



GC

GC(45)/OR.4
October 2001

International Atomic Energy Agency
GENERAL CONFERENCE

GENERAL Distr.
Original: ENGLISH

FORTY-FIFTH (2001) REGULAR SESSION

RECORD OF THE FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Austria Center Vienna
on Tuesday, 18 September 2001, at 3.10 p.m.

President: Mr. GRÖNBERG (Finland)

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Abbreviations used in this record

AFRA	African Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
ARCAL	Co-operation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean
Assistance Convention	Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency
CANDU	Canada deuterium-uranium [reactor]
CPPNM	Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Early Notification Convention	Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident
Euratom	European Atomic Energy Community
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
G-7	Group of Seven [leading industrial countries]
GRULAC	Latin American and Caribbean Group
HWR	Heavy water reactor
INDAG	International Nuclear Desalination Advisory Group
INIS	International Nuclear Information System
INPRO	International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles
IPSART	International Probabilistic Safety Assessment Review Team
IPPAS	International Physical Protection Advisory Service
IRRT	International Regulatory Review Team
ITER	International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor
KEDO	Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization
NPP	Nuclear power plant
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT Review and Extension Conference	Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT Review Conference	Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
OECD/NEA	Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPANAL	Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
ORPAS	Occupational Radiation Protection Appraisal Service
OSART	Operational Safety Review Team
OSPAR Convention	Oslo-Paris Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic
PHARE	European Union programme of assistance for economic restructuring in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe

Abbreviations used in this record
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PRIS	Power Reactor Information System
PSA	Probabilistic safety analysis/assessment
RBMK	High-power channel-type reactor (Soviet Union)
RCA	Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (for Asia and the Pacific)
SAGNA	Standing Advisory Group on Nuclear Applications
SIT	Sterile insect technique
SSAC	State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material
TACIS	Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States
TCDC	Technical co-operation among developing countries
TCF	Technical Co-operation Fund
Tlatelolco Treaty	Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
Transport Regulations	Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material
TranSAS	Transport Safety Appraisal Service
Trilateral Initiative	Trilateral Initiative launched by the Minister of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy, the Secretary of Energy of the United States and the Agency's Director General on 17 September 1996 to consider practical measures for the application of IAEA verification to fissile material originating from nuclear weapons
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
WENRA	Western European Regulators Association
WWER	Water-cooled and -moderated reactor (former USSR)

GENERAL DEBATE AND THE ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2000 (continued)

1. Ms. HAIRD (United Kingdom), expressing deepest sympathy to the United States of America in the wake of the 11 September terrorist attacks, said that there could be no justification for such appalling acts. The United Kingdom stood ready to help bring the perpetrators to justice.
2. Recalling the history of the establishment of the Agency, she said that the Agency had the central role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons; its safeguards activities remained its *raison d'être*. The ability to detect and thus deter the diversion of nuclear material declared to be in peaceful use must remain a central feature of the safeguards regime. In recent years, the Agency had considerably strengthened its capability for detecting undeclared nuclear material and activities. The onus was now on Member States to ensure that the Secretariat was able to fully implement the strengthened safeguards system.
3. Although the additional protocols signed by European Union Member States had not yet entered into force, the United Kingdom already had the relevant legislation in place, and since 1999 it had been voluntarily providing the Secretariat with the information that would be required of it once its additional protocol was in force. Also, it had been helping, through its safeguards support programme, to develop strengthened and integrated safeguards methodologies.
4. She expressed appreciation of the Agency's assistance to Member States in establishing effective systems for the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities. Agency guidance documents, IPPAS, conferences and training courses were serving non-proliferation objectives and also helping to protect public health and safety and the environment. The United Kingdom had been supporting the programme in question through extrabudgetary contributions and the provision of technical expertise.
5. In the area of nuclear safety, the work on updating and extending the Agency's safety standards must continue to be accorded high priority. Her delegation therefore welcomed the budgetary provision for work on developing safety standards for fuel cycle installations. In that connection, it also welcomed the entry into force of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, already ratified by the United Kingdom.
6. The United Kingdom, which attached great importance to safety in the transport of nuclear materials, had an excellent record in the transport of such materials - both over land and by sea. Although it was confident that it was transporting such materials in full accordance with relevant international standards, it had recently requested the Secretariat to organize a TranSAS mission to look at its nuclear material transport operations. It was also confident that the mission would confirm that those operations were being carried out in accordance with best practice, whatever the method of transport.
7. With the rising global demand for energy and the greater awareness of concerns about climate change, the potential of nuclear power as a proven energy option remained important.

In that connection, the Agency's work on innovative reactors was timely given the global debate about the acceptability and viability of nuclear power.

8. The Agency had worked hard to promote various non-power applications of nuclear energy through its technical co-operation activities. Although the Agency was not legally bound to carry out such activities, the United Kingdom recognized the importance of a well-run and adequately funded technical co-operation programme. In 2001 it had paid its full TCF target share and had made additional voluntary contributions.

9. More than 50 countries party to the NPT had so far failed to conclude NPT safeguards agreements with the Agency; those countries should delay no further in concluding such agreements. In addition, speedier progress must be made with the conclusion and implementation of additional protocols; in the four years since the Board had approved the Model Additional Protocol, fewer than 60 States had signed additional protocols - and so far only 22 additional protocols were being implemented. The Secretariat - with support from the United Kingdom and a number of other Member States - had put enormous effort into the development of integrated safeguards, and the progress had been impressive, but the extent to which it would be possible to apply integrated safeguards would depend on the extent to which additional protocols were being implemented. The safeguards agenda was therefore a challenging one - for the Agency and for Member States.

10. Her delegation believed that the Agency should help States, on request, to meet their responsibilities for maintaining physical protection regimes capable of preventing the theft of nuclear material and the sabotage of nuclear facilities. In that connection, it welcomed the recently formulated "Physical Protection Objectives and Fundamental Principles".

11. The Agency had a broad mandate, but its resources were severely limited. Member States should therefore stop constantly requesting the Secretariat to carry out more activities. For its part, the Secretariat should be prepared to contribute to the identifying of priorities, so that a sensible and feasible work programme might be agreed upon, account being taken of the fact that the Agency needed to co-operate with other organizations. To help the Secretariat make the optimum use of its resources, an external study of selected areas of work would be useful. That would require careful preparation, which her delegation hoped could be done in the coming months.

12. Mr. GANCHEV (Bulgaria) expressed condolences to the United States of America and to the relatives of the victims of the terrorist attacks which had taken place in that country the previous week. Bulgaria had condemned the attacks, which had violated all democratic values, and fully supported the actions being taken by the international community against terrorism.

13. As a country with operating nuclear power reactors, Bulgaria was particularly interested in the Agency activities in the fields of nuclear power, nuclear safety, radiation protection and radioactive waste management and hoped that the Agency would continue to develop internationally recognized standards and criteria in those fields. Through its expertise, the

Agency was helping to bring his country's nuclear installations into compliance with such standards and criteria and to strengthen the Bulgarian nuclear regulatory authority.

14. The Agency's contribution to preventing nuclear weapons proliferation had been substantial, as indicated in the Annual Report for 2000, where it was stated that in 2000 the Secretariat had found no indication of diversion of nuclear material or misuse of facilities, equipment or non-nuclear material placed under safeguards.

15. His country, which contributed to the strengthening of the Agency's safeguards system, had ratified the protocol additional to its safeguards agreement with the Agency and had presented an initial declaration in accordance with the requirements of that protocol.

16. His delegation welcomed the improvements made in the area of technical co-operation management and also the results achieved in transferring nuclear techniques, training specialists and providing expert services and equipment.

17. His delegation attached great importance to INPRO and to the idea - stemming from the International Conference on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management held in Córdoba, Spain, in March 2000 - of the Agency's addressing the societal aspects of radioactive waste management.

18. As a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, Bulgaria was, in its foreign trade, requiring full-scope safeguards as a precondition for supplying nuclear material and equipment.

19. Although the main responsibility for ensuring the physical protection of nuclear materials and other radioactive materials lay with Member States, the Agency's role in promoting international co-operation in physical protection, improving Member States' systems for nuclear material accounting and control, and providing physical protection training was essential.

20. In Bulgaria, practically half of whose electricity was generated by the Kozloduy NPP, a draft Law on the Use of Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes - prepared with the assistance of Agency experts - had been submitted for approval to the National Assembly. It provided for the Committee on the Use of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes to be transformed into a State Atomic Energy Agency, the aim being to strengthen the independence of Bulgaria's nuclear regulatory authority. It also provided for Bulgaria's nuclear legislation to be brought into line with the nuclear legislation of the European Union.

21. With regard to the operational safety of the Kozloduy NPP, a three-stage WWER-440 modernization programme covering the period 1990-97 had been followed by a WWER-440 safety enhancement programme starting in 1998. After the signing of an understanding between the European Commission and the Bulgarian Government which envisaged the closure of Units 1 and 2 before 2003, the safety-enhancement programme had been converted into a programme for the modernization of Units 3 and 4, expected to be completed by the end of 2002. It was expected that the programme for the modernization of Units 5 and 6

(WWER-1000s), in the process of implementation, would be completed by the end of 2006. The aforementioned programmes had received positive assessments by Agency experts.

22. A safety review of the upgraded design of Units 3 and 4, expected to be conducted by the Agency in May-June 2002, would be of great importance for the future of nuclear power in Bulgaria.

23. Referring to technical co-operation projects BUL/4/008 and BUL/4/006, "Planning and Management of Decommissioning Kozloduy NPP Units 1 and 2" and "Failed Fuel Assembly Detection and Measurement", he said that the Kozloduy NPP would in 2001 be making an extrabudgetary contribution of US \$270 000 in support of the implementation of those projects and of regional projects for Europe in the field of nuclear power.

24. Bulgaria was participating very actively in regional technical co-operation activities, especially activities relating to nuclear power, nuclear safety, radioactive waste management and nuclear medicine. It was also participating in the Agency's research contract programme, INIS, the Incident Reporting System, PRIS and the Agency's Illicit Trafficking Database Programme.

25. His country greatly appreciated the work of the Secretariat in promoting international co-operation in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy and applying effective controls designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

26. Mr. MORGAN (Canada) offered his country's deepest condolences to all those in the United States of America and other countries affected by the horrific events of 11 September. The United States could count on the complete support and solidarity of Canada, which would work in the Agency and other fora to ensure that such senseless tragedies never occurred again.

