

# General Conference

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## Fifty-sixth regular session

# Plenary

## Record of the Sixth Meeting

*Held at Headquarters, Vienna, on Wednesday, 19 September 2012, at 3.10 p.m.*

**President:** Mr BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation)

**Later:** Mr BARRETT (Canada)  
Mr BARROS OREIRO (Uruguay)  
Ms BUJÁN FREIRE (Spain)

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**Abbreviations used in this record:**

ABACC	Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
AFRA	African Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
AIDS	acquired immune deficiency syndrome
ARCAL	Co-operation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CANDU	Canada deuterium-uranium [reactor]
CPF	Country Programme Framework
CPPNM	Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
CTBTO	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization
CWC	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EPREV	Emergency Preparedness Review
Euratom	European Atomic Energy Community
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
G8	Group of Eight
HEU	high-enriched uranium
HIV	human immunodeficiency virus
imPACT	integrated missions of PACT
INIR	Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review
INPRO	International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles
INSSP	Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan
IPPAS	International Physical Protection Advisory Service

**Abbreviations used in this record (continued):**

IPSART	International Probabilistic Safety Assessment Review Team
IRRS	Integrated Regulatory Review Service
Joint Convention	Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management
Joint Division	Joint FAO/IAEA Division of Nuclear Techniques in Food and Agriculture
LEU	low-enriched uranium
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MESA	Middle East and South Asia
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NPCs	national participation costs
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT Review and Extension Conference	Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT Review Conference	Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NSF	Nuclear Security Fund
OPANAL	Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
OSART	Operational Safety Review Team
PACT	Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy
PAHO	Pan American Health Organization
PATTEC	Pan African Tsetse and Trypanosomosis Eradication Campaign
PCMF	Programme Cycle Management Framework
Pelindaba Treaty	African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty
PET	positron emission tomography
R&D	research and development
SQP	small quantities protocol
TCF	Technical Cooperation Fund

**Abbreviations used in this record (continued):**

Tlatelolco Treaty	Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
WHO	World Health Organization
WMO	World Meteorological Organization



## **7. General debate and Annual Report for 2011 (continued)** (GC(56)/2 and Supplement)

1. Ms AYITTEY (Ghana), having expressed appreciation for the Annual Report, commended the Agency on its continued focus on activities that were relevant to socio-economic development and poverty reduction in Member States, particularly those ensuring that nuclear technology and its applications continued to be used for peaceful purposes.

2. Since acceding to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management in May 2011, Ghana had participated in the fourth review meeting in 2012. Set against the backdrop of the nuclear disaster at Fukushima, Japan, the meeting had given Ghana the opportunity to learn from the experience of countries with advanced nuclear programmes in spent fuel and radioactive waste management. The participants had agreed on an outcome document, which, in Ghana's view, contributed towards realization of the common goal of nuclear safety. In addition, Ghana had profited from the deliberations and outcomes in respect of such issues as the development of a comprehensive regulatory framework, effective independence of the regulatory body, strategy implementation using visible milestones, funding mechanisms to secure waste management and public engagement programmes concerning radioactive waste management.

3. Having also acceded to the Convention on Nuclear Safety in 2011, Ghana had now submitted its first national report. Her delegation commended the Contracting Parties on the successful organization of the second extraordinary meeting and the organizational meeting held in August 2012, which had provided a platform for deliberations on the progress made and the challenges faced in implementing the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety following the Fukushima incident. The meeting had enabled a thorough assessment of the safety vulnerabilities of nuclear power plants and of emergency preparedness and response, amongst other topics. As a result, Ghana had redoubled its efforts to pass its nuclear regulatory bill without delay.

4. A memorandum of understanding had been signed by Rosatom, Russia's Federal Atomic Energy Agency, and Ghana's Ministry of Energy for cooperation in the field of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In June 2012, Ghana had established a nuclear energy programme implementing organization under the auspices of the Ministry of Energy. In that regard, five potential sites had been identified for the construction of a nuclear power plant and studies were ongoing to select the most suitable.

5. Ghana's Government and people were very appreciative of the enormous benefits deriving from the Agency's technical cooperation programme. Activities in the areas of human health, food, agriculture and nuclear and radiation safety were of vital importance to her country. Ghana was encouraged by the continued development of nuclear techniques for the treatment of diseases, enhancement of crop resistance to disease and crop yields, control of food insects and pests, improvement of livestock, and water resources management and institutional and capacity building for African nuclear professionals. Ghana remained grateful to Member States that had provided additional support to the technical cooperation programme in those important areas.

6. Ghana called on Member States and the Secretariat to continue to work even more closely with African nuclear institutions and scientists with special focus on nuclear research and applications in the aforementioned areas in order to promote accelerated economic development.

7. The target year for the United Nations Millennium Development Goals, 2015, was not far away and achievements had thus far been minimal. It was important that efforts continue, in collaboration with the Agency, to confront the challenges of hunger and poverty, maternal and child mortality, malaria, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS, amongst others.

8. The current state of the developing world presented not only a challenge but also an opportunity to Member States in terms of contributing in various ways to find solutions. The Peaceful Uses Initiative launched in 2010, to which the United States of America had pledged US \$50 million, was one such laudable approach. To date, the sponsoring countries had disbursed more than US \$21 million in support of various projects in the developing world, contributing in particular to the application of medical isotopes in the diagnosis and treatment of various ailments, including cancer.

9. In 2006, Ghana had established an isotope hydrology laboratory with Agency assistance at the Ghana Atomic Energy Commission. In 2012, the Agency had assisted Ghana in the installation of a tritium line for the purpose of analysing the tritium content in both ground and surface waters in Ghana and in the West Africa subregion as a whole. The results of that analysis would help in determining the age of the aquifers and estimating their respective recharge status. In parallel, Ghana had embarked on a number of projects to delineate the recharge zones, estimate the recharge in the Densu river basin, determine the sources of salinization in Ghana's central region and characterize the aquifers in Ghana's three northern regions making combined use of geochemistry and isotopes. Also, the country was currently engaged in monitoring its major rivers using both isotope techniques and conventional methods.

10. As regards her Government's activities in training nuclear professionals in the Africa region, she said that, under a memorandum of understanding involving the Ghana Atomic Energy Commission, the University of Ghana and the Agency, a School of Nuclear and Allied Sciences had been established and had been enrolling students from other African countries in a Master's degree programme in medical physics and nuclear science and technology. The School had also been selected to host the postgraduate education course in radiation and the safety of radiation sources. The first class of English-speaking African countries had graduated in April 2012 and the second class was expected to commence studies in November. Based on those achievements, her Government would appreciate support from Member States in boosting the capacity of AFRA Member States to initiate national and regional programmes to accelerate qualitative training of African nuclear professionals.

11. Mr CHELO LOTSIMA (Democratic Republic of the Congo) said that the global context continued to be marked by the events in Japan and the growing interest of developing countries in civil nuclear programmes, raising issues that had been under discussion for many years, including those relating to nuclear installation safety, security of nuclear and radioactive materials, and sustainability of regulatory infrastructures in Member States.

12. Nuclear non-proliferation remained a pending issue alongside nuclear disarmament. Despite a number of international forums aiming at a world free of nuclear weapons, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was a goal that seemed to recede further every day.

13. In the field of nuclear security, his country welcomed the human and technical resources being deployed to combat illicit trafficking and nuclear smuggling at the local, regional and international level. His country's approach to the issue was both bilateral and multilateral. It was determined to play its part alongside other countries and regional and international structures to combat those two threats.

14. In that context, he welcomed the implementation of the joint plan of action that had been signed between the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United States of America. Its aims included: responding in a global and effective way to the recurring problems posed by nuclear security, by strengthening the penal code in order to repress rigorously any offences in the nuclear



area; physically protecting nuclear facilities and training human resources; and ensuring effective and efficient control of national borders by deploying physical resources. The joint plan of action was regularly evaluated to ensure compliance with their obligations by both parties.

15. In the same vein, his country was also in the process of concluding a plan of action with the European Commission that was to address aspects of chemical, biological and radiological weapons, starting with the radiological issues before moving on to other aspects of nuclear security.

16. Turning to technical cooperation, he said that its long partnership with the Agency had enabled his country to install various items of nuclear infrastructure of which the most important were the TRIGA Mark I and II research reactors, now no longer operational. That had brought a considerable development of national competencies in nuclear science and technology, which would play a major role in the future introduction of nuclear power, an option that his country was seriously considering.

17. Technical cooperation projects with the Agency had also led to fruitful results in vital areas such as health, water, agriculture and food security.

18. The use of isotopic and nuclear techniques for a hydrogeochemical study of the Mont-Amba aquifer near Kinshasa had allowed the characterization of water bodies that might have potential for the country, with the final outcome being a hydrological map that could be used for the evaluation and sustainable management of water resources at national level.

19. The use of isotopes and induced-mutation techniques in the health and food security area had provided a basis for a long-term national strategy to combat malaria.

20. In addition, thanks to the long experience gained from the operation of the two research reactors, radiological safety and nuclear security had been improved. As a result of the national regulatory infrastructure that had been put in place, the country's reactors were regularly inspected by Agency inspectors and valuable recommendations for the safe use of those scientific tools were being formulated.

21. While the Democratic Republic of the Congo had undertaken to continue its nuclear programme by upgrading and recommissioning its TRIGA Mark II reactor, which could run for another 20 years, it had been decided that after 30 years of operation the time had come to think about planning its decommissioning.

22. Global warming with its repercussions for ecosystems was a reality recognized by the international scientific community. Nuclear power was increasingly considered a viable option for meeting growing energy demand and reducing the use of fossil fuels, which caused pollution and the emission of greenhouse gases. In his country, the Congo River had for some time been experiencing the lowest water levels ever recorded, leading to a marked reduction in electricity supply with a substantial negative effect on the national economy.

23. At a time when various countries were turning to nuclear power as a reliable option for meeting energy shortfalls, anticipating future electricity demand, strengthening supply security and countering climate change, his country was once again happy to have the assistance and support of the Agency and friendly countries which had substantial experience with technology transfer in that area.

24. Nuclear safety and security played a major role in the use of nuclear technology, which could not attain its principal objective without effective regulatory structures at national level. The Agency made great and welcome efforts to help Member States set up appropriate regulatory infrastructures for safety and radiation protection. However, to achieve sustainability, such regulatory bodies needed further assistance from the Agency and other bodies in friendly countries with longer experience in that area.

25. Recent statistics on the incidence of cancer showed a 70% increase in new cases for the developing countries, with the number of people affected growing to 10 million by 2020. Aware of its backwardness in setting up an adequate cancer control programme, his country was grateful to the Agency for its support in establishing an infrastructure for the treatment of cancerous tumours and called on friendly countries with greater experience to join his Government's efforts to draw up a national programme for cancer prevention and control and to establish an infrastructure for detecting and treating cancer patients, including by radiotherapy.

26. Ms LE JEUNE D'ALLEGEEERSHECQUE (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) said that the tragic events that had unfolded at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant in Japan continued to shape and define the role of nuclear energy. They had prompted fresh debate on the security of energy supply and on whether States should pursue nuclear energy, while focusing attention on nuclear safety and security and issues related to the fuel cycle. The global commitment to ensuring the continuing safe and efficient application of nuclear energy owed much to the work of the Agency.

27. The United Kingdom, with its desire to use low-carbon forms of energy, remained committed to safe nuclear power as part of its overall energy mix. Following publication of the national policy statement for nuclear power in 2011, commercial interest had been strong and construction had begun on the country's first new reactor in twenty years. Steps had also been taken to restructure the regulatory framework, including through the creation of an office for nuclear regulation that would address nuclear safety, security, safeguards implementation and transport of radioactive materials. That office had been operational for over a year, pending legislation for its establishment as a statutory body; openness and transparency had already increased with more information being made available online about regulation, the regulatory process and decisions taken.

28. The United Kingdom's approach to generic design assessment had allowed it to give full and comprehensive pre-approval to potential reactor designs before formal bids were accepted, thereby reducing uncertainty for bidders, costs and the overall time frame for approval to build.

29. Nuclear safety remained the utmost priority for her country. Although its facilities were not threatened by such extreme natural hazards as those in Japan and despite the fact the final report on the implications of Fukushima for the United Kingdom's existing nuclear operations had confirmed that no radical changes needed to be made to the operation of the United Kingdom nuclear industry, the United Kingdom was not complacent. It had identified a number of enhancements and was prioritizing their implementation.

30. The United Kingdom commended the Agency's work on the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety and agreed that continuous improvement of nuclear safety should be a priority. Her country also commended the work of the second extraordinary meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, welcoming the focus on the implementation of the spirit and intention of the Convention and the sharing of international best practices.

31. The United Kingdom had recently reviewed its arrangements for emergency planning and response. It was implementing a new national strategic framework and had recently joined the Agency's Response Assistance Network. It was also developing a joint emergency planning framework with France to strengthen practical cooperation and would make emergency planning a key theme of the Nuclear Safety and Security Group under its presidency of the G8 in 2013.

32. Turning to nuclear security, she said that the United Kingdom continued to attach great importance to understanding and countering the threat posed by those who sought to acquire and use nuclear and other radioactive material for terrorist and other malicious purposes. It welcomed the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit communiqué reaffirming the essential role of the Agency in the

international nuclear security framework and the commitment to ensuring that the Agency had the resources and expertise needed. Her Government had made a contribution of 2 million pounds to the Nuclear Security Fund. It called upon all States to adhere to the amendment to the CPPNM and welcomed planned Agency activities to promote its early entry into force.

33. The United Kingdom had reviewed nuclear security arrangements at the national level to ensure a robust and effective security regime. It would extend the relevant regulation to the construction phase with a view to ensuring that security measures were as effective during the construction of a facility as they were during its operation.

