

# General Conference

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## Fifty-third regular session

# Plenary

## Record of the Fourth Meeting

*Held at Headquarters, Vienna, on Tuesday, 15 September 2009, at 3.25 p.m.*

**President:** Mr GARCÍA REVILLA (Peru)

**Later:** Mr SOLTANIEH (Islamic Republic of Iran)

Mr ENKHTSAIKHAN JARGALSAIKHAN (Mongolia)

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**Abbreviations used in this record:**

|                       |   |
|-----------------------|---|
| AFRA                  | African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology |
| ARCAL                 | Cooperation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean            |
| Bangkok Treaty        | Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone   |
| CANDU                 | Canada deuterium-uranium [reactor]  |
| CPF                   | Country Programme Framework   |
| CPPNM                 | Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material   |
| CTBT                  | Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty   |
| DPRK                  | Democratic People's Republic of Korea   |
| EBRD                  | European Bank for Reconstruction and Development  |
| Euratom               | European Atomic Energy Community  |
| FAO                   | Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations   |
| G8                    | Group of Eight  |
| HEU                   | high-enriched uranium   |
| imPACT                | integrated missions of PACT   |
| INIR                  | Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review  |
| INPRO                 | International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles  |
| IRRS                  | Integrated Regulatory Review Service  |
| LEU                   | low-enriched uranium  |
| NPCs                  | national participation costs  |
| NPT                   | Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons  |
| NPT Review Conference | Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons                              |
| NSG                   | Nuclear Suppliers Group   |
| PACT                  | Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy  |
| Pelindaba Treaty      | African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty   |
| PET                   | positron emission tomography  |

**Abbreviations used in this record (continued):**

|                   |   |
|-------------------|---|
| R&D               | research and development  |
| RCA               | Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology<br>(for Asia and the Pacific)       |
| SSAC              | State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material  |
| START             | Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms |
| TCDC              | technical cooperation among developing countries  |
| TCF               | Technical Cooperation Fund  |
| Tlatelolco Treaty | Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean  |
| WHO               | World Health Organization   |

## **8. General debate and Annual Report for 2008 (continued)** (GC(53)/7)

1. Mr DJELIC (Serbia) said that his country had been fortunate to host a visit by Mr Elbaradei in July 2009 which had marked the successful repatriation of Serbian spent nuclear fuel and had raised general awareness of the importance of nuclear technologies and their development in the future.
2. Serbia remained committed to all the Agency's fundamental principles and goals relating to safe and secure applications of nuclear energy for the benefit of human society and in accordance with global international standards and practices. It would continue to support efforts to strengthen and develop an integrated safeguards regime in accordance with the NPT and commended the Secretariat on its implementation of safeguards agreements and additional protocols. During Mr ElBaradei's visit in July 2009, his country had signed an additional protocol.
3. The Serbian Government attached great importance to nuclear security issues and was committed to strengthening its national nuclear security, and to international cooperation in that area. With assistance from the Agency and other international actors, Serbia was making progress in upgrading its capabilities for combating illicit trafficking, improving its physical protection system and implementing measures for gaining control over orphan sources. Only with an efficient nuclear security system in place in all countries, and through strong international cooperation, could the threat of nuclear terrorism be countered globally.
4. His country had accelerated its decommissioning efforts and its work on the repatriation of spent nuclear fuel with a view to removing the Vinča Institute of Nuclear Sciences from the list of potential global threats. Progress was being made through national efforts and with international support, one of the important steps having been realized in June 2009 when Serbia had signed the necessary intergovernmental agreement with the Russian Federation. A further major step, the signing of a foreign trade contract, had been accomplished during the current General Conference. In addition to strong national efforts, it had been the support of the Secretariat that had allowed those major steps to be accomplished successfully and on time. The repatriation effort would be one of the largest of its kind ever conducted, involving 2.3 t of material, and it was planned to be completed by the end of 2010. He thanked all international donors, in particular the United States of America, the European Union, the Russian Federation, the Czech Republic, the Nuclear Threat Initiative and Slovenia, and reaffirmed Serbia's commitment to covering at least half of the costs for decommissioning.
5. Serbia had also carried out significant internal restructuring in order to ensure the efficient accomplishment of the repatriation and decommissioning, and to meet international norms. In July 2009, it had founded a public company which would assume control of and responsibility for the management of all nuclear liabilities and assets throughout the country, including all those involved in the Vinča Institute Nuclear Decommissioning programme. That Institute, which had a long tradition in nuclear science and multidisciplinary research, would coexist with the new public company and conduct its activities as one of Serbia's leading research institutions.
6. The Agency's nuclear and radiation safety activities were of great importance and his country was committed to strengthening further its nuclear legal system to protect both society and the environment from potential risks and to ensure that nuclear energy was applied for the benefit of future generations. Although applications of nuclear energy were already covered by an array of national legal instruments, to make the legal framework more comprehensive and comply with

international safety standards and practices, and in view of Serbia's position as a future European Union member State, Serbia had adopted a new law on radiation protection and nuclear safety in May 2009. The new law provided a basis for the establishment of an independent regulatory authority which would be responsible for radiation protection, nuclear safety and radioactive waste management. The new authority would provide better and more extensive regulatory control, would develop a new set of by-laws and would track their implementation; it should be operational by the end of the year. It would also ensure that all operations, practices and activities, including the Vinča Institute Nuclear Decommissioning programme, were carried out with the highest possible level of safety.

7. Serbia strongly supported further improvement of Agency technical cooperation and was grateful for the assistance it had received with restoring and upgrading its nuclear technologies. The support of the Agency was indispensable for countries in transition, particularly countries like Serbia that had suffered a loss of human resources in the nuclear field. His country hoped that the Agency would continue to improve its activities, working with it not only on existing programmes, but also in applying nuclear technologies in such civil sectors as human health, agriculture, veterinary medicine, water resources management and preservation of cultural heritage. Serbia had recently signed a new CPF covering the period up to 2015.

8. Finally, he noted that Serbia had, as usual, met all its financial obligations to the Agency in a timely fashion and would continue to do so in the future.

9. Mr STEINMANN (Switzerland) said that, since the preceding General Conference, there had been encouraging signs in the field of nuclear disarmament, in particular: the commitment made by the Presidents of the United States and the Russian Federation on 1 April 2009 to achieving a nuclear-free world, which had been followed by the signing of the Joint Understanding for the START follow-on treaty in July 2009; the constructive atmosphere surrounding the work of the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference held in May 2009 in New York; and the acceptance, on 29 May 2009, of the work programme of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, which had restored the confidence of the international community in multilateral mechanisms. Those developments should be followed closely, particularly since some of them could have interesting implications for the Agency.

10. Where regional issues were concerned, developments had unfortunately not been as satisfactory. In the area of nuclear verification, there were still many uncertainties and indications that nuclear programmes could have a military dimension. It was therefore important that the Agency be able to carry out all the required verification activities. Switzerland saw no way out of the crises in question other than diplomacy, which was why his country called on all parties concerned to seize the opportunities offered to them, even if they did not immediately meet their expectations.

11. Switzerland appreciated the discussions in progress concerning the future of the Agency. Although a conclusion was some way off, the opportunity to discuss freely and openly questions that were of concern to all enabled Member States to understand each other's points of view better and thus improve their ability to find compromises where necessary.

12. The issue of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle had provoked intense discussion. Since the report of the Agency expert group, published in 2005, work on the issue had been overshadowed by a certain malaise. Such discussions should never lead to attempts by States in possession of sensitive nuclear technologies to curb the technological progress of States without such technology on the pretext of combating nuclear proliferation. The free use of nuclear technology, in accordance with the inalienable rights provided for in the NPT, must not be called into question. For many, the main motive of those initiatives was economic considerations. It was true that the exception

granted to India by the NSG in August 2008 had undermined confidence in the notion of a fair non-proliferation system and had tainted discussions with concern over double standards. Moreover, in the absence of real progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, there was the risk that those discussions would always be seen as premature by many non-nuclear-weapon States. Consequently, Switzerland supported any initiative which would reassure the latter as to their rights.

13. His country was satisfied with the accounts for 2008 and the External Auditor's report. On a number of occasions in recent years, Switzerland had asked that efforts be made to ensure that all expenditures be included in the Regular Budget and, after various exceptions, it expected future budget increases to be limited to offsetting inflation both as regards the Regular Budget and the technical cooperation budget. The budget for 2010, which had been accepted by consensus, had not shown any real improvement in that respect. However, the creation of a fund for major investments marked a first step towards the development of a modern and transparent policy for the management of property and the essential equipment. That fund should now be incorporated in the Regular Budget so that it properly reflected a shared commitment funded by all and not just a handful of States. Switzerland also noted the decision to establish a working group charged with the task of proposing a budget for 2011 on the basis of priorities still to be defined, in which it was ready to take an active and committed part. His country attached great importance to the inclusion in the Regular Budget of all costs and investments related to the statutory tasks of the Agency, and to rigorous planning.

14. His country also gave high priority to the Agency's promotional activities and efforts in the area of technical cooperation. Payment of contributions had been satisfactory and, as a result, interest in the Agency's programme remained intact despite the financial crisis affecting the economies of many States. Switzerland fully endorsed the application of NPCs and CPFs, which were important factors in ensuring the efficient implementation of the technical cooperation programme and enabling the Agency to make a more useful contribution to the achievement of Millennium Development Goals.

15. Switzerland was satisfied with the annual report on the application of safeguards, in particular the fact that the Agency had concluded that, within the group of States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force, nuclear material had remained in civilian use. His country called on all States party to the NPT that had not brought comprehensive safeguards agreements into force to do so. With regard to integrated safeguards, he asked the Secretariat to focus on analysis of the reduction in overall costs their progressive application would entail both for the Agency and the countries concerned, recalling that reduction of verification costs had been one of the declared purposes of the introduction of the additional protocol. Like other countries, Switzerland would like to receive from the Department of Safeguards a proposal to focus verification efforts on facilities with nuclear material that posed a major proliferation risk.

16. It would be useful if the Agency were to recall and clarify its role and responsibilities in the areas of safety and security, and the roles and responsibilities of the host State of a nuclear installation or its owner. Such distinctions were not always clear to the public, and it would be undesirable if false expectations were to be created regarding the Agency's role.

17. Turning finally to nuclear energy developments in Switzerland, he said that the road map for the creation of depositories in deep geological strata had been accepted in 2008 by his country's Government following consultations with the parties concerned at home and abroad. The road map was now being progressively applied. Switzerland had five nuclear power plants, the oldest of which had been in operation for forty years, and it was envisaged that the three oldest plants would be decommissioned after fifty years' service. The issue of their replacement thus had to be considered. A referendum would be held, probably after 2012, to elicit the public's approval to build new plants. To date, Switzerland's five nuclear power plants had generated 750 000 million kW.h of electricity,

corresponding savings in CO<sub>2</sub> generation of some 600 Mt, or more than 15 years of Switzerland's total carbon dioxide emissions.

18. He concluded by thanking the Secretariat and the Director General for the high quality of their work and their dedication to the Agency's fundamental objectives. He emphasized his country's admiration for the independence and courage the Director General had shown over the preceding twelve years.