27. Canada was firmly committed to the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime as a means of advancing global security. Agency safeguards were a fundamental pillar of that regime, and Canada welcomed the significant role of the Agency in supporting the 13 practical steps leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons adopted at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

28. There continued to be significant challenges to the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, and Canada would like to see India, Pakistan, Israel and Cuba acceding to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States soon and without conditions. It remained very concerned about the DPRK, which was still not co-operating fully with the Agency, so that the Agency was unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration made by the DPRK pursuant to its safeguards agreement. The DPRK should start co-operating fully with the Agency and resume Agency membership at the earliest opportunity. Canada was also concerned that the Agency had not been in a position since December 1998 to implement its mandate in Iraq under the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions despite the routine verification activities carried out by it there in 1999 and 2000. The Agency was to be

commended for its continuing efforts to find practical and constructive solutions to the issues involved.

29. Canada attached considerable importance to the strengthened safeguards regime, including integrated safeguards, and looked forward to completion of the Agency's efforts to develop facility-specific integrated safeguards approaches. Additional work was clearly required in order to develop State-level integrated safeguards approaches that combined the relevant facility-specific approaches with appropriate State-level safeguards elements. The Agency should proceed in a timely manner with the application of integrated safeguards in States that had concluded additional protocols.

30. With regard to Canada's additional protocol, which had entered into force in September 2000, the required initial declaration had been delivered on 6 March 2001 - within the specified time frame. In conjunction with other interested Member States and the Agency, Canada had been developing an integrated safeguards approach that was appropriate for the country as a whole. It looked forward to the pragmatic and timely implementation of that approach, so that Canada might begin to reap the benefits of the implementation of integrated safeguards.

31. Canada would like to see many more States demonstrating their commitment to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by concluding additional protocols with the Agency. It was concerned that 54 States party to the NPT had not yet concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency, and it was participating in the efforts of the Agency and a number of Member States to promote the universalization of safeguards agreements and additional protocols.

32. Nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament developments indicated that there would continue to be new challenges to and pressures on the Agency in the verification field. One example was the Trilateral Initiative, pursuant to which an agreement between the Agency, the Russian Federation and the United States would be presented to the Board of Governors at an appropriate time. Another was the Agency's possible role in the verification aspects of the Russian Federation/United States Plutonium Management and Dispositioning Agreement. Canada looked forward to early and comprehensive discussions on both issues, with a view, inter alia, to ensuring that key principles such as the need for irreversibility were incorporated into the agreements.

33. Canada was in favour of strengthening the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material by extending its coverage to include the physical protection of nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport. It would continue to participate actively in the current review process, which it hoped would lead to improvements in the Convention.

34. The Agency had a vital role to play in promoting the safe use of nuclear energy, which was essential for sustaining public confidence in nuclear technology. Canada welcomed the Agency's emphasis on the importance of education and training for establishing and maintaining adequate radiation protection and nuclear safety infrastructures and for ensuring the continued viability of the nuclear industry.

35. His country strongly supported the use of nuclear power, which was meeting some 15% of its electricity requirements. Efforts were well under way in Canada, pending regulatory approval, to return six of eight laid-up nuclear power reactors to service. Another significant development was the recent private-sector and foreign investment in Canadian nuclear power utilities. It was expected that the contribution of nuclear power to Canada's energy mix would increase significantly during the next several years.

36. His delegation was pleased that the process leading to the production of national reports pursuant to the Convention on Nuclear Safety was well under way, in anticipation of the second Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention, scheduled for April 2002. It would like to see the few countries with nuclear power programmes which had not yet done so acceding to the Convention without further delay.

37. It was also pleased that the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management had entered into force. It believed that implementation of the Convention would assist in ensuring the safe and efficient management of spent fuel and radioactive waste, and it would like to see many more States becoming Contracting Parties to the Convention in the near future.

38. The management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste continued to be a significant public policy challenge. Against that background, his Government was proposing legislation which would require nuclear power utilities to establish an organization to carry out waste management activities under federal oversight. The legislation would also require nuclear power utilities to establish a trust fund for financing the implementation of a long-term waste management approach. The aim was to demonstrate that nuclear power was a safe and sustainable energy option.

39. His delegation was pleased that significant international collaboration on "next generation" reactor designs had begun in earnest through INPRO and the United States-led Generation IV International Forum. Canada was participating in both initiatives, which could make a unique contribution to activities focused on the development of "next generation" technology. However, care should be taken to avoid overlapping and duplication.

40. A significant fusion energy project (ITER Co-ordinated Technical Activities) was also well under way, and his Government had announced its intention to participate as a full member. Also, it had submitted a proposal to host the project in Canada, where an excellent site was available.

41. CANDU reactors were among the best-performing power reactors in the world; their design had proved to be safe, viable and competitive. Furthermore, work was under way in Canada on the next generation of CANDU reactors, building on the proven benefits of HWR technology. A significant CANDU community existed, and his delegation trusted that the CANDU reactor would continue to be accorded attention in the Agency's programme activities. As Canada was also a world leader in the production of radioisotopes and uranium, his delegation also trusted that the Agency would continue its important activities relating to those fields.

42. Canada strongly endorsed public information and outreach activities in accordance with the Agency's mandate as it believed that the Agency had an important role to play in effectively addressing public perception issues related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

43. His delegation welcomed the Secretariat's innovative approaches to technical co-operation programme management, such as the linking of technical co-operation activities with broad development strategies in recipient States, and the efforts of the Secretariat to increase management efficiency and eliminate administrative barriers. Canada would continue to encourage the development of technical co-operation partnerships with other international organizations and the private sector in order to broaden the base of contributors and thereby mitigate the effects of the continuing non-payment by some Member States of their full TCF target shares.

44. Canada was concerned about continuing increases in the Regular Budget level. However, it had actively sought an acceptable resolution of the 2002 Regular Budget issues and had not stood in the way of a consensus. Increasing transparency and responsiveness in the budget formulation process would greatly facilitate negotiations in the future. It was incumbent on Member States and the Secretariat to establish a coherent programme and budget formulation process and to engage in a constructive dialogue on programme priorities. Canada, which was committed to establishing such a process and engaging in such a dialogue, looked forward to addressing the challenges that lay ahead in a positive and co-operative manner.

45. His delegation would study with interest the results of the financial management review by an external consultant which the Director General had announced at the Board's June meetings. It was confident that the review would result in a simplification of procedures, and it would welcome similar reviews in other areas. It expected the review to lead to further savings and efficiency gains and also to greater management flexibility, permitting the reallocation of resources to high-priority activities.

46. To remain effective, the Agency should place appropriate emphasis on activities related to verifying the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, advancing safe operating practices at nuclear facilities worldwide and promoting beneficial applications of nuclear technology. On that basis, and through the careful management and efficient use of existing resources and the constructive engagement of Member States, the Agency would help to ensure that nuclear energy remained a sustainable energy option and was able to capitalize on new opportunities.

47. Mr. RÓNAKY (Hungary), expressing condolences to the American people and the United States Government in connection with the 11 September terrorist attacks, said that terrorism knew no boundaries and that international organizations should join in the fight against it.

48. The international community had been reminded by the recent terrorist attacks of the vital importance of the Agency's work relating to the physical protection and security of nuclear material. Hungary endorsed the recommendation from the informal open-ended expert meeting to discuss whether there is a need to revise the Convention on the Physical

Protection of Nuclear Material that a process of improving the physical protection capabilities of Member States in respect of nuclear material and nuclear installations be initiated, and it looked forward to early action to strengthen the physical protection regime, including the CPPNM.

49. Associating his delegation with the statement made by the delegate of Belgium on behalf of the European Union, he said that Hungary's co-operation with the European Union in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy had intensified in the past year and would doubtless contribute to the smooth and timely accession of Hungary to the European Union.

50. As a committed supporter of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, Hungary considered that the international community should take urgent steps to expedite progress in the implementation of the programme of action adopted by the 2000 NPT Review Conference; so far, the progress had been disappointingly slow. Lack of political will had prevented the Conference on Disarmament from commencing negotiations on an internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices. The CTBT was still far from entering into force, and only modest progress had been achieved in the conclusion of comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency and of protocols additional to such agreements.

51. Hungary continued to attach high priority to the efficient functioning and reliable operation of the safeguards system and considered additional protocols to be an essential ingredient of a credible system. It commended the efforts of the Secretariat and a number of Member States to bring about universal application of the measures provided for in the Model Additional Protocol, and it would like to see all States that had not yet done so concluding additional protocols.

52. Since the 2000 session of the General Conference, Hungary had taken a number of steps to fulfil its additional protocol obligations, including the submission of a first annual declaration and the provision for complementary access. It hoped that the Secretariat would soon be able to draw conclusions regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Hungary which would permit the early application of integrated safeguards measures. In the meantime, Hungary was looking forward to increased co-operation between the Agency and the Hungarian SSAC in implementing strengthened safeguards measures. Also, it stood ready to help in further enhancing the safeguards system and by making its facilities available for the training of Agency safeguards inspectors.

53. Welcoming the Agency's work in support of States' efforts to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and other radioactive substances, he said that Hungary had further developed its procedures and that an illicit trafficking response exercise had been conducted at Hungary's borders in 2000.

54. National and international efforts over the past decade had resulted in a higher level of nuclear safety worldwide. The Agency had played a decisive role by initiating the conclusion of international conventions and establishing internationally agreed safety standards and providing for their application. Hungary, which welcomed the entry into force of the Joint

Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, was ready to fulfil its obligations under the Joint Convention and to assist the Agency in preparing for its implementation.

55. Hungary was also ready to participate in the second Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Since the submission of its first report pursuant to the Convention, it had taken important steps to further improve its regulatory practices. The recommendations resulting from an IRRT mission to Hungary in 2000 had been acted upon and a follow-up mission had been requested for 2002, to review the action taken to increase regulatory effectiveness and efficiency.

56. Hungary, which welcomed the efforts of the Secretariat to adjust its safety review services in the light of new developments, expected the OSART mission to the Paks NPP scheduled for October 2001 to result in further operational safety improvements.

57. The security of energy supplies was a national responsibility, and each State was entitled to adopt a strategy in keeping with its geographical, economic, regional, climatic and structural circumstances. In that connection, his delegation welcomed a recent draft report of the European Parliament on a European strategy for energy supply security which reflected a realistic approach to nuclear power. Having relatively few domestic energy resources, Hungary had to carefully weigh the options available for meeting its current and future energy needs. The safe and profitable operation of the State-owned Paks NPP was very welcome in that connection.

58. A service life extension and power uprating project was soon to be initiated at the Paks NPP. To prepare for it, the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority would have to elaborate detailed guidelines for - inter alia - plant ageing management, evaluation of the physical condition of ageing equipment and licence renewal processes. Hungary hoped to be able to draw on the experience of other Member States and to receive Agency support in that regard.

