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President: Mr. OTHMAN (Syrian Arab Republic)

Later: Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation)

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Abbreviations used in this record:

ABACC	Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
AFRA	African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
AIDS	acquired immune deficiency syndrome
ALARA	as low as reasonably achievable
ARCAL	Cooperation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Basic Safety Standards	International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources
CPF	Country Programme Framework
CPPNM	Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EU	European Union
Euratom	European Atomic Energy Community
G8	Group of Eight
HEU	high-enriched uranium
HIV	human immunodeficiency virus
HTGR	high-temperature gas-cooled reactor
INLEX	International Expert Group on Nuclear Liability
IPF	indicative planning figure
IRRS	Integrated Regulatory Review Service
ISIS	IAEA Safeguards Information System
LEU	low-enriched uranium
NDT	non-destructive testing

Abbreviations used in this record (continued):

NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT Review Conference	Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
OPAL	Open Pool Australian Light Water Reactor
OSART	Operational Safety Review Team
PACT	Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy
PATTEC	Pan African Tsetse and Trypanosomosis Eradication Campaign
PCMF	Programme Cycle Management Framework
PET	positron emission tomography
Quadripartite Agreement	Agreement between the Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards
RaSSIA	Radiation Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources Infrastructure Appraisal
RCA	Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (for Asia and the Pacific)
SQP	small quantities protocol
SSDL	Secondary Standard Dosimetry Laboratory
TCDC	technical cooperation among developing countries
TCF	Technical Cooperation Fund
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
WHO	World Health Organization

8. General debate and Annual Report for 2006 (continued) (GC(51)/5)

1. Mr. HIMEDE (Mozambique) said that his country had only recently joined the Agency but was fully committed to its objectives as set out in its Statute.
2. Mozambique supported the continuous review and strengthening of measures aimed at preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including those under the safeguards system. Progress could only be made in securing the world against the threat of nuclear weapons if all Governments demonstrated genuine political will. It was therefore of vital importance that all States comply fully with their legal obligations in the area of non-proliferation and disarmament.
3. The universalization of the safeguards system, including the additional protocol, was crucial to the success of the Agency's verification activities and for global security. The implementation of integrated safeguards based on comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols would significantly enhance the efficiency of verification measures. In that connection, Mozambique had decided to conclude a safeguards agreement, a small quantities protocol and an additional protocol based on the model approved by the Board of Governors in 1997. They would enter into force as soon as all constitutional requirements were met.
4. Great advances in the use of nuclear science and technology in such areas as agriculture, animal and human health and the environment had enhanced the role of nuclear science and technology in tackling major development challenges. Technical cooperation played an important role in increasing and disseminating the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in the developing world. By assisting developing countries with the introduction of nuclear applications, the Agency was helping improve the living conditions of millions of people around the world.
5. He called on all States, developing and developed alike, to step up their engagement in technical cooperation activities and commended those countries that made contributions to the TCF. Mozambique would soon pay its share of the TCF for 2006–2007 and was committed to paying its 2008 share.
6. The Agency had a growing role to play as an international organization that assured the necessary balance between the use of nuclear energy for development needs and commitment to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The fight against nuclear terrorism and illicit trafficking called for intensified international cooperation and Mozambique supported the Agency's activities in that regard. Given the mounting challenges and threats to international peace and security, Member States should commit themselves to strengthening the Agency's role.
7. Mr. DAINIUS (Lithuania) said that nuclear non-proliferation and the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with the NPT were crucial to global peace and security. The continued vitality and integrity of the NPT depended on all countries working to resolve problems of regional instability and insecurity. His country greatly valued the Agency's efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Lithuania continued to support the current NPT review process and felt it was vital that the 2010 NPT Review Conference produce substantive results. However, progress could only be made if all three pillars of the NPT were addressed equally.

8. The Agency's safeguards system formed the core of the international non-proliferation regime. He called on those States which had not done so to reaffirm their commitment to the NPT regime and to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols with the Agency, since those two instruments were vital for further strengthening and increasing the credibility of the safeguards system and constituted the current global verification standard. Lithuania had begun to apply integrated safeguards in June 2007 and had completed the internal process of transition from its bilateral safeguards agreement to the trilateral agreement between Lithuania, Euratom and the Agency.

9. In recent years, serious cases of non-compliance with NPT obligations had arisen which had caused great concern within the international community and had put the global nuclear non-proliferation regime at risk.

10. It was regrettable that Iran had disregarded the obligation to suspend all enrichment-related activities, including research and development, despite numerous calls by the United Nations Security Council and the Agency. His country joined the international community in calling on Iran to comply with Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007), and stressed the importance of Iran implementing fully the provisions of its comprehensive safeguards agreement and the additional protocol, pending its ratification, and of its providing all information requested by the Agency.

11. Equally, with respect to the DPRK, while his country welcomed the progress made through the six-party talks, and the fact that the Agency had been able to verify the shutdown of the Yongbyon nuclear facility, much remained to be done to establish a safe security environment on the Korean Peninsula. He expressed grave concern at the DPRK's self-declared possession of nuclear weapons and the related testing and called on the DPRK to comply fully with Security Council resolution 1718 (2006) and to abandon promptly and dismantle completely its nuclear weapons programme in a verifiable and irreversible manner. In addition, it was important for the DPRK to reconfirm its full commitment to the NPT.

12. The non-proliferation regime could not be separated from the broader issue of disarmament. The Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was being held concurrently with the current session of the General Conference and the challenges facing that Treaty needed to be borne in mind. Lithuania welcomed the growing number of countries that had signed and ratified the CTBT and urged States, and particularly Annex 2 States, to sign and ratify it without delay and without conditions. It also welcomed the revitalizing developments with respect to a fissile material cut-off treaty. Negotiations on a new multilateral instrument banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices should be the next step in global efforts to promote both non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Lithuania was strongly committed to the requirements of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) which, together with export control regimes, provided States with possibilities for concerted action, cooperation and assistance in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

13. Weapons of mass destruction in the hands of irresponsible regimes, and the possibility of terrorists gaining access to such weapons, posed a major challenge to the global security environment. His country was determined to act in concert with other countries in combating the growing risk of nuclear terrorism through such mechanisms as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which his country had joined in May 2007, and the Proliferation Security Initiative, which provided a systematic approach for improved tangible international cooperation. Lithuania had hosted the first regional exercise under the latter Initiative in April 2007.

14. During 2006, Lithuania had made steady progress with its preparatory work for ratifying the amendments to the CPPNM. The legislation governing physical protection had been reviewed and

updating priorities had been identified, and provisions had been added to the country's nuclear energy law regarding the obligation to identify the design basis threat during transport of nuclear material. In October 2006, the national regulatory authority had organized a workshop in cooperation with the Agency to improve the country's physical protection system and enhance the skills of experts in Lithuanian institutions who were involved in physical protection.

15. Nuclear energy continued to play a significant role in Lithuania's economy, accounting for approximately 70% of electricity generated. In view of the forthcoming closure of the remaining Unit 2 of the Ignalina nuclear power plant, which was planned for the end of 2009, the issue of energy production and security of supply was being addressed with the utmost concern in Lithuania and the whole Baltic region. He thanked the Agency for the assistance it had provided with the preparation of an energy study analysing energy supply options and security of energy supply in the Baltic States.

16. After the closure of the Ignalina plant, the share of gas in the country's energy mix would increase significantly. Since the region was dependent on a single, external gas supplier, closing the Ignalina plant would have a negative effect on energy security, as well as increasing CO₂ emissions, which was not in line with global efforts to address climate change. Nuclear energy was one of the most realistic and commercially feasible alternatives to traditional fossil fuels and developing it, along with renewables and other climate-friendly energy sources, could be of assistance in dealing with future challenges in the field of energy and climate change.

17. A feasibility study carried out in 2006 on the construction of a new nuclear power plant in Lithuania had reached a positive conclusion and, in January 2007, the Lithuanian parliament had approved a national energy strategy which envisaged that course of action. In March 2007, Poland had joined the Baltic States' initiative to build a new nuclear power plant in Lithuania by signing a communiqué on cooperation in the energy field. In line with its national energy strategy and the European Union's energy policy strategy, the Lithuanian parliament had passed a law in June 2007 establishing the legal basis for practical implementation of the project and the necessary conditions for constructive cooperation among four energy companies representing each participating country. The Agency had provided timely assistance by organizing a subregional meeting on challenges and opportunities related to the construction of a new nuclear power plant in the Baltic region, which had been hosted by Lithuania.

18. Energy generation and reliable energy supply had become an integral part of the European political agenda. The best way to address energy security and ensure mutually beneficial cooperation among relevant actors was international cooperation and engagement based on the principles of mutual confidence and transparency. Lithuania, in cooperation with Poland, had organized a high-level energy summit in Vilnius, to be held in October 2007, which would cover issues relating to the European Union's external energy policy, with particular attention to its Eastern dimension, and the search for new forms of cooperation among the main energy producers, consumers and transit countries. In addition to strengthening regional cooperation, a global vision on the peaceful use of nuclear energy should be sought. The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership should be valuable in helping to meet growing energy demands worldwide using nuclear energy, while ensuring that such energy systems were used only for peaceful purposes.

19. The decommissioning of the Ignalina nuclear power plant was currently one of the principal issues for his country. During 2006, the Agency had continued to provide assistance with the preparations for decommissioning of Unit 1, focusing on upgrading local capabilities and facilitating coordination with the project's major international donor. A new project on management of radioactive waste arising from the decommissioning of a nuclear power plant had been launched in 2007 to help ensure safe and effective waste management and increase the competence of the institutions involved.

20. In December 2006, the status of Unit 1 had been changed to final shutdown. In cooperation with international experts and the Agency, a programme for defuelling was under way and partially burned assemblies were being transported from Unit 1 to Unit 2, following authorization by the regulatory authority. Over 60% of the fuel assemblies had already been transferred. In early 2007, a mission had been undertaken by the Agency's Review of Accident Management Programmes service to the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate to assist its review of the draft severe accident management guidelines and the related technical justification documentation, which were being prepared by the Ignalina plant. The Agency's team had concluded that the documents provided a well developed and structured approach to mitigate core damage accidents. A number of important hardware changes had been implemented voluntarily at the plant to mitigate severe accidents more effectively.

21. The radioactive waste management strategy covered the disposal of waste arising from the operation and decommissioning of nuclear facilities. Short-lived very low-level waste would be disposed of directly in a landfill-type repository, while short-lived low- and intermediate-level waste would be placed in a near-surface repository with reinforced concrete vaults. The tendering process for design of the repository for very low-level waste had been initiated. In the first half of 2007, the Lithuanian Radioactive Waste Management Agency had completed an environmental impact assessment for the near-surface repository for short-lived low- and intermediate-level waste and had finalized international consultations with Belarus and Latvia regarding transboundary impact. The assessment report had served as a basis for the decision of the Ministry of Environment to allow construction of the near-surface repository in the vicinity of the Ignalina plant.

