Application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East

Report by the Director General

A. Introduction

1. General Conference Resolution GC(49)/RES/15 (2005), in operative paragraph 2, affirmed:
   “the urgent need for all States in the Middle East to forthwith accept the application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all their nuclear activities as an important confidence-building measure among all States in the region and as a step in enhancing peace and security in the context of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ)”;

   and the resolution, in operative paragraph 3, called upon all parties directly concerned:
   “to consider seriously taking the practical and appropriate steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a mutually and effectively verifiable NWFZ in the region” of the Middle East.

2. In this regard, the resolution in operative paragraph 5 reiterated the Director General’s mandate from earlier resolutions of the General Conference:
   “to continue consultations with the States of the Middle East to facilitate the early application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all nuclear activities in the region as relevant to the preparation of model agreements, as a necessary step towards the establishment of an NWFZ in the region, referred to in resolution GC(XXXVII)/RES/627”;
and furthermore operative paragraph 6 repeated the call from previous resolutions of the General Conference to:

“All States in the region to extend their fullest cooperation to the Director General in the fulfilment of the tasks entrusted to him” in this regard by the General Conference.

3. Resolution GC(49)/RES/15, in operative paragraph 7, further called upon all States in the region:

“to take measures, including confidence-building and verification measures, aimed at establishing a NWFZ in the Middle East”;

and in operative paragraph 4, took note:

“of the importance of the ongoing bilateral Middle East peace negotiations and the activities of the multilateral working group on Arms Control and Regional Security in promoting mutual confidence and security in the Middle East, including the establishment of an NWFZ”;

and called upon the Director General, as requested by the participants:

“to render all necessary assistance to the working group in promoting that objective”.

4. Resolution GC(49)/RES/15, in operative paragraph 9, requested the Director General:

“to submit to the Board of Governors and to the General Conference at its fiftieth regular session a report on the implementation of this resolution.”

5. In the context of its agenda item ‘Application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East’, the General Conference in 2000 adopted Decision GC(44)/DEC/12 in which the Conference requested:

“the Director General to make arrangements to convene a forum in which participants from the Middle East and other interested parties could learn from the experience of other regions, including in the area of confidence building relevant to the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone.”

The decision also called upon:

“the Director General, with States of the Middle East and other interested parties, to develop an agenda and modalities which will help to ensure a successful forum”.

6. The Director General has consistently stressed the importance of the mandates entrusted to him and has sought to encourage the development and consideration of relevant new ideas and approaches that could help to move his mandates forward. This report describes the steps undertaken by the Director General in seeking to fulfil the mandates conferred by the General Conference in Resolution GC(49)/RES/15 and by Decision GC(44)/DEC/12.

B. Application of Full-Scope Agency Safeguards

7. The Director General has continued to stress the emphasis that has been placed in successive IAEA General Conference resolutions on the application of comprehensive Agency safeguards on all nuclear activities in the Middle East region.
8. All States of the Middle East region\(^1\) except for Israel are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and have undertaken to accept Agency safeguards to provide the assurance that all of their nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes. Since the last report on this agenda item,\(^2\) two States have signed comprehensive safeguards agreements,\(^3\) one State has signed an Additional Protocol,\(^4\) and an Additional Protocol has entered into force for one State in the region.\(^5\) Thus, as of 14 August 2006, eight States\(^6\) of the Middle East region that are party to the NPT have yet to bring into force their comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency pursuant to that Treaty; four of those States\(^7\) have signed but have not yet brought into force their NPT comprehensive safeguards agreements, while the remaining four States have yet to take any action in this regard. Additional Protocols are in force in three States\(^8\) of the region, while five States\(^9\) have signed but not yet brought into force an Additional Protocol, and an Additional Protocol has been approved for one other State\(^10\) in the region but not yet signed.