19. Mr ALEINIK (Belarus) said that, for some years, the Agency had been witnessing increasing interest in nuclear power. A large number of countries, including his own, had announced their intention of starting up a nuclear power programme and building their first nuclear power plants. At past General Conferences, Belarus had outlined its views on that issue and announced the decision taken by its authorities to build a nuclear power plant. It had made substantial progress in dealing with many of the fundamental issues and in creating the necessary infrastructure. The regulatory infrastructure, which was being built up from virtually nothing, would ultimately comprise some 120 instruments formulated in accordance with international requirements. One law on the utilization of atomic energy had recently been adopted in 2008.

20. Emphasis was being placed on developing an effective regulatory system for nuclear and radiation safety. A department had been set up with the responsibility for licensing at all stages of the construction and operation of a nuclear power plant, performing inspections, formulating safety regulations and criteria and protecting the environment and human health. Extensive work had been done on selecting a site for the future nuclear power plant. Following careful and comprehensive studies of potential locations, three had been identified, one as a priority and the others as back-ups. The Agency had been assisting with the selection process and two expert missions had been sent to Belarus in the preceding year.

21. One very high priority was developing the necessary staffing and scientific potential in the nuclear power field. The Government had adopted two programmes in that connection, one of which called for the establishment of new fields of specialization in the nuclear power field in a number of universities in the country, under which instruction had already begun in 2008. Training courses and study placements in foreign educational institutions and operational nuclear power plants were also planned.

22. Public information was also being accorded major attention. The Government had approved regulations for the discussion of issues relating to the use of atomic energy with the participation of State associations, other organizations and the public. That document set out the functions and responsibilities of State authorities, local authorities and operators in that respect. Reports and environmental impact assessments on the projected use of atomic energy had to be open to public discussion.

23. An environmental impact assessment for the planning and construction of the nuclear power plant was currently in preparation. In August, brief summary information had been sent to the States that had announced their intention to participate in the procedure: Austria, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine. Any comments those countries and the public might have would be taken into account in the final version of the report.

24. His Government was engaging in active international cooperation to implement the nuclear power plant construction project. An intergovernmental agreement had been signed in 2009 between Belarus and the Russian Federation on cooperation in the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. That framework document established the main spheres of cooperation, namely planning, construction, operation, supply of nuclear fuel, nuclear and radiation safety, scientific cooperation and



staff training. A similar intergovernmental agreement had already been signed between Belarus and China.

25. Implementing such a major project as the establishment of a nuclear power programme would be impossible without the involvement of the Agency, the leading international organization in the nuclear field. His country's interaction with the Agency on a whole range of matters related to that project had been most productive. Belarus would like to see the Agency play an even stronger role in helping States that had decided to set up a national nuclear power programme. Recently, an understanding had developed within the Agency regarding the need for a comprehensive approach to providing assistance to States that were setting up a nuclear programme. In view of the growing number of such States, it was logical and appropriate that the Agency should have a means of providing integrated appraisals and assistance in that regard. The key factor was an appropriate infrastructure that met existing international standards. Systematic expert and technical support from the Agency was needed to develop such infrastructure. The Agency's new INIR service, which was of interest to his country, was intended to provide such assistance and it should have a significant impact on the establishment of new nuclear power programmes and on the safe use of nuclear power worldwide.

26. Belarus was an active participant in the Agency's technical cooperation programme. Belarus's priorities were the development of a national nuclear power infrastructure, environmental protection, rehabilitation of land contaminated by the Chernobyl accident, and health. All the technical cooperation projects being implemented focused on important socio-economic problems. Assistance was being provided with the introduction of nuclear power, including training of personnel and the development of a national nuclear safety regulatory system. Belarus intended to continue its active collaboration with the Agency in the rehabilitation of areas contaminated by the Chernobyl accident. Cooperation in that field was in line with the United Nations Chernobyl strategy, which envisaged transition of the affected regions to sustainable socio-economic development. Belarus expected that the Agency would be actively involved in implementing the United Nations Chernobyl action plan.

27. His country consistently supported the strengthening and expansion of the Agency's technical cooperation programme, and making its funding more predictable and assured. In that connection, it was pleased to note the continuing positive trend in the funding situation for the programme thanks to the coordinated efforts of Member States and the Secretariat. For its part, Belarus had for several years paid its voluntary contributions to the TCF in full and on time. It pledged to pay its 2010 contribution in full and called on all Member States to follow that example.

28. Work at national level to ensure nuclear and radiation safety was an inseparable part of the Agency's general efforts to maintain a global safety regime. Belarus supported the activities of the Agency and its Secretariat in that field and, as a State which had taken the decision to construct its first nuclear power plant, it accorded great attention to nuclear safety issues. In that connection, it noted the importance of universal adherence to and effective implementation of the most important international legal instruments in that field, above all the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. The review meetings pursuant to those two conventions bore witness to the fulfilment by Member States of their obligations. Since more and more States were announcing plans to establish a nuclear power programme, the early achievement of universal adherence to such instruments took on even greater importance. In addition, the processes under the aforementioned instruments confirmed the interconnection between the prospective growth of nuclear power and increased attention to nuclear safety issues. Ensuring the necessary level of safety and the security of nuclear facilities, and proper management of nuclear waste, was a key element in any State's nuclear power programme. In that context, international legal instruments and the Agency's safety standards had an even greater role to play.

29. Belarus was committed to the international processes aimed at achieving nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It attached great importance to strengthening the Agency's safeguards system. Proof of its commitment to the principles of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was its rigorous compliance with its obligations under the NPT and its safeguards agreement.

30. When considering non-proliferation and disarmament as a whole, it was worth remembering that one of the most important aims was to ensure that nuclear technology was used exclusively for peaceful purposes. In that connection he stressed that, under the NPT and the Agency's Statute, every Member State had the inalienable right to pursue peaceful nuclear activities. Existing international mechanisms should promote equal and non-discriminatory access for all interested countries to the benefits of nuclear energy.

31. As one of the founding members of the Agency, Belarus consistently advocated the strengthening of the Agency as the leading international organization promoting the safe, reliable and peaceful use of nuclear energy for sustainable development. A great deal had been done in recent years to achieve the Agency's main goal of Atoms for Peace, and much of that could be attributed to its Director General. He expressed sincere gratitude to Mr ElBaradei for his tireless efforts as Director General, which had significantly enhanced the Agency's international authority.

32. In conclusion, he said that Belarus gave a positive assessment of the Agency's activities over the preceding year and proposed that the Annual Report be approved.

33. Mr BORGES (Angola) welcomed the progress described in the Annual Report for 2008 and expressed appreciation for the ongoing partnership between the Agency and FAO, assisting African countries in their efforts to eradicate tsetse flies and trypanosomiasis, and for the Agency's support for application of nuclear technology in the agricultural sector, which had contributed significantly to reducing poverty. He also commended the Agency's efforts to help Member States fight cancer and expressed regret at the scarcity of institutions in Africa equipped for PET. He called on the Secretariat to strengthen cooperation with governments in order to build institutional and human capacity in that sphere.

34. Angola attached great importance to the safeguards system, not only owing to the growing interest among Member States in access to nuclear energy but also because of the need to ensure safe management. Having access to nuclear energy and using it to promote development were the right of all Member States, but that right must be exercised within the framework of the Agency's Statute.

35. For the large number of developing Member States, particularly in Africa, one of the greatest benefits of Agency membership was the technical cooperation programme, which had made a fundamental contribution to development in various economic sectors. He expressed appreciation for the Agency's continued support to his country, within the framework of its CPF, to promote and develop nuclear technology and science, including through training of personnel and the supply of equipment and experts. Considerable progress had been made.

36. Angola was firmly committed to improving control over activities involving ionizing radiation through monitoring of occupational doses, inspection and authorization of the use of X ray equipment, and authorization of the import of radiation sources for use in industrial gamma radiography. Twelve projects were under way in such areas as education, human resources development, agriculture, environment and health. Under AFRA, it was hoped that 14 more projects would be approved as soon as possible. Five Agency missions had visited Angola during 2009 to assess the implementation of ongoing projects, identify projects of national and regional scope, and formulate an action plan for 2009–2011 with particular emphasis on revision of legislation, preparation of regulations and guidelines, and recruitment and training of staff for the regulatory body created in 2008.

37. He expressed satisfaction at the results of the negotiations on the programme and budget for 2010–2011 and welcomed the rational management of financial resources and the creation of the major capital investment fund. He also welcomed the alignment of the TCF cycle with the Regular Budget cycle as of 2012. Angola had fulfilled its financial obligations to the Agency and had contributed to the TCF. He called on other Member States to strengthen their financial support for the Agency.

38. Mr KARIMOV (Azerbaijan) said the world was witnessing a renaissance in nuclear power and an ever growing number of States was expressing an interest in developing nuclear energy programmes, prompted by increasing demands for environmental protection and problems of energy security and fluctuating oil prices. States' efforts to ensure sustainable energy supplies — a matter of fundamental importance for economic development and the well-being of the population — could not be impeded by any discriminatory mechanisms. However, as the number of countries with nuclear power facilities increased, so did the risk of proliferation. In that connection, Azerbaijan highly valued the Agency's efforts to prevent the proliferation or diversion of nuclear technology for military purposes. However, the best way of ensuring the peaceful nature of nuclear technology was to strengthen further international peace, security and stability.

39. In keeping with its commitments, and in cooperation with the Agency, Azerbaijan was gradually implementing a strategy aimed at the use of nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes and at preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Reflecting its readiness to cooperate with the international community and all States and international organizations, Azerbaijan was playing an active part in strengthening the nuclear security regime and was making its contribution to ensuring energy security in the Eurasian region through the supply of its national energy resources. However, all supply routes became vulnerable in the absence of peace and stability. Prolonged conflicts, aggressive separatist movements and the illegal occupation of foreign territories in the region constituted a great risk not only to the reliable supply of energy resources but also to the stable functioning of energy systems.

40. The destructive policy of one State which had made territorial claims on its neighbours and occupied 20% of Azerbaijan's territory was not only prejudicial to regional stability but was also a challenge to the security of the international community. His country once again drew attention to the threat from the use of occupied and uncontrolled territories for illegal trafficking in nuclear and radioactive material or for nuclear and radiological terrorism. Such uncontrolled territories posed a grave threat, because they were outside the sphere of international law and were not accessible for appropriate and timely response.

41. Recalling the Agency's vital role in preventing nuclear proliferation, he stressed the need for further development of international cooperation within the framework of the organization to reduce the global threat of the use of nuclear and radioactive material for terrorist purposes, and he urged the Agency to ensure the universal implementation of its statutory verification functions in the area of non-proliferation, including in the territory of Azerbaijan occupied by Armenia.

42. Azerbaijan greatly appreciated the work of the Secretariat in implementing the technical cooperation strategy and in ensuring that its technical cooperation programme was in keeping with the national priorities of Member States. Cooperating closely with the Agency, Azerbaijan received assistance in the areas of nuclear knowledge and technology, simultaneously improving and strengthening its radiation safety infrastructure. On 3 April 2009, Presidential decree No. 74 had approved legislation on a State agency for the regulation of nuclear and radiological activities. That agency, which had the role of the country's regulatory body, employed 30 specialists who were working to improve existing legislation in the area of nuclear and radiological activities to ensure they met international standards. A regulatory programme had been formulated and regulatory and legal

documents were being drafted. An inspection programme had been elaborated and an inventory of all ionizing radiation sources and nuclear material was being drawn up.