22. With Agency assistance, Lithuania was devoting significant resources to further enhancing and strengthening the regulatory infrastructure for control of radiation sources, exposure to ionizing radiation and radiation emergencies. It understood the importance of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the associated Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources, the provisions of which had been transposed into national legislation and were being implemented. A system for controlling occupational, natural and medical exposure had been established and the results of its operation were apparent: doses among occupationally exposed workers and patients were decreasing and the population was becoming better informed about exposure. Recognizing the importance of participation in the Information System on Occupational Exposure for decreasing doses among workers in the nuclear sector, his country took an active part in the activities of the Regional European and Central Asian ALARA Network, which was a very effective tool for maintaining radiation protection levels already achieved. Increasing attention was being paid to quality systems of analytical laboratories, and his country appreciated the activities of the Analytical Laboratories for the Measurement of Environmental Radioactivity network.

23. Proper funding of technical cooperation activities was of great importance to Lithuania, which had fulfilled its commitment to the TCF and would continue to do so. Lithuania had more than 13 years' experience of beneficial cooperation with the Agency and was willing to continue its active participation in technical cooperation activities, gradually becoming a donor country, through such measures as hosting of regional workshops and seminars and provision of training. The number of foreign specialists trained was expected to rise from 30 in 2006 to 50 in 2007 and Lithuania remained dedicated to hosting future events in cooperation with the Agency.

24. Mr. DIAZ Y PEREZ DUARTE (Mexico) said that the fiftieth anniversary of the Agency was marked by the convergence of a number of major issues which were also being addressed in other forums: climate change, alternative energy sources and security of energy supply, and the global strategy for non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. In the face of increasing energy demands and the challenge of reducing carbon dioxide levels, nuclear power was re-emerging as a viable alternative for ensuring sustainable development in many developing countries, and technological progress held out the promise of making its benefits accessible to all.

However, that brought with it an increased risk of indiscriminate access to and non-peaceful use of nuclear energy. The Agency would have to deal with those issues during the coming decades and, in doing so, it faced major challenges.

25. Thus, events in the international arena over the preceding six years had tested the Agency's capabilities, particularly in the area of international peace and security. The Director General had led the Agency with admirable professionalism during a time of great political turmoil. Strengthening the collective security system required decentralization of functions and recourse to specialized bodies. Therefore both the Agency's inspection and monitoring capabilities, and its promotion of technological development and safeguards needed to be supported. Mexico welcomed the Secretariat's efforts to optimize the human and financial resources available for all programmes. That strategy should be complemented by establishing closer links between the Agency and other United Nations organizations.

26. Another challenge was the increasing number of initiatives which could inadvertently lead to duplication of effort, or to the attention of the international community becoming unfocused. Such efforts should be coordinated by the appropriate institution.

27. A third challenge was to ensure that objectives in each of the areas of climate change, energy supply and non-proliferation were not pursued at the expense of objectives in the other two areas.

28. The Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference had met for the first time in Vienna in early May 2007. There had been a constructive general debate and interactive dialogue on disarmament and non-proliferation. He called on NPT State Parties to meet their commitment to achieving universal nuclear disarmament, and on the international community to work towards ending forever the culture of armament and the use of nuclear energy for military purposes.

29. His Government welcomed the progress made in the context of the six-party talks on the DPRK nuclear issue, including the shutdown of the nuclear reactors in Yongbyon and the renewed cooperation with the Agency. That constituted an important step towards the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Nevertheless some matters were still outstanding, such as the submission by the DPRK of its inventory of nuclear weapons. He expressed the hope that the forthcoming Inter-Korean Summit would yield positive results and encouraged the DPRK to participate in the Agency's work again.

30. Mexico also welcomed the work plan adopted following the extensive negotiations between the Director General and the Islamic Republic of Iran and urged Iran to continue cooperating unconditionally with the Agency and the international community to dispel doubts concerning the nature and scope of its nuclear programme.

31. His Government was analysing the approaches proposed by the Director General and other Member States to assure fuel supplies and strengthen control in order to prevent diversion to illicit activities. That matter should be considered within the framework of the Board of Governors and General Conference, keeping in view the importance of safeguarding the inalienable right of all States to research, develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

32. He endorsed the Agency's activities aimed at improving the safety of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, specifically its work on the safety and security of nuclear material and facilities. Mexico was preparing for a ConvEx-3 large-scale international nuclear emergency exercise in 2008 in cooperation with the Agency, with the aim of contributing to the planning and the analysis of the efficiency of such exercises.

33. His country attached particular importance to the use of nuclear energy and applications to help solve various problems in such fundamental areas as power, human health, agriculture and food, as

well as environmental protection and industry. The technical cooperation programme was one of the main instruments for extending such benefits to developing countries in particular. Mexico promoted TCDC in Latin America and continued to support activities under ARCAL. It welcomed the Agency's support for that programme, especially in connection with the ongoing work on the Regional Strategic Profile for 2007–2013. Mexico supported the Agency's initiative on the establishment of regional training centres for nuclear security and was willing to host such a centre so that it could share its expertise with other countries in the region.

34. Following difficult negotiations, the Board had approved the programme and budget for 2008 in July. It was important to reflect on the Agency's future and how its great responsibilities should be financed. The way in which those responsibilities were discharged and funded should be analysed to ensure the financial load was equitably spread.

35. Mr. FAHMI (Iraq) said that his country was grateful to the Agency for its fine work in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and in assisting Member States, especially developing countries, to keep abreast of developments in nuclear science and technology. It was helping to build a new Iraq, offering valuable guidance that would set the country back on the path towards comprehensive development and enable it to recover its former status. Iraq was turning over a new leaf, pursuing policies based on trust and transparency in its technical and technological cooperation with the international community on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

36. Iraq benefited greatly from its national and regional technical cooperation projects with the Agency, for instance in dismantling the nuclear installations inherited from the country's former nuclear programme and in radiation protection. There were several areas in which Iraq continued to need the Agency's support: clean-up of destroyed nuclear sites; management of radioactive waste, development of an effective waste management strategy and selection of waste burial sites; safe transport of contaminated material and acquisition of the necessary equipment; support for joint research projects in the area of health, water resources and radiation protection; and more opportunities for training and scientific visits for Iraqi personnel.

37. Iraq was a candidate for membership of the Agency's Board of Governors. His Government's basic policies in that regard included: promoting peaceful applications of nuclear energy in all fields; developing cooperation with the Agency and supporting its programmes; opposing the use of nuclear energy for non-peaceful purposes and ensuring compliance with international agreements; and adopting a policy of dialogue to resolve all problems arising between Member States regarding issues relating to their nuclear programmes. He noted that the Iraqi constitution prohibited trafficking in and the manufacture and use of weapons of mass destruction.

38. The application of comprehensive Agency safeguards in the Middle East region would help maintain international peace and security, thereby contributing to non-proliferation efforts. Everyone was aware of the importance of establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, in the Middle East. Iraq consistently worked to achieve that goal in international forums and urged all States to accede to international treaties prohibiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly the NPT. Israel should accede to that Treaty and place all its nuclear facilities under full-scope Agency safeguards as a prerequisite for building confidence and achieving a just and lasting peace in the region.

39. Mr. AL-JASEM (Kuwait) said that sustainable development and international security called for the availability of energy sources that were compatible with global environmental criteria. The member States of the Gulf Cooperation Council had announced at their summit in December 2006 the adoption of a joint programme aimed at promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in order to meet the energy shortage, reduce dependence on imported energy, diversify energy sources and reduce

emissions of greenhouse gases. A number of meetings had been held to date between experts from member countries of the Council and representatives of the Agency to prepare a preliminary study of energy needs and assess institutional and personnel requirements. He commended the Agency's cooperation in that regard.

40. The 435 operational nuclear reactors throughout the world reflected the growing demand for vital nuclear technology and highlighted the Agency's role, which lay not only in the area of nuclear energy but also in running diverse humanitarian programmes. It was important to enable it to continue to fulfil that role by ensuring continuity of funding for technical cooperation programmes and preventing any recurrence of past shortfalls in the TCF. Although Member States' contributions were voluntary, the Government of Kuwait regularly paid its share of the target.

41. Kuwait was prepared to step up its bilateral cooperation with the Agency in developing the nuclear science and technology sector and promoting its contribution to sustainable development.

42. Stressing the importance of adopting and implementing regulations and guidelines concerning the safety and security of radioactive sources and nuclear material, he stressed Kuwait's willingness to cooperate with the Agency in that area through national or regional projects, and with other organizations with shared safety and security interests. While welcoming the fact that a high level of safety had been maintained in 2006 and that no events at any power plant had resulted in a release of radioactivity that would cause harm to the environment, he urged the Agency to carry out continuous verification activities in order to ensure that the necessary caution was observed in Member States operating nuclear facilities and that authorities complied with safety regulations. Verification was particularly important to prevent nuclear terrorism. In that context, his country noted with growing concern the persistence of smuggling and illicit trafficking of nuclear material. The Agency's Nuclear Security Plan had to address those challenges, providing for measures to detect cases of trafficking by underground nuclear networks, prevent theft and protect nuclear facilities.

43. Kuwait had signed the amendments to the CPPNM and had signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. It supported the action taken by some States to prevent nuclear terrorism, provided that such action was in keeping with the NPT regime and the Agency's mandate.

44. The Agency's safeguards system was the cornerstone of the NPT regime, which was supported by the majority of States. He urged all States that had not yet done so to sign a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency and an additional protocol, and to comply with their provisions and with the NPT. Any issues arising with respect to a State's nuclear programme should be addressed through constructive and transparent negotiations and dialogue.

45. It was of the utmost importance to ensure that the safeguards regime was applied to all nuclear activities in the Middle East region. He noted with regret, however, that Israel persisted in its refusal to accede to the NPT and place its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards, thereby preventing the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region and undermining regional and international security and stability. Kuwait supported the draft resolution submitted by the Arab Group on Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat. It called in the strongest terms for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East that included Israel, while at the same time recognizing the right of all States in the region to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

46. His Government welcomed the peaceful settlement of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, which was a major achievement for the Agency. It also welcomed the agreement reached between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Agency on resolving all outstanding issues related to the Iranian nuclear programme. A policy of dialogue and negotiation was the best means of attaining the desired outcome, which would promote security and stability in the region and the world as a whole.

47. Ms. LACANLALE (Philippines) recalled President Eisenhower's impassioned speech at the United Nations in 1953 calling for the peaceful use of nuclear energy worldwide and the reduction of nuclear arsenals. He had also advocated the establishment of an international atomic energy agency, which had led to the Agency's creation in 1957. Fifty years later, the Agency remained strong, having steadfastly promoted nuclear energy for development while ensuring nuclear safety and security, despite the challenges it had faced. She congratulated the Director General and the Secretariat on their achievements.

48. In 2008, the Philippines would be marking 50 years of IAEA membership. Despite its modest nuclear energy programme, her country had gained much from its relationship with the Agency. Technical cooperation had been at the centre of that relationship and the Agency had become an important partner in achieving the United Nations Millennium Development Goals. The technical cooperation programme had helped the Philippines increase agricultural and industrial productivity, gain access to clean drinking water and address environmental challenges. She thanked the Department of Technical Cooperation, in particular the Division for Asia and the Pacific, and the Department of Nuclear Sciences and Applications for their valuable support. Thanks to their excellent collaboration, the Philippines had achieved a project implementation rate of 84% in 2006.

49. Agency technical assistance had enabled the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute to upgrade its multi-purpose irradiation facility and its non-destructive testing training centre, and to establish its national environmental isotope laboratory. Her country's participation in RCA regional projects on environment had enabled it to undertake various environmental studies using nuclear techniques. Data generated by those studies had provided important support for the implementation of national laws and regulations on the environment.

