Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System Including Implementation of Additional Protocols

Summary

- This report describes the progress made since the forty-ninth regular session of the General Conference in strengthening the safeguards system and improving its efficiency, including implementation of additional protocols.
A. Introduction

1. In resolution GC(49)/RES/13, “Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System, and Application of the Model Additional Protocol”, the General Conference requested the Director General to report to the fiftieth regular session on the implementation of the resolution. This report responds to that request and updates the information given in last year’s report to the General Conference (document GC(49)/9) on this agenda item.

B. Implementation and Further Development of Safeguards Strengthening and Efficiency Measures

2. As described in document GC(49)/9, in May 2005, the Director General submitted a report to the Board of Governors on the limitations of ‘Small Quantities Protocols’ (SQPs) to comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs), seen against the background of efforts to strengthen the safeguards system. At the conclusion of its deliberations on the issue in June 2005, the Board while recognizing that the SQP, in its present form, constituted a weakness in the safeguards system, requested the Secretariat to provide further information about the practical implications of the two possible options for addressing this concern which were identified in the Director General’s report. The Secretariat did so at a seminar open to all parties to safeguards agreements in Vienna in early September 2005. Following further extensive consultations with States, the Board of Governors decided on 20 September 2005 that SQPs should remain part of the Agency’s safeguards system, subject to modifications in the standardized text and the modified criteria governing eligibility for an SQP, as proposed in the Director General’s report to the June Board. The Board also decided that it would henceforth approve only SQPs based on the revised standardized text and subject to the modified criteria. It authorized the Director General to conclude exchanges of letters with all States with SQPs to give effect to these modifications and changed criteria, called upon the States concerned to conclude such exchanges of letters as soon as possible and requested the Secretariat to assist States with SQPs in the establishment and maintenance of their State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSACs). The Secretariat has since initiated the exchanges of letters, produced written guidance for representatives of SQP States on practical aspects of the Board’s decisions on SQPs and

1 The text of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards is contained in document INFCIRC/540 (Corr.).

2 The changes endorsed by the Board have the effect of: (i) making an SQP unavailable to a State with an existing or planned facility; (ii) requiring States to provide initial reports on nuclear material and notification as soon as a decision has been taken to construct or authorize construction of a nuclear facility; and (iii) allowing for Agency inspections.
organized three training events for those States (see paragraph 41). As of the end of June 2006, seven SQP States had accepted the proposed amendments to their SQPs. 3

3. In June 2005, the Board of Governors established the Advisory Committee on Safeguards and Verification within the Framework of the IAEA Statute, otherwise known as Committee 25. Committee 25 was established, with an initial two-year mandate, to consider ways and means to strengthen the safeguards system and to make relevant recommendations to the Board. The first Committee meeting was held in November 2005, followed by two other meetings in January and May 2006. The Secretariat has prepared for the Committee’s consideration several notes identifying further measures to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system. Informal consultations on these measures were held with Member States in the margins of the June 2006 session of the Board of Governors. The next meeting of Committee 25 will be convened on 26 September 2006.

4. In resolution GC(49)/RES/13, the General Conference welcomed efforts to strengthen safeguards, including the Secretariat’s activities in verifying and analysing information provided by Member States on nuclear supply and procurement, and invited States to cooperate with the Agency in this regard. The Secretariat has since continued to analyse nuclear trade related information provided by Member States, with a view to contributing to the State evaluation process and providing early indications of undeclared nuclear activities. Information on the procurement and supply of sensitive nuclear technology is aimed at allowing the Agency to obtain a greater understanding of covert trade activities on a transnational basis, for safeguards purposes. The Secretariat is reaching out to Member States that might be willing, on a voluntary basis, to provide pertinent information on international nuclear activities and trade relevant to improved safeguards implementation. As of June 2006, nine States are either participating in this effort or are in discussions with the Secretariat on their participation. The Secretariat is continuing to develop a secure information system to facilitate the handling, storing and analysis of the information acquired by it in this connection.

B.1. Drawing Safeguards Conclusions: The Further Development of the State Evaluation Process

5. As reported in the Safeguards Statement of the Agency for 2005, safeguards were applied in that year for 156 States4 with safeguards agreements in force with the Agency. The Secretariat’s findings and safeguards conclusions for 2005 are derived from an evaluation of all the information available to the Agency. As in the Safeguards Statement for 2004, the conclusions for 2005 were reported by type of safeguards agreement and corresponding safeguards obligations. This format provides greater clarity in the way in which the Secretariat presents its safeguards conclusions and supporting material in the annual Safeguards Implementation Report5.

