical topics in nuclear security in more detail. Information on the conference can be found in document GOV/INF/2013/9-GC(57)/INF/6.

7. The Ministerial Declaration and other results of the Conference were taken into account, as appropriate, in finalizing the Plan outlined below.

## C. Objective

8. The objective of the Nuclear Security Plan 2014–2017 is to contribute to global efforts to achieve effective security wherever nuclear and other radioactive material is in use, storage and/or transport, and of associated facilities by supporting States, upon request, in their efforts to meet their national responsibilities and international obligations, to reduce risks and to respond appropriately to threats.

9. In achieving this objective, the Agency will:

- Assist States, upon request, in their efforts to establish effective and sustainable national nuclear security regimes;
- Serve as the focal point for strengthening international cooperation, and for coordination of nuclear security assistance given through regional and bilateral programmes and other international initiatives;
- Enhance global nuclear security efforts by completing international guidance in the Nuclear Security Series and, upon request, supporting its implementation by States;
- Encourage and assist States to adhere to relevant international instruments and support States, upon request, in their efforts to adopt implementing national legislation;
- Build on the progress made during the implementation of the first three Nuclear Security Plans to help States sustain and further improve their national nuclear security regimes.

## D. International Instruments relevant to the Nuclear Security Plan 2014–2017

10. Details of the international legal framework for nuclear security have been set out in previous Nuclear Security Plans<sup>11</sup> and Nuclear Security Reports. The framework includes legally binding and

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<sup>11</sup> For a detailed analysis see IAEA International Law Series No 4.

non-binding instruments adopted under Agency and other auspices. Among its nuclear security activities, the Agency facilitates adherence to and implementation of the international legal framework by assisting States, upon request, in effectively meeting their obligations under the relevant international instruments.

11. A number of international instruments make reference to the role of the Agency, which in some cases is assigned specific responsibilities. The Agency has taken account of these instruments in drawing up this Nuclear Security Plan.

12. Of particular importance is the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) which, upon its entry into force and its implementation by States Parties, will have a major impact on reducing the vulnerability of States Parties to nuclear terrorism. The Amendment extends the scope of the physical protection measures required by the CPPNM to include nuclear facilities and nuclear material in peaceful domestic use, storage and transport as well as sabotage. It also provides for expanded cooperation between and among States regarding rapid measures to locate and recover stolen or smuggled nuclear material, mitigate any radiological consequences of sabotage and prevent and combat related offences. The Amendment also confers a number of additional functions on the Agency, which were set out in document GOV/2005/51 and approved by the Board of Governors. General Conference resolutions and the Ministerial Declaration encourage the Agency to continue its efforts to promote the entry into force of the Amendment at the earliest possible date.

## **E. Programme Elements and Expected Outcomes**

13. The Agency believes that it should continue to use, and build upon, the methods and tools of programme implementation set out in Section E of the Nuclear Security Plan 2010–2013<sup>12</sup>, taking into account new and modified priorities of Member States. Agency assistance will continue to be provided solely at the request of States, and nothing in the Plan is intended to impose obligations upon States. Proposed activities under the Plan are summarized under the following headings:

### **E.1. Needs Assessment, Information and Cybersecurity**

14. The availability of correct and adequate information continues to be a key factor in the Agency's implementation of its programme. Needs assessments, evaluations, analysis, and feedback from implementation of activities provide valuable input to programme prioritization and implementation. The provision of nuclear security related information that supports the development of national nuclear security regimes is important. Assistance will be provided to States through the development, at their request and with their cooperation, of Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans (INSSPs). The Agency will also conclude the development of the Nuclear Security Information Management System (NUSIMS) self-assessment methodology for use by States that so decide. The important role of INSSPs was noted in paragraph 6 of the Ministerial Declaration. The proposed activities in cybersecurity are in line with paragraph 22 of the Ministerial Declaration.