50. The effectiveness of technical cooperation projects was best illustrated by their impact at grass roots level. Throughout the country, the benefits of such projects as those on soil and water management, air pollution studies, study of groundwater contamination and use of isotopes to characterize groundwater supplies had started to be recognized by local government officials who were providing resources to sustain Agency-assisted projects and had become active end-users of nuclear technology.

51. As a founding member of the RCA, the Philippines continued to participate actively in the programme, contributing its expertise in the area of health, agriculture and the environment, while enhancing its capabilities through training and scientific exchange in industry and energy. The Philippines supported the fourth extension of the RCA agreement and looked forward to continuing close cooperation with other Member States in the region, with the support of the RCA Secretariat and the Regional Office in the Republic of Korea.

52. The Philippines supported PACT as a priority activity in view of the alarming rise in the incidence of cancer worldwide, particularly in developing countries. Its collaboration with PACT should enhance cancer training capabilities in the region and it appreciated the generous contributions by donor countries and institutions. The Agency's work in that area was a concrete example of "atoms for peace" in action. The draft resolution before the General Conference was intended to define the role of PACT and provide enhanced tools for cooperation with all stakeholders. She urged Member States to support it.

53. Her country encouraged the Secretariat to address the long-term funding challenges facing the Agency and welcomed the Director General's announcement on the 20/20 review. She thanked the Secretariat for their efforts to put the issue of sustainable, assured and predictable technical cooperation funding before the Board in a timely fashion. Her country was prepared to work with

other Member States and the Secretariat to find ways and appropriate mechanisms to address that concern.

54. In June 2007, her Government, recognizing the need for a secure energy supply for sustainable development and bearing in mind the effects of global warming, had announced its intention to reconsider nuclear power as a means of meeting the country's future energy requirements. It had asked the Agency to conduct a review mission to study the possibility of rehabilitating the mothballed nuclear power plant or finding suitable sites for a new one.

55. Since many people in the Philippines remained wary of nuclear power, the Government would need more help from the Agency with its awareness-raising activities to address concerns over security, safety and nuclear waste. She thanked the Agency for providing speakers at an awareness-raising workshop on nuclear power held in June 2007.

56. The Philippines had accepted the invitation to join the International Radioactive Waste Technical Committee (WATEC). It also adhered to the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources, implementation of which had considerably improved the safety and security of use of radiation sources in the Philippines and, despite its non-binding nature, the Code's relevant provisions had been integrated into national regulations wherever applicable.

57. The Philippine Nuclear Research Institute had participated in the regional project on security of radioactive sources funded by Australia and the United States Department of Energy. The Institute had formulated an action plan to regain regulatory control over orphan sources, trained a team on orphan source methods and received equipment.

58. Under the Memorandum of Intent between the Governments of the United States and the Philippines, monitors had been installed at the port of Manila to detect illicit trafficking in nuclear material and radioactive sources, which constituted an important step towards enhancing global and national security against nuclear and radiological threats.

59. The Philippine Government had finalized the country's nuclear security plan, which would soon be submitted for approval by the authorities. It was also working on the ratification of the amendments to the CPPNM.

60. Her country had a strong interest in maintaining high standards of safety at nuclear power facilities, given the increasing number of nuclear power plants in the region. In addition, ratification of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management would remain a key priority

61. The Philippines welcomed the recent positive developments with regard to the DPRK nuclear issue, including the verification of the shutdown of the Yongbyon nuclear facility, the DPRK's announcement at the fourteenth meeting of the Regional ASEAN Forum in August 2007 that it would respect its commitment to make a complete declaration of all nuclear programmes and disable all its nuclear facilities, and the agreement reached in Beijing in July 2007 in the sixth round of the six-party talks. Her Government urged the DPRK to continue its full cooperation with the Agency.

62. Her country was encouraged by the understandings reached between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Agency on a work plan to resolve outstanding verification issues. That should reduce tensions and open the way for renewed cooperation. While respecting Iran's right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy under safeguards and in accordance with its NPT obligations, the Philippines urged Iran to comply with all relevant United Nations Security Council and Agency resolutions and to demonstrate the necessary transparency, going beyond the additional protocol. It also welcomed the recent efforts by the European Union, on behalf of the permanent members of the United Nations

Security Council and Germany, to open negotiations with Iran. The issue should be resolved through dialogue and consultations.

63. Although much progress had been made in the use of nuclear technologies to improve people's lives, the same could not be said of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and the international non-proliferation regime continued to face major challenges. Greater efforts were needed to strengthen the institutional framework of the NPT, including the universal adoption of the Model Additional Protocol to strengthen the Agency's verification authority.

64. Despite the new challenges facing the Agency, it had become a strong partner, helping developing countries achieve their development goals. She congratulated the Director General and the Secretariat on their commitment and excellent work.

65. Mr. NGANDAJINA (Angola) said that his country attached great importance to the technical cooperation programme through which the Agency helped to create, maintain and strengthen national and regional technical capacity for using nuclear technology in a safe, secure and sustainable manner. Since those activities depended on sufficient, foreseeable and assured resources being made available for the programme's implementation, his country encouraged Member States to pay their contributions to the Regular Budget and the TCF.

66. Angola welcomed the Agency's efforts to strengthen technical cooperation with Member States. In 2006, activities had been mainly related to health, food, agriculture, radiation safety of transport, nuclear sciences, physical and chemical applications, water and management of radioactive waste. Improvement of living conditions in many developing countries depended on the eradication or control of diseases such as cancer, sleeping sickness, HIV/AIDS and malaria, which hindered their socio-economic development. His country therefore appreciated the voluntary contributions made to PACT in 2006 by certain Member States, the OPEC Fund for International Development and the United States National Cancer Institute with a view to strengthening the fight against cancer. It supported the plans to set up a joint WHO/IAEA programme on cancer prevention, control, treatment and research, and encouraged the Agency to step up cooperation with organizations involved in cancer research and control. Angola welcomed the decision to use the Nobel Prize money to fund the needs of developing countries for the peaceful application of nuclear energy, in particular in the fields of health and food production.

67. Malaria was a major obstacle to the eradication of poverty in developing countries, especially in Africa, and his country called on the Agency to strengthen research on control of malaria-transmitting mosquitoes.

68. HIV/AIDS had reached pandemic proportions in Africa, and Angola appreciated the Agency's regional project on initiatives in HIV-1 molecular epidemiology and immunology in support of the UNAIDS-WHO African AIDS vaccine programme and encouraged it to seek new partnerships with national, regional and international institutions.

69. The tsetse fly and trypanosomosis, another major transboundary problem in Africa, affected human health, restricted land use and increased poverty. Angola therefore welcomed the Agency's support for PATTEC.

70. Angola was grateful to the Agency for the support it had received with its CPF, which aimed at promoting and developing nuclear science and technology in many areas, from staff training to equipment provision. Considerable progress had been made thanks to the efforts on both sides, but he appealed for more technical cooperation from the Agency and other Member States to support the development of peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

71. In the context of technical cooperation, he drew attention to the progress made in Angola in monitoring occupational exposure to ionizing radiation in hospitals.

72. Five national projects were being implemented in his country as part of the 2007–2008 cycle and another seven projects had been submitted for Agency approval. As a sign of Angola's commitment to developing nuclear science and technology, in June 2007 new legislation on atomic energy had been passed which would open up new prospects for his country. The next step would be to establish an atomic energy regulatory authority.

73. Angola had met all its financial obligations to the Agency. He thanked the Agency and its Director General for their work and expressed the hope that the decisions taken at the General Conference would have a positive effect for the organization and, by extension, its Member States.

74. Mr. GOREA (Romania) observed that, as well as marking the 50th anniversary of the Agency, 2007 marked 50 years of Romanian nuclear energy development since its first research reactor was commissioned in 1957. He expressed appreciation for the Agency's activities and accomplishments during that time.

75. Energy security was vital for Romania and, owing to economic growth, rising oil and gas prices and energy security concerns, the contribution of nuclear power to the country's energy mix was set to increase over the coming few years. The second unit at the Cernavoda nuclear power plant had recently started commercial operation and a third and fourth unit were planned to be complete by 2013–2014, bringing the nuclear power share to around 35%. Romania considered nuclear energy to be a clean, reliable and sustainable energy source which could offer a long-term solution to challenges related to energy, the environment, health and water supply. It believed there was a need to expand the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in a safe and secure manner, with a reduced risk of nuclear proliferation, a vision shared by the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership which Romania had recently joined.

76. Safety was the most important factor in a nuclear programme and Romania was doing everything possible to maintain the highest safety standards by strictly complying with the existing international framework. Safety was a national responsibility but had implications beyond national boundaries and for the future use of nuclear power, which meant that international cooperation in a forum such as the Agency was indispensable. Romania strongly supported the safety standards developed and adopted under Agency auspices and encouraged all Member States to adopt them. The Agency's international peer review services were an essential part of international cooperation and a confidence-building measure. Romania had benefited from an IRRS mission, which had provided valuable input to all involved in improving the safety of nuclear installations.

77. His country believed that the peaceful use of nuclear energy should be based on full compliance with the NPT and transparency in nuclear programmes. A universal international non-proliferation regime, supported by a strong international safeguards system, was vital. Romania was committed to the prevention of proliferation of nuclear technologies that might be misused, it supported the universal introduction of the optimum combination of all safeguards measures available to the Agency and was pleased to announce the recent introduction of integrated safeguards in Romania. As a member of the European Union, Romania had also recently completed internal ratification of the trilateral safeguards agreement and related additional protocol between Euratom, EU member States and the Agency.

78. He noted with satisfaction that the international regime to combat nuclear terrorism had been greatly improved in recent years. His country was committed to combating nuclear terrorism and to reinforcing joint efforts to increase international cooperation to combat that threat, and it had ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism earlier in 2007. It had

also become a partner in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which aimed at developing a global network of partners committed to preventing terrorists from acquiring and using a nuclear weapon. The amended CPPNM was another valuable instrument which Romania had ratified, but he noted with concern that only 11 states had ratified the amendments.

79. The Agency had an important role to play in the prevention of nuclear terrorism, and its activities had mainly been financed from extrabudgetary funds, of which the European Union had been the main donor in 2007. Romania had made four annual contributions in the amount of US \$40 000 and would transfer its contribution for 2007 within a month.

80. No country was immune to the effects of nuclear or radiological emergencies and incidents and his country recognized the need for international coordination and cooperation in response to such events. Therefore, it had decided to make a voluntary contribution of €30 000 to the newly established Incident and Emergency Centre to strengthen its reporting and exchange of information capabilities and to enhance its overall response capabilities and emergency preparedness activities.

81. Romania had gained a great deal from participation in technical cooperation activities and technical cooperation remained an important part of its work with the Agency. The country was assessing its changing role within the technical cooperation programme and trying to define a new strategy and new mechanisms for future cooperation. The main task of regional technical cooperation in Europe was to promote the sharing of knowledge and best practices and Romania was ready to continue providing its experts and training facilities. The TRIGA reactor, which had recently been converted from the HEU to LEU, could become a centre of excellence for regional services.

82. It was generally agreed that financing of technical cooperation activities should be sufficient, assured and predictable. Romania shared the opinion that Member States should demonstrate their commitment by pledging and paying their share of the TCF targets on time and in full, as Romania had done.