6. The State evaluation process, through which safeguards relevant information is continuously evaluated and reviewed, continues to be central to the drawing of safeguards conclusions. Between July 2005 and June 2006, the Secretariat prepared and reviewed 88 State evaluation reports, 62 of which involved analysis of additional protocol (AP) declarations. Since the inception of the State evaluation process, 416 State evaluation reports have been produced and reviewed covering 109 States, 64 of which have significant nuclear activities.

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3 Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Comoros, Ecuador, Mali, Palau, Tajikistan.

4 And Taiwan, China.

7. The Secretariat continued to develop the State-level concept for the implementation of safeguards and evaluation of safeguards implementation. Under the State-level concept, safeguards implementation and evaluation are based on State-level approaches (SLAs), which include an Annual Implementation Plan, developed for each State. SLAs are using safeguards verification objectives common to all States with CSAs, while the approaches also take into account State-specific features, such as the effectiveness of the SSAC and the features of the State’s nuclear fuel cycle. The equitable implementation of the State-level concept will facilitate the further improvement of the effectiveness and efficiency of Agency safeguards. By the end of 2005, the Secretariat finalized guidelines for the development of integrated SLAs and an updated procedure for evaluating the implementation of integrated safeguards.

B.2. Development and Implementation of Safeguards Approaches, Procedures and Technology

8. The Secretariat continued to rely on Member State Support Programmes (MSSPs) for all safeguards research and development (R&D) activities and developed a biennial R&D programme for 2006–2007 to coordinate these activities. In addition to contributing to many of the activities reported in this document, MSSPs also supported the Secretariat’s new project for the identification and development of effective and appropriate advanced technologies for the detection of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Over 60 technical proposals were received from Member States in connection with this project, from which six tasks with three States were established for further development and field evaluation. Three of these tasks involve the development of novel instruments and procedures for detecting the location and nature of undeclared nuclear material or activities, while the remaining tasks focus on the development of inspection tools with on-site forensic capabilities. A technical meeting on noble gas monitoring sampling and analysis for safeguards applications, a workshop on safeguards tools for the future, and bilateral seminars organized by several Member States generated a number of new ideas for safeguards technologies and tools.

B.2.1. Safeguards Approaches

9. The Agency has continued to develop new and improved safeguards approaches. These include: a review of safeguards approaches at enrichment plants; the verification of transfers of spent fuel to dry storage; and safeguards approaches for geological repositories. An improved model safeguards approach for gas centrifuge enrichment plants was prepared by the Secretariat and reviewed and supported by the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI). Additionally, several facility-specific safeguards approaches have been developed or further improved, including: field trials of the new safeguards approach for verifying transfers of spent fuel to a dry storage facility; a safeguards approach for a research reactor fuel stabilization project; short notice random inspection regimes for uranium conversion plants and for depleted, natural and low enriched uranium fuel fabrication plants; and a safeguards approach for a new commercial enrichment plant.

10. The ten-year project to develop a safeguards approach for the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant in Japan was completed at the beginning of 2006. Active testing of the facility began in April 2006, with commercial operation anticipated for 2007. Most of the safeguards equipment is installed and in use, while the remainder is undergoing hot testing and calibration. Safeguards inspections are being carried out on a continuous basis.

B.2.2. Information Technology

11. Since last year’s report to the General Conference, the Agency continued to work on the IAEA Safeguards Information System Re-engineering Project (IRP) to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of information processing by replacing the current system with a modern environment. The
project will ensure better process support and accessibility of data, including remote access by field offices and inspectors. Upon completion, the new system should not only serve the current needs of the Agency’s safeguards programme, but also be flexible enough to adapt to future challenges and associated requirements. IRP implementation began in July 2005, with the assistance of a commercial contractor. A new platform for the storage and processing of safeguards information was selected in October 2005. A “proof of concept” was performed in February 2006, confirming the adequacy of the selection. The development environment was installed and tested as of June 2006. The project is expected to be completed by 2009, with the phasing out of the current platform and associated data management systems and processes.