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<sup>12</sup> GOV/2009/54-GC(53)/18. Methods and tools comprise, nuclear security guidance; legislative assistance and facilitation of adherence to and implementation of international instruments; nuclear security peer reviews and advisory services; sustainability support; research and development; integrated nuclear security support plans; information management and collection; cooperation and networking; risk reduction.

### ***Objectives***

- To maintain a comprehensive information system that supports effective implementation of the Nuclear Security Plan by assisting the Agency in the prioritization of nuclear security improvements and in the better identification of resources required to implement the Plan.

### ***Outcomes***

- A secure information system that will provide the Secretariat with accurate, relevant information on a real time basis to effectively support its activities for assisting States.
- Comprehensive and up-to-date databases and tools that meet the needs of States.
- Improved cybersecurity capabilities at the State and facility level to support the prevention and detection of, and response to, information security incidents that have the potential to either directly or indirectly adversely affect nuclear safety and nuclear security.
- Better identification, where relevant, by States of possible improvements in their information collation and assessment systems.
- Enhanced tools for programme evaluation and monitoring.
- Better awareness, where relevant, among States of nuclear security needs through the use, on a voluntary basis, of INSSPs.
- Timely submission of reports to the Agency's Policy-Making Organs and Member States.

### ***Performance indicators***

- Number of INSSPs agreed and implemented by States.
- Number of users on the Nuclear Security Information Portal (NUSEC).
- Number of States using NUSIMS and feedback from those States.
- Production of reports to a standard that meets the requirements of the Policy-Making Organs.
- Annual review of priorities and of resources required to implement activities under the Plan.

## **E.2. External Coordination**

15. Member States have recognized through General Conference resolutions the central role of the Agency in ensuring coordination of international activities in nuclear security while avoiding duplication and overlap. Similar views were expressed in paragraph 17 of the Ministerial Declaration.

### ***Objective***

- To ensure effective coordination of international activities in the field of nuclear security, while avoiding duplication and overlap, and to increase awareness of Agency nuclear security activities.

### ***Outcomes***

- Enhanced coordination between the activities of the Agency nuclear security programme and those of other initiatives, reducing duplication and overlap.
- Greater awareness of the need to maintain and continuously improve nuclear security in an effective and efficient manner.

- Increased awareness worldwide of emerging nuclear security issues and international best practice through increased cooperation with others (e.g. governmental and non-governmental organizations and initiatives).

#### *Performance indicators*

- Frequency and effectiveness of technical exchanges with relevant international and regional organizations and initiatives whose activities contribute to nuclear security globally.
- Number of States and organizations participating in technical exchanges and collaborative networks in the area of nuclear security.

### **E.3. Supporting the Nuclear Security Framework Globally**

16. The Agency supports the international legal framework for nuclear security through the promotion of the relevant legally binding and non-binding instruments under Agency auspices and the development of comprehensive guidance in the Nuclear Security Series in accordance with the publications plan agreed by the NSGC. The importance of strengthening the framework was indicated in paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 17, and 20 of the Ministerial Declaration.

#### *Objective*

- To assist in the development and promotion of a comprehensive and global nuclear security framework, and in particular adherence to and implementation of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), including through the provision of corresponding legislative assistance.
- To produce comprehensive guidance for issue in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series and to support, upon request, its implementation by States.

#### *Outcomes*

- Wider adherence to, and effective implementation by States of, the relevant legally binding and non-binding international legal instruments, focusing on the entry into force of the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM.
- Improved nuclear security through the timely and systematic development of up-to-date and comprehensive internationally accepted nuclear security guidance.
- Improved nuclear security through the broad voluntary application of the internationally accepted guidance issued in the Nuclear Security Series.
- Better understanding of the use made by States of guidance issued by the Agency and continuous improvement of the guidance.

#### *Performance indicators*

- Number of States adhering to international legal instruments on nuclear security.
- Number of guidance publications in the Nuclear Security Series approved and produced in accordance with the publications plan agreed with NSGC.

