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President: Mr. GRÖNBERG (Finland)

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[*] GC(45)/28.

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC(45)/INF/17/Rev.2.

For reasons of economy, this document has been printed in a limited number.
Delegates are kindly requested to bring their own copies of documents to meetings.

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Abbreviations used in this record

ABM Treaty	Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems
AFRA	African Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Assistance Convention	Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency
Basic Safety Standards	International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources
Biological Weapons Convention	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on their Destruction
Chemical Weapons Convention	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction
COP6	Sixth Session of the Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change
CPF	Country Programme Framework
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Early Notification Convention	Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident
HEU	High-enriched uranium
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
IMO	International Maritime Organization
INPRO	International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles
INSARR	Integrated Safety Assessment of Research Reactors
IPPAS	International Physical Protection Advisory Service
ITER	International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor
Joint Convention	Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management
Malaga Conference	International Conference on the Radiological Protection of Patients in Diagnostic and Interventional Radiology, Nuclear Medicine and Radiotherapy
NDT	Non-destructive testing
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT Review Conference	Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Abbreviations used in this record
(Contd.)

NSG	Nuclear Suppliers Group
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PATTEC	Pan African Tsetse and Trypanosomosis Eradication Campaign
Pelindaba Treaty	African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty
R&D	Research and development
RCA	Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
TCDC	Technical co-operation among developing countries
TCF	Technical Co-operation Fund
Transport Regulations	Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material
Trilateral Initiative	Trilateral Initiative launched by the Minister of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy, the Secretary of Energy of the United States and the Agency's Director General on 17 September 1996 to consider practical measures for the application of IAEA verification to fissile material originating from nuclear weapons
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
WANO	World Association of Nuclear Operators
WHO	World Health Organization

GENERAL DEBATE AND THE ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2000 (continued)
(GC(45)/4)

1. Mr. SOERIAATMADJA (Indonesia) said his Government was shocked at the tragic events of 11 September in New York and Washington. His delegation expressed condolences to the bereaved families.
2. He commended the Agency's efforts to expand the application of nuclear science and technology with a view to enhancing the quality of life, especially in developing countries. His country had recently inaugurated the Polytechnics Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology in Yogyakarta and, within the framework of the Agency's technical co-operation, had expanded its capabilities in important areas such as agriculture, livestock production, human health, industry and environmental protection. The Agency's pre-project mission relating to the 2003-2004 technical co-operation programme had greatly assisted Indonesia in preparing its technical co-operation projects in line with the CPF and thematic planning.
3. In the face of current economic difficulties, Indonesia had intensified its efforts to transfer R&D results to the community in order to accelerate economic development based on agriculture, animal production, fisheries, and small- and medium-scale industries. To bolster the staple food supply, nuclear technology had been used to provide Indonesian farmers with several new varieties of rice, soybean and mungbean. Significant progress had been made in developing nuclear techniques to improve animal reproduction and animal health. Feed supplementation technology had been transferred to farmers to increase meat and milk production under a scheme involving various ministries, provincial governments, universities, non-governmental organizations and the private sector. Indonesia was grateful for the Agency's support for its efforts to incorporate nuclear techniques in the integrated regional development programme through three technical co-operation projects in the 2001-2002 biennium.
4. Indonesia had actively participated in the Agency's isotope hydrology programme in the hope of increasing land use to support sustainable agricultural development. Indonesia appreciated the Agency's support for the groundwater resources exploitation project in Central Java and its assistance in studying the feasibility of introducing small and medium-size reactors for electricity generation and the production of potable water through nuclear desalination, especially to accelerate economic development in the eastern part of Indonesia which consisted of many small islands.
5. Indonesia had been working hard to develop and produce radiodiagnostic equipment, radioisotopes and radiopharmaceuticals, and to improve the safety of radiotherapy treatment. In that connection, he expressed support for the Board's recommendation to convene a group of experts to formulate, on the basis of the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Malaga Conference, an action plan for future international work relating to the radiological protection of patients. Indonesia faced difficulties in dealing with 300 radium-226 sources stored in 6 hospitals and in the Ministry of Public Health and sought the Agency's advice in dealing with spent sources.

6. All three research reactors in Indonesia were in good operating condition. Although the first in Bandung and the second in Yogyakarta were 36 and 22 years old, respectively, neither was experiencing ageing problems. The first reactor had been upgraded in 1999 and had been the subject of an INSARR mission in 2000. Indonesia had recently conducted an in-service inspection of the tank of the second reactor in compliance with safety requirements.

7. Under the new national development policy, in which nuclear power was seen as a potential alternative to oil and gas, systematic planning for the introduction of nuclear power would be enhanced, especially in the fields of safety, regulation, final waste disposal, environmental impact analysis, the decision-making process and financing. In the short term, the planning process would be strengthened through further investigation and data completion, supplemented by Agency support through technical co-operation project INS/0/016 entitled "Comparative assessment of different energy sources for electricity generation."

8. The wide spectrum of projects under the RCA and the Agency's bilateral technical co-operation activities had contributed significantly to the development of human resources and nuclear science and technology in Indonesia. Indonesia was in favour of an extension of the RCA and wished to share its acquired expertise and its scientific facilities with other RCA member countries. It urged the Agency to increase its efforts to promote TCDC, in addition to existing North-South co-operation schemes.

9. Indonesia adhered to the principles embodied in the NPT and related agreements, including the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. It had been invited to an international seminar on the additional protocol in June 2001 in Tokyo to present Indonesia's experience thus far and was currently being considered by the Agency as the third country to implement the integrated safeguards approach, hopefully by 2002.

10. At the invitation of his Government, an IPPAS mission had been undertaken in early February 2001 and had been impressed with Indonesia's efforts to conform to international standards.