34. Work was continuing to change the way that civil nuclear security arrangements were regulated at sites to bring about a more outcome-focused regulatory approach. Having recalled her country's IPPAS mission in October 2011, she said that the United Kingdom had been the first nuclear weapon State to host such a mission, which she commended as a means of ensuring the most effective levels of security based on international best practice and experience. She was pleased to report that Agency experts had concluded that the civil nuclear security in the United Kingdom was robust and effective. Many examples of good practice had been identified and the valuable recommendations and suggestions made were being taken forward as the United Kingdom continued to develop and improve its civil nuclear security regime.

35. The United Kingdom looked forward to the continuing implementation of the Nuclear Security Plan, in particular the maintenance of the illicit trafficking database, the development of INSSPs, and support for human resource development.

36. The United Kingdom recognized the Agency's crucial verification role and called on all non-nuclear-weapon States that had not yet done so to bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol, which constituted the current verification standard and enabled the Agency to provide credible assurances of both the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. It also urged States to amend their small quantities protocol, where relevant.

37. The safeguards system must remain effective and efficient and the United Kingdom welcomed the current evolution to a State-level concept, which would allow Agency to focus effort where it was most needed. It was vital that the Agency had an independent analytical capability for the analysis of safeguards samples, and her Government had been pleased to make a contribution of €500 000 in January 2012 towards the new nuclear material laboratory at Seibersdorf.

38. The growing energy demand worldwide would inevitably mean that States looked to nuclear energy as a power source. The United Kingdom took seriously all its commitments as a nuclear-enabled State and attached priority to the fullest possible cooperation on all aspects of nuclear technology and operations. Its good record of cooperation with other countries had continued with the signing of formal cooperation agreements with three new nuclear countries in the preceding three years.

39. In the area of training, the United Kingdom would be pleased to share the expertise concerning its National Skills Academy for Nuclear, which was providing the skills and expertise required to meet the future needs of the nuclear sector both domestically and abroad.

40. The United Kingdom strongly supported measures to explore multinational approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle and commended the Agency's work to establish an LEU bank, which would help underpin confidence in the fuel supply market, while minimising the risks of disruption to a nuclear programme and helping States that wished to do so to pursue nuclear energy. It would sit alongside other confidence building measures, but it would not affect a State's rights or involve additional costs.

41. The Director General's latest report on Iran (GOV/2012/37) reminded Member States that Iran was continuing to defy United Nations resolutions and was failing to cooperate fully with the Agency. The Iranian nuclear programme was clearly continuing to develop in a direction that offered no assurance of Iran's peaceful intentions. The report detailed continued enrichment activities and the significant expansion of Iran's capacity for further enrichment. It also highlighted the possible military dimensions to the Iranian programme and the increasing concerns, including with regard to activities that could significantly hamper the Agency's verification efforts. The United Kingdom fully supported the work of Director General and his staff in connection with previous or current undisclosed activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile.

42. Resolving the Iranian issue remained one of the United Kingdom's top international priorities. Her country was committed to working with China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United States and the European Union High Representative on a negotiated solution. Iran must show that it was prepared to negotiate seriously, without preconditions; it must also cooperate fully with the Agency to enable the international community to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran was in peaceful activities.

43. Member States must cooperate fully with the Agency to support its important safeguards work, and the United Kingdom therefore continued to urge Syria to give the Agency the full disclosure and cooperation that it had promised more than a year previously.

44. Finally, she expressed her country's deep concern at the DPRK's continued lack of cooperation with the Agency, particularly in light of its satellite launch in April 2012, in violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions. The United Kingdom called on the DPRK to resume cooperation with the Agency, comply immediately with all relevant Security Council resolutions and refrain from any further provocative actions since the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was vital for peace and stability in the region and beyond.

45. Mr BA (Mauritania) said that the growth in the Agency's membership showed its vitality and its importance for security and the socio-economic development of all nations, which relied increasingly on the peaceful use of the atom for electricity generation and in such fields as health, agriculture, water and food. Any nation, however small, had the same inalienable right as more powerful nations to have access to civil nuclear applications to meet its energy, industrial and other vital needs.

46. Given the strategic importance of the Agency for global security and stability, it should not be subject to any form of pressure from industrial, economic and political lobbying and it should always prefer the path of dialogue and consensus in resolving crises falling within its competence.

47. The Agency should continue to promote civil use of nuclear energy for development without discrimination, in particular in least developed countries. It should also ensure that such use was regulated and controlled to prevent proliferation of radioactive material and nuclear accidents. Environmental risks must also increasingly be taken into account.

48. He asked whether it was just that the African continent, where more than 14% of the world's population lived and 15% of the world's known uranium reserves were located, had only one of the 198 operating nuclear power plants in the world in 2012, while 4 countries possessed 56% of those plants. Yet Africa had an increasing need for reasonably priced and reliable energy to fuel its economic growth, which had stood at 5% per annum on average in recent years. Where was world solidarity if, in the 21st century, there were still nations that could not supply schoolchildren with electricity so they could study in the evening, or to keep them warm when it was cold? To close that gap, real solidarity was needed in the areas of education, and fundamental and applied research, as well as a real partnership between North and South for the transfer of technology.

49. Mauritania urged the Director General and the Agency to put the atom and its peaceful applications to use for economic development and the wellbeing of humanity. It welcomed the Director General's support for that aspiration and encouraged him to continue on that path and to support the efforts of the African Union to combat malaria, trypanosomosis and rinderpest, which the Agency should make a priority in its cooperation programmes in the interests of achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.

50. Civil applications of nuclear energy highlighted the importance of technical cooperation, which brought such benefits to developing countries, and the vital need for all countries to join the NPT in the interests of creating a better world for future generations. Hence, his country remained concerned that Israel had still not ratified the NPT, risking an arms race and imperilling the Middle East region.

51. Mauritania continued to benefit from Agency technical cooperation in the field of training, expert support, and technical and financial assistance for energy planning, hydrogeological mapping, animal disease control and health.

52. In the health field, the Agency had provided support with the establishment of a radiotherapy centre that had been operational since the end of 2010. There were plans to construct a nuclear medicine unit before the end of the year.

53. Support had also been provided for the establishment of a national radiation protection and nuclear safety and security authority which, since its establishment, had done remarkable work in identifying all sources at national level, monitoring occupationally exposed workers and putting in place strict procedures for the import, use and storage of radioactive elements. The country had also designated a national nuclear security committee in expectation of the forthcoming Agency mission on the drawing up of its INSSP.

54. In conclusion, he thanked the Agency, and in particular its Department of Technical Cooperation, for the meaningful and competent assistance it had given his country with joint projects, and he urged it to continue to assist States in the establishment of sustainable national nuclear safety and security authorities with a view to enhancing protection of the public against the harmful effects of ionizing radiation.

55. Mr ALKAABI (United Arab Emirates) said that, in light of the natural disaster that had taken place in Japan in 2011, resulting in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, the United Arab Emirates had placed utmost emphasis on nuclear safety and security in the development of its own peaceful nuclear energy programme.

56. Since its establishment, the Agency had played a vital role in helping Member States to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The United Arab Emirates, which in 2008 had embarked on a peaceful nuclear power programme to meet the growing domestic demand for electricity, was convinced that nuclear energy would contribute significantly to its future energy mix. The national nuclear policy of 2008 was committed to ensuring the highest standards of nuclear safety and security and of non-proliferation, to the principles of transparency, and to full cooperation with the Agency.

57. Earlier in the year, construction had started on Unit No. 1 of the Barakah nuclear power plant, making his country the first nuclear newcomer to build a nuclear power plant in 27 years. The construction licence issued by the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation had taken into consideration all the early lessons learned from the Fukushima accident. A thorough review of the reactor design had been made and additional measures adopted to enhance safety, including against extreme natural events.

58. The United Arab Emirates had been one of the first Member States to follow the Agency's integrated guidance for the development of a new nuclear energy programme. It continued to work

closely with the Agency and with international partners to establish a successful and sustainable peaceful nuclear energy programme.

59. The United Arab Emirates recognized the key role played by the Agency, in view of its technical nature and broad membership, in strengthening the global nuclear safety regime and in providing advice and expertise. It therefore called for strengthening of the Agency's role in that field and welcomed all the Director General's efforts in response to the Fukushima accident and towards implementation of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety.

60. His country was maintaining its transparent approach with regard to the comprehensive review services provided by the Agency. Further to the Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review mission conducted in 2011, it had requested an Integrated Regulatory Review Service mission. The outcomes had been very positive, with no major infrastructure gaps identified. The Agency had found that the country understood the long-term commitments and responsibilities of nuclear power and was implementing its programme in line with the Agency's Milestones approach.

61. The IRRS mission in the United Arab Emirates had marked the first time that the Agency had conducted a mission at such an early stage in a country embarking on a nuclear programme and thus served as a model for other nuclear newcomers. The United Arab Emirates attached high importance to the Agency's peer review services because they not only enabled the best standards to be adopted in its programme but were also in line with its policy of transparency. That approach had been further demonstrated through publication of the review reports.

62. In addition, the United Arab Emirates had recently submitted its national report, highlighting the steps it had taken to improve nuclear safety in light of the Fukushima accident, to the second extraordinary meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety.

63. His country had not long ago acceded to the Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and to the Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention, thereby further demonstrating the responsible approach it was taking.

64. The United Arab Emirates strongly endorsed the Agency's role in nuclear security. Notwithstanding the fact that nuclear security was a State responsibility, his country felt that the Agency had an important role to play in strengthening international measures and coordinating cooperation and training programmes of relevance, in addition to its work to develop the nuclear security fundamentals. The United Arab Emirates had participated actively in the Nuclear Security Summits held in Washington (2010) and Seoul (2012), and in various international initiatives aimed at strengthening international technical cooperation in the sphere of nuclear security.

65. The United Arab Emirates attached priority to human capacity building, especially in relation to its national nuclear power programme. That was reflected by its commitment to extensive capacity building programmes. Through its increased participation in Agency technical cooperation activities, workshops, training sessions, fellowships and scientific visits, the United Arab Emirates was efficiently developing the human resources it needed for its nuclear programme and for other nuclear applications. It was also paying special attention to knowledge management in the fields of nuclear power and nuclear applications and had, for a number of years, been hosting and developing a nuclear knowledge management database in cooperation with the Agency.

66. Furthermore, his country had signed an updated Country Programme Framework, which defined the reference framework for the short- and medium-term planning of its technical cooperation activities with the Agency and formed part of a broader vision for its development strategies.

67. The national technical cooperation projects with the Agency covered areas where nuclear applications were used for environmental and archaeological purposes, radioactive waste management, dosimetry, environmental monitoring, an early warning network for nuclear accidents and radiological emergencies, and in the development of a national nuclear power infrastructure for electricity generation.

68. His country, which was keen to share its experience of embarking on a nuclear power programme with other Member States, was providing feedback in many Agency activities regarding best practices, guiding principles, lessons learned and challenges faced. In addition, the United Arab Emirates participated actively in various Agency committees, including safety standards committees.

69. The United Arab Emirates attached high importance to the Agency safeguards regime as a credible means of ensuring that nuclear material and facilities were being used only for peaceful purposes. In view of the critical challenges the regime had faced, the Agency needed to be able to provide complete assurance regarding not only declared material, but also possible undeclared material and activities. The additional protocol provided the comprehensive safeguards regime with better tools in that regard. His delegation was pleased that 117 countries had brought an additional protocol into force to date and hoped that that number would increase in the near future so that the Agency could more effectively meet its safeguards responsibilities and thus promote confidence within the international community and the various regions. The United Arab Emirates supported the Director General's efforts to promote globalization of the additional protocol.

70. Also, his delegation called on States to cooperate fully with the Agency with respect to the application of safeguards in order to resolve related issues and thereby provide assurances about the exclusively peaceful nature of their programmes and the absence of any military dimensions.

71. His delegation welcomed the Director General's efforts, in consultation with the countries of the Middle East, to facilitate the early implementation of comprehensive Agency safeguards with respect to all nuclear activities in the region. In that regard, it had also welcomed his successful convening, in November 2011, of the Forum on Experience of Possible Relevance to the Creation of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone in the Middle East. The United Arab Emirates would support all efforts aimed at facilitating the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in the Middle East, including the convening of a conference to that end in 2012, as had been endorsed by the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The United Arab Emirates called on all the countries of the region to contribute positively to the establishment of such a zone by acceding to the NPT and complying fully with their comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency so as to enhance the security and stability of the region.

72. In conclusion, he reiterated the United Arab Emirates' intention to work with the Agency to enhance nuclear safety, security and safeguards worldwide, while promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

73. Mr TIENDREBEOGO (Burkina Faso) said that the commitment of the international community to implementing the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, which had been adopted a year previously in response to the Fukushima accident, was clearly increasing. His country welcomed the progress the Agency had made in that regard in such areas as assessment of the vulnerability of nuclear power plants, improvement of States' capacity to respond to a nuclear emergency, and the review of international safety standards, demonstrating the important role the organization played in promoting the safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear energy, science and technology.

74. The second extraordinary meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, held in Vienna in August 2012, had offered an opportunity for exchange with a view to maximizing the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident, thus strengthening the global legal and

regulatory framework relating to nuclear safety and security of facilities. Member States should cooperate closely with the Agency with the aim of making their nuclear power plants, and any other facilities housing ionizing radiation sources, secure, and should strengthen their operational capacities and their ability to assess risks.

75. Despite the reaction prompted by the Fukushima accident, his country was still convinced that nuclear power remained one of the solutions of the future to address energy problems and climate change. It urged the Agency to pursue its outreach programme, alongside strong efforts to promote nuclear safety and security. In that context, Burkina Faso looked forward to the Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety to be held in Japan in December 2012.

