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President: Mr. BAZOBERRY (Bolivia)

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¹ GC(49)20

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Abbreviations used in this record:

AFRA	African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
ARCAL	Cooperation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean
Assistance Convention	Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency
BSS	International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources
CPF	Country Programme Framework
CPPNM	Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
CRP	coordinated research project
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
CTBTO	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Early Notification Convention	Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident
EDF	Electricité de France
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
G8	Group of Eight
GIF	Generation IV International Forum
HEU	high-enriched uranium
INPRO	International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles
INSARR	Integrated Safety Assessment of Research Reactors
IRRT	International Regulatory Review Team
ITER	International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor
Joint Convention	Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management
LEU	low-enriched uranium
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development

Abbreviations used in this record (continued):

NGO	non-governmental organization
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT Review Conference	Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
OECD/NEA	Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSART	Operational Safety Review Team
PACT	Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy
PATTEC	Pan African Tsetse and Trypanosomosis Eradication Campaign
Pelindaba Treaty	African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty
SAGSI	Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation
SIR	Safeguards Implementation Report
SIT	sterile insect technique
TCF	Technical Cooperation Fund
Tlatelolco Treaty	Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
TranSAS	Transport Safety Appraisal Service
TRANSSAC	Transport Safety Standards Advisory Committee
WWER	water cooled water moderated reactor (former USSR)

* Speakers under Rule 50 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure are indicated by an asterisk.

8. General debate and Annual Report for 2004 (continued) (GC(49)/5)

1. Mr. WINKLER (Austria) said that the recent serious challenges to the nuclear non-proliferation regime had highlighted the Agency's important role in verifying States' compliance with their NPT obligations. The Agency continued to be in the international limelight and bore a heavy responsibility for maintaining international stability and security. Austria was proud to host such an eminent organization. The Agency's standing was largely due to the leadership of its Director General, Dr. ElBaradei, and Austria remained convinced that he, and the Agency, would continue working to a high professional standard and live up to the expectation of the international community.

2. The NPT was a unique international legal instrument. Its aim was not only to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but also their elimination. As the key non-proliferation and disarmament treaty it had served the international community well over the previous 35 years. The indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 had been the result of carefully balancing the three pillars of non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Now, however, the balance between those pillars had been tilted and the integrity of the NPT had been challenged. Increasing numbers of States were gaining nuclear knowledge and accessing nuclear technology. While the overwhelming majority of non-nuclear-weapon States complied with their non-proliferation obligations under the NPT, there had been alarming cases of proliferation and non-compliance. At the same time, progress in nuclear disarmament remained elusive. Austria had been optimistic after the 2000 NPT Review Conference that the NPT community would work together with a common sense of purpose, but instead States Party were grappling with a crisis of confidence. Non-proliferation was not enough; long-term progress in non-proliferation would be possible only if there were tangible results in nuclear disarmament. The practical steps agreed in that regard at the 2000 Review Conference continued to be very important. Austria regretted that the 2005 NPT Review Conference had failed to achieve a substantive outcome. The international community had missed an important opportunity to reaffirm its full support for the Agency's indispensable role in the area of nuclear non-proliferation and security.

3. Safeguards were a key element of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. In the previous year, the Board had again addressed a number of proliferation challenges. Undeclared nuclear programmes which had not been detected by traditional safeguards measures had demonstrated the need for improvement. It was important for the international community that the Agency provide credible assurances of the non-diversion of nuclear material and of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. Austria continued to advocate adherence to the additional protocol, the conclusion of which was a legal obligation for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the NPT. It provided the Agency with a better insight into States' nuclear programmes and made detection of clandestine activities more likely. The development of the integrated safeguards system was welcome and the Agency needed to be given the necessary legal authority for its implementation. With 37 countries yet to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement and universality of the additional protocol not yet attained, much remained to be done.

4. Nuclear security in the widest sense was a precondition for nuclear cooperation and trade. States party to the NPT could supply nuclear items only if they were confident that there was an appropriate level of nuclear security in the recipient country. That included the implementation of an Agency comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol as well as an appropriate physical

protection system and effective export controls. Many countries with small or insignificant nuclear activities lacked the necessary experience and needed assistance in closing security gaps. Efforts to combat nuclear terrorism would not succeed unless appropriate nuclear security control systems were properly implemented all over the world.

5. The international community had responded to the threat of nuclear terrorism with a vast array of measures, one key element of which was strengthening the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities. In that regard, Austria welcomed the successful outcome of the recent conference to amend the CPPNM. The amended Convention would make an important contribution in the fight against terrorism and to nuclear non-proliferation. He paid tribute to the late Dr. Fritz Schmidt of Austria who had played an important role in that process.

6. Nuclear safety and security were inseparable and Austria continued to contribute to efforts to investigate the safety and security of nuclear installations. Austrian policy regarding nuclear energy production was determined by a constitutional law on a nuclear-free Austria. It supported the phasing out of nuclear energy production internationally, while respecting national decisions and international law. Austria welcomed the Agency's draft self-assessment guidelines for the engineering safety aspects of the protection of nuclear facilities against sabotage, linking physical protection with the design of nuclear installations. That approach helped to identify weaknesses against all kinds of external and internal threats, including sabotage and terrorism, and would increase the stability and security of nuclear energy as a whole. The goal of achieving inherently safe plants where even a severe accident would have no serious radiological consequences outside the plant would remain elusive as long as the technology itself posed a risk. His delegation urged the Agency to further strengthen its efforts to enhance safety and security regimes worldwide.

7. Austria did not share the view that nuclear power was the answer with respect to climate change and the need to reduce greenhouse gases. Taking all aspects into account, including the full life cycle, nuclear power was not a viable option. Energy efficiency and structural changes would help solve the problem, and would also increase safety and security and decrease dependencies.

8. Austria was pleased that the number of States which had ratified the Convention on Nuclear Safety now included all States with operating nuclear power reactors. It encouraged all States to ratify that Convention and hoped that review meetings under that Convention would continue to be useful to countries without a nuclear power programme. Also, Austria welcomed the increased ratification of the Joint Convention and was looking forward to the forthcoming review meeting, which should yield positive results. He called on all States that had not done so to sign and ratify the Joint Convention in order to strengthen that instrument of global nuclear safety.

9. He drew attention to the significant progress that had been made in increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the Agency's technical cooperation programme. While remaining sceptical about the power applications of nuclear energy, Austria fully supported the Agency's activities in the broad range of non-power applications.

10. In conclusion, he expressed appreciation for the work done by the Director General and his staff during the previous year, in particular in the area of verification. He assured the Agency of Austria's continuing support.

11. Mr. ADEGBULUGBE (Nigeria) said that the Director General's visit in January 2005 had afforded his country an opportunity to assess its cooperation with the Agency in the area of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, which would be extended to the generation of electricity from nuclear sources. His delegation thanked the Director General for bringing attention to Nigeria's dire situation with regard to electricity generation and the associated consequences for meeting the United Nations Millennium Development Goals.

12. In its effort to achieve a better life for Nigerians, and in line with the Millennium Development Goals, his Government had embarked on a number of programmes, and in particular the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS), which focused on key issues of sustainable development such as cancer treatment, disease control, adequate potable water supply and sustainable energy development. Nigeria's current electricity production from hydroelectric and thermoelectric plants of a mere 4000 megawatts for a population of more than 120 million meant that the country was living virtually in darkness. Nuclear technology could play an important role in meeting its pressing need for reliable power and to that end his Government had sought the Agency's advice, assistance and cooperation.

13. Bearing in mind the global implications of the use of nuclear technology and energy, Nigeria was setting up the appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks as well as safety, security, safeguards and physical protection practices.

14. Nigeria was pleased that its aspirations were being taken into consideration in the Agency's technical cooperation programme. Projects for the 2005/2006 biennium had placed emphasis on capacity-building through further training in radiation control, protection and safety, the establishment of nuclear facilities, including an industrial gamma irradiation facility and a tandem accelerator, and enhanced use of the research reactor commissioned in 2004.