11. In close co-operation with the Agency, Indonesia was preparing to hold a regional workshop on physical protection and material security to combat illicit trafficking in November 2001. Ideas would be exchanged on the implementation of a physical protection system to combat illicit trafficking among countries of the region. To complement that, a national workshop on design basis threat would be held early in 2002.

12. Mr. SHKOLNIK (Kazakhstan) extended deepest sympathy to the American people in the wake of the unprecedented terrorist attacks suffered.

13. The present year marked the tenth anniversary of his country's independence. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan had been left with the fourth largest nuclear arsenal in the world. Nonetheless, it had declared itself a non-nuclear-weapon State. The vast Semipalatinsk nuclear testing range, with an area of influence larger than a medium-size European State, had been closed down and the considerable consequences of the testing were beginning to be addressed. Kazakhstan had become one of the first of the former Soviet

States to accede to the NPT and all its nuclear activities had been under Agency safeguards since 1995. The same year, when the last remaining nuclear device on its soil had been destroyed, it had attained de facto non-nuclear-weapon status.

14. Efforts had then concentrated on the remaining infrastructure of the nuclear test site, including the removal of highly enriched weapons-grade uranium from the world's largest nuclear fuel fabrication plant. By 2000, the underground testing facilities and intercontinental ballistic missile launch silos at Semipalatinsk had finally been destroyed.

15. Kazakhstan's peaceful nuclear activities had continued; its nuclear fuel fabrication plant, research reactors and uranium ore enterprises were still in operation. However, in 1999, the BN-350 fast neutron reactor at Aktau had been shut down and, with Agency assistance, its decommissioning was now in hand.

16. Kazakhstan was about to sign an additional protocol to its comprehensive safeguards agreement, and was also taking steps to strengthen the physical protection of its nuclear materials and facilities, upgrade its nuclear exports monitoring system, and improve its procedures to combat illegal trafficking in nuclear materials.

17. In 1996, Kazakhstan had signed the CTBT, and was now an active member of the worldwide monitoring network. Its seismic observation posts were capable of registering nuclear explosions at any point on the globe.

18. Kazakhstan had become a member of the Conference on Disarmament in 1999 and had also acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention. Discussions were currently under way on its accession to the Biological Weapons Convention, and work had already begun on eliminating all facilities concerned with biological weapons production.

19. While the end of the millennium had brought an end to the rivalry between two extremely powerful war machines, the world had not become a safer place. Ownership of nuclear weapons was no longer the prerogative of only five countries. Kazakhstan wished to demonstrate by its own example that disarmament, confidence-building measures and adherence to non-proliferation principles offered a real alternative to the politics of force.

20. Mr. RUMYANTSEV (Russian Federation) extended condolences to all the victims of the unprecedented act of aggression which had just taken place in the United States of America and reiterated President Putin's call for all nations to unite and stamp out international terrorism.

21. The Russian Federation attached great significance to maintaining and strengthening the multilateral treaties in force in the area of disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. It was convinced that the 1972 ABM treaty, far from being obsolete, still had a role to play, especially as no new global instruments had been introduced in the sphere of nuclear missile systems since the end of the Cold War.

22. Russia believed it had put forward a constructive arms control programme which provided for, inter alia, a stepwise reduction of Russian and United States strategic offensive weapons, and also contained measures designed to strengthen non-proliferation regimes and prevent an arms race in space.

23. Under the 1993 agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on the use of HEU resulting from nuclear weapons, some 5000 warheads had already been destroyed. Good progress was also being made in converting former nuclear weapon plants to peaceful uses.

24. Russia felt it was now time for the five permanent members of the Security Council, who bore special responsibility for international security, to begin discussing strategic issues in relation to the multilateral mechanisms - the NPT, the CTBT and others. The success of the 2000 NPT Review Conference had depended crucially on the fine balance of interests expressed in its final document. Russia attached great importance to implementation of its provisions and believed that the decisions of the Review Conference had enhanced the Agency's standing. It was now vitally important to continue strengthening the Agency's role and authority.

25. Nuclear power development should remain a high priority for the Agency. The previous year had witnessed a greater focus on that area with the inauguration of INPRO, which undoubtedly had the potential to help resolve problems relating to sustainable development, nuclear non-proliferation and man's destruction of the environment. Its successful implementation depended on the level of constructive information exchange established between all the relevant national programmes. His delegation urged all interested countries to support INPRO.

26. Russia supported the three-pillar approach to the Agency's activities and wished to see adequate funding and attention devoted to them.

27. His country's contribution to the welcome resurgence of nuclear power in a number of countries had been to approve a nuclear power development strategy for the first half of the 21st century which aimed to achieve a growth rate three times higher than that of any other branch of electricity production. Moreover, Russia's first new reactor unit for eight years had been commissioned at Rostov, and a decision had been taken to build additional units at Kalinin and Kursk.

28. In the continuing climate change discussion, the anti-nuclear lobby, as had been seen at the COP6, was still too strong. Russia, like many Agency Member States, was convinced that greater use of nuclear power plants could reduce greenhouse gas emissions and better fulfil sustainable energy needs. It called on the countries interested in nuclear power development to intensify their efforts to have it included in the Clean Development Mechanism, and urged the Agency to adopt a more active role as the co-ordinator of such efforts.

29. Russia had recently passed laws to permit the import of spent nuclear fuel for storage and reprocessing, one of the most sensitive stages of the fuel cycle. The revenue accruing

from such operations would fund special environmental programmes designed to rehabilitate contaminated areas of Russia. The new laws facilitated the development of international co-operation in the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, offered greater scope for reprocessing spent fuel from nuclear power plants constructed and operated with Soviet or Russian assistance, and also provided for fuel leasing.