76. In a world faced with the risks of weapons of mass destruction and, in particular, nuclear weapons, Burkina Faso reaffirmed the importance and urgency of implementing effectively the three pillars of the NPT, and of achieving universal application of that Treaty. Proliferation of nuclear weapons was a real threat to humanity, and the international community should maintain its efforts to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime, of which the NPT was the cornerstone. In that connection, his country welcomed the spirit of dialogue shown by the international community in the preparations for the next NPT Review Conference. All States should comply strictly with the NPT and adhere fully to the CTBT. Only effective and determined cooperation between Member States and the Agency would ensure that the 2015 NPT Review Conference achieved convincing results.

77. With the entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty in 2009, the African nuclear-weapon-free zone had been established and the serious intent of African leaders in that regard had been reinforced through the establishment of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy, which was responsible for ensuring compliance with the Treaty. Thus, it was important that the Commission was supported via regional and subregional cooperation programmes and by the international community.

78. His country supported international initiatives to universalize the safeguards system. It was fully committed to that system and urged all States that had not yet done so to adhere to the relevant instruments.

79. Burkina Faso had undertaken efforts to strengthen regulation of the use of nuclear energy. Its 2005 nuclear safety law had been revised and approved in June 2012, bringing the legislative framework in line with international radiation protection, safety, security and waste management standards.

80. His country's cooperation with the Agency was very fruitful. National projects had been implemented in the fields of energy planning, water resources management, health and agriculture. There had been a successful partnership with the regional directorate of the Health Science Research Institute in Bobo-Dioulasso, which had helped strengthen its operational capabilities in joint training of fellows. In 2012, a nuclear medicine service had been started up at the Yalgado Ouédraogo Teaching Hospital in Ouagadougou to improve treatment of cancer and cardiovascular and thyroid ailments. That service was the first phase in the establishment of the nuclear medicine and radiotherapy centre. PACT had also assisted with the finalization of the country's cancer control programme. The establishment of a national cancer institute was planned, covering all aspects from prevention to palliative care, and his country looked forward to Agency support in that regard. His country welcomed the approval of the project on integrated and sustainable management of shared aquifer systems in the basins of the Sahel region, allowing countries in that region to benefit from isotope hydrology in solving their development problems. It also appreciated the technical and financial support the Agency gave to AFRA. Partnership arrangements between AFRA and the African Commission on Nuclear Energy should assist greatly with the promotion of the peaceful use of nuclear technology for development in Africa.



81. There had been several calls within the United Nations family for better collaboration between individual organizations. In that context, his country welcomed the initiative to increase the operational capabilities of the Joint FAO/IAEA Division of Nuclear Techniques in Food and Agriculture, and efforts to strengthen the partnership with WHO, notably in connection with cancer control.

82. Mr BARRETT (Canada) said that, based on the Agency's decade-long investigation, Iran's nuclear programme could only be seen as an effort to acquire nuclear weapon capability. The United Nations Security Council and the Agency's Board of Governors had imposed unambiguous legal requirements and obligations on Iran, which that country was wilfully ignoring. Iran's non-compliance with international law and its lack of respect for its safeguards obligations devalued the Agency's work to ensure the safe, secure and, above all, peaceful use of nuclear energy. Iran should pursue real, immediate and effective cooperation with the Agency with the aim of creating international confidence that it was living up to its NPT commitments.

83. His country had serious concerns over the DPRK's uranium enrichment programme and light water reactor construction activities that constituted a violation of Security Council resolutions and the DPRK's commitments in the 2005 Joint Statement from the six-party talks. It condemned the provocative launch by the DPRK of a ballistic missile earlier in the year and reaffirmed that the DPRK did not and could not have the status of a nuclear weapon State under the NPT.

84. In June 2011, the Board of Governors had reported to the Security Council that Syria might have been clandestinely constructing a nuclear plant at Dair Alzour. Since that time, Syria had had ample opportunity to cooperate with the Agency to refute those allegations, but it had failed to do so, which failure his country condemned.

85. Following the Fukushima accident, Canada, like other Member States, had made efforts to improve nuclear safety. Its nuclear regulator, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, had conducted a transparent review of all major nuclear facilities in the country, which had confirmed the safety of Canada's nuclear power plants and the ability of those plants to withstand and respond to credible external events such as earthquakes. Nevertheless, a four-year action plan had been established to strengthen the defences of those plants and improve emergency preparedness. In December 2011, Canada had been the first country to receive an IRRS mission with a post-Fukushima module. That mission had commended the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission for its response to Fukushima, recognizing its approach as good practice for other regulators around the world.

86. His country resolutely supported the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, which was an essential tool for improving nuclear safety in the world. Global collective measures should be taken to ensure that neighbouring countries and the international community could have confidence that use of nuclear energy was safe and secure. The same importance should be accorded to nuclear safety as to nuclear security and non-proliferation, and the Agency's Board of Governors should continue to address that issue.

87. Strengthening the international emergency preparedness and response framework was an important element of the Action Plan. Canada had strengthened international communication and rapid information exchange through its involvement in the Agency's efforts to build an international radiation monitoring information system. In addition, Health Canada was finalizing its registration of biological dosimetry capabilities with the Agency's Response and Assistance Network to support international response to high radiation exposures that could occur during a radiological or nuclear emergency.

88. Together with other partners, Canada was actively implementing its Nuclear Security Summit commitments. It had contributed over 17 million Canadian dollars to the Agency's Nuclear Security Fund since 2004, including the 5 million announced at the Seoul Summit.

89. In Canada, nuclear power continued to be an indispensable energy source. In recent months, the country had granted environmental authorizations and issued the necessary permits for the construction of two nuclear reactors at the Darlington plant in Ontario province. The Canadian Government had also made significant efforts to ensure that the Canadian nuclear industry continued to provide the services required for the proper functioning of existing reactors, and that it was able to take advantage of new commercial opportunities. With the sale in October 2011 of the former CANDU reactor division of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited to the SNC-Lavalin group, an internationally renowned Canadian engineering company, the Government had laid the foundations for making the Canadian nuclear reactor industry more competitive via privatization.

90. His country appreciated the Director General's efforts to curb the Agency's budget and looked forward to their continuation.

91. Canada strongly supported the State-level approach to safeguards which facilitated more efficient use of resources. It was in favour of a move towards a State-specific information-driven safeguards system.

92. Finally, he invited all Member States to attend the Agency conference on effective nuclear regulatory systems, which would be held in Ottawa in April 2013.

93. Mr CHOREV (Israel) said that geopolitical realities in the Middle East had changed since the previous General Conference, with the region dominated by adverse developments, in particular in Iran and Syria — two States known for their clandestine pursuit of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

94. There was no doubt from the Director General's reports that Iran had shed any pretention of a civilian programme, given that country's sizeable uranium enrichment activities, the construction of a heavy water research reactor for military production of plutonium, the design and testing of components of nuclear weapons, and activities related to the development of a payload for a missile. The Director General's most recent report (GOV/2012/37) emphasized Iran's total lack of cooperation, and the resolution adopted by the Board on 13 September expressed serious concern regarding the continued enrichment and heavy water-related activities in Iran. Iran's nuclear activities were conducted with impunity in violation of all relevant United Nations Security Council and Board of Governors resolutions. Iran might even be looking for a pretext to withdraw from the NPT, which had long been misused to mask Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons.

95. Iranian leaders missed no opportunity to issue severe threats against Israel, and the international community had an obligation to denounce them. Israel did not remain indifferent to such direct and blunt threats: his country was competent to deter its enemies and defend itself.

96. The Agency's continued investigation of the Syrian regime's clandestine pursuit of nuclear weapons was hampered by that country's non-cooperative stance. Syria had neither signed nor acceded to the CWC and its large chemical stockpiles were a matter of grave cause to the international community given the possible use of chemical agents against the Syrian people and the close links between the Syrian regime and Hezbollah. Syria had stated in 2005 that it neither possessed nor intended to acquire weapons of mass destruction. However a senior Syrian official had recently admitted Syria's possession of chemical and biological weapons. Syria's pledges concerning weapons of mass destruction should therefore be judged against reality.

97. The concept of a region free of weapons of mass destruction had never been put to the test even in the most peaceful regions of the world, and was much less applicable in the current volatile and hostile Middle East. If a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction was to be achieved, significant changes would have to be made and certain preconditions met. No diplomatic or political campaign in international institutions could compensate for the acute deficit created by decades of non-compliance, proliferation, violence and terrorism practised by despotic regimes in the region. Any initiative to promote the 2012 conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East under the banner of the NPT Review Conference or the Agency's General Conference in complete disregard of the current sombre realities in the region was futile.

98. Arab States had requested the inclusion on the agenda of the Conference of an item on Israeli nuclear capabilities, even though the majority of Member States had rejected the resolution under that agenda item in 2010. He called on all delegates to express their disapproval of such a damaging Arab political move, which had nothing to do with the mission and mandate of the Agency.

99. Despite the turmoil and uncertainties in the Middle East, Israel had cooperated fully with the Director General's initiative to convene a forum on experience of possible relevance to the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in the region in November 2011. Obvious lessons to be learnt from other regions where similar zones had been established included the need for peaceful relations and confidence among States in the region over a reasonable period of time, and for the creation to emanate from within the region, rather than being imposed from outside. Regrettably, realities in the Middle East were far from conducive; some of Israel's neighbours had not even reached the point of admitting Israel to the MESA regional group of the Agency.

100. The Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul had emphasized the close association between the threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. Israel supported the initiative of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in connection with the Seoul Summit to establish a working group on countering nuclear smuggling.

101. Israel supported the use of nuclear power to enable its neighbours to meet their energy and water needs. It believed in the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the Middle East, providing States honoured fully their non-proliferation obligations. At the request of Jordan, Israel had provided comprehensive geological data concerning the selection of that country's nuclear power site.

102. The urgent situation in Syria and the fact that the nuclear fuel destined for Dair Alzour had not been declared, served as a reminder of the need for countries of the region to work together to secure nuclear materials and prevent illicit trafficking.

103. He recognized the importance of the Agency's technical cooperation programme in promoting safety, security, welfare and regional cooperation. Israel had launched a project on improving quality assurance in nuclear medicine, under which Agency audit missions would be carried out in all relevant medical centres in Israel.

104. The Fukushima nuclear accident and its consequences remained in the minds of Member States, and Israel welcomed the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety. As part of the measures to improve nuclear safety at the national level, the head of Israel's Nuclear Licensing and Safety Office had requested the IAEA to conduct an integrated safety assessment at the Soreq Nuclear Research Center. The Israel Atomic Energy Commission was confident that the assessment would demonstrate the high safety standards of Israel's nuclear centres.

105. Having commended the vision and leadership of the Director General, he said that there was a growing sense that the normative international system, based on shared values, was under increasing

pressure from a small minority. The consistent efforts of a few to exploit the democratic nature of international institutions should be rejected.

**Mr Barrett (Canada), Vice-President, took the Chair.**

106. Mr SHOOGUFAN (Afghanistan) said that, although his country had not developed a nuclear power industry, it derived considerable benefits from its membership of the Agency. Technical cooperation was the major priority in his country's cooperation with the Agency and, in recent years, officials from numerous government agencies had participated increasingly in consultations and meetings organized by the Agency concerning technical cooperation.

107. Afghanistan remained confident that, with technical assistance from the Agency and other international partners, its priority programmes could be implemented. The 2012–2013 technical cooperation programme was being implemented in full, and preparations had been initiated to develop the proposed programme for the 2014–2015 programming cycle, with nine projects envisaged under the PCMF, as well as feedback on Afghanistan's Country Programme Note, and a review of the CPF for 2012–2016 that had been signed in November 2011 and sought to contribute to the effective development of Afghanistan's human resources and management in nuclear science and technology. The CPF was consistent with the requirements of the 2008–2013 Afghanistan National Development Strategy and of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework for 2010–2013.

108. The added values generated through improved agricultural technologies were an important means of transforming agriculture and increasing productivity. As a mineral-rich country with a complex geological structure, Afghanistan regarded the Agency's assistance in mine exploration and exploitation through the utilization of nuclear techniques as particularly important. Noting that his country was benefiting from a total of 22 regional technical cooperation projects, he said that his Government remained open to discussion of all options for enhanced regional technical cooperation.

109. Nuclear technologies must be safe and secure, and appropriate levels of vigilance must be assured. Afghanistan currently required extensive assistance from the Agency with regard to radiation safety and nuclear security infrastructure. It currently received support in a number of areas including training, development and implementation of legislation, regulations and guidance, accession to international legal instruments, adoption of codes of best practices, and inspection of facilities and activities that used ionizing radiation.

110. The process of re-examining existing nuclear power plants and similar installations with a view to enhancing safety management, which had begun in the wake of the Fukushima Daiichi accident, should continue. The Fukushima Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety, to be held in December 2012, would provide a further opportunity to share knowledge and lessons learned from the accident and to discuss the implementation of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety.

111. Afghanistan agreed that the possible use by terrorists of nuclear or other radioactive material was a major threat and a growing concern. His Government attached particular importance to a multilateral approach to bolster the security of nuclear sites worldwide and introduce security measures prohibiting the illicit acquisition of such material. He drew attention in that regard to the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit communiqué, which encouraged universal adherence to key multilateral nuclear security instruments, such as the amended CPPNM and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

112. Comprehensive safeguards agreements, the additional protocol and the small quantities protocol constituted the current verification standard, and Afghanistan encouraged those States that had not yet adopted those instruments to do so. Efforts to strengthen the Agency's safeguards capabilities should

be a high priority since all States would benefit from a safeguards system that was as effective and comprehensive as possible.

113. His Government supported all disarmament efforts, and called on Member States to take full advantage of opportunities in that area. It commended the parliamentary appeal for nuclear abolition adopted by participants of the International Conference: From a Nuclear Test Ban to a Nuclear-Weapons-Free World held in Kazakhstan in August 2012.