15. In pursuance of its policy of developing peaceful nuclear technology, his Government had nearly completed the tandem accelerator project in Ile-Ife and had also licensed a multipurpose industrial gamma irradiation facility for the purpose of food preservation and pest control. That had taken place with the cooperation of the Nigerian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NNRA), which had set up regulatory mechanisms requiring a licence for the siting, design and construction of the industrial gamma irradiation facility, as well as a commissioning licence and an operating licence.

16. Nigeria expressed appreciation to the Agency for the provision of a reserve fund for the licensing and commissioning of the industrial gamma irradiation facility. It intended to make the facility available as a regional centre and invited the Agency to take full advantage of it in its training activities for the region. Nigeria also planned to set up an isotope hydrology laboratory to consolidate the gains made with the Agency's assistance in the production of potable water. Nigeria had made a counterpart contribution of \$100 000 towards the procurement of a mass spectrometer for the laboratory, and it looked forward to timely action by the Agency in implementing the project and using it as a regional facility for its closest neighbours.

17. Nigeria was appreciative of the follow-up programme for radiation protection in Africa, which would go a long way towards strengthening the achievements of the Model Project on Upgrading Radiation Protection Infrastructure. Nigeria, which was participating in all five regional projects under that programme, was doing everything possible to achieve the goals and objectives of milestones 2 and 3 by December 2005 and milestones 4 and 5 by December 2006. It was in that context that the NNRA, with the support of the Agency, had held several national seminars and training courses earlier in 2005.

18. Nigeria now had a road map detailing the country's needs and required level of competence in radiotherapy practices. As a further elaboration of the *Nigerian Basic Ionizing Radiation Regulation 2003*, the NNRA had issued five practice-specific guides in the areas of radiography, nuclear well-logging and nuclear gauges. The manpower challenges which Nigeria faced in the field of radiation protection were being effectively addressed. Approval by the Agency of a technical cooperation project in the current biennium for the establishment of a national postgraduate training centre in radiation protection would crown national efforts in that area. The NNRA was also planning

regional training events in 2006 to further promote Agency technical cooperation programme activities in Africa.

19. The African continent had benefited from SIT for the eradication of pests and parasites. Nigeria thanked the Agency for the use of technical cooperation funds and for extrabudgetary contributions to PATTEC. Africa had begun to take effective ownership of that programme. In Nigeria, a presidential committee and an advisory national technical task force had been set up to support and complement African Union activities and efforts were being made to establish a subregional centre of excellence in Nigeria.

20. His Government fully supported the *Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources* and the supplementary *Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources*. National regulations for the safety and security of radioactive sources had been drafted incorporating the Guidance and imposing licensing requirements on the import and export of scrap metals. The regulations would also require all steel recycling plants to be equipped with portal radiation monitors to prevent the recycling of radioactive sources as scrap metal. His delegation noted with satisfaction the outcome, earlier in the year, of the International Conference on Nuclear Security in the United Kingdom, and the International Conference on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources in France and looked forward to working with other delegations on implementing the findings of those and other meetings. Nigeria continued to support the Agency's efforts to enhance the Code of Conduct, a balanced international instrument which deserved the respect of both exporters and importers of radioactive sources.

21. With the support of the Agency, the NNRA had successfully licensed Nigeria's first nuclear reactor. Commissioned on 30 September 2004, the reactor was undergoing monthly safety inspections by the NNRA and annual safeguards inspections by the Agency. With that facility, a national culture had been gradually developing on the safety and security of nuclear installations and the need to respect Nigeria's international commitments regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Nigeria had signed the additional protocol to its safeguards agreement in September 2003 but had not yet ratified it. That delay had been due mainly to difficulties in implementing the protocol, which called for additional manpower, financial and material resources. An interministerial committee had been established to study that and other relevant issues. It was in that context that the NNRA had organized a national seminar in July 2005 on the NPT and the additional protocol.

22. Nigeria was party to the Assistance and the Early Notification Conventions and remained very active in all the activities of the National Competent Authorities' Coordinating Group (NCACG), in which it represented the Africa region. It called on other delegations to join it in urging the Agency to draw up a code of conduct for the international emergency management system to serve as a basis for the practical implementation of the Conventions.

23. Nigeria regretted that the 2005 NPT Review Conference had failed to reach an agreement on the important matters before it and called on the nuclear-weapon States to honour their NPT commitments in the interest of the collective security of mankind. Expressing Nigeria's support for the six-party talks on the Korean Peninsula, he welcomed the mutual agreement reached to de-escalate tensions. The six-party talks had been a triumph of diplomacy over confrontation and was an example which should be emulated.

24. In line with past policy, his delegation pledged an amount to the TCF for 2006 equal to Nigeria's assessed contribution.

25. Mr. KADIMAN (Indonesia) expressed appreciation for the valuable support received through the Agency's technical cooperation activities. Noting with satisfaction that 66 CPFs — used as

planning tools to design projects within the context of national priorities — were now in place, he said that his country had signed a revised CPF in September 2004. Indonesia welcomed the Agency's efforts to expand and intensify the application of nuclear science and technology with a view to promoting quality of life, particularly in the developing countries.

26. With regard to the Agency's programme and budget for 2006–2007, his delegation said that, despite budgetary changes due to price adjustments, new appropriations for the funding of security measures and the phasing out or merging of activities, it was optimistic that the specific needs of developing countries would not be overlooked. Indonesia noted that as of the end of July 2005, Member States had paid \$2.9 million, or only 66%, of their total assessments of \$4.4 million for national participation costs. Flexibility should be accorded on a case-by-case basis to Member States that might have problems in meeting those payments.

27. His delegation was pleased to note that the Agency had revised and simplified its approach to the planning of technical cooperation projects. The new project concept form would significantly reduce the time and effort spent by Member States and the Secretariat on project formulation and budget allocation. However, the Agency should play a more active role in helping Member States in that regard.

28. Indonesia expected nuclear technology to have a significant impact on securing energy availability and food supply, as well as on health care. For its part, Indonesia planned to utilize nuclear techniques in further exploring and exploiting its abundant geothermal resources, which amounted to about 40% of the world's total. To date they had been employed in a number of sites, including the Kamojang, Sibayak and Lahendong geothermal fields.

29. The 400 kW underground micro hydropower plant was to be commissioned by the end of the year. The facility would pump a significant amount of potable water in a karst area of the southern part of the Yogyakarta region. A demonstration electron beam machine for treating sulphur and nitrogen oxides emitted from a coal-fired power plant was also being designed in cooperation with a State-owned utility company, drawing on experience gained during the recent construction of a low-energy electron beam machine.

30. Indonesia had been using radiation-induced mutation to breed improved varieties of plants for biofuel, for example *Jatropha curcas* and sweet sorghum. Also, two new high-yielding rice varieties, namely Mayang and Juwono, had been launched in Indonesia and more than 200 000 hectares of rice fields in 20 provinces had been cultivated with varieties improved by means of radiation-induced mutation. The recent International Rice Conference in Bali had showcased 28 improved varieties and 8 traits, including a number developed by the National Nuclear Energy Agency (BATAN) using radiation-induced mutation breeding techniques. To speed up the dissemination of the new varieties and ensure the availability of seeds, cooperation with local governments, universities and the private sector had been expanded to include NGOs dealing with associations of Indonesian farmers. Indonesia was also continuing to disseminate nuclear techniques to improve animal reproduction and animal health and feed supplement technology.

31. In the field of human health, Indonesia was intensifying its efforts to develop and produce radioisotopes and radiopharmaceuticals for domestic use and for export. It had also started a programme to design and manufacture nuclear medical instruments for radiodiagnostics and radiotherapy. Indonesia's 30 MW multipurpose research reactor had increased the production capacity of iodine-125, thus ensuring supplies for domestic and regional use.