9. The Director General has not been able to make progress in fulfilling his mandate pursuant to resolution GC(49)/RES/15 regarding the application of full-scope Agency safeguards in the region of the Middle East. The Director General’s discussions with representatives of the States of the Middle East region have shown once again that there still continues to be a long-standing and fundamental difference of views between Israel, on the one hand, and other States of the Middle East region, on the other hand, with regard to the application of comprehensive Agency safeguards to all nuclear activities in the region. Israel takes the view that safeguards, as well as all other regional security issues, cannot be addressed in isolation from the regional peace process and that these issues should be addressed in the framework of a regional security and arms control dialogue that could be resumed in the context of a multilateral peace process, and when phase II of the road map is reached.\(^11\) The other States of the region maintain that there is no automatic sequence which links the application of comprehensive safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East, or the establishment of an NWFZ, to the prior

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\(^{1}\) Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Libya), Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen (23) – Technical Study on Different Modalities of the Application of Safeguards in the Middle East, (IAEA Document) GC (XXXIII)/887, 29 August 1989, para. 3.

\(^{2}\) GC(49)/18 (1 August 2005).

\(^{3}\) Comoros and Saudi Arabia.

\(^{4}\) Comoros.

\(^{5}\) Libya.

\(^{6}\) Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Somalia.

\(^{7}\) Comoros, Mauritania, Oman and Saudi Arabia.

\(^{8}\) Jordan, Kuwait and Libya.

\(^{9}\) Comoros, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.

\(^{10}\) Algeria.

\(^{11}\) Israel’s position on this matter has been elaborated further in document GOV/2004/61/Add.1-GC(48)/18/Add.1; and in the statement by the Permanent Representative of Israel at the meetings of the Board of Governors in June 2006 (GOV/OR.1158). The “road map” is described briefly in paragraph 14 of this report.
conclusion of a peace settlement, and that the former would contribute to the latter. The Director General will continue his consultations in accordance with his mandate regarding the early application of comprehensive Agency safeguards on all nuclear activities in the Middle East region.

C. Model Agreements as a Necessary Step towards a Middle East NWFZ

10. The evolutionary process which has resulted in broad adherence to the NPT and consequently to INFCIRC/153-type comprehensive safeguards agreements in the Middle East is an important step in creating confidence regarding nuclear non-proliferation and regional security. Furthermore, the United Nations General Assembly has adopted without a vote successive resolutions supporting the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East. Additionally, in 1995 and 2000, the parties to the NPT reaffirmed their conviction that the development of NWFZs, especially in regions of tension such as the Middle East, as well as the establishment of zones free of all weapons of mass destruction, should be encouraged as a matter of priority, taking into account the specific characteristics of each region. There is, then, a consensus that the global nuclear non-proliferation regime would be further strengthened through the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East. The requests of the General Conference for model safeguards agreements require, however, agreement among the States in the region on the material obligations that those States are prepared to assume as part of an NWFZ agreement in the Middle East region.

11. As described in the previous reports of the Director General, most recently in GC(49)/18, the material obligations which could form part of an eventual Middle East NWFZ agreement might fall into several general categories, inter alia, those that: (i) preclude research and development on and the possession, acquisition, manufacture or stationing of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices; (ii) require the disclosure of all nuclear activities, including research and development, imports, exports and production; (iii) require the application of the Agency’s strengthened safeguards system, with possible additional features relevant to the region, to all nuclear material, installations and relevant equipment and material; and (iv) preclude research and development on and the production, importing or stockpiling of weapon-usable fissile material, as well as possible other prohibitions or restrictions on some specific sensitive nuclear activities.

12 The views of the other States of the region (Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Morocco, Oman (on behalf of the Arab Group), Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia and Yemen) have been elaborated further in their statements at the 49th regular session of the IAEA General Conference on 26-30 September 2005 (GC(49)/OR.2, GC(49)/OR.3, GC(49)/OR.4, GC(49)/OR.5, GC(49)/OR.6, GC(49)/OR.7, GC(49)/OR.10), and at the meetings of the Board of Governors in February 2006 (GOV/OR.1148, GOV/OR.1149, GOV/OR.1150) and in June 2006 (GOV/OR.1157, GOV/OR.1158, GOV/OR.1163).


14 NPT/CONF.1995/32/DEC.2, “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”, paragraph 6; and NPT/CONF.1995/32/RES.1 “Resolution on the Middle East”.

