

General Conference

GC(53)/OR.3

Issued: February 2010

General Distribution

Original: English

Fifty-third regular session

Plenary

Record of the Third Meeting

Held at Headquarters, Vienna,, on Tuesday, 15 September 2009, at 10.10 a.m.

President: Ms MACMILLAN (New Zealand)

Later: Mr TAN (Singapore)

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Abbreviations used in this record:

AFRA	African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
AIDS	acquired immune deficiency syndrome
ARASIA	Cooperative Agreement for Arab States in Asia for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
ARCAL	Cooperation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean
Assistance Convention	Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency
CPPNM	Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Early Notification Convention	Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FMCT	fissile material cut-off treaty
GIF	Generation IV International Forum
HIV	human immunodeficiency virus
INPRO	International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles
IRRS	Integrated Regulatory Review Service
ITER	International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor
Joint Convention	Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management
Joint Division	Joint FAO/IAEA Division of Nuclear Techniques in Food and Agriculture
LDC	least developed country

Abbreviations used in this record (continued):

LEU	low-enriched uranium
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT Review Conference	Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NSG	Nuclear Suppliers Group
Nuclear Safety Convention	Convention on Nuclear Safety
NWFZ	nuclear-weapon-free zone
OECD/NEA	Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (earlier CSCE)
PACT	Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy
Paris Convention	Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy
Pelindaba Treaty	African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty
SIT	sterile insect technique
TCF	Technical Cooperation Fund
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
Vienna Convention	Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (May 1963)
WHO	World Health Organization
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

8. General debate and Annual Report for 2008 (continued) (GC(53)/7)

1. Ms YAR'ADUA (Nigeria) commended the outgoing Director General for his outstanding leadership during his twelve-year tenure and expressed deep appreciation of his support and assistance to Nigeria's national and regional programmes. She congratulated the Director General designate, with whom Nigeria looked forward to working, on his election, and said that Nigeria looked forward to the continued support and assistance of the Agency in its national programmes.
2. Welcoming the new Member States, she expressed the hope that the continuous enlargement of the Agency's membership would continue to strengthen international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and deepen the nuclear safety culture and nuclear non-proliferation.
3. A major fact often lost to public health policy formulators, particularly in developing countries like Nigeria, was that cancer had emerged as the primary killer. According to the available data, cancer killed more people in Nigeria than malaria and HIV/AIDS combined. Her country was therefore beginning to look towards the evolution of effective mechanisms to combat cancer, including the incorporation of nuclear medicine and radiotherapy techniques for diagnosis and management. She welcomed the assistance Nigeria had received from the Agency in establishing nuclear medicine and radiotherapy as an important component of the national strategy to control cancer, which had given impetus to intensified national efforts to develop and implement a structured nuclear medicine and radiotherapy programme for the diagnosis and management of cancer.
4. Nigeria's commitment had been manifested in the approval and implementation of two major projects in the health sector in the 2009–2011 technical cooperation cycle under which steps would be taken to develop and expand nuclear medicine facilities in ten tertiary hospitals and to strengthen existing radiotherapy facilities in six. When fully functional, the facilities were expected to provide much-needed services to alleviate the suffering of cancer patients and function as referral centres.
5. Earlier in 2009, the foundation had been laid for an international cancer centre in Abuja. Conceived as a private-sector-driven enterprise, its primary objective was to provide a world-class facility for the diagnosis and management of cancer in Nigeria. The project was expected to benefit from the expert services and professional advice of PACT.
6. Many developing countries, particularly in Africa, were faced with massive infrastructure challenges that had a direct impact on quality of life and threatened attainment of the MDGs by the target date of 2015. In response to Nigeria's huge energy deficit, her Government had made it a priority to diversify and strengthen the country's energy generation base beyond current sources to include nuclear power. The initiative was being driven through the Nigeria Atomic Energy Commission with full commitment to nuclear safety, security and safeguards. Through the Nigerian Nuclear Regulatory Authority, Nigeria had developed wide-ranging regulations and guidelines to ensure nuclear safety and radiation protection, and had acceded to, and ratified, relevant treaties and conventions relating to the use of nuclear energy. The nuclear research reactor and accelerator facilities installed and commissioned with Agency assistance were being operated and utilized to promote socio-economic development.
7. Nigeria remained committed to the basic tenets of the NPT and had placed its peaceful nuclear activities under safeguards. Her country commended the efforts of all African nations to have signed

the Pelindaba Treaty, especially Burundi, which had become the twenty-eighth nation to deposit its instrument of ratification, leading to the Treaty's entry into force on 15 July 2009. Such a step demonstrated Africa's commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear technology in all its forms for the continent's economic development and regeneration.

8. Proliferation concerns were best addressed in a transparent, comprehensive and non-discriminatory manner, through multilateralism. The absence of a demonstrable commitment to nuclear disarmament on the part of some nuclear-weapon States could have grave consequences for the full implementation of NPT obligations by all Parties. It was also discriminatory and could erode the confidence of Member States in the Agency's safeguards and verification system.

9. Mr WIBOWO (Indonesia) congratulated the Director General designate on his appointment and expressed his country's gratitude to the outgoing Director General for his outstanding contribution to the Agency's work, and commended his impartial, effective and professional approach to managing the Agency's affairs.

10. Indonesia welcomed the Agency's achievements in supporting progress in nuclear applications, in promoting socio-economic development and in maintaining world peace and security. Its role in promoting nuclear technology for peaceful purposes was also praiseworthy. Technical cooperation was vital to the transfer of nuclear science and technology to Member States, and served as the basic instrument for promoting peaceful uses of atomic energy for sustainable socio-economic development. As the demand for technical cooperation continued to grow, especially from developing Member States, efforts must be made to ensure that technical cooperation was funded in a sufficient, assured and predictable manner. Although Indonesia had consistently paid its share of the TCF target, it shared the concerns about the current funding system, which relied on voluntary contributions. The Agency should pursue a more balanced distribution of the budget, in order to reflect the equal importance of the three pillars of its work. The recent trend towards making the Agency primarily a tool for verification and safeguards could weaken promotional activities and was therefore a cause of concern. Moreover, the tendency to emphasize one core function over others could lead to a problematic imbalance in funding and to a loss of equilibrium.

11. Indonesia had long advocated promoting nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and attached priority to cooperating with the Agency for the application of nuclear science and technology to improve the quality of human life, including human health. His country was particularly committed to developing an integrated and comprehensive approach to cancer, and continued to support the implementation of PACT in developing countries. Indonesia commended the Agency's efforts to enhance capabilities of Member States in sustainable food security and productivity through the application of nuclear technology, and fully supported relevant technical cooperation projects. It welcomed the Agency's work in radiation-induced breeding of new varieties of plants. Two high-yielding, high-quality rice mutant varieties produced by irradiation techniques had been planted in an area of more than three million hectares in Indonesia. Three mutant varieties of rice produced by the Indonesian National Nuclear Energy Agency had also been introduced in early 2009.