30. Nuclear fusion was a potential alternative fuel source for future generations. Following the successful completion of the technical design stage of the ITER project, Russia looked forward to the elaboration of a draft agreement on its joint implementation. His Government had approved a federal programme to ensure that Russia participated in preparatory activities relating to ITER construction.

31. Russia continued to support the development of measures to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system, including integrated safeguards. Faced with increasing safeguards responsibilities and also the need to maintain a zero-real-growth budget, the Agency would need to develop new resource-saving approaches and control measures. The Agency also had a potential contribution to make in verification of excess fissile material of weapons origin in the framework of the Trilateral Initiative.

32. Russia welcomed the measures being taken by the Agency in the area of nuclear, radiation and waste safety, including the updating of its safety standards. Russia was currently finalizing the legal procedures required for the entry into force of the Joint Convention, which it considered an important international instrument..

33. The Agency's efforts to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the technical co-operation programme were laudable. Russia would continue to provide assistance through the provision of experts, the supply of equipment and materials, and by holding training courses for personnel from developing countries. Also, it had paid its share of the target for voluntary contributions to the TCF for 2001 in full and on time. In future, it hoped to expand its co-operation in projects on nuclear power plant and waste safety and in nuclear applications important for the economic development of all Member States.

34. He commended the Secretariat on the work it had done during the previous year, and on the usefulness of the consultations it had held during the difficult process of formulating a zero-real-growth budget for 2002-2003. In conclusion, he emphasized the need to maintain a balance between the Agency's major functions.

35. Mr. REIMANN (Switzerland), speaking also on behalf of Liechtenstein, joined in the expression of sympathy for the victims of the recent terrorist attacks in the United States of America. The Agency continued to operate in a world overshadowed by the threat of nuclear weapons. Far-reaching changes were taking place. On the one hand, the countries with the biggest arsenals were seriously contemplating reductions, so that a resumption of the strategic arms limitation process was to be expected. On the other hand, strategic challenges had changed radically since the Cold War and now included projects such as the anti-missile shield, whose technological and political dimensions had implications for the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

36. For States that were strongly committed to disarmament, the scale of the work ahead and the attitude of certain powers were a source of concern. Switzerland continued to attach great importance to all political and diplomatic moves aimed at reducing the threat of nuclear proliferation, including export controls. It welcomed recent action by the NSG to increase public awareness of its activities and to boost dialogue with non-member countries. Switzerland considered it vital for all States to apply the NSG's principle, endorsed at the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences, of requiring full-scope safeguards for all nuclear deliveries.

37. He noted that some Member States were reluctant to respond to the Director General's call for more rapid implementation of the integrated safeguards system and an increase in budgets. Switzerland was convinced that renewed progress in nuclear disarmament would create a more favourable environment for the introduction and financing of the integrated safeguards system.

38. For some years, Switzerland had been advocating zero nominal growth in budgets throughout the United Nations system. Some flexibility was, however, necessary in certain circumstances; hence its decision to accept zero real growth in the case of the Agency. Indeed it had gone further in the current year by accepting an effective increase in the safeguards budget and a higher rate of inflation than that actually prevailing. That should not become a regular practice. In the event of a future shortfall in funds, the Conference should reduce the Agency's programme of activities. Statutory activities should be fully covered by Member States' contributions and not by extrabudgetary funds. If necessary, the funding of more costly or additional activities would have to be deferred.

39. Commending those involved in the implementation of the technical co-operation programme, he said that the quality of their work was a vital factor in persuading all Member States to pay their full share of the target for voluntary contributions to the TCF. The increase in the safeguards budget had refuelled the debate on the relative importance of safeguards and technical co-operation. The Agency's basic mandate - to ensure that nuclear energy contributed to world peace, health and prosperity - was inextricably linked with the controls needed to ensure that the assistance provided was used for civilian purposes and that Member States honoured their obligations. Further cohesion on the budgetary front would reinforce the safeguards dimension of the Agency's mission.

40. Switzerland attached great importance to the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities. Its experts had played an active part in the debate on a possible revision of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Switzerland fully endorsed the final recommendations of the group of experts, including the expansion of the Convention to cover material reserved for domestic use and the protection of material and facilities against sabotage. He noted with satisfaction that the Board of Governors had approved the basic security principles in that area and looked forward to their systematic application. Switzerland was prepared to participate in an advisory group on the subject.

41. The use of nuclear energy was a politically sensitive issue in Switzerland. Opponents sought to change nuclear policy through popular initiatives aimed at amending the

Constitution. Two such initiatives in 1999 sought to ban the construction of new nuclear power stations until 2010 and to close down existing stations once they had been in operation for 30 years. To counter the initiatives, the Government had submitted a bill on nuclear energy to Parliament in February 2001 which provided, inter alia, for the building of new nuclear power stations, an unlimited operating life and a ban on the reprocessing of nuclear fuel once existing contracts expired. The Swiss people would vote on the two initiatives in 2003 and also on the bill if a referendum on its enactment was demanded.

42. Much work remained to be done to promote the establishment of an international framework for the transport and storage of high-level radioactive waste. In the light of the preamble to the Joint Convention, his Government considered that the Agency was best placed to look into all relevant legal and institutional aspects of the matter. Switzerland hoped that the Agency would set to work as soon as possible in that area in the interests of the international community.

43. Mr. SANON (Burkina Faso) prefaced his statement with an expression of compassion and solidarity for the American people following the tragic events of 11 September. He commended the Agency on its contribution to peace, security, disarmament, development, the eradication of poverty and protection of the environment, all of which were priority objectives espoused by the United Nations Millennium Summit. Nuclear technology was being used to promote development in agriculture, food, human and animal health, and water resources management.