43. The technical cooperation projects that were being implemented in Azerbaijan with the help of the Agency were aimed at addressing high-priority socio-economic problems. The country was taking part in 9 national, 32 regional and several interregional projects relating to the security of equipment, material and technological systems containing radioisotopes, improvement of the work of regulatory bodies responsible for nuclear and radiation safety, dissemination and application of nuclear knowledge, and training of scientific and technical experts in the area of safety and use of nuclear and radioactive material. His country was particularly grateful to the United States Department of Energy which, together with the Agency, was helping Azerbaijan ensure the physical protection of radioisotope facilities.

44. Azerbaijan valued the Agency's assistance in the area of research, exchange of scientific and technical information and support for training of scientific staff and experts in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. He thanked the Agency for the assistance provided in connection with a project on a feasibility study for the construction of a nuclear research facility. The Government of Azerbaijan had already allotted land for the reactor site and the requisite financing would be made available. The site would also accommodate a radiation facility for the sterilization of food products and medical materials, and the project would be implemented under the technical cooperation programme for 2009–2011.

45. He thanked the Agency for its help in providing the National Cancer Centre with modern nuclear medicine equipment for the diagnosis and treatment of oncological complaints. Work was being stepped up and, over the coming two years, it was planned to introduce additional equipment, including a linear accelerator and a BrainLab unit.

46. Promotion of nuclear knowledge and the availability of trained staff for peaceful nuclear applications was a priority for his country. It endorsed the Agency's efforts to elaborate a comprehensive methodology and guidelines for management of nuclear knowledge and was prepared to contribute actively to the development of a nuclear education network.

47. The Government of Azerbaijan greatly appreciated the Agency's assistance in implementing technical cooperation projects and had every intention of meeting its commitments in that regard.

48. Ms GONZÁLEZ (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) reiterated her country's commitment to the principles laid down in the Charter of the United Nations and the Agency's Statute. Defence of State sovereignty and self-determination of peoples, as well as renunciation of the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, were essential for the preservation of international peace and security. The Venezuelan Constitution reflected the country's pacifist conviction and explicitly stated that the State would prohibit the manufacture and use of weapons of mass destruction and promote nuclear disarmament.

49. Venezuela appreciated the Agency's efforts to promote the use of nuclear energy in areas such as food security, agriculture, health, water resources management and environmental protection and urged it to strengthen them. It accorded high priority to the development of integration among the States of Latin America and the Caribbean, strengthening of South-South relations and promotion of solidarity among peoples. ARCAL and the Agency could help achieve those aims by espousing cooperation, solidarity and peaceful coexistence instead of discriminatory political criteria.

50. She stressed the importance of the transfer of technology and knowledge relating to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes to developing countries by means of training in line with national priorities and objectives. The resulting enhancement of scientific and technological capacities would

effectively contribute to social and economic development. Her country firmly rejected attempts to apply trade practices or other mechanisms designed to monopolize or even impede access to nuclear technology and knowledge, especially to developing countries.

51. Her country had established a high-level commission to develop cooperation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including enhancement of activities being conducted with the Agency, in the conviction that such efforts were consistent with the development priorities established by the Government in the Simón Bolívar National Project — First Socialist Plan 2007–2013.

52. The Venezuelan National Assembly had recently approved the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and it was hoped that the corresponding instrument of ratification would shortly be deposited.

53. Her country was convinced of the need to build a multipolar world in which all peoples and not just the most powerful nations had a voice. The global balance of power had been shifting in recent years and multilateral bodies should keep abreast of the new political circumstances.

54. It was disturbing that some countries were implementing military doctrines that contemplated the threat of use or use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, they had been developing more sophisticated weapons in breach of their disarmament and non-proliferation commitments, undermining prospects of achieving lasting peace. Venezuela had ratified the Tlatelolco Treaty, which had made Latin America and the Caribbean into the world's first nuclear-weapon-free zone. It was a party to the NPT, had ratified the CTBT and had defended the principles of disarmament and non-proliferation in international forums, since it was convinced that the eradication of such weapons was the most effective way of dealing with the threats posed by their existence. Support for the early entry into force of the CTBT would promote security for the peoples of the world and would check the development of new nuclear weapons.

55. The NPT, which was recognized by all as the cornerstone of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime, was still under considerable pressure. The fight against terrorism was being used as a pretext for the development and production of more destructive nuclear weapons, nuclear agreements were being signed with States that were not parties to the Treaty, and the existence of military nuclear programmes that were not subject to Agency supervision was being ignored, while other countries were cynically hounded for seeking to exercise their inalienable right to have access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Venezuela therefore urged the nuclear-weapon States to make a political commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, thus sending a clear message to the world that the 2010 NPT Review Conference should achieve that goal.

56. Action in support of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation should be taken multilaterally, simultaneously and in a non-discriminatory manner. Her country rejected the suggestion that some countries' nuclear weapons posed no threat, while those allegedly possessed by other States placed the world in mortal danger. In that connection, she recalled that an attack or threat of attack on nuclear facilities that were operational or under construction undermined the climate of peace and trust that should prevail in international relations and seriously threatened the survival of human beings and the environment. Venezuela strongly objected to the classic expression of imperialist principles known as preventive war, justifying attacks on sovereign States on the grounds of unproven presumed threats. It therefore supported the draft resolution on prohibition of armed attack or threat of attack against nuclear installations, during operation or under construction.

57. Venezuela had consistently supported initiatives aimed at establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, including the resolution submitted to the current session of the General Conference, since that would contribute effectively to peace and stability in the region. It was essential that Israel, the only State in the region which possessed nuclear weapons and which was not a party to

the NPT, join the majority of countries throughout the world by acceding to the Treaty and placing its nuclear installations under Agency safeguards, a matter that had become more urgent since the Israeli Government's public acknowledgement that it possessed nuclear weapons. Her country supported the proposed resolution on Israeli nuclear capabilities, since the application of discriminatory practices and double standards in that regard was unacceptable. Requiring some countries to meet their obligations while others were exempt violated the principle of the legal equality of States.

58. Her country acknowledged the efforts made by the Iranian Government to close the nuclear file opened against it once and for all. The work plan agreed between Iran and the Agency, which foresaw a return to routine application of safeguards to that country's nuclear installations, had been implemented. The Agency had found no evidence that Iran's nuclear programme was anything other than peaceful. Venezuela therefore called for an end to the threats and harassment from a group of countries which, in order to justify their imperialist, geopolitical and commercial ambitions in the region, had maintained a smear campaign in the media not only against Iran but even against the Agency.

59. It should be remembered that the farcical allegations regarding the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq had led to the cruel and illegal invasion of that country, in breach of the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, and notwithstanding the outcry of the international community. The people of the United States, like all other peoples, had always been rigorous in requiring that their rulers abide by the truth. There had never been any such weapons, and yet Iraq had been bombed and occupied, and remained under occupation.

60. In the case of Iran, that privileged group of countries had pushed a series of resolutions through the United Nations Security Council, thus assuming de facto — though not de jure — competencies which belonged solely to the Agency. Such interference undermined the Agency's credibility and independence. The Agency was the only body with the technical competence to deal with such matters.

61. Her country strongly condemned the bombardment of alleged nuclear installations within Syrian territory in September 2007, which constituted a violation of Syria's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

62. The question of assured supply mechanisms raised a number of disturbing economic, financial and national security issues. The imposition of politically discriminatory practices that violated States' inalienable right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes could not be ruled out. Those concerns had not been addressed by the countries proposing such mechanisms.

63. Venezuela upheld the right of developing countries to secure the technology and knowledge that would enable them to include the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in their development plans. It advocated a strengthening of the role of developing countries, and Venezuela in particular, in the design and implementation of programmes of cooperation and action of multilateral bodies such as the Agency with a view to achieving that goal.

64. Mr VALLIM GUERREIRO (Brazil) said that the Agency was entering a new era with the departure of Mr ElBaradei and the election of his successor as Director General, Mr Amano. Mr ElBaradei had had to face challenges for which past history had not fully prepared the Agency. Yet he had always risen to the occasion, constantly reminding members that, instead of haggling over petty issues, it was necessary to develop a vision for the future, to transcend differences and to overcome misgivings. Equally, he had never wavered in his endeavours to convince members that, whatever their national agendas, all should submit to the rule of law. Indeed, one of the paramount lessons he had taught the Agency for the future was that, if it ceased to function as a rule-based organization, it

would lose its relevance. Mr ElBaradei would be missed, but Brazil was confident that Mr Amano would make a great Director General and it looked forward to working closely with him.

65. Apart from the change of Director General, there was a fresh wind in the world political landscape. There was room to hope that the vision of a world free of the deadliest weapons mankind had ever invented could be realized sooner rather than later. Brazil urged all countries that possessed nuclear weapons to commit themselves to the earliest possible elimination of their nuclear arsenals. The argument that, to rid the planet of nuclear weapons, absolute guarantees were necessary that no country would be in a position to develop them was understandable. To bring that about, verification measures would need to be strengthened to a level higher than that foreseen in the NPT, if possible making assurances of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities as foolproof as the assurances with respect to peaceful applications of declared activities.

66. However, it was not fair to expect that countries that had already made unequivocal, credible and verifiable commitments to forswear nuclear weapons should implement further enhanced verification measures until the international community had before it, at least, some kind of time frame within which the objective of a world free of nuclear weapons could be expected to be achieved. Enhanced verification mechanisms should be devised and incorporated into a future convention on the prohibition of all nuclear weapons, which would level the playing field for all members of the international community.

67. During the preceding year, the Agency's Board of Governors had had productive and useful discussions of the issue of assurances of supply of low-enriched uranium. That had brought to light differences of opinion on how to approach that question. There was a lack of understanding of what the objective of the various proposals on the table was. One thing was clear: the exercise of an inalienable right could not be looked on with suspicion, provided, of course, that compliance with safeguards obligations was assured. Brazil saw merit in the idea advocated by many, including the Director General, that, ultimately, all enrichment and reprocessing activities should be placed under some kind of multilateral control. The modalities for achieving that goal could perhaps be enshrined in a future convention on the prohibition of nuclear weapons.

68. As a founding member of the Agency, his country was fully and unflinchingly committed to the objectives of the organization's Statute. It supported the Agency's activities and highly appreciated its efforts in the field of nuclear power, other nuclear applications, safety, security, safeguards and — last but not least — technical cooperation. For the organization to be even more effective, it was essential to strive for a more balanced approach to the implementation of its core activities. That was particularly true in the face of a revival of interest in nuclear power, including in countries which were planning to use nuclear power for the first time.

69. Applications of nuclear energy in the health field were also expanding as an ever growing number of countries availed themselves of nuclear techniques for diagnosis and therapy. PACT played an important role in that regard. Furthermore, new applications of nuclear energy in agriculture and hydrology had been developed and a growing number of countries were benefiting from them.

70. The international community needed a strong Agency endowed with the necessary resources to carry out fully its statutory activities, to which goal Brazil was unequivocally committed. States needed to join forces to find the will and means to achieve their common goals: development, peace and security.