83. To sustain the objectives of Romania's national strategy for development of the nuclear field, a new CPF had been signed during the current session of the General Conference. The strategy concentrated in the medium term on certain areas of importance to the country: the extension of the capacity of the Pitesti fuel fabrication plant; the construction and commissioning of the industrial tritium removal facility at the Cernavoda nuclear power plant; the extension of the interim spent fuel dry storage modules; site selection and elaboration of the feasibility study and preliminary safety assessment report for the national repository for final disposal of low-level radioactive waste; the return to the Russian Federation of spent nuclear fuel from the WWR-S nuclear research reactor and the beginning of its decommissioning; and diversification of non-power nuclear applications in medicine and the commissioning of regional PET units.

84. Romania had implemented strategic workforce planning and knowledge management across its whole nuclear system, for which human resources constituted a major issue. The average age of the workforce was high and it was necessary to avoid loss of experienced staff and generation gaps. With the commissioning of Units 3 and 4 of the Cernavoda nuclear power plant, needs for qualified personnel would double and it was essential to identify core competency requirements and strategies, and to make an annual assessment of current technical capacity and attract and retain qualified individuals. Great emphasis was laid on gender balance and efforts to attract female candidates in such highly specialized, technical areas. Romania supported the Agency's efforts to recruit women professionals and had established a point of contact for the recruitment of women within Romania's nuclear agency.

85. Mr. ZNIBER (Morocco) said that the role played by the Agency continued to expand and his country supported the Director General's appeal for increased financial support for the Agency, which should go hand in hand with increased political support.

86. Expressing disappointment at the lack of success of the 2005 NPT Review Conference and the modest progress made so far in the preparations for the 2010 NPT Review Conference, he called on all States which had not done so to adhere to the NPT and the Agency's verification regime. Universalization of non-proliferation was an ever more urgent issue in the face of the constant threat to the regime. Morocco continued to support the Agency's verification activities and strengthening of the safeguards system. Support from Member States was crucial if the Agency was to be able to provide the necessary assurances and guarantees with regard to non-diversion of nuclear material and facilities. He welcomed the increasing number of additional protocols concluded, but every effort should be made to encourage those States which had not done so to adhere to the safeguards regime and sign an additional protocol.

87. His country had actively supported General Conference resolution GC(50)/RES/16 on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East and lamented the fact that no significant progress had been made in implementing it. Israel's continuing refusal to adhere to the non-proliferation regime and submit its installations and activities to Agency safeguards was deplorable. Its attitude undermined all efforts to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and establish a fair and lasting peace. The international community should recognize that the time had come to change the situation and to take seriously concerns about the deployment of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Furthermore, the General Conference should contribute to achieving those objectives, which fell squarely within its mandate.

88. No one was immune from the threat of nuclear terrorism and more could always be done to guard against it. All States should benefit from the cooperation needed to put in place nuclear security infrastructures. His own country was particularly interested in establishing a national nuclear security strategy. He commended the Agency for its efforts to provide Member States with the means to ensure physical protection of nuclear material and equipment and to combat illicit trafficking. Morocco was ready to cooperate fully with the Agency in implementing the Nuclear Security Plan for 2006–2009 and, in October 2007, would host a workshop on defining the design basis threat. It had also hosted the first meeting of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and had joined that Initiative in the belief that it was necessary to adopt a global approach to combating nuclear terrorism. The Initiative would gain much by making use of the expertise and knowledge of the Agency.

89. Morocco was convinced that the future of nuclear energy depended on the range of safety measures to which it must be subject. He expressed appreciation for the revised and strengthened Safety Fundamentals approved by the Board of Governors in 2007, which formed the basis for the Agency's safety standards, presenting a coherent and strategic approach to safety for all nuclear activities. His country was working intensively with the relevant Agency services to develop a national legislative and regulatory framework to ensure that nuclear energy was used safely and peacefully, and to establish a safety culture.

90. A safety culture should have its roots in knowledge development and human resources training and Morocco continued to be a centre of excellence for training in the field of radiation protection and nuclear medicine for experts from Africa and other regions. It had become a centre for South-South cooperation in radiological and nuclear matters, working particularly with its African partners. In that connection, he called for cooperation benefiting Africa to be strengthened in order to respond to the region's urgent and growing needs and contribute to its socio-economic development.

91. The Moroccan authorities were particularly interested in establishing a national nuclear strategy, and the country's first Triga Mark II research reactor had been inaugurated earlier in 2007. He expressed appreciation to the Agency for the support it had given throughout the project, which would enable Morocco to increase its ability to use nuclear technologies, particularly in training and research.

92. His country welcomed the fact that, for the first time, the technical cooperation programme for 2007–2008 had been prepared using the PCMF in collaboration with Member States' national authorities. It was important for the Agency to listen to Member States when preparing the technical cooperation programme. Morocco continued to support the programme as a beneficial mechanism for transferring technology to promote socio-economic development, particularly in developing countries. It also supported the emerging approach in the Agency in support of technical cooperation activities which could help to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, in particular alleviating poverty and fighting cancer. In that connection, PACT was an important initiative. He reaffirmed his country's willingness to cooperate fully with the Agency and put at its disposal all the human and material resources necessary for its humanitarian programme to be successful.

93. He expressed support for the Agency's activities on the sterile insect technique, an example of cooperation in the application of nuclear techniques for development in the areas of human health and nutrition which at the same time had a significant economic impact. In parallel to the work of the General Conference, his delegation was organizing a display on the application of nuclear techniques in Morocco which demonstrated the importance Morocco attached to Africa and to the need to strengthen technical cooperation among African countries.

94. Recalling that the amendment to Article VI of the Agency's Statute adopted by the Board in 1998 had yet to be brought into force, he expressed concern at the report on progress in that regard, which was detrimental to the principle of democratization within international organizations. He called on all States which had not yet done so to deposit their instruments of acceptance of the amendment to Article VI in order to allow its entry into force as soon as possible.

95. Mr. SMITH (United Kingdom) said that his country's institutions and enterprises had a long and intensive history of engagement in the development of nuclear power both at home and overseas. However, he was somewhat constrained in what he could say about future developments in nuclear energy in the United Kingdom. His Government was currently involved in a major consultation exercise with the British public on whether commercial operators should be allowed to construct new nuclear power stations in the United Kingdom as part of a diversified mix of energy supply sources. The consultation process was not yet complete, and it would thus be premature to speculate on its conclusions. The consultation period ran until 10 October and his Government expected to be in a position to share its conclusions by the end of the year.

96. One recent development worth noting had been the decision to bring together the regulation of nuclear safety, security and safeguards within one body, the Health and Safety Executive. That should prove beneficial for both operators and the regulatory process, and improve the efficiency of regulatory management.

97. His country was keen to see a similar improvement in the efficiency of Agency safeguards verification. It welcomed the progress which ISIS had made over the preceding two years. The United Kingdom had been a major contributor to that project.

98. The United Kingdom strongly supported the Director General's call for those Member States that had not yet done so to bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol. It was only with the additional protocol that the Agency could provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities. There were significant improvements to be gained in terms of both efficiency and effectiveness through the adoption of

integrated safeguards, but the Agency could only achieve those improvements for States with both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force.

99. His Government had been a strong supporter of the Agency's nuclear security programme. The danger of nuclear material being obtained by terrorists was one of the major issues facing the international community. An acute consciousness of that threat and the need for robust action to address it had been behind the United Kingdom's decision to become and remain a major contributor to the voluntary Nuclear Security Fund. The United Kingdom had also provided expertise and supported the exchange of information on that important issue. Just ten days previously, it had hosted a conference in London to address the problem of nuclear smuggling, and it would also host an IAEA conference on illicit nuclear trafficking in Edinburgh from 19 to 22 November. The United Kingdom looked forward to continuing to work closely with the Agency in tackling that threat.

100. The 1986 accident at Chernobyl remained a sombre landmark and a stark lesson in the need for the highest possible standards of nuclear safety. The United Kingdom had been a major donor to the project to build a new safe confinement at Chernobyl, contributing some €77 million to date to the international funds operated by the EBRD at the site. It remained committed to supporting the international programmes at Chernobyl — if necessary with additional financial support alongside Ukraine and other key donors. The project was moving into a new and critical phase where the unwavering commitment of all parties would be of the highest importance.

101. The United Kingdom continued to have strong concerns about the proliferation implications of Iran's nuclear programme. The Governments of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States had reiterated their commitment to seeking a negotiated solution with Iran. The far-reaching proposals made by those countries in June 2006 remained on the table as a possible basis for such a negotiated solution. Those offers included substantial help in developing a modern nuclear power programme. Regrettably, Iran had chosen to ignore those offers and remained in non-compliance with the requirements of the Security Council made mandatory in resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007). It was time for Iran to comply fully with the Security Council and immediately to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities in order to allow negotiations to restart. His country looked forward to the rapid and purposeful implementation of the work plan agreed between Iran and the Agency Secretariat to resolve all outstanding questions surrounding Iran's programme. Iran's willingness to cooperate with the Agency seriously and fully over the P1 and P2 centrifuge issues was a key test of whether its agreement to the work plan was a genuine commitment or a delaying tactic. The United Kingdom welcomed any movement on the outstanding issues, but their resolution would not, by itself, be sufficient to restore confidence in Iran's nuclear intentions. For that to happen, it was also essential that Iran suspend enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and implement fully the additional protocol and other measures that the Agency had requested. The United Kingdom did not wish to deny Iran any of its rights, but Iran first had to prove that it would exercise those rights responsibly.

102. The shutdown of the Yongbyon facilities in the DPRK and the implementation of the monitoring and verification measures by the Agency were encouraging first steps in the resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue. His country urged the DPRK to comply fully with United Nations Security Council resolution 1718 (2006), and to ensure that all past nuclear activity was declared and that its nuclear programme was dismantled in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.

103. The United Kingdom attached great importance to the development of mechanisms that would provide assurances of nuclear fuel supplies to countries looking to start a nuclear power generation programme or develop one further. It therefore welcomed the Director General's report on that issue contained in document GOV/INF/2007/11. To demonstrate their commitment to taking initiatives in that regard forward, the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands had

made a joint declaration setting out their shared thinking on the subject. That declaration had been circulated in document INFCIRC/713. Among the options described in the Director General's report was, in Annex 12, the United Kingdom's idea for 'enrichment bonds'. Such a concept, which could be elaborated for implementation comparatively quickly, might be of particular interest to those countries that were considering embarking on a nuclear power programme for the first time. The United Kingdom recognized the merits of many of the options listed and was eager to see dialogue on them intensified, with a view to making rapid progress on translating ideas into action.

104. Mr. HORVATIC (Croatia) noted that the Agency had been steadily growing in both membership and importance over the preceding 50 years. He commended the Agency's commitment to the peaceful use of atomic energy and acknowledged its important role in the field of nuclear non-proliferation, congratulating both the Director General and the staff on the Agency's major contribution to world peace, security and development.

105. Since becoming a Governor on the Agency's Board one year previously, he had become ever more convinced of the Agency's essential role in securing the world against nuclear weapons. The Agency had achieved significant successes since the preceding General Conference: negotiating with India on safeguards; addressing the issue of the DPRK's nuclear programme; and drawing up the work plan to resolve outstanding issues with the Islamic Republic of Iran, which Croatia hoped would be implemented swiftly and fully. The right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy was guaranteed by the NPT to all State Parties and should not be disputed. However, a fully transparent nuclear policy was a prerequisite for global security.

