

# General Conference

**GC(51)/OR.5**

Issued: February 2008

**General Distribution**

Original: English

---

## Fifty-first (2007) Regular Session

# Plenary

## Record of the Fifth Meeting

*Held at the Austria Center, Vienna, on Wednesday, 19 September 2007, at 10.05 a.m.*

**President:** Ms. LACANLALE (Philippines)

**Later:** Mr. MOHAMAD (Malaysia)

## Contents

Item of the agenda <sup>1</sup>	Paragraphs
8	General debate and Annual Report for 2006 ( <i>continued</i> )
	1–118
	Statements by the delegates of:
	Latvia
	1–10
	Egypt
	11–23
	Armenia
	24–28
	India
	29–36
	Vietnam
	37–45
	Cuba
	46–54
	The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
	55–60
	Cameroon
	61–64
	Burkina Faso
	65–75
	Syrian Arab Republic
	76–87
	Bulgaria
	88–97
	Yemen
	98–105
	Sweden
	106–118

---

<sup>1</sup> GC(51)/22.



**Abbreviations used in this record:**

AFRA	African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
ARASIA	Regional Cooperative Agreement for Arab States in Asia for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
ARCAL	Cooperation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean
BSS	International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources
CPF	Country Programme Framework
CRP	coordinated research project
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Euratom	European Atomic Energy Community
G8	Group of Eight
GNP	gross national product
HEU	high-enriched uranium
ICRP	International Commission on Radiological Protection
INPRO	International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles
Joint Convention	Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management
LEU	low-enriched uranium
LWR	light-water reactor
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NPCs	national participation costs
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT Review Conference	Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NWFZ	nuclear-weapon-free zone

**Abbreviations used in this record** (continued):

OSART	Operational Safety Review Team
PACT	Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy
PATTEC	Pan African Tsetse and Trypanosomosis Eradication Campaign
PCMF	Programme Cycle Management Framework
Pelindaba Treaty	African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty
PHWR	pressurized heavy water reactor
R&D	research and development
RCA	Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (for Asia and the Pacific)
SIT	sterile insect technique
SQP	small quantities protocol
TCF	Technical Cooperation Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

## **8. General debate and Annual Report for 2006 (continued)** (GC(51)/5)

1. Mr. EGLAJS (Latvia) said that his country appreciated the Agency's ongoing professional work to advance the safe and peaceful use of nuclear energy, promote the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, foster disarmament and prevent the threat of nuclear terrorism. The best way to maintain peace and stability was through a multilateral approach to international security, including the strengthening and full implementation of key international treaties for non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament.
2. In 1957 only a limited number of countries had been able to enjoy the benefits of nuclear science and technology and the Agency's technical cooperation programme had consisted of a relatively modest collection of projects. For example, in 1960 the Board had approved only 28 projects in 16 Member States. Now the programme covered over 1000 projects in over 50 fields of activity in 115 Member States. Both resources for and delivery of the technical cooperation programme had increased significantly in 2006, with contributions to the TCF reaching a record level. The rate of attainment had reached its highest level ever, exceeding 93% by the end of the year. That demonstrated not only the increased commitment of Member States to pay their full share of the TCF target, but also their interest in the technical cooperation programme and trust in the Agency's professional work.
3. In Latvia, progress had been made in the project to establish a multipurpose cyclotron centre. The Government, having approved the concept document, had decided that the project would be implemented through a public-private partnership. Latvia, which had gained a lot from its participation in technical cooperation activities, felt that the sharing of knowledge and experience provided great opportunities for all countries.
4. The Agency's international safeguards system was an essential part of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, and Latvia strongly supported strengthening its effectiveness and efficiency. At the end of 2006, 31 States party to the NPT had not yet fulfilled their obligation to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements, which meant that the Agency had not been able to perform any verification measures in those countries. Latvia regretted such a situation and called upon those countries to bring their agreements into force. A safeguards agreement and an additional protocol should be the verification standard, heightening common security and making the Agency's work easier.
5. The Agency had provided assistance to a number of Member States, including Latvia, with the repatriation of HEU fuel. Thanks to the Agency's help nuclear fuel from the former research centre in Salaspils had been safely returned to its country of origin, the Russian Federation.
6. In the field of nuclear security, the conclusion of the first CRP on the improvement of technical measures to detect and respond to illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material had been an important milestone. Also, he noted the adoption by the European Council of the third Joint Action in support of Agency activities in the area of nuclear security.
7. As regards nuclear power, at the end of 2006 there had been 435 nuclear power plants in operation worldwide, representing approximately 370 GW(e) of generating capacity and supplying about 16% of the world's electricity. International energy demands were continuing to increase

rapidly, with the latest projections estimating that, at current consumption levels, global energy consumption would increase by 53% by the year 2030, with approximately 70% of that growth coming from developing countries. With more and more countries announcing plans to build nuclear power plants, it was essential to ensure full compliance with all nuclear safety standards, including those relating to transport and waste management, and to enhance emergency preparedness. Latvia therefore welcomed Agency assistance in those areas and urged it to step up its assistance in drafting relevant national standards and strengthening regulatory authorities. The publication of the *Fundamental Safety Principles* (Safety Fundamentals No. SF-1) had marked an important step forward and, in addition, the provision of safety review services and training were very helpful.

8. Latvia underlined that greater attention should be paid to more systematic dissemination of nuclear knowledge, enabling future generations to pursue R&D in nuclear science and its applications. Areas of importance in that regard included food security and human health, especially epidemic control, cancer management and improved child health. He urged the Agency to support the World Nuclear University summer institute, which could serve as a forum for nuclear leaders to share their expertise. Latvia had benefited from an Agency knowledge management audit mission and would use its findings, one of which was that adequate development of human resources was an essential aspect of technological progress, to make improvements.

9. His country welcomed the Agency's new website providing health professionals with information on radiological protection of patients, which was yet another example of its successful and efficient work. Similarly, the new IAEA International Law Series would provide Member States with much needed help.

10. Latvia was concerned about overlap in the various databases being developed within the Agency and urged that the Secretariat try to avoid the situation where Member States were being asked to submit essentially the same information several times.

11. Mr. FAWZY (Egypt) said that the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the Agency provided an opportunity to review its achievements and to take an objective look at how its action might be improved in order to meet the demands of the peoples of the world under circumstances that were very different in political and economic terms from those prevailing in the 1950s. The Agency held a special position in the multilateral system since its mandate combined a security dimension and an economic development dimension. Egypt aspired to develop its cooperation with the Agency in order to enhance its role in promoting security and stability as well as sustainable development in line with the Agency's Statute, the NPT and diverse United Nations resolutions. Such cooperation included the training of Egyptian experts, experts from other Arab countries in the framework of the Arab Atomic Energy Agency and experts from African countries in the framework of AFRA.