12. Nuclear power was emerging as one of the primary energy resources to meet a huge increase in demand for power in the medium and longer term, while mitigating the negative effect on the climate caused by the combustion of fossil fuels. The rising demand for nuclear energy and the spread of nuclear technology might bring about proliferation risks, particularly if States planned to build indigenous uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities. The proposals for multilateral nuclear fuel cycle mechanisms and assurances of nuclear supply sought to minimize that risk, and the creation of a multilateral fuel cycle arrangement, which would also guarantee the assurance of nuclear fuel supply, would help to strengthen the existing non-proliferation regime. Such proposals must nevertheless take account of the right of all States to develop all aspects of nuclear

science and technology for peaceful purposes, including with regard to the nuclear fuel cycle. Indonesia appreciated the discussions on assurances of nuclear fuel supply, but agreed that all associated technical, legal, economic and political aspects should be taken into account before a final decision was taken. Moreover, any decision must be taken by consensus, taking into account the views and concerns of all Member States.

13. The Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network established in April 2009 would enhance safeguards implementation in the Asia-Pacific region and promote regional cooperation in nuclear safeguards. The first meeting of the Network would be convened by the Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency in Indonesia in April 2010. Membership was open to any country in the Asia-Pacific region that used nuclear materials.

14. Indonesia was satisfied with the role of the Asian Nuclear Safety Network as the sole network promoting nuclear safety in the Asian region. At the second 2nd meeting on the nuclear safety strategy of the Asian Nuclear Safety Network held in Seoul in April 2009, it had been agreed that the Network should be a platform for regional capacity building and a centre of knowledge management for nuclear safety in Asia.

15. Indonesia commended the Agency's efforts to strengthen nuclear safety and security, and stressed that measures taken in that regard should not hamper international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, or the utilization of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. His country was pleased that the Agency had addressed the issues of natural events and seismic safety, and welcomed the range of extrabudgetary programmes aimed at addressing safety issues arising from tsunamis and seismic events. It also looked forward to the completion of an Agency safety report on emergency preparedness and capabilities to respond to nuclear or radiological emergencies triggered by natural disasters.

16. The safeguards system was both a fundamental part of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and an essential element of the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. As a party to the NPT and to the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free-Zone, Indonesia had a comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol in force, and was also implementing integrated safeguards. However, his country was concerned at the slow rate of progress being achieved in the application of safeguards agreements and additional protocols in all States, including non-nuclear and nuclear-weapon States. The failure to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East due to a single country's refusal to place its nuclear installations under Agency safeguards was regrettable. That country's acquisition of nuclear weapons posed a serious threat to regional security, and he called for the early implementation of Agency resolutions on the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East.

17. His country was also deeply disappointed with the interruption in the six-party talks. It called upon the DPRK to resume its cooperation with the Agency, return to the six-party talks and adhere to the NPT. While some of the DPRK's concerns needed to be addressed, it was important for the DPRK to recognize the genuine concerns of the international community and act responsibly.

18. The Agency should continue its verification activities related to the Iranian nuclear programme and he called on all Member States to support the Director General's efforts in that regard. The Iranian nuclear issue must be resolved through dialogue, cooperation, diplomacy and other peaceful means. He therefore urged Iran to provide the Agency with all the support and cooperation it needed in order to perform its tasks.

19. Mr BIGOT (France) said that the Agency had a key role to play, not only in ensuring the non-diversion of nuclear technologies and materials, but also as a driving force in the responsible development of civil nuclear power, in particular by promoting a safety culture and strict safety standards in Member States and by disseminating information related to the application of nuclear

technologies in areas including health, nutrition, agriculture and water resources. The Agency also contributed to nuclear security, including the fight against nuclear terrorism. He assured the Director General designate of his delegation's full support and thanked the outgoing Director General for his outstanding work.

20. With a growing number of countries looking to nuclear energy to meet their rising energy demands, the international community must sustain its efforts to address non-proliferation challenges, including the Iranian and DPRK nuclear issues. Iran continued to accumulate low-enriched uranium, in violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions. It had still not provided a satisfactory response to the Agency's questions about possible activities linked to the design and manufacture of nuclear weapons. The Agency had an essential role to play in informing the international community of developments concerning the Iranian nuclear issue, and the French President had recently suggested that the Agency should be given strengthened powers of inspection in such situations.

21. The actions of the DPRK in conducting a second nuclear test and firing several missiles were unacceptable. He called for the return of Agency inspectors to the DPRK and for the full, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of that country's nuclear weapons programme, in conformity with United Nations Security Council resolutions. The DPRK must meet its obligations under the NPT and its safeguards agreement, and France supported the Agency's efforts to that end. The DPRK must halt all proliferation activities and refrain from the export of certain items, as prohibited by United Nations Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009). The six-party talks provided the framework for a resumption of dialogue on denuclearization, and the DPRK should return promptly and without precondition to the negotiating table.

22. France, which would continue to support the Agency's investigations into the issue, called on the Syrian Arab Republic to demonstrate transparency and to cooperate fully in the implementation of its safeguards agreement.

23. The NPT remained the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime, and France looked forward to a successful outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

24. The right to use nuclear energy brought with it the duty for States to honour their non-proliferation commitments and pursue peaceful nuclear activities. Grave violation of those obligations by any State undermined mutual trust and hampered the development of international cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, to the detriment of the vast majority of States that fulfilled their obligations in good faith. A strengthened and universal safeguards system would be of benefit to all, and would facilitate the expansion of nuclear energy in the world while enhancing nuclear security and protection against nuclear terrorism. However, the Agency's capacity for detecting undeclared nuclear activities would remain limited unless States implemented an additional protocol. France therefore called upon all States that had not yet done so to conclude safeguards agreements and additional protocols without delay.

25. Through its safeguards support programme, France would continue supporting the Agency by providing expertise and by promoting the development of technologies to detect clandestine nuclear activities.

26. The identification of an international network for the trafficking of sensitive technologies had highlighted the need for strict and universally applicable export controls for the most sensitive nuclear technologies, equipment and materials, particularly as more States developed their nuclear capacity.

27. The transfer of such technologies, particularly those linked to enrichment and reprocessing, should benefit those countries that complied fully with their non-proliferation obligations and that required the technologies to develop a credible nuclear power programme. Recipient and exporting

countries must engage in long-term partnerships to ensure the safe, secure, proliferation-resistant and environmentally sound transfer and use of those technologies.

28. Nuclear terrorism remained a threat and States must take all necessary measures to continue to improve the levels of physical protection for nuclear installations and materials to ensure compliance with the most stringent security requirements. Firm action was required to prevent the acquisition and use of nuclear or radioactive materials by terrorists. To that end, States should accede to relevant international legal instruments, including the CPPNM and the amendment thereto, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. France welcomed the Agency's activities in promoting the security of nuclear materials and installations, and supported the Nuclear Security Plan for 2010–2013.

29. The International Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Energy in the 21st Century held in April had affirmed that nuclear energy, as a proven, clean, safe, competitive technology, would make an increasing contribution to the sustainable development of humankind throughout the 21st century and beyond. Nuclear energy, along with other non-greenhouse gas-emitting energy sources, was an integral part of the energy mix that could help to reduce the risks of climate change. That topic would be addressed by all stakeholders at a forthcoming international conference to be organized by France in close cooperation with the Agency.

