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(GC(46)/1)

## NUCLEAR SECURITY – PROGRESS ON MEASURES TO PROTECT AGAINST NUCLEAR TERRORISM

### Report by the Director General

#### BACKGROUND

1. At the 45<sup>th</sup> General Conference, the Director General was requested to “review thoroughly the activities of the Agency with a view to strengthening the Agency work relevant to preventing acts of terrorism involving nuclear materials and other radioactive materials”<sup>1</sup> and report the results to the Board of Governors, as soon as possible<sup>2</sup>. At the same time the General Conference welcomed the plan of activities on the security of material described in GC(45)/20<sup>3</sup> adding that it looked forward to continuing achievements in this field. This report is written pursuant to these requests. **Attachment 1** provides a detailed summary of the progress in implementing the activities approved in principle by the Board in March 2002.
2. As requested by the General Conference, resolution GC(45)/RES/14A was brought to the attention of the UN General Assembly.
3. Following the General Conference, the Secretariat undertook, in consultation with Member States, a comprehensive review of all the Agency’s activities relevant to protection against nuclear terrorism, including those specified in GC(45)/20 and presented the results to the Board of Governors in November 2001, and March 2002. The specific proposals for the protection against nuclear terrorism<sup>3</sup> included new and expanded measures to supplement the Agency’s existing activities. The Board of Governors, in November 2001, directed the Director General, where resources were available, to proceed urgently with the full implementation of the approved activities and, in March 2002, approved in principle the plan of new and expanded activities to be funded from extra-budgetary funds.

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<sup>1</sup> Presidential statement, 45<sup>th</sup> General Conference.

<sup>2</sup> Resolution GC(45)/RES/14B, The Physical Protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities.

<sup>3</sup> GC(45)/20 “Measures to improve the security of nuclear materials and other radioactive materials.”

## **ADVISORY GROUP ON NUCLEAR SECURITY**

4. In January 2002, the Director General established the Advisory Group on Nuclear Security (AdSec), to advise him “on the Agency’s activities related to preventing, detecting and responding to terrorist or other malicious acts involving nuclear and other radioactive materials and nuclear facilities”. AdSec has met twice and a third meeting is planned for October 2002. AdSec has already assembled substantial knowledge of the Agency’s activities and their advice on implementation has been taken into account. Future areas for consideration by AdSec include the consideration of: the balance of priorities between the various planned activities; the implementation of the Secretariat’s plan of action; and, the nuclear security related components of the Agency’s 2004-2005 Programme and Budget.

## **PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION**

5. The Agency has adopted an integrated approach to planning and implementing measures to protect against nuclear terrorism. This brings together Agency activities concerned with physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear installations, the detection and response to illicit nuclear trafficking, promoting adherence to relevant international instruments<sup>4</sup>, the establishment of States’ legal and regulatory infrastructures, the security and safety of radioactive sources<sup>5</sup>, the protection of information technology (IT) infrastructure, emergency response measures in Member States and at the Agency, including pre-emergency response measures and national nuclear material accountancy. Protection against nuclear terrorism includes activities that are carried out in several departments. To ensure a coherent approach, the Director General has assigned responsibility for the co-ordination of these cross-cutting activities to a Co-ordinator for Nuclear Security.

## **RESOURCES**

6. The proposed plan of action is estimated to cost about \$12 million per year. In view of the urgency of some of the measures included in the action plan, and the range of views among Member States over the method of financing the activities, the Board agreed to fund new and expanded activities using voluntary resources. The Director General created an extrabudgetary Nuclear Security Fund (NSF) for the receipt of contributions to the Agency in support of these activities. However, a review of the funding mechanism will be undertaken in 1-2 years, once additional experience has been gained regarding the implementation of the programme.

7. Now, six months after the initial plan of action was approved by the Board, the voluntary contributions received amount to \$3,412,000 (rounded). As a first step, the Secretariat has started the activities with the available resources on the basis of the immediate needs and priorities identified by Member States and AdSec. **Attachment 2** shows the

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<sup>4</sup> The following international agreements, negotiated under the auspices of the IAEA, are relevant to the protection of nuclear or other radioactive material or nuclear facilities against terrorist activities: Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocol; Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident; Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency; Convention on Nuclear Safety and Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.