32. A number of institutions in Indonesia, including the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources and the State-owned company responsible for electricity, had worked to set up responsible organizations to prepare for the construction of the country's nuclear power plant. His delegation

expressed appreciation to the Agency for its support in that matter, including three recent technical cooperation projects, and hoped that such support would be extended and further enhanced for the next cycle. In anticipation of the construction of the nuclear power plant, the national regulatory body, BAPETEN, had embarked on a comprehensive programme to develop the infrastructure needed, including for activities connected with licensing and inspection. Indonesia looked forward to Agency cooperation, in particular with respect to the capacity-building of the regulatory authority. Close bilateral and multilateral cooperation with countries with experience in developing and operating nuclear power plants would also be useful.

33. National legislation in line with the BSS was in its final stages. In August 2005, the Agency's recommendations on steps for making better use of existing capabilities to establish an interim response had been followed up by a training course in emergency preparedness for first responders. His delegation hoped that the Agency would continue and expand its assistance programme in that important area also. His Government fully supported the Agency's efforts to enhance the safety and security of radioactive sources and was working to comply with the Guidance for the relevant Code of Conduct.

34. Indonesia welcomed the amendments made to the CPPNM at the diplomatic conference in July 2005, which would strengthen the Convention and help prevent nuclear material from falling into the hands of those who might use it to threaten international peace and security. Indonesia would make every effort to ratify those amendments in keeping with its commitment to strengthen the global nuclear security regime.

35. His delegation expressed its appreciation to the Agency for dispatching experts and transferring knowledge to anticipate increasing terrorist threats by improving the physical protection system of Indonesia's nuclear facilities. Regarding the safety of nuclear reactors, Indonesia welcomed the support provided by the Agency to Member States through the extrabudgetary programme. Agency INSARR missions and basic professional training courses had been carried out to assist Indonesia in ensuring the safety of research reactors and enhancing nuclear safety knowledge among young scientists.

36. Indonesia thanked the Agency for supporting activities in education and capacity-building as well as programmes with a positive impact on the quality of life of the Indonesian people. In conclusion, he stressed that nuclear science and technology applications in Indonesia were solely for peaceful purposes.

37. Mr. KHELIL (Algeria) said that the positive cooperation between his country and the Agency attested to Algeria's support for the Agency's functions under Article III of the Statute. It had led to partnership in the areas of technical cooperation and safeguards, and the establishment of a legislative and regulatory framework for the application of international safety standards. Scientific and technological development in the nuclear field for peaceful purposes was fully compatible with the goals of non-proliferation and the fulfilment of non-proliferation obligations.

38. All national activities relating to nuclear science and technology were subject to the comprehensive safeguards agreement that had entered into force in 1997, following Algeria's accession to the NPT in 1995. Algeria's commitment to non-proliferation would be strengthened by its forthcoming signature of an additional protocol. Algeria considered the NPT to be the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime and had been making a tangible contribution to the realization of its objectives by, for example, presiding over the 2000 NPT Review Conference, ratifying the CTBT in July 2003 and chairing the CTBTO Preparatory Commission for 2005.

39. His Government considered scientific research, technological advances and innovation vital for Algeria's development and important for future generations. As such, they formed the basis of government policies for creating jobs, meeting the growing socio-economic needs of the population and conserving natural resources. At the national level, the acquisition of scientific knowledge, including nuclear technologies in accordance with the non-proliferation treaties to which Algeria was party, was crucial to meeting the challenges of electricity production, development of the agricultural sector, exploitation of water resources and improvement of the health services. At the global level also, efforts must be redoubled to promote science and technology, since they were the driving force behind viable and sustainable socio-economic growth and the conservation of natural resources and the environment. The Algerian Government had launched its 2005–2009 five-year plan for economic revival and, to consolidate the political and socio-economic stability of the country, the Algerian people were about to participate in a referendum on a draft Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation. Socio-economic and other indicators promised better prospects for the future. The change for the better could be attributed to the policy implemented by President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. It was vital for Algeria to rebuild and expand its national infrastructure, which had been damaged by a decade of terrorist violence and had led to disinvestment that had been detrimental to economic growth. In that context, the electricity sector was under great pressure to meet growing demands from industry, agriculture and other consumers.

40. Algeria, an oil and gas producing country, was aware that those energy resources were non-renewable and that it was imperative for Algeria to diversify its energy sector by preparing sustainable and economically viable options. To that end, the Algerian Government had established programmes designed to stimulate research into alternative energy sources such as solar, wind and biomass. Nuclear energy, which was a non-polluting and economically attractive alternative, also had a contribution to make, as had been underlined at the International Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Power for the 21st Century held in Paris in March 2005.

41. Algeria regretted the lack of progress made by the NPT Review Conference in New York in May 2005, and the stalemate at the United Nations World Summit. Rather than being discouraged by that situation, the international community should redouble its efforts to rid the world of weapons of mass destruction. That meant working towards maintaining, and the universalization of, the international non-proliferation system.

42. At the regional level, Algeria commended the African contribution to non-proliferation and disarmament in the form of the Pelindaba Treaty, which established a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. Algeria, which had been one of the first to ratify the Treaty, called on all African States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify it in order to accelerate its entry into force. With the cooperation of the Agency, Algeria was prepared to host a regional meeting on non-proliferation and the contribution of nuclear energy to socio-economic development in Algiers in 2006.

43. Universalization of all the instruments which formed the multilateral non-proliferation regime, in particular the NPT, was an imperative. Algeria called for the application of Agency safeguards to all the States of the Middle East, in particular Israel, the only country outside the NPT. Algeria supported the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and encouraged the Agency to do its utmost to promote non-proliferation in that sensitive region of the world.

44. Algeria noted with satisfaction the successful outcome of the six party talks on the DPRK's nuclear programme. Algeria welcomed the DPRK's commitment to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes, as authorized under Article VI of the NPT, and its announced return to the NPT regime. His delegation paid tribute to the efforts of the six parties, in particular China. The lack of consensus on the ways and means of achieving a negotiated settlement with regard to the Iranian nuclear programme was regrettable. Like other countries of the Non-Aligned Movement, Algeria was

of the view that the Agency continued to be the most appropriate framework for handling that issue. Algeria reaffirmed its confidence in and support for the Director General's objectivity and professionalism in carrying out his mandate. His delegation urged Iran and the three European countries to show flexibility in returning to negotiations so that the outstanding questions might be resolved.

45. Turning to the Agency's recent activities to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace and prosperity in the world, he paid tribute to the commendable work it had done in the areas of nuclear verification, technical cooperation, and safety and security, helping to realize the international community's objectives with respect to nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the promotion of nuclear power in the context of sustainable development.

46. Emphasizing his Government's commitment to participating in international efforts to fight terrorism in all its forms, including attacks against nuclear facilities or material, he said Algerian had recently signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the amendment to the CPPNM. The risk of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of non-State actors should be combated by States working collectively towards the goal of nuclear disarmament. It was important to ensure that the fight against nuclear terrorism was not used as justification for States to hold weapons of mass destruction. The end goal must be to eradicate them completely. It was also important to ensure that the fight against terrorism did not contribute to the erosion of States' inalienable right to develop nuclear power for peaceful purposes. In that context, his delegation commended the Director General's efforts to accelerate the entry into force of the amended Article VI of the Statute, which would expand the composition of the Board of Governors. He appealed to all Member States that had not yet done so to ratify that Article so that there could be broader participation by Member States in that policy-making body of the Agency.

47. Algeria attached particular importance to the Agency's technical cooperation programme, which must be strengthened by the provision of adequate, reliable and predictable financial resources. It was encouraged by the new impetus that the Director General had given to technical cooperation, which was a vector for the transfer of knowledge and know-how in the nuclear field. Algeria was both a contributor to and a recipient of the Agency's cooperation programme, focusing its efforts on human resources training and establishing nuclear research infrastructures. Technical cooperation must continue to promote nuclear technology applications, in particular in the areas of health, industry, agriculture and water resource management. The development of programmes to promote nuclear power and to strengthen national energy planning capacities was of particular interest. To increase the socio-economic impact of such applications, the priorities and the needs of Member States must continue to be a key element in deciding whether to approve technical cooperation projects and activities and when preparing the Agency's regular programme.