15 NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Part I), “The Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East”.

16 Strengthened safeguards refer to comprehensive safeguards agreements (INFCIRC/153 (Corr.)) and the Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540 (Corr.)).
12. During the last several years, the Director General has sought the views of the States of the Middle East region on the material obligations that could be part of an NWFZ and has provided examples of the types of these material obligations\textsuperscript{17}. The Director General’s previous reports\textsuperscript{18} provided some analysis of the responses received that had cited ideas, for example, that specific provisions of currently existing NWFZ treaties might be drawn upon. Emphasis has been placed, regarding verification arrangements in a future Middle East NWFZ, on the Agency being the main body responsible for verifying compliance with safeguards obligations, with specific regional verification arrangements complementing international verification.

13. There still continues to be general lack of clarity on the substance and modalities of an agreement to establish a Middle East NWFZ. The Secretariat may therefore not be in a position at this stage to embark on the preparations of the model agreements foreseen in the resolution. However, the Director General and the Secretariat will continue to consult and work with States of the Middle East region to find the common ground required to develop the model agreements as a necessary step towards the establishment of a Middle East NWFZ.

D. Agency Assistance with the Activities of the Multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security

14. There has not been a plenary meeting of the Multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security for more than a decade – the last such meeting was held in December 1994. Accordingly, no request has been received from the Working Group for Agency assistance. The Middle East “road map to the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict”\textsuperscript{19}, developed by the Quartet Group (of the European Union, the Russian Federation, the United Nations and the United States of America), foresees in phase II a “revival of multilateral engagement on issues including…arms control”; however, no request for Agency assistance on this matter has been received by the Director General.

E. Decision GC(44)/DEC/12 of the General Conference: Arrangements to Convene a Forum

15. The General Conference in 2000 adopted Decision GC(44)/DEC/12, as referred to in paragraph 5 above, in which the Conference requested the Director General, inter alia, to develop an agenda and modalities which will help to ensure a successful forum on the relevance of the experience of existing NWFZs, including confidence building and verification measures, for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East.

\textsuperscript{17} GC(XXXVI)/1019 of September 1992.
\textsuperscript{18} GOV/1999/51-GC(43)/17 and GOV/2000/38-GC(44)/14.
16. As noted in the Director General’s previous reports, most recently in GC(49)/18, nuclear-
weapon-free zones have already been established in Latin America, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia,
and Africa\textsuperscript{20}, respectively, through the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin
America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty
(Raratonga Treaty), the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Bangkok Treaty), and
the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty). These established NWFZs are of
particular relevance to the examination of a verification regime for a future Middle East NWFZ: all
four treaties cover large inhabited areas and all are designed to ensure the total absence of nuclear
weapons from the territories of the States party to them; all four treaties provide for Agency
verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material and for the establishment of regional mechanisms
to deal with compliance problems; and all four treaties contain a protocol providing for the nuclear-
weapon States to commit themselves not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-
nuclear-weapon State party to the NWFZ treaty in question. In addition to the above, the existing
NWFZ treaties contain certain variations and additional rights and obligations that inter alia take into
account the specific characteristics of each of the respective regions.

17. As reported in GC(49)/18, consultations were carried out by the Director General and the
Secretariat with concerned States of the region on a draft agenda for a forum (the Secretariat’s
proposal for such a forum was contained in the Annex to GC(48)/18). Despite these efforts, the
concerned States have not reached final agreement on the agenda for such a forum. The Director
General remains ready to continue to consult with the concerned States in order to reach agreement in
this regard. The Director General has continued to call for an expanded regional dialogue on issues of
security to facilitate the establishment of an NWFZ in the region of the Middle East and to encourage
the concerned States to initiate a regional security dialogue in parallel with the resolution of long-
standing conflicts that could lead to the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East.

\textsuperscript{20} NWFZs have also been established in certain uninhabited areas – Antarctica (Antarctic Treaty), Outer Space (Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies) and the sea bed (Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of
Mass Destruction on the Sea Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof.)