59. It was of paramount importance to maintain Hungary's nuclear research and development capabilities, not only for improving nuclear safety but also for attracting young people into the field of nuclear power plant operation and into nuclear regulatory activities. Those capabilities had been enhanced through the installation - at the Budapest Research Reactor Centre - of a cold neutron source which significantly increased the usefulness of the research reactor not only in the area of neutron physics research but also in the investigation of the ageing of structural materials. Hungary greatly appreciated the support which it had received from the Agency and the European Union in that connection, and, given the safe operation of the research reactor, it was ready to offer its research reactor safety expertise to the Agency in support of work on preparing a code of conduct on the safety of research reactors.

60. The application of nuclear techniques in fields such as medicine, agriculture, industry and environmental protection was of great importance. SAGNA could play a catalytic role in opening up new fields of application and could further increase the effectiveness of co-ordinated research programmes by creating synergy with other Agency activities.

61. Hungary had noted with satisfaction the efforts of the Secretariat to ensure that the Agency's technical co-operation activities were in line with national development priorities. Governmental commitment should be a central criterion in the technical co-operation project selection process, and projects matching the "core competence" of the Agency should enjoy first priority.

62. The Agency's comprehensive regional technical co-operation programme for Europe in the area of nuclear power was helping Hungary to keep abreast of developments relating to nuclear safety. Such regional activities were an important source of expertise and an important means of experience-sharing.

63. The Agency had been one of the first organizations to realize the potential importance of nuclear emergency preparedness and to initiate co-ordination efforts in that connection. A series of national and regional programmes had been conducted in eastern Europe, and, as a result, emergency planning and preparedness in Hungary had made significant strides. Given its vital importance, nuclear emergency preparedness had become a focal point of the activities of other international organizations too, but closer co-ordination between the Agency and those organizations should improve overall efficiency. The signing of a memorandum of understanding between the Agency and OECD/NEA would be an important step in the right direction.

64. Mr. BENDJABALLAH (Algeria) expressed the deep sorrow of his delegation following the recent terrorist attacks on the United States of America. His delegation's thoughts were with the victims and their families. Such reprehensible acts should once more remind all how essential it was to strengthen international co-operation in the struggle against terrorism. Algeria, itself a victim of terrorism, had for many years been calling for greater international co-operation in that struggle.

65. At the current session of the General Conference, Member States should not only renew their commitment to the objectives of the Agency but also undertake to work together in complete solidarity in helping to bring peace, security and prosperity to all. For its part, Algeria would continue making its full contribution to the efforts to promote the utilization of nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes and to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, of which the Agency was an essential element.

66. That contribution had found very concrete expression during the 2000 NPT Review Conference, over which his country had had the honour to preside and where the States parties to the NPT had, for the first time, entered into an unequivocal commitment to eliminate nuclear arsenals and had agreed on specific measures designed to lead to their elimination.

67. In that spirit, Algeria had just embarked on the process of ratifying the CTBT, which was one of the pillars of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

68. It was important that every Member State help to preserve what had already been attained in the way towards true nuclear disarmament - attainments which were still fragile.

Accordingly, Member States should abstain from all actions which might jeopardize those attainments, for the prize was peace and security throughout the world.

69. Broader utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes presupposed the complete control of it, so as to ensure its acceptance by the public. Hence the importance of the Agency's activities in the areas of nuclear, radiation and waste safety, to which Algeria was giving its full support. The intensification of efforts relating to - for example - the safety and security of radiation sources called for wider international co-operation, which the Agency should do more to promote.

70. The same applied with regard to the physical protection of nuclear material, which was a fundamental aspect of nuclear safety. His country appreciated the importance of becoming party to the CPPNM.

71. One of the Agency's principal tasks remained that of promoting the use of nuclear techniques in support of socio-economic development. The activities in question were helping developing countries to achieve a minimum of well-being by enabling them to respond to basic needs in the areas of food security, water supply and human health.

72. His delegation, which attached great importance to increasing the effectiveness of the Agency's technical co-operation activities, believed that the necessary balance between the various roles of the Agency should be maintained and that everything should be done to ensure that the resources of the TCF were assured, predictable and sufficient for full implementation of the Agency's statutory tasks.

73. Algeria, which considered the Agency's safeguards system to be one of the surest means of preventing the diversion of nuclear material for non-peaceful purposes, intended to conclude subsidiary arrangements pursuant to its safeguards agreement with the Agency in the near future.

74. The strengthening of the safeguards system, which his authorities were following closely, required from countries like Algeria a sustained effort in order to respond to the requirements of the Model Additional Protocol. His country was gradually establishing the regulatory framework and the structures necessary for fulfilling in an optimum manner the obligations associated with the strengthened safeguards system.

75. Innumerable socio-economic development needs had prompted developing countries to initiate co-operation in the field of nuclear science and technology at the regional level. African Member States had initiated such co-operation through AFRA, which deserved wide support from the Agency's membership.

76. Algeria, a founder-member of AFRA, was participating very actively in all AFRA projects relating to radiation safety, human health, agricultural productivity and industrial applications of radiation technology, and it intended to work still more closely with other African Member States within the AFRA framework in seeking to increase the effectiveness of AFRA projects and thereby to contribute to sustainable development in Africa. In that

context, it would be hosting, in April 2002, the 13th meeting of the AFRA Technical Working Group.

77. The question of the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East was important in many respects, particularly because of the need to make the non-proliferation regime universal and thereby help to create a climate of peace and security in that troubled region. With the exception of Israel, all States in the Middle East had concluded full-scope safeguards agreements with the Agency, thus demonstrating their commitment to using nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes. It was necessary to work for the implementation of the General Conference resolutions on that question - as an important step towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

78. The present dangerous situation in the Middle East highlighted the problem of the threat posed by Israel's nuclear capabilities. Urgent action was needed in order to induce Israel to accede to the NPT and place all its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards - one of the preconditions for a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East and for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region.

79. Two years previously, the General Conference had approved an amendment to Article VI of the Agency's Statute which would open the way for an expansion of the Board of Governors. Now, it was important that the amendment - the result of 25 years of difficult negotiations - enter into force so that the legitimate expectations of many Member States, particularly African ones, might be realized and the decision-making process within the Agency might become more democratic. For its part, Algeria had deposited an instrument of acceptance of the amendment with the depositary Government in June 2001, and it would like to see many other Member States following suit.

80. Mr. MONTOYA (Peru) condemned the 11 September terrorist attacks on the United States of America and expressed condolences to the United States Government and to the families of the victims.

81. Since the 2000 session of the General Conference, Peru had benefited from a wide range of Agency-sponsored activities relating to fields such as the evaluation and exploitation of water and mineral resources, the genetic improvement of cereals, radiotherapy, radioisotope and radiopharmaceutical production and food irradiation. Particularly worthy of note was Model Project PER/5/024, "Introduction of barley and other native crop mutant cultivars", which was being implemented in co-operation with FAO. The Model Project had led to improvements in the pest-resistance of barley and other native cereals of high nutritional value. Seeds of the improved varieties would be distributed to farmers, to be sown during the 2001 season over a total area of about 100 000 hectares in some of the poorest parts of the country.

82. In addition, the Agency had been supporting bilateral projects being implemented by Peru together with Ecuador and Bolivia. In the case of co-operation with Ecuador, progress had been made in a feasibility study relating to the use of nuclear medicine in the diagnosis and treatment of thyroid diseases, and the possibility was being considered of proposing

Agency-supported projects relating to human health, pest control, food irradiation, pollution control, the sustainable management of water resources and the detection of anti-personnel mines. In the case of co-operation with Bolivia, a study of sources of pollution in the Lake Titicaca basin was continuing, as was a study relating to the sustainable management of the two countries' water resources.

83. Peru attached great importance to ARCAL, which it had ratified in May, and it would host the ARCAL meeting to consider the regional co-operation programme for 2003-2004 and projections for subsequent years.

84. His Government and the Peruvian Nuclear Energy Institute were grateful to the Agency for supporting international events organized in Peru such as ARCAL meetings on nuclear instrumentation maintenance, the standardization of nuclear nephrology techniques and quality assurance in the production of sterilized graft tissues. They were also grateful to the Agency for numerous advisory missions, for equipment such as a gamma camera for a nuclear medicine centre, and for a very large number of fellowships.

85. There was a need to continue promoting the conclusion of multilateral legal instruments covering various aspects of nuclear power. There was also a need for greater compliance by Member States with the existing legal instruments, particularly those relating to nuclear, radiation, transport and waste safety, with a view to creating a climate of public opinion more in favour of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

86. The Peruvian Nuclear Energy Institute had continued carrying out important safety-related activities such as the calibration of dosimeters, the quality control of radioisotopes and radiopharmaceuticals, and environmental radiation monitoring. Regrettably, for financial reasons the Institute had not been properly represented at some important regional meetings on the physical protection of nuclear materials and radiation protection.

87. His delegation was pleased with the progress made in revising the Agency's Transport Regulations and arranging for their incorporation into the regulations of the international modal organizations. It was also pleased that transport safety was being considered under a separate agenda sub-item at the current session of the General Conference.

88. His delegation welcomed the decision of an important Member State involved in the international transport of radioactive materials to request a TranSAS mission, but it was concerned about the fact that the resources available to the Agency for meeting similar requests from other Member States were extremely scarce.

89. There was a need for constructive dialogue between, on one hand, the States which were involved in the international transport of radioactive materials and, on the other, potentially affected States about issues such as the early notification of shipments, emergency and recovery plans and the establishment of effective liability mechanisms.

90. Member States should increase their political and legal support for the efforts being made to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In particular, they should facilitate the

Agency's verification activities by concluding protocols additional to their safeguards agreements with the Agency. For its part, Peru had on 23 July become the first Latin American country to have an additional protocol in force. In December 2001, Peru would be hosting a regional seminar - organized by the Agency with the support of OPANAL and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean - to promote the Model Additional Protocol among States parties to the Tlatelolco Treaty.

91. In conclusion, he said that the Peruvian Nuclear Energy Institute stood ready to make its scientific and technical expertise available for Agency activities aimed at promoting sustainable development and strengthening nuclear and radiation safety and nuclear non-proliferation worldwide.

92. Mr. LIPÁR (Slovakia) extended, on behalf of the people of Slovakia, heartfelt sympathy to those who had been affected by the tragedy which had occurred the previous week in the United States of America.

93. Slovakia strongly supported the Agency's programme for strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system and further enhancing the Agency's ability to draw, for the State as a whole, conclusions as to whether nuclear material placed under safeguards remained in peaceful nuclear activities or was otherwise adequately accounted for. The 58 additional protocols approved by the Board of Governors represented a major contribution to the strengthening of the safeguards system. Slovakia had signed a protocol additional to its NPT safeguards agreement with the Agency and was taking steps to bring it into force and implement its provisions.

94. The efforts of the Secretariat in negotiating and concluding safeguards agreements and additional protocols were to be commended, but there was a significant number of States party to the NPT which had not concluded NPT safeguards agreements and the associated additional protocols. His delegation would like to see those States concluding NPT safeguards agreements and additional protocols without further delay.