48. In 2004, 60 foreign specialists had participated in 5 training courses and workshops held in Algeria with Agency support, and a number of Algerians had worked as experts for the Agency. Algeria was particularly interested in regional and South-South cooperation. Reiterating Algeria's support for AFRA, he requested Agency support in helping AFRA establish strategic partnerships in order to implement the regional cooperation programmes. As a founder country of NEPAD, Algeria was working towards the development of synergies between NEPAD and AFRA. Still on the regional front, Algeria urged the Agency to work with the FAO to determine the feasibility of using nuclear techniques to help combat the locust plagues which ravaged the economy of many African countries. In that regard, Algeria was prepared to host a meeting of experts and to make available its experts in the field.

49. In conclusion he expressed his satisfaction with the mutually beneficial partnership that had existed for a long time between Algeria and the Agency towards the common goal of promoting the use of the atom for peace and development.

50. Mr. RUMYANTSEV (Russian Federation) recalled that ten days previously at the United Nations World Summit in New York, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism had been opened for signature. It had been elaborated on the initiative of Russia and on the basis of a Russian draft. President Putin had been the first to sign it, followed immediately by President Bush of the United States of America. Many countries had now signed the Convention. At the same time, the Security Council had adopted a resolution criminalizing for the first time incitement to terrorism. The Convention opened up new possibilities for reinforcing anti-terrorist cooperation under the aegis of the United Nations and considerably increased the role and significance of the Agency in consolidating international cooperation in that field. His delegation welcomed the willingness of the Agency, in coordination with the committee responsible for implementing Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), to provide active assistance to countries requiring help in organizing effective legislative, organizational and other measures for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

51. At the NPT Review Conference held in May 2005, an objective and balanced analysis had been carried out of the functioning of all the fundamental areas of the NPT, including non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Despite the range of opinions about the NPT's success, States Party to the Treaty had emphasized its importance as the foundation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and their commitment to strict compliance with their obligations under the NPT. In July 2005, the G8 leaders had spoken of their determination to continue to make efforts to preserve and strengthen the NPT. Their joint declaration expressed full support of the Agency's activities, welcomed the establishment of a committee on safeguards and verification and had noted the need for the additional protocol to be recognized as a norm for compliance with safeguards obligations under the NPT.

52. Russia was firmly on the path of reducing surplus nuclear weapons, as had been clearly demonstrated by the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation concerning the Disposition of High Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons, the so-called HEU-LEU Agreement or the Megatons to Megawatts programme. In 2005, half of the amount envisaged under that Agreement, namely 250 tons, had been reprocessed into LEU and shipped to the United States as nuclear power plant fuel. That meant that 10 000 nuclear warheads had been dismantled and reprocessed into fuel for nuclear power plants, a unique example in world history of genuine nuclear disarmament and strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. Russia continued to develop its cooperation with the United States in that regard, actively cooperating with the Department of Energy in the framework of the joint declaration on nuclear security issues, signed by the Presidents of both countries in Bratislava in February 2005. Good working relations had been established with the Secretary of Energy Mr. Bodman, with whom he co-chaired the United States-Russia senior interagency group for cooperation on nuclear security.

53. In the Sea Island action plan on non-proliferation adopted in June 2004, G8 leaders had called on nuclear technology suppliers to establish new measures so that sensitive nuclear items with proliferation potential would not be exported to States that might seek to use them for weapons purposes, or allow them to fall into terrorist hands. They had agreed to declare a one-year moratorium on the transfer of uranium enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technology, which had been extended for a further year at the G8 summit held at Gleneagles in 2005.

54. The results of the International Conference on Multilateral Technical and Organizational Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle aimed at Strengthening the Non-Proliferation Regime, held in

Moscow in July 2005, had further developed the Director General's initiative regarding the internationalization of the nuclear fuel cycle. The Conference, which had been organized by Rosatom with the support of the Agency, had been attended by 220 experts from 23 countries and international organizations. The results of the Agency's Expert Group on Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, contained in its report of February 2005, had been greatly appreciated. The Conference had identified as a potential priority the establishment of a mechanism of assured fuel supplies to countries which had renounced the development of national uranium enrichment technology. Russia was prepared to provide such supplies. As a first step in that direction, the Secretariat should consider continuing work in the area and creating an expert group on the assessment of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle which could soon begin discussing the issue of determining the terms and scenarios for establishing an assured nuclear fuel reserve under Agency control. Russia's experience had shown that an efficient mechanism of ensuring supplies was bilateral international agreements that provided for fuel supplies throughout the entire operating life of a nuclear power plant, as part of a packet including shipment of the plants themselves and also return of the spent fuel to its supplier. The issue of additional safeguards was still outstanding and needed to be resolved within the framework of the Agency.

55. Even the most conservative estimates suggested that the development of the world economy by 2050 would require energy production to more than double. That would not be possible using only fossil fuels and alternative energy sources such as the sun, wind and water. Nuclear energy therefore had a future. The development of nuclear energy depended above all on resolving issues related to non-proliferation, ensuring the safety and security of nuclear materials, increasing the competitiveness of nuclear energy, and to the management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste. Clearly, the course of action to be taken would depend on a number of factors, the key ones being limited resources, environmental and technological safety, the cost of nuclear power production and the degree of risk associated with its use.

56. The innovative potential of modern nuclear power engineering meant it could be used as a basis for an energy system which would meet the requirements of the non-proliferation regime and ensure the sustainable development of civilization in the 21st century with environmentally clean, safe, economical and socially acceptable sources of energy. Such a complex task could be accomplished only on the basis of international cooperation and collaboration, with a much enhanced role and responsibility for the Agency. Coordinating research in the field of nuclear power engineering and consolidating the efforts of Member States to develop innovative nuclear energy were key elements of such cooperation.

57. His delegation welcomed the Secretariat's efforts to further develop INPRO, which was a unique project designed to achieve the nuclear power goals of the 21st century. Russia proposed that the Secretariat look into establishing a programme to provide assistance to Member States in conducting expert assessments of their nuclear energy systems on the basis of the internationally recognized and highly regarded INPRO methodology. With regard to the future development of INPRO, the Russian delegation, together with a number of other delegations, had submitted for the Conference's consideration a draft resolution in support of the Project, taking account of the new challenges to be addressed in 2006–2007.

58. The ITER project aimed at the development of fusion energy was evolving successfully under the auspices of the Agency with the participation of Russia, the EU, the United States of America, Japan, China and the Republic of Korea. It was now entering the engineering phase. At the ministerial meeting of the six ITER participants, held in Moscow in June 2005, a joint declaration on selection of the site of the reactor in Cadarache, France, had been signed. That would soon lead to the signing of an agreement on joint implementation of the ITER project.

59. Russia was due to take over the G8 presidency in 2006. One of the central themes of the Russian presidency would be international energy security. Rosatom and Rostechnadzor were taking an active part in developing the concept for a strategy, to be agreed upon by the partners, for energy security ensuring a reliable supply of all types of energy for the world's economy and its peoples.

60. Russia would continue to support the Agency's efforts to strengthen international cooperation in the field of nuclear and radiation safety. The results of the meeting held in April 2005 to review national reports by Contracting Parties under the Convention on Nuclear Safety were satisfactory. The Russian Federation's report had mentioned that nuclear safety legislation had been drawn up and had come into force in Russia, that an independent regulatory body, Rostechnadzor, was in operation, and that there had been a number of safety assessments of first-generation nuclear power plants.

61. Russia affirmed its readiness to organize the Agency's International Conference on Effective Nuclear Regulatory Systems in Moscow in February–March 2006, which would review a wide range of issues relating to regulatory activities with a view to improving their effectiveness and efficiency.

62. The Russian delegation commended the Secretariat's work on safeguards implementation over the past year and supported the Agency's position that further progress in strengthening its verification activities could be achieved through the broader application of integrated safeguards and the development of cooperation with State and regional systems of accounting and control.

63. Russia would continue its active participation in technical cooperation, and was about to transfer its contribution to the TCF in full.