30. France had more than thirty years' experience in using nuclear energy for power generation. It was ready to assist the increasing number of States expressing an interest in developing civilian nuclear programmes, provided that they respected their non-proliferation commitments and were committed to using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Such cooperation would be based on full respect for the most stringent safety, security and non-proliferation requirements as an essential precondition for the responsible development of nuclear energy, and would focus on the establishment of the necessary framework and infrastructure for the safe and efficient use of nuclear energy. France's International Nuclear Agency would provide assistance to States, notably in the area of staff training and development. A Masters programme in nuclear engineering had been launched in 2009; it was run by a consortium of leading academic institutions in cooperation with the National Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology under the auspices of the Atomic Energy Commission. The course was taught entirely in English and open to foreign students. In addition, since the beginning of 2008, France had signed seven bilateral intergovernmental cooperation agreements in the field of nuclear energy.

31. The global expansion of nuclear power should be accompanied by international debate on multilateral approaches to the fuel cycle. France welcomed the decision taken by the Council of the European Union to contribute to the establishment of a fuel bank under Agency control, which was one of the initiatives aimed at further strengthening the already high level of security in the nuclear fuel market.

32. France actively supported the technical cooperation programme, the benefits of which should be distributed equally among the least developed countries. Noting that the financing and strengthening of technical cooperation activities were the responsibility of all Member States, he said that in addition to supporting projects concerning the development of nuclear power, France would also be supporting projects in the area of human health, notably within the framework of AFRA and ARCAL.

33. The establishment of national regulatory infrastructures for nuclear safety and radiation protection was a prerequisite for the development of nuclear technology. All States, particularly those looking to develop nuclear programmes, should accede to the relevant international legal instruments, including the Nuclear Safety Convention and the Joint Convention. Those States that had not already done so should also take the necessary steps to ratify those instruments.

34. As nuclear programmes expanded and more states joined the global nuclear community, France would continue to support the Agency's efforts to enhance safety through international cooperation. It had increased its voluntary contribution to the extrabudgetary programme on the seismic safety of existing nuclear power plants and would provide several cost-free experts to the Department of Nuclear Safety and Security.

35. France welcomed the Agency's efforts to organize IRRS missions, and urged Member States to avail themselves of that service with a view to the continued improvement of national safety authorities.

36. With regard to transport safety, he said that France was continuing to engage in dialogue and consultations with its partners and concerned coastal States in order to promote mutual understanding and confidence regarding the safe maritime transport of radioactive materials. He drew attention to the importance of the universal application of a civil liability regime in the nuclear field, and called on all States to accede to either the Paris Convention or the Vienna Convention, and adapt their domestic legislation where necessary.

37. Approximately 80% of electricity in France came from nuclear power plants. The 58 reactors currently in operation strengthened his country's energy independence and security, while reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Noting that, for more than 30 years, France had pursued the same responsible energy policy and had equipped itself with the tools required to deal with radioactive waste, opting for closed cycle reprocessing, he said that plans were being made for the construction of a second European Pressurized Reactor at Penly. Research activities were continuing and a prototype fast neutron reactor was expected to be developed by 2020, which would further enhance the energy potential of nuclear materials and could provide an innovative solution for the efficient reprocessing of minor actinides. A new research reactor was to be built at Cadarache, which would begin producing radioisotopes in 2015 and was expected to meet 25% of European requirements.

38. Turning to the supply of medical radioisotopes, he said that the repeated shortages of Molybdenum-99 in recent years had highlighted weaknesses in the radioisotope production chain. The shutdown of the Canadian Chalk River reactor in May 2009 had exacerbated the situation and had implications for patients' access to nuclear medicine diagnostic tests. France was participating actively in the international debate on how to resolve the problems associated with ensuring the supply of radioisotopes for medical use. The high-level group on the security of supply of medical radioisotopes set up by the OECD/NEA should cooperate closely with the Agency, especially in regard to the economic model to be used to meet demand.

39. International cooperation was essential for the development of a new generation of reactors that were more competitive, safer, more proliferation resistant and generated less long-lived radioactive waste. France participated actively in the Agency's INPRO project and had made an extrabudgetary contribution in 2009 to promote the participation of emerging nuclear States. France also participated in the GIF and had hosted a symposium marking the tenth anniversary of the Forum at the beginning of September.

40. Preparations of the ITER site at Cadarache would be completed by February 2010, and it was to be hoped that the fifth ITER Council meeting to be held on 18 and 19 November 2009 in Cadarache would give the go-ahead for the construction of the reactor. France was pleased to note that the Agency and the ITER Organization had signed a cooperation agreement facilitating an exchange of information and training.

41. France was actively involved in informal consultations among Member States on the future of the Agency, and would welcome the development of a long-term strategy on issues such as the Agency's key objectives, methods of financing and management. It was essential that the Agency had

the resources it required to undertake its statutory duties, and France welcomed the establishment of a working group to consider the priorities of the Agency and their budgetary implications.

42. Mr NICOLAS (Haiti) paid tribute to the efforts of the outgoing Director General, which had won acclaim for the Agency in the fields of non-proliferation and nuclear security, and trusted that the incoming Director General would maintain the current momentum in the Agency's work.

43. Having welcomed the new members of the Agency, he said that Haiti hoped that other States would join the Agency so that their populations could also enjoy the advantages offered by the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. His Government recommended that the Secretariat send missions to countries that were not yet members to raise awareness. In January 2009, an Agency official had participated in the 14th Ordinary Meeting of the Ministerial Council of the Association of Caribbean States, during which options for cooperation with the Caribbean countries had been discussed, and a framework agreement was now under preparation. Haiti also urged the Agency to contact, for example, the Organization of American States about the possibility of establishing partnerships with countries in the Americas.

44. The Government of Haiti attached great importance to the Agency's technical cooperation programme. The Agency's work in fields such as water, energy, agriculture, health and the environment might be integrated with that of other United Nations bodies in Haiti, for example through UNDAF. He hoped that a technical mission could shortly be sent to Haiti to discuss with UNDP the feasibility of such a project. The Agency's technical cooperation activities in Haiti had increased in recent years, and projects were being implemented in areas including energy planning, water resources management and increasing agricultural productivity. Haiti could find solutions to many of its development problems through ever more effective cooperation with the Agency. It was currently experiencing difficulties in setting up its radiotherapy centre but was confident that the problems would be solved soon. His Government requested once again that an imPACT mission be sent to Haiti to perform a systematic evaluation of Haiti's needs in terms of cancer treatment.

45. For almost six years, Haiti had actively participated in ARCAL and had received vital assistance in diverse and strategic areas. ARCAL was at a turning point and its institutional strengthening was increasingly under discussion. His country invited other regional bodies such as AFRA, ARASIA and the RCA to strengthen their cooperation with ARCAL. Haiti welcomed the efforts of the Board of ARCAL Representatives and looked forward to working with the new ARCAL executive board.

46. The Agency needed to provide for technical assistance with regard to bi-national projects between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, in particular concerning the management of shared aquifers and environmental management using isotopic and nuclear techniques.

47. Since 2007, Haiti had repeatedly stressed the need for the Agency to pay particular attention to LDCs, a group that included Haiti. In the context of efforts to ensure that international organizations included the specific problems of LDCs in their programmes, Haiti had submitted a draft resolution to the General Conference in 2008 on making the LDC issue a permanent agenda item. The intention was not to disadvantage any group or to demand additional funding, but to ensure that Agency technical assistance was tailored to the needs of LDCs in order to help them meet the objectives of the Rio and Brussels Declarations and the MDGs.

48. The Board of Governors must consider the increasing budgetary and financial problems facing the Agency which could affect its future and that of the stronger global nuclear order outlined in the report of the Commission of Eminent Persons in 2008. Haiti would, despite the many difficulties it faced, do all it could to make its modest contribution to the Agency's financial and budgetary efforts.