<sup>5</sup> The Agency’s security-related work focuses on radioactive sources; the terrorism-related security risks from the misuse of radiation generators (electrically produced radiation) is judged to be insignificant. Hence throughout this document reference is made to radioactive sources.

amounts so far pledged to the NSF and the offers of gifts of services, equipment and use of facilities so far made.

8. The TC mechanism will continue to be actively involved in assisting Member States in the field of nuclear security as part of their Country Programme Frameworks. The Director General has emphasized that while he views the improvements in nuclear security to be of a high priority, they should not be implemented at the expense of other existing high priorities in the TC programme in such areas as food and agriculture, health, water and environment. To this end, he also reiterated that if the TC programme were to participate in the implementation of some of the new or expanded activities, additional funds would have to be provided.

### **CONVENTION ON THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL (CPPNM)**

9. Following the Final Report of the Expert Meeting of May 2001, which recommended strengthening the Convention, the Director General decided to convene an open-ended group of legal and technical experts in order to prepare a draft of a well-defined amendment aimed at strengthening the CPPNM. The General Conference welcomed this decision in resolution GC(45)/RES/14B.

10. The group has met three times since and has made substantial progress. The draft amendment being prepared addresses the following subjects specified in the Final Report of the Experts Meeting<sup>6</sup>: the extension of scope to cover, in addition to international nuclear transport, nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport; protection of nuclear material and facilities from sabotage; national responsibility for physical protection; protection of confidential information; the physical protection objectives and fundamental principles; and appropriate definitions. The group will meet again in the first week of September 2002. States Parties will review the final draft amendment with a view to determine if, in accordance with Article 20 of the CPPNM, the Director General should be requested to convene an Amendment Conference, before the end of 2002, to consider and adopt the amendment.

### **PUBLIC INFORMATION**

11. Good communication leads to a better understanding of the issues in protecting against the threat of nuclear terrorism. Through its Public Information and Communication programme, the Secretariat has attempted to ensure that media reporting on the threat of nuclear terrorism is based on objective and accurate information. The programme has mounted two major campaigns: one focused on the need for concerted national and international action to prevent nuclear terrorism; the other on the need for better control of radioactive sources. The Agency's WorldAtom website is responding to and emphasizing the significance of this issue and provides a useful source of information about the Agency's activities.

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<sup>6</sup> The draft amendment excludes the following subjects that, according to the 2001 Final Report, should not be included in an amended Convention: a requirement to submit reports to the international community on the implementation of physical protection; a peer review mechanism; a mandatory application of INFCIRC/225, e.g. through direct reference and also through "due consideration"; mandatory international oversight of physical protection measures; and nuclear material and nuclear facilities for military use.

## **INFORMATION SECURITY**

12. The Agency has taken additional steps to address Member States' concerns about the protection of nuclear security related information. Building on existing arrangements, and reflecting the recommendations of internal working groups and external consultants, an Agency-wide confidentiality regime has been established and implementation of specific measures is underway. The new regime will allow the Agency's obligation to promote the exchange of information; e.g. on safety issues, to be balanced with the need to protect certain information for security or other reasons. Full implementation of these measures is expected to be completed by the end of 2002.

## **RECOMMENDATION FOR THE GENERAL CONFERENCE**

13. It is recommended that the Conference welcome the progress reported by the Director General and call upon all Member States to contribute to the Nuclear Security Fund.

## **PROGRESS ON AGENCY MEASURES TO PROTECT AGAINST NUCLEAR TERRORISM**

### **ACTIVITY AREAS**

#### ***I. Physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities***

1. The Agency's International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions provide advice to States designed to help them to strengthen the effectiveness of their physical protection systems. States can request follow-up IPPAS missions to review progress in implementing the recommendations and to determine if further assistance is required. Such IPPAS missions were carried out in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Lithuania and Romania. A further 4–6 IPPAS missions are currently being planned in response to requests from Member States.

2. A Design Basis Threat (DBT) developed by the State is an essential element of a system of physical protection<sup>7</sup>. Since September 2001, the Agency has organised DBT workshops in Armenia, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Ukraine. A further 4-5 DBT workshops are currently being planned in response to States' requests.