64. In two days' time, Russia was to celebrate the sixtieth anniversary of its nuclear industry, which was one of the most important components of global nuclear energy. He expressed his country's willingness to participate actively in the further development of peaceful nuclear energy for the benefit of civilization.

65. Mr. LEPRA (Uruguay) said the Agency was an essential instrument in maintaining world peace and promoting the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes for the benefit of humankind and the environment. His Government, which had assumed office on 1 March 2005, was committed to helping the Director General as far as possible in fostering the uses and benefits of atomic energy.

66. Uruguay was fully committed to the safety culture concept, as instilled by its President. The Uruguayan regulatory authority's radiation protection criteria were based on the BSS, and the national regulatory infrastructure had been established in compliance with up-to-date requirements.

67. Uruguay had no industrial irradiators or nuclear power plants. With regard to improving the national regulatory infrastructure, the first and second milestones of Model Project RLA/9/041 were close to completion. No less important, and part of the national radiation safety strategy, was the attention to possible radiological emergency situations. In August 2005, the Uruguayan Executive Authority had approved the national radiological emergency plan, which was already in force.

68. He expressed thanks to the Agency which, through its Department of Technical Cooperation, had offered support through training and the provision of the up-to-date equipment Uruguay needed to complete its tasks with the highest level of efficiency. The Agency's technical cooperation had also always enabled Uruguay to keep abreast of the demands and challenges posed by cutting edge nuclear technology, taking into account its innumerable peaceful uses, including radiation safety, medicine, the environment, agriculture, veterinary science and non-destructive testing. Projects under ARCAL had also contributed to the constant updating of the application of nuclear technology in the various Uruguayan institutions where it was used.

69. Uruguay was strengthening the security of radioactive sources which, in the hands of criminals, could cause terrible damage. That was why in February 2004, Uruguay had been one of the first countries to give its support to the *Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources* and, in July 2005, had been the fourth country in the world to comply with its supplementary *Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources*. In applying the Guidance, Uruguay was working with the customs authorities to ensure strict control of the import and export of sources and generators of ionizing radiation and anticipate illicit trafficking and was acting as a contact point for the Illicit Trafficking Database.

70. The Uruguayan Government was moving towards ratification of the Joint Convention, which Uruguay had signed in 1997. It was also about to ratify the ARCAL agreement, which it had signed in 1998, and through which it had benefited from technical assistance and training over the years.

71. Uruguay had a special interest in PACT as cancer was the second largest cause of death in the country. On 27 June 2005, the Government had set up a national cancer control plan (PRONACAN), with the aim of reducing mortality from and the incidence of cancer by means of national coordination of activities and resources in the field of oncology. A centre of excellence had been planned for that purpose and Uruguay hoped it would be able to continue to rely on Agency recommendations and support when PACT was implemented.

72. He reaffirmed Uruguay's commitment to peace and nuclear disarmament, as seen by its membership of the Tlatelolco Treaty since 1968. Uruguay believed that all conflicts could be resolved through dialogue without resorting to the use of force and that every effort should be made to free the world from the threat of nuclear weapons.

73. Mr. GOREA (Romania) commended the Director General and his competent and dedicated team on their efforts over the past years and expressed conviction that the Director General would show the same wisdom, impartiality and energy during his next mandate.

74. His Government was keenly interested in nuclear power generation as a reliable energy source and an important contributor to the national power supply. In recent years, Romania had experienced sustained economic growth and, consequently, the demand for electricity was expected to increase constantly until the end of the current decade. Based on that positive trend, which had been confirmed by several national and international studies, and Romania's high nuclear safety standards, the Government had decided to further develop Unit 2 and Unit 3 at the Cernavoda nuclear power plant. The construction of Unit 3 in the framework of Romania's national nuclear strategy had been planned as a joint venture project using multilateral financing agreements.

75. The conversion of the TRIGA research reactor at Pitesti from HEU to LEU, an Agency project financed by the United States Government, the Romanian Government and the Agency's TCF, was currently under way. Romania hoped that the TRIGA fuel rods would be delivered in time to allow for the completion of the conversion by mid-2006.

76. Another priority project was the decommissioning of the WWER research reactor, which was being implemented with the Agency's assistance. After a slow start, considerable progress had been made in that regard in recent months, and clean up and characterization activities were expected to be completed by the end of 2005. The Romanian Government was cooperating with the authorities of the Russian Federation to facilitate the return to Russia of the S36-type spent fuel. The remaining EK10-type spent fuel would be prepared and sent to an interim repository. Those achievements proved that the best results were always obtained through cooperation and international partnership.

77. The aforementioned projects were part of the Agency's technical cooperation programme and his Government was grateful to the Secretariat, in particular to the Europe Section of the Department of Technical Cooperation, for the continuous support Romania had received.

78. As to future perspectives, his Government looked forward to fulfilling its commitment to support the Agency in the promotion of international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. He reiterated his Government's readiness actively to support the Agency's technical cooperation programme. His delegation trusted that the Agency would continue to use Romania's nuclear facilities for the implementation of some of its projects. Agency technical cooperation would certainly remain important to Romania in the medium term.

79. Under the national nuclear strategy, special attention was being placed on the development of an adequate legislative framework, consistent with European Commission standards, to achieve national objectives in the nuclear field. Legislation would be brought up to date with a view to establishing an institutional framework appropriate to market economy conditions that ensured implementation of the national nuclear strategy and defined responsibilities and methods to promote and manage activities in the nuclear sector. The reports of the European Commission on Romania confirmed that substantial efforts had been made in the power generation sector in preparation for EU accession. In addition, new legislation had been adopted aimed at restructuring the power generation and power distribution sectors.

80. Romania was committed to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. That political will was clearly reflected in the national nuclear strategy adopted by its Government. Romania was party to the NPT, had concluded a safeguards agreement with the Agency and had subsequently signed an additional protocol, which had been in force since 2000.

81. The 2004 SIR reflected the complexity of Agency activities in the field of safeguards. The Report had drawn the Agency safeguards conclusions regarding the non-diversion of nuclear material placed under safeguards for 21 States including, for the first time, Romania. That conclusion had been based on a comprehensive evaluation undertaken by the Agency of the results of its verification activities under the safeguards agreement and the additional protocol, as well as of other information on Romania's nuclear and related activities.

82. Romania would continue cooperating with the Department of Safeguards in the implementation of the additional protocol in the years to come and looked forward to developing a system of integrated safeguards adapted to its nuclear sector. It was also ready to share its positive experiences in the implementation of a comprehensive safeguards regime and of the additional protocol with other countries in the region.

83. Consistent with its commitment to support efforts aimed at combating international terrorism and implementing the Agency's action plan on nuclear terrorism adopted in 2002, Romania was a contributor to the Nuclear Security Fund. In that connection, in the past two years, it had organized regional pilot courses on combating nuclear terrorism and incidents involving illicit trafficking of nuclear material. Romania had recently made another voluntary contribution to the Fund thereby reaffirming its commitment to strengthening its cooperation with the Agency in that area in the future.

84. His delegation supported the adoption by the General Conference of the Agency's nuclear security plan for 2006 to 2009. The activities proposed in the new plan would contribute to further enhancing nuclear security in Member States in such crucial areas as needs assessment, analysis and coordination, prevention, detection and response.

85. He reiterated his delegation's support for all the Agency's activities and for its role in promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy through competence, confidence and multilateral cooperation. That

support was reflected, inter alia, in the prompt and full payment of Romania's assessed contributions to the Regular Budget and of its pledges to the TCF.

86. Mr. MATOUQ (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) said that his country attached great importance to technical cooperation in nuclear science and technology with the Agency and other Member States because of the direct economic benefits that accrued from such cooperation in most areas of economic and social development and health. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya was greatly indebted to the Agency for its valuable assistance in recent years, particularly in the priority areas of health and groundwater resource management.

87. In the context of African regional cooperation, his country had hosted a coordination meeting attended by 15 African States on sustaining regional capability in maintenance and repair, and a coordination meeting attended by 20 African States on strengthening radiological protection of patients and medical exposure control.