49. Haiti was fully committed to the efforts to combat all forms of terrorism, including nuclear and radiological terrorism, and his Government supported the efforts of the international community to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Lastly, Haiti encouraged all States party to the NPT to comply with the Treaty, since that was the only way to achieve a reinforced global nuclear order.

Mr Tan (Singapore), Vice-President, took the Chair.

50. Bishop SÁNCHEZ SORONDO (Holy See) said that, in his recent Encyclical Letter entitled “Caritas in veritate”, Pope Benedict XVI had sought to highlight the goals and values to be tirelessly pursued, promoted and defended in order to build a human family that was free and united, and in a position to promote effectively a truly integral human development. He had stated that the risk for our time was that the *de facto* interdependence of people and nations was not matched by ethical interaction of consciences and minds that would give rise to truly human development. That risk appeared to be even more pronounced when set against the backdrop of the challenges posed by the global ‘nuclear renaissance’, such as disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, increased demand for energy, terrorism, and the black market for nuclear material. Those challenges could only be addressed seriously by cultivating a culture of peace founded upon the primacy of law and respect for human life. In order to respond to those challenges and fulfil its mandate, the Agency could and must contribute to favouring the “ethical interaction of consciences and minds”.

51. There was an urgent need for the ethically responsible use of scientific and technical knowledge that, especially in the nuclear field, must always be applied for the common good, with full respect for international law and for the purposes of genuine development, in an environmentally friendly manner sensitive to the most disadvantaged populations. Through the technical cooperation programme, the Agency could and should play an important role in promoting a more responsible and appropriate application of nuclear technology not only in the energy field, but also in medicine, agriculture, hydrology, food security and access to drinking water. Such activities must form part of a broader ethical framework for development, since they had important implications for current as well as future generations. Funding for such activities must be seen as an investment for the future of humanity.

52. The development of peoples depended, above all, on a recognition that the human race was a single family working together in true communion, not simply a group of subjects who happened to live side by side. The approach to multilateralism should therefore be permeated by dialogue and honesty, as well as by responsible cooperation among all parties within the international community. States should pursue the development and wellbeing of all nations and peoples rather than economic or military national power, with the human being as the essential point of reference. Such a multilateral approach must be marked by the development of a new paradigm of collective security, in which each country recognized the clear limits of recourse to nuclear weapons for its own security. Humanity was at a difficult crossroads, characterized by ever-increasing interdependence involving economic, political, social and other factors. The use of force would serve only to increase mutual distrust, and used enormous resources in a near-sighted way. The temptation to confront new situations with old systems must be avoided. Priorities and hierarchies of values should be redefined with a view to achieving moral, cultural and economic development, since development, solidarity and justice were none other than the true name for a lasting peace.

53. The surveillance and monitoring activities of the Agency should be understood not as a means of limiting the legitimate interests of States, but as a guarantee for the security and the common good of all peoples. Even civilian programmes involving dual-use technology required effective international monitoring, while respecting the freedom of States. However, threats to security arose ultimately from attitudes and actions hostile to human nature, so it was important to act on the human level of cultural values and ethics. If, in the short term, technical and legal measures were needed to

protect nuclear sites and materials and prevent acts of nuclear terrorism, then there was also a need in the long term for preventive measures that might affect the deeper cultural and social roots of crime and terrorism. Particular emphasis must be placed on codes of conduct for staff working in the nuclear field who should always take account of the possible consequences of their activities; the Agency's initiatives in that field were invaluable and should be strengthened. In its work, the Agency must always aim to unite and associate, not to divide and oppose.

54. The development of nuclear energy programmes for civil use posed potential new challenges to the non-proliferation regime, which would be weakened unless specific steps were taken towards disarmament. The Holy See remained convinced that non-proliferation and disarmament were interdependent and a major tool for combating nuclear terrorism and creating a culture of peace. The Holy See welcomed the steps being taken to put disarmament at the heart of the international debate on peace and security. Recent initiatives meant there was still hope of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. That augured well for the outcome of the next NPT Review Conference, where the international community would need to put in place specific measures. Negotiations on the FMCT were due to begin shortly, and every effort should be made to facilitate the entry into force of the CTBT.

55. The nuclear renaissance appeared to offer opportunities for prosperity, but might be nothing more than an illusion if it was not accompanied by a cultural and moral renaissance. Mere material wealth did not eliminate the risks and conflicts related to poverty and cultural and moral misery. For that reason, nuclear policies must be considered from the perspective of the integral development of the human person. A common commitment to peace and security could lead not only to an equitable distribution of resources, but above all to the establishment of a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms of all human persons could be fully realized.

56. Mr HOMANN (Germany) congratulated the incoming Director General on his appointment, and thanked the outgoing Director General for the professionalism with which he had handled the most difficult and delicate subjects in the fields of nuclear non-proliferation and verification over the previous twelve years.

57. In July 2009, the Board of Governors had decided to increase the regular budget of the Agency by 5.4 % for 2010. Although that decision did not reflect Germany's position, his delegation had not wished to block consensus. However, the additional burden on the national budget as a result of the global financial crisis required Germany to pursue a consistent policy of zero growth with respect to the budget of international organizations, including the Agency. The Secretariat and Member States should find additional mechanisms to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the Agency, and he drew attention in that regard to the implementation of integrated safeguards within the framework of the additional protocol. The working group recently established by the Board would provide a useful opportunity to discuss the Agency's requirements in detail. That being said, Germany's general intention was to support the Agency where specific needs arose. It had pledged an amount of up to €10 million until 2012 for activities in the field of nuclear security aimed at securing vulnerable radiological sources and at securing and modernizing the Seibersdorf laboratories.

58. Germany was gravely concerned about the nature of the Iranian nuclear programme. The most recent Agency report clearly showed that Iran was continuing to develop its uranium enrichment activities and to withhold cooperation concerning the alleged military dimension of its nuclear programme, in violation of binding United Nations Security Council resolutions and relevant calls from the Board. In so doing, Iran was further reinforcing doubts about the nature of its nuclear programme, instead of building trust. A comprehensive offer of cooperation had been put forward, and the EU3+3 remained willing to engage in immediate talks with Iran. The only way for Iran to restore confidence was by cooperating fully with the international community in order to resolve the

outstanding issues. Germany and its other EU3+3 partners had carefully studied Iran's proposal package, and remained committed to meaningful negotiations with Iran to resolve international concerns about the Iranian nuclear programme.

59. Germany was also gravely concerned about the nuclear weapons programme pursued by the DPRK. The recent nuclear and missile tests had been unequivocally condemned by the international community and had highlighted the undiminished importance of the Agency's monitoring activities. The DPRK should allow the Agency to resume its work. He drew attention to the importance of preventing the proliferation of material to and from the DPRK, and called upon all States to comply with their obligations under United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009). The complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula remained the ultimate goal, and he called on the DPRK to return to the six-party talks without delay.

60. His country shared the Agency's concern about possible undeclared nuclear activities in the Syrian Arab Republic, which would run counter to that country's commitments under its safeguards agreement. He called on Syria to improve cooperation with the Agency, notably by responding to outstanding questions and providing access to related sites. All parties concerned should cooperate fully with the Agency with a view to facilitating further clarification.