3. A physical protection training course was held in Egypt and a joint security/safety workshop in Pakistan<sup>8</sup>. A regional workshop held in co-operation with the Indonesian Government involved members of ASEAN and covered both physical protection and illicit trafficking issues. A regional workshop on security culture involving nuclear power plant (NPP) operators from Armenia, Kazakhstan, Lithuania and Ukraine was held in the Russian Federation, and an international training physical protection course attended by 27 States was held in the United States. Support was given to a trilateral meeting of NPP operators and nuclear regulators meeting in the Czech Republic to discuss physical protection practices post-11 September 2001. A fact-finding mission was undertaken in Tunisia. Further, physical protection training and workshops currently being planned include regional courses in China and India and joint security/safety seminars in the Republic of Korea<sup>9</sup> and the Islamic Republic of Iran<sup>10</sup>. A training course on developing and maintaining national regulations on physical protection is being compiled.

4. The "*Handbook on the Physical Protection Nuclear Materials and Facilities*"<sup>11</sup> which helps States to design effective physical protection measures was published in March 2002. Work has begun on drafting a "*Regulatory Handbook for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Facilities*" which will provide guidance on the development and maintenance of physical protection regulations. An international "DBT Workshop Curriculum Review Meeting" has been convened by the Secretariat to be held in Vienna in August 2002. The

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<sup>7</sup> INF/CIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected) para 4.1.4.

<sup>8</sup> See also Activity Area V, para 19.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> TECDOC-1276.

workshop will review the DBT methodology and begin work on drafting international guidance on the development and maintenance of a DBT. With assistance from Member States, and combining both safety and security considerations, the Agency is also developing a methodology<sup>12</sup> to identify 'vital areas' in NPPs which would be vulnerable to acts of sabotage.

## ***II. Detection of malicious activities involving nuclear and other radioactive materials***

5. Training courses for front line officers most likely to encounter radioactive materials were held in Azerbaijan and Cyprus, and a workshop on illicit trafficking issues for States in the south-eastern European region was held in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. A regional workshop held in Indonesia<sup>13</sup> covered illicit trafficking as well as physical protection issues. In Romania, the Agency helped to plan a national exercise for law enforcement and technical authorities and provided training. In co-operation with the Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU), two courses on nuclear forensics for law enforcement agencies and experts from national laboratories were delivered in Germany and a third is planned before the end of 2002.

6. In January 2002, the Agency sponsored a workshop in Vienna on hand-held radionuclide identifying instruments that brought together law enforcement officers, laboratory experts and the manufacturers. The workshop results will be integrated into the newly created Co-ordinated Research Project (CRP) which will co-ordinate R&D on the detection capabilities and field performance of hand-held and portable radionuclide measurement devices. The CRP will also prepare standardized procedures for detecting and examining suspicious packages and the assessment of hazard for confiscated material.

7. Work has begun on a project to develop a handbook specifically for law enforcement and customs personnel in the field, which will provide guidance on the detection, handling and response to incidents involving radioactive materials.

8. The Agency has held meetings in Moscow and Vienna on developing a certified curriculum for training law enforcement officers. Two courses, both in the Russian Federation, will be delivered using the new curriculum before the end of 2002. The Agency is also developing a structured approach to fact-finding missions designed specifically to evaluate border monitoring needs. Three Member States have requested such missions.

## ***III. State systems for nuclear material accountancy and control (SSAC)***

9. An effective SSAC is an essential component in maintaining the security of nuclear material and combating illicit trafficking. SSAC training courses were held in Algeria, Argentina, and the United States of America, regional seminars in Japan and Peru, and workshops in the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Japan. The Agency also provided assistance to Australia in the implementation of a regional training course for SSAC personnel from selected north Asian States. The Agency's Co-ordinated Technical Support Programme (CTSP) for the Newly Independent States and Eastern European States has been used as a mechanism for co-ordinating bilateral donor State assistance in the establishment

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<sup>12</sup> See also Activity Area V.

<sup>13</sup> See Activity I.

and improvement of SSACs. Workshops and seminars to strengthen SSAC activities have been held in Belarus, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Uzbekistan under the CTSP. To enhance the operation of the SSAC, computer hardware and software has been delivered to a number of States through the technical co-operation programme. These systems have improved the nuclear material accounting reports and given recipient States the ability to encrypt electronic reports to the Secretariat. SSAC computer hardware and software will be provided to additional States during the remainder of 2002 and a number of training courses and workshops are planned.