88. He welcomed efforts to strengthen the Agency's activities related to nuclear science, technology and applications, especially the use of isotope hydrology in water resource management and the plan for producing potable water economically using small and medium-sized reactors. His country accorded special attention to the use of nuclear energy for seawater desalination and was keen to participate in CRPs in that area and to join INPRO.

89. Libya supported all measures to strengthen international cooperation in nuclear, radiation and transport safety and waste management. It was currently restructuring the Radiation Monitoring and Nuclear Safety Agency and enacting legislation that would enable it to operate independently. It was also modernizing regulatory and safety arrangements in respect of the Tajoura Nuclear Research Centre with the Agency's assistance and was seeking to supply the reactors with low-enriched fuel instead of the high-enriched fuel that was returned to the supplier under the Agency's aegis.

90. His country's consistent opposition to weapons of mass destruction was attested by its active participation in most meetings on the subject convened by the General Assembly, the Agency and the Disarmament Commission and by its ratification of a number of relevant treaties. In line with the NPT and Great Green Document on Human Rights in the Age of the Masses promulgated by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in 1989, which prohibited the use of weapons of mass destruction, his country had decided in December 2003 voluntarily to divest itself of all equipment and to end all programmes that might lead to the production of internationally prohibited weapons.

91. The failure of a number of countries to heed the Agency's repeated calls for compliance with the NPT and safeguards agreements was perhaps due to the fact that, notwithstanding the Jamahiriya's voluntary renunciation of the means to produce nuclear weapons and the transparency and credibility it had demonstrated in its cooperation with the Agency and the other parties concerned, it had not received any guarantees of non-aggression or protection of its national security against the use or threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction. Its initiative had not led either to any offers of assistance from developed countries in enhancing its capacity to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and to enhance the well-being of the Libyan people. States that had contemplated following Libya's example were now having second thoughts. He therefore urged the developed countries to respond to Libya's request for economic, political and security assistance.

92. In its 1996 Advisory Opinion, the International Court of Justice had unanimously held that "[t]here exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control". Unfortunately, countries outside the NPT, including Israel, had developed a military nuclear capacity with the assistance of certain other countries, a fact that had undermined security in the Middle East, thereby posing a threat to international peace and security. It was essential to rid the Middle East of all

weapons of mass destruction and to insist that all States accept international verification and inspection of their nuclear facilities. He drew attention in that regard to a series of General Assembly resolutions beginning in 1974 and to Security Council resolution 487 (1981) which urged all parties concerned to consider establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and to place their nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards. It had become more urgent than ever to recognize the fundamental role of the NPT in preserving international peace and security through the twin pillars of non-proliferation and disarmament. He further stressed the need for universal application of the safeguards regime. Moreover, unless the nuclear weapon States eliminated their arsenals and halted all programmes to produce and develop weapons of mass destruction, the NPT would remain a dead letter.

93. He regretted that the Agency's efforts to increase the representation of developing countries on its staff had so far made little progress. It was particularly important to take advantage of the wide range of expertise now available in those countries to fill high-level positions.

94. Mr. AL-ATHEL (Saudi Arabia) said the success of nuclear energy depended on its safety and economic benefits. In view of the continually increasing global demand for energy, developing countries benefited greatly from the Agency's assistance in drawing up energy plans that catered to their needs and that took into account their economic, environmental and social circumstances.

95. Some of the greatest challenges facing the Agency were the decommissioning of nuclear facilities and the disposal of radioactive waste, the ageing nuclear workforce, which had prompted the Agency to focus on promoting nuclear knowledge through educational networks and training opportunities, and the conversion of research reactors from HEU to LEU.

96. Saudi Arabia supported the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes related to industry, the environment and health, to increase food production and to ensure efficient water resource management in the context of the United Nations International Decade for Action, "Water for Life" (2005–2015).

97. The Agency's technical cooperation programme was an important mechanism for strengthening national scientific, technological and regulatory capacities and enhancing technical cooperation among countries. The difficulty of guaranteeing adequate funding, however, demonstrated the need to finance the programme from the Regular Budget. He proposed that the beneficiary States bear a greater share of the costs of project implementation in order to increase the average rate of implementation of approved projects.

98. He commended the Agency's efforts to develop and apply radiation safety standards, to ensure the safety of radioactive waste and to review the regime of civil liability for nuclear damage.

99. He noted with some concern countries' growing dependence on international support and the Agency's assistance in strengthening their capacity to deal with the threat of nuclear terrorism. In that context, he welcomed the new nuclear security plan and measures to detect clandestine nuclear trafficking networks and to prevent the theft of nuclear and other radioactive materials.

100. With regard to comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols, he noted that the Agency had concluded in the light of its verification reports that there were no indications of the existence of proliferation activities. However, its authority to verify the existence of nuclear weaponization activities was extremely limited.

101. A number of verification measures were being held in abeyance for some 60 countries that had signed small quantities protocols to comprehensive safeguards agreements, thereby reducing the expenses incurred in respect of safeguards activities. Saudi Arabia considered that the recent proposal

that the Agency should refrain from adopting such protocols should be backed up by an objective comprehensive study.

102. He welcomed the decision to establish a safeguards and verification committee, which should endorse existing international resolutions that urged the Agency to apply integrated safeguards to all countries with nuclear technology in the Middle East. States that violated their safeguards agreement should be prohibited from sitting on the committee or on the Board of Governors. That would hopefully persuade all countries possessing nuclear technology, including Israel, to sign a safeguards agreement and an additional protocol and to permit international verification of their facilities.

103. Saudi Arabia called on all peace-loving nations to cooperate with the Agency in promoting non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and disarmament as the foundation of international security and stability. His country had acceded to all international treaties aimed at preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and supported steps to create nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia was party to the NPT and had signed a comprehensive safeguards agreement in June 2005 as well as a small quantities protocol, since his country had no nuclear plants or reactors and engaged in no nuclear activities that would require the application of safeguards.

104. While Saudi Arabia supported the universal application of safeguard agreements and additional protocols in countries that used nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, it considered at the same time that countries wishing to acquire or modernize such technology should be able to count on the support of the developed countries.

105. Mr. BUGAT (France) said that ensuring respect for non-proliferation commitments was one of the international community's key tasks. While no consensus document on substantive points had been adopted at the 2005 NPT Review Conference, it had provided an opportunity to reaffirm the importance of the NPT, which remained the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime. Growing concerns over proliferation showed that the regime needed strengthening. The international community should acquire means to respond effectively in cases of failure to comply or non-compliance with non-proliferation commitments and continue the debate on adequate responses when States withdrew from the NPT. To prevent proliferation, stricter controls were needed on the transfer of the most sensitive technology, equipment and nuclear materials, with universal application of the relevant regulations. Such measures must not, however, run counter to the legitimate development needs of those States that honoured their international commitments. Under conditions yet to be specified, those States should be given assurance of access to non-sensitive technology and equipment and of the supply of nuclear materials and associated services.

106. A comprehensive safeguards agreement combined with an additional protocol should be the norm to ensure the credibility of international verification and to show the commitment to and respect for the NPT by States Party. France had long supported the Agency's efforts to achieve universal application of those two instruments and had participated in relevant initiatives undertaken by the G8 and the EU. It had submitted an updated initial declaration in May 2005 with respect to its additional protocol, which had entered into force on 30 April 2004.

107. His delegation had followed with interest the work of the SAGSI, which contributed to enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards. France welcomed the creation of a committee on safeguards and verification, which would hopefully commence its work in the near future.

108. Effective cooperation between the Agency and the European Commission with respect to the implementation of safeguards was crucial. To that end, high-level dialogue should be strengthened with a view to meeting challenges that arose. Increased cooperation would further enhance the achievements already obtained at the EU level.

109. Three years after disclosure of the clandestine nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the international community remained concerned over the true purpose of Iran's nuclear programme. According to the Director General's recent report, full cooperation on the part of the Iranian authorities had not been forthcoming and a number of important issues were still outstanding.