114. In conclusion, he welcomed the Agency's continued efforts to strengthen national capacity among Member States and its professionalism over the previous year. Enhanced cooperation between Afghanistan and the Agency would contribute to the implementation of the Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the Decade 2011–2020 and to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.

115. Mr AL HAMMADI (Qatar) expressed his country's firm support of the Agency's leading role in the utilization of peaceful nuclear energy and applications, particularly in the fields of health, food and water.

116. Qatar had set up a national working team responsible, in coordination with Agency legal experts, for preparation of the legislative framework required to set up institutions to manage and organize the implementation of nuclear technology in various civil areas in the country, and also for supervision of the training of qualified staff to manage those national institutions and ensure implementation of the legislation in the near future.

117. More than a year had passed since the Fukushima nuclear accident and his delegation noted with satisfaction the efforts made by the Agency and the cooperation shown by Member States in strengthening nuclear and radiation safety at the local, regional and international levels with the aim of restoring public confidence in the safety of nuclear energy and its benefits, especially electricity generation. The lessons learned from that accident would help prevent the recurrence of future reactor accidents.

118. His delegation looked forward to publication by the Agency of the results of its integrated regulatory reviews of the safety of various standard reactor types in the world. That was an important step in the right direction as regards transparency and States benefiting from the recommendations issued by the Agency in that connection. His delegation noted the number of States, especially in the Middle East, that had shown an interest in recent years in nuclear technology for the purpose of electricity generation.

119. To benefit from nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, it was vital that States accede to the relevant international instruments, particularly in the field of safety, so as to ensure the safety and security of nuclear installations and avoid the potential hazards of contamination.

120. Since joining the Agency more than 30 years previously, Qatar had supported its pioneering role in contributing to progress and prosperity through its many scientific programmes. Also Qatar acknowledged the Agency's major, and in recent years steadily expanding, role in nuclear non-proliferation. His delegation was concerned that the efficiency and effectiveness of the current non-proliferation regime was weakened by the non-application of comprehensive safeguards to States that had not acceded to the NPT, especially in the Middle East.

121. Much time had elapsed since adoption of the resolution on the Middle East at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and there had been no substantive progress towards nuclear disarmament in that region. Whereas the Arab States had taken a unified stance in support of the non-proliferation regime and had acceded to the NPT, Israel remained the only country in the region outside that important regime, pleading the illegality of any international measures that urged it to

accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State and place its military nuclear installations under comprehensive safeguards. That was a serious shortcoming and constituted a threat to regional and international peace and security.

122. Notwithstanding the lack of stability in the Middle East and Israel's refusal to accede to the NPT, the long-awaited convening of the 2012 conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, which had been decided upon at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, was considered a first practical step towards implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. Despite the delay in preparations for that conference, Qatar joined the other Arab States in demonstrating goodwill and full cooperation in order to create a climate conducive to participation of all the States concerned with a view to attaining the desired goal of ridding the Middle East of all weapons of mass destruction.

123. Qatar reiterated its appeal to all the States concerned to participate in that conference without preconditions and urged the depositary States, co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, to encourage participation and not to create obstacles leading to postponement of the conference. In that connection, Qatar recalled the pivotal role played by the Agency in the preparation of background documentation.

124. In conclusion, he said that Qatar looked forward to the day when universality of the NPT was achieved and all of the provisions of that Treaty could be implemented, including attainment of the goal of nuclear disarmament.

125. Mr BRENNAN (Ireland) said that a cornerstone of Irish foreign policy was his country's belief in, and commitment to, multilateralism, since common challenges were best addressed through a common response. Ireland therefore valued strongly the Agency's vital and unique role in promoting safe, secure and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and remained committed to working with the Agency and other Member States in pursuit of common goals.

126. The multilateral regime of disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements offered the best guarantee of international peace and security. Ireland was committed to maintaining the integrity of those instruments and to supporting the institutions overseeing them.

127. For over five decades, successive Irish governments had pursued a policy of opposition to nuclear weapons. Resolutions tabled by Ireland at the United Nations General Assembly had paved the way for the discussions leading to the NPT — an instrument that contained the only international obligation to disarm nuclear weapons and was at the heart of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. He called on States that had not already done so to accede to the Treaty as a crucial step towards ensuring its universality. More than 20 000 nuclear weapons still posed an unacceptable threat to humanity, and their retention, for whatever reason, encouraged proliferation and non-compliance with international, legally binding obligations. Along with other partners, including those in the New Agenda Coalition, Ireland had consistently sought to prioritize nuclear disarmament, in the belief that the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only realistic option. The 13 practical steps agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference should point the way forward.

128. In order to ensure the success of the 2015 NPT Review Conference, nuclear weapon States should demonstrate their serious commitment to fulfilling their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty in order to achieve the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals in an irreversible, verifiable and transparent manner. Ireland looked forward to progress reports from the nuclear weapon States in 2014.

129. The wider NPT membership must deliver, and be seen to deliver, on the resolution adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference concerning the establishment of a zone free of

weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. The practical steps agreed at the 2010 NPT Review Conference towards implementing that resolution, including the convening of a conference in 2012, were a solid starting point. Ireland commended the tireless efforts of the facilitator over the previous year and acknowledged the seriousness with which the States of the region had approached the endeavour. His country also welcomed the Agency's initiative to convene a forum on experience of possible relevance to the creation of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

130. The Agency's work in the area of safeguards and verification was more crucial than ever and underpinned international confidence in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Comprehensive safeguards agreements and the additional protocol were the only acceptable verification standard, and Ireland called on those States that had not yet adopted those measures to do so without delay. The upgrading and expansion of the Agency's laboratories at Seibersdorf would help to enhance the Agency's verification capabilities. His Government had contributed financially to the associated costs and was pleased to note that the work was proceeding satisfactorily.

131. Ireland called on the DPRK to comply unconditionally and without further delay with its international obligations under United Nations Security Council resolutions and in accordance with its safeguards agreement. It should abandon all of its existing nuclear and ballistic programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and refrain from further provocative acts. Ireland urged the DPRK's authorities to facilitate the early return of Agency inspectors, and provide the Agency with the requested access to individuals, documents, equipment and facilities.

132. The Islamic Republic of Iran's failure to provide the Agency with the necessary cooperation despite several rounds of talks was a cause of ongoing concern to the international community. Iran should, as a matter of urgency, take all necessary steps towards the full implementation of its comprehensive safeguards agreement, additional protocol and relevant resolutions of the Board and Security Council without delay. Ireland commended the professional and impartial approach of the Director General and the Secretariat in their efforts to resolve the outstanding issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme, noting that success depended ultimately on Iran's open and transparent cooperation with the Agency.

133. Ireland strongly urged Syria to comply with its obligations under its safeguards agreement, bring into force an additional protocol as soon as possible and cooperate without delay in a transparent manner with the Agency.

134. Although Ireland maintained a policy of not using nuclear power for electricity generation, it recognized the sovereign right of each State to determine its own energy mix. It derived considerable benefits from its membership with the Agency and was pleased to contribute to the culture of learning and improvement fostered by the Agency. It valued the high quality of the Agency's research and publications and the collaborative relationship between Agency staff and specialists from the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland.

135. The Fukushima accident had served as a powerful reminder that nuclear safety was of universal and grave concern. Although the safety of nuclear installations remained, in the first instance, the responsibility of individual States, the status of nuclear safety in one country was a concern to all countries in view of the potential transboundary impact of a nuclear accident. Ireland strongly supported the Agency's work in the area of nuclear safety; it attached particular importance to acting upon the lessons learned from Fukushima and implementing the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety. Ireland welcomed the progress already made in implementation of the plan, in key areas including emergency preparedness and response capabilities, capacity building, peer review services, communication and the sharing of information with Member States. His country looked forward to further progress on the Action Plan through the commitment and dedicated effort of all stakeholders.

136. As a coastal state, Ireland was concerned about risks related to the transport of nuclear and radioactive material through a shared marine environment. Coastal states should be fully informed of shipments passing close to their coastline to enable those States to engage in risk assessment and put in place emergency response measures into place in the unlikely event of an accident. Ireland had participated actively in the 2011 International Conference on the Safe and Secure Transport of Radioactive Material and looked forward to the follow-up, including in respect of effective notifications and communication between shipping and coastal states.

137. Ireland continued to have a significant stakeholder interest in the area of reprocessing, which, in its view, gave rise to real and substantial safety and environmental concerns. It welcomed the ongoing work of the Agency in that area and supported the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic. His country would continue its cooperation with a view to minimizing health and environmental hazards in that connection.

138. Mr LEBAI JURI (Malaysia) said that it was gratifying to note that, despite resource constraints, the Agency had managed to expand its work. His country was confident that the Agency could play an even greater role in responding to the needs of its Member States in the future.

139. Malaysia welcomed the Agency's efforts to formulate and implement the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, taking into account lessons learned from the Fukushima accident, and looked forward to participating in the Fukushima Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety in December.

140. Malaysia had always attached the utmost importance to nuclear safety. At the Agency's request, his country had hosted a number of events related to nuclear, radiation, transport and waste safety as well as a regional workshop on the General Safety Requirements in April 2012. Malaysia stood ready to host similar events in the future. It was encouraged with the progress in the discussions launched at the initiative of Thailand to establish an ASEAN network of nuclear regulatory bodies or relevant authorities that would enhance cooperation on nuclear safety, security and safeguards and complement the Agency's work.

141. Malaysia attached great importance to nuclear security and looked forward to greater cooperation with the Agency in that area. It would be hosting a regional workshop on radioactive source security for industrial radiography before the end of 2012, which would promote the sharing of knowledge and expertise, and looked forward to discussing the possibility of being recognized as a centre of excellence for nuclear security training in the region and beyond.

142. Malaysia had demonstrated its commitment to tackling security, safety and safeguards issues through efforts to revise and strengthen its legal framework. The country's training and education programme would be enhanced further through the introduction of a new Master's course in radiation science and the hosting of programme on a nuclear non-proliferation course.

143. The technical cooperation programme, to which Malaysia attached importance, should be based upon Member States' evolving needs and requirements. Funding for the programme should be sufficient, assured and predictable, and Malaysia joined others in calling for support for the programme to be provided from the Regular Budget. His country looked forward to discussions in the Working Group on Financing the Agency's Activities on the nature and level of the TCF and the Fund's relationship to the Regular Budget.

144. Malaysia had contributed in kind to the programme and had provided training and expertise to other Member States. There was a considerable number of footnote/a components for Malaysia in the 2013–2014 project cycle and his delegation would work closely with the Agency to ensure that the projects would be adequately funded. Noting the importance of qualified personnel in order to develop



and sustain a radiation protection infrastructure, he said that Malaysia was pleased to continue to be hosting the postgraduate education course in radiation protection.

145. Research and development and knowledge sharing were key to the successful and sustainable development of nuclear technology. Malaysia therefore attached great importance to the R&D activities being conducted under coordinated research activities, which provided an avenue for multilateral cooperation under the aegis of the IAEA and constituted an effective mechanism to enable scientists and engineers worldwide to share their knowledge and experience.

146. Cancer was the leading cause of death in Malaysia and his country was committed to upgrading its cancer detection, monitoring and treatment system, recognizing the role of nuclear techniques and the Agency in that field. Malaysia had decided to join PACT and was pleased that the Agency had accepted its request for an imPACT mission.

147. Malaysia had become a member of INPRO in July and was involved in the collaborative project on synergistic nuclear energy regional group interactions evaluated for sustainability.

148. In conclusion, he said that Malaysia looked forward to the convening of a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in 2012, as agreed at the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

149. Mr EL MHAMDI (Morocco) said that as a result of factors that had caused an unprecedented rise in fossil fuel prices, such as demographic developments, the gulf between North and South, and climate change with its devastating effects on agriculture and food security, applications of nuclear energy in such vital sectors as water, agriculture, food, environment and health were of increasing relevance. Thus, his country reiterated its position regarding the inalienable right of all States party to the NPT to develop nuclear power programmes, and to research and use nuclear techniques for peaceful purposes. The assistance the Agency gave to developing countries in implementing cooperation programmes on nuclear energy for peaceful purposes would be strengthened through an increase in training activities and transfer of technology and expertise in all nuclear applications.

150. The severity of the Fukushima accident should not be allowed to shake the confidence of the international community in nuclear energy, even if the reliability and safety of nuclear installations did need to be strengthened in the light of that incident. The Agency had reacted appropriately and, pursuant to the Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety held in June 2011, the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety had been elaborated and adopted by the General Conference at its preceding session. The implementation of that plan should strengthen standards and the global nuclear safety regime in the light of the lessons learned from the accident, and his country urged the Agency to strengthen the assistance it was giving to Member States with the establishment of sustainable nuclear safety and security systems. In addition, concerted efforts should be made to ensure the universality and entry into force of relevant standards and international legal instruments.

151. Morocco had honoured its commitments in that regard. It had ratified the CPPNM in 2002, and the ratification process for the 2005 amendment to that Convention was nearing completion. In 2006, it had signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and had initiated the process of adopting a law on nuclear and radiological safety and security and establishing a supervisory authority.

152. As regards training and human resources, Morocco had established a nuclear security training and support centre, with support from the Agency and the United States Department of Energy, which was helping to meet national and regional needs. His country also periodically organized regional training events on radiation safety for French-speaking African countries.