12. He welcomed the global trend towards the use of nuclear energy in electricity generation because of the enormous contribution that nuclear technology could play in providing energy for development, especially in developing countries. Nuclear energy would also offset shortages in fossil fuels and reduce greenhouse gases that contributed to global warming. The Agency's energy assessment services ensured that countries' nuclear energy programmes were placed on a sound scientific basis. The Secretariat's advice and publications on best practices in using nuclear technology for electricity generation were very welcome, since existing data indicated that the application of such technology was limited in regions such as Africa and the Middle East. Egypt itself had just embarked on an important stage in its cooperation with the Agency on the preparation of feasibility, safety and legislative studies relating to the nuclear option for electricity generation.

13. Turning to other applications of nuclear science and technology, he welcomed the Agency's assistance to Member States in the areas of food security, human health, especially child health and the

fight against cancer, and regional water resource management. Egypt appreciated the Agency's cooperation with UNEP and UNDP on a special project involving Chad, Egypt, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Sudan for the management of the Nubian aquifer. It was also grateful to the Agency for its cooperation with Egypt and five other Nile Basin countries on a joint water management project.

14. With regard to nuclear safety, the plans of a large number of countries to build nuclear power plants for electricity generation should be accompanied by an equivalent increase in compliance with nuclear safety standards and criteria for the safe transport of nuclear material and the safe disposal of nuclear waste, as well as enhanced incident and emergency preparedness. He therefore welcomed the provision of technical assistance to regulatory authorities in Member States and the development of the Incident and Emergency Centre.

15. As a coastal State and in view of the heavy traffic on the Suez Canal, Egypt attached great importance to the safe transport of radioactive material and called on all States, especially shipping countries, to comply with transport regulations and guidelines, to accede to the relevant international treaties and to strengthen the international liability legislation.

16. The consistently good safety record of nuclear power plants should not lead to any relaxation of efforts in that area and the Agency should give increased attention to human resources development and the training of staff employed in research reactors, since most accidents were due to inadequate training.

17. It was important to assess the risks associated with waste from ageing reactors in the Middle East that were not subject to Agency safeguards and that posed a threat to neighbouring States. The Agency's periodic nuclear safety reports should address that issue and appropriate measures should be taken to deal with the threat.

18. Turning to the technical cooperation programme, a cornerstone of the Agency's activities, he welcomed the increase in the average rate of attainment to 93%, the increase in NPCs to 74%, the increase of some 10% in new financial resources and the increase in in-kind contributions. He noted that health projects continued to account for the bulk of technical cooperation funds, followed by nuclear science, and food and agriculture. He reiterated the need for a special effort to increase such funds so that they kept pace with the growing requirements of technical cooperation projects and with the continual increase in funds allocated to other Agency activities. The discrepancy in the funding of technical cooperation activities and safeguards, despite their equal standing as two of the Agency's three pillars, was highly questionable, especially since developing countries were required to participate in the funding of their technical cooperation projects.

19. Egypt was concerned about the continued imbalance of the nuclear non-proliferation regime due to the fact that comprehensive safeguards could not be applied to States that had not acceded to the NPT and that no new steps had been taken to monitor the five nuclear-weapon States' compliance with their nuclear disarmament obligations under Article VI of the Treaty. It was important to publish a Safeguards Statement that was objective and balanced and that reflected the true global situation by referring to the Agency's inability to reach any conclusions regarding nuclear materials and installations to which no safeguards were applied in the three States that applied partial INFCIRC/66/Rev.2-type safeguards agreements and the five nuclear-weapon States that applied voluntary offer agreements.

20. Referring to the continued calls for the universalization of additional protocols, he emphasized that such protocols were a voluntary tool and no attempt should be made to universalize them until comprehensive safeguards agreements were universalized. The conclusion of an additional protocol was a sovereign decision to be made by States in the light of their interests and commitments.

21. With regard to assurances of nuclear fuel supply, it was important to look seriously at all political, legal and economic aspects of such initiatives before submitting them to the Board of Governors. Any such initiative should take into account all States' rights to develop their nuclear capabilities independently provided that they complied with the non-proliferation regime and undertook to apply comprehensive safeguards. The countries that developed the initiatives should avoid attaching conditions to them that violated the NPT. It was also important to address commercial and economic impediments stemming from the cost of nuclear fuel so that any such initiative resulted in a balanced mechanism and did not become yet another means of discriminating among Member States. There should also be sufficient safeguards to ensure that assistance in obtaining nuclear fuel was not provided to States that were not parties to the NPT.

22. The Agency's diminishing role in supporting the international community in the area of nuclear disarmament, despite the fact that one of the objectives of the Medium-Term Strategy for 2006-2011 was to contribute as appropriate to effective verification of nuclear arms control and reduction agreements, was discouraging. He urged the Secretariat and Member States to take serious steps to meet that objective, which was based on Article III of the Statute.

23. Fifteen years had passed since the adoption by the General Conference of a resolution calling on all States in the Middle East to apply comprehensive safeguards. Israel had taken no steps to comply with that provision and the nuclear powers had failed to react to its non-compliance, although Egypt and all other States in the region were party to the NPT and applied safeguards. That anomaly threatened to undermine the achievements of the non-proliferation regime in the Middle East and conferred a measure of legitimacy on the launching of an arms race in the region, which was absolutely unacceptable. The Conference should therefore address the nuclear threat in the Middle East region by adopting the draft resolutions submitted under the relevant agenda items. Egypt was sponsoring the traditional draft resolution that the Conference had adopted by consensus until the preceding session, when the consensus had been broken for reasons that were not objective since they sought to link the draft resolution to legitimate Arab efforts to adopt a resolution concerning Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat. At the current session Egypt had included consensus language in the text of the draft resolution taken from the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its sixty-first session on the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East. It urged all parties to return to the previous consensus on the item and called on Israel to cooperate in establishing an NWFZ. Peace in the Middle East could not be achieved without a strong international commitment to establish a new security regime based on equilibrium and mutual security safeguards, including first and foremost the elimination of nuclear weapons. Adoption of the draft resolution by consensus would attest to the international community's commitment to its declared principles and positions regarding the achievement of peace, stability and security in the Middle East.