44. In that context, he welcomed the agreement concluded between the Agency and the OAU on joint action against the tsetse fly through the sterile insect technique. At its thirty-sixth and thirty-seventh sessions, the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government had given high priority to eradication of the tsetse fly, a major obstacle to Africa's socio-economic development. Burkina Faso intended to participate actively in those efforts and to share its experience, human resources and facilities with the Agency and with other African countries. To that end, a tripartite project involving the Agency, Mali and Burkina Faso on integrated control of animal trypanosomosis through the establishment of a tsetse-fly-free zone was being implemented. Also, his country was honoured to host the launching, on 5 October 2001, of PATTEC in Ouagadougou. He appealed to all countries and donors to support that initiative.

45. He noted with satisfaction the steps taken by the Secretariat to implement GC(44)/RES/24 concerning the servicing of immediate human needs, in particular the idea of a regional technical co-operation project to develop and evaluate the sterile insect technique in fighting malaria vector mosquitoes. He hoped that the project would attract generous support and thanked the United States of America and Italy for their contributions.

46. Since joining the Agency a few years previously, Burkina Faso had launched activities and programmes in a number of areas, including the control of animal diseases, water resources management, desertification control, training of human resources, the establishment of radioprotection facilities, the improvement of milk production, and malaria and tuberculosis control. The Government had just established a standing national body to

oversee co-operation with the Agency. He expressed renewed thanks to the Africa Section of the Department of Technical Co-operation for its ongoing assistance.

47. Mr. BAHRAN (Yemen) said that his country supported all international, regional and national action to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy, nuclear, radiation and waste safety, the safe transport of radioactive material, and the strengthening of the safeguards system and its expansion to include all States without exception. It also supported the Agency's action against illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material and the development of structures for the physical protection of nuclear material.

48. Yemen renewed its appeal for a halt to the nuclear arms race everywhere and for action to root out the causes of tension, violence, terrorism and war through the promotion of understanding and co-operation among States and the creation of an international environment that no longer tolerated violence and injustice and in which the weak could exercise their rights in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations. He supported Egypt's renewed call for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, compelling Israel to accede to the NPT so that the Middle East region no longer lived in a state of permanent fear.

49. Expressing his condolences to the victims of the vile terrorist acts in the United States of America, he called on the international community to fight against all forms of terrorism, including nuclear terrorism, and to provide the long-suffering Palestinian people with the international protection they required.

50. The threat presented by radioactive sources, particularly orphan sources, deserved greater attention. In Europe alone, some 30 000 sources were either not accounted for or not properly protected. Theft and illicit trafficking were compounding the problem.

51. Internationally supported efforts by Member States to upgrade radiation protection and waste safety infrastructure projects, such as the Agency's Model Project on the topic, had proved effective in many countries and should be stepped up. At the Agency's International Conference on Security of Material in Stockholm in May 2001, Yemen had proposed an international tagging system for radioactive materials to ensure trackability, accountability and safety. It hoped that the proposal would attract broad support and was considering submitting a draft resolution on the matter at the forty-sixth session of the General Conference.

52. He urged the Agency to enhance the material and human resources of the Department of Technical Co-operation in recognition of its vital contribution to sustainable development and its important role in radiation protection and nuclear and waste safety. He called on States that had not honoured their pledges to the TCF to do so without delay. He thanked the West Asia Section of the Department of Technical Co-operation for its valuable assistance, especially in connection with the establishment of the first radiotherapy centre for cancer in Yemen.

53. Mr. GARCIA (Philippines) expressed sincere condolences to the American people for the senseless loss of innocent life the previous week and said that terrorism undermined the very foundation of civilized existence.

54. He welcomed the Annual Report for 2000 and commended the Director General and the Secretariat for their accomplishments over the past year. His delegation was ready to join the consensus on the programme and budget for 2002-2003. The Philippines was committed to promoting the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and to international verification efforts, but believed that they should develop at the same pace. Thus, in future programmes and budgets, every effort should be made to maintain an equitable balance between the Agency's activities.

55. With regard to nuclear safety, he looked forward to the formulation of an action plan by the Secretariat, in the light of the Malaga Conference, for future international work relating to the radiological protection of patients. The Philippines, for its part, was currently upgrading its code of regulations using the Agency's Basic Safety Standards.

56. While his delegation agreed on the need for an international research reactor safety enhancement plan, it believed that an effort should be made, using international assistance, to bring research reactors which had been temporarily shut down back into productive operation. With regard to transport safety, he welcomed the news that international modal organizations such as IMO and ICAO had incorporated the 1996 edition of the Agency's Transport Regulations into their regulatory documents. He called on other Member States to follow his country's example and adopt the 1996 edition of those Regulations. The Philippines intended to participate actively in the Agency's conference on the safety of transport of radioactive material, scheduled for 2003.

57. He commended the Secretariat's efforts to strengthen the Agency's technical co-operation activities, as detailed in document GC(45)/INF/4, and reiterated his country's appreciation for all the technical co-operation assistance it had received. He hoped that the revised rules for the acceptance of voluntary contributions, together with intensified fund-raising efforts, would attract greater resources for the technical co-operation programme.

58. Reporting on recent progress in the Philippines with respect to nuclear applications, he said that in the health sector, the first medical cyclotron was expected to be operational by the end of 2001. Also, a hydrogel burn and wound dressing had been developed which, once commercialized, would bring considerable cost savings. In industry, NDT was gaining ground with the establishment of a national infrastructure for NDT certification and a training programme. National specialists were eagerly awaiting the outcome of the Agency's initiative to harmonize recognition of such certifications worldwide. The successful application of nuclear techniques in geothermal field studies and also the detection, monitoring and mitigation of toxic "red tide" occurrences had resulted in the identification of three regional resource units, through which the Philippines hoped to contribute to TCDC. In 2001 the Philippines would host eight regional training courses and workshops and accept a number of Agency fellows for training.