61. Those developments had again highlighted the need for an effective and efficient safeguards regime. Comprehensive safeguards agreements together with the additional protocol should therefore be considered the verification standard.

62. The Board of Governors had recently started its discussion of assurances of supply and of the three proposals submitted in connection with multilateral nuclear approaches. Germany welcomed the proposal of the United Kingdom on nuclear fuel assurances and noted that multilateral approaches offered a promising way to provide for reliable access to nuclear fuel. Germany had developed the Multilateral Enrichment Sanctuary Project, which offered a market compatible option for independent access to nuclear fuel cycle services. Germany would respond to the questions raised in due course.

63. The self-assessment conducted in the run-up to the recent IRRS mission to Germany and the subsequent visit of the reviewers had set in motion a complex and important process for improving Germany's regulatory body. His delegation hoped that other Member States operating nuclear power plants would avail themselves of such missions. Over recent years, Germany had sent experts to act as reviewers in other IRRS missions and would continue to support the service actively in that way.

64. Germany welcomed the announcement by President of the United States at the 2009 G8 Summit that his country would host a high-level summit on global nuclear security in March 2010. That event would provide an opportunity to consider the different initiatives and programmes already being implemented with a view to promoting coordination in order to achieve synergies and increased "Global Zero" initiative.

65. Germany greatly appreciated the assistance provided through the Agency's technical cooperation programme, which led to noticeable improvements in essential areas such as health, water management, agriculture and environmental protection. His country would continue to support the Agency's valuable efforts in that regard.

66. Mr MSOLLA (United Republic of Tanzania) commended the outgoing Director General for his leadership of the Agency over the previous 12 years and congratulated the incoming Director General on his election.

67. He expressed appreciation for the message delivered to the General Conference on behalf of the United Nations Secretary-General, which provided valuable guidance and would contribute to the further strengthening of the Agency's activities, particularly in the formulation of appropriate

strategies and programmes for the advancement of peaceful applications of nuclear technology and the non-proliferation regime.

68. He hoped that the Agency's technical cooperation activities would be continued and strengthened, and noted that Tanzania, like other LDCs, urgently required technical assistance for the acquisition, adoption, adaptation and use of appropriate nuclear technologies for economic development and poverty alleviation. Peace and development could not coexist in the long term with abject poverty; democracy and good governance could not grow amidst poverty, disease and deprivation. Prosperity therefore very much depended on alleviating poverty, and his country called on the Agency and the international community to intensify technical cooperation activities. The strategic applications of nuclear technology in targeted areas such as sustainable energy development, health, food crop and livestock improvement, water resources management and sanitation could contribute immensely to poverty alleviation, particularly in LDCs like Tanzania, which was following with keen interest the use of nuclear technology for electricity production and other beneficial purposes.

69. The increasing attention being given to cancer therapy in developing countries was welcome, as was the support provided through PACT. Under that Programme, Tanzania was receiving assistance in establishing a centre of excellence at the Ocean Road Cancer Institute in Dar es Salaam, where the majority of cancer patients in Tanzania received radiotherapy treatment. However, more centres, more machines and a corresponding number of qualified staff would be required to meet future demand. Tanzania was pleased that its call for expanded services for cancer treatment had been heard, and would work to ensure that PACT activities contributed significantly to helping save lives.

70. In terms of regional initiatives to promote prosperity, he highlighted AFRA, which Tanzania had chaired during the transition period following the decision made by the High Level Policy Review Seminar held in Aswan, Egypt in November 2007. The Aswan Declaration sought to support the improvement of AFRA's managerial procedures, increase effectiveness and efficiency and promote full ownership of AFRA programmes by Member States. The decision made at that Seminar to increase the number of AFRA management committees from one to three would become effective following endorsement at a meeting of representatives due to be held during the present session of the General Conference. In addition, the 19th Meeting of AFRA Representatives, held in October 2008, had endorsed the decision to establish the AFRA Fund as a vehicle for collecting voluntary contributions from donors and AFRA Member States to support the implementation of AFRA projects, all of which would require the support of the Agency and the international community.

71. Tanzania met its obligations to the Agency through the timely payment of its share of the regular budget. It had established an adequate legal framework governing the safe and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and had already ratified a number of treaties, conventions and agreements in accordance with Agency guidelines. Lastly, he pledged Tanzania's full share of the TCF target.

72. Mr CHOREV (Israel) said that his country looked forward to working with the incoming Director General.

73. In the context of the worldwide nuclear renaissance, the intensive development of nuclear energy was highly desirable; however, proliferation risks associated with inherently dual-use nuclear fuel cycle technologies must be minimized. Each State had an absolute duty to honour its international non-proliferation obligations and commitments and not to abuse its right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

74. Israel attached great importance to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and despite the geopolitical realities in the Middle East, its long-standing policy was to support and wherever possible join arms control and other international treaties. His Government appreciated acknowledgement of Israel's narrow security margins.

75. One recent development in non-proliferation was the renewed interest in multilateral nuclear arms control and disarmament led by the President of the United States of America. Israel had continued to contribute to the global non-proliferation regime through its policy of responsible behaviour and restraint in the nuclear domain, repeatedly stating that it would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East. Therefore it was regrettable that the outgoing Director General had repeatedly misrepresented his country's policy in that regard.

76. The continuous growth of Israel's energy needs coupled with its total dependence on foreign energy sources posed a complex national challenge, which could be addressed through its advanced nuclear expertise.

77. Turning to Israel's vision and policy regarding the transformation of the Middle East to a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, he said that Israel had always believed that the nuclear issue and other security issues could only be realistically addressed in a regional context. The recent entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty provided an excellent example of such an approach. The process of establishing the Middle East as a zone free of WMDs should begin with confidence-building measures, followed by mutual recognition, reconciliation and peaceful relations, culminating in conventional and non-conventional arms control measures. That vision could not be realized without a fundamental change in regional circumstances, including a transformation in the attitudes of States towards Israel.

78. Nuclear proliferation developments of grave concern had taken place in recent years, with the most widely recognized cases of non-compliance with non-proliferation obligations occurring in the Middle East by States party to the NPT. The Agency's investigations in Iran and Syria had been hampered by a lack of cooperation and denial of access. He hoped that the activities in those countries would soon be clarified. It was crucial to enhance the Agency's inspection and verification activities. Agency investigations needed to be conducted free of extraneous influences, and countries that failed to meet their obligations must be subject to immediate, international measures.

79. Adequate measures to ensure nuclear safety and security were vital to ensuring international acceptance of the civil nuclear industry. The Israel Atomic Energy Commission pursued uncompromising standards of safety in its two nuclear research centres.

80. In view of the threat of nuclear terrorism, cooperation was needed to ensure that the materials terrorists would need to build a radiological or improvised nuclear device were secure. Israel commended the Agency for addressing the prevention of illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials. It had also joined the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Megaports Initiative led by the United States, and welcomed the decision of the President of the United States to host a global nuclear security summit in 2010.

81. It was regrettable that some countries were imposing politically motivated agenda items on the General Conference in an apparent effort either to single out Israel or to divert attention from the issues of non-compliance by certain Middle East States. The item on Israeli nuclear capabilities had been removed by agreement from the agenda in 1993 and never acted upon since. Among the sponsors of that draft resolution were countries that did not recognize the State of Israel and even called for its annihilation. He would question the moral standing of those sponsors that did not recognize Israel's right to exist while criticizing Israeli policies aimed at securing that very existence.