24. Mr. MOVSISSYAN (Armenia) said that the increased interest in the nuclear energy option could be a threat to the existing fragile balance of international security, so more importance should be given to the establishment of safeguards through international agreements and national legislation. For its part, Armenia was strengthening its domestic legislation and making sincere efforts to comply with its international commitments, including the additional protocol. Like other countries, Armenia had its own strategic energy development plan, one of whose key elements was the development of nuclear energy. The country's leadership had taken the political decision to build a new 1000 MW unit, which would be of regional importance.

25. Armenia had been producing nuclear energy since 1976 and had spent more than \$80 million on safety improvements since 1995. Although a plan was already under way to decommission its power station in 2016, the Government intended to spend at least another \$40 million in upgrading its technical and operational safety in accordance with the recommendations of TECDOC-640. The power station's seismic stability had been reappraised with the help of international experts and found



to be up to standard. In selecting the model for the new 1000 MW unit, consideration was being given to safety, seismic stability, and economic and financial factors. A protocol had been signed in 2007 between the Government of Armenia and the Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom) under which the Russian side would carry out surveys on Armenian territory.

26. In 2005, his Government had taken a decision to expand the country's dry spent fuel storage facility, and a further 24 modules would be built by 2050. A Government decree of 2006 regulated the detection, storage and transport of radioactive materials and the procedure for issuing licences for their use.

27. There had been significant improvements in the Armenian system of safety controls in terms of both legislation and improving the qualifications of personnel and renewing equipment. On 15 March 2007, the Armenian National Regulatory Agency had signed an agreement with the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission on the exchange of technical information and cooperation in nuclear safety matters. That agreement provided for collaboration in such areas as expert assistance, staff training, emergency training, and physical protection of nuclear material.

28. Finally, he thanked the Agency Secretariat for the various meetings it had organized with a view to enhancing the safety of Armenia's nuclear power plant, and for the series of national and regional technical cooperation projects from which his country had benefited. He also expressed thanks to donor countries and partners for their continued help, and gave an assurance that Armenia intended to fulfil all the international commitments it had undertaken in the area of nuclear energy.

29. Mr. KAKODKAR (India) said that, on the occasion of the Agency's 50th anniversary, it was gratifying to recognize the unique place that the Agency held within the United Nations System. The Agency's current prestige, credibility and authority were due to the consistent good work of its Secretariat, under the wise leadership of the Director General, especially over the preceding critical decade. The Agency's achievements in the preceding fifty years had contributed towards rekindled hopes for the peaceful atom in coming years.

30. The world was on the threshold of a paradigm shift. There was greater awareness than ever of the serious consequences to humanity arising from the threat of global warming. That situation had been caused by the unmindful and unsustainable use of fossil fuels by a small fraction of the world's population in industrially advanced societies. More of the world's population was now on a rapid economic development path. Enormous energy resources would be required to bridge the deficit between emerging demand and current supply, which was very low in the developing world. Meeting the development aspirations of those large populations would raise serious energy sustainability issues and, inevitably, fuel prices would escalate, affecting everyone. Nuclear energy had to be considered in that context. It offered a powerful energy potential and, because of its non-emission of greenhouse gases, was now appealing to those who had previously opposed it. At the same time, nuclear energy induced a fear of the unknown. That was a natural reaction experienced by humankind whenever a paradigm shift took place, for example when advancing from horse-drawn carriages to locomotives and automobiles. However, humankind always overcame its fear and learned to access the benefits of the new technology. Nuclear energy, however, registered on a different scale. Society had to evolve so that it could benefit from it as an energy source without risking its misuse.

31. With a growing population of over 1 billion, a \$1 trillion economy and GNP growth of over 8%, India required an enormous and reliable energy supply. Its estimated need was around 7000 TW·h electricity annually, with additional primary energy needed to replace the use of fossil fuels. Ensuring such a large energy supply was a major challenge, and India was fully conscious of the associated environmental impact. At the G8 summit in Heiligendamm earlier that year, India's Prime Minister had pointed out that his country's greenhouse gas emissions were among the lowest per capita and, as

they constituted only 4% of the world's emissions, any action taken to reduce them would have a marginal effect. He had said that India recognized its responsibilities as a developing country and intended to engage constructively with the international community to add its weight to global efforts to preserve the environment. He had expressed India's determination that its per capita greenhouse emissions should not exceed those of developed countries, even though it was pursuing policies of development and economic growth. He had also underlined the need to work together to find pragmatic solutions for the benefit of all humankind.

32. Construction was well under way for six more reactors in India: three PHWRs, two LWRs and a 500 MW(e) prototype fast breeder reactor. Fuel loading would begin at two of those reactors later that year. Once the construction of those six reactors was complete, there would be 23 reactors in operation with an installed capacity of 7280 MW(e). Progress was being made in the detailed design and engineering of the indigenous 700 MW(e) PHWR in keeping with the set time schedule. The Government had approved in principle the construction of four 700 MW(e) PHWRs at two sites and four 1000 MW(e) LWRs at a further two sites in the country. It had also approved the establishment of a uranium mine and mill at Tummalapalle.

33. To accelerate the growth of fast reactors in the country, metallic fuel with high breeding capabilities was being developed as a priority with a view to its use around the year 2020. However the four fast reactors which were planned to be commissioned by 2020, after the prototype fast breeder reactor, would continue to use oxide fuel. Refinements would be incorporated into the design and construction of those reactors based on experience with the prototype fast breeder reactor. The objective was a substantial decrease in the energy cost per unit compared with the prototype fast breeder reactor. Improving fuel burnup from 100 to 200 GW·d/t would also help significantly in reducing fuel cycle costs.

34. India was looking forward to international civil nuclear cooperation, which it expected to be sustainable, free from interruptions and consistent with the country's closed fuel cycle policy. To increase significantly India's nuclear power generation capacity in the short term through imports, in addition to the indigenous programme, a site selection committee had evaluated coastal sites in the country where reactors could be set up in convoy mode. Another initiative involved the possibility of exporting reactors and services. India was the only country to have the technology, design and infrastructure required for small PHWRs with a unit capacity of 220 MW(e). That offered great export potential, particularly to countries with small grids hoping to introduce nuclear power with relatively modest investments and infrastructure. Given its large manufacturing base and relatively low manufacturing costs, there was also potential for India to become a centre for the manufacture of equipment and components for the global nuclear industry.

35. India had been interacting closely with the Agency as partners in development. India, one of the founder members and a strong supporter of INPRO, had noted with great satisfaction the progress made in that important Agency activity. It welcomed the step under Phase-II of INPRO to initiate several collaborative projects, which could help in the search for cost-effective solutions for the global deployment of next-generation advanced nuclear energy systems. INPRO had immense potential to improve the global availability of safe and economical nuclear energy to meet future demands, but needed full budgetary support to realize that potential.