59. In June 2001, the Philippines had deposited its instrument of ratification for the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. Such regional initiatives pursuant to Article VII of the NPT warranted international encouragement as they contributed to regional and, ultimately, global security. As the Philippines with its ASEAN partners prepared for implementation of that Treaty, it looked forward to Agency assistance and to the speedy conclusion of negotiations with nuclear weapon states concerning the Treaty's protocol.

60. Mr. BUTT (Pakistan), conveying deep sympathy to those afflicted by the disaster in the United States of America, said his country was opposed to all forms of terrorism and would co-operate in collective actions to combat it.

61. Like many developing countries, Pakistan had repeatedly stressed the need for an increased share of nuclear power in the total energy mix. Nuclear power still provided only about 16% of overall electricity, and the six new nuclear power reactors in the year 2000 represented only about 3% of additional estimated world electricity capacity. The Secretariat and the Member States therefore needed to continue their efforts to secure for nuclear power its due place on the global scene. There were heartening signs of a possible resurgence of nuclear power. In the United States of America its contribution was increasing to 20% of total electricity generation. Also, the life-extension programme of various nuclear power plants in the United States and Spain was positive.

62. Despite financial constraints, his country had completed its second nuclear power plant (Chasnupp) which had just gone into commercial operation; that was a shining example of South-South collaboration. His Government was following with interest worldwide efforts to develop innovative reactor designs, including the pebble bed modular reactor, aiming for improved safety and proliferation-resistance. It urged the Agency and the industrially advanced Member States to devise an effective partnership mechanism with the developing countries to share knowledge, expertise and technology in that regard.

63. Pakistan strongly believed in giving top priority to safety, irrespective of any operational or financial considerations. Earlier in the year, his Government had set up an independent Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority. Pakistan had ratified the Convention on Nuclear Safety promptly and was steadfastly committed to it. To continue strengthening its safety practices, Pakistan was an active member of other organizations, such as WANO, and sought further co-operation from the world community to stay abreast of technological developments. He hoped that the Agency would play a more proactive role in convincing the advanced countries of the need for a liberal transfer of safety-related technology and equipment to developing countries. His delegation proposed that the Agency adopt a mechanism to ensure the supply of safety-related equipment to safeguarded nuclear reactors and facilities. His delegation appreciated the invaluable help which the Agency had rendered Pakistan in the field of nuclear safety and commended it for taking cognizance of the continuing loss of qualified and experienced manpower worldwide. It suggested that the Agency elaborate, under the technical co-operation programme, an education initiative in the area of nuclear safety for young scientists and engineers, particularly from the developing countries. In that connection, his Government proposed that the Agency conduct courses in Pakistan on operational safety and safety analysis which would lead to a diploma in nuclear safety from a

Pakistani university. The Agency could send safety experts and sponsor travel costs while Pakistan would provide access to its research and power reactors. That initiative could develop into an international centre for safety studies.

64. Agency safeguards were an effective tool against the proliferation and clandestine diversion of nuclear materials. Pakistan had enacted nuclear export control legislation in 2000, had acceded to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and had always fulfilled its safeguards obligations vis-à-vis the Agency.

65. Technical co-operation was the most important aspect of Pakistan's collaboration with the Agency. As a major beneficiary, Pakistan had been enhancing its technical co-operation management on a regular basis to keep pace with Agency strategies for greater impact, sustainability and outreach. It was pleased that the Agency's thematic focus had included immediate human needs. In that respect, his delegation stressed the importance of water resource management, which had a direct bearing on other areas such as agriculture, human health, industry and the environment, and urged the Agency to step up its work in the area of fresh water management and desalination.

66. The technical co-operation programme could be more effective if a few points of concern, such as the uncertain nature of the TCF, non-payment or delayed payment by Member States of their voluntary contributions, and problems associated with placements for the training of fellows, the travel of fellows, trainees, experts and project counterparts, were tackled by the Secretariat more vigorously. In addition, TCDC implementation, maximum utilization of available resources within the regions and greater involvement of the developing Member States at the programme formulation stage merited attention. Also, Pakistan was concerned about the vulnerability of the balance between the Agency's promotional and other activities.

67. Salinity and waterlogging were serious problems in Pakistan. Pakistani scientists had developed a biological technique for utilizing salt-affected soils and saline water economically, which had been adopted as a Model Project by the Agency and introduced by Pakistani experts in Myanmar, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Morocco, Iran and Tunisia.

68. Pakistan was engaged in numerous other Agency technical co-operation activities. It provided assistance to many Member States in the assimilation of NDT technologies through the National Centre for Non-Destructive Testing and the Pakistan Welding Institute. One spin-off product had been the development of a laser-based land-leveller. Manufactured by Pakistani scientists and costing less than half the international price, it was expected to result in considerable savings of irrigation water in levelled areas. A technetium-99m generator loading facility had recently been set up and would soon begin supplying nuclear medical centres throughout the country so that nearly 300 000 patients could be treated every year. Another national Agency-sponsored project had been the safe conditioning of disused radium-226 needles, and that technology had been passed on to Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Lebanon. Pakistan had commissioned a seawater desalination plant based on reverse osmosis technology at its Kanupp plant. In the medical field, it had started a postgraduate medical physics programme for which it welcomed nominations from Member States.

69. Pakistan offered its experience to other developing countries under the Agency's auspices. Not only was that in line with the Agency's TCDC strategy but it would also serve as a confidence-building measure to encourage developing Member States to operate programmes of their own. Furthermore, Pakistan had taken steps towards revenue generation to ensure sustainability and self-reliance.