71. Mr SHOOGUFAN (Afghanistan) said that Afghanistan had been one of the founder members of the Agency but its active involvement in technical cooperation programmes had been interrupted as a result of years of conflict and war. Since 2002, it had been seeking to regain its place on the political map and within international organizations. In 2004, it had signed a payment plan to settle its arrears

to the Agency, and it was confident that the outstanding balance would shortly be paid off in its entirety. As a least developed country, Afghanistan continued to depend on the support of donor countries and required large-scale technical cooperation to foster its socio-economic development. His Government was convinced that the Agency's technical cooperation activities would contribute substantially to the reconstruction of his war-torn country, and would help to improve the lives of the Afghan people. Transfer of nuclear technology to increase agricultural productivity and improve the provision of health services and potable water was crucial for his country. Currently 11 national projects and 31 regional or interregional projects involving Afghanistan were being implemented. His Government welcomed the Agency's approach to the development of self-reliance with a view to increasing productivity and building capacity. It had established the Afghanistan High Atomic Energy Commission with a view to responding efficiently to the increasing number of Agency projects in the country.

72. The Agency, in cooperation with the WHO, was capable of enhancing health care in many developing countries. Moreover, nuclear and isotopic techniques were instrumental in alleviating hardships caused by a shortage of potable water, hunger and disease. Radiation-induced mutation produced higher-yield, drought-resistant crops of better nutritional quality. The Agency and its Member States must seek to minimize the number of undernourished people, particularly children.

73. Increased use of nuclear technology brought with it increased levels of responsibility, and he emphasized the importance of preventing the misuse, diversion and theft of nuclear material. Safeguards agreements between the Agency and its Member States, the development of SSACs, secure storage and waste management, and effective border controls were essential to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear material. When safety and safeguards activities also served security purposes, additional funding should be provided from the Nuclear Security Fund to accelerate implementation and promote sustainability. However, Member States' contributions to the TCF should not be adversely affected by contributions to the Nuclear Security Fund.

74. The strategic value of nuclear weapons in today's world was declining. However, the dangers of proliferation must be seriously taken into account and the international community must continue its efforts in the area of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. He called for effective reductions of stockpiles and warheads and commended the positive steps taken recently by the United States and the Russian Federation to sign a Joint Understanding for the START follow-on treaty. His country trusted that other nations would follow that example and seek to reduce the number of nuclear weapons. It also noted with satisfaction that the Conference of Disarmament had agreed to negotiate a fissile material cut-off treaty and to discuss nuclear disarmament and security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. Downsized nuclear arsenals should reduce the risk of nuclear accidents and free time and resources which could be used to support developing countries embarking on peaceful nuclear technology programmes.

75. Mr BERNHARD (Denmark) said that the world would continue to depend on the Agency to prevent nuclear proliferation, for it was a dedicated, trusted and highly professional organization whose contribution was essential. Its inspection procedures served not only to verify the peaceful use of nuclear technologies but also enabled States to clear themselves of any suspicion of wrongdoing through full and unrestricted cooperation with the organization. However, the Agency could only be as effective as its tools allowed it to be. Some States had developed secret nuclear programmes even with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force. It was therefore important for all States to recognize that the current IAEA verification standard was a comprehensive safeguards agreement together with an additional protocol.

76. The Agency's non-proliferation efforts were part of a broader perspective, including the NPT, the United Nations Security Council, export controls and several other initiatives all serving to prevent



the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The NPT was the cornerstone of those efforts and, in May 2009, there had been a noticeably improved atmosphere at the third and final session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference and a determination among participants that the Conference should have a constructive outcome and bring closer the prospect of a world without nuclear weapons.

77. The Security Council also had a key responsibility for non-proliferation, and Denmark supported its increased attention to proliferation issues both generally and with respect to specific cases. The adoption of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) had been a fundamental step forward in that respect. It was of the utmost importance that all States complied with their obligations as set forth in Security Council resolutions on specific issues.

78. Denmark continued to support a consistent approach in the Security Council process. The latest report by the Director General on Iran had concluded that that country had neither implemented the additional protocol nor cooperated with the Agency over the remaining issues of concern which needed to be clarified to exclude the possibility of military dimensions to its nuclear programme. Denmark shared the serious concern expressed by the Director General and urged Iran to take the steps required by the Board of Governors and the Security Council in order to create confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme, and to allow for negotiations. In his latest report on the Syrian Arab Republic, the Director General had urged that country to cooperate fully with the Agency. Denmark called on Syria to sign and ratify the additional protocol as soon as possible as a means of strengthening the confidence of the international community in the peaceful nature of its nuclear activities.

79. A relatively new challenge was the threat posed by proliferation to non-State actors such as terrorists. The Agency's work in the area of nuclear security was crucial and Denmark was committed to securing sufficient resources for the Nuclear Security Fund for that work. It welcomed the agreement reached to allocate increased Regular Budget resources to nuclear security. Denmark would also continue to give financial support to the Nuclear Security Fund on a voluntary basis and, in the coming years, would focus on activities in Asian countries.

80. As Security Council resolution 1540 underlined, nuclear and other radioactive material must not fall into the hands of terrorists. To prevent that and proliferation in general, it was necessary to exercise strict export controls on a non-discriminatory basis. Denmark cooperated with partners in the European Union and the NSG. It also cooperated with Proliferation Security Initiative partners to prevent illegal transfers of weapons and material that might be misused for developing weapons of mass destruction and, with that aim in view, had hosted a Nordic-Baltic regional meeting in Copenhagen in September 2009. It encouraged all States to participate in such efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

81. With regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, Denmark had taken the stance that nuclear power was not a sustainable form of energy and should not be included in its own energy planning. While respecting the opinion and choice of others and noting the role of the Agency as stipulated in its Statute, his country was thus not in favour of a promotional role for the Agency in that field. Hence, Denmark had had some reservations regarding the various proposals for a multilateral nuclear fuel assurance mechanism. Nevertheless, the renewed interest in nuclear energy was a fact that had to be taken into account. His country considered it important to ensure that an expansion of civilian nuclear power did not result in a further spread of sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technologies that could be used for military purposes, so, together with its partners in the European Union, it was ready to support a multilateral proliferation-safe mechanism for assurance of supply of nuclear fuel for those States that had chosen the nuclear power option. Denmark welcomed the Director General's proposal for the establishment of an IAEA LEU bank, and other proposals brought before the Board of

Governors, and it looked forward to discussing those proposals with a view to finding responses to open questions and concerns.

**Mr Soltanieh (Islamic Republic of Iran) took the Chair.**

82. Mr AL-JASEM (Kuwait) said that since its establishment, the Agency had contributed to global peace, security and development and had made nuclear power one of the world's main sources of energy. Kuwait's relationship with the Agency had entered a new stage in 2009. The Emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, had instructed the Government to elaborate an integrated national strategy for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In March 2009, the Kuwaiti cabinet had decided, as a first step, to establish a high-level National Commission for Nuclear Energy chaired by the Prime Minister. It was planned to use nuclear energy, in cooperation with the Agency and under its supervision, for electricity generation and water desalination, and to build the national capacity and institutions required for such projects.

83. The leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council had decided in December 2006 to adopt a joint programme for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Kuwait had actively participated in the consultations and meetings in that connection held between the Council and Agency experts. It welcomed the progress that had been made during the current year in elaborating a plan of action, as well as recommendations based on the Agency's feasibility study. Kuwait, which would chair the Council in 2010, looked forward to even closer cooperation between the Agency and the Gulf Cooperation Council States.

84. According to the Agency's Annual Report for 2008, a total of 438 nuclear power reactors were currently in operation throughout the world, a figure that reflected the growing demand for nuclear technology and the increasingly important role of the Agency in terms of both nuclear expertise and its humanitarian mandate.

85. His country had been keenly interested in the Agency's technical cooperation programme for many years. It had implemented national projects and participated in regional projects in the areas of economic development, environmental protection and human health. Kuwait greatly appreciated the Agency's assistance in that regard and trusted that it could continue to rely on its support in the future. It was important to identify stable sources of financing for the TCF in order to ensure the successful implementation of current and future projects, and to prevent any deficits from occurring. Although contributions to the TCF were voluntary, Kuwait consistently paid its share of the target.

86. Kuwait accorded top priority to nuclear safety and security and strongly believed that all nuclear projects and programmes should comply with the Agency's safety standards. Kuwait also welcomed the Agency's continuous efforts to build up and enhance nuclear security capabilities. All Member States should support such action in order to ensure the requisite coordination of measures to strengthen security of nuclear and other radioactive material. Commending the assistance provided by the Agency in that regard, he said that Kuwait had joined the illicit trafficking database in May 2008.

87. He expressed strong appreciation for the efforts of the Director General and the Secretariat to promote the effective implementation of the NPT and Agency safeguards agreements and additional protocols. In view of the importance of nuclear verification, he urged all Member States that had not yet signed a comprehensive safeguards agreement to do so, and he likewise encouraged States that had not signed an additional protocol to do so.

88. He emphasized the importance of taking serious steps to rid the Middle East of all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. It was imperative for Israel to accede to the NPT and to place its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards. At the same time, his country reaffirmed the right of the States in the region to obtain and use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

89. Kuwait called on Iran, the Agency and the group of States involved in dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue to continue engaging in a serious and constructive dialogue with a view to reaching a settlement that allayed all doubts and resolved outstanding issues.

90. The world was currently facing new international challenges that were thwarting efforts to achieve sustainable development in many countries, chief among them the economic and financial crisis, the food crisis and climate change. Together with security challenges such as terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction, those issues posed a serious threat to international peace and security. The Agency had an important role to play in addressing those challenges in cooperation with Member States, which should stand shoulder to shoulder in order to fulfil the aspirations of their peoples and create a world free from weapons of mass destruction.

91. Mr SKOKNIC (Chile) said that promoting research into and the development and practical application of atomic energy through the Department of Technical Cooperation and specific projects with Member States was one of the Agency's central functions. To help fulfil that function, his country had paid its full share of the TCF in 2009. Under the 2009–2011 technical cooperation cycle, Chile was implementing 4 national projects and participating in 34 regional projects, 24 of which were ARCAL projects.

92. With regard to nuclear power, since 2007 his country had been working with the Agency on various studies and reports and had organized workshops on public opinion and human resources. Although no political decision had been taken regarding nuclear power in Chile, the actions taken had allowed the issue to be tabled for discussion and not excluded a priori from the country's future energy mix. Chile appreciated the support it had received from the Agency in performing studies to evaluate the possibility of embarking on a nuclear power programme.

93. The Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission, together with the Agency, had held a regional training course on physical protection of nuclear material and facilities at the La Reina Nuclear Research Centre in November 2008. In the same month, Chile had also hosted a national seminar on radioactive waste management with the Agency's cooperation. The first coordination meeting for an ARCAL project on nuclear applications in agriculture and environment had been held in Chile in April 2009.

94. His country was party to various international instruments in the fields of nuclear and radiation safety, emergency assistance, civil liability for nuclear damage and the physical protection of nuclear material. It appreciated the Agency's efforts to develop nuclear and radiation safety manuals, which had contributed to the creation of a safety culture. It also attached high priority to the safe transport of nuclear material and had insisted that the issue remain on the Agency's agenda. It would continue actively to support initiatives — including General Conference resolutions — aimed at strengthening the transport safety regime. The dialogue that had been taking place within the framework of the Agency between representatives of coastal and shipping States was highly beneficial.