36. The global renaissance of nuclear energy seemed both necessary and likely, but it rested on a very fragile foundation. Firm partnerships needed to be built on an objective, reliable and predictable basis, with mutual understanding and trust. There was also a need to recycle fuel in order to maximize energy availability. The entire international community was justifiably concerned about the risks related to safety, the environment and proliferation arising from the irresponsible behaviour of State and non-State actors. Of even greater concern was the vastly increased risk to future generations

caused by the radioactive decay of disposed spent fuel containing plutonium. Risks and challenges did exist, but they were within the professional competence of the nuclear energy community. The answer could lie in a judicious combination of technological and institutional control, with every responsible partner being a part of the solution, rather than being seen as a problem.

37. Mr. LE DINH Tien (Vietnam) said that his country attached great importance to the Agency's technical cooperation programme, a vital resource for the development of national capabilities in nuclear science and technology. Vietnam had always worked closely with the Agency to implement the programme in the most effective manner. In the 2006–2007 cycle, Vietnam had been carrying out 18 technical cooperation projects, including 4 which were new and 2 which had been extended to the 2007–2008 cycle. A national programme for cancer therapy had been formulated and approved for active and effective participation in the PACT. His delegation expressed its appreciation to India for providing Vietnam with a Bhabhatron II teletherapy unit under PACT. Vietnam had actively participated in 68 regional and interregional projects. Cooperation between the Agency and Vietnam had been fruitful and cost-effective in the development of nuclear human resources, the enhancement of national technical infrastructures for nuclear applications, radiation and nuclear safety and the promotion of nuclear applications in a number of areas, such as the creation of new rice mutant varieties, food preservation, radiotherapy and nuclear medicine, the production of radiopharmaceuticals, groundwater management, oil and gas prospecting and exploitation, the formulation of nuclear energy legislation and the introduction of nuclear power in the country.

38. Vietnam had made remarkable progress in the area of nuclear safety and security. Important regulatory documents had been issued on the security of radioactive sources, the recovery and handling of orphan sources, and guidance on the implementation of a decree on administrative sanctions in connection with radiation safety and control. Draft regulations on export and import control of radioactive sources had been completed and were scheduled to be issued by the end of 2007 in keeping with Vietnam's commitment to comply with the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. The implementing capability of the Vietnamese nuclear regulatory body had been substantially enhanced over the past year thanks to more experienced staff, training courses, funding and the provision of advanced technical equipment.

39. On 23 July 2007, his Government had approved a master plan for a strategy on peaceful uses of nuclear energy until 2020. Under the plan, 5 groups of issues with 23 specific projects had been identified for implementation with a view to promoting, enlarging and developing peaceful applications of nuclear energy in various social and economic sectors in a safe, secure and cost-effective manner in support of sustainable development in the country. They included the expansion of radiation and radioisotope applications in health care, agriculture, industry, environmental protection and the development of nuclear power.

40. The final draft of the nuclear energy legislation had been completed and submitted to the standing committee of the National Assembly for consideration and was scheduled to be submitted to the National Assembly for adoption in the first half of 2008.

41. In August of 2007 Vietnam had signed the additional protocol to its safeguards agreement and was actively preparing the necessary conditions for ratification. That testified to its policy of using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only. His Government was studying other nuclear related international conventions and treaties with a view to future accession once the requisite conditions had been met.

42. Vietnam had also cooperated with the Agency, the United States of America and the Russian Federation in the conversion of the Da Lat nuclear research reactor from HEU to LEU fuel.

43. His delegation expressed appreciation to the Director General for his visit to Vietnam in December 2006 aimed at strengthening and enhancing cooperation with the Agency.

44. Vietnam had fulfilled its obligations and commitments to the Agency, including the provision of the requisite resources to the technical cooperation projects and the payment of its NPCs for the 2006-2007 cycle, its assessed contribution to the Regular Budget and its pledged contribution to the TCF for 2007. It had also worked with the Agency to host 8 IAEA/RCA workshops and training courses.

45. Expressing his Government's gratitude for the close cooperation that the Agency had extended to Vietnam over the past few years, he said it would like to continue receiving assistance from the Agency, other concerned international organizations and all Member States, in particular for the introduction of nuclear power in the country. He reaffirmed Vietnam's full support for Agency activities aimed at promoting the application of nuclear science and technology for a world of peace, stability, cooperation and development.

46. Ms. GOICOCHEA ESTENOZ (Cuba) said that the Agency's 50th anniversary was an appropriate occasion to acknowledge the important role that it had played for half a century in promoting peace and development.

47. Cuba attached great importance to cooperation among developing countries and north-south cooperation and was participating actively in ARCAL. The action plan to create a strategic alliance between ARCAL and the Agency had been successful, its first achievement being the elaboration of a strategic regional framework for Latin America and the Caribbean which had provided the basis for the regional project concepts for the 2009–2011 triennium. Cuba was also participating actively in a number of CRPs.

48. Regrettably, in clear contravention of the principles governing multilateralism and international relations, the illegal blockade that the United States of America had imposed on Cuba for over forty years affected the Agency's promotional activities with her country. Over the preceding year, that destructive policy had meant that North American companies had refused to sell to the Agency equipment destined for Cuba and visas had been denied for Cuban specialists to participate in Agency meetings held in the United States. Cuba was grateful for the Secretariat's efforts to seek alternatives to overcome those problems. Article III.C of the Statute stipulated that the Agency would not make assistance to members subject to any political, economic, military, or other conditions incompatible with the provisions of the Statute. Thus, Cuba rejected the political and manipulative use of the Agency's technical cooperation and, in that connection, denounced Security Council resolution 1737 imposing sanctions on Iran.

49. Cuba appreciated the Agency's activities in 2006 related to nuclear and radiological safety and was grateful for its efforts to strengthen infrastructures to deal with radiological emergencies. Cuba would continue to contribute towards that objective by, amongst other things, providing experts. For 17 years, Cuba had been implementing a health programme to look after children from the areas affected by the Chernobyl accident. Under that programme, 23 000 patients had been treated, principally from Ukraine, Russia and Belarus. The Cuban specialists involved had accumulated vast experience in treating such patients, which Cuba would continue sharing with other countries.