95. In Slovakia, the spent nuclear fuel from the power reactors in operation was being stored on-site and small quantities of nuclear material were being used by so-called "small users". All nuclear facilities and all nuclear material within Slovak territory were subject to full-scope Agency safeguards in accordance with Slovakia's NPT safeguards agreement. In addition, the Nuclear Regulatory Authority was performing regular inspections at the country's nuclear facilities and at the premises of "small users" in accordance with the provisions of Slovakia's Atomic Energy Act.

96. Since the previous session of the General Conference there had been no significant development with regard to a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. To be credible, such a ban would have to be irreversible and subject to verification carried out under the auspices of the Agency. Slovakia would like the Secretariat to make its expertise available for that purpose.

97. The 2000 NPT Review Conference had reaffirmed the importance of the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests. Despite the growing number of ratifying States, the CTBT had not yet entered into force. His delegation would like to see far more States signing and ratifying the CTBT, particularly States whose ratification was a prerequisite for the CTBT's entry into force, and hoped that the forthcoming conference of States which had already deposited their instruments of ratification of the CTBT would give fresh impetus to the ratification process.

98. Under Slovakia's energy strategy, nuclear power would remain important in the medium term. Since the previous session of the General Conference, a project for the safety upgrading of Units 1 and 2 of the Bohunice NPP had been completed. At the invitation of his Government, an Agency team had reviewed the results of the upgrading. It had concluded - *inter alia* - that in some respects the upgrading had gone beyond what the Agency recommended for the safety upgrading of WWER-440/230 reactors.

99. In the area of radiation protection, an amendment to Slovakia's Public Health Protection Act and new radiation protection regulations had entered into force in 2000; they took into account the relevant international regulations and recommendations, including those of the Agency. His delegation welcomed the willingness of the Secretariat to send a peer review team to Slovakia for the purpose of assessing the country's radiation protection infrastructure.

100. On the basis of operational performance and regulatory inspection results, the Nuclear Regulatory Authority considered that all nuclear facilities in Slovakia were operating safely, reliably and in accordance with the relevant regulations.

101. Slovakia was continuing to co-operate in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy with more than 20 other Member States and with a number of international organizations, including the Agency. It was co-operating with the Agency in dozens of national, regional and interregional technical co-operation projects. One national project, relating to radiochemical facilities for the production of medical radionuclides, was of the utmost importance for Slovakia, which was supporting it through a national contribution in the amount of \$1.45 million.

102. The competent Slovak authorities attached great importance to the expert services provided through the Agency in the areas of nuclear and radiation safety, regarding them as valuable support for the national regulatory decision-making process. His Government was grateful to the Director General and the Secretariat for the expert services which had been provided to Slovakia in those areas.

103. His delegation would like the Secretariat to continue providing OSART, IRRT and other safety-related services. In addition, it would like more attention to be paid to the transfer of knowledge about nuclear technologies.

104. The Secretariat had been organizing, in co-operation with his Government, workshops for experts from all over the world. The feedback from participants had been very positive, and his Government stood ready to host further such workshops. Also, there were Slovak

organizations with broad experience in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy which would be pleased to receive fellows and scientific visitors sponsored by the Agency.

105. Special attention was being devoted in Slovakia to co-operation with neighbouring countries. Regular meetings of senior governmental experts were being held to consider questions of common interest and exchange experience in the area of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. His Government regarded such meetings as important for confidence-building.

106. Against that background, his Government looked forward to further meaningful co-operation with other Member States and with international organizations such as the Agency.

107. Mr. MURPHY (Ireland) said that, following the horrific events of 11 September in the United States of America, his delegation's thoughts were with the American people, particularly the families of the victims.

108. Ireland continued to regard the non-proliferation regime based on the NPT as the cornerstone of the collective international effort to curb the spread of nuclear weapons and to achieve their elimination. The 2000 NPT Review Conference had provided a blueprint for intensified negotiations on the elimination of nuclear weapons. The role of the Agency, set out in the NPT itself, remained crucial. Ireland, which had in 1997 welcomed the Board's approval of the Model Additional Protocol, was close to bringing the protocol additional to its NPT safeguards agreement with the Agency into force.

109. Ireland had in the previous two years paid its full TCF target shares, and he hoped that it would pay its full TCF target shares in the future. It did not support the use of TCF resources to promote the expansion of nuclear power generation, but it did welcome TCF-financed activities in the area of radiation protection. Staff of its national regulatory authority for radiation protection - the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland - had been directly involved in such activities.

110. Ireland had long before rejected the nuclear power option because of strong misgivings about safety and the environmental risks. In Ireland's view, any economic benefits of nuclear power generation were significantly outweighed by the long-term harmful effects on public health and the environment. Ireland's approach to nuclear power generation therefore focused on nuclear safety, radiation protection and emergency preparedness.

111. Although primary responsibility for the regulation and safe use of nuclear installations rested with those countries which had chosen the nuclear power option, nuclear safety was a legitimate concern also of other countries, particularly neighbouring ones. Because of its close proximity to certain nuclear installations, Ireland had concerns relating to plant operations, radioactive waste storage, radioactive discharges into the marine and the terrestrial environment, the transport of nuclear fuel and other radioactive materials, and the ever-present risk of a major accident.

112. Some governments, international organizations and other stakeholders saw global warming, climate change and the need for sustainable energy development as arguments for re-emphasizing the nuclear power option. In Ireland's view, nuclear power generation was incompatible with sustainable development, mainly for security and safety reasons. Ireland, which was particularly worried about the reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuel, saw no merit in the suggestion that nuclear power generation might be a solution to the problem of greenhouse gas emissions. Nuclear accidents did not respect international boundaries, and countries which had rejected the nuclear power option should not be exposed to the risks of such accidents. At a time when some of the world's most advanced countries were phasing out their nuclear installations, it would be a mistake to encourage developing countries to adopt nuclear power as part of their energy mix.

113. Ireland, which had been the twenty-fifth State to ratify the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, thereby ensuring its entry into force, believed that the Joint Convention would be a major pillar of the international nuclear safety regime.

114. The Convention on Nuclear Safety was another such pillar. Ireland had taken part in the first Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties, in 1999, and was looking forward to participating in the second Review Meeting, in April 2002.

115. Over the past decade or so, the Agency had been very actively involved in improving the safety of reactors in central and eastern Europe and in States of the former Soviet Union. In Ireland's view, if those reactors could not be upgraded quickly in order to meet modern safety standards, they should be shut down and decommissioned. Ireland welcomed the initiatives of the Agency, the European Union and OECD/NEA aimed at improving nuclear safety standards and establishing effective nuclear regulatory regimes in the countries in question, especially those which were candidates for European Union membership.

116. The potential for catastrophic damage associated with nuclear-related activities made nuclear liability a very important issue. It was essential that there be an international nuclear liability regime providing for appropriate levels of compensation and including simple, effective and impartial mechanisms for the speedy settlement of claims. Ireland was concerned about the adequacy of the compensation provided for by the existing international nuclear liability instruments. Without an effective and generally recognized liability regime, including an enhanced compensation regime, international efforts to improve nuclear safety would be greatly undermined.

117. Mr. GONZÁLEZ ANINAT (Chile) expressed his delegation's solidarity with the people of the United States of America following the terrorist attacks which had taken place there the previous week.

118. In general, public opinion was negative about the uses of nuclear energy, and that was reflected in the manner in which the subject was dealt with at the United Nations, where nuclear energy was referred to mainly in the General Assembly's First Committee and in discussions regarding weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons proliferation. With a

view to dispelling some of the suspicions about - and highlighting the benefits of - the uses of nuclear energy, especially in the developing world, his country intended to propose that the subject be taken up during the General Assembly's 2002 session in the Fourth Committee under an agenda item with a title along the lines of "International co-operation in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy". It was his country's hope that, with the highlighting of the potential direct benefits of the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, the Agency would acquire greater visibility and influence, leading to appropriate follow-up action on the part of the Agency's Secretariat. Meanwhile, his delegation wished the Director General to submit to the General Conference, for consideration at its next session, a report on the political and legal possibilities associated with his country's initiative.

119. Safety in the transport of radioactive materials was a matter of particular concern to Chile, especially because of its unusual geography. His country, which abided by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, attached very great importance to care in the handling, exploration, exploitation and conservation of natural resources within its exclusive economic zone. Against that background, his country strongly believed that it was necessary to continue striving at the multilateral level to strengthen the present regulations governing the transport of radioactive materials, filling the gaps in the international legal provisions relating to safety - and especially to contamination of the marine environment, the advance notification of the start of shipments and the selected routes, contingency plans, the recovery of discharged materials, and liability mechanisms.

120. There was need for continuous strengthening of all regulations designed to make the transport of radioactive waste and irradiated nuclear fuel safer, in accordance with the general principles of modern international law. To that end, Chile had decided to embark on a process of consultation and co-ordination with other interested countries in order to ensure that the matter was addressed by the relevant international organizations.

121. Document GC(45)/INF/18, distributed at the request of the Chairman of GRULAC, contained declarations by various Member States - including Chile - and regional groups regarding safety in the maritime transport of radioactive materials, and Chile - together with Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Turkey and Uruguay - had submitted a draft resolution on the matter (GC(45)/COM.5/L.3).

122. The energy situation at the start of the 21st century was characterized by great uncertainties which could result in growing instability on a world scale. In developing countries, some 2000 million people were still having to make do without electricity, and it was expected that worldwide electricity consumption would double during the next 50 years. In that context, it was essential to make the public aware of the importance of nuclear energy for socio-economic development. In order to dispel the doubts in the minds of many people, including many decision-makers, it was necessary to interact in a sustained and systematic manner with various influential players on the international scene, including major non-governmental organizations, and to develop - through formal and informal contacts - a consistent academic and scientific approach taking into account all the variables, especially those of importance for the achievement of a better quality of life.

123. An issue which should be addressed more seriously and decisively than in the past was the sustainability of nuclear energy. The work of the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development should therefore receive strong support, with a view to clarifying any remaining uncertainties. That would mean more intensive contacts with the relevant United Nations bodies.

124. At its present session, the General Conference had an opportunity of addressing two concerns of many countries - how to reduce the risks associated with the transport of radioactive waste and how to highlight - in a politically relevant manner and in the right quarters - the benefits of the uses of nuclear energy. It was important to devise ways of arriving at a balanced view which would enjoy the support of informed public opinion and result in closer international co-operation.

125. Chile, which was an active member of OPANAL, would like to see the Agency and OPANAL signing a memorandum of understanding designed to intensify the contacts between the two organizations and increase their ability to achieve their respective objectives. In that connection, it attached great importance to the seminar on the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy and on the safeguards regime which the Government of Peru was organizing jointly with the Agency and OPANAL and which would be taking place in Lima in December, and it welcomed the fact that the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean would be participating in the seminar.