106. Croatia considered the additional protocol crucial for mutual trust within the international community. Comprehensive safeguards agreements together with additional protocols were the current Agency verification standard and he called upon all Member States to ratify and implement an additional protocol.

107. Only joint efforts and transparent policy would lead to a safer world. His country had been among the first Member States to ratify the Model Additional Protocol, the amendment to Article VI of the Statute and the amended CPPNM. It was also one of just 32 States in which the Secretariat had found no indication of diversion of declared nuclear material and no indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities. It had also initiated the procedure for acceptance of the new SQP.

108. As in previous years, Croatia continued to honour fully and on time all its financial obligations to the Agency, including its contribution to the TCF.

109. Croatia had established a strategy and relevant institutional capacities to guard against trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material. The strategy's main aim was to prevent terrorists and non-State actors from acquiring nuclear weapons. Strong international cooperation was the only way to reduce that danger and States should cooperate closely within such initiatives as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. At national level, States should continue to take measures to prevent proliferation and the misuse of civil nuclear programmes, such as improving controls over the import and export of arms, strengthening border controls, reevaluating and improving laws, exchanging information at national and international level and improving public awareness of the issue of proliferation.

110. Since the preceding General Conference, Croatia had hosted a regional awareness seminar on combating illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material and a regional training course on radiation detection equipment, both of which had been organized through cooperation between the Agency and the Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre based in Croatia. He invited the Agency to make greater use of Croatia's capacity to run such events.

111. Also, with the assistance of the Agency, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina had hosted two training courses for police and customs officers to strengthen institutional capacities to prevent trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material. During the courses, forty customs and police officers had been educated in the use of portal monitors donated by the Agency.

112. Another important, but perhaps less visible role of the Agency was that of peaceful nuclear cooperation and development, one major aspect of which was the Agency's technical cooperation programme. Croatia, as a net recipient country, was grateful for the assistance provided to it.

113. In February 2007, a delegation from the Agency's Department of Technical Cooperation, headed by the Director of the Division for Europe, had visited Croatia. During the visit, two portal monitors donated by the Agency were put into operation on the border between Croatia and Slovenia.

114. Croatia had submitted six national project proposals for the new programme cycle and several regional project proposals had been prepared covering various areas, based on the priorities set out in the CPF. Croatia fully supported the Agency's efforts to enhance regional cooperation.

115. Mr. WEKESA (Kenya) said that, in taking stock of the Agency's many commendable achievements, it was important to consider whether all three pillars of its activities had progressed in an equal and balanced manner.

116. The results would have been better if more progress been made in the area of non-proliferation. Recent developments had given cause for concern. His country urged all concerned to comply with their obligations and work towards a nuclear-weapon-free world.

117. On the whole, progress in the area of technical cooperation had been satisfactory. Significant advances had been made in socio-economic development through the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, notably in the fields of human health, agriculture, potable water and energy.

118. Non-proliferation efforts, including safeguards and verification, should go hand in hand with nuclear disarmament, and efforts to strengthen the Agency's statutory activities should take account of the need to maintain a balance between technical cooperation, verification, and safety and security.

119. The Agency's technical cooperation activities in Kenya had grown over time, in support of the Government's endeavours to develop the national nuclear science and technology infrastructure and address the priorities identified in the country's CPF. Kenya was participating in 13 national projects, covering human resources development, human health, agriculture, livestock production, radiation protection and industrial applications.

120. His country was taking part in the exhibitions currently being held in the Austria Center to showcase the contribution of technical cooperation programmes to poverty alleviation and economic growth. One tangible example of the success of the technical cooperation programme in his country had been the bread wheat variety developed with the help of nuclear techniques by the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute. In the field of molecular genetics, the Kenya Medical Research Institute had made significant progress in efforts to overcome resistance to front-line antimalarial and anti-tuberculosis drugs.

121. His country was grateful for the Agency's assistance with the establishment of an SSDL, which had been commissioned in June 2007. The laboratory would play an important role in the calibration of medical and industrial devices which produced or utilized ionizing radiation.

122. Kenya recognized the global efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation and had submitted its instrument of acceptance of the amendments to the CPPNM. A comprehensive

safeguards agreement and SQP, and an additional protocol were in the process of being concluded following Cabinet approval.

123. His country had set up security agencies with highly trained staff for the purpose of combating crime related to nuclear terrorism. It had also recently hosted regional training courses on the safety and security of radioactive material.

124. With the help of an established infrastructure, Kenya was promoting a radiation safety culture for the protection of persons and the environment. The competent authority, the Radiation Protection Board, had increased its manpower, equipment and resources to cope with more radiation protection activities.

125. In June 2007, Kenya had taken a verified inventory of its radioactive sources in collaboration with the Agency, and a similar exercise was expected to be carried out as part of a RaSSIA mission before the end of the year.

126. His country recognized the importance of safety and security in the context of the transport of radioactive sources. Kenya's regulatory authority licensed and authorized all movements of radiation sources within, and in and out of the country. Systems had been put into place to prevent illicit trafficking in radioactive and nuclear material in the East African region.

127. With regard to radiological emergencies, Kenya was in the process of incorporating expertise within the structure of its National Disaster Operations Centre.

128. In addition, it subscribed to the Agency's safety standards for radioactive waste management and steps had been taken to ensure their implementation. His Government had contributed \$200 000 towards the planning and construction of a central radioactive waste processing facility and it would be seeking the Agency's assistance in setting up the facility which it hoped would be operational in the near future.

129. The Kenyan Society for the Promotion of Peaceful Applications of Nuclear Science and Technology had been registered and its aim was to promote peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology for socio-economic development. It looked forward to enhanced interaction among stakeholders and the Agency's technical assistance programme in the field of technology development.

130. The tsetse fly and trypanosomosis posed a threat to lives and livelihoods and hampered livestock production. Kenya was one of six Phase 1 countries participating in PATTEC. The facility at the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute-Trypanosomiasis Research Centre was boosting the production of sterile males for use in the PATTEC programme.

131. Projects on the expansion of radiotherapy services and improvement of nuclear medicine services were a matter of high priority for his Government. In May-June 2007, physicians from the Kenyatta National Hospital and the Ministry of Health had held a planning meeting on radiotherapy and nuclear medicine with Agency staff in Vienna with a view to enhancing technical cooperation in those areas in the context of national plans to promote advanced health care services and the national cancer control strategy. His Government had allocated resources equivalent to \$707 143 for 2007 and 2008 to spearhead the expansion of cancer treatment services.

132. Skills development in the field of nuclear science and technology was crucial. Local universities had been working with the Agency to develop curricula in nuclear technology. One area that had been explored had been mutation breeding of plants, which played an important role in improving crop production. The training courses, fellowships, scientific visits, expert missions and equipment provided by the Agency to Kenyan institutions were highly appreciated.

133. His Government welcomed the External Auditor's report on the Agency's accounts for 2006. Kenya was committed to paying its financial contributions and, to date, had honoured all its financial obligations to the Agency. It had also pledged its full share to the TCF for 2008.

134. Mr. ABDRAKHMANOV (Kazakhstan) said that recent events had once again demonstrated the complexity of creating an atmosphere of mutual trust. The non-proliferation regime was one of the cornerstones of such efforts and the NPT was the core instrument underlying that regime. Successful implementation of the NPT was a precondition for further development of international control over all types of weapons of mass destruction. It was therefore of paramount importance to have an efficient NPT regime and to take measures to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation. First and foremost, that meant steadfast adherence to commitments made under the NPT.

135. On 19 February 2007, Kazakhstan had ratified the protocol additional to its safeguards agreement with the Agency, which had entered into force on 9 May. His country was an active participant in nearly all anti-nuclear threat initiatives, including the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Nuclear Threat Initiative. It also welcomed the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism launched by the United States and the Russian Federation in July 2006 and had signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism to demonstrate its firm commitment to international security and the international community's collective efforts to combat terrorism. The third meeting of the Global Initiative had been held in Astana in June 2007. Kazakhstan was also taking measures to strengthen border controls and upgrade its system to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material. It fully supported United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

136. His country had joined the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership whose Statement of Principles it had signed in September 2007. It endorsed the main principles underlying the Global Partnership and its vision for nuclear energy cooperation. Its membership gave renewed impetus to Kazakhstan's national nuclear industry.

137. Kazakhstan's export control policy was in full conformity with commonly accepted standards. As a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, his country took effective measures to meet its obligations to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. A system had been set up to combat illicit nuclear trafficking which was being improved constantly. The introduction of new restrictions on nuclear technology transfer should be examined closely to avoid unjustified barriers to peaceful nuclear development.

138. By giving up the world's fourth largest nuclear arsenal, Kazakhstan had made a historic contribution to enhancing non-proliferation and disarmament and had demonstrated its commitment to its international obligations. Recognizing the threat posed by highly enriched material, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources of Kazakhstan had adopted a five-year programme to convert the VVR-K research reactor to low-enriched fuel. The decommissioning of the BN-350 fast breeder reactor in Aktau was under way. Downblending of HEU from the reactor fuel had been completed at the Ulba Metallurgical Plant in Ust-Kamenogorsk.

139. Kazakhstan was actively implementing the new edition of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. Projects to strengthen control over ionizing radiation sources, and on the safe and secure management of strong sources, were being implemented successfully. Instruments to introduce a national register of sources of ionizing radiation were being prepared and an inventory of radioactive sources was being carried out. The Agency and countries participating in those projects had provided valuable support.

140. With Government support, the Nuclear Technologies Park in Kurchatov had been registered and had commenced operations. It would lay the foundation for the development of peaceful applications of atomic energy, including nuclear power. In 2006, a heavy ion accelerator had been put into service in Astana and construction of the materials research tokamak in Kurchatov was under way. The Government had also lent its support to the forthcoming construction of a large nuclear medicine centre in Almaty.

141. Kazakhstan was actively engaged in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia, as proposed in the Almaty Declaration of 28 February 1997. On 8 September 2006, representatives of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan had signed the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia.

142. In 2007, Kazakhstan had signed an intergovernmental agreement with the Russian Federation on the establishment of an international uranium enrichment centre in Angarsk. It was convinced that such international centres, working under strict Agency control, where the most sensitive stages of the nuclear fuel cycle would be implemented, would create a basis for the development of nuclear power engineering while maintaining full compliance with non-proliferation principles.

143. In his statement at the G8 Summit in July 2006, the President of Kazakhstan had underlined that global security could only be ensured through complete nuclear disarmament, as the possession of such weapons posed a direct threat to humanity.

144. It was time for all to think about alternative energy sources and global energy security. His Government supported the development of peaceful applications of nuclear energy under strict international control, in particular by the Agency. Any State that complied with that requirement for transparency, having implemented a safeguards agreement and additional protocol with the Agency, should have the right to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and build nuclear power reactors. Ways had to be found to solve recent conflict situations by rebuilding the confidence of the international community in the nuclear activities of countries without restricting their right to technological development and access to knowledge. The Agency and its Director General, with their experience, were in a good position to address such complex issues.

145. Control over nuclear weapons and nuclear technology should be improved to prevent the diversion of fissile material for military purposes. One possibility was to establish a body under the auspices of the Agency that would ensure the reliable supply of fuel for nuclear power plants and manage safe storage and waste processing. Political, commercial and financial issues would need to be resolved prior to the establishment of such an entity. Although the idea might appear unrealistic at present, efforts should be made to move in that direction.