10. The development of guidelines and recommendations combined with the provision of advisory services, training and technical support and are key components in establishing and strengthening SSACs. Consultations have been held with Member States on the content and format of guidelines for the establishment, improvement and maintenance of an effective SSAC and the drafting of guidelines for an SSAC Advisory Service has started. The Secretariat has prepared and distributed to the Newly Independent States and Eastern European States, a document setting out a methodology for self-assessment of their SSACs. So far, nine of the 14 States contacted have carried out the self-assessment and the Secretariat has completed evaluation of their responses. Meetings have been convened with Belarus, Estonia, Lithuania and Uzbekistan to discuss the results and to identify areas for upgrades. Further meetings with Member States to discuss their SSAC self-assessments are planned during the remainder of 2002.

#### ***IV Security of radioactive material other than nuclear material***

11. An important underpinning for nuclear security is the continuing work related to improving the national infrastructure for radiation safety in over 80 Member States. This includes the establishment of a regulatory authority, legislation/regulations, an education and training programme plus a comprehensive inventory of sources. In addition, a substantial programme of activities has been started to increase the security of radioactive sources under regulatory control and to recover sources that are out of control. The existing standards<sup>14</sup>, developed by the Agency<sup>15</sup> in co-operation with other international organizations, contain general requirements on the security of radioactive sources but there are no detailed guidelines. The first step, therefore, is to provide recommendations covering security issues related to acquisition, use, transport and disposal of sources. A Safety Guide covering the safety of radiation sources and the security of radioactive sources will be submitted to the Radiation Safety Standards Committee for consideration at the next meeting in December 2002. A supporting Safety Report on detailed security recommendations for radioactive sources has been drafted and will be reviewed by a Technical Committee in October 2002. Development of the related training modules and appraisal procedures and the delivery of training and appraisal missions will follow.

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<sup>14</sup> Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, International Atomic Energy Agency, International Labour Organisation, OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, Pan American Health Organisation, World Health Organisation, International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radioactive Sources”, IAEA Safety Series No.115, Vienna (1996).

<sup>15</sup> See also “Report on the Implementation of the Revised Action Plan for the Safety and Security of Radiation Sources”, GOV/2002/XX – GC(46)/XX, Attachment 2.

12. To address the issue of locating and regaining control over orphan sources, a TECDOC on “*National Strategies for Detection and Location of Orphan Sources and their Subsequent Management*” is in final draft. The Agency is now seeking Member States prepared to host missions designed to pilot the use of the TECDOC. Following any revisions, it is planned that regional workshops will provide training on the use of the TECDOC and Agency missions to Member States will help to develop national action plans. An initial draft of criteria for the provision of assistance to Member States on the security of radioactive sources has been completed.

13. Valuable experience has been gained from the effort to locate orphan sources in remote areas of Georgia. In January 2002 the Agency provided support and advice on the recovery and securing of two large ‘orphan sources’. Subsequently, the Agency convened a meeting involving the Georgian authorities and external experts, to formulate an action plan for detecting and localizing ‘orphan sources’ in Georgia. Phase I of that plan, which included training of Georgian personnel, was successfully completed in June 2002 with direct help from France, India, Turkey and the U.S. Phase 2 will take place in September/October 2002. The Agency also provided support to other States in connection with incidents involving ‘orphan sources’, notably in Afghanistan, Bolivia and Uganda.

14. Drafting of the TECDOCs, jointly sponsored by the IAEA, World Customs Organization (WCO) and Interpol, which cover the prevention, detection and response to inadvertent movement, and illicit trafficking of radioactive materials<sup>16</sup> is complete. They have been submitted for publication. The current “*Code of Conduct on Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources*”<sup>17</sup> is to be reviewed by a Technical Committee in August 2002, which will consider its effectiveness. The assessment of threats to radioactive material during transport will be addressed by a meeting of consultants in October 2002. There is currently no funding available for other work in the transport area.

15. A significant recent development has been the establishment of a tripartite (USA, Russian Federation, IAEA) working group on ‘Securing and Managing Radioactive Sources’ which will develop a co-ordinated and proactive strategy to locate, recover, secure and recycle ‘orphan sources’ throughout the former Soviet Union.

16. A regional workshop on the safety and security of radioactive sources for the countries of West and Central Asia is to be held in Kazakhstan in August and further workshops are to be held in Mexico and Japan before the end of 2002.

#### ***V. Assessment of safety/security related vulnerability of nuclear facilities***

17. Safety and security issues are inseparable considerations in the development of measures to reduce the vulnerability of nuclear facilities to terrorist attack. The Secretariat’s approach to developing new tools and training modules has combined both physical protection and safety concerns. The Agency provides services to promote self-assessment of

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<sup>16</sup> “*Detection of Radioactive Materials at Borders*”.