153. In view of the increase in terrorist attacks, the international community needed to take the necessary precautions to prevent individuals and terrorist groups from getting hold of nuclear and radioactive material. His country had been playing an active part in international initiatives to combat nuclear terrorism. In 2006, it had hosted the first meeting of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. In 2011, it had organized an international exercise on response to a malicious act involving radioactive material in which several experts and scientists from partner countries had participated. It had been chairing the response and mitigation working group under the Global Initiative since June 2011 and, in February 2012, had organized the biannual meeting of the group responsible for evaluation and implementation of the Global Initiative in Marrakech. It had also taken part in the Nuclear Security Summits held in 2010 and 2012. The country had also cooperated with Spain on nuclear security and combating chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats.

154. The Agency's mandate under the NPT to verify compliance with non-proliferation commitments had been reaffirmed in the action plan produced by the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and during the first session of the preparatory committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference. His country commended the impartiality, expertise, dedication and professionalism of the Agency in carrying out its verification mandate. It had repeatedly called for strengthening of the organization's verification capabilities and had honoured its own commitments, signing and ratifying all multilateral instruments related to disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. The additional protocol to its safeguards agreement had entered into force in 2011.

155. Sustainable peace could not be achieved in the Middle East until all States in the region had joined the NPT. The 2000 NPT Review Conference had appealed to Israel to place its nuclear installations under Agency comprehensive safeguards, but that appeal, like the 1995 resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, had had no effect, which the international community should make every effort to remedy. Morocco welcomed the efforts of the Director General to organize, in November 2011, a forum on experience of possible relevance to the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The establishment of such a zone could be an important stage in establishing mutual confidence, a sine qua non for a just and sustainable peace in the region. Thus, in accordance with its mandate, the Agency should make every effort to promote dialogue among States in the region with a view to achieving that goal. Morocco also supported the efforts of the facilitator of the planned 2012 international conference on the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

156. The technical assistance the Agency provided was of great importance to countries like his own and was made even more effective by the Agency's cooperation with other United Nations organizations such as the FAO and WHO. Agency technical cooperation had helped his country establish infrastructure and mobilize human resources, allowing it to benefit from nuclear applications in such vital sectors as agriculture, health, water resources management, the environment and nutrition.

157. Morocco also attached importance to regional cooperation, in particular South-South cooperation. It had successfully hosted five AFRA programmes and would be hosting another five in the current year. Its contribution to South-South cooperation had recently been acknowledged when it had been chosen as a designated regional centre for isotope hydrology and as a centre for education and training in radiation protection, in which latter capacity it was helping develop radiation protection capacities in African States. In addition, following the establishment of its centre for the use of stable isotopes in human nutrition, it was continuing to share its experience and expertise with other African countries.

**Mr Barros Oreiro (Uruguay), President, took the Chair.**

158. Mr LABBÉ VILLA (Chile) underlined the importance of the Agency's role in the field of technical cooperation, nuclear verification and non-proliferation.

159. Promoting and facilitating research, development and the practical application of atomic energy was one of the Agency's central functions, carried out through the Department of Technical Cooperation and specific projects implemented with Member States. Chile participated actively in the development of nuclear applications and techniques, and its scientists and engineers were researching their production and use in areas of relevance to the public. They were also seeking to establish networks in the areas of medicine, agriculture, hydrology, the environment and industry. Particular challenges in the short and medium term were linked to assessment of climate change, food security, water quality and supply, and the production of materials for diagnosis and treatment in the area of nuclear medicine. Attempts were also being made to develop a sound knowledge base for making decisions related to energy. The technical cooperation programme, which was of clear benefit to countries, must be strengthened as much as possible.

160. The Ibero-American Forum of Radiological and Nuclear Regulatory Agencies, which was celebrating its 15th anniversary, had contributed, in particular, to the radiation protection of patients through its work on the safety of radiotherapy facilities and the development of recommendations regarding medical exposure, as well as to nuclear safety, through its contributions and findings in relation to lifetime extension and stress tests on nuclear power plants in its region.

161. Chile attached high priority to nuclear safety and security. It supported the Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan, which would help to strengthen national capacities. A nuclear security support centre was being established in Chile in order to strengthen the infrastructure for prevention, detection and response to the misuse of nuclear and radioactive materials and facilities, through training and coordination among stakeholders.

162. Chile had participated actively in recent Nuclear Security Summits, events that had helped to establish international awareness of the crucial importance of nuclear security and had contributed to a more secure world.

163. With regard to the international legal framework, he said that slow progress was being made with regard to adherence to instruments concerning international nuclear security. Although 145 States were party to the CPPNM, it was a matter of concern that the number of States that had ratified the 2005 amendment to that Convention remained far below the two thirds required for its entry into force.

164. The Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety held in June 2011 had marked the launch of a process whose next stage had been the approval of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety by the General Conference at its preceding session. Chile was pleased to note that the Action Plan had been consistently and systematically implemented during its first year. It was vital to send out a signal that there was real will on the part of the Agency to strengthen nuclear security activities. The Fukushima accident had shown that more needed to be done to ensure that international emergency preparedness and response mechanisms were rapid and effective. There was also a need to improve the transparency and effectiveness of communication with the public and civil society in the event of nuclear emergencies, as public confidence could only be regained and maintained through the provision of objective, reliable, comprehensible and timely information. He hoped that the Fukushima Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety to be held from 15 to 17 December 2012 would provide a high-level platform for evaluating the implementation of the Action Plan and demonstrate to the public that the international community could work together on nuclear security.

165. Chile supported general and complete disarmament and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It was party to all relevant international instruments, which it wished to see

universally applied. It had ratified the CTBT, the entry into force of which was of vital importance, and it urged all States that had not yet ratified that Treaty — particularly Annex 2 countries — to do so.

166. As a member of the world's first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated area, his country supported the establishment of such zones in other parts of the world, notably the Middle East. Consequently it welcomed the convening of the forum in November 2011 on that issue, which should contribute to the success of the conference on that subject planned in 2012.

167. Article III of the NPT entrusted the Agency with a vital verification role. The additional protocol allowed the Agency to provide assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in a country. Although the additional protocol was a voluntary instrument, its provisions helped strengthen the non-proliferation regime and universal adherence would therefore allow for substantial improvements in the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system. In that connection, Chile welcomed the Director General's announcement that 116 States had now concluded additional protocols.

168. Turning to the implementation of safeguards, he said that the hopes initially raised by the talks and agreement reached between the DPRK and the United States in February 2012 that the dialogue on the DPRK's nuclear programme might be resumed had unfortunately come to nothing. Chile deplored the fact that the DPRK was not granting the Agency access to its nuclear facilities, thereby preventing the Director General from reporting adequately on that country's activities. It hoped that the DPRK would return to the negotiating table and rejoin the NPT, and that the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula would become a reality.

169. His country had also consistently supported the Agency's verification work in the Islamic Republic of Iran and acknowledged that country's collaboration in safeguards matters. Nevertheless, there was still a lack of confidence regarding the absence of a military dimension to Iran's nuclear programme. Iran should cooperate fully with the Agency to re-establish confidence in the peaceful nature of that programme and had to meet its international obligations if it wished to take its place in the community of nations.

170. The Agency was contributing to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals through its work in the areas of health, agriculture and energy, and to peace and non-proliferation through its verification activities. It was in the interests of all countries for the Agency to be strong, with the human and other resources it needed to carry out its mandate. Chile would continue to support the Agency's work in all areas.

171. Mr AL-SALLAL (Kuwait) said that socio-economic development necessitated a major increase in energy supplies in the coming decades. As nuclear energy was deemed to be a supplementary rather than an alternative source of energy, the nuclear option depended on national policies based on needs, aspirations and capacities. Kuwait was cooperating with the Agency with a view to building its national capacity and developing the institutions required for the implementation of key nuclear projects. It looked forward to further consultations and close cooperation to that end.

172. His country was also participating in consultations and meetings between experts from Member States of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Agency on the implementation of a joint programme on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. A great deal had been achieved during the preceding five years and Kuwait looked forward to further close cooperation in the years ahead.

173. The technical cooperation programme was a cornerstone of the Agency's work in support of capacity building and the transfer of peaceful nuclear technology to the developing countries. Kuwait had long attached special importance to technical cooperation activities and greatly appreciated the

Agency's activities in support of the Asia and the Pacific region, especially the organization of regional workshops and training courses. It looked forward to continued close and constructive cooperation and was grateful to the Agency staff that had visited Kuwait for their valuable assistance.

174. Kuwait attached great importance to the safety and security of radioactive sources and nuclear material. He emphasized the need for strict application of the rules and guidelines aimed at controlling the movement of such material. His delegation, which had followed with keen interest developments in the Agency's integrated nuclear security support plans, had agreed with the Agency to hold a training workshop on advanced equipment for the detection of radioactive material.

175. The painful lessons learned from nuclear accidents had made States even more determined to address safety requirements and enhance their collective capacity to respond to future nuclear accidents, including those caused by major natural disasters, by taking practical steps to apply safety measures to all activities relating to the use of nuclear energy. Failure to take such action would have an adverse impact on the sustainability of the role of nuclear energy and its potential contribution to the economic development of most societies. A constructive and transparent dialogue must therefore begin at once with a view to identifying a solid foundation for the development of new and effective strategies and mechanisms in the area of nuclear safety.

176. Nuclear safety was not only a global and regional issue but also a national responsibility and must be addressed at all three levels. The importance of universal application of nuclear safety conventions and emergency response mechanisms should be recognized and emphasis should be placed on the binding nature of such international obligations. Close and transparent international cooperation was required as a first step towards expansion of the use of nuclear energy as and when required.

177. All present and future users of nuclear energy should be required to meet the highest safety standards. The Agency had a key role to play in all areas relating to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, especially that of nuclear safety, and it should be accorded greater authority for regular inspection of national arrangements to deal with emergencies and improve the operational safety of nuclear installations in accordance with internationally agreed norms. Clearly, such steps might call for an increase in the Agency's financial resources, but the benefits to be gained would greatly outweigh the small additional costs. His country called on all States that had not yet acceded to the Convention on Nuclear Safety to do so as soon as possible.

178. The Kuwaiti delegation was following developments with respect to the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its safeguards agreement. While Kuwait affirmed the right of all States to produce, develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the NPT, it called on Iran to cooperate more closely with the Agency and to respond to the latter's queries in order to dispel any fears or doubts regarding the nature of its nuclear programme and resolve all outstanding issues. It further called on all parties concerned to step up diplomatic efforts to resume the dialogue and negotiations in the interests of security and stability in the Middle East region and the world as a whole.

179. The safeguards system, as a cornerstone of the Agency's work and of the non-proliferation regime, enjoyed the support of most countries in the world. His country therefore urged all States that had not yet signed a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency to do so. Also, it encouraged States that had signed such an agreement but had not yet signed an additional protocol to do so. All States party to the NPT should abide by their obligations under the Treaty and under their safeguards agreements, and should work closely with the Agency in resolving any doubts regarding their programmes through constructive and transparent negotiations and dialogue.

180. Kuwait attached great importance to the application of Agency safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East. It noted with deep regret that, although all other States in the region were party to the NPT and were committed to the application of the provisions of their comprehensive safeguards agreements, Israel persisted in its refusal to sign the NPT and place its installations under the Agency safeguards regime although it possessed advanced reactors that posed a threat to the region, thereby impeding the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Its stance undermined security and stability in the region and hence in the world as a whole.

181. In that context, Kuwait welcomed the efforts of the NPT depositary States to convene an international conference at the end of 2012, in line with the final document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, aimed at the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. That was a first important and tentative step in global recognition of the seriousness of Israel remaining outside the NPT and an important step towards achieving universality of the Treaty.

182. Mr DAVIDOIU (Romania) said that growing concerns regarding energy security, climate change, increasing demand for energy and the need to diversify energy sources meant that nuclear energy remained vital to many Member States.

183. His country remained committed to safe nuclear power as part of its overall energy mix and was planning to build two more reactors at the Cernavoda nuclear power plant, as well as a new nuclear power plant.

184. Events since the Fukushima Daiichi accident had demonstrated to the world the central and crucial role played by the Agency in ensuring a safe, secure and proliferation-free nuclear future. Romania fully supported the efforts of the Agency and the entire international community to draw lessons from the Fukushima Daiichi accident and enhance the level of nuclear safety worldwide.

185. The IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety approved by the General Conference at its preceding session was an important step towards the necessary strengthening of nuclear safety worldwide, and collective commitment was essential for its implementation. Romania fully supported the plan and noted with satisfaction the Secretariat's recent progress report on the implementation of activities under it.

186. Romania had taken part in the European Union's stress tests aimed at assessing the reliability of nuclear power plants in its member States and some neighbouring countries. It had presented the results of safety assessments performed since Fukushima in its national report on those stress tests and in its national report under the Convention on Nuclear Safety, including the conclusions and recommendations from the European Union stress test peer review held in March 2012.

187. Romania was one of the countries that had benefited most from the external, independent assessments available through the Agency's peer review services. It had received IRRS, OSART, IPSART, EPREV and IPPAS missions, which had contributed significantly to the development of its national nuclear safety framework and practices. Implementation of the recommendations from the 2011 IRRS mission was being completed and a follow-up was planned for 2014. An IPPAS mission would take place in November or December 2012. Romania would continue to request Agency peer reviews and would also provide specialists for peer reviews organized for other Member States.

188. Romania's National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control and the United States Department of Energy were implementing a bilateral agreement on upgrading the security of radioactive sources and nuclear material in Romania, which had already resulted in the upgrading of the physical protection system at the Horia Hulubei National Institute of Physics and Nuclear Engineering and the ongoing improvement of the physical protection systems at two hospitals.

189. His country had a tradition of active engagement in international cooperation projects and would continue to share its expertise and experience in the field of nuclear security and safety. In the preceding year it had conducted a joint exercise with Bulgaria on radiological emergency protection and intervention, in partnership with Norway and the Agency under a regional excellence programme on safe nuclear energy in Romania, and a CTBT International Data Centre workshop. In 2011 it had contributed €500 000 to projects aimed at securing the Chernobyl facility in Ukraine.