### **E.4. Coordinated Research Projects**

17. The Agency promotes research and development to support effective nuclear security through coordinated research projects (CRPs) that involve a broad range of experts and institutions of a broad range of States. Recent and current CRPs address topics such as the application of nuclear forensics

techniques in combating illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material and the development of a nuclear security assessment methodology for facilities and transport. Continued development and implementation of appropriate CRPs will promote improvements in current technology, international best practice, confidence building via peer-to-peer networking, and increased competence among nuclear security practitioners. The results of CRPs will provide input to the Agency's nuclear security support activities, including the development and application of guidance in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series.

***Objective***

- To provide technical support and confidence building networks, available to all, in order to promote information exchange on the results of research projects and to support the Nuclear Security Series guidance publications.

***Outcomes***

- Availability of R&D results that contribute to the process of developing and revising IAEA Nuclear Security Series publications and its implementation.
- Enhanced technical capabilities in States to sustain national nuclear security regimes.
- Promotion and sharing of best practice.

***Performance indicators***

- Number of researchers and institutions involved in CRPs and Member States supporting the CRPs.
- Number of CRPs that produce documented results that contribute to the process of establishing and revising guidance on nuclear security and the application of the guidance.

**E.5. Assessment through Self-assessment and/or through Peer Review Missions**

18. There has been greater appreciation of the value of peer review and advisory services to assist States, upon request, in sustaining and improving their national nuclear security regimes. Such increased recognition of the value of the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IP PAS) service was welcomed in paragraph 13 of the Ministerial Declaration, while recognizing the voluntary nature of the Agency's advisory services. Through operative paragraph 20 of resolution GC(56)/RES/10, States were encouraged to use the advisory services for exchanges of views and advice on nuclear security measures. Activities will also, as encouraged in operative paragraph 21 of the same resolution, establish and promote self-assessment methodologies, in cooperation with Member States.

***Objective***

- To assist States, upon request, in improving their national nuclear security regimes for nuclear and other radioactive material and associated facilities and activities through the promotion of self-assessment and through the provision of peer reviews, based upon the relevant international instruments and internationally accepted guidance, within the timeline requested and to a standard acceptable to the requesting State.

### ***Outcomes***

- Enhanced national nuclear security regimes.
- Increased capacity of States to carry out self-assessments, including self-assessments prior to peer review missions.
- Increased effectiveness of Agency peer reviews and advisory services through the analysis of data and feedback from States.

### ***Performance indicators***

- Number of requests from Member States for, and feedback from States on, nuclear security related peer reviews and advisory services.
- Development of self-assessment methodologies and the number of self-assessments performed by Member States using such methodologies.
- Level of acceptance and implementation of suggestions for improvement as indicated by follow-up to peer reviews and advisory services.

## **E.6. Human Resources Development**

19. The Agency recognizes human resources development as the cornerstone of capacity building and sustainability of nuclear security skills, ensuring that, once learned, such skills are maintained, practised and appropriately shared. The Agency has a well-developed education and training programme and has placed significant emphasis in Nuclear Security Series publications on the need for sustained education and training. The Agency's support, upon request, for capacity building in nuclear security in States was welcomed in paragraph 19 of the Ministerial Declaration. The efforts to establish a collaborative network of national Nuclear Security Support Centres and an International Nuclear Security Education Network were welcomed in preambular paragraph (p) of resolution GC(56)/RES/10, and the importance of such networks was recognized in paragraph 19 of the Ministerial Declaration. In developing such networks, information on their activities will be reported to the Policy-Making Organs through the annual Nuclear Security Report.

### ***Objective***

- To provide a coordinated education, awareness raising and training programme in nuclear security that meets the requirements and needs identified by Member States.

### ***Outcomes***

- Strengthened and sustainable capacity building in States through the implementation of a nuclear security education and training programme, available to all States, involving all competent authorities together with vocational training and academic communities and supported by the International Nuclear Security Education Network and the International Network for Nuclear Security Support Centres.
- Improved capacity in States to address recurring nuclear and radiological security issues.
- Strengthened network of nuclear security support centres through acceptance of the Agency concept of Nuclear Security Support Centres in support of sustainable nuclear security regimes.