126. Lastly, his delegation, which was very concerned about the devastating impact which the drought in Central America was having on the countries there, hoped that all delegations would support the request, made on the initiative of Guatemala, for the preparation of a technical co-operation project on the use of isotope hydrology in the search for further groundwater resources in Central America.

127. Mr. SAHINBAS (Turkey), expressing his delegation's sympathy with the victims of the recent terrorist attacks on the United States of America, condemned the attacks and said that, as his Government had declared on a number of occasions, Turkey was ready to co-operate with all nations in the fight against terrorism.

128. In 2000, despite budgetary constraints, the Agency had been remarkably successful in carrying out a multitude of activities relating to verification, safety and nuclear technology. His delegation particularly appreciated the success of the Agency in addressing the needs of developing countries.

129. In his delegation's view, nuclear energy would occupy a leading place among the power sources which did not contribute to global climate change. However, his delegation was aware that there were reservations about the wide utilization of nuclear energy stemming mainly from concerns about safety, sustainability, cost-effectiveness and nuclear weapons proliferation. Accordingly, it welcomed the establishment of INPRO, which it believed would help to address those concerns.

130. In that context, his delegation hoped that the studies on small and medium-sized reactor technology which were currently under way would give new impetus to projects in areas such as nuclear desalination. It believed that the Agency had a unique role to play in bringing technology-seekers together with technology-developers in the decades to come. Turkey looked forward to participating in INPRO and hoped that other Member States would support it through the provision of extrabudgetary resources.

131. The question of the utilization of nuclear energy was creating controversy in many countries, including Turkey, which, believing that the main reason was the difficulty of explaining nuclear energy and nuclear technology to the public, had proposed a technical co-operation project entitled “Public Awareness of Nuclear Energy and Comparative Energy Studies” which was currently being implemented. The project was the first project of its kind, and continuous Agency support was of utmost importance for its sustainability.

132. His delegation was very pleased that the Agency was implementing an increasing number of projects in which nuclear techniques were being used in addressing human needs in various fields. One such field was the detection of land mines. The project in question was of utmost importance, and his Government, aware of the human suffering caused by land mines, would continue to support it.

133. His delegation was grateful to the Secretariat for helping with the organization of the 1st Eurasian Conference on Nuclear Science and its Applications, which had taken place in Izmir the previous year and been attended by more than 250 scientists and other experts from nine countries and a number of international organizations.

134. Following the adoption by the General Conference in 2000 of a resolution on “Strengthening co-operation between nuclear research centres in the area of the peaceful applications of nuclear technology”, a seminar on the sustainability of and co-operation between nuclear research centres in the area of the peaceful applications of nuclear technology was to be held in Ankara the following month. The seminar, organized jointly by the Agency, the Black Sea Economic Co-operation Organization (BSECO) and the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority, would bring together the senior managers of nuclear institutions of the BSECO countries.

135. Taking measures to ensure high levels of nuclear, radiation and waste safety was a national responsibility that States should assume in the interest of their own peoples and of the world as a whole. Turkey, which believed that the existence of binding international safety conventions was important for the development of safety culture worldwide, greatly appreciated the safety standards developed by the Agency and would like to see them adopted by all States and all relevant organizations.

136. In response to a request made by Turkey, there was to be a TranSAS mission to Turkey the following month. His delegation had been pleased to learn that a number of other Member States were considering requesting TranSAS missions, and it would like to see arrangements made whereby such missions could be funded from technical co-operation resources.

137. Turkey, which greatly appreciated the work done by the Secretariat in reviewing and periodically revising the Agency's Transport Regulations, welcomed the Secretariat's plan to convene a Conference on the Safety of Transport of Radioactive Material early in 2003 and would be pleased to host the Conference in Istanbul.

138. There was considerable concern in the world about the safety of research reactors. It was particularly worrying that the Agency did not have adequate information on many of the 651 research reactors in the world. Turkey believed that there was a need for a binding international legal instrument on the safety of research reactors - for example, an amended Convention on Nuclear Safety or a protocol to the Convention. It supported the idea of the preparation of a code of conduct on the safety of research reactors within the framework of an Agency-organized international research reactor safety enhancement programme.

139. The absence of evidence of non-compliance by State parties to the NPT with their safeguards obligations was a positive sign. Nevertheless, it did not mean complete immunity from the risks of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Being close to regions generally regarded as having a significant potential for proliferation, Turkey attached great importance to the speedy entry into force of strengthened safeguards measures.

140. In that context, he was pleased to announce that the protocol additional to the NPT safeguards agreement between Turkey and the Agency had entered into force on 17 July 2001.

141. In Turkey, which attached the utmost importance to the fight against illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, there were plans to upgrade the existing equipment for the detection of nuclear materials and other radioactive sources passing through customs. In addition, the United States and Turkey had entered into a co-operative arrangement providing for - inter alia - the installation of advanced radiation detection equipment at Turkish border points-of-entry.

142. In order to enhance the ability of selected Turkish laboratories to analyse seized nuclear materials, the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority had started co-operating with the European Commission in a project through which personnel were trained and technical upgrades carried out.

143. It was regrettable that since the General Conference's 2000 session the Director General had been unable to make progress in convening a safeguards forum for participants from the Middle East. His country would like to see all countries of the Middle East doing their utmost to alleviate the tension prevalent in the region. For true and reliable application of the Agency's safeguards in the Middle East, it was indispensable that all States in that region adhere to the NPT.

144. The situation in Iraq continued to be a source of concern. Iraq should implement in full all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and give the Agency the access necessary for implementing its mandate in Iraq.

145. Turkey, which greatly appreciated the efforts of the Director General and the Agency's staff to implement the safeguards agreement between the Agency and the DPRK, would like to see the DPRK complying fully with that agreement in order that the Agency might complete the verification of the DPRK's initial declaration at an early date.

146. As a technology recipient, Turkey considered the Agency's technical co-operation activities to be very useful as long as they were linked to real needs. In recent years, the application of the Model Project concept and the Country Programme Framework exercise had helped considerably in guiding the selection of technical co-operation projects both by national authorities and by the Secretariat.

147. The Turkish authorities were pleased with the success attained in national and regional projects in 2000 and with the overall project implementation rate, and Turkey, which attached great importance to the TCF, would once more be paying its full TCF target share.

148. Ms. DRÁBOVÁ (Czech Republic), expressing her delegation's condolences to the people of the United States of America and the families of the victims of the 11 September terrorist attacks, said her delegation hoped that the perpetrators would be brought to justice.

149. Having subscribed to the statement made by the delegate Belgium on behalf of the European Union, she said that the Czech Republic supported the ongoing efforts to strengthen the Agency and increase its effectiveness and efficiency in the face of budgetary constraints. It was essential to make better use of the Agency while preserving the objective character of its work.

150. The importance of the Agency's responsibilities in connection with the NPT could not be overstated. The Czech Republic was about to complete the domestic legislative steps necessary for bringing into force the protocol additional to its NPT safeguards agreement with the Agency. Comprehensive amendment of its Atomic Energy Act, on which the Parliament would deliberate before the end of the year, was the last prerequisite for ratification.

151. The Czech Republic, which had acceded to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, would like to see many more Member States acceding to the Joint Convention in time to participate in the first Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties.

152. Her Government had already approved a national report - which included information about the Dukovany and the Temelin NPP - for consideration at the second Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Her delegation was confident that the Review Meeting would demonstrate the full compliance of the Czech Republic with its obligations under the Convention.

153. Her delegation welcomed the Agency's role in the consideration of whether the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material should be amended. Like the European Union, the Czech Republic was in favour of deciding on the need for a review conference after a well-defined draft amendment to the Convention had been prepared.

154. The Czech Government had recently approved an updated national energy policy. The nuclear power option had been retained, but a greater effort would be made to use energy more efficiently and to promote the utilization of renewable energy sources. There would be stronger emphasis on quality control and transparency in the nuclear industry and on the independence of those working in the areas of nuclear safety and radiation protection.

155. The commissioning of the Temelin NPP was nearing its final stage. The first of the two units had become critical for the first time on 11 October 2000, in accordance with the licence issued by the National Regulatory Authority. In tests at up to 55% of nominal power, the nuclear island design had been found to be in compliance with the licensing criteria. In addition, as in the case of the Looviisa, Mochovce and Paks NPPs, it had been demonstrated that a combination of reliable, modern instrumentation and control systems with WWER technology made for a high level of safety. Some technical problems had occurred in the non-nuclear part of the plant. In particular, turbine vibrations had caused a four-month outage and necessitated repairs. In recent weeks, however, the operator had shown, through a series of tests, that the measures taken to eliminate the problem had been appropriate. The licence-holder was about to apply for regulatory approval to carry out commissioning tests at 75% of nominal power.

156. The Temelin NPP had undergone thorough licensing procedures before the first unit had become critical for the first time, and no anomalies had occurred so far during the commissioning tests. Recognizing the international dimension of nuclear safety and radiation protection issues, however, the Czech authorities and the licence-holder had submitted the design and its improvements to the scrutiny of independent peer reviews with international participation. In 2000 and 2001 alone, four teams had been sent by the Agency to the Temelin NPP - and a fifth team was scheduled to visit the plant in November. Two teams had examined the operator's preparations for safe commissioning and operation. The other two teams had reviewed the framework for and conduct of regulatory activities. In addition, there had been a number of similar - unfortunately for the most part overlapping - reviews by bodies such as WENRA and the European Union Atomic Questions Group. Nevertheless, the first unit of the Temelin NPP had become the subject of heated international debate with few rational, technical arguments. Her delegation believed that the bilateral consultative process launched by the Czech Prime Minister and the Austrian Federal Chancellor, and supported by Commissioner Verheugen, would ultimately reassure the Czech Republic's south-eastern neighbours that the Temelin NPP's safety standards were on a par with those prevailing in the European Union. Any attempt to link the Temelin NPP safety issue with other, unrelated issues would not benefit anyone.

157. In the Temelin NPP debate, there had been minimum use of peer review results, despite their being available to the public. Moreover, there had even been attempts to belittle the competence of expert organizations, including the Agency. The overlapping of safety surveys had made matters worse. Her delegation would like to see a better co-ordination of activities at the international level, with greater involvement of the Agency, which should consider speaking up more often about the results of reviews carried out under its auspices. Also, an initiative was needed to heighten the awareness of the general public and of politicians with

regard to the philosophy behind safety requirements and recommendations and to the measures taken to maintain the safety level of nuclear installations throughout their service lives. That would enable operators and regulators to concentrate more on their primary mission - ensuring operational safety and thereby protecting the public.