50. Cuba welcomed the Agency's efforts to seek viable and sustainable energy alternatives, in particular those directed at creating capabilities and maintaining nuclear knowledge for sustainable energy development. As regards the Secretariat's continuing efforts to promote analysis of nuclear fuel assurance, she underlined that all proposals in that regard should be considered, that the analysis should be transparent and that decisions should be by consensus. Cuba rejected any attempt to use nuclear fuel supply as a means of discriminatory political or economic coercion or as a monopolistic

mechanism in the hands of a few. Cuba objected strongly to the use of that resource as a condition to impose new non-proliferation obligations on non-nuclear-weapon States. Rather, it was up to the nuclear powers to eliminate, in a complete, unconditional and verifiable manner, their nuclear arsenals. That was a necessity that could not be delayed and the only way to ensure non-proliferation. The Cuban Government's position on disarmament was reflected in the final document of the 14th NAM Summit Conference held in Havana in September 2006.

51. Cuba supported the declaration of the NAM Heads of State and Government on the Iranian nuclear issue, which emphasized the inalienable right of all States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. As a State that favoured peace and negotiation in resolving all international affairs, Cuba was convinced that the only way to find a solution to that issue was through unconditional dialogue based on equality and mutual respect. In that connection, Cuba supported the agreement reached between Iran and the Secretariat to resolve the outstanding issues. The Agency was the sole competent authority to verify compliance with safeguards obligations and Cuba opposed any undue attempt to apply pressure or interfere in the Agency's work, especially in its verification process, that could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility. The matter should never have been referred to the Security Council and should be returned to its proper arena. Cuba strongly supported the steps taken by Secretariat and the Director General to promote peaceful resolution of the Iran issue.

52. On another matter, Cuba welcomed the agreements reached for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The Agency's essential role in their implementation was recognized by all.

53. Cuba supported the prompt establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East. For that to be achieved, Israel had to join the NPT without delay, submit its nuclear facilities to Agency safeguards and implement its nuclear activities in accordance with the non-proliferation regime. Furthermore, the United States of America should stop its transfer to Israel of nuclear equipment, information, material, facilities, resources and devices, and its assistance to that country in the fields of nuclear science and technology. That was imperative following the declarations of the Israeli Prime Minister of 12 December 2006.

54. The world was unstable, mainly as a consequence of certain States' policies. Those policies led to, inter alia, environmental degradation, global warming, increased economic and social underdevelopment and a growing gap between rich and poor on the macroeconomic level. Sadly, with the vertical proliferation of nuclear arsenals and the application of new and irresponsible belligerent policies, that scenario was worsening and must not continue. The survival of humankind was at stake. The Agency's 50th anniversary provided an opportunity for reflection and to make a real commitment to development, non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and, most importantly, world peace.

55. Mr. RUSHITI (The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) said that his country had concluded a safeguards agreement and additional protocol with the Agency and had acceded to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Those crucial instruments were milestones in international efforts to strengthen the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities and the non-proliferation regime. He encouraged all Member States that had not done so to ratify those instruments without delay. Efforts to secure negotiated peaceful solutions to pressing problems should also be pursued further.

56. His country continued to give priority to technical cooperation with the Agency and greatly appreciated the Secretariat's assistance with the implementation of its national projects, particularly the support of the Division for Europe in the Department of Technical Cooperation. Thanks to those joint efforts, 95% of the current project cycle had been completed.

57. Continuing efforts had been made to strengthen the capacities of the Macedonian Radiation Safety Directorate. The Office of Legal Affairs had provided valuable assistance in amending national legislation and the Department of Nuclear Safety and Security had helped build the technical capacities of that regulatory authority.

58. The proposals submitted for the 2009–2011 project cycle were based on an evaluation conducted jointly with the Agency. The projects were in full compliance with his country's CPF and focused on health, the environment, capacity building and knowledge management. The Agency's new simplified planning process using the PCMF had proved useful in that regard.

59. The medical applications of nuclear technologies were crucial to improving human health. His Government had therefore decided to proceed with the establishment of a positron emission tomography (PET) centre and had allocated the necessary resources. It nevertheless relied on the Agency for expertise and training.

60. Notwithstanding budgetary restraints, his Government pledged its full share of the TCF target and intended to meet its NPC obligations, thus proving its commitment to the Agency's work. The General Conference was an excellent opportunity to reaffirm the country's commitment to the Agency's activities aimed at strengthening regional cooperation. Macedonian institutions were ready to participate in the preparation of regional projects for the new project cycle. A growing number of foreigners were participating in training programmes run by Macedonian institutions, which, based on the results achieved by their projects, had been declared centres of excellence. His country would continue to engage actively in efforts to promote coordinated and effective regional cooperation.

61. Ms. TCHUINTE (Cameroon) underlined her country's support for general and complete disarmament, including the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. To that end, it had signed the relevant international instruments and looked forward to the entry into force of the African NWFZ under the Pelindaba Treaty. Cameroon also supported the revision to the SQPs. Cameroon endorsed the international community's efforts to combat nuclear terrorism and illicit use of radioactive sources, weapons of mass destruction or radiological dispersion devices. However, it should always be borne in mind that the removal of insecurity could not be effective in a world where there were widening gaps between rich and poor countries and between cultures and civilizations. At the same time, non-proliferation should not be used by nuclear powers as an excuse for not fulfilling their obligations under the NPT, or for depriving States which had renounced the nuclear military option of their legitimate right under the NPT to enjoy free access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear technology. The efforts of the international community in the area of nuclear disarmament should not overshadow any aspect of proliferation, whether horizontal or vertical, or lead to the one being regarded as more dangerous than the other. Cameroon's hope was for non-discriminatory application of the three basic principles of the NPT, namely disarmament, verification and free access to peaceful nuclear applications.

62. Cameroon expressed its appreciation for the Agency's increasing assistance in the development of nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes, and reiterated its commitment to participate fully in the technical cooperation programme. The assistance given to Cameroon through national and regional projects in a wide variety of areas, including human health, water resource management, radioactive waste management and radiation protection, had enabled her country to develop its technical capacities in the nuclear field. Cameroon appealed to the Agency to provide increased support to AFRA, which over the years had become the main engine for the development for nuclear science and technology in Africa.

63. Cameroon was following with interest the Agency's activities in relation to energy planning, HIV/AIDS, drug resistance in malaria and tuberculosis, environmental protection and nuclear

knowledge management and intended to collaborate to the extent possible. The fact that its national radiation protection agency was now operational had brought a new dimension to Cameroon's scientific and technical cooperation with the Agency, and her country was confident that the Agency would continue to play an active part in helping it to achieve its objective of establishing a competent and effective national radiation protection infrastructure.