146. Mr. CURIA (Argentina) welcomed the new safeguards agreements and additional protocols that had been signed over the preceding year.

147. Argentina firmly believed in the right of all countries to develop the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including the fuel cycle, in compliance with their international obligations. Any attempt to alter the delicate balance of rights and obligations set forth in the NPT, calling into question the legitimacy of States' efforts to develop technologies for exclusively peaceful purposes, could undermine the widely accepted NPT regime. Any proposal for modification that could be interpreted as being unjust and sought to reallocate rights and obligations ran the risk of weakening the international non-proliferation regime that Argentina strongly supported. Such would be the case for any initiative seeking to curtail State sovereignty and the independent ownership and control of a key technological sector, such as the nuclear fuel cycle, thus restricting the potential benefits of those activities and technologies to a small number of countries. However, given the current challenges, continued efforts needed to be made to find solutions to the problems of proliferation in order to

ensure that all those in compliance with their obligations under the NPT could reap the benefits of nuclear energy. It was against that background that Argentina was carefully observing initiatives aimed at multilateralization of the fuel cycle which might entail a fundamental shift in the political, technological and legal framework for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

148. Since the inception of its nuclear activities in 1950, Argentina had been firmly committed to the exclusively peaceful uses of nuclear energy and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as demonstrated by the various binding legal instruments to which it was party and its rigorous domestic legislation on the transfer of nuclear technology, equipment and material. The most important development in Argentina's nuclear activities over the preceding year had been the Government's decision to resume nuclear activities in the country, which it had announced in August 2006. In the year following that announcement, the authorities had adopted important measures that consolidated that policy and initiated steps to implement it without delay.

149. The resumption of nuclear activities in Argentina was being carried out through a nuclear programme for the short and medium term which focused on the large-scale generation of nuclear power and nuclear technology applications in the health sector and industry. The aims of the programme were as follows: consolidation of the nuclear power option through the completion of the Atucha II nuclear power plant, extension of the life of the Embalse nuclear power plant, preliminary feasibility studies for the construction of a fourth nuclear power plant which could potentially comprise two units, and the construction of a prototype of the CAREM low-power reactor.

150. Completing the Atucha II nuclear power plant was of special significance for his country, not only because it would substantially increase generation of electricity but also because it would revitalize the whole scientific, technological and industrial sector related to the nuclear field, creating a high demand for highly specialized human resources. To date, work to finish the over 90% complete civil engineering work and to complete the assembly of major components had been resumed, and the contracts for assembly of the turbine generator had been renegotiated.

151. Other aims of the programme were to reinforce the mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle achieved in the 1980s, including by restoring the technological capacity for design engineering and management of fuel element processes for Atucha II, resuming enrichment activities at the Pilcaniyeu plant by consolidating the original technology and evaluating the possibility of applying new, innovative technologies, reviving uranium mining, and resuming production of heavy water at the Arroyito plant, which was to provide 600 tonnes for the initial inventory of Atucha II.

152. The Argentine Nuclear Regulatory Authority, an independent nuclear monitoring body, was taking the necessary steps to license the Atucha II plant, and to ensure nuclear safety in connection with the extension of the life of the Embalse and Atucha I nuclear power plants.

153. The resumption of enrichment activities would not only place Argentina among those countries that possessed such technology, but would also enable it to meet the demand for LEU fuel elements for its heavy water-moderated power reactors, and to meet the demand for low-enriched fuel for its research and production reactors and reactors exported to third countries. In that connection, his Government welcomed the inauguration in April 2007 of the OPAL reactor in Australia.

154. Argentina would continue to participate actively in international efforts to develop new-generation reactors and fuel cycles, in particular the Agency's INPRO project to which it had contributed cost-free experts and extrabudgetary contributions.

155. His country was converting the core of the RA-6 research reactor to low-enriched fuel and returning almost all 90% enriched uranium to the State of origin. That process was due to be completed in 2007 or early 2008.

156. With regard to applications of nuclear technology, in particular in the health field, a highly complex and advanced nuclear diagnostics centre had opened in Buenos Aires in May 2007. Its state-of-the-art equipment would make it one of the most advanced centres in South America for oncology, cardiology and neurology. The centre would offer health care to the public, carry out medical research and train highly qualified nuclear medicine staff.

157. Argentina remained open to establishing and strengthening cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as demonstrated by its ongoing involvement in technical cooperation and assistance both at the multilateral level, through active participation in the Agency's technical cooperation programme and ARCAL, and at the bilateral level, through its specific cooperation agreements with around 30 countries.

158. His country welcomed the efforts of the Agency and its Member States to strengthen international cooperation in nuclear, radiation and transport safety and waste management. The progress made with regard to fostering a safety culture was particularly noteworthy. He drew special attention to the steps taken with respect to information and communication networks for nuclear and radiation safety, and to the efforts to strengthen national regulatory infrastructures for the control of radioactive sources.

159. He welcomed the inclusion in the Annual Report of a reference to the activities carried out under an extrabudgetary programme in conjunction with the Ibero-American Forum of Radiological and Nuclear Regulatory Agencies. His country was honoured to host the headquarters of the Forum secretariat in Buenos Aires and would continue to support its activities and operations.

160. Argentina was conscious of the importance of the Agency's cooperation activities in the field of nuclear security and was following them with special interest. However, the Agency should bear in mind the different treatment which should be given to nuclear material and non-nuclear radioactive material so as to avoid any negative impact on peaceful nuclear activities.

161. The efforts of the Secretariat and the Agency's Member States with regard to education and training in radiation protection and nuclear safety were noteworthy. In line with its traditionally active policy in that area, Argentina had continued to make progress towards becoming a regional training centre for radiation, nuclear, transport and waste safety. The final report of the Agency's expert mission of June 2006 had confirmed that the postgraduate course run by Argentina on safety was appropriate for instruction in the proper application of the Agency's standards, and had set out a plan of action that his Government had already implemented. A long-term agreement with the Agency would facilitate the efficient use of resources for the systematic dissemination in Spanish of the latest know-how and experience in radiation, nuclear, transport and waste safety throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. His country was confident that such an agreement would soon be signed.

162. Priority should be given to areas and activities clearly identified in the Agency's Statute. With regard to Agency activities relating to the security of radioactive sources, safety and security should be addressed in an integrated fashion in order to ensure appropriate control.

163. The Agency's verification system served to provide the international community with assurances of the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes. However, Argentina continued to encourage the Secretariat to strive for greater efficiency in the application of safeguards and noted that a profound cultural change was needed for the proper design and implementation of integrated safeguards. He reaffirmed the importance of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, noting that cooperation between ABACC and Agency should continue to be consolidated with a view to more effective and efficient application of safeguards under the Quadripartite Agreement.

164. Finally, his country would continue to cooperate with the Agency in its important work by making available to the Secretariat its experts and training capacity.

Mr. Berdennikov (Russian Federation) took the Chair.

165. Ms. DRÁBOVÁ (Czech Republic) commended the Agency's contribution to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the prominent role it played in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and threats of nuclear terrorism. Non-compliance with the NPT and related safeguards obligations was one of the main challenges facing the international community. Her country had always fulfilled its obligations under the NPT, its safeguards agreement and additional protocol. The additional protocol was an important instrument to strengthen the efficiency, effectiveness and transparency of the safeguards system and it was regrettable that, ten years after the adoption of the Model Additional Protocol, a significant number of States had still to bring it into force. She also strongly urged those States that had not yet concluded a safeguards agreement to do so without further delay.

166. The Czech Republic had always given priority to providing the Agency with sufficient evidence of its peaceful use of nuclear material. As of June 2007, it had become one of those countries in which the highest level of safeguards — integrated safeguards — was being applied. Moreover, under the Czech Republic's support programme her country had made financial contributions to the IAEA Safeguards Information System Re-engineering Project and hoped to continue to promote such assistance in the future. As part of its in-kind assistance, it had helped the Agency test monitoring systems at nuclear power plants and used satellite communications for remote monitoring. It had also been involved in the development of a new system of Agency safeguards for deep repositories of spent nuclear fuel, had helped organize training courses for Agency safeguards inspectors and had provided sample analyses for safeguards activities.

167. Her country remained concerned about the growing threat of nuclear terrorism and thus had always supported all efforts to eliminate the risk of misuse of sensitive nuclear material and technologies. The Agency was one of the key coordinators in the fight against international nuclear terrorism and the Czech Republic, recognizing the need to secure funding for specific measures, had regularly contributed to the Nuclear Security Fund since its establishment. Her country had been the fourth to ratify the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and was party to all thirteen international treaties relating to the struggle against international terrorism. It was also in the process of ratifying the amendment to the CPPNM and regularly organized regional training courses on the physical protection of nuclear material.

168. The Czech Republic was committed to the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in general and had recently joined the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Under the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, preparations were in progress for the repatriation of spent fuel from the research reactor at Řež to the Russian Federation. Her country would be willing to share its experience and expertise with other countries preparing for similar action.

169. Her country attached great importance to international regimes in the field of import and export controls; it participated actively in the Nuclear Suppliers Group and also chaired the Zangger Committee. Steps should be taken to tighten up the conditions for the supply of trigger list and dual-use items, and efforts should be made to define minimum standards for nuclear export controls, and possibly also harmonized standards for conditions of supply.

170. The ongoing renaissance of nuclear power highlighted the importance of ensuring reliable supplies of nuclear fuel. The proposals concerning multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle provided a solid basis for further discussion in which her country would participate.

171. The Czech Republic valued the Agency's ongoing activities relating to radiation protection and its major contribution to increasing the safety and security of sources of ionizing radiation. The Agency played a crucial role in evaluating and improving radiation surveillance in Member States and in harmonizing national practices. Her country voluntarily followed the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and fully supported the related Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.

172. Her country had taken advantage of the Agency's technical cooperation programme to further its development. A Model Project under which the first PET centre had been established in the Czech Republic eight years earlier had been selected for an exhibition to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Agency as an example of one of the most successful national projects implemented in Europe. The centre was now one of the largest in Europe and was used as a training centre not only for domestic institutions but also for interested parties from other countries. The technical cooperation programme was an important and unique platform for the exchange of information and experience and should receive adequate and predictable resources. In addition to the regular payment of its contributions to the TCF, the Czech Republic had assumed some of the costs associated with the implementation of national projects, demonstrating its genuine interest in their implementation. She urged other countries to do likewise. To the extent possible, the Czech Republic made every effort to compensate for the aid it received and to support the implementation of the programme by providing assistance to less developed Member States. Following positive economic developments, it had become a net donor. It voluntarily contributed to selected projects in accordance with its foreign policy interests and regional priorities; for example, it was continuing to enhance nuclear safety in Ukraine and Armenia. Her country also supported Agency activities that went beyond the technical cooperation programme; thus, under PACT, over the preceding two years it had financed improvements in cancer treatment in countries in need in the region.

173. The rising demand for the Agency's services was not reflected in a corresponding increase in financial resources. The Czech Republic commended the Secretariat on its efforts to seek a balance between programme requirements and the limited funds available for their implementation. It welcomed the activities to mobilize further resources, including by approaching non-conventional donors.