82. Israel had joined the consensus on the agenda item concerning the application of safeguards in the Middle East for 14 consecutive years, despite its grave reservations about the modalities and about the relevance of the General Conference as a forum to address the issue. Consensus had been lost on the resolution in 2006, because of the uncompromising attitude of the sponsors of the resolution who were aiming at extraneous political goals, which also raised doubts as to whether it was their genuine

aim to establish the Middle East as a NWFZ. During recent months Israel had approached Egypt directly and through other governments, hoping to reach an agreed language on Middle East issues at the General Conference. Israel had also responded positively to the efforts by several delegations and the President of the Conference to work together towards a positive outcome. It was not too late to reach a consensus on the item and Israel would cooperate fully.

83. Iran's initiative to promote agenda item 24 on the prohibition of armed attack or threat of attack against nuclear installations was a clear case of hypocrisy. Iran hoped that the international community would condone its violations of its obligations and long-standing deception campaign. No diplomatic smoke screen and manoeuvring at the Agency General Conference could obscure the real facts and findings, which were that Iran had not cooperated with the Agency and that, should the information obtained be real, there was a high probability that nuclear weaponization activities had taken place. The Government of Israel and many others believed that the information the Agency had was accurate and real, and he called on all delegations to reject the transparent and cynical move of Iran.

84. Mr AL SAUD (Saudi Arabia) expressed his country's appreciation of the tireless efforts of the outgoing Director General to promote the interests of the Agency since his appointment in 1997. He was confident that the incoming Director General would pursue the same successful course.

85. Nuclear energy now played a vital role in electricity generation and industrial infrastructure for almost half of the population of the planet, even though 2008 had been the first year for five decades in which there had been no start-up of a nuclear reactor. However, there had been many positive developments, such as the building of a number of nuclear power plants, mostly in Asia, requests for licences to build new nuclear power plants, and an increasing number of technical cooperation projects involving analysis of energy options and preparations for the use of nuclear energy. In that context, he commended the Agency on its convening of the International Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Energy in the 21st Century in China in April 2009.

86. Saudi Arabia supported efforts to prevent the current economic and financial crisis from having an adverse impact on the expansion of applications of nuclear technology and welcomed the continued cooperation to that end between the Agency and the FAO.

87. The Agency had successfully laid the basis for a global nuclear safety regime aimed at ensuring optimum nuclear safety and security in Member States through extensive sharing of knowledge, expertise and lessons learned, strengthening of infrastructure, training of human resources, early warning of accidents and emergencies, waste safety, safe decommissioning of nuclear facilities, rehabilitation of contaminated sites, wide application of nuclear safety standards, use of review and guidance services, implementation of relevant international instruments, and establishment of a civil liability regime for nuclear damage. In spite of the progress achieved in recent decades, the Agency must continue to improve and promote nuclear safety standards and to assist States in complying with them. However, the promotion of safety and security, responsibility for which lay with the countries concerned, should not be undertaken at the expense of the development of peaceful applications of nuclear energy. His country supported action to develop international mechanisms enabling the Agency to verify the safety of nuclear power plants alongside its existing verification activities. Saudi Arabia commended the Agency's technical cooperation activities and its bilateral and multilateral partnerships in that context. It encouraged the Agency to continue studying issues that had a bearing on the effectiveness of such activities, particularly the availability of predictable and assured resources under the TCF. In fact, Saudi Arabia believed that it would be preferable to finance the technical cooperation programme under the Agency's regular budget.

88. The Agency played a key role in ensuring non-proliferation through its verification of States' compliance with their safeguards obligations. However, other components of the NPT were equally

important, such as nuclear disarmament and the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Impartial mechanisms similar to those concerning verification and safeguards should be developed for that purpose. The Agency's credibility in applying the safeguards regime under the NPT depended to a large extent on its success in meeting current challenges, particularly the development of Agency safeguards and verification laboratories that guaranteed full neutrality.

89. Saudi Arabia noted that despite efforts to promote the universality of the NPT, sensitive regions, including the Middle East, were still not fully covered. Israel remained outside the NPT and the verification regime, and Agency documents failed to mention Israel's refusal to accede to the Treaty or to apply comprehensive safeguards to its nuclear installations. The persistence of that anomaly was likely to encourage other States to breach their obligations. It opened the door to all kinds of transgressions and delaying tactics that undermined the Agency's credibility and neutrality. The Director General should take a strong stand against Israel's intransigence. Saudi Arabia therefore welcomed the incoming Director General's statement that he was committed to adopting a balanced approach to the application of the non-proliferation regime. The Member States of the Agency should also take more determined action on the issue, avoiding the disputes and delaying tactics that had been a feature of previous General Conferences.

90. It was essential to provide the Agency with sufficient funds to maintain its capacity to fulfil its mandate effectively. However, the Agency's budgets should be restructured. It was inappropriate to continue placing heavy financial burdens on Member States through increases in the regular budget. Moreover, the shielding system might be reintroduced to cushion the impact of increases in the safeguards budget on developing Member States at a time of global financial crisis. Other possibilities included the reappraisal of financial priorities and measures to achieve greater efficiency and cost savings in basic programmes. Nuclear security activities should be financed from voluntary contributions and extrabudgetary sources since they did not form part of the Agency's basic mandate. It would therefore be inappropriate to incorporate part of the nuclear security programme in the regular budget without considering at the same time a proposal to address the long-term funding of the technical cooperation programme. The basic aim should be to achieve balance in the allocation of the Agency's resources to development and verification activities.

91. Mr SADDO (Ethiopia) congratulated the outgoing Director General for having successfully led the Agency during his three terms of office and warmly welcomed the Director General designate.

92. His Government was implementing far-reaching reforms in its public organizations with a view to creating effective and transparent institutions better able to implement the policies, strategies and action plans of a developing State. Critical areas to be addressed included gaps in infrastructure, political and economic transformation, and science and technology capacity building. A Ministry of Science and Technology had also been established.

93. Ethiopia was involved in an increasing number of national and regional technical cooperation projects in the areas of agriculture, human health, water resources development, non-destructive testing, energy planning, nuclear instrumentation and radiation protection. The project with the highest priority was the project on creating a tsetse-free zone in the Southern Rift Valley, which aimed to eradicate tsetse flies from 25 000 km² of land using the SIT. The project was gradually moving closer to achieving its objectives, and a decisive stage had been reached where the cooperation and assistance of all partners was more crucial than ever. Regrettably, the project had been delayed as a result of poor organization; strong measures would be taken in order to rectify the situation, including the restructuring of the project, and the development of a new national organizational arrangement. His Government was grateful to the Agency and all those that were supporting Ethiopia's efforts to make the project a success.

94. As a result of its technical cooperation activities with the Agency, Ethiopia had built up a modest national infrastructure for the application of nuclear medicine, radiotherapy and isotope hydrology. However, it still had only one radiotherapy centre with a single cobalt machine to serve more than 75 million people. Preliminary data indicated that only around 400 cancer patients received radiotherapy treatment per year, despite an estimated 115 000 new cancer cases annually. To narrow the gap between the increasing demand for radiotherapy services, and their limited supply, an action plan had been developed with the assistance of the Agency to expand radiotherapy and nuclear medicine services to five university hospitals around the country. His Government was mobilizing resources from local, bilateral and multilateral sources, and he urged the Agency and Member States to increase their technical and financial support for his country's endeavours to save thousands of lives each year by strengthening and expanding radiotherapy services.