12. The Agency held a workshop in November 2005 in Vienna on enhancement of information analysis architecture with the aim of improving the collection, handling and analysis of information for the State evaluation process. The workshop was particularly valuable for learning about state-of-the-art information analysis tools.

13. In 2005, the Secretariat acquired and analysed satellite imagery on a regular basis in support of its safeguards activities. Hyperspectral imagery, which was used for the first time in 2005, demonstrated potential for significantly improving the Secretariat’s ability to monitor uranium mining and milling activities. In cooperation with some Member States, radar imagery processing has been developed and partially implemented; this technique further improves the Secretariat’s ability to identify specific activities including activities underground. The rapid growth of satellite imagery services and their demonstrated value in support of the Agency’s safeguards and verification work have created the need for a more sophisticated system for processing, analysing and storing imagery and cartographic data. In this regard, a project for the design of such a system was initiated in 2005.

14. In support of strengthening SSACs, the Agency has developed software aimed at improving the quality of States’ nuclear material accounting reports. The software has been tested and is available on request to all States.

15. In 2005, the implementation of further secure local network segments helped standardize the handling of highly confidential electronic information related to safeguards implementation within the Agency. Tools for detecting and preventing electronic intrusion attempts were upgraded. Special attention was paid to reinforcing the security of the information technology networks and equipment at the Agency’s regional offices and at selected facilities.

B.2.3. Safeguards Equipment

16. Since last year’s report to the General Conference, the customizing of gamma and neutron measurement equipment for the verification of special irradiated material in hot cells and reactor ponds continued. Efforts were also made in enhancing the Agency’s ability to perform measurements on spent fuel dry storage containers. Further development and implementation of new systems continued in connection with: the verification of containers with uranium and of items containing nuclear waste; the improved calibration of neutron coincidence counting instruments; and the application of the digital Cerenkov viewing device (DCVD).

17. In connection with design information verification, the Secretariat confirmed the value of ground penetrating radar to detect the presence of undeclared design features and hidden facilities. A commercially available non-destructive assay (NDA) system based on X ray fluorescence analysis, which can determine, inter alia, special steels used in enrichment technology, was tested and subsequently authorized for inspection use.

18. By June 2006, the Agency’s surveillance systems continued to be improved through the installation of more reliable digital systems to replace obsolete video-based multi-camera systems. By
the end of June 2006, the Secretariat was managing 987 cameras connected to 535 systems at 232 facilities in 34 States.

19. A new electro-optical sealing system (EOSS) has been successfully tested and its purchase is under way to replace all VACOSS seals. Development of a new Fiber-Optic Seal (Cobra) verification system was initiated to enhance tamper resistance and to incorporate reader compatibility with the EOSS seal. Feasibility studies were initiated on new sealing systems and containment verification techniques.

20. Since last year’s report to the General Conference, unattended monitoring systems continued to be installed or upgraded. By the end of June 2006, there were 126 surveillance and radiation monitoring systems with remote transmission capabilities: 85 surveillance systems (with 311 cameras) in 15 States, and 41 unattended radiation monitoring systems in seven States. Ninety-five of the 126 systems were transmitting safeguards data and 31 systems were transmitting only equipment ‘state-of-health’ data.

21. The Secretariat initiated cooperation with the European Space Agency (ESA) in the area of secure satellite communications. It was demonstrated that the same satellite link could also be used for secure surveillance data and voice communication. The Agency and ESA co-funded a feasibility study to assess the relevance of satellite communications for both safeguards purposes and for the Agency’s Incident and Emergency Centre.

B.2.4. Environmental Sampling

22. Environmental sampling continues to play a key role in detecting undeclared nuclear material and activities. The Agency’s Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) was used at full capacity in 2005. The number of environmental samples increased from just over 200 in 2000 to more than 750 in 2005. In the same period, the number of analytical laboratories in the Agency’s network performing environmental sample analysis increased from 10 to 14 (in nine Member States), including the Agency’s Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) in Seibersdorf. In addition, the number of staff in the Department of Safeguards engaged in evaluating the results of environmental samples was increased. Nevertheless, due to the overall shortage of laboratory services and human resources, significant delays in environmental sample analysis are being experienced.