95. Chile was in favour of the complete elimination of weapons of mass destruction, and of non-proliferation, and had signed and ratified the relevant international conventions, that being the best way to contribute to such an objective. The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean had demonstrated their common vision of nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes through their adherence to the NPT and the Tlatelolco Treaty. Chile supported similar efforts in other regions of the world. In particular, it welcomed the entry into force of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia and the Pelindaba Treaty. The country was also working actively to arrange a second conference of States belonging to nuclear-weapon-free zones, to be held in the days leading up to the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

96. It was important to give greater international support to the Agency's safeguards regime through adherence to and ratification of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. Ratification and implementation of the latter, though voluntary, was essential to consolidate the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Chile's additional protocol had entered into force in April 2004 and, since then, the country had submitted all the relevant declarations on time and had regularly carried out the necessary inspections.

97. The Agency's delicate safeguards role, entrusted to it by the international community through Article III of the NPT, had changed over time. The Agency was often referred to simply as a nuclear watchdog, with no regard for its other statutory functions or its promotion of nuclear applications to benefit human health and food security. The balance between the Agency's statutory functions had shifted over the preceding decade, with most of the budget going to safeguards while technical cooperation, safety and security became increasingly dependent on voluntary and extrabudgetary contributions. That situation had to be monitored and dialogue maintained within the Agency to agree upon fair solutions that allowed the Agency to meet its responsibility to ensure the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy, and to strengthen its promotional activities to benefit developing countries.

98. Chile had supported the Agency's careful efforts to verify the non-diversion of nuclear material and technology to non-peaceful purposes in Iran. Acknowledging Iran's collaboration thus far, he urged it to extend still further cooperation and comply with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and Agency's Board of Governors. Iran could only restore confidence in its nuclear programme by providing greater transparency and more information to the Agency, and by implementing the additional protocol.

99. His country regretted the lack of progress towards denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and condemned the recent nuclear explosions carried out by the DPRK. It hoped that the diplomatic dialogue that was taking place among various States might lead to agreement on reintegration of the DPRK into the NPT and the effective dismantling of military nuclear facilities on the Peninsula.

100. Expressing his country's recognition for the Director General's professional and important work over the preceding 12 years, he said that it had been characterized by vision, leadership, transparency, honesty, impartiality and commitment to multilateral diplomacy. Mr ElBaradei had made two visits to Chile, where he had held fruitful discussions with the national authorities and had been awarded an important national medal. He congratulated Mr Amano on his appointment as the new Director General and offered him his delegation's collaboration in successfully fulfilling his functions. In his new role he would face complex, varied and politically sensitive challenges related to both the administration of the Agency and its future functions and tasks, as well as the limited financial resources available. In discussions of such issues as safeguards and multilateral nuclear fuel supply initiatives in the Board it was clear that, in some areas, members differed enormously in their opinions. Patience would be required before common ground could be found with a view to meeting the growing demand for cooperation and technology transfer by members, and the constantly evolving non-proliferation challenges. Chile also valued the Agency's considerable contribution to achieving the Millennium Development Goals.

101. Mr BARRETT (Canada) said that the Agency remained an essential organization whose mandate was as relevant today as it had been when the Statute had entered into force in 1957. As a major donor, Canada supported the Agency's continuing mission to implement and verify international safeguards, advance nuclear safety and security, and promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

102. The preceding decade had brought positive outcomes and new challenges for the Agency. As more countries turned to nuclear power to address the challenges of climate change and rising energy demand, it was essential that the Agency remain focused on its core mandates and not engage in tasks more appropriately addressed in other forums. Equally, more than ever, the Agency could not allow its work to be weakened by political differences.

103. In his country's view nuclear power had a vital role to play in the world for the foreseeable future and his country would remain a global leader in adapting nuclear power to the energy needs of the coming decades. His Government and Atomic Energy of Canada Limited were developing the advanced CANDU reactor which should have improved safety, economic and non-proliferation characteristics. The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission had concluded that there were no fundamental barriers from a design viewpoint to licensing the reactor in Canada.

104. Canada remained a strong supporter of the Agency's technical cooperation activities and a major contributor to the TCF. It commended the Secretariat's efforts to improve prioritization and meet more efficiently and effectively the needs of donors and recipients.

105. The development and implementation of the State-level approach to safeguards implementation and evaluation was a fundamental change in the Agency's safeguards system, providing the basis for more efficient use of safeguards resources and for enhanced confidence in the Secretariat's assessment of a State's compliance with its peaceful nuclear undertakings. In Canada's case, the State-level approach was being applied in the context of integrated safeguards, based on the Agency's conclusion that all nuclear material in the country remained in peaceful applications. The utilization of a State-level approach to safeguards implementation and evaluation had to be complemented by more focused and specific information relevant to activities in each State, providing greater transparency with respect to the use of the Agency's verification resources. Canada continued to emphasize the importance of cooperation and transparency between Member States and the Secretariat in the implementation and evaluation of safeguards, and noted that the inspection effort to be applied in a given State should be based on the level of cooperation and transparency as well as on consistent compliance by the State concerned with its safeguards obligations.

106. Canada welcomed India's signing of the additional protocol approved by the Board of Governors in March 2009, and the ratification and entry into force of the India-specific safeguards agreement. Those texts formed the cornerstone of the agreement reached by India with the NSG in September 2008.

107. Iran's failure to provide critical information and full cooperation to the Agency belied its claims that its nuclear programme was peaceful in nature. Canada urged Iran to end its continued intransigence, to cooperate fully and transparently with the Agency, and to make a positive contribution to the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.

108. The DPRK's unsafeguarded nuclear activities and aggressive weapons programme continued to pose a grave threat to international security and were particularly troubling for stability in north-east Asia. Canada called on the DPRK to seek a path that would lead to lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula and increased regional stability, and bring about major improvements in the lives of its people. It should return to the six-party talks and abide by its commitment to peaceful denuclearization through the resumption and completion of existing disablement activities. Canada also called on the DPRK to return to the NPT, implement its safeguards obligations and resume cooperation with the Agency.

109. His country remained deeply concerned by revelations pointing to possible undeclared nuclear material, facilities and activities in the Syrian Arab Republic, and to possible nuclear cooperation

between Syria and the DPRK. It encouraged Syria to cooperate fully and transparently with the Agency to restore confidence in the nature of its nuclear programme.

110. Safety and security were of critical importance to the work of the Agency and to his country, and Canada actively participated in the development of Agency safety and security standards. As part of its commitment to continuous improvement, Canada had hosted an IRRS mission in June 2009 and it encouraged other Member States to avail themselves of that very useful service. The review team had found that Canada had a mature and well-established nuclear regulatory framework that ensured the safety and security of the Canadian nuclear industry, while also protecting the health of Canadians and the environment. The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission was currently considering the review team's recommendations with a view to their implementation.

111. A coordinated effort was required to tackle the constant threat of nuclear terrorism and proliferation. Activities supported by the Nuclear Security Fund were essential to strengthen nuclear security worldwide, which was why Canada had contributed \$13 million to the Fund as part of its continuing commitment to the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. Canada's latest contribution of \$4 million would support the activities described in the Nuclear Security Plan 2010 – 2013, which his country supported.

112. In closing, he said that Canada remained strongly committed to the goals of the Agency, and it welcomed the return to and greater emphasis on core nuclear energy issues in the Agency's work. He trusted that the consensus regarding the balance between the Agency's activities, which gave the Agency its strength of purpose, success and standing in the world, would continue to prevail.

113. Ms MOSLEY (New Zealand) said that creating a world free of nuclear weapons was one of her country's longstanding goals. It would not be simple to achieve, but New Zealand had been heartened by recent signs that the disarmament landscape was changing for the better and full advantage must be taken of that opportunity.

114. New Zealand had participated actively in the constructive and positive third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference in May 2009 and would continue to work towards a successful Conference, which would provide the opportunity to ensure that the Treaty remained relevant, effective and credible, and that it was implemented to the fullest extent. New Zealand endorsed the principle that nuclear technology should be available for peaceful uses in conformity with Article II of the Treaty, but with the expansion of the use of nuclear energy came a growth in the risks associated with it and, for that reason, her country would continue strongly to support the Agency's work on safety and security and on verifying that nuclear material was not being diverted from peaceful uses. It attached importance to ensuring that the Agency had all the tools it needed to provide the international community with robust assurances that nuclear activities undertaken by States were purely for peaceful purposes.

115. Current proliferation challenges meant that a comprehensive safeguards agreement alone was not adequate to provide the Agency with the necessary authority to carry out its verification mandate fully. The additional protocol was the contemporary verification standard and should always feature as a condition in new supply arrangements for nuclear and associated material. New Zealand strongly urged all State Parties that had not yet done so, particularly those with significant nuclear activities, to conclude and bring into force an additional protocol without delay.

116. The possibility of terrorists obtaining nuclear or other radioactive material remained a grave threat and her country noted the concern that the uncertainty with regard to funding made the Agency's programme planning and prioritization in the area of nuclear security difficult. New Zealand had supported the Nuclear Security Fund over the preceding year and its commitment to preventing

nuclear material falling into the hands of terrorists was also demonstrated by its participation in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and its chairmanship of the NSG in 2010.

117. Nuclear safety was another important pillar of the Agency's work and, in that connection, her country was committed to the principles and objectives of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the Supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. The safe transport of radioactive material was of fundamental importance, and such shipments must be conducted in accordance with the highest possible safety and security standards, with appropriate information being provided to coastal States in advance of shipment and with proper emergency response systems in operation. An effective liability and compensation mechanism must be in place to insure against harm to human health and the environment, as well as possible economic loss, due to an accident or incident during the transport of radioactive material. New Zealand was pleased that progress was being made in many of those areas, notably in the reintegration of the transport resolution into the omnibus safety resolution, but it continued to urge all parties to strive for improvements. Her country welcomed the continued dialogue between coastal and shipping States on the related issues, in particular exchange of information regarding shipments.

118. New Zealand condemned the nuclear test carried out earlier in 2009 by the DPRK which had dangerous implications for the security of the Korean Peninsula and the region, and was a significant step backwards for global disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. Her country had implemented the sanctions mandated by United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) and joined others in urging the DPRK to return to the six-party talks process, Agency safeguards and the NPT.

119. Her country shared the concerns of the international community over the remaining questions regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear programme. She urged Iran to suspend its enrichment- and heavy water-related activities, implement the additional protocol and reconsider its decision to suspend implementation of the modified Code 3.1 of its Subsidiary Arrangements. New Zealand continued strongly to support a diplomatic solution based on Iran's compliance with Agency and Security Council requirements, but Iran must play its part in realizing that outcome.

120. In line with recent discussions in the Board of Governors, her country also called on the Syrian Arab Republic to be more cooperative and transparent in its provision to the Agency of information about and access to the Dair Alzour site and other related locations.