70. His Government endorsed the Agency's activities in the year 2000 as described in the Annual Report, particularly in the areas of safety and maintenance of knowledge and competence. It also appreciated the tremendous contribution of the Abdus Salam International Centre for Theoretical Physics in Trieste, Italy, which had provided training opportunities to a large number of Pakistani scientists.

71. In conclusion, he recalled the considerable effort the Agency had made in past years to introduce an amendment to Article VI of its Statute to allow expansion of the Board. His delegation urged those Member States that had not yet ratified the amendment to expedite the process so as to bring about a more equitable Board representation.

72. Mr. HASHIM (Malaysia), having condemned all forms of terrorism, expressed condolences to the United States of America and the families affected by the terrorist attacks of the previous week.

73. New applications for membership of the Agency testified to the potential benefits of the peaceful and non-power applications of nuclear technology for developing countries, in which TCDC played an increasingly important role. He endorsed the request made by the Group of 77 and China that the Secretariat continue the long-term training courses in Member States on radiation protection. Malaysia ran such a postgraduate course on which Agency-sponsored fellows were welcome.

74. In order to meet the expectations of developing Member States the Agency must strive to strike an appropriate balance in the funding and composition of its major functions. Non-nuclear-weapon States should not have to help shoulder the burden of the Agency's verification activities, either through an increase in safeguards contributions or a reduction in benefits from the technical co-operation programme. Although the Agency was the safeguards implementing agency for the NPT, it was also bound by its Statute to, inter alia, accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. The NPT provided for non-nuclear-weapon States to benefit from the peaceful applications of nuclear technology in exchange for their total renunciation of such weapons of mass destruction.

75. Malaysia welcomed the Board of Governors' recommendation that the General Conference adopt revised rules regarding the acceptance of voluntary contributions. That represented a significant step forward in encouraging funding from non-traditional donors. Perhaps other restrictive financial and legal procedures could be revised along similar lines to ensure that all Member States, in particular the developing countries, derived maximum benefit from the Agency's activities. His delegation requested the Director General to pay special attention to the technical co-operation programme when soliciting or allocating

voluntary contributions, since the revision of the rules had stemmed from resolution GC(44)/RES/18 aimed at strengthening the Agency's technical co-operation activities.

76. He reiterated Malaysia's concern about the safety of international maritime transport of nuclear materials, in particular the potentially harmful effects on human life and ecosystems in the littoral States concerned. His delegation welcomed the proposal to hold a conference on the safety of transport of radioactive material in 2003 as well as the other measures outlined in document GC(45)/13. However, it did not support the idea of a single, binding, mode-independent international instrument governing the transport of radioactive material on the grounds that it did not seem feasible. Instead, the Agency should continue its current practice of updating its own Transport Regulations and encouraging their adoption by the relevant multilateral organizations.

77. The Agency's involvement in the post-conflict environmental assessment of the effects of depleted uranium munitions in Kosovo led by UNEP was laudable. Malaysia also welcomed the Agency's undertaking to assess the radiological and environmental effects of the debris of such munitions in other regions. Expressing concern about the associated safeguards implications, he asked for clarification by the Secretariat as to whether the transfer of such munitions to non-nuclear-weapon States which had signed a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency should be reported to the Agency.

78. Mr. AL-JANABI (Iraq) said that for a number of decades Iraq had been a model Member State, attending all meetings of the governing bodies and implementing comprehensive safeguards. But the brutal attack on Iraq in 1991 had led to the destruction of all nuclear and some civilian facilities and had, at the same time, undermined the credibility of the stated aim of the United Nations and the Agency to promote the contribution of science and technology to the progress of humankind. The Security Council had then adopted a series of biased resolutions under pressure from the United States of America and the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, Iraq had complied with their provisions and co-operated with Agency inspection teams, allowing them to obtain a complete picture of its nuclear programmes despite the fact that some members had engaged in espionage. Owing to United States and United Kingdom interference, however, the Agency had been unable to carry out its mandate under the Security Council resolutions. As a technical body, it should have remained aloof from their nefarious political influence. It had emerged directly and indirectly from the Agency's reports in recent years, for instance paragraph 31 of its report to the Security Council annexed to document GOV/INF/1999/4, that the Agency had in fact completed its tasks under section C of Security Council resolution 687(1991), especially paragraphs 12 and 13 concerning inspections. The Agency should make that clear to the Security Council in order to put paid to the empty allegations being used by the United States and the United Kingdom to prolong the unjust embargo.

79. Iraq had long sought to restore normal relations with the Agency and to recover its rights and privileges as a Member State. During two inspections conducted in 2000 and 2001, the Agency had verified the physical inventory of the nuclear material subject to safeguards. It was therefore duty bound, under the Statute and in accordance with paragraph 13 of Security

Council resolution 687(1991), to restore full relations with Iraq and to respect its rights under the NPT.

80. Having suspended Iraq's rights under the technical co-operation programme in 1991, the Agency had partially restored them for humanitarian projects as of 1995. However, it had failed to implement ten projects, including three regional projects, approved from 1999 onwards because the Security Council Sanctions Committee established by resolution 661(1990) had unfairly decided, under pressure from the United States and the United Kingdom, to make implementation dependent on the return of the inspection teams that had engaged in espionage. That decision was incompatible with Articles II and III of the Statute, under which Member States were entitled to benefit from technical co-operation. Given that the Board of Governors had approved those humanitarian projects, he called on the Conference to request the Agency to proceed with their implementation.