23. In 2005, the average time from the collection of environmental samples to the reporting of analytical results was eight months. The Agency’s goal is to reduce sample processing time to three months on average: one month for shipping and distribution to the NWAL, one month for sample analysis and one month for evaluating and reporting the results. Meeting this goal would require an increase in the number/capacity of relevant laboratories in the network, a substantial improvement in the capability of SAL, and a substantial increase in the number of staff involved in the evaluation and reporting of the results. A feasibility study involving a number of MSSPs was initiated in March 2006 to identify options and the associated costs for updating SAL laboratory space and installed instrumentation, as well as streamlining process operations, to meet the analytical needs of the Agency.

24. In 2005, SAL opened a new room for chemical treatment of radioactive environmental samples prior to mass spectrometry measurements. A new high resolution inductively coupled plasma mass
spectrometer (ICPMS) was installed at SAL for use in the quality control of material and processes in environmental sampling and destructive analysis. A new high resolution video microscope was installed which speeds up the preparation of samples for particle analysis by secondary ion mass spectrometry (SIMS). New methods were deployed at the SIMS laboratory to enhance the isotopic measurements. A consultant group of experts from the NWAL recommended the introduction of a new ultra-high sensitive SIMS instrument for the analysis of safeguards samples at SAL to improve the effectiveness of particle analysis and gamma-spectrometric measurements of environmental samples. Nevertheless, due to lack of qualified human resources, the operation of SAL’s SIMS laboratory has been temporarily shut down since April 2006.

B.3. Cooperation with State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material

25. SSACs are fundamental to effective and efficient safeguards implementation. States need legislative and regulatory systems to exercise necessary regulatory and control functions. SSACs also need the technical and analytical ability to perform nuclear material measurements and to meet safeguards reporting obligations. The IAEA SSAC Advisory Service (ISSAS) was initiated to provide Member States with advice and recommendations in establishing and strengthening their SSACs. The ISSAS Guidelines, which were tested during a pilot ISSAS mission to Indonesia in 2004, have been finalized and published. Upon the request of the Government, an ISSAS mission was conducted in the Republic of Korea in 2005. A Nuclear Material Accounting Handbook was prepared by the Secretariat, reviewed by a group of international experts, and is being published. It aims to provide assistance to Member States in matters related to nuclear material accounting and control. Some Member States have invited the Agency to carry out an ISSAS mission in their respective countries and the Agency is actively considering each request.

26. Since July 2005, the Agency has conducted 11 national, regional and international training courses for State personnel where assistance was provided to States in fulfilling their obligations under safeguards agreements and APs. These included: courses on SSACs in Brazil, Japan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine; an SSAC course in Australia for Iraqi State authorities; a regional seminar in Morocco on the AP for African countries; a national workshop in Mexico on the application of the AP; a workshop at the Agency Headquarters in Vienna on nuclear material accounting and control for operators of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, Iran; a seminar in Vienna on the role of SSACs in implementing safeguards in States with CSAs and SQPs; a seminar in Quito, Ecuador, on verifying compliance with nuclear non-proliferation commitments; and a regional workshop in China on nuclear material accounting and control at facilities.

27. The common book auditing procedure agreed upon with the Brazilian–Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material (ABACC) was successfully implemented. The Agency and ABACC agreed on a number of new procedures for joint inspections and joint equipment use for Argentina and Brazil.

28. Safeguards implementation continued to be carried out in the Member States of the European Union pursuant to the New Partnership Approach (NPA) between the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the Agency. EURATOM maintained its participation at most inspections; however, during 2005, there was a noticeable decrease in the level of EURATOM’s support for the maintenance and replacement of joint-use equipment, particularly surveillance systems. The Secretariat continued its discussions on pending safeguards implementation matters and on the NPA at the various levels with officials responsible for safeguards implementation in EURATOM.

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8 ISSAS Guidelines; Reference report for IAEA SSAC advisory service, Service Series 13, Vienna, November 2005.
with a view to improving the working relationship between the Agency and EURATOM. It was agreed that the liaison meetings with senior representatives from each organization be resumed later this year.

**B.4. Training**

29. Effective and efficient safeguards implementation depends, inter alia, on well trained staff with the necessary skills. The safeguards training curriculum was further developed with an emphasis on safeguards strengthening measures. An Introductory Course on Agency Safeguards (ICAS) for new inspectors was held once in the past year. In addition, the Agency continued to provide inspector and support staff training on AP subjects. Much effort has been dedicated to the assessment and development of training to respond to the needs coming from the changing safeguards environment.