“*Prevention of the inadvertent movement and illicit trafficking of radioactive materials*”.

“*Response to events involving the inadvertent or illicit trafficking of radioactive material*”.

<sup>17</sup> IAEA/CODEOC/2001.

facilities related to design and operational measures, which provide 'defence in depth' and contribute to preventing and/or mitigating the impact of malicious acts.

18. The existing Agency safety requirements related to the design and operational safety of nuclear facilities have been recently revised<sup>17</sup> and some safety guides relevant to external and internal "challenges" are currently in the final stage of revision. Guidance documents on the design of nuclear facilities, other than nuclear power plants, and covering external events such as acts of extreme violence and human induced events are in preparation. A new methodology to identify 'vital areas' is being developed<sup>18</sup> as well as a related training module. In January 2002 Sandia National Laboratories organized a workshop in the Ukraine on vital area identification. A draft of the workshop material has been produced. A consultant group, comprising both physical protection and nuclear safety skills, will review the draft material in August 2002 and offer comments and advice. When finalised, it is intended that the 'vital areas' training module will be delivered to Member States as part of a joint safety/security training program. In addition, a methodology to evaluate the inherent robustness of nuclear facilities in the face of external events of malevolent origin is being developed by the Secretariat with the assistance of external consultants.

19. Following GC(45)/RES/14, a meeting of consultants was convened to provide expert advice to the Secretariat. As a result, "*Guidelines for Self Assessment for Nuclear Installations*" were compiled which bring together physical protection, engineering, operational and administrative measures. The application of the guidelines has been discussed at a safety/security seminar in Pakistan, and a seminar the Russian Federation. They will be further discussed at meetings in the Republic of Korea in September 2002 and in the Islamic Republic of Iran in November 2002.

#### ***VI. Response to malicious acts, or threats thereof***

20. The draft of the *Requirements on Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency* was reviewed and modified to ensure that the response to emergencies involving malicious acts was covered. The final document<sup>19</sup> was approved by the Board at its March 2002 meeting. Before the end of 2002, the Secretariat expects to publish an updated version of TECDOC-953<sup>20</sup> on the methodology for developing emergency preparedness and response arrangements that will take specific account of the need to strengthen arrangements in Member States for responding to emergencies resulting from malicious acts.

21. Since September 2001, the Agency has intensified the existing programme to strengthen emergency response measures in States. In addition, an action plan for revising emergency response preparedness and response manuals, associated training material and appraisal methodologies is being developed to address the specific issue of the response to nuclear or radiological emergencies arising from malicious activities. The Agency is also augmenting

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<sup>18</sup> See also Activity Area I.

<sup>19</sup> "The Agency's Safety Standards, Safety Requirements: Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency" GOV/2002/5, dated 18 February 2002.

<sup>20</sup> Method for the development of Emergency Response Preparedness for Nuclear or Radiological Accidents, 1997.

existing training material for emergency response teams and will pilot test this by extending the scope of a previously planned workshop to be held in Australia for the East Asia and Pacific region. The Agency also held a seminar on emergency response issues in the Republic of Korea.

22. The Agency is carrying out activities to strengthen its own emergency response arrangements<sup>21</sup>. Additional activities include an analysis of existing legal instruments and policy, and identification of threats and possible scenarios that might require an Agency response. The preliminary results will be reflected in the next edition of the Joint Radiation Emergency Management Plan of the International Organizations, the Emergency Notification and Assistance Technical Operations Manual (ENATOM), and the Emergency Response Network (ERNET) arrangements all due for publication in December 2002. The Secretariat expects to have established rudimentary interim arrangements for in-house response to such events and updated in-house procedures and training material before the end of 2002. More highly developed arrangements, including institutional links with other mandated international organizations are envisaged for the medium term, assuming resources are available.

23. In addition, the CRP on “Technical measures to detect illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials” will facilitate the necessary development and the preparation of guidelines for establishing a network of analytical laboratories to be available for States to obtain the required nuclear forensics analysis.

24. In October 2002, the Agency is holding, in co-operation with the European Commission’s Institute for Transuranium Elements, a major international conference “Advances in Destructive and Non-Destructive Analysis for Environmental Monitoring and Nuclear Forensics” in Karlsruhe, Germany.