174. Mr. ERTAY (Turkey) said that the rapidly increasing global demand for electricity, growing uncertainty regarding the supply and prices of oil and natural gas, and heightened concerns about greenhouse gas emissions had opened up new prospects for the development of nuclear energy on a global scale and led to a revival of the debate on the pros and cons of nuclear energy. Turkey's energy policy was focused on the security, sustainability and competitiveness of supply, and was designed to sustain targeted economic and social growth in the long term. Recent demand projections in Turkey for the period up to 2020 predicted an average annual increase in demand of about 8%. There was therefore a need to increase energy production and supply significantly and the Turkish Government was striving to improve the utilization of domestic resources such as coal, hydroelectric power, petroleum and natural gas. However, those resources currently fell short of meeting domestic needs and more than half of Turkey's primary energy demand was being met through imports.

175. Turkey recognized the importance of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology and the crucial role the Agency played in that regard. It also recognized that any significant increase in nuclear power would only be possible if the international community were able to meet certain challenges, including advances in innovative and evolutionary technologies, and address concerns about waste, proliferation, safety and security. The Turkish Government had already expressed its intention to introduce nuclear energy and preparations were well under way to include nuclear power as a major component in its energy supply mix in the medium to long term. Turkey's current priority was the reorganization of its nuclear regulatory infrastructure; it would then put the final touches to a

programme that aimed to make the first units of a nuclear power plant operational in the latter part of the coming decade. A law was expected to be enacted soon that would provide incentives for the private sector. His country would continue to cooperate closely and fully with the Agency in launching and operating its prospective programme.

176. Nuclear weapons proliferation, including potential proliferation to non-State actors, was a serious concern for Turkey, which was fully committed to the implementation of the NPT. His country would continue to promote issues of key importance for the NPT's sustainability in the long term, including its universalization, strengthening of the Agency's safeguards system, reinforcement of export controls, the early entry into force of the CTBT, and the immediate start of negotiations on and early conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty. Turkey was dedicated to full compliance with the NPT, including the application of its comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol.

177. Comprehensive safeguards agreements plus additional protocols were the current verification standard and his country was concerned that there were still more than 100 States without additional protocols, and even 31 without comprehensive safeguards agreements. Turkey added its voice to the persistent calls of the Director General for all the States concerned to sign, ratify and implement comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols without delay. It found it regrettable that the 2005 NPT Review Conference had been unable to reach consensus on substantive matters, and it would continue to work constructively towards a substantive outcome for the 2010 NPT Review Conference. He encouraged others to do likewise.

178. His country looked forward to the peaceful solution of the current non-proliferation issues that were of concern to the international community. The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula remained a regional and global priority and his country welcomed the progress made in implementation of the agreement of 13 February 2007. The active cooperation the Agency's team had been receiving from the DPRK was particularly welcome.

179. Turkey also attached great importance to the alleviation, through peaceful means and as soon as possible, of the ongoing crisis of confidence between Iran and the international community regarding the scope and nature of its past and current nuclear programmes. It was therefore concerned that the Agency had once again been unable to verify certain important aspects relevant to the scope and nature of that country's nuclear programme in its latest report. It did, however, welcome the fact that the Agency had been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and that Iran had continued to provide the access and reporting needed to allow Agency verification in that regard. It was also encouraged that Iran had provided the Agency with additional information needed to resolve a number of long outstanding issues. His country welcomed the work plan that had been agreed, which was an important step in the right direction. It looked forward to its full and timely implementation, and hoped that it would help to pave the way for the resumption of the negotiation process between Iran and all relevant parties. He commended the Director General and his staff for their tireless and impartial efforts. A just and durable solution should provide the international community with the required level of assurance while at the same time enabling Iran to exercise its rights under the NPT.

180. His country recognized that a global nuclear, radiation and waste safety culture was a key factor for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and that continued efforts were required to ensure that the technical and human elements of safety were adequately maintained worldwide. It appreciated the Agency's efforts to develop appropriate strategies for sustainable education and training in those areas, including the safety and security of radioactive sources, and welcomed its activities aimed at fostering a global nuclear safety regime, in particular the updating of its safety standards. Turkey encouraged the Agency to continue its efforts to provide guidance, support and assistance to Member States in establishing and maintaining adequate safety standards and infrastructure, particularly those that were considering developing nuclear power.

181. Turkey attached great importance to the fight against terrorism. Its Government was committed to international efforts to combat all forms of terrorism, including malicious acts involving nuclear and radioactive material. His country strongly supported all measures aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological weapons and their means of delivery. It supported the objectives and implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and it took the utmost care to prevent illegal trade in nuclear material and technology, weapons of mass destruction or any of their components. It had hosted the second meeting of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in February 2007 and had also taken part in the activities of the Proliferation Security Initiative.

182. His country attached the utmost importance to the Agency's promotional activities and strongly supported its technical cooperation programme, considering the funding of technical cooperation activities to be the joint responsibility of all Member States. It therefore encouraged all concerned to pay their shares of the TCF in full and on time.

183. Finally, Turkey upheld the recommendation of the External Auditor to improve interaction with United Nations organizations and other institutions and welcomed the progress made in that regard.

184. Mr. HASTOWO (Indonesia) said that, over the past 50 years, the Agency had played an important role in promoting socio-economic development and maintaining world peace and security. He expressed appreciation for the technical cooperation provided to his country by the Agency and for the visit by the Director General in December 2006.

185. Given the growing demand for energy, Indonesia could not continue to rely on traditional energy sources and had opted for nuclear energy to meet its future energy needs. In that context, he thanked the Agency for assisting Indonesia through two technical cooperation projects: one on the preparation of regulations, codes, guides and standards; and the other relating to preparations for the construction of a nuclear power plant. Intensive bilateral and multilateral cooperation with countries with experience in building and operating nuclear power plants was also necessary. Indonesia was at a crucial stage of its programme: with the help of a public information campaign and educational initiatives, it had to convince the public of the importance of nuclear energy in achieving sustainable development.

186. His country welcomed the agreement on eight projects proposed by Indonesia for implementation in 2007–2008 in the fields of energy, food and agriculture, human health and environment. However, it stressed the need for a more balanced distribution of the budget so as to reflect the equal importance of the Agency's various statutory activities.

187. Indonesia welcomed the fact that the TCF targets for 2007–2008 had been set at \$80 million and the IPFs for 2009–2011 at \$82 million. It was encouraging that the rate of attainment for the TCF had stood at 93% by the end of 2006 and that new resources had reached a record high of \$101 million. He thanked those countries that had contributed regularly to the TCF in full and on time. For its part, Indonesia had consistently paid its pledge of its annual share of the TCF targets and would continue to do so in the future.

188. Resources for the Agency's technical cooperation activities had to be sufficient, assured and predictable. Any efforts to explore proposals for a more sufficient, assured and predictable TCF, as requested in resolution GC(50)/RES/12, should strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's technical cooperation activities and should not place any additional financial burden on Member States, especially developing countries. In that connection, Indonesia looked forward to the outcome of the discussions on various approaches to strengthening the financing of the technical cooperation programme, as well as to the forthcoming study on the future programmatic and

budgetary requirements of the Agency announced by the Director General at the July 2007 Board meeting.

189. His country wished to place on record its appreciation for the significant contribution made by the Agency through its technical cooperation activities to increasing the capacity of Member States in the area of nuclear applications. It was implementing the new approach to improving the CPF and expected to sign a CPF for 2007–2012 by the end of the year.

190. Indonesia appreciated the Agency's support in the field of radiation-induced mutation to produce new plant varieties. High-quality rice mutant varieties had been planted on more than one million hectares in the country.

191. His country also supported the Agency's efforts to combat cancer and, in that connection, it was pleased to report that the commissioning of the radiotherapy centre in Kalimantan was expected to be completed by the end of the year.

192. With regard to the preservation and dissemination of nuclear safety knowledge, the Asian Nuclear Safety Network had been disseminating nuclear safety knowledge to universities and academic bodies in the country. Indonesia had also been actively involved in six topical groups in the Network. Funding for nuclear safety activities should be secure, adequate and predictable. However, it should not come from the Regular Budget because that would be an additional burden for developing Member States.

193. As one of the members of INPRO, Indonesia supported the project's activities aimed at meeting global energy demand and promoting sustainable economic and social development. It welcomed the application of the INPRO user methodology in multiple contexts in a number of countries as part of the assessment of innovative nuclear systems. It had contributed to the INPRO programme by sending cost-free experts in the nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear safety. In 2008, it would be participating in a collaborative project in the field of advanced HTGR design.

194. With regard to the security of radioactive sources, his delegation was pleased to announce that a Government regulation on the safety of ionizing radiation and security of radioactive sources, based on the IAEA Basic Safety Standards, had been enacted in 2007.

195. Indonesia was committed to implementing fully its integrated safeguards agreement. While it supported efforts to promote the universalization of the additional protocol, they should not be at the expense of the Agency's work on promoting international cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As a party to the NPT and integrated safeguards, Indonesia fully supported the inalienable right of State Parties to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in accordance with Article IV of the NPT. Each country's choice in that regard should be respected without undermining its national policies, international cooperation agreements and arrangements concerning the peaceful use of nuclear energy, or its fuel cycle policies.

196. The inability to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East was a matter of serious concern, as was the continuing defiant attitude and policy of one country in the region which refused to place its nuclear installations under Agency safeguards or accede to the NPT. Even more regrettably, the belligerent policy of that country enjoyed the support of a number of Member States of the Agency. The double standard applied by those countries was unacceptable.

197. Indonesia welcomed the outcome of the latest round of six-party talks on the DPRK nuclear issue in February 2007 and the agreement on initial actions for the implementation of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005. The agreement was a step in the right direction in a long and complex process aimed at achieving the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful and transparent manner. His country was also pleased at the recent positive developments regarding the

implementation of the arrangements agreed between the DPRK and the Agency for monitoring and verification of the shutdown of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities.

198. With regard to the Iranian nuclear issue, his country welcomed the work plan agreed upon by Iran and the Agency and commended the Agency on the progress it had made in its efforts to resolve the outstanding issues. Timely implementation of the work plan was the key to arriving at a peaceful settlement of the issue through diplomacy and negotiation.

199. Ms. MACMILLAN (New Zealand) said that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were key elements of her country's foreign policy. New Zealand would continue to support the Agency's key role in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons through the implementation of safeguards under the NPT. It had taken an active part in the discussions in May launching the preparatory process for the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Delegations had demonstrated a commitment to be constructive, an agenda for the review cycle had been agreed and there had been a good exchange of views on issues at the heart of the Treaty. The challenge ahead was how best to build on that substantive start to strengthen the Treaty and meet the challenges of the current security environment.

200. One of the Agency's key roles was to provide assurances that nuclear material was not being diverted from peaceful uses. To fulfil that mandate, the Director General had to have the necessary tools, including the additional protocol. New Zealand continued to believe that the additional protocol was the contemporary verification standard and should be a condition of nuclear supply. It urged those States that had not yet done so to conclude an additional protocol with the Agency without delay. Her country was also supportive of the decision to modify the SQP in order to address weaknesses in the current safeguards system and welcomed the Agency's offer to assist small States in the implementation of that decision.

201. The threat of nuclear terrorism and other malicious acts involving nuclear material remained real, transnational and multifaceted. New Zealand welcomed the Nuclear Security Report 2007 and assured the Agency of its continued support for the Nuclear Security Fund.