95. Ethiopia had also developed a basic capacity to generate useful isotopic data. Steps taken included the establishment of an isotope hydrology laboratory at the Addis Ababa University, the development of a national groundwater database, and the training of personnel. A memorandum of understanding between four counterpart institutions had been signed, and high-level steering and technical committees established to monitor its proper implementation.

96. Ethiopia remained committed to the peaceful application of nuclear technologies, and respect of global, regional and national peace, safety and security. He called for Member States to work towards a world free from nuclear weapons, through the implementation of all relevant international guiding principles and treaties, including the CTBT. The recent entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty was a clear reflection of the commitment of the African States towards more transparency and cooperation, and Ethiopia called upon all African Member States to ratify that instrument.

97. He was proud that the Prime Minister of Ethiopia would be leading the African Group to the forthcoming United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen. Nuclear power, which was a reliable and clean source of energy, might go some way to providing solution to the problem of global warming.

98. In conclusion, he thanked the Secretariat for its dedication and hard work to make cooperation with his country more relevant.

99. Mr AL-BUSAIDI (Oman) said that Oman looked forward to working constructively with its fellow Member States to achieve the objectives of the Agency's Statute, particularly the promotion of development through electricity generation, water desalination, harnessing of thermal energy, industrial, agricultural and medical applications, water resources management and protection of the environment. The Gulf Cooperation Council project concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy was a regional initiative that served the same goals, and Oman itself had developed a corresponding national project to promote sustainable economic development.

100. Immediately after becoming a member of the Agency in 2009, Oman had been visited by a fact-finding team of Secretariat staff members who had studied the country's economic and social situation and development plans, the use of radioactive isotopes and radioactive sources, and the existing technical, legal and radiation safety infrastructure. The team had assessed Oman's nuclear application requirements in the light of the resulting data. Oman had subsequently submitted technical cooperation project requests relating to human health, energy planning and radiation safety to the Agency, basing the projects on its proposed long-term strategy and medium-term plan for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

101. Oman supported and encouraged the Agency's partnerships with other United Nations specialized agencies, since its nuclear techniques could be applied in areas that fell within their competence. It had been particularly pleased to hear in May 2009 of the launching of the Agency-

WHO Joint Programme on Cancer Control, which provided for coordinated detection, diagnosis and treatment of the different types and stages of the disease. Oman hoped to benefit from the programme in view of the increasing prevalence of cancer throughout the world. He also noted with satisfaction that the FAO had cancelled its notice of withdrawal from the Joint FAO/IAEA Division of Nuclear Techniques in Food and Agriculture, a 45-year partnership that had promoted food security and the eradication of poverty, in accordance with the Millennium Development Goals. The Joint Division had made pioneering advances in the use of nuclear technology to increase crop yields, improve pest control and control infectious animal diseases. Oman urged all Member States, especially industrialized countries, to increase their investments in agricultural research and to make low-cost food widely available.

102. Oman attached great importance to the Agency's safety and security programme. More than 200 safety standard documents had been published since the publication in 1958 of a manual on the safe handling of radioisotopes, which had become an authoritative source of guidance for all Member States. Oman undertook to apply the Agency's integrated radiation safety regime and to incorporate the relevant norms in its legislation.

103. His country was also studying the Agency's binding and non-binding legal instruments. He was pleased to announce that Oman had acceded on 8 August 2009 to the Early Notification and Assistance Conventions.

104. All States bore full responsibility for ensuring nuclear safety and security. One positive sign and a source of optimism in that regard was the entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty on 15 July 2009. Combined with other similar treaties covering South America, the South Pacific, South-East Asia and Antarctica, it turned the whole of the southern hemisphere into a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

105. Other regions of the world had been less fortunate. Oman welcomed all recent initiatives aimed at nuclear disarmament in accordance with the provisions of the NPT. It called on the Agency and all countries in the Middle East to redouble their efforts to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region, based on the Agency's comprehensive safeguards regime. A prerequisite for any such step was the accession of all States in the region without exception to the NPT. It followed that Israel would be required to place its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards and to accede to the NPT. Universal accession to the NPT by all countries in the Middle East and the application of comprehensive safeguards to all nuclear installations were also prerequisites for the convening by the Director General of a forum on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. It would then be possible to draw up a clear-cut agenda to achieve the aims and ensure the success of the forum.

106. Oman deeply appreciated the dedicated service and wise leadership of the outgoing Director General during his tenure. It welcomed the incoming Director General and wished him every success in his work.

107. Mr SCOTTI (Italy) thanked the outgoing Director General for his work over the previous 12 years, and congratulated the Director General designate on his appointment.

108. New legislation had been passed in Italy providing for the use of nuclear energy for power production. The Government had recently issued regulations concerning the establishment of new sites for nuclear power plants, and a nuclear safety agency had been set up, combining the structures of the nuclear department of the Higher Institute for Environmental Protection and Research with the resources of the Italian National Agency for New Technologies, Energy and the Environment. The new nuclear safety agency had been granted new authority in the fields of nuclear safety and security, and a national agency for new technologies, energy and sustainable economic development had been set up. The new institutional framework would facilitate cooperation with the Agency at a time when the Italian nuclear industry was forging strategic alliances with major partners abroad.

109. In 2009, Italy had chaired the G8 Summit at L'Aquila, which had seen the adoption of a statement on non-proliferation that called upon all States to take further action in line with the three pillars of the NPT. The statement expressed support for the Agency's work and a commitment to pursuing universal acceptance of the comprehensive safeguards agreement and the additional protocol as the verification standard. In that connection, Italy had recently made a financial contribution to the Agency's plan of action to promote the conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols.

110. The NPT remained the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime and the foundation for promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear disarmament, and Italy supported universal adherence to that instrument. However, the peaceful use of nuclear energy was an inalienable right of all States Parties; such a principle was absolutely unquestionable. At the same time, compliance and effective verification would not hinder the use of nuclear energy, but would facilitate its safe and secure development as an energy source. Agency safeguards were an essential tool for the effective implementation of the NPT and its non-proliferation objectives. Italy was committed to pursuing a safer world for all that was free of nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the NPT.

111. The next NPT Review Conference in 2010 would provide an important opportunity to enhance non-proliferation commitments, and to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and disarmament. Common political will was needed in order to set realistic and achievable goals and strengthen the three pillars of the NPT, which were mutually reinforcing. One common goal was to ensure that sensitive technologies and goods were disseminated exclusively for peaceful purposes. In that regard, Italy encouraged the Agency's work on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including assurances of nuclear fuel supply, as an effective means of addressing increased demand for nuclear fuel services while taking account of the global interest in minimizing the risk of proliferation. Italy welcomed the initiative to establish a nuclear fuel bank administered by the Agency.

112. Safeguards were an essential tool to ensure compliance with non-proliferation objectives, and he commended the Agency's verification activities in particular in the DPRK, Iran and Syria. It was regrettable that the most recent report by the Director General on the application of safeguards in Iran had confirmed Iran's failure to comply with relevant Security Council resolutions. Although some progress had been made in clarifying certain aspects of Iran's nuclear programme, the Agency remained unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. Iran's inalienable right to pursue the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes came with a responsibility to restore confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear activities. Italy therefore urged Iran to comply fully with the resolutions of the Security Council, to implement its additional protocol and to cooperate fully with the Agency.