81. The environment in many parts of Iraq had been severely contaminated by the weapons used against it in 1991. Iraq had taken urgent action within its limited resources to tackle the problem and had repeatedly asked for the Agency's assistance both in that regard and in rehabilitating the radioactive waste treatment plant in Tuwaitha. Although the Agency had sent a technical team to Iraq in June 1995 no significant progress had been made in that regard. Iraq had drawn the attention of the General Conference at previous sessions to the damage caused by the use of depleted uranium missiles by United States and British troops in 1991. Their radioactive and chemical effects had led to the death of thousands of civilians and would continue to affect future generations. Iraq had requested emergency assistance from the Agency, which, in turn, had referred the request to the relevant Security Council Sanctions Committee, where every request that might benefit the people of Iraq was rejected. The Conference should thus be aware that the Agency, despite having participated effectively in the depleted uranium fact-finding process in Kosovo, had applied double standards in the case of Iraq under United States pressure, although the quantities of depleted uranium used were far greater than in Kosovo. The WHO, recognizing the gravity of the situation, had developed a joint programme with Iraq to study the risks to human health and the environment. The United States and the United Kingdom were merely seeking to conceal the facts relating to the criminal use of depleted uranium against civilians. The Agency had decided to organize a course on the effects of depleted uranium in the countries against which it had been used. Iraq had nominated four experts to attend the course but the Agency had referred only two of the nominations to the relevant Sanctions Committee. The Agency had a moral and technical duty to assist Iraq in training personnel to deal with depleted uranium contamination and should not allow any political machinations to interfere with its humanitarian work.

82. Numerous efforts were being made to rid the world of nuclear weapons. Nuclear-weapon-free zones could relax tension in areas of conflict such as the Middle East, which was still living under the threat of Zionist nuclear weapons. The Agency had been discussing that issue and the question of the application of comprehensive Agency safeguards in the Middle East for years. In 1981 the Zionist entity had destroyed Iraq's Tammuz research reactor, which had been used for peaceful purposes and had been under Agency safeguards.

All international calls to the Zionist entity to place all its nuclear reactors under safeguards and to accede to the NPT had failed. Paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687(1991) constituted an important step towards the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, in the Middle East, but the United States and the United Kingdom had impeded its implementation because it was applicable to the Zionist entity and no other State.

83. He urged the General Conference to restore Iraq's rights as a Member State, to assist it in recovering from the enormous damage inflicted by bombardment of its territory, and to call for the lifting of the unjust embargo. Iraq, for its part, was prepared to co-operate fully with the Agency in pursuing the objectives set forth in its Statute.

84. Ms. MOSLEY (New Zealand) pledged her country's support for efforts to combat terrorism and to bring to justice the perpetrators of the recent terrifying attacks in the United States of America.

85. Her Government was encouraged by the outcome of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Of singular significance had been the unequivocal political undertaking of the five nuclear-weapon States to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. Despite those positive developments, her delegation cautioned against complacency.

86. As the previous week's tragic events had shown, international security required collective engagement and effective international responses. That meant not only providing full support for bodies such as the Agency, which stood at the centre of efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, but also paying assessed contributions in full and on time and meeting safeguards commitments. She expressed concern that some Member States had yet to fulfil their NPT obligations by concluding safeguards agreements with the Agency and regretted that adherence to the strengthened safeguards system was progressing so slowly. As for New Zealand, which had both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in place, the Agency had recently concluded that it had no undeclared nuclear material or activities.

87. As a practical contribution to collective engagement, in March New Zealand had hosted the United Nations Asia Pacific Regional Disarmament Conference to discuss a wide range of security and non-proliferation issues relevant to the South Pacific region. Agency representatives had been present to explain the safeguards system and encourage the conclusion of additional protocols to comprehensive safeguards agreements.

88. The long-standing problem of the implementation of the safeguards agreement by the DPRK was becoming ever more acute as time passed. New Zealand urged the DPRK to co-operate fully and promptly with the Agency in ensuring complete compliance with its safeguards agreement, which remained binding and in force.

89. Her delegation was also concerned about the Agency's inability to fulfil its mandate in Iraq under the relevant Security Council resolutions. It urged Iraq to co-operate fully in that regard.

90. Nuclear safety was a matter of the highest priority. That was reflected in the importance Member States attached to various safety conventions, safety standards and safety services. New Zealand strongly supported the Agency's work to strengthen international co-operation in nuclear, radiation and waste safety and the assistance it provided in the event of accidents.

91. One aspect of nuclear safety of particular importance to New Zealand was the safety of transport of radioactive materials. New Zealand was on one of three routes for shipments of nuclear materials being returned to Japan after reprocessing in Europe. There were deep concerns about the risk of an accident and the potentially immense impact on coastal States. New Zealand did not want shipments of nuclear materials to come anywhere near it, and certainly not into its 200-mile exclusive economic zone. It wanted proper systems of notification and expected the highest standards of safety to apply. It asked that States shipping nuclear materials accept full responsibility for any damage, including liability and compensation. New Zealand's concerns about the shipment of radioactive materials were shared by the small island States of the South Pacific, which were dependent on fishing and tourism and where the stakes were, if anything, higher. The 32nd Pacific Islands Forum, held in Nauru in August, had urged that those concerns be constructively and vigorously pursued. New Zealand was co-sponsoring a resolution on the safety of transport of radioactive materials together with a number of countries from other regions. The text agreed for resolution GC(44)/RES/17 had set a benchmark for action and accountability, and there was a need for a realistic but progressive agenda for improving measures for the international transport of radioactive material and spent fuel.

92. In today's troubled times, the agreements reached and practical efforts employed to enhance international stability, security and safety acquired even greater significance. It was in that light that New Zealand viewed, and supported, the Agency and its work.