202. In the area of nuclear safety, her country was committed to the principles and objectives of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the related Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.

203. New Zealand welcomed the Director General's recent report on the application of safeguards in the DPRK. It was pleased with the progress that had been made in the six-party talks and the working group process. A committed dialogue where all parties worked constructively to achieve a peaceful settlement offered the best possibility to ensure the peaceful and comprehensive resolution of the issue. Her country welcomed the Agency's return to the DPRK and hoped that the progress made would signal the start of efforts by the DPRK to return to full compliance with its international obligations. The successful settlement of such a longstanding issue would be a significant accomplishment for international peace and security.

204. Her country shared the international community's concerns over the outstanding questions regarding Iran's nuclear programme. The increased level of engagement in recent weeks between Iran and the Agency was encouraging and she expressed the hope that it would result in tangible progress in the Agency's efforts to resolve the outstanding issues. Despite those positive developments, Iran's failure to comply with resolutions of the Security Council and the Agency remained a cause of concern. She called on Iran to comply with the resolutions, in particular through the suspension of its enrichment and reprocessing activities. Iran would need to continue to build confidence about the scope and nature of its present and future nuclear programme. The additional protocol was of key importance in that regard and New Zealand urged Iran to take steps to ratify that instrument without delay.

205. Safety of transport of radioactive material continued to be of considerable significance to New Zealand, since shipments occasionally passed its shores. It was important to ensure that the highest possible safety and security standards were adhered to, that appropriate information was received in advance of any shipments that might take place through the Pacific, that proper emergency response systems were in operation, and that an effective liability and compensation mechanism was in place. New Zealand was pleased that progress was being made in many of those areas and urged all parties to continue to strive for improvements where possible. Her country appreciated the valuable role that INLEX had played in examining the application and scope of the Agency's nuclear liability regime and welcomed the outreach workshops held to explain the nature and content of the international regime. It continued to attach importance to INLEX's consideration of possible gaps in the regime and ways in which to address any such gaps. Her country also welcomed the continued dialogue between coastal and shipping States on those issues, in particular on the exchange of information regarding shipments.

206. As a strong supporter of the NPT, her country had accepted the principle of access to nuclear technology for peaceful uses, in particular the many civilian applications that were not related to nuclear power generation and could enhance the lives of millions of people worldwide. New Zealand had rejected the use of nuclear power for itself, as it did not believe it to be compatible with the concept of sustainable development, given the long-term financial and ecological costs associated with the disposal of nuclear waste. Her country was also concerned about possible associated proliferation risks. Any responsible discussion about nuclear power as an option should be balanced and include consideration of the serious risks and costs as well as of any potential benefits. New Zealand was not convinced that the Agency should have an increased focus on the provision of expertise and resources relating to nuclear power when there were many other more sustainable energy sources that could be developed.

207. It was a challenging time for the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime and it was imperative that the international community work together to agree on and coordinate effective responses to meet the challenges. The Agency played a vital role in that collective response, working with Member States to safeguard and secure nuclear material for exclusively peaceful purposes.

208. Ms. ŽIAKOVÁ (Slovakia) said that the Agency's international safeguards system was an essential part of the global non-proliferation regime. The current verification standard should be a comprehensive safeguards agreement combined with an additional protocol, which would help create the necessary confidence for increased international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Her country had been the first to ratify the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism which had entered into force in July 2007 and it supported all reasonable measures that would encourage broad adherence to the Convention and implementation of its provisions.

209. Over 50% of electricity in Slovakia was generated by nuclear power plants. The shutdown in 2006 of Unit 1 of the Bohunice V1 nuclear power plant posed a challenge to the security of energy supply. The Government and the energy sector were working to find economically acceptable, reliable and environmentally sound sources of electricity to make up the shortfall. In 2007, the country's major energy producer had announced plans to complete two nuclear units at the Mochovce site, which would make a major contribution to energy security in the long term. However, the security of nuclear fuel supplies had to be assured if the growing demand for electricity was to be met and the country's economic growth maintained. Her country was ready to discuss all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle with the international community.

210. The first constitutive conference of the European Nuclear Forum would take place in Bratislava in September 2007 and it was hoped the forum would create a platform for broad discussion of the use of nuclear power in Europe.

211. The Agency's Fundamental Safety Principles were a milestone in the development of unified Agency safety standards. Slovakia was ready to contribute actively to the development of subsequent Safety Requirements and Safety Guides in the future. She also emphasized the importance of the Agency's international peer review services and expert services. Slovakia had invited an OSART team to visit the Mochovce plant in 2006, which had provided valuable safety information for both the operator and the regulator. The independent Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic had declared that all nuclear installations in Slovakia were safe, reliable and operated in accordance with national legislation. However, that had not prompted complacency. Further steps were being taken to improve safety at all installations, including a modernization and improvement programme at the Bohunice V2 nuclear power plant.

212. Slovakia had collaborated with the Agency in many national, regional and interregional technical cooperation projects. Human resources development, safety of long-term operation of nuclear power plants, decommissioning of nuclear facilities, emergency preparedness and nuclear medicine were important areas of cooperation and information exchange. Slovakia would also continue to provide experts and training facilities and host fellows and visiting scientists sponsored by the Agency. The Government had paid its contributions to the TCF in full and on time and had taken steps to fulfil its obligations for 2008.

213. Mr. MSOLLA (United Republic of Tanzania) commended the Agency's technical cooperation programme and expressed his country's gratitude for the projects it had benefited from in such areas as tsetse eradication, improved cancer care, radiation protection, radiation and waste safety infrastructure, enhanced water resources management, and the building of energy planning capabilities for sustainable development. There was an urgent need for continued cooperation to catalyse socio-economic development and alleviate poverty.

214. His country also appreciated being included in the PACT pilot project as there was a major equipment and expertise deficit in his country in the area of cancer treatment. A number of consultative meetings had been held between Tanzanian experts, Agency experts and PACT partners to formulate a national cancer control and management programme. Two cobalt units had been received and a second cancer treatment centre was planned. He urged the acceleration of the pilot project so that it could be extended to other Member States.

215. The United Republic of Tanzania had recently suffered an energy crisis owing to a drought that had had a very adverse impact on its power supply which was largely dependent on hydroelectric power. Consequently, it was keenly following the progress of the current renaissance in nuclear power. International efforts aimed at assuring nuclear fuel supplies were a positive development. His country welcomed the fact that the Agency was implementing the project on sustainable energy development in sub-Saharan Africa. If its objectives were achieved, participating countries would be empowered to make their own decisions as to whether it was appropriate, and how to integrate nuclear power into their energy mixes. He urged continued support in that area.

216. His country gratefully acknowledged the Agency's support for AFRA, in which it participated. It supported the current reorganization in the Agency Secretariat in the interests of efficiently supporting AFRA. It also appreciated the funding and support from the Agency and from donor Member States and hoped that that support would continue.

217. He wished to place on record his country's profound appreciation for the assistance that was being given to it and to Africa in general in the area of tsetse eradication, which had enabled Tanzania

to fly-proof its tsetse mass rearing facility at the Tsetse and Trypanosomiasis Research Institute. The centre had been strengthened and was now able to rear efficiently a number of species of tsetse fly. His country was eagerly awaiting further Agency assistance to implement a national workshop on grid-based sampling systems which would give it and PATTEC countries a better capability to formulate projects.

218. In connection with his country's efforts to improve dairy farming by artificial insemination, it was grateful to the Agency for enabling its national artificial insemination centre in Arusha to acquire a brand new liquid nitrogen plant capable of producing up to ten litres an hour.

219. In the area of industrial applications of nuclear technology, Tanzania had received valuable technical assistance with the aim of strengthening NDT infrastructure and capacity. Consolidation of the capacity gained in human resources development, leading to international accreditation, and strengthening of institutional quality management systems would contribute to the poverty reduction programme. It was expected that his country would be developing a national programme for the qualification and certification of personnel in that area. There was also a need to build capacity for the use of nuclear techniques for quality control, troubleshooting and optimization of industrial processes.

220. The United Republic of Tanzania appreciated the efforts being made by the international community to meet the challenges of nuclear weapons proliferation and the global threat of nuclear terrorism, and it called on all Member States to stand together, through the United Nations and the Agency, in meeting those challenges. However, it was also important not to lose focus on poverty reduction efforts in developing countries or marginalize technical cooperation activities. His country would do its best to meet its nuclear non-proliferation obligations in a non-discriminatory way. In that connection, strengthening of the Agency's safeguards system and the additional protocol were vital to efforts to reinforce the NPT.

221. Mr. RISTORI (European Commission) said that, in the year 2007, two significant anniversaries were being commemorated: the fiftieth anniversary of the Agency and the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the Euratom Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community. Over those fifty years, the importance of the role of nuclear energy in different countries had been proven, together with the value of work to ensure the safety and security of nuclear energy, and non-proliferation. The importance of cooperation between the Agency and Euratom would be emphasized in a joint political statement that was in the process of being prepared and should be signed in the coming months.

222. In March 2007, the European Council had considered issues relating to energy, environment and climate change, and had emphasized the link between those policy areas, noting that some 80% of greenhouse gas emissions resulted from energy production and consumption. The key objective was to construct an economy in Europe that was low in emissions. Although each Member State had the right to choose its own energy mix, nuclear energy — with its low carbon emissions — could have a role to play.

223. Europe possessed some of the most advanced reactors and enrichment and reprocessing technologies. It hoped to develop the most advanced legal framework for nuclear power, and the Commission had, with the full support of the European Council, created a European high-level group on nuclear safety and waste management. A European nuclear forum had been established with a view to promoting frank discussion of the benefits and risks of nuclear power. The first meeting of the forum would be held in Bratislava in November.

224. Nuclear safety remained one of the major concerns within the Euratom Community. The European Commission fully supported all Agency initiatives promoting a global nuclear safety regime and continued to encourage the Member States of the European Union to ensure the highest safety levels in nuclear installations. Following the enlargements of the European Union, agreement had been

reached on the early closure of less reliable plants in Bulgaria, Lithuania and the Slovak Republic. In exchange, the countries concerned had received significant financial assistance for safe dismantling, waste management and the energy and human resources sectors.

225. In the area of radiation protection, the new Euratom directive on the supervision and control of shipments of radioactive waste and spent fuel had entered into force in December 2006. The Commission was also continuing with the revision of the Euratom basic safety standards and intended to incorporate all directives relating to radiation protection in a single piece of legislation.

226. Nuclear safeguards were of the greatest importance to provide credible assurances of the non-diversion of nuclear material. The European Commission strongly supported the Agency's efforts to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system, and had entered into a dialogue with the Agency in that regard at the highest level.

227. The issue of non-proliferation was assuming ever greater importance as more and more countries recognized the need to resort to nuclear energy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions while achieving economic growth. There was an obligation to assist those countries in their pursuit of low-carbon sources of energy while maintaining the highest levels of non-proliferation, safety and security. The European Commission looked forward to the development of multilateral approaches to the fuel cycle. The Commission would ensure that the provisions and obligations of the Euratom Treaty were respected by its Member States and that market competition was maintained within the territory of the European Community. It would contribute in a constructive manner to the debate on multilateral supply mechanisms and would work with the international community to establish a global partnership enabling countries to benefit from civil nuclear power.

The meeting rose at 7.50 p.m.