190. Romania fully supported the successful Nuclear Security Summit convened by the United States in 2010 and the Nuclear Security Summit hosted by the Republic of Korea in 2012. During the latter, Romania had made several unilateral commitments. First, it would request an IPPAS mission to certify that its national nuclear security and safety practices with respect to the Cernavoda nuclear power plant met the latest international standards and to identify practical steps for making improvements, if necessary. Second, it stood ready to share the expertise gained from experience in the conversion of Romanian research reactors from HEU to LEU, repatriation of HEU and ensuring the safety of radioactive sources. And third, it would make a voluntary contribution to the Agency's Nuclear Security Fund. Romania was looking forward to the 2014 summit to be held in The Hague on reinforcing the commitments to improve nuclear security worldwide.

191. His country welcomed the recent measures to strengthen the Agency's nuclear security programme, particularly the International Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing Global Efforts to be hosted by the Agency in July 2013 and the establishment of the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee.

192. Romania had participated actively in the second extraordinary meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety and in the organizational meeting for the sixth review meeting of the Contracting Parties held in Vienna in August 2012. In that regard, Romania understood the importance of appropriate implementation of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and was prepared to address the conclusions presented in the summary report of the second extraordinary meeting.

193. Romania welcomed Japan's decision to organize, in cooperation with the Agency, the Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety to be held in the Fukushima region in December 2012 and pledged its full support to make the conference a success.

194. His country valued the role of the Agency's technical cooperation programme in developing peaceful applications of nuclear technology in the areas of human health, food and agriculture, water resources, the environment and nuclear power, while stressing the importance of nuclear and radiation safety in participating Member States. Romania commended the Agency for its work in that regard and for the contribution technical cooperation projects made towards achieving the MDGs.

195. Technical cooperation between Romania and the Agency was excellent. Romania participated actively in national, regional and interregional projects addressing its short- and medium-term national development priorities in the areas of waste management, human health, and research and development. Romania had five major national projects in the 2012–2013 technical cooperation cycle which together were worth over €1 million, illustrating the unprecedented development of technical cooperation with the Agency. Those projects addressed, in particular, the non-power applications of nuclear energy.

196. His country had received two Agency missions concerning early detection, imaging and treatment of cancer in the autumn of 2011 and summer of 2012. Oncology institutes in Cluj-Napoca, Brasov and Bucharest had been visited and evaluated for the purpose of preparing a report, the conclusions of which had been delivered to the Romanian delegation recently, for assessing performance around themes of interest and possible support groups.

197. Having already been involved in three INPRO collaborative projects, Romania had become the 38th active Member State in INPRO to consider performing a nuclear energy system assessment using the INPRO methodology, in the framework of the appropriate interregional projects.

198. In conclusion, he assured the Director General and the Secretariat of Romania's full support and cooperation in the Agency's continuing effort to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

199. Mr MWIRIA (Kenya), welcoming the theme of the Scientific Forum, said that food security remained a challenge, in particular for developing countries, where access to sufficient, nutritious and affordable food was a daily struggle.

200. Kenya believed that the Agency should address global peace, safety, security and sustainable development in a balanced, impartial and non-political manner. The cooperation of all Member States and the universalization of the NPT and the additional protocol were essential for the Agency to fulfil its mandate effectively, and Kenya called on Member States that had not yet done so to ratify and bring into force the relevant instruments in that regard.

201. Kenya welcomed the significant progress made in implementing the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, and the steps being taken to establish an emergency preparedness and response expert group. It appreciated the updates provided by the Agency on the Fukushima accident and hoped that the Fukushima Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety would have the desired outcome.

202. The Agency's activities continued to have a great impact in many countries in various fields of socio-economic development, including food and agriculture, livestock development, energy generation, human health, water resources and environmental management and industrial development. Despite the Fukushima accident, many Member States had continued to show renewed interest in nuclear power as an option to meet national development demands given the escalating prices of fossil fuels and the challenges of climate change.

203. Kenya appreciated the assistance it received under the Agency's technical cooperation programme in developing a national nuclear science and technology infrastructure. Two years earlier, Kenya had indicated its interest in introducing nuclear energy into its energy mix with a view to achieving socio-economic development goals. The nuclear electricity project committee established in Kenya in 2010 had been conducting promotional activities and was undertaking pre-feasibility studies in line with the Agency's Milestones approach. His country was grateful for the Agency's continued support, in particular the expert mission that had taken place in May, and urged development partners to assist Kenya in its capacity building efforts. Kenya looked forward to hosting a second expert mission in 2012.

204. Kenya had developed a draft atomic energy policy and bill providing for the establishment of an atomic energy commission as a regulator, a nuclear electricity board as a promoter, and an atomic energy research institute. Efforts were being made to strengthen the country's radiation health and safety law to ensure compliance with the Agency's Basic Safety Standards and best international practices and address concerns about safety and security of radioactive and nuclear materials.

205. Radiation-based technology had become an indispensable development tool in Kenya's socio-economic sectors, and the use of radioactive materials was increasing. Given concerns regarding nuclear terrorism, the corresponding rise in waste stockpiles raised safety and security concerns. His Government had spent over US \$7 million on establishing a central radioactive waste processing facility that was expected to be operational in 2013. The facility would provide temporary storage and ensure the safety and physical security of radioactive waste.

206. Concerns had also emerged with regard to unsecured radiation sources. His Government had established a national nuclear support centre whose objective was to coordinate local, regional and



international initiatives related to nuclear security, and provide support to organizations including the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear centre of excellence to be based in Nairobi.

207. The incidence of cancer in Kenya was continuing to increase and capacity at the country's largest public referral hospital was insufficient to meet demand. It was encouraging that the Agency was considering ways of strengthening PACT, and he called on Member States to enhance support in order to fight the disease. His Government had launched the 2011–2016 cancer control and prevention strategy, which sought to promote the early detection of cancer and improve diagnosis and treatment, including palliative care. A 2012 cancer prevention and control act had been enacted with the aim of: promoting public awareness of the causes, consequences, prevention and control of cancer; encouraging safety in practices and procedures relating to the treatment of cancer; promoting access to high-quality and affordable diagnostic and treatment services; and ensuring sustainable capacity for cancer prevention and control. Kenya sought assistance from the Agency and interested development partners in implementing the cancer strategy.

208. Kenya continued to use nuclear and isotopic techniques to enhance agricultural productivity under rainfed and irrigated conditions. Steps to improve the resilience and sustainability of smallholder crop-livestock systems was a logical option in view of climate change. Farmers had embraced small-scale drip irrigation and greenhouse tunnel technologies to intensify crop production, and required urgent support for modernization. Kenya appreciated the support received from the FAO/IAEA Joint Division through which the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute had developed drip irrigation technologies to assist farmers in reducing their water requirements by up to 45%. The Institute was now providing technical assistance to 23 African countries for the improvement of agricultural water management under rainfed and irrigated conditions in arid and semi-arid regions.

209. Nuclear science was being used to generate technologies that could enhance food security and build resilience to climate change and variability. Mutation and biotechnology techniques continued to be used to address challenges associated with pests and diseases in national crops, and elite mutant selections of a variety of crops had been developed.

210. Kenya would continue to build capacity in agricultural research in order to minimize post-harvest losses that were sometimes as high as 50%, and food irradiation technology could play an important role in that regard.

211. Kenya acknowledged the Agency's continued support of initiatives that contributed to enhanced livestock productivity and continued to participate in PATTEC.

212. With regard to AFRA, Kenya had hosted the meeting of the AFRA technical working group in June where important policy and management issues concerning the promotion and coordination of peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology had been discussed. In collaboration with the Agency, it would also be hosting a regional meeting on stakeholder involvement and public communication for the introduction of nuclear power in African countries in November. Kenya called upon the international community to continue to support AFRA's programmes and activities, and encouraged the Agency to continue to promote national training courses in AFRA Member States.

213. In order to enhance skills development, the Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology of the University of Nairobi continued to build capacity through postgraduate programmes in nuclear science. It also offered diploma and certificate courses in radiation protection. Kenya appreciated the Agency's technical support to strengthen those initiatives.

214. His Government was undertaking extensive groundwater exploration and exploitation in the arid and semi-arid areas of the country. One of the flagship projects of Kenya's Vision 2030 concerned water demand along the Lamu Port – South Sudan–Ethiopia Transport Corridor. Assessment studies

were also being undertaken to investigate groundwater contribution to the Lake Victoria and Nile River Basin. The efforts were being hampered by inadequate isotope hydrology infrastructure and limited human resources, and his country would welcome increased technical cooperation activities with the Agency in the area of isotope hydrology applications.

215. Modern, efficient and cost-effective technologies for industrial processes were necessary for Kenya to realize its aspiration of becoming a newly industrialized middle-income country by 2030. Kenya's participation in the regional project on promoting self-reliance and sustainability of non-destructive testing facilities had strengthened capacity. His country was determined to establish a non-destructive certification body by 2013, and appealed to the Agency and other development partners for enhanced support. It would continue to offer courses in non-destructive testing for the region in collaboration with the Southern African Institute of Welding.

216. Having welcomed the support his country had received from the Agency in the application of nuclear technology, he emphasized the importance of the Agency's technical cooperation programme as well as the need to ensure adequate resources. Kenya continued to meet its obligations to the Agency, including the timely payment of its assessed contributions and NPCs. On behalf of his Government, he wished to pledge Kenya's full share of the TCF for 2013, and an additional extrabudgetary contribution of US \$20 000.

217. Mr KURIDAN (Libya) emphasized the need for intensified international efforts aimed at preventing the production of all types of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, and of working towards their total elimination according to a time schedule and a verifiable mechanism, as called for by the United Nations General Assembly, the Agency and the United Nations Disarmament Commission, since such weapons posed a threat to world peace and security. In pursuit of a world without nuclear weapons, Libya had supported the establishment of a zone free of such weapons and had acceded to a number of important instruments, such as the Pelindaba Treaty to rid the African continent of nuclear weapons. Also, it supported the resolution of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference on making the Middle East a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, and supported the convening of a conference in December 2012 by the United Nations Secretary-General and Finland pursuant to that resolution. In addition, Libya had acceded to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and was an active participant in symposiums and seminars to discuss ways and means of eliminating weapons of mass destruction.

218. The nuclear weapon States bore responsibilities as regards upholding the principle of preventing the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons against States. In that context, Libya, a country situated near an extremely tense geographical region of international concern, called on the international community to provide the necessary assurances for the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States. The necessary arrangements should be put in place without delay for submitting all the nuclear activities in that region to effective and reliable safeguards so as to prohibit the production of nuclear weapons and avoid the dangers of other radioactive material.

219. He expressed his country's deep concern about the danger of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East in the framework of preoccupations with political tension and an arms race in that region. That concern was not limited to Libya alone but was shared by all the States of the region and most States of the world, as shown by the successive resolutions adopted by the General Assembly since 1974 urging that practical steps be taken by all parties in the region to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and calling for compliance with the NPT and the placement of all nuclear activities in the region under the Agency's safeguards regime.

220. Israel was the only country in the Middle East that possessed nuclear weapons. It continued to produce and develop them, refused persistently to accede to the NPT and steadfastly pursued a policy of threat and nuclear blackmail against all States of the region under the pretext of maintaining the balance of power, thus putting the peace and security of the Middle East, and consequently of the world, at risk and making the issue an axis of concern for the States of the region. The international community must shoulder its responsibilities and exert pressure on Israel to sign the NPT and comply with relevant international instruments to enable the States of the region to focus on their economic development and encourage the peaceful use of atomic energy in accordance with the Agency's Statute.

221. His delegation affirmed NAM's standpoint underscoring the sensitivity of the Iranian nuclear dossier. Any ill-considered step on the part of Iran or the other States of the region would have extremely serious political and economic consequences.

222. The sensitivity of the Iranian issue meant that the use of threats and pressure was not conducive to finding a solution. Nor were defiance and non-transparency in relation to cooperation with the Agency helpful. Libya considered that the matter should be dealt with within the Agency relying on the wisdom and professionalism of its Director General. Libya hoped a decision would be reached that would put an end to a problem that was of concern to all States and threatened the peace and security of the world.

223. Libya was continuing its technical cooperation activities with the Agency and with other Member States in all fields of nuclear science and technology for the benefit of its citizens. It had been particularly grateful for cooperation in recent years in the areas of health and water resources management, which were national priorities for addressing Libya's socio-economic development requirements under its CPF. Also, Libya was actively participating in and had hosted several national and regional activities aimed at enhancing the technical cooperation programme.

224. In view of the growing importance of the role of nuclear energy in helping States, including Libya, to meet their energy needs, his delegation looked forward to the Agency playing a greater role in the introduction of nuclear power for electricity generation. At the same time, it looked forward to assistance as regards the services provided by the Tajoura research reactor, especially in the production of radioisotopes and their various uses.

225. Finally, he noted Libya's interest in nuclear security and safety and the physical protection of nuclear installations, areas in which it was currently cooperating with the Agency and other countries.

**Ms Buján Freire (Spain), Vice-President, took the Chair.**

226. Ms FRIXIONE MIRANDA (Nicaragua) said that her country attached the utmost importance to the Agency's technical cooperation activities that had enabled it to meet basic human needs, in particular in the area of health.

227. Nuclear technologies were being used in Nicaragua including to improve water resources management, develop high-yield crops, eradicate pests and increase industrial productivity. They were also used for cancer treatment, and Nicaragua was pleased to have been designated as one of the eight PACT pilot countries.

228. Under the technical cooperation programme, Nicaragua was also seeking to increase the value added of agricultural products, ensure the safety of foodstuffs for consumption and export, improve the conservation of natural resources and increase agricultural productivity.