110. In November 2004, Germany, France and the United Kingdom, with the support of the High Representative of the European Union, had concluded an agreement with the Iranian authorities, which had undertaken to suspend all enrichment related and reprocessing activities. In all its relevant resolutions, the Board of Governors had underlined that full implementation of those commitments was crucial to restoring confidence and resolving outstanding issues. The Board had also requested the suspension of the heavy water research reactor project. The resumption of conversion activities at the Esfahan facility on 1 August, contrary to repeated calls from the Agency, and the refusal to consider the assistance offer from Germany, France and the United Kingdom in the framework of the November Paris agreement were not conducive to restoring the confidence of the international community in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. In response, in August 2005, the Board of Governors had reiterated its call to Iran to suspend its conversion activities to restore international confidence, had further underscored the need to resolve outstanding issues and had invited the Director General to report on the issue on 3 September.

111. The Board had approved a resolution that gave a clear and objective account of the situation and left the door open for negotiations. The Agency would continue to play a key role in clarifying outstanding issues and monitoring the suspension. Conditions permitting, France remained committed to finding a solution through dialogue.

112. France had followed closely the work of the International Expert Group on Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle established by the Director General. The outcome of the Group's activities and its report were commendable and his delegation looked forward to learning of the latest developments in that regard.

113. France was committed to the entry into force of the CTBT and to the early implementation of the international monitoring system. Also, it was in favour of negotiations in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty prohibiting the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.

114. The threat of nuclear terrorism was another cause for grave concern and the international community had endeavoured to attenuate that threat by enhancing existing nuclear security measures. While responsibility for such action primarily fell to States, international cooperation was vital.

115. The Agency by its very nature played a prominent role in ensuring the security of nuclear materials and facilities. France supported the Agency's activities in that field by providing financial and technical support. On 27 April 2005, it had signed a nuclear security arrangement with the Agency that provided for the creation of an assistance programme in the areas of physical protection, security of radiation sources, improvement of national systems and accession to relevant international instruments. With regard to physical protection, France welcomed the consensus adoption of the amendment to the CPPNM in Vienna in July 2005, which, once in force, would strengthen the Convention considerably.

116. The risk of radioactive sources being used for terrorist or malicious acts made the safety and security of radioactive sources particularly important. In cooperation with the Agency and under the auspices of the G8, France had hosted the International Conference on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources held in Bordeaux in June 2005. The Conference had evaluated the international community's efforts to enhance control of radioactive sources and outlined future perspectives. Recognizing the importance of the revised *Code of Conduct on Safety and Security of Radioactive*

Sources, the Conference had urged Member States to make efforts to comply with the principles contained therein.

117. France had always attached the utmost importance to the Agency's promotional activities and its technical cooperation programme and had provided expertise and training, in particular in the area of radiation protection. It also provided ongoing support for activities undertaken in the framework of AFRA and ARCAL through the financing of several footnote-a/ projects, and by contributing French experts. France contributed regularly to the TCF and was aware of the funding difficulties for technical cooperation activities. All Member States had a common responsibility to support the Agency's technical cooperation activities, thus enabling it to fulfil its promotional mandate.

118. The Convention on Nuclear Safety had facilitated progress in many areas. He urged States that had nuclear facilities and had not yet acceded to the Convention to do so as soon as possible. France had sent its national report and contributed actively to the review meeting in April 2005.

119. France would participate, in May 2006, in the second review meeting of the Joint Convention and the organizational meeting scheduled for November 2004. In order to win international confidence in spent fuel and radioactive waste management, the broadest possible adherence to the Convention was vital.

120. France was contributing actively to the implementation of the Action Plan for the Safety of Transport of Radioactive Material, approved by the Board of Governors in March 2004. It was engaged in consultations with its partners and with coastal States to enhance mutual understanding and confidence in the safety of the maritime transport of radioactive materials.

121. During 2004, in a spirit of progress and transparency, France had received a TranSAS mission, which had drawn very positive conclusions regarding the French Nuclear Safety Authority. A TranSAS mission was planned to Japan, following those to the United Kingdom and France, which would allow that country to benefit from an international evaluation of its practices relating to the safety of transport of radioactive materials.

122. France had requested an IRRT review in 2007. An external evaluation could only help to improve the quality of the activities carried out by its Nuclear Safety Authority. France had also requested an OSART mission, as it had done every year since 1985 to strengthen the safety of its operational facilities. By the end of the decade, all of France's nuclear facilities would have received an OSART mission. He reiterated his country's full support for the Agency's nuclear safety activities.

123. Nuclear power as a means of ensuring sustainable economic development was enjoying a revival. That renewed interest had led the Director General, with the OECD/NEA and the French authorities, to organize an International Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Power for the 21st Century in March 2005, which had brought together 400 delegates from 74 countries. The success of that Conference had sent a clear signal of the renewed global interest in nuclear power to meet growing energy needs in the future, while taking into account public concerns and expectations, particularly regarding development and the environment. Delegates had delineated the energy situation in their countries and their vision for the future of nuclear power, they had emphasized the need for a diversified energy mix, and they had recognized the economic advantages of nuclear electricity generation in terms of economy, sustainable access, and low CO₂ emissions. In that context, it was important to involve the emerging countries. The energy choices they made would be crucial in the next 50 years. He underlined the progress made in that regard recently by France and India.

124. For more than 30 years, France had pursued an energy policy which was largely reliant on nuclear power, ensuring high energy independence. In 2004, France's 58 operating reactors accounted for more than 78% of electricity generation. The major role of nuclear power had been formally

confirmed in a law passed on 13 July 2005, which had fixed the priorities of French energy policy until 2015.

125. A 1600 MW unit of the European pressurised water reactor (EPR), a reactor with enhanced industrial and environmental performance and increased safety, was due to be constructed on the EDF site at Flamanville. A public debate was being organized for the period from October 2005 to February 2006 in France's major cities with a view to the commissioning of a demonstration reactor under optimal conditions between 2011 and 2012.

126. Progress had also been made in the long-term management of long-lived high-level nuclear waste. Under the law of 30 December 1991, a global evaluation report was due to be submitted to parliament by mid-2006 accompanied by, as appropriate, a draft law authorizing the establishment of a storage facility for long-lived high-level radioactive waste. The French Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) and the National Agency for Radioactive Waste Management (ANDRA) had been particularly involved and a public debate would be held to prepare for the 2006 deadline.

127. In June 2005 in Moscow, it had been decided to site ITER at Cadarache — an important step towards electricity generation by controlled thermonuclear fusion. All the partners now faced a significant technological and organizational challenge, which they were working hard to meet. Discussions had also been under way regarding the drawing up of a joint implementation agreement. He commended the Agency's contribution to that ambitious project.

128. International cooperation was essential to producing a new generation of innovative systems which were more competitive, safer and more proliferation-resistant, produced less long-lived waste, could meet the world's energy needs, and could ensure sustainable socio-economic development. For that reason, France was actively participating in GIF. In February 2005, France, along with the United States of America, Canada, Japan and the United Kingdom, had signed a framework agreement which marked the entry into the operational cooperation phase. France was also participating in the INPRO Steering Committee, which could make contributions with respect to evaluation methodologies in the Agency's specific fields of expertise. He emphasized the importance France attached to the complementary nature of, and coordination between, GIF and INPRO.

129. In conclusion, he reiterated the importance his country attached to the preservation of nuclear energy's role in global power generation and its contribution to progress and sustainable development of mankind and the planet. The Agency contributed to that objective by helping to ensure peace and international security and by assisting a growing number of countries to benefit from the peaceful uses of atomic energy. He assured the Agency and the Director General of France's full support in the accomplishment of those missions.

130. Mr. PLACHKOV (Ukraine) said that the past years had been critical in the development of Ukraine's nuclear energy sector. In 2005, Ukraine had commissioned two new 1000 MW nuclear power units. Now, atomic power plants were generating about half of the electricity consumed, providing the country with cheap, safe and ecologically clean electricity. Nuclear and radiation safety therefore remained a high priority. Achievement of adequate safety levels depended not only on Ukraine's own highly-qualified scientific and technical nuclear capabilities, but also on broad international cooperation.