121. The challenges facing the international non-proliferation regime were numerous and only likely to increase, so it was imperative that the international community work together to agree on and coordinate effective responses. The Agency had a vital role in that collective response, working with Member States to safeguard and secure nuclear material for exclusively peaceful purposes to the benefit of the global family.

122. New Zealand supported the Agency's work to apply the benefits of nuclear technology to human health, water quality, crop enhancement and pest control, as well as the Secretariat's efforts to develop national capacity in Member States and promote regional and international cooperation in those areas. Such issues needed urgent action on a global scale, and progress in them would make a real difference and, over time, benefit millions of people.

123. Ms LACANLALE (Philippines) said that her country attached great importance to the application of nuclear technologies to meet contemporary challenges, particularly in the areas of food security, water resources management, environment and human health, with a view to achieving the Millennium Development Goals. In the area of food and agriculture, irradiation technology had been used in her country to support the national agenda on food security through mutation breeding, which had helped produce drought-resistant agricultural products. Through the joint FAO/IAEA programme

on nuclear techniques in food and agriculture, the Philippines hoped to enhance the delivery of nuclear technologies for crop improvement, livestock production, and soil, water and fertilizer management.

124. In the human health field, the Philippines welcomed the Agency's valuable work under PACT and called on Member States and other funding institutions to donate generously to that programme. She trusted that the draft resolution on PACT that her country would be submitting to the Conference would meet with the approval of Member States. Noting that regional initiatives on cancer therapy could also be of benefit to PACT, she said that the Philippines had developed the best protocols for treating cancer patients through the Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia. It also continued to conduct a two-year training programme for nuclear medicine technicians based on the RCA project on distance learning.

125. The Philippines had achieved significant milestones in its environmental activities using radioisotopes and nuclear techniques. In December 2008, the Environmental Isotope Centre had been inaugurated, enabling the Philippines to conduct its own isotope analyses, and enhancing its capability to assess water resources.

126. With the renewed interest in nuclear power as a reliable source of energy, more countries, particularly from the developing world, were turning to the Agency for assistance with the development or expansion of their nuclear power programmes. Confidence in the use of nuclear power hinged on the continuous improvement and strengthening of safety and security regimes, and the Philippines therefore attached great importance to the Agency's programmes on safety and security. Her country was collaborating closely with the Agency on the development of a safety infrastructure and it appreciated the technical assistance it was receiving from the Agency in that regard, including with respect to the long-term management of radioactive waste and enhancing the competencies of technical personnel. Her country participated actively in various knowledge networks on safety, including the Asian Nuclear Safety Network, and it looked forward to contributing to the vision of a sustainable regional network by 2020. In the area of nuclear security, with the assistance of the Agency, it had refined its national nuclear security plan and developed an Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan.

127. A major challenge associated with the nuclear renaissance was the increasing risk of nuclear proliferation. The Agency's safeguards activities played a critical role in ensuring the non-diversion of nuclear material, and it was important for the Agency's nuclear verification capability to be strengthened. The conclusion of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols, as well as the provision of tools and resources to enable the Agency to implement a credible verification system, would go a long way towards reducing the risk of nuclear proliferation. That being said, it was necessary to resolve the issue of the balance between the Agency's verification and promotional activities. Her country looked forward to the commencement of the negotiations of the working group on the budget, which it hoped would address some of the long-standing issues relating to the TCF.

128. With regard to assurances of fuel supply, a multilateral framework, within which the Agency played a central role, would serve as an important tool for strengthening the non-proliferation regime. Consultations should continue to clarify issues raised by Member States with a view to promoting wider acceptance of the proposals put forward. The resulting mechanism should guarantee equal access to nuclear fuel and should not result in any Member State or group of States having a monopoly over nuclear fuel supply.

129. Her country remained concerned over the lack of substantive progress in resolving the outstanding issues regarding the implementation of safeguards in Iran. She emphasized the importance of continued constructive dialogue among all parties concerned with a view to achieving a peaceful



and comprehensive solution, and called on Iran to comply with relevant United Nations Security Council and Agency resolutions.

130. With regard to the DPRK's nuclear programme, the Philippines noted with concern that country's recent announcement concerning the current status of its enrichment activities following the total cessation of all cooperation with the Agency. The DPRK's intransigent acts constituted a serious threat to peace and stability in the region, and the Philippines urged the DPRK to return to the six-party talks and to the NPT, and to resume implementation of its safeguards agreement with the Agency.

131. The Philippines strongly supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones as a means of achieving nuclear non-proliferation. It urged all countries in the region to accede to the Bangkok Treaty and called for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

132. With regard to the nature of Syria's nuclear programme, the Philippines encouraged Syria and all other parties concerned to extend full cooperation to the Agency so that the verification activities could be completed.

133. The Philippines shared the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and stressed the need for equal progress to be made in all three pillars of the NPT. It hoped that the 2010 NPT Review Conference would bring the world closer to achieving the objectives of the Treaty.

134. Mr FERNÁNDEZ RONDÓN (Cuba) said that there was a growing need for nuclear applications in developing countries, hence the significance of the Agency's activities. In Cuba, the application of nuclear technologies in vital areas of the economy was highly appreciated and his Government was committed to technical cooperation activities. Cuba had stepped up its participation in regional projects, especially under the ARCAL programme, in keeping with the priority which it gave to TCDC.

135. As in the past, Cuba had met its financial commitments to the TCF on time and had paid its NPCs in full. In the preceding year, it had contributed half a million dollars to support one project on a cost-sharing basis. It had attained an implementation rate for national projects of 80%, which was higher than the average.

136. Also, in 2008 Cuba had further increased its contributions to the technical cooperation programme, inter alia through the contribution of 29 experts for 53 international Agency missions and 8 teachers for training activities. Nine specialists from other countries had conducted training activities in Cuba.

137. He underscored the importance of PACT and acknowledged the recent results achieved. In particular, his country valued highly the synergies that had been established within the framework of PACT with a number of international institutions and organizations and it welcomed the establishment of the WHO-IAEA Joint Programme on Cancer Control. He expressed appreciation to the Division for Latin America of the Department of Technical Cooperation for its efforts in 2008 to improve the various performance indicators and strengthen national capacities for managing the programme. He also stressed the need to maintain a suitable balance between human resources and equipment components in the design and implementation of technical cooperation projects, given the Agency's essential role in managing the procurement of materials and high-tech equipment, which developing countries sometimes found difficult to obtain.

138. Referring to the damaging effect the unjust economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed on Cuba by the Government of the United States had on the Cuban people, he noted that difficulties in procuring scientific equipment for Cuban projects had grown, making project implementation more expensive, since equipment had to be purchased at more distant locations. That

had an adverse impact on the achievement of objectives. Cuba denounced that policy, which was contrary to international law and the Agency's Statute; at the same time, it acknowledged the ongoing efforts of the Secretariat to find alternatives and solutions, which had allowed Cuba to achieve high implementation rates.

139. His country noted with satisfaction that activities related to nuclear and radiation safety had continued to develop satisfactorily in 2008. Thanks to the efforts of his Government and optimal use of Agency assistance with training and infrastructure, a national system had been set up which ensured comprehensive monitoring of staff exposed to ionizing radiation. Similar progress was taking place in other countries in the region with the help of Cuban experts.

140. The Agency was in the process of analysing ways of making its work more effective in the future. In that connection, account must be taken of the great differences that existed between the nuclear programmes of Member States of the IAEA. A significant number of Member States had small quantities of nuclear material and many did not even have nuclear facilities, as that term was defined for safeguards purposes. Thus, general measures could not be devised for countries that had large or medium-sized nuclear programmes with the expectation that all countries comply.

141. The verification process must be conducted fairly and impartially, as a prerequisite for preserving peace and security. It was not, and could not be, without limits or boundaries, as some sought to make it for the sake of purely geopolitical interests and in violation of the norms enshrined in international law and the Charter of the United Nations. It was important to prevent any attempt to exert pressure or indulge in undue interference that would undermine the efficiency and credibility of the Agency's verification process.

142. The political manipulations behind the so-called Iranian nuclear case, and the double standards that were being applied in the allegations against the Syrian Arab Republic and in the failure to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, which the international community had been demanding for decades, should have ceased long ago.

143. Cuba reaffirmed the need to respect the inalienable right of all States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Under no circumstances should voluntary measures become obligations for Member States. The Agency was the sole competent authority for verifying the compliance of Member States with their obligations under safeguards agreements. Cuba trusted that the Agency's work could continue without external interference, and it reiterated its appreciation for the professional and technical work of the Secretariat.

144. Cuba underlined the importance of giving priority to peace and negotiation in resolving all international issues. If existing differences were to be addressed, dialogue must be based on equality and mutual respect.

145. Cuba devoted considerable human and financial resources to meeting its obligations under its safeguards agreement. It carried out such actions as part of its political commitments under the NPT and the Tlatelolco Treaty, in the hope that those mechanisms would lead to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

146. It was vitally important to reaffirm the indissoluble link between non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

147. Despite hopes for change, it was worrying that militarist policies continued to be applied and that so much was spent annually on weapons. It was in the hands of the international community to reverse that situation. The coming months would bring new opportunities and the 2010 NPT Review Conference would offer an opportunity to promote multilateral action and to enter into a real commitment to development, non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and world peace.

148. Mr GARCÍA REVILLA (Peru) said that his country shared the Director General's vision of strengthening global cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, promotion of nuclear safety and security worldwide, and the provision of assurances, through verification activities, of compliance with international obligations relating to the use of nuclear facilities and material for peaceful purposes.

149. As a founding member of the Agency, Peru was committed to global peace and security, non-proliferation and disarmament. It would therefore be honoured to serve as a member of the Board of Governors for the period 2009–2011 if elected during the Conference and undertook to contribute actively to achieving consensus.

150. His country attached great importance to the non-proliferation regime and welcomed any decision aimed at strengthening it, particularly the universal adoption and implementation of the mechanisms established through such international instruments as the NPT and the Tlatelolco Treaty, which Peru had joined at an early stage. As a member of the world's first nuclear-weapon-free zone, Peru strongly supported the establishment of such zones which helped strengthen the NPT regime. The creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East should be an abiding objective. It was also vital to redouble efforts to ensure the early entry into force of the CTBT.

151. While his country recognized the right of all States to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, such activities must be conducted in strict compliance with non-proliferation obligations and Agency NPT safeguards regime, an important instrument of universal scope to which all States that had not yet done so should accede in order to guarantee a safer and more peaceful world.

152. Peru regretted the fact that the DPRK had carried out a nuclear test in May 2009 and hoped for its speedy return to the NPT and the resumption of the six-party talks aimed at the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

153. To demonstrate transparency and its commitment to the Agency's objectives relating to the nuclear verification and safeguards, Peru had signed an additional protocol to its safeguards agreement with the Agency in 1999. It complied with all the obligations it had assumed in that regard, as was regularly verified by the Agency.

154. Peru had continued to participate during the preceding year in many activities aimed at enhancing the beneficial contributions of nuclear energy to the socio-economic development of Member States, promoting its safe use and building an increasingly effective regime to prevent diversion of nuclear energy for military or other unlawful purposes.