229. Nicaragua attached great importance to nuclear security and had hosted a number of regional meetings on that subject in cooperation with the Agency. She was pleased to report that her

Government was working towards the swift ratification of the amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

230. Nicaragua congratulated the Government of Japan on the management of the tragic accident at Fukushima. It welcomed the adoption of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, which aimed to strengthen the nuclear safety regime.

231. Nicaragua's commitment to peace and a just international order was enshrined in its Constitution. While recognizing the inalienable right of all States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, Nicaragua supported initiatives promoting complete disarmament and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. It had ratified a number of treaties and associated protocols concerning nuclear weapons, including the CTBT, the NPT and the Tlatelolco Treaty. It was working through the Central American Integration System to implement Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), the CPPNM and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

232. Nicaragua congratulated the Agency and the Government of Norway on the success of the Forum on Experience of Possible Relevance to the Creation of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East and commended the work of its Chairperson. Nicaragua strongly supported the holding in 2012 of a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons, and called on all States to make that conference a success.

233. Mr JANAHI (Bahrain) said that his country had supported the Agency, ever since its establishment on 29 June 1957, in its mission to foster the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to limit nuclear armament through its regulatory, inspection and technical verification work in States with nuclear installations, thereby contributing to environmental, political and economic stability in the world.

234. When Bahrain had joined the Agency in 2009, its main aim had been to benefit from the sharing of nuclear knowledge and technology among the industrial and developing States and from promotion of the peaceful and reliable uses of atomic energy. It had also wished to gain maximum benefit from the Agency's significant work in the spheres of peace, security, science and technology, safeguards and technical verification and to cooperate with the Agency in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Nuclear radiation had the potential to harm successive generations, to extend beyond land, sea and air boundaries, and expose inhabitants in dwellings to biological and hereditary genetic damage.

235. Bahrain remained concerned about Israel's continued intransigence as regards signing the NPT and disclosure and control of its nuclear programme. It looked forward to more cooperation and transparency by the States of the region with the Agency to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the security and stability of the region. That notwithstanding, Bahrain reiterated that it was the right of every State to acquire nuclear energy and to use nuclear technology not just for electricity generation but also for other applications, such as medical treatment and diagnosis, in the agricultural, food, industrial, the oil and natural gas sectors, as well as for carbon dating and for water management and environmental purposes, provided that it was under the scientific and technical control of the Agency and that no double standards were applied.

236. The Agency played a pioneering role in regulating some 435 nuclear reactors in 31 countries, and nuclear electricity generation was expected to be 1000 GW(e) by 2030. Furthermore, there were ambitious plans to build some 280 nuclear reactors in the future, estimated to be ready by 2050. Also worth mentioning was the fact that there were approximately 670 nuclear research reactors in 56 countries, which the Agency monitored for safety and for which it provided technical advisory assistance.

237. Bahrain hoped that the Agency would establish more safety and security standards aimed at averting damage resulting from human error by workers in reactors or from organizational errors between the supplier, the regulatory authority and the government. In the past, nuclear catastrophes had led to the closure, or a reduction in the operational lifetime, of 138 nuclear reactors in 18 countries.

238. For its part, Bahrain hoped to have nuclear electricity generation that would be nuclear waste and radiation free.

239. In general, the past year had been a fruitful one for Bahrain as regards cooperation with the Agency. It had acceded to three agreements: the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident; and it had ratified its additional protocol. In addition, Bahrain had cooperated with the Agency in holding two workshops in the country. It had received Agency support in the implementation of four important projects and it hoped to receive urgent support for some seven other nuclear projects related to peaceful uses and human capacity building.

240. Bahrain continued to make progress in Gulf nuclear peaceful uses projects for electricity generation and desalination aimed at reducing the impact of climate warming.

241. Finally, he said that Bahrain aspired to achieve sustainable development and to prevent damage from climate change. It endeavoured to work with the Agency in achieving energy security, nuclear safety and security, and nuclear non-proliferation and to receive assistance in managing nuclear waste for the welfare of life on earth.

242. Mr DIMIDIS (Greece) said that the discovery of nuclear fission seventy years previously had changed the world. There were currently 435 nuclear power plants delivering 369 GW of electrical energy worldwide and thousands of laboratories conducting research in agriculture, medicine and industry. The Fukushima accident had united the international nuclear community within the framework of the Agency with a view to establishing new rules and regulations to strengthen nuclear safety and security. Greece took a keen interest in the expansion of the Agency programmes on nuclear safety and security and in the Agency's overall role to enhance the global safety and security framework, and welcomed the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety endorsed by the previous session of the General Conference.

243. An IRRS mission had been carried out in his country in May 2012 to assess the regulatory system for nuclear and radiation safety, and the report had been made available on the website. The majority of the recommendations and suggestions contained in the report had already been identified during Greece's self-assessment and relevant actions had been included in the proposed action plan. The outcome of the mission would form the basis for the Commission's strategy and practice in the forthcoming few years.

244. With regard to nuclear security, his country appreciated the Secretariat's efforts to help States establish and sustain effective national security frameworks, meet commitments under legal instruments, establish review mechanisms, strengthen international cooperation and provide education in nuclear security. Greece had recently adhered to the amendment to the CPPNM and urged all States that had not yet done so to do likewise.

245. Turning to safeguards and non-proliferation, he said that Greece supported the Agency's efforts to develop and implement the State-level concept and evaluate further the conceptual framework for safeguards implementation. It supported the Medium Term Strategy 2012–2017 and the long-term strategic plan 2012–2023 for safeguards. International confidence in non-proliferation and the safeguards regime depended mainly on political support at the national, regional and international

levels, and he called upon all Member States to adhere to the additional protocol and set the standard for a successful non-proliferation and safeguards regime.

246. Noting that Iran had not provided the necessary cooperation to permit full access to all its facilities and that the Director-General had been unable to conclude that nuclear facilities and material in that country were used for peaceful purposes only, he urged Iran and the Agency to intensify dialogue with a view to resolving all outstanding issues. Iran should provide the necessary clarification, including access to all relevant information, persons and facilities.

247. Greece urged Syria, notwithstanding the critical situation in the country, to improve its cooperation with the Agency in accordance with its obligations under the relevant resolution of the Board. It hoped that the unresolved matters would be resolved as soon as possible.

248. His country reiterated its call to the DPRK to return to full compliance with its safeguards agreement and allow Agency inspectors to return to the country. The absence of inspectors and the operation of an enrichment facility in the DPRK were causes of serious concern.

249. Greece highly appreciated the Secretariat's efforts to increase Member States' capabilities in the development and application of nuclear sciences in the areas of food and agriculture, the environment, industry, health and water resources. It welcomed the Peaceful Uses Initiative that served to enhance areas of work, such as PACT and efforts to enhance the nuclear safety regime and strengthen the international security framework.

250. Greece highly appreciated the Agency's technical assistance and cooperation activities as the primary mechanism to support the development of Member States, and commended the Secretariat's efforts to ensure technical cooperation cycles reflected new trends and realities worldwide. Technical cooperation activities should focus on the use of radiation in health care and on strengthening safety and security in all aspects of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Although cooperation at the international and regional levels was important, interaction between the Secretariat and Member States, as well as national institutions, was key to ensuring the achievement of objectives.

251. Mr MCCOOK (Jamaica) said that his country attached great importance to the work of the Agency in promoting safe and effective use of nuclear technology for the common good. The Director General and the Secretariat were to be commended for their commitment and dedication in implementing the Agency's mandates.

252. The attention paid to the Agency's work in the area of safeguards and nuclear security was warranted, given the challenges that could arise from natural disasters and the potential consequences of nuclear material falling into the hands of malicious actors.

253. Noting the progress being made in the implementation of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety and on measures to strengthen international cooperation in nuclear, radiation, transport and waste safety, he said that Jamaica recognized the concerted efforts made to apply lessons learned, share knowledge and experience, and develop common approaches to tackle many of the challenges identified.

254. Jamaica, like other members of the Caribbean Community, remained concerned at safety implications of the transportation of nuclear material through vulnerable regions, such as the Caribbean. It continued to urge shipping States to take those concerns into account and discontinue the practice.

255. As a party to the NPT, Jamaica remained committed to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. It hoped that countries would remain steadfast in their undertaking not to develop nuclear weapons, and that there would be deeper commitment to the elimination of such weapons.

256. His country recognized the importance of a collective commitment to nuclear safety and attached great importance to the relevant conventions. It had signed the CPPNM and continued to consider other measures aimed at reinforcing the global regime for the safe, secure and effective use of nuclear material and technology. Jamaica had decided to join the illicit trafficking database to help strengthen the global effort to prevent the abuse of nuclear material and technologies.

257. Jamaica attached great importance to the Agency's technical cooperation activities. It particularly welcomed programmes in the area of capacity building in nuclear physics and medical sciences, and groundwater-related studies, which would have social and economic benefits for the country. Fellowships and training programmes for national experts had also contributed to capacity building. He emphasized the importance of programmes in support of technical cooperation, such as the Peaceful Uses Initiative, and thanked contributing countries and the Agency for their support.

258. Jamaica had taken steps to deepen its engagement with the Agency by acceding to the Co-operation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean. It looked forward to complementing its national cooperation programme with regional initiatives under that Agreement.

259. Jamaica was already seeking to contribute to increasing awareness of the importance of cooperation in the nuclear area and support for the Agency's work at the regional level. Noting that all States must, as a minimum, develop capacities for the safe handling of radioactive materials, he said that Jamaica had, in collaboration with the Agency and PAHO, hosted the Caribbean Community's regional workshop on regulatory infrastructure for the control of radioactive sources. Participants had undertaken to develop national action plans to address issues pertaining to safety and security, such as illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive material, attesting to the important steps being taken by the region to strengthen frameworks for the handling of radioactive material and application of nuclear technology.

260. Jamaica recognized that an effective regulatory framework for the monitoring, oversight and enforcement of necessary standards and safeguards was at the heart of an effective national programme for the use of nuclear technologies. His country appreciated the valuable support of Agency experts concerning the establishment of the national regulatory body, and was committed to completing work in that regard in the shortest possible time frame.

261. The countries of the Caribbean Community had helped to place noncommunicable diseases at the forefront of the global health agenda and were seeking to ensure that the most effective measures were deployed to tackle the issue. The utilization of nuclear technologies in response to some of the most significant noncommunicable diseases had been prioritized, and Jamaica welcomed the assistance it was receiving from staff from the Division for Latin America in developing an effective and sustainable programme in that area.

262. In conclusion, he said that Jamaica remained committed to ensuring the safe, secure and effective use of nuclear technology and would continue to give its full support and cooperation to the Agency.

263. Mr ENKHS AIKHAN (Mongolia) said that the Agency was being called upon to play an increasing role in international affairs, and its mandate needed to be strengthened further, in particular with regard to nuclear safety and security. He commended the Agency's work, not only in technical matters, but also in tackling global challenges pertaining to the Millennium Development Goals and the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development.

264. Mongolia was a strong promoter of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and was party to the NPT and CTBT. It had declared its nuclear-weapon-free status two decades previously, and the

joint declaration of the five permanent members of the Security Council recognizing Mongolia's status was a concrete step towards making Mongolia a region of peace and stability.

265. Mongolia fully supported international efforts to convene a conference in 2012 on the establishment of Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons. It called for the involvement of all stakeholders in that conference with a view to achieving practical initial results. Mongolia thanked the facilitator for his tireless efforts.

266. The nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant had served as a reminder of the need to ensure the utmost safety and security at nuclear power plants and other nuclear facilities. Mongolia welcomed the Declaration adopted by the Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety and attached significant importance to the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety. Although much had improved since the adoption of the Action Plan, much remained to be done. The forthcoming ministerial conference in the Fukushima Prefecture would provide an opportunity to evaluate achievements and to identify action to be taken in the future.

267. The application of nuclear technology for civilian purposes was an important aspect of the Agency's work and one that benefited developing countries the most. He hoped that the goal of modernizing outdated and obsolete nuclear laboratories could be achieved.

268. Mongolia was working closely with the Agency and its Member States to strengthen national, regional and international standards. It was currently working to accede to the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention, and to adopt the amended SQP.

269. The transfer of nuclear technology and knowledge was of great importance, and his country sincerely appreciated the technical assistance it received from the Agency.

270. His Government attached great importance to cancer prevention and treatment, and valued its cooperation with PACT. With assistance from that Programme, Mongolia had adopted a general action plan on cancer prevention and control for 2011–2012 and a strategic plan for development of radiotherapy, and had become the eighth PACT Model Demonstration Site country. Mongolia welcomed the Director General's initiative to establish a cancer training centre at Seibersdorf, which would help to strengthen the training of health professionals.

271. Mongolia was planning to exploit its uranium resources in order to address national development goals and challenges. It was well aware that the exploitation of uranium would pose a number of challenges, such as ensuring physical security of nuclear material at all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. In that regard, increased emphasis should be placed on safety and security of nuclear facilities, on strengthening the legal framework, and on training of human resources.

272. In developing its nuclear programme, Mongolia would seek to learn from the experience of other countries. It hoped to work more closely with the Agency to benefit from its expert advice and support.

273. Mr ŽUGIC (Serbia) emphasized the importance of the Agency's role in verifying that the nuclear activities of Member States were performed for peaceful purposes only and in compliance with the NPT, and highlighted the Agency's outstanding contribution to development.

274. Nuclear technologies must be used in accordance with international standards and requirements. Serbia, a European Union candidate country, was focusing on the process of integrating into the European Union and was endeavouring to meet all obligations from the stabilisation and association process, with particular emphasis on nuclear safety and security, including safeguards.



275. A strengthened safeguards system, including application of the additional protocol, would help to address current challenges to the NPT regime. Serbia had signed its additional protocol in 2009 and appreciated the assistance it had received from the Agency and other donors in connection with implementation of that instrument.