64. The Agency was having to face new challenges brought about by the increasing use of nuclear energy and by the need to ensure nuclear safety and security. Cameroon was certain that the Agency would overcome all the difficulties it confronted, and would be victorious in its pursuit of its peaceful mission for the good of humankind.

65. Ms. DAMIBA (Burkina Faso) said that the 51st General Conference was taking place in a context of growing insecurity around the world as a result of the threat of terrorism. Today more than ever, the Agency must take that new challenge into account in its strategies, and it must be able to rely on the support of all its Member States in that regard.

66. The international community must continue to work to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime and its cornerstone, the NPT. All States must comply strictly with the provisions of that Treaty and of the CTBT. The 2005 NPT Review Conference held in New York, which had not resulted in a consensus document, and the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference held in Vienna in April/May 2007 had reaffirmed the importance of the NPT for disarmament and non-proliferation.

67. Africa was a model in that regard, since almost all African States had acceded to the Pelindaba Treaty. It was to be hoped that Africa could count on the international community to help it preserve that achievement and use its resources to promote sustainable development.

68. Burkina Faso supported international initiatives in favour of universalizing safeguards. It reaffirmed its full commitment to the Agency safeguards regime and called on those States that had not yet done so to accede to it.

69. Her delegation welcomed the progress made in the fight against cancer in the context of PACT. Capacity building and training would be useful to Member States in strengthening their activities in the area of cancer prevention and treatment. Efforts should be pursued to establish partnerships and mobilize the necessary resources in that regard.

70. Burkina Faso encouraged the Agency to continue to help developing countries meet their growing energy needs, giving priority to projects that promoted capacity building. Nuclear energy for electricity generation should some day become accessible to all countries and, in that connection, the idea of setting up a fuel bank to multilateralize supply should be given closer consideration.

71. Since joining the Agency, Burkina Faso had benefited from a number of regional projects in the areas of health, food and the environment. Together with Tanzania, it had been chosen to apply the SIT technique for mosquito control. It was already taking part in a SIT pilot project with Mali and the Agency to combat trypanosomosis, a major constraint to the socio-economic development of affected countries. The project had recently been expanded through its inclusion in PATTEC and was being conducted in six countries under the auspices of the African Union with funding from the African Development Fund. Burkina Faso played a crucial role in the subregion by providing facilities for raising sterile insects and for training staff.

72. Her Government's priorities for the period 2007–2011 included: improving the health of the population with the help of nuclear medicine and radiotherapy; ensuring radiological safety and security; providing access to drinking water; managing air quality; promoting capacity building; and boosting agricultural and livestock production.

73. On 26 April 2005, legislation had been introduced in Burkina Faso on nuclear safety and protection against ionizing radiation. On 11 July 2007, the Council of Ministers had adopted a decree on the establishment of a national radiological protection and nuclear safety authority.

74. Her delegation was pleased that the rate of attainment for technical cooperation in 2006 had reached a record 93%. For its part, Burkina Faso would pay the sum of \$1 600 to the TCF for 2008.

75. In conclusion, she said that her Government welcomed the progress made in gender mainstreaming in the Secretariat, where the percentage of women had risen to 28%, but further efforts were still needed.

**Mr. Mohamad (Malaysia), Vice-President, took the Chair.**

76. Mr. OTHMAN (Syrian Arab Republic), having commended the Agency on its achievements over the past fifty years in the field of the development and prosperity of humanity and in the service of world peace and security, said his country had benefited from national and regional projects in the forty years that it had been a member of the Agency and had acquired significant capabilities in a number of fields.

77. It was unfortunate that the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference, which had taken place earlier in the year, had failed to agree on a final document. In the context of the NPT, he underlined not only the Agency's fundamental verification role under its comprehensive safeguards regime, but also the unconditional right of all non-nuclear-weapon States to acquire nuclear technology and the equipment needed for peaceful nuclear uses.

78. He recalled that, in a break with tradition, debate of the draft resolution submitted by the Arab States to the 50th General Conference under the agenda item on Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat had been adjourned. The Arab States were determined to remove the threat posed by Israel, the only country in the Middle East to possess nuclear weapons, and also nuclear facilities not subject to international control. Israel should follow the example of all the other countries in the region and accede to the NPT. The failure to implement successive United Nations and Agency resolutions had increased Arab frustration and increased the likelihood of an arms race. More than ten years previously, the Arab League had formed a committee whose goal was to prepare a draft treaty establishing an NWFZ in the Middle East, and it had hoped that those States bearing special responsibility for world security and stability would contribute. The Arab States called on all States of the world to implement the international community's resolutions and reject double standards. The acceptance — support even — by some States of Israel's refusal to implement such resolutions defied logic and political wisdom. The Syrian delegation appealed to the Conference to treat the tense situation in the Middle East with the utmost concern and to give the agenda item the attention it deserved.

79. Syria, given its strong desire for the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East, was deeply concerned about Israel's intransigent position, which prevented achievement of that objective and also damaged the credibility and universality of the NPT. Creating an NWFZ in the Middle East, as called for in United Nations resolutions, required that Israel accede to the NPT, place all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive Agency safeguards and eliminate its stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Security Council resolution 487 (1981) also called on Israel urgently to place its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards. Eager to rid the region of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, Syria had with the help of others submitted a draft resolution to the Security Council in December 2003 to that end. Some States, however, had stopped that initiative, protecting Israel and supporting it in developing its nuclear arsenal. That resolution was still on the table and its adoption and implementation by all States of the region without exception were sought as soon as possible.



80. In the sphere of technical cooperation he announced that, at the beginning of 2007, the Agency had opened a cooperation centre with the Syrian Atomic Energy Commission for work on naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORMs), the ninth such centre worldwide. That centre not only strengthened cooperation between the two organizations but also demonstrated that the many years of technical assistance received by Syria from the Agency had borne fruit for the region.

81. Also, at the beginning of 2007, Damascus had hosted the second meeting of the ARASIA council of representatives, attended by senior Agency officials. His delegation expressed gratitude for the Agency's support under that agreement.

82. He commended the Department of Technical Cooperation for its good management of national and regional projects and expressed support for the Secretariat's use of the automated PCMF system. Experience gained of that system in the current cycle had shown the need for its further development. Before moving into the second phase, which involved project implementation and reporting, the Agency should obtain feedback from the main operators of the system in beneficiary States with a view to facilitating data input and retrieval.

83. The TCF had shown the highest rate of attainment ever the previous year. That would be difficult to maintain, considering the increasing number of Member States, especially from the least developed countries. Syria continued to support the view that making contributions to the TCF mandatory rather than voluntary would make technical cooperation funds more assured and predictable, and also felt that consideration should be given to their inclusion under the Regular Budget.