**B.5. Quality Management**

30. Pursuant to recommendations by an external evaluators’ review of Major Programme 4, ‘Nuclear Verification’, and by SAGSI in 2004, the Department of Safeguards initiated a project to implement a comprehensive quality management system (QMS) that will comply with the ISO-9001: 2000 standard. A project plan was developed to implement the QMS, a broad outline of which is included in the R&D programme for 2006–2007. The training of managers and other staff members continued in 2005 with a view to establishing a quality culture. A number of key enabling mechanisms have been introduced, including: (i) establishing the quality managers’ meeting as the forum for coordinating the implementation of the QMS and sharing information; (ii) producing guidelines, and document control procedures and templates; (iii) establishing a continuous process improvement methodology and documenting the procedure; (iv) developing an internal quality audit process; and (v) creating a website as a single reference point for information on the QMS. During the last year the audit process was initiated and three audits carried out, and regular management review was started.

**C. Additional Protocol Implementation and Integrated Safeguards**

**C.1. Additional Protocol Implementation**

31. Additional protocols based on the Model Additional Protocol in document INFCIRC/540 (Corr.) are central to the Agency’s ability to detect possible undeclared nuclear material and activities and to provide credible assurance of their absence. Over the last year, the Secretariat continued its efforts to implement APs. In that regard, considerable resources continue to be expended on the analysis, follow-up and evaluation of declarations made under APs.

**C.1.1. Consultations with State Authorities**

32. Under an AP, a State is required to provide the Agency with a wide range of information about its nuclear material, activities and plans and to provide the Agency with complementary access to locations in the State. To help States meet these obligations, the Secretariat held consultations on AP implementation issues with representatives of 20 States and the European Commission. A technical meeting on the transition to integrated safeguards was held in Austria in September 2005 and a regional technical meeting on AP implementation was held in Australia in October 2005 for States in East Asia and the South Pacific.
C.1.2. State Declarations under Additional Protocols

33. Under the Model Additional Protocol, initial Article 2 declarations are due within 180 days of the entry into force of an AP, annual updates are due by 15 May of the following years, and quarterly declarations are due within 60 days of the end of each quarter. In the last year, the number of declarations received under APs increased significantly. Most of the declarations from the 75 States with APs were submitted on time or with only minor delays. Of the 1540 reports received in 2005 (compared to the 365 received in 2004), 241 were delayed by more than 30 days, with some delayed by up to 1047 days. For nine States, no declarations were received at all.

34. AP declarations are a major input to the safeguards State evaluation process, which may culminate in the drawing of the broader safeguards conclusion. An absence of or substantial delays in submission of declarations has had a significant bearing on the Agency’s evaluation process for drawing the broader conclusion for some States.

C.1.3. Complementary Access

35. Under APs, the implementation of complementary access (CA) is an important element in drawing safeguards conclusions relating to the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Since last year’s report to the General Conference, CA has been implemented in a total of 37 States. One hundred and five CA were carried out during the period from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006.

C.2. Integrated Safeguards

36. The implementation of integrated safeguards (IS) offers the best opportunity for increased effectiveness and enhanced efficiency. General Conference resolution GC(49)/RES/13 requested the Secretariat to continue to extend the implementation of IS on a priority basis in an effective and cost-efficient manner. As stated in paragraph 7, the Secretariat continued to further develop the State-level concept for the implementation and evaluation of safeguards with expanded guidelines and updated evaluation procedures. During all of 2005, IS were implemented in Australia, Hungary, Indonesia, Japan, Norway, Peru and Uzbekistan. During the last year, implementation of IS was initiated for Bulgaria, Poland and Slovenia. The Secretariat estimates that, in 2005, implementation of IS in these States resulted in savings of approximately 230 person-days of inspection effort (PDIs).