276. The Serbian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency, which had been established as an independent regulatory body in 2009, was becoming fully functional to facilitate more adequate control and management in the nuclear field. State administration would be reorganized to ensure full implementation of regulatory control in accordance with international safety standards. Serbia's efforts to build capacity and enhance infrastructure in the field of radiation protection and nuclear safety were recognized by the Agency and supported through several national and international projects.

277. In addition to developing and introducing a new set of regulations, Serbia was making efforts to strengthen its legal framework, in particular by incorporating into national legislation provisions from conventions already enacted. He was pleased to report that preparatory activities for ratification of the Convention on Nuclear Safety were now in the final phase.

278. The Agency had an indispensable role in preventing possible acts of nuclear terrorism, which were a global danger, and Serbia supported the programmes and funds established in that regard. In order to prevent the misuse of nuclear and other radioactive material and related knowledge and technologies, Serbia was committed to the further improvement of its physical protection measures and capabilities to combat illicit trafficking.

279. Serbia strongly supported the further strengthening of the Agency's technical cooperation activities, which were indispensable, particularly for the developing countries. The Agency's expertise and input were crucial to help countries achieve goals in a variety of fields, including safeguards, safety and security, regulatory infrastructure and radiation medicine. Serbia welcomed the technical assistance it was receiving, which was yielding remarkable results. Areas of particular attention for his country included upgrading the regulatory infrastructure, human health, environmental protection and nuclear security. The Agency's assistance in decommissioning nuclear facilities at the Vinča site and in the safe management of waste was indispensable.

280. Noting that Serbia had, as usual, fulfilled its financial contributions to the Agency, he said that his country would continue to meet its obligations to the Agency and remained committed to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

281. Mr VINHAS (Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean) said that the General Conference provided an opportunity to consider the relationship between the Agency and OPANAL that had evolved over the previous five decades during which a complex universal legal framework had been developed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the non-proliferation regime. Although the scope of both organizations differed in many respects, they were linked through the Tlatelolco Treaty, which gave authority to the Agency to verify compliance with obligations by States party and by countries associated through the Treaty's two Additional Protocols. Member States of OPANAL undertook to use for exclusively peaceful purposes nuclear material and facilities and the nuclear-weapon-States undertook to respect the region's status of military denuclearization and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against Parties to the Treaty.

282. Under the Treaty, States parties were required to negotiate safeguards agreements with the Agency and to sign the NPT, and the Agency could be requested to conduct special inspections.

283. The Agency's links with the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean had increased at the beginning of the 1990s with the signature of the Quadripartite Agreement between the

Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the Agency. That agreement and the establishment of ABACC had helped to strengthen the regional control system on a bilateral basis.

Although OPANAL had not had to request the Agency to conduct special inspections, they were an inherent part of the non-proliferation regime under the Tlatelolco system. It was therefore essential for OPANAL to maintain and strengthen links with the Agency. The presence of OPANAL at the Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety held in June 2011 and its active participation in the Agency's Forum on Experience of Possible Relevance to the Creation of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East in November had provided a starting point for reviving the link between both agencies. The Director General had attended the conference marking the 45th anniversary of the signing of the Tlatelolco Treaty in February, during which he had recalled that, for the international nuclear safeguards regime, the Treaty had enshrined a requirement that all parties should conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency.

284. The five nuclear-weapon-free zones made a significant contribution to regional and international peace and security, and to the promotion of non-proliferation and disarmament. The Agency played a vital role in each of the zones, and the Tlatelolco Treaty had been instrumental in imposing the requirement for safeguards and for giving the Agency a more extensive role with respect to nuclear-weapon-free zones.

285. OPANAL would continue to forge closer links with the Agency with a view to strengthening the monitoring of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean. It would work towards enhancing the non-proliferation regime and ensuring that its 33 Member States could continue to use and develop nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes in a world free of nuclear weapons.

286. Ms BOYLE (Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization) said that the CTBTO Preparatory Commission and the Agency had shared responsibilities with respect to addressing threats to global security through nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear security and nuclear safety instruments.

287. In June 2011, three months after the Great East Japan Earthquake and the Fukushima accident, the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission had addressed the Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety and had said that mitigating and effectively responding to nuclear accidents would necessitate the forging of the widest possible coalition. Only days after the accident, collaborative efforts had been undertaken between the two organizations in that connection. The accident had shown the value of the international community's investment in the Commission's international monitoring system. Relevant data had been shared with nations and with international organizations, including the Agency, WMO, WHO and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. The earthquake and several thousand aftershocks had been detected by the seismic stations of the international monitoring system around the globe. Data from those stations had contributed to alerts issued by tsunami warning centres in the Pacific region. Infrasound detection had provided evidence of explosions at the nuclear power plant.

288. A multi-technology global platform had important added value. The speed, reliability and quality of the tsunami warning information produced by the system were unique. The system was up to 180 seconds faster than the second comparable international system. It was also providing noble gas radionuclide release measurements for nearly 100 isotopes in some 100 locations. The data was being freely shared. In cooperation with the Agency and other organizations, her organization had provided a more accurate picture of the radionuclide situation to the benefit of national governments and the public. Thus, exchange of data and cooperation between the Agency and the Preparatory Commission remained relevant and important. The Commission was participating in the Inter-Agency Committee

on Radiological and Nuclear Emergencies and was a co-sponsor of the Joint Radiation Emergency Management Plan of the International Organizations.

289. The CTBT and its verification regime embodied the principles of democracy and transparency. Around the globe and around the clock, data was shared with 1300 institutions in 120 countries. Comprising 377 monitoring facilities and 250 communications assets, the system operated at the cutting edge of scientific knowledge. It was unprecedented in its global reach and was a joint venture for strengthening global security. The 2013 CTBT science, technology and innovation conference to be held in Vienna in June 2013 would provide another opportunity for exchange on pertinent issues. The interface between scientific advancement and policy-making would be explored in panel discussions, and a number of initiatives were planned to promote interest in relevant research fields for CTBT verification, and to foster the work of younger scientists.

290. Her organization addressed two interrelated challenges: nuclear weapons and complex disasters. It sought to provide solutions to those challenges based on knowledge and use of the best technologies. It was important to empower the organization, and to empower all countries and institutions and the next generation to make the most of what it could offer.

291. There was a continued urgency to invest in the next generation of disarmament and non-proliferation specialists by increasing awareness and understanding of the international non-proliferation framework. Hence, her organization had launched its capacity development initiative in 2010 with the objective of training and educating the next generation of experts. As an organization producing and sharing global public goods, it was bringing together mass education and a broad alliance of international organizations and academia, and — it hoped — the business community as well. In 2012, it hoped to train more than 1000 experts, including up to 300 women using innovative mobile platforms, including internet-based platforms. In that connection, she drew attention to an advanced science course that would be held in November 2012 in Vienna and streamed online in real time. Like all courses under the capacity development initiative it would be free of charge.

292. As the 50th anniversary of the Cuban missile crisis approached, it was instructive to recall the words of President John F. Kennedy about nuclear war: “the fruits of victory would be ashes in our mouth”. By placing a qualitative constraint on nuclear weapons development, the CTBT helped maintain international peace and security. It was a core element of the non-proliferation and disarmament regime, and the Commission’s verification regime was a key part of the legal framework for nuclear security and safety worldwide. Since 1945, the number of test explosions been in the order of 500 a decade, but there had been only two in the preceding decade — in the DPRK, though that was still too many.

293. There was reason for optimism. The Treaty enjoyed growing political support. Since its adoption in 1996, it had been signed by 183 countries and ratified by 157. With an inspiring demonstration of political determination, Indonesia had deposited its instrument of ratification in February 2012, sending a powerful signal to the 8 remaining States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty whose ratifications were required to achieve entry into force.

294. The CTBT was one of the three key pillars of all nuclear-weapon-free zones: no nuclear weapons, no fissile material for nuclear weapons, and no nuclear weapons tests. It provided a forum to engage on complex verification issues in a multilateral setting. The activities of the Preparatory Commission demonstrated that politically and scientifically complex multilateral verification was possible and that it did work.

295. The on-site inspection verification mechanism, to be implemented after the Treaty entered into force, continued to be a priority for the organization. To ensure it worked effectively, the Commission had embarked on testing all relevant procedures and techniques. Those efforts were being

complemented by build-up exercises, field experiments and table-top simulation exercises. The next field exercise, to be held in 2014 in Jordan, would involve all-inclusive testing and training of the organization's on-site inspection capabilities.

296. Mr DABIK (The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) said that his country believed firmly that a strong system of international safeguards was needed to promote collective security. With terrorism on the rise worldwide, the Agency's role in that regard was becoming even more important. Cooperation between all Member States and the Agency in the application of safety standards and the implementation of the Nuclear Security Plan should be sustained and strengthened.

297. His country had subscribed to the most important instruments embodying international efforts to strengthen non-proliferation, nuclear verification and export controls and it fulfilled its reporting commitments. He encouraged those Member States that had not yet done so to ratify those instruments in the near future. He stressed the importance of consistent efforts to achieve a negotiated peaceful solution to the urgent problems.

298. Over the last decade, as his country focused on integration into the European Union it had developed and implemented a wide range of measures to strengthen its nuclear regulatory framework and infrastructure. It was continuously improving its capabilities to combat illicit trafficking and ensure physical protection of nuclear and radioactive materials in order to prevent the misuse of those materials and the related knowledge and technologies.

299. Regarding national regulatory infrastructure, the independent Radiation Safety Directorate had made further progress, assisted by the Agency, in building national capacities for effective radiation protection and nuclear safety, including providing training for a significant number of young experts. The Radiation Safety Directorate had adopted several volumes of rules that were aligned with European Union legislation, thus further harmonizing national legislation in the field of nuclear safety and radiation protection.

300. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia had joined the European Union Urgent Radiological Information Exchange, having signed the agreement between Euratom and non-member States of the European Union on the early exchange of information in the event of radiological emergency.

301. His country strongly supported strengthening Agency technical assistance, which it considered indispensable, especially for developing countries. The Agency's expertise, training, education, and provision of necessary equipment were crucial for meeting objectives in the fields of nuclear safeguards, safety and security, regulatory infrastructure, radiation medicine and diagnostics, agriculture, and many other fields. He thanked the Agency for its assistance to his country through the technical cooperation programme. The CPF envisioned would be implemented through both national and regional projects and would incorporate the progress of existing programmes and plans addressing priority sectors for development.

302. The projects selected in the 2012–2013 cycle were fully consistent with the existing CPF and the new CPF for 2012–2017 to be signed by the end of the year. The projects were focused on building capacities in human health, food safety and cultural heritage protection. His country also attached great importance to regional projects, which addressed shared needs and goals in areas where promoting connections between countries in a region was the most effective and efficient approach.

303. Recognizing the importance of nuclear technologies in medicine for improving health services, his country reaffirmed its commitment to proceed with the current project on establishing a PET centre despite the severe economic conditions. Further Agency support, in accordance with the work plan adopted, would be required in order to implement the project successfully.

304. His country had begun a systematic and comprehensive programme aimed at collecting the information required to take a decision on embarking on a nuclear power programme. A national energy strategy had been prepared under which one option for meeting the demand for electric power in 2030 and beyond was the use of nuclear power in addition to other energy sources. In that regard, financial and technical assistance from Agency was required to implement properly all stages of that work, assess the work plan and the results, and ensure that the programme met all relevant international and Agency guidelines and requirements.

305. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia welcomed the Agency's Annual Report for 2011 and the budget planned for 2013. It would continue to be an active partner in, and a strong supporter of, the Agency's activities in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the benefit of all nations.

306. Mr DONA (Sovereign Order of Malta) expressed confidence in the Director General's ability to ensure that the Agency continued to contribute to sustainable strategies that addressed the challenges of hunger, disease and poverty.

307. The Sovereign Order of Malta had been founded over 950 years earlier and had a unique sovereign status. It had diplomatic relations with 104 States, permanent observer status at the United Nations and affiliated organizations, and was also seeking to achieve a similar status with the Agency.

308. In the area of public health, the Sovereign Order of Malta was confident that effective preventive, diagnostic, curative and palliative measures could be provided with the Agency's assistance through PACT. The Order commended the Agency's assistance in building the capacity of Member States concerning cancer management, and noted the Agency's concerted efforts to make a meaningful contribution to fight against HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. It called upon the Agency to continue to strengthen its support to such crucial areas of public health.

309. In February, the Sovereign Order of Malta and the Agency had signed a practical arrangement to support the advance of comprehensive, multidisciplinary cancer capacity building in low- and middle- income countries, notably Albania. In order to support the PACT Model Demonstration Site in Albania, the Order of Malta had, as a first step, committed funds to support breast cancer control activities in that country by arranging for the publication and distribution of materials for staff and patients on topics concerning clinical examination and screening approaches.

310. The agricultural sector was a major area of development, and projects supported by the Agency in that sector helped developing countries to improve food security. The Order welcomed the theme of the Scientific Forum on food for the future, noting that the stark realities of hunger, poverty, climate change and environmental degradation brought unprecedented challenges in the area of food and agriculture. Research, expertise and experience of the FAO/IAEA partnership and other effective alliances worldwide were necessary to help countries achieve and sustain higher levels of food security for their populations.

311. The Agency had played a critical role in facilitating the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in particular in developing countries. Strategic applications of nuclear technology in targeted areas, such as health, crop and livestock management, and water resources management could make a huge contribution to reducing hunger and poverty in an equitable and sustainable manner — a goal to which the Sovereign Order of Malta was committed.

312. In conclusion, the Order expressed appreciation of the significant role of the Agency in fostering peace and security and in promoting the development of the most marginalized peoples of the world.

**The meeting rose at 8.45 p.m.**