158. During the current year, the Czech Republic had taken a further step towards a balance between the technical assistance which it received and the technical assistance which it provided through the Agency. It was gradually increasing its involvement in technical co-operation activities through which it could share its knowledge and expertise. Earlier in the year it had pledged voluntary financial contributions for technical co-operation projects in Armenia, Bulgaria and Georgia, and it was continuing to accept fellows and scientific visitors interested in the upgrading of national radiation protection networks in various parts of the world.

159. Mr. NORENDAL (Norway), expressing deep sympathy with the American people after the devastating terrorist attacks on New York and Washington D.C., said that the entire Norwegian nation had been shocked and outraged. Norway condemned those barbaric attacks, which had targeted a large number of innocent civilians and violated the fundamental principles of humanity and democracy.

160. Having associated his country with the statement made by the delegate of Belgium on behalf of the European Union, he said that strengthening the effectiveness of the Agency's comprehensive safeguards system by means of the Model Additional Protocol was an important contribution to the enhancement of nuclear non-proliferation. The protocol additional to Norway's comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency had entered into force in May 2000, and the procedures for reporting to the Agency had been finalized. The Agency had carried out its first inspection in Norway under the terms of the additional protocol during the summer of 2001.

161. It was disappointing, however, that so far only 56 countries had signed additional protocols and that only 21 additional protocols were in force. Norway would like to see many more countries signing additional protocols and speeding up their ratification procedures, so as to make the enhanced safeguards system as universal as possible.

162. Export controls were of vital importance to nuclear non-proliferation, and in that connection his country supported the Nuclear Suppliers Group's requirement of full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply. That requirement had been explicitly confirmed in the Final Document of the NPT Review and Extension Conference and endorsed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

163. Norway, which was pleased that the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management had entered into force, would take an active part in the December preparatory meeting for the first Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties. It hoped that many more States would become Contracting Parties in time to be able to attend the first Review Meeting.

164. As nuclear and radiological accidents could have a significant impact over wide areas, the competent authorities in individual countries needed official and accurate information about such accidents in other countries as early as possible. It was therefore important to establish an international consensus that all nuclear and radiological accidents likely to cause public concern were reported to the international community at a very early stage.

165. In order to emphasize the important role of the Early Notification Convention and the Assistance Convention, Norway had at the General Conference's 2000 session submitted a draft resolution encouraging Member States and the Agency to increase their capabilities for responding to nuclear and radiological accidents (GC(44)/RES/24). The outcome of the first meeting of the competent authorities under those two conventions, held in June 2001, had confirmed Norway's view that greater efforts were needed if the two conventions were to be implemented in a timely and cost-effective manner. In particular, the importance of the Agency as co-ordinator and facilitator had been emphasized and concern had been expressed about the Agency's limited resources for fulfilling the tasks involved within a reasonable time frame. The development of harmonized and cost-effective response capabilities in countries parties to the conventions heavily depended on international co-ordination by the Agency.

166. In June 2001, at a ministerial meeting of the Council of Baltic Sea States, an agreement on the exchange of radiation monitoring data had been signed. The agreement, the purpose of which was to ensure that the results from national gamma monitoring networks were made available without delay to all parties, was at present a regional one, but it was open for accession by other countries and by international organizations. Norway would welcome the accession of other countries and of international organizations, as that would create a better basis for assessments and decisions in the event of nuclear or radiological accidents.

167. Effective information exchange was very important for the security of nuclear materials and other radioactive materials. His country therefore welcomed the results of the International Conference on Security of Material held in Stockholm in May 2001, which had concluded, among other things, that the Agency had a key role to play in supporting State efforts to improve the security of and combat illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and other radioactive materials by providing guidance, promoting technical development and, on request, giving direct assistance.

168. In the final report of the informal open-ended expert meeting to discuss whether there is a need to revise the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, it was concluded that there was a need to strengthen the international physical protection regime. That was an important issue, and Norway welcomed the initiatives taken by the Director General.

169. The terrorist attacks on the United States of America had shown that some terrorist groups were willing to use any means in order to promote terror, and nuclear terrorism could not be ruled out as a possible scenario in the future. Norway therefore welcomed the fact that the threat of nuclear terrorism was on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly and the fact that the Secretariat was assisting the United Nations in that connection.

170. The challenges in north-west Russia were among Norway's main concerns in the area of nuclear safety. Norway was participating in a number of projects in the region and co-operating closely with the Russian authorities. Russia was faced with the necessity of decommissioning and dismantling a large number of nuclear-powered naval vessels and safely conditioning and storing the radioactive waste and spent fuel. For that purpose a completely new infrastructure was needed, requiring huge investments.

171. Under the Agency's auspices, a nuclear clean-up strategy for Russia, with a list of priorities, was being established with the co-operation of the Russian authorities within the Contact Expert Group. Currently, support and assistance were being sought for a spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste clean-up at the Andreyev Bay storage site in the Murmansk region.

172. Norway, the United States, the European Commission and a number of European Union countries had since 1999 been working on the establishment of a multilateral legal framework for the provision of assistance to nuclear safety-related projects in Russia. Such a legal framework would be vital for the multilateral funding of large nuclear clean-up projects.

173. Norway was satisfied with the 1998 agreement under the OSPAR Convention providing for significant reductions in discharges of radionuclides into the ocean, but it was disappointed that the agreement had not resulted in the expected reductions in discharges from spent fuel reprocessing facilities. Discharges of radionuclides such as technetium-99 had increased substantially in recent years, and Norway would like the relevant States, which were also parties to the OSPAR Convention, to take the measures necessary for reducing the discharges from their facilities in accordance with their commitments under that convention.

174. As both a coastal and a shipping nation, Norway attached great importance to the work done in revising the Agency's Transport Regulations. Following the April 2001 recommendation of the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development referred to in document GC(45)/INF/18, his delegation would like to see Agency Member States increasing their efforts to further improve measures and internationally agreed regulations relevant to the maritime transport of spent fuel and other radioactive materials. In particular, there was a need for effective liability mechanisms and effective arrangements for the provision of relevant information relating to shipments of radioactive materials, it being understood that the information should in no case be contradictory to the measures of physical security and safety.

175. Norway, which considered projects financed from the TCF to be of vital importance to the recipient countries, had recently made an extrabudgetary contribution of \$400 000 in support of a project aimed at helping to control the tsetse fly in Mali and Burkina Faso.

176. The representation of women in the Secretariat at the Professional and higher levels was still rather low, particularly in the scientific and engineering fields. Member States should encourage women to study nuclear science and engineering and suitably qualified female graduates to apply for Professional posts in the Secretariat. The Director General was to be commended for creating the International Advisory Group on Gender Issues, and his

delegation was looking forward to reviewing the action plan to be drawn up by the Secretariat in accordance with the recommendations of the Group.

177. Mr. NIEWODNICZAŃSKI (Poland), expressing sympathy with the whole American nation, said that Poland had been profoundly shocked by the brutal acts of terrorism committed in the United States the previous week.

178. Having associated his country with the statement made by the delegate of Belgium on behalf of the European Union, he said that the principal steps in accelerating and enlarging “the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world” were the creation and maintenance of a global nuclear and radiation safety culture supplemented by a parallel security culture. For that it was necessary to have legally binding international conventions together with internationally accepted safety standards. One such convention, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, had entered into force in June, with Poland as one of the Contracting Parties. His country hoped that there would be wide adherence to the Joint Convention and, in particular, that all States with operating nuclear power plants would accede to it. Moreover, it attached great importance to effective implementation of the Joint Convention’s provisions and to the general public’s seeing that those provisions were being implemented effectively.

179. There were no nuclear power plants in operation in Poland, and no nuclear power plants were planned. However, Poland wished to keep the nuclear power option open. It was therefore elaborating a set of regulations and a technical and organizational infrastructure for the management of radioactive waste generated by a variety of nuclear applications and the operation of research reactors and for the management of spent fuel from research reactors which would, in the longer term, be taken into account during strategic consideration of whether Poland should decide in favour of nuclear power.

180. Poland, which had been among the first countries to conclude protocols additional to their safeguards agreement with the Agency, would like to see the regrettably short list of countries with ratified additional protocols grow substantially, as the implementation of additional protocols would be an important element of the global nuclear security system.

181. Poland was in the process of preparing a national report for consideration at the second Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, to be held in 2002. The report would cover - inter alia - Poland’s new Atomic Energy Act, which provided for an effective separation of regulatory functions from promotional ones and for real independence of the regulatory body.

182. Poland, which shared the view that the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material should be amended in order to address the issue of preventing the unauthorized possession of nuclear material and unauthorized access to nuclear facilities, had recently adopted two regulations relating to the area of operation of the Convention - one on the physical protection of nuclear material and one on nuclear material accounting.

183. Poland greatly appreciated the steps taken by the Secretariat to strengthen both technical co-operation between the Agency and Member States and TCDC. It particularly welcomed the “Partners in Development” concept, which was being successfully implemented through regional agreements (one not formally signed in the case of Europe) and TCDC. As both a provider and a recipient of technical assistance through the Agency, Poland had for years been participating successfully in various technical co-operation activities - for example, by making its research centres available for training carried out under the auspices of the Agency.

184. In line with its usual practice, Poland had already paid its full share of the current target for the TCF. It believed that strict and consistent application of the “due account” principle could be an effective way of inducing Member States to pay their full TCF target shares and also any assessed programme costs owed by them to the Agency. It also believed that the Secretariat could make the Agency’s insufficient technical co-operation resources go further by promoting regional co-operation and TCDC and through the expanded outsourcing of technical co-operation activities.

185. Welcoming the fact that, for the first time, there was an agenda sub-item devoted to the Nuclear Technology Review, he said that, at a time when nuclear power had become a subject of lively discussion in international fora, both governmental and non-governmental, a concise review of recent developments relating to nuclear power was very useful for Member States. At the same time, his delegation hoped that in future editions of the Nuclear Technology Review more attention would be paid to nuclear applications.

186. Although Poland supported the policy of zero real Regular Budget growth, it realized that the policy had created a situation where implementation of the Agency’s approved programme relied very significantly on extrabudgetary resources, making comprehensive planning difficult. Moreover, matters were not improved by the fact that some Member States, besides not paying their full TCF target shares, were not paying their full assessed contributions. Poland, which was just finishing a term as a member of the Board, hoped that the implementation of resolution GC(44)/RES/8 (on the financing of technical co-operation) and resolution GC(44)/RES/9 (on the financing of safeguards) would benefit the Agency’s programmes.

187. Mr. BADDOU (Morocco) expressed the condolences of his delegation in the face of the losses and grief caused by the acts of abject barbarism to which the United States of America had recently been subjected.