- Completed and updated suite of training courses, based on agreed Agency guidance, covering all aspects of nuclear security, that assist States in the implementation of their responsibilities under legally binding and non-binding instruments.

#### ***Performance indicators***

- Number of persons completing educational and training courses developed by the Agency and feedback from participants on the use of skills learned.
- Number of academic institutions implementing nuclear security education programmes using the curriculum recommended by the Agency, or parts thereof.
- Number of Member States and academic institutions taking part in the Nuclear Security Support Centres and International Nuclear Security Education Network programmes.

### **E.7. Risk Reduction and Security Improvement**

20. Raising awareness in Member States, as needed, of their national responsibilities with regard to nuclear security, including those deriving from international obligations, remains an important component of the Agency's nuclear security programme. Where appropriate, and upon request, the Agency also provides material assistance and advice to States to help them discharge these responsibilities. Activities of the types carried out under previous Nuclear Security Plans to address these issues will be continued where still needed. Such issues were identified in paragraph 4 of the Ministerial Declaration. The Agency's programme will also support national efforts to respond to a number of operative paragraphs in General Conference resolution GC(56)/RES/10.

#### ***Objectives***

- To contribute to efforts by States to improve the security of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, and radioactive sources and associated facilities, and for the transport of nuclear and other radioactive material.
- To improve national nuclear security capabilities to act effectively when material is detected out of regulatory control as well as assisting in national efforts to reduce the risk that nuclear or other radioactive material could be used in criminal or intentional unauthorized acts.

#### ***Outcomes***

- Enhanced protection of nuclear and other radioactive material and their associated facilities and activities.
- Improved regulatory infrastructure and capabilities for nuclear security in States.
- Improved capabilities to provide advice and assistance, on request, to States with regard to the physical protection of nuclear and other radioactive material and associated facilities and activities.
- Improved capabilities to provide advice and assistance, on request, to States with regard to nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control, including measures to prevent, detect and respond to nuclear security events.

### **Performance indicators**

- Number of agreed nuclear security projects implemented with States, such as ‘complex projects’ for border monitoring or ‘joint action plans’ for major public events, and related feedback.
- Number of facilities/locations/transport for which security has been improved through implementation of Agency advice and assistance, including accounting for and control of nuclear and other radioactive material.
- Number of disused radioactive sources that have been secured or returned to the original supplier.

## **F. Programme Management**

### **F.1. Programme Management and Resources**

21. During the period of the first three Nuclear Security Plans, funding relied in large part on extrabudgetary contributions. In order to plan for and manage its activities, the Secretariat needs to increase the share of its funding that comes from the regular budget. The activities funded by the regular budget should be core activities that are designed to benefit the greatest number of Member States, including the maintenance of the programme on the Incident and Trafficking Database, the development of guidance in the Nuclear Security Series and the development of education and training programmes to assist States to implement that guidance.

22. An increase in the resources available to the Secretariat from the regular budget should support the regularization of full-time staff positions in the Office of Nuclear Security so that reliance on short term contracts and other hiring instruments to fill staffing needs can be reduced.

23. Although the Secretariat anticipates greater reliance on the regular budget to support core activities, it anticipates continued reliance on extrabudgetary funds. The use of extrabudgetary funds should be directed towards activities primarily of benefit to an individual State or group of States, or in other ways consistent with requirements placed on such funds.

24. A significant percentage of extrabudgetary contributions have restrictions and/or direction on their use. The Secretariat must continue to meet such conditions while determining how it can continue to implement the core activities mentioned above.

25. In support of its activities, whether through resources provided from the regular budget or extrabudgetary funds, the Secretariat must be prepared to address possible reductions in contributions to the Nuclear Security Fund.

26. Resource requirements for 2014 and for 2015 (preliminary estimates) were set out in document GC(57)/2, *The Agency’s Programme and Budget 2014–2015*. As assistance is provided at the request of States, the actual resource required over the four years implementation of the Plan will depend on the number and complexity of requests received. The Secretariat will provide further information in the course of the implementation of the Plan.