### ***VII. Adherence to and implementation of international agreements, guidelines and recommendations***

25. Existing Agency programmes provide assistance to Member States in assessing and developing national legislation. Special attention is being given to legislation related to nuclear security; e.g. covering the control of radioactive sources, physical protection requirements, safeguards and import-export controls. A workshop on the development of national legislation to fulfil States’ obligations under the additional protocol was held in Tallinn, Estonia on January 2002 in co-operation with the Government of Sweden.

26. To encourage States to adhere to and implement international instruments relevant to protection against nuclear terrorism<sup>22</sup>, the Agency intends to assemble teams of experts who will be able to advise Member States on these issues. Work has started on identifying the experts and work on developing the terms of reference and assembling background material will begin soon. The first mission will visit five States in Africa with the objective of persuading national policy-makers to adhere to and implement international instruments

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<sup>21</sup> Report on “Actions Arising out of the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency”, GOV/2002/35–GC(46)/11, Attachment 8.

<sup>22</sup> See paragraph 5 of the Report.

relevant to the enhancement of protection against nuclear terrorism, and to assist them in doing so. Three such missions per annum are envisaged but development of this activity will depend upon the availability of staff and other resources.

### ***VIII. Nuclear security co-ordination and information management***

27. Effective planning, prioritising and implementation of nuclear security related activities by both the Agency and Member States requires information. The Secretariat is seeking ways to expand the scope and quantity of the information it has available. Expanded data sources would be used to help design and prioritise future Agency nuclear security related activities; e.g. in supporting fact-finding missions requested by Member States to identify broad national requirements and needs. The terms of reference, including modalities, for such missions are under development.

28. The existing illicit trafficking database (ITDB) continues to grow. Over the last year, information on about 90 new trafficking incidents was added, of which the States involved confirmed more than 50. The Illicit Trafficking Annual Report was issued to Member States in May 2002 and summary listings of reported incidents were issued to Member States on a quarterly basis. Efforts continue to encourage more Member States to become ITDB participants. Since September 2001, the number of Member States participating in the ITDB has increased a little and now stands at 70. Coverage in the ITDB of incidents involving radioactive sources is much less complete than that for nuclear material. Efforts to identify and corroborate additional incidents have been expanded. Functional improvements to the ITDB requested by the Member States' points of contact are also in hand. Further development of the ITDB and its exploitation, and the development of an expanded nuclear security related database is awaiting the availability of resources.

29. Since September 2001, the Secretariat has serviced a high volume of *ad hoc* demands for information from Member States, NGOs, academic institutions and the media. Secretariat staff has also provided briefings and lectures on illicit trafficking in Indonesia, Kazakhstan and Latvia, and to several international organisations. The volume of these demands reflects the value attached to the ITDB and the work done on its evaluation, but it places further strains on the limited resources available.

30. The Secretariat has continued to maintain co-operation with other international organizations albeit against a backdrop where resources on all sides have been under considerable strain. The Secretariat has supported conferences related to terrorism at both the European Police Agency (EUROPOL) and Interpol and will conclude a Memorandum of Understanding with the Universal Postal Union in the near future covering, inter alia, the exchange of information relevant to the transport of radioactive material. A version of the ITDB database containing unrestricted information was supplied on CD-ROM to Interpol, EUROPOL, and the WCO. The Secretariat has also supplied information on specific trafficking incidents to these organizations and received information from them. The Agency intends to develop further this co-operation including expanding the opportunities for information exchange by finalizing a Memorandum of Agreement with EUROPOL.

**CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE AGENCY'S  
NUCLEAR SECURITY ACTIVITIES**

<b>STATUS OF NUCLEAR SECURITY FUND (2 AUGUST 2002)</b>	
<b>Member States/ Organizations</b>	<b>Voluntary Contributions Pledged (Rounded) (US Dollars Equivalent)</b>
Australia	55,000
Bulgaria	15,000
Iran	30,000
Israel	20,000
Japan	342,000
Netherlands	246,000
Norway	130,000
Republic of Korea	100,000
Slovenia	13,000
United Kingdom	355,000
United States of America	5,201,000
Nuclear Threat Initiative	1,200,000
<b>TOTAL PLEDGED</b>	<b>\$7,707,000</b>
<b>TOTAL RECEIVED</b>	<b>\$3,412,000</b>

<b>GIFTS OF SERVICES, EQUIPMENT AND USE OF FACILITIES</b>
<b>Member States</b>
Finland
France
Germany
India
Japan
Romania
Turkey
United States of America