113. The situation in DPRK was cause for serious concern. The country's recent nuclear test had been a flagrant violation of Security Council resolutions and posed a threat to peace and stability in the region and beyond. The DPRK should comply fully with the relevant Security Council resolutions and its safeguards obligations, and should return to the six-party talks without preconditions and as a matter of urgency. Italy firmly supported the Agency's fundamental role in verifying the DPRK's compliance with its international obligations.

114. Every country intending to embark on a nuclear programme should give absolute priority to nuclear safety and security, and he highlighted the importance of the Agency's safety standards in that regard. Italy welcomed the adoption by the European Commission of a new nuclear safety directive and the agreement between the European Union and the Agency on a new instrument for nuclear safety cooperation. It also welcomed initiative of the President of the United States to convene a global nuclear security summit in March 2010.

115. Italy appreciated new initiatives concerning education and training in the nuclear field and capacity building. The Italian Presidency of the G8 was organizing an international workshop on nuclear safety and security to be held in Bologna in October 2009. Italy's universities and health institutions ran cooperation programmes, particularly in the field of nuclear medicine, which provided for a large number of scientific visits and fellowships in Italy.

116. Italy contributed 85% of the budget of the International Centre for Theoretical Physics in Trieste, which worked in close cooperation with the Agency and UNESCO to promote international cooperation among scientists from all countries of the world. The Centre was contributing significantly to the achievement of the MDGs and had trained more than 100 000 scientists from many countries, especially developing countries, over the previous 40 years.

117. Mr MAGAUOV (Kazakhstan) said that his delegation supported the Director General's balanced and professional approach to finding solutions to issues concerning the peaceful use of nuclear energy and non-proliferation. The risk of nuclear weapons proliferation was one of the greatest challenges to international security and stability, particularly in view of the threat that terrorists might acquire WMD.

118. Kazakhstan continued to take an active role in the international cooperation in the field of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and response to international terrorism, religious extremism and other contemporary threats. Kazakhstan had ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and called on those States that had not yet done so to accede to that instrument as soon as possible. His country fully supported Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), and was taking steps towards further strengthening its control mechanisms to counter illegal trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials, including prevention of the illicit transfer of nuclear technologies. Kazakhstan's national export control policy fully complied with all universally accepted norms. As a member of the NSG, Kazakhstan took all the measures necessary to fulfil its obligations in order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

119. The international community must have the assurance that nuclear technologies and expertise were used exclusively for peaceful purposes. For more than 50 years, the Agency had been bringing together the efforts of its Member States to promote the exclusively peaceful use of atomic energy for the benefit of mankind, ensuring nuclear safety and security, and precluding any chance of diverting achievements in the nuclear area for military use. The Agency's undoubted successes called for the appreciation and universal recognition of all Member States.

120. Kazakhstan supported the Agency's efforts to assist States in achieving the highest possible nuclear security and physical protection standards, and in building capacities to prevent the diversion and theft of nuclear material. He reiterated the importance of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative in the context of securing vulnerable nuclear and radioactive materials at civil facilities around the world.

121. His country called on all States to ensure the universality of Agency safeguards agreements and the additional protocol. It also encouraged those States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify the CTBT so that it could enter into force.

122. Shortly after its independence, Kazakhstan had taken a number of concrete steps highlighting its determination to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and international security, including its accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State. Closure of the Semipalatinsk test site had also signalled Kazakhstan's support for non-proliferation, disarmament and the objectives of the CTBT. Furthermore, his country, which aspired to a vision of a nuclear-free world, had been instrumental in establishing the NWFZ in Central Asia, and trusted that other nuclear-weapon-free zones would be established in other regions of the world. Kazakhstan had called on the United Nations to declare 29

August — the day when the Semipalatinsk test site had been definitively shut down — as the world day of renunciation of weapons of mass destruction.

123. The Agency was a leading global forum for scientific and technological cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear technology. Its activities facilitating the transfer and development of nuclear technologies and expertise in relation to all peaceful applications, including nuclear power and the nuclear fuel cycle, deserved support, and its work in developing human resources and capacity-building in the area of nuclear science and technology was of great relevance to Kazakhstan.

124. His country attached considerable importance to the joint declaration adopted by the participants in an international forum on uranium tailings in Central Asia that had taken place in June 2009 in Geneva and had been attended by representatives of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, the UNDP, the Agency, the OSCE, the EU, the EBRD and the Eurasian Economic Community. While the countries of Central Asia were making efforts to implement international programmes, the region required additional technical, financial and human resources to be capable of managing and maintaining the safety of areas contaminated with uranium tailings.

125. In May 2009 Kazakhstan had, with Agency support, hosted an international conference on remediation of land contaminated by radioactive material residues. The conference had focused on strengthening international cooperation, promoting international standards, increasing international awareness and exchanging views. Its outcome had been important in strengthening partnerships and improving coordination of efforts.

126. Kazakhstan was a major producer of uranium ore, possessed nuclear fuel production capacity and intended to increase its role in the peaceful use of atomic energy under the NPT and the Agency. It supported the proposal by the Director General for an international nuclear fuel bank under Agency auspices. He stressed that LEU deposited in such a bank should be under the full control of the Agency and in its legal possession. He also emphasized that the introduction of international control instruments to guarantee security of supply should not prejudice the rights of Member States to develop their own production capacity. Kazakhstan agreed that any mechanism should not be politicized or used with discrimination and should be accessible to all States that were in compliance with their safeguards agreements. Kazakhstan, as a signatory to the NPT and a State that had voluntarily given up nuclear armament, would be prepared to consider hosting any prospective Agency fuel bank on its territory.

127. His country was committed to continuing to develop its technical cooperation activities with the Agency, and would continue to pay its contributions to the TCF and the regular budget.

128. Kazakhstan supported the policy of strengthening export control mechanisms suggested by the NSG in relation to facilities and equipment used to enrich uranium and reprocess spent fuel. In view of its intention to develop its nuclear power sector further, his country recognized the need to enhance implementation efforts under INPRO and noted that a vertically-integrated company with a full nuclear fuel cycle was being established in Kazakhstan.

129. He expressed his country's appreciation of the outgoing Director General's endeavours to strengthen the Agency and enhance its international authority, and for his tireless efforts to promote the peaceful and safe use of atomic energy. Kazakhstan fully supported the Director General designate, and wished him every success.

130. Mr GHARIBABADI (Islamic Republic of Iran), exercising his right of reply, said that since the representative of Israel, a State not party to the NPT, had made false allegations about Iran, he joined other speakers in expressing serious concerns about Israel's nuclear programme. It was shameful that a State with a record of atrocities and aggression that possessed a nuclear weapons programme and had

violated various United Nations Security Council resolutions was recommending compliance with Security Council resolutions and NPT obligations. Stability could not be achieved in the Middle East as long as Israel's nuclear weapons posed a threat to its neighbours. Israel had refused to sign the NPT or implement an Agency safeguards agreement and relevant resolutions despite international demands. The international community, including the General Conference, must deal urgently with the Israeli threat.

The meeting rose at 1.45 p.m.