188. The General Conference was meeting at a time when large sections of the populations of Member States were calling for security and for protection of the environment. By virtue of its Statute and the mandate conferred on it by Member States, the Agency had a duty to help in bringing about the peace without which the demands in question would remain a dead letter.

189. Morocco deplored the worsening of the situation in the Middle East, which was due to the refusal of Israel to comply with international legal norms. The other countries in the Middle East were parties to the NPT and in most cases had concluded full-scope safeguards

agreements with the Agency, whereas Israel was continuing to disregard the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, refusing to accede to the NPT and to place all its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards. His delegation would like to see all States with special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security rendering all assistance to the Director General in his efforts to facilitate the early application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East.

190. Progress in the utilization of nuclear energy and the broad acceptance of nuclear power generation by the public would depend very much on there being an extremely good safety record. That called for a comprehensive and integrated set of binding legal instruments and rigorous standards, brought up to date continuously and accompanied by practical procedures for assisting Member States with their implementation. The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management would undoubtedly strengthen the international legal regime in question.

191. In that connection, his delegation would welcome the development of a network of institutions providing safety-related training in the various official languages of the United Nations. In its view, the long-term action plan for education and training in radiation and waste safety referred to in Note by the Secretariat 2001/Note 20 would be a step in the right direction. From September 2002 onwards his country's Centre National des Etudes des Sciences et Techniques Nucléaires would, in co-operation with the Secretariat and France, host an international postgraduate radiation safety course in French.

192. With regard to the transport of radioactive materials, his delegation continued to believe that transit countries should be notified about shipments in advance so that their governmental authorities might take steps to minimize the risks to people and the environment.

193. In some parts of the world there were severe water shortages which could be mitigated only by the use of techniques such as desalination. Morocco, situated in a region threatened by desertification and growing water scarcity, was following with interest the work of INDAG, which it intended to support to the maximum extent possible.

194. In January, a permanent commission for nuclear energy-related matters had been established in Morocco, under the direct authority of the Prime Minister, with responsibility for bringing the country's legal infrastructure into line with the nuclear energy-related conventions to which Morocco was a party, establishing a national regulatory infrastructure in the field of nuclear and radiation safety, developing a communication strategy designed to make users and the general public more aware of the possibilities of nuclear techniques and of the risks involved in using such techniques, and formulating an overall strategy for the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. In June, the Secretariat had sent a team to Morocco to assist with legislative and regulatory activities and acquaint the commission's members with international best practices. His country greatly appreciated the Secretariat's support.

195. His delegation would like to see the Secretariat stepping up its activities relating to the rehabilitation of radioactively contaminated territories, so as to help protect the terrestrial and the marine environment. With the Secretariat's relevant experience, the Agency could make a

valuable contribution to the work of the next world summit on sustainable development, due to take place in Johannesburg in 2002.

196. From 29 October to 9 November, Morocco would be hosting the seventh conference of the parties to the UNFCCC. It was counting on the Agency's active support.

197. His delegation, which regretted that so far only 21 Member States had accepted the amendment to Article VI of the Statute approved by the General Conference in 1999, hoped that far more Member States would accept it in the months to come, so that it would enter into force without undue delay.

198. Mr. DAINIUS (Lithuania), expressing his country's condolences to the families of the victims of the 11 September terrorist attacks on the United States of America, said that the ideas of freedom and democracy had been insidiously attacked by evil. His country was convinced that the perpetrators would be brought to justice.

199. Having associated his country with the statement made on behalf of the European Union by the delegate of Belgium, he said that since the establishment of its Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate, ten years previously, Lithuania had made significant progress in creating a nuclear safety and radiation protection regulatory infrastructure which was in accordance with international safety standards. In doing so, it had received valuable support from many countries and international organizations. The Agency had played a key role, providing necessary assistance to the Lithuanian institutions responsible for nuclear safety and radiation protection. In order to assess the progress made, an IRRT mission to Lithuania had taken place just before the current session of the General Conference. On the basis of the IRRT mission recommendations, an action plan would be drawn up for strengthening the national regulatory infrastructure in the years to come.

200. Having expressed appreciation of the technical assistance received by his country through the Agency, he said that nuclear power reactor decommissioning was an issue of great importance to Lithuania, which, wishing to become a member of the European Union, had decided to shut down Unit 1 of the Ignalina NPP by the end of 2005, subject to the terms and conditions of long-term financial and technical assistance from the European Union, G-7 countries and other States, and international financial institutions. Lithuania fully shared the Secretariat's view that the operational safety of nuclear power reactors should be maintained from the time when a decision to shut down was taken, through the shutdown to the completion of decommissioning.

201. The decommissioning of RBMKs was a complicated exercise, and Lithuania would need a great deal of international support. Since a donors' conference held in June 2000 in Vilnius, his country had received considerable assistance from the European Union, G-7 and other interested countries, and international institutions. The Agency had provided timely assistance through its technical co-operation programme in response to an urgent request from Lithuania, which had finished planning the preparatory stage of the decommissioning of Unit 1 of the Ignalina NPP.

202. Lithuania, which attached great importance to the Agency's work in the field of sustainable energy strategies, had received from the Agency considerable assistance with development of institutional capabilities for performing national energy strategy studies which took into account - among other things - the consequences of the future closure of the Ignalina NPP.

203. Referring to the Agency's technical co-operation Model Project on upgrading radiation and waste safety infrastructures, he said that, following a visit to Lithuania's Radiation Protection Centre, an Agency peer review team had concluded that Lithuania had passed milestones 1 and 2 of the Model Project. In the light of that conclusion, his delegation hoped that Lithuania would receive Agency technical assistance designed to improve the radiation exposure control of patients in diagnostic radiology, radiotherapy and nuclear medicine.

204. Following an IPSART mission to the Ignalina NPP in June 2000, for the purpose of carrying out a peer review of a Level 1 PSA which had been performed by Lithuanian and Swedish specialists (the first PSA of an RBMK), a further such mission was planned for the beginning of October 2001.

205. Lithuania, which recognized the Agency's safeguards as playing an indispensable role in the implementation of the NPT, strongly supported the efforts being made to increase their effectiveness and improve their efficiency. The protocol additional to the safeguards agreement between the Agency and Lithuania had entered into force, and implementation had started after defects in the legal basis had been eliminated. His delegation would like to see many more Member States demonstrating their commitment to nuclear non-proliferation by signing and implementing additional protocols.

206. His country attached great importance to Agency assistance in improving the security of nuclear materials and facilities in Member States and enhancing the co-operation between physical protection experts in various countries; that assistance was proving to be one of the most effective ways of strengthening the international physical protection regime. Also, his country remained a strong supporter of all Agency efforts to help combat illicit trafficking in nuclear materials.

207. The Secretariat was to be commended for helping Member States to establish sustainable education and training programmes. At the beginning of the Ignalina NPP decommissioning process, Lithuania's technical universities were reorganizing their programmes in order to prepare the necessary specialists, and Agency assistance in that connection would be very important.

208. Mr. NOBILO (Croatia), deploring the previous week's terrorist attacks in the United States of America, said that it was necessary to strengthen the international safeguards regime and co-operation in the fight against illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. It was not hard to imagine what would happen if terrorists came into possession of such materials.

209. Although Croatia was not playing a leading role in the utilization of nuclear energy, it was co-operating closely with the Agency in several areas, and the current projects at both the national and the regional level were considered to be useful and successful.

210. Croatia had harmonized its radiation safety legislation with the relevant Agency standards, had been among the first countries to bring additional protocols to their comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency into force, had also been among the first countries to accept the latest amendment to Article VI of the Statute, and was one of the Contracting Parties to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, which had entered into force on 18 June.

211. The number of persons being granted Agency fellowships for training at Croatian institutions and the number of Croatian experts attending Agency-organized seminars and training courses abroad was appreciable, and his delegation hoped that it would increase.

212. Representatives of Croatia and Slovenia, which were joint owners of the Krško NPP, located in Slovenia, had on 23 July initialled an agreement regulating the status of - and legal relations in connection with - investments in and the operation and decommissioning of the plant; it was expected that the signing and ratification procedures would be completed before the end of the year, so that the agreement could enter into effect on 1 January 2002. Through the agreement, the two countries would be expressing their awareness of their joint responsibility for the safety of the Krško NPP.

213. Mr. GREGORIČ (Slovenia) expressed his deepest condolences to the American people, who had suffered great losses as a result of the previous week's barbaric terrorist acts.

214. Having associated his country with the statement made by the delegate of Belgium on behalf of the European Union, he said that the Agency could carry out its verification activities only where the necessary safeguards agreements were in place. Despite the efforts of the Secretariat, however, more than 50 States parties to the NPT had not yet brought into force the comprehensive safeguards agreements which the NPT called for. For its part, Slovenia had brought into force not only an NPT safeguards agreement but also a protocol additional to it, so that the Agency would now be able to provide assurance not only that there had been no diversion of declared nuclear material but also that there had been no indication of the presence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Slovenia.

215. As a party to the CPPNM, his country shared the view, expressed in the final report from the informal open-ended expert meeting to discuss whether there is a need to revise the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, that the international physical protection regime should be strengthened. His delegation, which welcomed the fact that the Board had endorsed the "Physical Protection Objectives and Fundamental Principles" in the Attachment to document GC(45)/INF/14 as a "Security Fundamentals" document, had noted the Director General's decision to convene an open-ended group of legal and technical experts to draft an amendment to the CPPNM. In the light of the Conference Summary Document of the International Conference on the Security of Material held in Stockholm in May, the outcome of the drafting exercise would be of great interest to Slovenia.

216. In the area of nuclear safety, besides internationally agreed safety standards the main prerequisite for a successful international safety regime was legally binding international instruments and the mechanisms for implementing them. The Early Notification Convention, the Assistance Convention and the Convention on Nuclear Safety had already proved their worth, and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management would no doubt start doing so soon.

217. Slovenia aimed to submit a report on the fulfilment of its obligations under the Convention on Nuclear Safety by mid-October, and it was looking forward to the second Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties. It would like to see those States with nuclear installations which had not yet done so becoming Contracting Parties soon.

218. To be effective, the internationally agreed safety standards to which he had just referred had to be applied in practice. Slovenia greatly appreciated the services provided by the Secretariat in that connection and would continue its efforts to maintain a high level of nuclear safety at its nuclear installations. In the past, Slovenia had requested several Secretariat-organized missions for the purpose of comparing its practices with current international consensus standards and guidelines and with good practices of other countries. An ORPAS mission to Slovenia had taken place in July, and a third OSART mission was expected to take place in 2003.

219. The recent radiological emergency in Panama had highlighted the urgent need for further action to minimize the harmful effects of ionizing radiation used in medicine. The findings, conclusions and recommendations of the International Conference on the Radiological Protection of Patients held in Málaga, Spain, in March would undoubtedly be of great importance in that connection.

