

## **General Conference**

GC(52)/RES/13 Date: October 2008

**General Distribution** 

Original: English

## Fifty-second regular session

Item 18 of the agenda (GC(52)/21)

## Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System and Application of the Model Additional Protocol

Resolution adopted on 4 October 2008 during the tenth plenary meeting

## The General Conference,<sup>1</sup>

- (a) Recalling resolution GC(51)/RES/15,
- (b) Convinced that the Agency's safeguards promote greater confidence among States, inter alia by providing assurance that States are complying with their obligations under relevant safeguards agreements, and thus contribute to strengthening their collective security,
- Considering the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Treaty for the (c) Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and the Agency's essential role in applying safeguards in accordance with the relevant articles of these treaties,
- Noting that decisions adopted by the Board of Governors aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of Agency safeguards should be supported and implemented and that the Agency's capability to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities should be increased.
- Welcoming the Board's decision, in September 2005, that the Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) should remain part of the Agency's safeguards system, subject to the modifications in the standardized text and the change in the criteria for an SQP referred to in paragraph 2 of document GC(50)/2,
- Welcoming the fact that, as of 4 October 2008, 29 States have accepted SQPs in accordance with the modified text endorsed by the Board of Governors,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The resolution was adopted with 71 votes in favour, 0 against and 19 abstentions (roll call vote).

- (g) <u>Stressing</u> the importance of the Model Additional Protocol approved on 15 May 1997 by the Board of Governors aimed at strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system,
- (h) <u>Welcoming</u> the fact that, as of 4 October 2008, 118 States and other Parties to safeguards agreements have signed additional protocols, and that additional protocols are in force for 89 of those States and other parties,
- (i) <u>Welcoming</u> the fact that all nuclear-weapon States have signed protocols additional to their voluntary offer safeguards agreements incorporating those measures provided for in the Model Additional Protocol that each nuclear-weapon State has identified as capable of contributing to the non-proliferation and efficiency aims of the Protocol, when implemented with regard to that State, and as consistent with that State's obligations under article I of the NPT, and <u>noting with satisfaction</u> that protocols additional to the voluntary offer safeguards agreements are in force for four of these States,
- (j) <u>Noting</u> the Director General's statement to the 52nd regular session of the IAEA General Conference, that without safeguards agreements, the Agency cannot provide any assurance about a State's nuclear activities, and without the additional protocol, the Agency cannot provide credible assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities,
- (k) <u>Noting</u> that additional protocols constitute one of the important instruments in enhancing the Agency's ability to derive safeguards conclusions regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities,
- (1) <u>Noting</u> the high priority the Agency attaches, in the context of furthering the development of the strengthened safeguards system, to integrating traditional nuclear material verification activities with strengthening measures,
- (m) Taking note of the Agency's Safeguards Statement for 2007,
- (n) <u>Stressing</u> the continuing need for the Agency's safeguards system to be equipped to respond to new challenges within its mandate,
- (o) <u>Noting</u> the considerable increase in the Agency's safeguards responsibilities since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in particular since the approval of the Model Additional Protocol by the Board of Governors in May 1997,
- (p) <u>Recalling</u> that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons inter alia
  - (1) reaffirmed that the IAEA is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with the Agency's Statute and the Agency's safeguards system, compliance with its safeguards agreements, and
  - (2) recommended that the Director General of the IAEA and the IAEA's Member States consider ways and means, which could include a possible plan of action, to promote and facilitate the conclusion and entry into force of safeguards agreements and additional protocols, including, for example, specific measures to assist States with less experience in nuclear activities to implement legal requirements,
- (q) <u>Stressing</u> the importance of assisting States upon their request to establish and maintain effective systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material,