131. Confidence in nuclear energy had been restored in Ukraine and there were now new complex and crucial challenges facing its nuclear energy sector. His Government saw the nuclear sector as an important element in ensuring Ukraine's sustained development. Furthermore, taking into account the situation of the world's fossil fuel markets, it expected the global significance of Ukraine's nuclear energy sector to grow in the future. Bearing in mind the need to strengthen domestic energy security, nuclear energy would remain a crucial constituent of the long-term electricity generation mix. The

Government was therefore formulating a number of conceptual long-term energy policy documents. The draft concept for developing the fuel and energy infrastructure by 2030 envisaged keeping the same mix of nuclear and fossil-fuel based power plants. An important element of the concept was reorientation of the economy from imported fossil fuels to the consumption of electricity, including that generated by nuclear power plants. With electricity consumption expected to increase more than twofold by 2030, the nuclear energy sector would need to increase output significantly. That would be achieved by extending the operating life of existing power plant units and by building new units. In that regard, Ukraine highly valued the Agency's work through its INPRO programme and would participate actively in it.

132. Wider use of atomic energy would be illogical without suitable approaches to the problems of nuclear fuel supply, and spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste management. As to the first problem, Ukraine intended to use its own sufficient uranium reserves. It was willing to develop broad international cooperation in the area of the production of uranium concentrate, materials and components for nuclear fuel with all interested partners. With regard to spent nuclear fuel, Ukraine was looking into the possibility of constructing a long-term dry storage repository. Radioactive waste management required the development of a national strategy and the use of an integrated approach, which also included work to be done on decommissioning the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and building a new confinement over the destroyed Unit 4.

133. For Ukraine, the country to have suffered the largest nuclear energy related disaster, ensuring nuclear and radiation safety remained a central concern. The safety level of Ukraine's operating units complied with modern requirements and were equivalent to those of similar units in other European countries. A safety enhancement programme was currently under way, the most important tasks of which would be implemented over the coming three to five years. Ukraine, which highly valued the Agency's work aimed at increasing the safety of nuclear facilities, attached particular importance to the third review meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety which had taken place in Vienna on 11-22 April 2005. Ukraine's third national report, submitted under the Convention, showed that the safety approaches being applied were correct. Ukraine regarded the recommendations and proposals of that meeting as a programme of action for it to follow in the future.

134. His country also supported the Agency's efforts to preserve knowledge in the field of nuclear safety. Relevant regional projects carried out under the Agency's technical cooperation programme were highly important in that regard, as were the Agency's missions to assess nuclear safety and its activities to draw up and review safety standards.

135. Like many other countries with a well-developed nuclear infrastructure, Ukraine was concerned about how to deal with the threat of terrorism at nuclear facilities and the unlawful proliferation of nuclear and radioactive materials. It supported the efforts of the Agency and Member States to prevent acts of nuclear terrorism and was in favour of strengthening the regime for the physical protection of nuclear material. While all facilities in Ukraine ensured the required level of physical protection of nuclear material, technical assistance from other countries to increase that level would be appreciated. No additional effort on that score could be too much. The activities of the Agency and Member States to prevent the illegal handling of ionizing radiation sources were also important. Ukraine called on all States to take measures to ensure compliance with the *Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources*.

136. Overcoming the consequences of the Chernobyl accident remained a central concern, which consumed a substantial part of the State budget and significant amounts of international aid. In the 20 years since the accident, much experience and a great deal of scientific data had been obtained. However, the passing of years had by no means diminished the many pressing questions. A wide range of work, much of it unique, was being carried out at the Chernobyl site related to decommissioning of

the plant. Special attention was being paid to nuclear and radiation safety requirements. Resources from the Ukrainian budget and from a number of technical assistance programmes were being used and well-known foreign companies were participating. Unfortunately substantial delays were being encountered.

137. The Ukrainian Government would be marking the 20th anniversary of the Chernobyl accident in 2006. The main event would be an international conference on its results and the future outlook. The Secretariat, interested Member States, companies working to overcome the consequences of the accident and other organizations were all invited to take part.

138. The Agency was playing an invaluable role in helping to solve the problems related to the Chernobyl accident. Its assistance manifested itself both in the funding of projects and in attracting the best experience from the international nuclear community. Ukraine thanked donor countries for their efforts.

139. One of the Agency's main tasks was verification of non-proliferation. As a country that had voluntarily renounced nuclear weapons, Ukraine called upon the international community to spare no effort to bolster the non-proliferation regime. An important instrument in that regime was the additional protocol and Ukraine, for its part, was finalizing procedures aimed at implementation of its additional protocol.

140. The Agency's technical cooperation programme made a considerable contribution to addressing tasks related to the peaceful use of atomic energy. Ukraine was involved in both regional and national technical cooperation projects. Aspects given high priority under Ukraine's CPF were: extending the operating lifetime of nuclear power plants; a comprehensive solution to the problems of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant; a national strategy for radioactive waste management; and, improving the nuclear and radiation safety regulatory system. Ukraine expected to sign its CPF at the current session of the General Conference.

141. Ms. TCHUINTE (Cameroon) said she was pleased with the emphasis placed in the Agency's Annual Report 2004 on nuclear technology. The Agency played an active role in promoting development through nuclear applications in such spheres as agriculture, food, human and animal health, the management of water resources and the environment. She welcomed the Agency's activities in support of development and the peaceful applications of nuclear techniques under its technical cooperation programme. Reaffirming Cameroon's full support for the Agency's objectives, she said it would do all it could to take an active part in promoting the peaceful use of nuclear techniques and strengthening the non-proliferation regime. Her country was committed to working with other Member States to bring peace, security and prosperity for all peoples.

142. The NPT's objectives to prevent nuclear proliferation and encourage disarmament were increasingly under threat. There were thousands of nuclear weapons in existence in Member States and in States not party to the NPT. The Government of Cameroon had recently signed a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol thereto, a small quantities protocol, the Early Notification Convention and the Assistance Convention, and had taken an active part in the Conference to Consider and Adopt Proposed Amendments to the CPPNM in Vienna in July 2005. That was evidence of Cameroon's support of efforts by the international community to combat nuclear terrorism or any other illicit use of radioactive sources, weapons of mass destruction or radiological dispersion devices.

143. It was nevertheless important to remember that security and stability could not be achieved in an environment marked by increasing rifts between cultures and civilizations, and between the rich and the poor. The chronic lack of good governance and respect for human rights in many regions was also a limiting factor. The Government of Cameroon was aware of the dangers posed by such uncertainties

and was keen to see a reduction of the world's nuclear threats. In that connection, it hoped to see fresh initiatives under Agency auspices aimed at enhancing the security of radioactive sources.

144. Since the beginning of the decade, the international community had been paying increasing attention to peace, security, development, eradicating poverty and environmental protection. The Agency's role in the areas identified as priorities by the Millennium Summit of the United Nations was also increasing. With regard to scientific and technical cooperation, Cameroon was grateful to the Agency for the support it given over many years to Member States in general, and to Cameroon in particular. Such cooperation enhanced national competences and the use of nuclear techniques in strategies for development and combating poverty. Cameroon attached particular importance to the work undertaken by the Agency in the domains of human health and in particular cancer control, the management of water resources, animal health and production, agriculture, food and desertification. Also important were its activities focusing on sustainable energy development, energy planning and evaluation of the environmental impact.

145. Her Government had made the necessary arrangements to contribute to the TCF. It was also making efforts to honour its commitments in terms of national participation costs.

146. Cameroon was grateful for the Agency's commitment to share knowledge in the area of the peaceful application of nuclear energy. Her country was taking steps to evaluate and organize nuclear knowledge with a view to making better use of nuclear technology for national development.

147. In conclusion, she said that Cameroon was striving to improve its radiation safety on the basis of the Agency's recommendations and was also making efforts to strengthen its legal and regulatory framework for radiation protection.

The meeting rose at 6.05 p.m.