220. Another conference to which his delegation attached great importance was the International Conference on Topical Issues in Nuclear Safety which had taken place just two weeks previously. In his delegation's view, such well-attended and well-structured meetings contributed to the excellent image of the Agency and could help to bring about the acceptance of nuclear power worldwide.

221. Slovenia, which had pledged its full TCF target share for 2001, would like to see Member States providing more in-kind assistance in support of the Agency's technical co-operation activities. For its part, Slovenia had the previous year hosted several Agency training courses, seminars and workshops, mainly in the areas of nuclear power, nuclear safety and radiation safety. In addition, Slovenian institutes were providing on-the-job training and making experts available for technical co-operation projects.

222. Slovenia, which needed technical assistance in the area of radiation safety, would be submitting proposals for technical co-operation projects during 2003-2004 which were guided by the principles underlying the Agency's Technical Co-operation Strategy.

223. Monsignor BOCCARDI (Holy See) said that the consequences of the recent tragic events in the United States of America weighed heavily upon the General Conference. The

horrible crimes of 11 September had been condemned by the entire civilized world, which had demonstrated deep-felt solidarity with all the innocent victims.

224. The Agency's efforts to promote the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy were being exerted within the larger context of international co-operation, so that the General Conference's decisions could contribute to wider processes affecting the international community, which was becoming more and more aware of the fact that only the agreed joint actions of peoples and nations could ensure that the objective of peaceful coexistence was attained.

225. Such actions, however, presupposed ideas, programmes and political choices responding to real needs and possibilities. Moreover, the readiness to set aside the resources necessary for ensuring that knowledge and technology were made more widely available remained a top priority. The gap due to different levels of development ran counter to the fundamental principle of the equality of political communities, and it must be bridged.

226. His delegation, which had read with pleasure the Annual Report for 2000 and the Technical Co-operation Report for 2000, had noted a significant shift in the priorities of Member States - a shift towards greater emphasis on assistance in solving national development problems. Member States were more aware of the potential of applying nuclear techniques in areas such as human health and food and agriculture. However, that shift in priorities did not diminish the importance of Agency activities relating to the physical and chemical sciences, the use of nuclear power, water resource management and other areas where the Agency had an excellent reputation.

227. In resolution GC(44)/RES/18, the General Conference had emphasized that Agency programmes should contribute to the achievement of sustainable development goals in developing countries, particularly least developed ones. His delegation was therefore pleased that the Agency had strengthened its co-operation with many least developed countries with the aim of eliminating the causes of poverty and underdevelopment. The Agency should continue along those lines, in order to help alleviate the growing social inequalities in the world and reduce the widening gap between rich and poor nations. The human family was becoming more and more interdependent, and globalization - for all its risks - was making it easier, given a spirit of solidarity, to assist the least developed countries in designing and implementing programmes which would enable them to take their futures into their own hands. Pope John Paul II had stated in his message on the occasion of the World Day of Peace, "The present reality of global interdependence makes it easier to appreciate the common destiny of the entire human family, and makes all thoughtful people increasingly appreciate the virtue of solidarity." The new century would present all with many opportunities of co-operating fully in a spirit of solidarity.

228. A vision of international co-operation which placed man and his personal dignity at its centre was relevant to the Agency, enabling its programmes to be evaluated in the wider context of the international debate on development - a debate which would continue in 2002, no doubt with an essential contribution from the Agency at the World Summit on Sustainable Development.

229. At the International Conference on the Radiological Protection of Patients held in Málaga, Spain, in March, a representative of the Holy See had chaired a round table discussion on the radiation protection of those who cared for and comforted patients. The exposure of patients' relatives tended to be of comparatively short duration, but many who cared for and comforted patients were members of religious and other charitable organizations who devoted their entire lives to that admirable task, and everything possible should be done to protect them.

230. His delegation hoped that the Agency would continue to participate in efforts to place nuclear energy at the service of sustainable development and of the well-being of the entire human family.

231. Mr. GHABRIAL (Organisation of African Unity) extended condolences to the families of the victims of the 11 September terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C. and expressed solidarity with the people and Government of the United States of America in the face of the immense tragedy.

232. Welcoming the reappointment of Mr. ElBaradei - a son of the African continent - as Director General, he expressed confidence that Mr. ElBaradei would exert all his energies in working towards the achievement of the Agency's goals.

233. The Organisation of African Unity had great expectations of the Agency with regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology in support of sustainable socio-economic development. The Agency's African Member States hoped that the Agency's technical co-operation activities in Africa would be further intensified in areas such as the eradication of the tsetse fly by means of the SIT.

234. Thanking the Department of Technical Co-operation for helping the General Secretariat of the Organisation of African Unity to implement decisions of the African Heads of State and Government regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, he said that the General Secretariat looked forward to further close collaboration with the Agency.

235. Mr. DE SAMPAIO NUNES (European Commission), extending heartfelt condolences to the United States delegation and the American people, said that the 11 September attacks had horrified the European Union.

236. The European Union was heavily dependent on external energy supply sources. About 50% of its energy needs had to be met through imports, and by 2030 the figure might well be about 70%. That raised a number of questions. Could the European Union accept becoming dependent to the extent of 70% on external energy supplies? How could the European Union continue to accept the disruption of its economies and the economies of non-oil-producing developing countries by erratic oil and gas price changes? How could the European Union do without nuclear power? The European Commission, which had published a Green Paper entitled "Towards a European Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply", believed that interdependence between Member States of the European Union had become such that any energy policy decision in one Member State was likely to affect the energy market in others,

so that uncoordinated national energy policy decisions could no longer be expected to provide satisfactory answers to such questions.

237. With a view to reducing the risks of over-dependence on external energy supply sources in the context of sustainable development, the European Commission proposed the development of an energy demand as well as an energy supply policy. The Commission considered that current total energy consumption could be reduced by 18% through increased efficiency, especially in the areas of housing and transport. An ambitious proposal on the supply side was that development of indigenous energy resources be stimulated further. The Commission had committed itself to increasing the percentage of total energy consumption in the European Union met by renewables from 6% to 12% by 2010. Another priority would be the development of a "clean coal" technology. Nuclear power would also have to be considered, both from the security of supply perspective and from the greenhouse gas emissions perspective. The role of nuclear power in limiting the growth trend in greenhouse gas emissions was often underestimated, in spite of the fact that by 2010, in the European Union alone, the use of nuclear power would each year be preventing the emission of some 300 million tons of carbon dioxide while meeting 35% of the electricity needs of some 390 million people.

238. If the nuclear option was to be kept alive, there would have to be complete transparency vis-à-vis the public. There was no place for secrecy. Moreover, further research efforts in the areas of nuclear waste management and nuclear safety would be necessary.

239. It was essential to ensure that electricity from nuclear power plants was produced in accordance with the highest internationally recognized safety levels, and nuclear safety had therefore become one of the crucial issues in the European Union enlargement process - high levels of nuclear safety were required also in the candidate countries. A methodology for the evaluation of nuclear safety levels in those countries had been developed thanks to the fact that in the European Union, within the framework of national responsibility for nuclear safety regulation, a high degree of convergence of technical and organizational requirements and good practices had been achieved through voluntary co-operation between Member States and in international fora such as the Agency.

240. Agency documents had been very important for the evaluation process, which had now been completed. The European Council had prepared a report in which country-specific recommendations were contained. Accession negotiations would be held with the candidate countries on the basis of those recommendations, account being taken of the fact that safety improvement programmes were being continuously implemented in the candidate countries - for example, within the PHARE framework.

241. During the period 1991-2000, the European Union had committed €774 million under the TACIS programme to international efforts to improve nuclear safety in the Newly Independent States through 650 projects - 450 under way and 200 still being prepared.

242. Nuclear material safeguards in the European Union were being applied by the Agency in close co-operation with the Euratom Safeguards Office of the European Commission. They

were being applied in a very satisfactory manner through the New Partnership Approach, which enabled the Agency to save resources.

243. The European Commission believed that the development of integrated safeguards would result in more effective safeguards within the present resource constraints, with a move away from a safeguards system based on prescriptive criteria to an information-based system focusing on areas of real proliferation concern. It also believed that the Agency could further improve the effectiveness and efficiency of its safeguards in the European Union by making greater use of the Euratom Regional Safeguards System. The Euratom Safeguards Office had recently made a proposal to that end to the Agency.

244. The process of ratifying the three additional protocols to which Euratom was a party was continuing in the European Union's Member States. At the same time, the Euratom Safeguards Office was, together with the Agency and the European Union's Member States, preparing for their implementation so that they could become effective immediately after their entry into force.

245. The radiation protection efforts of the European Commission were currently concentrated on the full application of the Basic Safety Standards Directive of 1996 and the Medical Directive of 1997. After the adoption of those two directives, the issue of strengthening the management of sealed radioactive sources had come to the foreground, as a consequence of several radiation accidents and other radiation events reported worldwide. The Commission was therefore pleased to be co-operating with the Agency in the implementation of the Action Plan for the Safety of Radiation Sources and the Security of Radioactive Materials.

246. The 1998-2002 Euratom programme of research covered nuclear fusion, nuclear fission and radiation protection. The Euratom budget for the programme was €1260 million. The programme involved about 200 projects in areas such as: the safety of existing installations; fuel cycle safety; future systems; radiation protection; and radiological sciences. The Commission's proposal for the 2002-2006 research programme was currently being discussed with the Member States. The main priorities were nuclear fusion and waste treatment and disposal.

247. The European Community had bilateral co-operation agreements with several States. The agreements were general in scope or covered very specific areas. Further, nuclear trade agreements were envisaged with Japan, China, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and consultations on such an agreement were under way with the Russian authorities. Nuclear fusion and nuclear safety agreements between Euratom and Russia might well be signed very soon.

248. The Community had acceded to the Convention on Nuclear Safety and was in the process of acceding to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management. Also, it was preparing to accede to the Early Notification Convention and the Assistance Convention.

249. Euratom was in the process of renewing, up to 2005, its participation in the KEDO project, to which its total financial contribution might increase to €175 million.

250. Effective and efficient international regimes for nuclear safety, safeguards, physical protection, technical co-operation and non-proliferation would remain essential for the safe and peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. Consequently, the importance of the Agency was beyond doubt. The role which nuclear power might play in contributing to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and keeping energy prices stable might require a more active role on the part of the Agency - and also of the European Commission after the broad energy debate in the European Union.

251. The European Commission commended the Agency on the way it had acquitted its tasks and looked forward to continued fruitful co-operation. The Director General's forthcoming visit to the Commission in Brussels would undoubtedly help to further enhance the excellent relations between the two organizations.

The meeting rose at 7.30 p.m.