- (r) <u>Noting</u> that the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the States Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons held two successful meetings in April/May 2007 and in April/May 2008, <u>further noting</u> that the third meeting of the Preparatory Committee, to be held in May 2009, should make every effort to agree on substantive recommendations to the Review Conference, and <u>encouraging</u> all States Party to continue to work towards a substantive outcome for the 2010 Review Conference,
- (s) <u>Stressing</u> that the strengthening of the safeguards system should not entail any decrease in the resources available for technical assistance and co-operation and that it should be compatible with the Agency's function of encouraging and assisting the development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful uses and with adequate technology transfer,
- (t) <u>Stressing</u> the importance of maintaining and observing the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards in accordance with the IAEA Statute and safeguards agreements,
- (u) <u>Stressing</u> the importance of the State, other concerned parties and the Agency, party to a safeguards agreement, cooperating in a transparent manner in the context of facilitating the implementation of that safeguards agreement,
- (v) <u>Welcoming</u> the holding of IAEA safeguards outreach seminars at Agency Headquarters in February 2008 and in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, in July 2008, as well as briefings on Agency safeguards for the delegations that attended the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT in Geneva in April/May 2008, and <u>sharing</u> the hope for the continuation of efforts to broaden adherence to the Agency's safeguards system, and
- (w) <u>Noting</u> that the Secretariat ensures that all measures for strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system remain consistent with the Agency's statutory responsibilities and functions,

Consistent with the respective safeguards undertakings of Member States:

- 1. <u>Calls</u> on all Member States to give their full and continuing support to the Agency in order to ensure that the Agency is able to meet its safeguards responsibilities;
- 2. <u>Stresses</u> the need for effective safeguards in order to prevent the use of nuclear material for prohibited purposes in contravention of safeguards agreements, and <u>underlines</u> the vital importance of effective safeguards for facilitating co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy;
- 3. <u>Bearing in mind</u> the importance of achieving the universal application of the Agency's safeguards system, <u>urges</u> all States which have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible;<sup>2</sup>
- 4. Stresses the importance of States to comply fully with their safeguards obligations;
- 5. <u>Affirms</u> that measures to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system with a view to detecting undeclared nuclear material and activities must be implemented rapidly by all concerned States and other Parties, in compliance with their respective international commitments;

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Operative paragraph 3 was voted on separately and was approved with 86 votes in favour, 2 against and 2 abstentions.

- 6. <u>Stresses</u> the importance of the Agency's safeguards system, including comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols, which are among the essential elements of the system, and with respect to the safeguards strengthening measures contained in document GOV/2807 and taken note of by the Board of Governors in 1995, <u>requests</u> the Secretariat to pursue the implementation of these measures as broadly as possible and without delay as far as available resources permit, and <u>recalls</u> the need for all concerned States and other Parties to safeguards agreements with the Agency to supply the Agency with all the information required;
- 7. <u>Takes note</u> of the revised standardized text for SQPs, and <u>encourages</u> States with SQPs to conclude with the Agency, as soon as possible, exchanges of letters consistent with the Board decision of 20 September 2005 with regard to SQPs, and <u>requests</u> the Secretariat to continue to assist States with SQPs, including non-members of the Agency, through available resources, in the establishment and maintenance of their State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material;
- 8. <u>Requests</u> the Secretariat to examine, subject to the availability of resources, innovative technological solutions to strengthen the effectiveness and to improve the efficiency of safeguards;
- 9. <u>Stresses</u> the importance of pursuing efforts to improve both the effectiveness and the efficiency of the safeguards system;
- 10. <u>Requests</u> the Director General to continue to review and update the established procedure for the protection of safeguards confidential information and report periodically to the Board about the implementation of the regime for the protection of safeguards confidential information;
- 11. <u>Reiterates</u> its support for the Board's decision to request the Director General to use the Model Additional Protocol as the standard for additional protocols which are to be concluded by States and other Parties to comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency and which should contain all of the measures in the Model Additional Protocol;
- 12. <u>Reiterates</u> its support for the Board's decision to request the Director General to negotiate additional protocols with other States that are prepared to accept measures provided for in the Model Additional Protocol in pursuance of safeguards effectiveness and efficiency objectives;
- 13. <u>Requests</u> all concerned States and other Parties to safeguards agreements, including nuclearweapon States, that have not yet done so to promptly sign additional protocols and to bring them into force as soon as possible, in conformity with their national legislation;
- 14. <u>Notes</u> in this regard that, for States with both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force, or being otherwise applied, Agency safeguards can provide increased assurances regarding both the non-diversion of nuclear material placed under safeguards and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for a State as a whole;
- 15. <u>Notes</u> that, in the case of a State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement supplemented by an additional protocol in force, these measures represent the enhanced verification standard for that State;
- 16. <u>Notes</u> that, as of 4 October 2008, 84 States have comprehensive safeguards agreements supplemented by additional protocols in force, which represents a majority of those non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT that have concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements, and that, of these, 47 States have significant nuclear activities and 31 States have operative SQPs;
- 17. <u>Notes with regret</u> that 30 non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT have yet to bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement;