155. The Peruvian Institute of Nuclear Energy, the body responsible for implementing national nuclear policy, had continued to implement its institutional strategic plan through programmes, projects and activities aimed at bringing added value to the production of goods and services in cases where nuclear technology offered comparative advantages. Major projects had been launched and were being implemented in cooperation with the Agency in such areas as modernizing and improving the use of the RP10 reactor, improving the treatment of cancer and cardiac diseases, training of human resources, and support for the improvement of nuclear technology in line with current advances in its rational and safer use.

156. Over the preceding year, an occupational radiation protection programme had been launched with the assistance of Agency experts in the radioisotope production plant of the RACSO Nuclear Centre, the use of neutron activation analysis techniques had been optimized, and research activities aimed at improving alpaca wool fibre and reducing mortality rates among the camelid population on the Andean high plateau had been assessed jointly with the Cayetano Heredia Peruvian University.

157. An evaluation mission had visited Peru from 29 June to 3 July to measure the impact of the use of irradiation technology on the country's economic and social development, especially with regard to activities and products related to international trade. The visit had encouraged the Peruvian agro-export sector to continue relying on irradiation of key fresh food export products such as asparagus.

158. The knowledge and technology transferred to Peru through Agency experts enabled the country to train specialist technicians locally. Advanced courses were being organized in the use of nuclear technology in biotechnology, materials science, medicine, nuclear instrumentation and other areas.

159. An IRRS mission to Peru had been undertaken from 19 to 30 April 2009, comprising experts from Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Finland, France, Cuba, Argentina and Brazil, Agency inspectors and an observer from Vietnam. The objective of the mission had been to promote nuclear and radiation safety, and regulatory effectiveness, by comparing the existing regulatory structure with international standards.

160. Finally, his country supported ARCAL, which had enhanced regional integration and forged cooperative links at regional level under the auspices of the ARCAL-IAEA Strategic Alliance.

161. Ms TROJANOWSKA (Poland) reaffirmed her country's full support for the Agency, which was the world's focal point for peaceful nuclear cooperation and nuclear safety and security. Those two areas, together with verification, constituted the three pillars of the Agency's Statute.

162. The NPT had an exceptional position in the global non-proliferation regime and the Agency a unique mission in verifying nuclear non-proliferation worldwide. Her country hoped that, after the positive outcome of the third meeting of the Preparatory Committee, the 2010 NPT Review Conference would produce a consensus document. Poland viewed the universal adoption and implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols as a prerequisite for a credible and effective safeguards system. Following its decision to join the European Union, her country had replaced its bilateral safeguards agreement and additional protocol with the trilateral safeguards agreement and additional protocol obligatory for European Union member States. It called upon other countries which had not yet done so to join the Agency's comprehensive safeguards system as soon as possible. States with SQPs should also conclude an exchange of letters with the Agency to reinforce the safeguards system.

163. Poland hoped that the sixth conference on facilitating the entry into force of the CTBT, which was to be held in New York following the General Conference, would make progress towards bringing that Treaty into force. Her country, which was one of the 44 States whose ratification was essential for the CTBT to enter into force, had completed the ratification process in 1999.

164. The Agency played a pivotal role in global planning and coordination of efforts to protect the world against nuclear terrorism. One valuable instrument in that regard was the amended CPPNM, for which Poland had deposited its instruments of ratification in 2006. She expressed the hope that other States party to the Convention had done so, or would do so in the near future. Poland welcomed the newly adopted Nuclear Security Plan 2010–2013 and supported the proposed increase in the Regular Budget for 2010 to fund core activities under the Plan, as the voluntary nature of contributions to the Nuclear Security Fund was a serious impediment to achieving the intended objectives. Poland had given both financial and in-kind support to nuclear security activities and encouraged other States to do likewise.

165. Her country had been involved in the Global Threat Reduction Initiative since its inception and, under it, had converted its nuclear research reactor to LEU fuel. It had also transferred unirradiated HEU fuel to the Russian Federation, which had been completed in 2006. Currently, spent nuclear fuel of Russian origin was being repatriated to the Russian Federation. She thanked all parties involved in

that complex process, in particular the United States Government, which had covered most of the costs.

166. Her country was concerned to maintain the highest levels of nuclear safety worldwide. Although safety was a national responsibility, it could have implications beyond national boundaries and international cooperation was essential. The Agency, through its statutory programme, was a globally recognized forum for such cooperation and Poland, which was party to all international legal instruments developed in that field under the auspices of the Agency, was fully convinced of their importance and their essential role in keeping nuclear facilities and material safe and secure worldwide. Representatives of her country had participated in the third review meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management in May 2009, and it looked forward to the organizational meeting prior to the fifth review meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety to be held soon.

167. On 13 January 2009, the Government of Poland had adopted a resolution on activities to be undertaken to develop nuclear power in the country. The Polish nuclear power programme was to be elaborated by a Government Commissioner and submitted to the Council of Ministers, together with the proposed administrative and legal changes required for its implementation. On 12 May 2009, the Council of Ministers had established by ordinance the position of Government Commissioner for Nuclear Power and had defined the tasks and responsibilities of the position.

168. Implementation of nuclear power in Poland was a priority in the country's energy policy. The main objectives of the nuclear power programme were: to achieve optimum conditions for nuclear power development; to specify the necessary activities and tasks to be carried out by the State administration within a proposed time frame; to estimate the costs of nuclear power development and indicate funding sources; and to assess the economic, social and environmental impact of the programme. Preparation and implementation of the programme were being based on the Agency's nuclear safety standards. Legislation and other activities under the programme would follow Agency principles and guidelines and draw on the experience of other Agency Member States. Consultation and cooperation with the Department of Technical Cooperation should optimize the process. Poland's new regulations relating to the programme would uphold the following basic principles: separation of regulatory functions and promotion and coordination functions; transparency of all activities; and preservation of safety culture at each stage. Other crucial elements of the programme included human resources development, public education and information and effective R&D support. Agency assistance was of essential importance for the programme's success. She thanked the Director General for his prompt response to her country's requests for INIR and IRRS missions. Poland looked forward to the establishment of a special technical cooperation programme which would provide assistance.

169. Technical cooperation had always been and remained an important activity in relations between the Agency and Member States. In Europe, the technical cooperation programme had been greatly enhanced by regular consultation meetings aimed at developing new managerial tools to help make the programme more effective and efficient. Poland was a good example of a country that had moved from being just a recipient to being an important donor. Together with other new European Union members, it played an important double role, contributing to TCDC. Apart from national projects with a high rate of Government cost sharing, it actively participated in regional projects, offering its knowledge and competence to other Member States.

170. Financing of technical cooperation activities should be assured, sufficient and predictable, and all Member States should demonstrate their commitment to the programme by pledging and paying in full and on time their shares of the TCF and their NPCs. Thus, her country strongly supported application of the due account principle. As in the past, it had pledged and paid its share of the TCF.

171. In conclusion, she expressed support for the Director General's efforts to initiate wide consultations on the future of the Agency and assured the organization of the continued support of her country.

**Mr Enkhsaikhan Jargalsaikhan (Mongolia) took the Chair.**

172. Mr STANKOVIC (Montenegro) said that, although his country was a new Agency member, it had come a long way since the first General Conference it had attended in 2007. Some developments in the preceding year had helped prepare for full implementation of international standards relating to radiation protection and safety, and of some operational activities.

173. As an ecologically minded State, Montenegro recognized the importance of cooperation with the Agency with a view to environmental protection and enhancement of the quality of life of its citizens. The Agency had provided valuable technical and expert assistance in that regard, promoting the country's development in line with sustainable development principles.

174. Since achieving independence, the country had enacted a number of laws relating to radiation protection and had established an environmental protection agency which was responsible for regulatory control of radiation sources. He thanked the Agency for the assistance it had provided with those activities.

175. During the 52nd regular session of the General Conference, Montenegro had signed a CPF, creating the basis for a planned approach in implementing technical assistance with the Agency. The CPF assigned priority to the following topics: environmental protection, illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material at border crossings, and oncology.

176. The application of nuclear technology in medicine was a significant tool for enhancing human health. Currently, Montenegro's national technical cooperation programme focused on enhancement of the working conditions for the future oncology clinic, which should soon be completed. In addition to establishing the required technical infrastructure, significant resources were needed for staff training. Montenegro was also participating in over thirty regional projects.

177. His country was committed to strengthening its national security system, and international mechanisms and cooperation to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive material. It took part in numerous non-proliferation initiatives, including the programme on the establishment of a knowledge management system on illicit trafficking in chemical, biological, radioactive and nuclear substances and weapons in south-east Europe and the Caucasus. It had signed a safeguards agreement and an additional protocol and would be ratifying them in the coming year.

178. Finally, he reiterated the readiness of all the relevant authorities and institutions in his country to contribute actively to the Agency's work.

179. Ms TCHUENTE (Cameroon), said that as a supporter of international peace and security, her country was a party to the NPT, a comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. It had also ratified the Pelindaba Treaty and welcomed its entry into force.

180. Only the Agency's verification activities provided assurances that international obligations with regard to the use of nuclear material for peaceful purposes were being respected, and those activities must be facilitated by all Member States.

181. Cameroon welcomed the Secretariat's efforts during 2008 to respond to the main sustainable development priorities through its technical cooperation programme. Increasingly, people were turning

to nuclear technology in seeking solutions to the problems of food security, water resources management, and diagnosis and treatment of diseases such as cancer. Cameroon had benefited from national and regional technical cooperation projects in human health, agricultural productivity and food security, environmental protection, physical and chemical applications of radiation, water resources management, and nuclear safety and security. It expected such cooperation to increase in other priority areas for its national development, as envisaged in its CPF for 2009–2013 to be signed during the current session of the General Conference. Cameroon had also hosted the 20th meeting of the technical working group for AFRA in Yaoundé in July 2009.

182. Nuclear power was increasingly being seen as the inevitable solution to ensure energy security for the majority of developed and developing countries. Her country's participation in the International Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Energy in the 21st Century, held in Beijing in April 2009, had demonstrated that its approach to the issue was based on dialogue and the sharing of experience. There had to be collaboration on such matters as mobilization of human resources, access to technologies, development of reactors of a size that met the needs of developing countries, the nuclear fuel cycle and radioactive waste management. There were concerns regarding the availability of qualified human resources for the introduction or expansion of nuclear power, security of nuclear fuel supplies, and equitable sharing of revenues from the exploitation of deposits of nuclear material between the countries in possession of the resources and those in possession of the technologies.

183. It was important for the international community to provide the Agency with more resources to strike a global balance in the field of the peaceful use of nuclear science and technology. Cameroon had established a national radiation protection agency and intended to enhance its nuclear safety and security infrastructure with a view to introducing nuclear power in its energy mix. Technical assistance from the Agency would be a necessity to achieve its national objectives.

184. There was a growing global need for nuclear technology, and the Agency was under pressure to meet Member States' requests and deal with new challenges. It was at the heart of coordinated efforts to confront the threats posed by nuclear terrorism, and was being called upon to assist States with the establishment of the infrastructures they needed to launch nuclear energy programmes, and to step up its safeguards activities. Cameroon was confident that the organization would rise to such challenges and would continue to support the progress of all Member States.

185. Mr D'UJANGA (Uganda) said his country appreciated the Agency's ongoing support for peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology in the fields of health, water, agriculture and industry.