84. The Syrian Atomic Energy Commission had contributed to Agency activities during the preceding year by hosting 5 regional training courses on such topics as geology, quality assurance and nuclear equipment, by providing training to 19 scientific staff from a number of States in the region, and by hosting 4 scientific visits. In addition, the Commission had provided experts for training and other services.

85. The masters course on radiation protection and the safety of radioactive sources organized by the University of Damascus had been a full success in its first year. So far, 221 students had been trained in the field of radiation protection in Damascus. He expressed gratitude to the Agency, especially the Director of the Division for Asia and the Pacific in the Department of Technical Cooperation, for efforts made in that regard.

86. In the field of health, Damascus had, based on a request from the Syrian Atomic Energy Commission, received a delegation from the Agency and WHO to prepare a programme of work for cancer control. The delegation had met high-level officials at the relevant ministries. The report on planning cancer control had been submitted and contained important recommendations. WHO's contribution to the drafting process had strengthened the principle of partnership in development.

87. In conclusion, he wished the Agency continued success in all three pillars of its work and stressed that they should be accorded equal footing.

88. Mr. TZOTCHEV (Bulgaria) said the Agency was a focal point for peaceful nuclear cooperation and nuclear safety and had a global role to play in the prevention of nuclear proliferation and terrorism. It was therefore essential to strengthen further the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system and he commended the Director General's efforts to that end. He reiterated Bulgaria's strong commitment to a universal nuclear non-proliferation regime. The additional protocol should become the verification standard for non-proliferation obligations under the NPT, and he called upon all States party to the NPT to sign and ratify their own additional protocol.

Bulgaria would play its part in the preparations for the NPT Review Conference due to be held in 2010.

89. He welcomed the DPRK's decision to shut down and seal the Yongbyon nuclear facility and to invite Agency personnel to conduct all necessary monitoring and verification. He emphasized the importance of continued dialogue and expressed his support for the political will of the six parties (China, DPRK, Japan, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation and United States of America) to achieve denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

90. Greater international cooperation was needed to counter nuclear terrorism and illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material. Bulgaria supported all national and international initiatives in the area of nuclear security. The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, along with the amendment of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, would further strengthen international efforts to improve the physical protection of nuclear facilities and material. Bulgaria had already ratified the amendments to the latter Convention and had declared its political commitment to the Agency's Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, adopted in 2003.

91. Bulgaria likewise supported the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, launched in 2006 by the Russian Federation and the United States of America. He called for full implementation of the measures under that Initiative, which aimed to prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons, control nuclear proliferation and make nuclear energy use safer throughout the world. Within the framework of that Initiative, Bulgaria was working with the Agency, the Russian Federation and the United States of America to return spent nuclear fuel from the Bulgarian research reactor to the country of origin.

92. Bulgaria had accumulated considerable experience in the operation of nuclear plants and in nuclear safety and security. Nuclear power had accounted for over 40% of the country's energy mix over the previous decade, and was in line with the European energy policy of supplying electricity at an acceptable price and slowing down climate change. The country's national energy policy, dating from 2002, provided for the maintenance of nuclear power at its current level by extending the operating lifetime of existing facilities and building new ones.

93. Units 5 and 6 of the Kozloduy nuclear power plant were being modernized in line with the Agency's recommendations, and work should be completed by the end of 2007. An Agency expert mission was due to visit the site in 2008. The new Belene nuclear power plant had been notified to the European Union in accordance with Article 41 of Euratom. The site had been approved by the Bulgarian Nuclear Regulatory Agency and permission for the design had been obtained. In April 2007, the WWER-100/B-466 reactor installation to be constructed at the Belene site had received a European Utility Requirements certificate proving that it met the technical requirements set by European companies operating nuclear power plants.

94. Bulgaria's strategy for the management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste formulated national objectives and priorities related to the safe management of radioactive waste, including an action plan for the construction of a national repository for the disposal of low level and intermediate level radioactive waste. Permission to select a site for the repository had been granted in 2006.

95. Bulgaria welcomed the fact that, as the Agency's Annual Report for 2006 showed, no nuclear worker or member of the public had received a significant radiation dose and no events leading to an environmentally harmful release of radiation had occurred in the operation of nuclear power plants in the year under review. The Agency's work to harmonize safety standards and strengthen regulatory infrastructures had made a substantial contribution to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Bulgaria encouraged the Agency to pursue its approach of building, strengthening and maintaining national and regional capacities for the safe, secure and sustainable use of nuclear technology.

96. The technical cooperation programme was functioning well and should be expanded to meet the needs of an even larger number of Member States. In the European region, where expectations of nuclear power programmes were rising, national and regional cooperation were a key factor. The technical cooperation assistance received by Bulgaria in 2006 from the Agency had contributed to the completion of important national projects in nuclear safety, nuclear energy and radioactive waste management. The application of nuclear technology in medicine would form an important element of future cooperation.

97. His delegation supported the proposed budget for 2008, which maintained an appropriate balance between the Agency's priority activities and would ensure that programmes could be implemented. Bulgaria had met all its financial obligations in respect of the Agency's 2007 Regular Budget. Also, it had paid its pledged contribution to the TCF for 2007 and its voluntary contribution for 2008 would be \$15 200. The Secretariat should ensure that technical cooperation funds were spent primarily in those developing countries which had themselves contributed to the TCF. He called upon all Member States to pay their Regular Budget contributions and their pledged voluntary contributions to the TCF in full and on time.

98. Mr. BAHARAN (Yemen) welcomed Bahrain, Burundi, the Republic of Congo, Nepal and Cape Verde as new members of the Agency.

99. Yemen was a staunch supporter of all the Agency's activities, particularly in the areas of radiation protection and nuclear security and safety, and urged all Member States to take advantage of peaceful applications of nuclear energy, especially for electricity generation and seawater desalination, while complying with the non-proliferation regime and the Agency's safeguards system.

100. Referring to the situation in the Middle East, he called for vigorous action to address the causes of political instability and war and to promote international understanding through negotiations. A prerequisite for any progress in that direction was the elimination of the nuclear threat through an earnest endeavour to ensure general nuclear disarmament and the placement of all nuclear installations in every country without exception under Agency safeguards. In that context, Yemen appealed to the international community to discharge its responsibility to ensure that all Israeli nuclear facilities were made subject to international law by demanding that Israel accede to the NPT and sign a safeguards agreement and additional protocol with the Agency.