- 18. <u>Further invites</u> the nuclear-weapon States to keep the scope of their additional protocols under review;
- 19. <u>Notes</u> the important contribution that State-level integrated safeguards approaches can make to the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards implementation, and <u>welcomes</u> the fact that, as of 4 October 2008, the IAEA is implementing State-level integrated safeguards approaches for 29 States and has developed a further five such approaches;
- 20. <u>Urges</u> the Secretariat to continue to study, in the context of implementation of integrated safeguards, the extent to which the credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, including those related to enrichment and reprocessing, for a State as a whole could lead to a corresponding reduction in the current level of verification efforts with respect to declared nuclear material in that State and a corresponding reduction in the costs associated with such efforts;
- 21. <u>Urges</u> the Secretariat to continue to ensure that the transition to integrated safeguards is given high priority and that elements of the conceptual framework are continually reviewed in the light of experience and technological developments with a view to maintaining effectiveness and maximizing cost savings for the Agency and for States under integrated safeguards, including the reduction of verification effort;
- 22. <u>Acknowledges</u> that Agency safeguards can achieve further effectiveness and efficiency when a State-level perspective is used in the planning, implementation and evaluation of safeguards activities taking into account the range of available safeguards measures, in conformity with the relevant safeguards agreement(s) in force for that State;
- 23. <u>Welcomes</u> continued cooperation between the Secretariat and State and regional systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material, and <u>encourages</u> them to increase their cooperation, taking into account their respective responsibilities and competencies;
- 24. <u>Notes</u> the commendable efforts of some Member States, notably Japan, and the IAEA Secretariat in implementing elements of the plan of action outlined in resolution GC(44)/RES/19 and the Agency's updated plan of action (September 2008), and <u>encourages</u> them to continue these efforts, as appropriate and subject to the availability of resources, and review the progress in this regard, and <u>recommends</u> that the other Member States consider implementing elements of that plan of action, as appropriate, with the aim of facilitating the entry into force of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols; and the amendment of operative SQPs;
- 25. <u>Welcomes</u> efforts to strengthen safeguards, and in this context <u>takes note</u> of the Secretariat's activities in verifying and analysing information provided by Member States on nuclear supply and procurement in accordance with the Statute and relevant State safeguards agreements, taking into account the need for efficiency, and <u>invites</u> all States to cooperate with the Agency in this regard;
- 26. <u>Requests</u> the Director General and the Secretariat to continue to provide objective technically and factually based reports to the Board of Governors and the General Conference on the implementation of safeguards with appropriate reference to relevant provisions of safeguards agreements;
- 27. <u>Requests Member States</u> to co-operate among themselves as appropriate to provide assistance to facilitate exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information for the implementation of additional protocols;
- 28. <u>Requests</u> that any new or expanded actions in this resolution be subject to the availability of resources, without detriment to the Agency's other statutory activities; and

29. <u>Requests</u> the Director General to report on the implementation of this resolution to the General Conference at its fifty-third regular session.