186. In the field of human health, he commended Agency assistance and support for radiotherapy and nuclear medicine services. With the increase in the number of cancer cases, in particular cervical cancer, radiotherapy techniques had proved to be a crucial component in cancer management. His country particularly valued PACT and was grateful to the Agency for approving its request for an imPACT mission. It looked forward to working with the PACT team to develop a comprehensive national cancer control programme.

187. As in many developing countries, access to clean drinking water was a serious problem in Uganda. He commended the Agency on its support for the use of isotope hydrology in assessing underground water resources with a view to developing comprehensive strategies and plans for water supplies for rural communities and small towns. His country looked forward to continued cooperation with the Agency in that field.

188. The Joint FAO/IAEA Division of Nuclear Techniques in Food and Agriculture had done and was doing an excellent job in conducting research to develop disease- and drought-resistant varieties of crops and improve animal production. Erratic rainfall and drought had brought biting hunger to

many people in Uganda and neighbouring countries. Many had died of starvation. He appealed to the Agency to strengthen the activities of the Joint Division.

189. Access to modern energy services, in particular electricity, remained a major challenge for his country and other developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. There was enormous potential for power generation from renewable energy sources such as hydroelectric power, solar power, geothermal power, biomass and wind, as well as from fossil fuels. Energy supply and demand studies showed that, in the long run, those resources would not be sufficient to meet demand. Thus, there was a need to diversify the energy mix and include nuclear power. Furthermore, the growing concern over global warming and climate change made it incumbent on every nation to choose an energy supply that helped mitigate climate change.

190. For the foregoing reasons, his country had taken the courageous step of starting to build capacity for the introduction of nuclear power. The Atomic Energy Act 2008 provided for the development of a peaceful nuclear power programme within the boundaries of the Agency's safeguards and safety regimes. He commended the Agency for the support it was giving to countries interested in launching nuclear power programmes. The Agency's milestone approach and the INPRO methodology were helpful tools for newcomer countries. His country was particularly appreciative of the Agency's work on the development and deployment of safe, secure, economically viable and proliferation-resistant small and medium-sized reactors, which would be ideal for developing countries.

191. He congratulated the Government and people of Sweden on reversing their decision regarding nuclear power. Equally, he expressed appreciation for the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership which aimed to facilitate the safe and secure expansion of nuclear power while minimizing proliferation risks.

192. Safeguards and verification remained the key instrument in enhancing the peaceful use of nuclear power technology. Uganda greatly appreciated the courageous steps taken by the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation regarding the reduction of their nuclear arsenals. However, much more needed to be done in that respect to build trust. He stressed that safeguards measures should continue to be applied comprehensively and impartially.

193. As peaceful applications of radioactive material expanded throughout the world, the challenges of ensuring safety and security increased. The main concern for developing countries was illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive material. In most cases, the cause of illicit trafficking was a desire to get rich quick. Many people in developing countries thought that every type of radioactive material was uranium for which a lot of money could be got on the black market. Trafficking in such material put the lives of many people at risk, both the traffickers and the public. He expressed appreciation in that regard for the work of the Agency's Department of Nuclear Safety and Security and the Global Threat Reduction Initiative.

194. In conclusion, he re-emphasized the importance of the contribution of atomic energy to health and prosperity throughout the world, expressing appreciation for the Agency's efforts in that regard, particularly under the technical cooperation programme. Uganda would continue to support the Agency and believed that, with the joint efforts of Member States and the Secretariat, the organization would be able to fulfil its mission.

195. Mr TURDIU (Albania) said that his country had completed its two-year term on the Board of Governors, during which time it had taken an active part in all discussions and had provided its own modest contribution to important issues. The Albanian Government lent its full support to the Agency's activities and would continue to do so in the future.



196. Albania would continue to contribute to efforts relating to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to meet all its obligations in the Agency. It thus attached particular importance to the implementation of all resolutions adopted by the Agency's General Conference and decisions of the Board of Governors, especially those that aimed at ensuring an effective and efficient international safeguards system and those that were universal in nature. Conscious as it was of the importance of the additional protocol as an instrument to achieve those objectives, his country had signed one and was in the process of ratifying it. It was also taking the final legislative measures to complete and adopt a comprehensive national atomic law which would also cover safeguards-related issues, as well as the relevant structures to ensure executive leadership and control over all nuclear- and radiation-related obligations, requirements and standards.

197. Nuclear applications were a priority for the Albanian Government, as were nuclear safety and security, and the country was working to improve and consolidate its regulatory framework, to adapt and harmonize the relevant national infrastructure and to consolidate the legal basis for all nuclear-related activities.

198. Albania would continue to be a beneficiary of PACT, highly appreciated the Agency's contribution and assistance in that area and was committed to strengthening cancer control activities in the country.

199. Both power and non-power applications of nuclear technology had a clear future in Albania. However, nuclear technology transfer and implementation was a long process and the Agency's cooperation and assistance would be required for many years to come. The Albanian Government was looking seriously into the possibility of using nuclear technology for power generation and had taken initial steps in that regard, with Agency cooperation.

200. The Albanian Government also attached great importance to continued cooperation in the field of nuclear security. It was committed and assigned top priority to ensuring effective prevention and combating of illicit trafficking in radioactive material, and of organized crime and terrorism. Border management and control had been greatly strengthened. The Agency had been providing advisory services to help establish the necessary infrastructure and Albania was part of the Agency's global plan to combat nuclear terrorism.

201. Mr AMADOU TIDIANE (Senegal) paid tribute to the Director General for his commitment, far-sightedness and determination in the service of peace, safety and security, and in strengthening the Agency's activities on peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology for sustainable economic and social development, culminating in the award of the Nobel Peace Prize. He also welcomed his successor, Mr Amano.

202. Senegal was determined to continue developing the wide-ranging cooperation it already enjoyed with the Agency in such areas as training, technology transfer, provision of state-of-the-art medical equipment, exchanges of experts and scientific meetings, and research support in water resources management, improvement of agricultural production, stockbreeding development, radiation protection and malnutrition. That was why Senegal had met all its financial obligations vis-à-vis the Agency. Since joining the Agency, it had also ratified various legal instruments, inter alia the Pelindaba Treaty.

203. The global energy crisis was felt particularly acutely by poor countries like his own, for which energy security had become a major preoccupation and nuclear energy a resource that had to be taken into account. Senegal's current energy policy was primarily based on fossil fuels, with solar and biofuel options, but its plans included the possibility of using nuclear energy for electricity generation. It had ratified the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Convention on Nuclear

Safety, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, and the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident. It had also recently adopted a law on nuclear safety and radiation protection and planned in the near future to establish an independent regulatory body. His country was also participating in AFRA project RAF/9/038 with a view to establishing a national regulatory infrastructure in line with international standards, and an African regulators network.

204. Senegal reaffirmed its total support for the Agency's ideals of peace and development and would spare no effort in its active promotion of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Thanking the Agency for the technical cooperation it provided to his country, he sought its continued support in any forthcoming development of nuclear energy for peace and sustainable development on a local or global scale.

205. Mr RISTORI (European Commission) expressed appreciation for the Director General's efforts to reinforce cooperation between the Agency and the European Commission.

206. The role of nuclear energy in reducing CO<sub>2</sub> emissions was now largely recognized. Nuclear energy provided almost one third of the electricity consumed and two thirds of the CO<sub>2</sub>-free electricity in the European Union. It could also play a decisive role in securing energy supply. Within the European Union and globally, the trend was in the direction of more nuclear energy with a broader range of applications. However, there was a need to limit the related risks while respecting the right of every country to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The European Union was playing an increasing role in that regard, particularly in the field of nuclear safety, with the Agency's cooperation.

207. Nuclear safety remained a priority and, in June 2009, the European Council had adopted the revised Commission proposal for a directive establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations, which had been supported by all 27 Member States, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee. The European Union had become the first major regional nuclear actor to give binding legal force to the Agency's Safety Fundamentals and the obligations resulting from the Convention on Nuclear Safety. It had cooperated fruitfully with the Agency in the preparation of the nuclear safety directive and hoped to strengthen that cooperation further to develop an even more advanced framework for nuclear energy meeting the highest standards of safety, security and non-proliferation. The directive had also taken into account the contributions from the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group whose first activity report, presented in July 2009, contained detailed recommendations for improving nuclear safety, spent fuel and radioactive waste management and decommissioning.

208. Cooperation with third countries was being implemented under the Nuclear Safety Cooperation Instrument and the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance. The European Union also cooperated with the Agency to implement specific projects with IAEA Member States, and consultations were under way with countries that had declared their intention to embark upon or expand their civil nuclear power programmes.

209. Following the adoption of the nuclear safety directive, the Commission was also considering progress in the field of the safe management of nuclear waste.

210. It was actively developing a common understanding for the management of decommissioning funds. A financial assistance programme for decommissioning of the Bohunice, Ignalina and Kozloduy nuclear power plants was also ongoing in cooperation with the EBRD.

211. Both the Agency and the European Commission were incorporating the new recommendations issued by the International Commission on Radiological Protection into their respective basic safety

standards. For Euratom, that presented an opportunity for a major recast of all related legislation into a single act.

212. The European Union supported the Agency's nuclear security activities through its strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It was also one of the main contributors to the Nuclear Security Fund through joint actions adopted by the European Council and contributions by individual Member States.

213. Cooperation on nuclear safeguards between Euratom and the Agency was well on track. The Commission had made a particular effort to strengthen cooperation in implementing safeguards agreements between Euratom, the Agency and European Union member States. The integrated safeguards partnership approach was in the process of being introduced and, by the end of 2009, the nuclear facilities of all European Union non-nuclear-weapon States were expected to be covered by integrated safeguards. The European Commission's safeguards support programme was becoming one of the largest in the field.

214. The great challenge ahead as regards nuclear non-proliferation was the review of the NPT at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. A new framework for civil nuclear cooperation needed to be built, and the European Commission and European Council were ready to provide financing and technical expertise to that end.

215. The Commission's Strategic Energy Technology Plan was an important link between energy policy and the technological development needed to meet the European Union's energy and climate change policy objectives. Euratom had supported research in nuclear fission and fusion for many years. The projects under the Seventh Framework Programme covered a broad range of areas including nuclear safety, radiation protection, geological waste disposal, Generation IV reactor designs, research infrastructures, education and training. Those projects were open to international cooperation.

216. As regards nuclear liability, many different regimes coexisted within the European Union, particularly following its expansion. The Commission was assessing the situation and the possible need for improvement.

217. The European Nuclear Energy Forum pursued broad and constructive discussion with relevant stakeholders from all member States on opportunities, risks and transparency with respect to nuclear energy. The most recent meeting had been held in Prague in May 2009, and the subsequent one would be held in Bratislava in 2010.

218. It was essential to enhance international cooperation, given the current global context and the fact that two major international events — the summit on global nuclear security announced by the President of the United States, and the NPT Review Conference — would be taking place in the coming year. The European Union could contribute to non-proliferation at global level based on its extensive experience in the nuclear fuel cycle and the range of legal instruments at its disposal.

219. Finally, the European Commission welcomed the ongoing debate on the future of the Agency. It supported the strengthening of the Agency, which represented the interests of nations using, or intending to use, nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

**The meeting rose at 8.10 p.m.**