D. The Conclusion and Entry into Force of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols

37. Between 1 July 2005 and 30 June 2006, Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements entered into force for four additional States and APs for eight States. For two States, the AP entered into force through their accession to the safeguards agreement between the non-nuclear-weapon States of the

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9 And in Taiwan, China.
10 A PDI is defined as a period of up to eight hours during which an inspector has access to a facility or LOF for inspection purposes.
11 Haiti, Republic of Moldova, Turkmenistan, Uganda.
12 Afghanistan, Estonia, Haiti, Malta, Slovakia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine.
European Union, EURATOM and the Agency, and the protocol additional thereto\textsuperscript{13}. During the same period, one State signed a CSA\textsuperscript{14} and eight States signed APs\textsuperscript{15}. One State\textsuperscript{16} notified the Agency that it was no longer prepared to allow for the voluntary application of the AP pending its formal entry into force.

38. By 30 June 2006, the number of States that had safeguards agreements in force with the IAEA had reached 160, of which 75 — including 72 with CSAs — also had APs in force. With regard to the 72 States with significant nuclear activities, 47 of these had APs in force. Thirty-two non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT had not yet brought into force CSAs with the Agency in connection with that Treaty. One-hundred-and-seven States had signed APs, while 86 States — including 13 States with significant nuclear activities\textsuperscript{17} — had not yet done so. The latest update of the status of safeguards agreements and APs is published on http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/index.html.

D.1. Action to Promote the Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols

39. In operative paragraph 19 of resolution GC(49)/RES/13, the General Conference “notes the commendable efforts of some Member States, notably Japan, and the IAEA Secretariat in implementing elements of the plan of action outlined in resolution GC(44)/RES/19 and the Agency’s updated plan of action (February 2005), and encourages them to continue these efforts, as appropriate and subject to the availability of resources, and review the progress in this regard, and recommends that the other Member States consider implementing elements of that plan of action, as appropriate, with the aim of facilitating the entry into force of CSAs and APs.” Among the elements of the plan of action proposed in GC(44)/RES/19, are:

- Intensified efforts by the Director General to conclude safeguards agreements and APs, especially with those States that have substantial nuclear activities;
- Assistance by the Agency and Member States to other States on how to conclude and implement safeguards agreements and APs; and
- Reinforced coordination between Member States and the Secretariat in their efforts to promote the conclusion of safeguards agreements and APs.


40. Guided by the relevant resolutions of the General Conference and instructions of the Board of Governors, the Agency’s Plan of Action, and the Agency’s Medium Term Strategy contained in document GOV/2005/8, the Secretariat has continued to encourage and facilitate wider adherence to the strengthened safeguards system. In the past year, these efforts were expanded to also incorporate efforts to implement the Board of Governors decisions of 20 September 2005 with regard to SQPs (see paragraph 2 above). To assist States with SQPs in establishing and maintaining SSACs, the Secretariat developed a standard form for use in making initial reports and a training module on this topic to fit

\textsuperscript{13} Estonia, Slovakia.

\textsuperscript{14} Comoros.

\textsuperscript{15} Afghanistan, Belarus, Comoros, Honduras, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

\textsuperscript{16} Islamic Republic of Iran.

\textsuperscript{17} Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, India, Iraq, Israel, Pakistan, Serbia, Syrian Arab Republic, Venezuela, Vietnam.
the special needs of States with SQPs. In June 2006, the Agency printed a booklet entitled “Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Security: Overview of Safeguards Requirements for States with Limited Nuclear Material and Activities”, to facilitate a better understanding of the limited reporting requirements that apply to such States. In June 2006, the Director General submitted a report to the Board of Governors on actions undertaken to implement the Board’s decisions on SQPs.

41. In order to facilitate the conclusion and implementation of APs and the implementation of the Board’s decisions on SQPs, the Secretariat convened three outreach events in the past year: the “Regional Seminar on the Conclusion and Implementation of Additional Protocols” in Rabat, Morocco, in October 2005, for African States having taken steps to conclude APs; the “Seminar on the Role of State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material on Implementing Safeguards in States with Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Small Quantities Protocols”, in Vienna, in February 2006; and the “IAEA Regional Seminar on Verifying Compliance with Nuclear Non-Proliferation Commitments: Strengthened Safeguards, Additional Protocols and Small Quantities Protocols”, in Quito, Ecuador, in April 2006, for Member States of the Association of Caribbean States and other SQP States in Latin America. The Secretariat also held bilateral consultations with 42 States on the conclusion of safeguards agreements and/or APs and on the modification of SQPs. In August 2005, the Agency contributed to a national AP seminar in Hanoi, Vietnam.