93. Ms. URIBE TORON (Colombia) said the recent tragic events in the United States of America had highlighted the need to continue supporting the Agency's activities. A clear consensus existed as to the Agency's three main - interrelated - priorities: technology, safety and verification. Mankind was still hampered in its efforts to release the formidable potential of nuclear power by the dual threat of its use for aggressive purposes or an unforeseen accident. As a developing country, Colombia attached a high priority to the use of nuclear energy for sustainable development, and looked to the Agency to act as a catalyst in transferring the tangible benefits of nuclear applications. The Agency's safety and verification activities had a vital role to play in allaying fears and suspicions.

94. The international legal instruments elaborated by the Agency in recent years not only showed Member States' willingness to achieve high standards of nuclear safety worldwide but were also crucial to global collaboration in the areas of nuclear safety, physical protection and assistance in radiation emergencies. That international dimension of the nuclear safety regime, combined with the benefits brought by the widespread co-operation and exchange, were extremely helpful to countries such as Colombia which were beginning to make greater use of nuclear applications for peaceful purposes. Colombia's Congress was currently in the process of ratifying the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Early Notification Convention and the Assistance Convention.

95. Her Government had recently established a national nuclear regulatory authority under the Ministry of Mines and Energy with the power to adopt national policy with respect to nuclear energy and the management of radioactive material, and to carry out regulatory, licensing, monitoring, supervisory and safeguards functions. The nuclear regulatory authority was responsible for ensuring compliance with international standards and agreements, and for ensuring personal safety and environmental protection.

96. Her Government had recently reaffirmed its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament through an agreement by exchange of letters with the Agency, approved by the Board of Governors¹ and in accordance with the recommendations of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

97. Regarding the safe transport of radioactive material, Colombia associated itself with the various declarations made by regional groups, as recorded in document GC(45)/INF/18, particularly the Santiago declaration made by the Rio Group in March 2001. Also, Colombia had cosponsored a resolution on the subject. There was a need to establish appropriate international mechanisms governing the transport of radioactive materials, given the potential risks of such transport through coastal routes or along navigable waterways.

98. The use of nuclear techniques considerably improved economic and social conditions and she stressed the importance of technical co-operation for non-nuclear countries that wished to join in the effort to eliminate the risks and dangers that still overshadowed the whole range of peaceful nuclear applications.

99. Colombia had met all its obligations vis-à-vis the Agency and was satisfied with the technical co-operation the Agency had provided to it. With the help of Agency experts, and in accordance with Colombia's national plan, three projects in the areas of nuclear medicine, mining, and sustainable agricultural development had been identified for the forthcoming biennial programme. Also, Colombia was a keen collaborator in regional programmes, and constantly sought to promote technical co-operation, especially in developing countries, with the help of multilateral institutions such as the Agency.

100. Mr. BACCARI (Tunisia) strongly condemned the criminal terrorist attacks in New York and Washington resulting in the deaths of innocent persons.

101. Tunisia attached high priority to the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology as a means of promoting progress. In particular, it was interested in the design and production of small and medium-sized reactors capable of producing power and desalinating sea water. His delegation urged the Agency to pay particular attention to that programme in view of its potential positive impact on development. Tunisia was also participating in the expert group on seawater desalination.

102. On questions of co-operation with the Agency, he said that Tunisian personnel had received training in a number of areas. In addition, the Agency had supplied scientific

¹ See document GOV/OR.1027, paras 1-14.

equipment, which had been used in support of socio-economic development activities. Of special importance had been the assistance received in setting up laboratories of the National Centre for Nuclear Science and Technology and, in particular, the sterile fruit fly production unit. Tunisia looked forward to the Agency's continued support in the establishment of advanced infrastructure for the application of nuclear technology in agriculture.

103. Tunisia was actively promoting scientific and technological co-operation at multilateral and bilateral levels. In that connection, it was co-operating bilaterally with the Arab countries and also through the Arab Maghreb Union and the Tunis-based Arab Atomic Energy Agency, which shared similar objectives to the Agency. He called on the Agency to increase its scientific co-operation with that organization.

104. He underscored the importance of the Agency's co-operation with the Mediterranean Arab countries under the regional project (RAF/7/004) on the study of marine pollution using radioisotopes. He expressed the hope that the Agency would engage the support of the Mediterranean European countries for that project.

105. In addition, Tunisia was regularly carrying out joint scientific and technological activities with countries in Africa, notably under the AFRA programme, making its facilities available for training human resources. He was grateful to the countries which supported that programme, and hoped that help from the industrialized countries would continue to be forthcoming so that its objectives could be achieved.

106. Also worthy of mention, was the assistance Tunisia had received from France in installing an electron accelerator, which was expected to start operation in 2002.

107. Tunisia was always punctual in paying its contributions to the Regular Budget and to the TCF. His delegation was thankful to all the countries which had contributed to the financing of technical co-operation, and hoped that they would continue to do so in a spirit of collaboration and solidarity.

108. Situated as it was on a sensitive sea route, Tunisia was aware of the hazards of the transport of radioactive material and waste by sea, and supported all efforts to strengthen controls on such transport.

109. His country was convinced that a concerted approach to nuclear security was the best guarantee not only for global security but also for the peaceful application of nuclear technology to promote sustainable development. Adherence by all States to the relevant international instruments and compliance with their requirements, allied with efforts to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, would provide the necessary assurance to all States. Tunisia itself was party to the Pelindaba Treaty, had collaborated in international efforts to strengthen the safeguards regime and was willing to enter into negotiations with the Agency to conclude an additional protocol, and was party to all international instruments relating to nuclear safety, safeguards, non-proliferation and the banning of nuclear tests. It looked forward ultimately to the universality of the safeguards system and to the total elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons.

110. In that context, his delegation was concerned at Israel's persistent refusal to accede to the NPT and called on Israel to co-operate with the Agency and place its nuclear installations under Agency safeguards. Finally, he appealed for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

The meeting rose at 1.00 p.m.