101. Yemen was cooperating with the international private sector in developing electricity generation through nuclear energy in coordination with the Arab States pursuant to the resolutions of the last Arab summit and of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The move was part of the country's creative diversification of its energy sources so that they included a mix of natural gas and nuclear and renewable energy. The new system involved independent power producers and was being developed on a build-own-operate (BOO) basis. Talks between the Yemeni Ministry of Electricity and Energy and the international private sector would shortly culminate in the signing of an agreement in principle on participation. Feasibility studies and site selection were also proceeding apace. The relevant Government Commission had recently selected three sites and climatic, geophysical and other studies were under way. Yemen hoped that nuclear energy would prove to be a safe and economically competitive means of generating electricity and of desalinating sufficient quantities of water to meet the country's acute water shortage.

102. Yemen's nuclear security and safety infrastructure was also undergoing rapid development on four levels: legislation; management and regulation; training of human resources; and development of technology, laboratories and equipment. For instance, Yemen had drafted a nuclear energy bill in

cooperation with the Agency and submitted it to the Council of Ministers. It was the first comprehensive nuclear energy legislation in the Arabic language. Moreover, the most important new project that Yemen had submitted under the Agency technical cooperation programme concerned the modernization of its nuclear security and safety infrastructure.

103. He emphasized the importance of the Agency's work in combating cancer, a disease that claimed millions of lives, especially in the least developed countries, through its support for the establishment of radiotherapy centres. Yemen warmly thanked the Agency for the services it was receiving under the PACT programme. The Agency had played a pivotal role in the establishment of the National Oncology Centre in the capital Sanaa and was assisting in the establishment of another centre in the city of Aden.

104. He welcomed the substantial progress made under ARASIA in developing technical projects with Agency support to address the joint concerns of ARASIA member States.

105. Lastly, he expressed deep gratitude to the Agency and its staff for their valuable assistance to Yemen through technical cooperation projects in vital areas such as health, agriculture and water resource management.

106. Ms. MELIN (Sweden) said that nuclear proliferation presented serious challenges. The detonation of a nuclear device in the DPRK in October 2006 had been condemned by the Security Council. Confidence in the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear programme still had to be restored and the Security Council's obligations remained unfulfilled.

107. Only effective multilateralism could deal with the threat of nuclear proliferation and counter the risks of nuclear terrorism and illegal diversion and trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials. The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, alongside Agency activities in the areas of nuclear security, verification and national implementation of international instruments, were very important.

108. Sweden had stressed the importance of the additional protocol which, as had been emphasized by the Director General with reference to the case of Iran, would enable the Agency to provide assurances not only regarding declared nuclear material but also regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

109. Functioning multilateral mechanisms for the supply of nuclear fuel would contribute to achieving non-proliferation goals. At the previous year's General Conference a wide range of options for nuclear fuel supply assurance had been presented and in June 2007 the Secretariat had issued a further report on such options. Sweden considered that the time had come to move from making proposals to selecting the most suitable options. The process was a complex one which would require time, so it was imperative that an incremental approach be begun immediately.

110. Sweden believed that the ideas presented in an article by former United States Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, together with former Secretary of Defence William Perry and former Senator Sam Nunn, whereby the leaders of the nuclear States should turn the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a joint enterprise, along with the proposals in a 2006 report by the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, chaired by Dr. Hans Blix, could constitute a platform for renewed progress.

111. Sweden's remaining ten nuclear power reactors were undergoing extensive modernization in order to be fit for operation for at least a further forty years. Power plant owners had also applied to uprate the power levels of eight reactors, which would add almost 1300 MW(e) to Sweden's current nuclear power production capacity. Recognizing that many older reactors across the world were being

similarly prepared, Sweden stressed the importance of assessing such reactors against modern safety standards and welcomed any Agency initiative to share experience gained from such programmes.

112. Events over the previous year had demonstrated to the Swedish nuclear power industry and regulatory bodies the importance of safety management and a safety culture, particularly under conditions of pressure to complete upgrade and uprate programmes within a limited time period. The event at Forsmark in 2006, when parts of the emergency power systems had failed, had prompted the Swedish nuclear regulators to initiate extensive feedback efforts on such issues in international forums. Sweden had requested the Agency to conduct OSART missions at the Forsmark site, as well as at Ringhals and Oskarshamn, to obtain an international assessment of their safety condition.

113. Installations serving the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle in Sweden currently included a final repository for low and intermediate level waste and an interim storage plant for spent nuclear fuel, which was to be encapsulated into copper canisters before being placed in a final repository. In November 2006 the Swedish nuclear power industry had applied for an encapsulation plant to be integrated with the existing interim storage facility and an application for the licensing of the final repository was expected in late 2009. The two applications would be reviewed in parallel, with the conclusion based on an integrated appraisal of both. Their evaluation would include safeguards considerations, for which a common international approach would be very useful. In that regard, Sweden looked forward to the results from the Agency's working group on safeguards of geological repositories.

114. The recently initiated review of the BSS was of great importance and was expected to result in improvement of current standards for protection of human health and the environment. The work could take full account of the recently adopted recommendations of the ICRP, as well as the new *Fundamental Safety Principles* (Safety Standards Series No. SF-1). Such efforts offered the opportunity to create a coherent system for protection of human health and the environment from the harmful effects of radiation in which terminology, protective ambitions, constraints and reference values, as well as environmental considerations could be harmonized.

115. In recent years, many countries had indicated an interest in embarking on a new, or expanding an existing, nuclear power programme. Sweden stressed that such a programme was a major undertaking requiring a century-long commitment to nuclear and radioactive waste safety and to radiation protection. Sweden viewed adherence to the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention as important confirmations of such a commitment.

116. Sweden emphasized that the Agency had a responsibility to advise Member States on what was required to deal adequately with all the issues connected with safe operation and decommissioning of nuclear reactor facilities and also to provide any necessary assistance. Sweden welcomed recent initiatives to that effect and called on Member States to ensure that reactors were constructed and operated only where the right conditions prevailed.

117. Sweden had been working externally to improve nuclear safety and security by investing six million euros per year in technical cooperation programmes to improve reactor safety, non-proliferation measures and waste management in States of the former Soviet Union. Hitherto such programmes had been implemented mainly in the Russian Federation and Ukraine, but further programmes were planned for Armenia and Georgia later in 2007.

118. Sweden was a strong supporter of the technical cooperation programme and had consistently contributed its full share of the agreed target figure for the TCF. The year 2007 was no exception and Sweden had already pledged its full share to the Fund.

**The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.**