



International Atomic Energy Agency

# GENERAL CONFERENCE

GC(45)/OR.2  
November 2001

GENERAL Distr.  
Original: ENGLISH

## FORTY-FIFTH (2001) REGULAR SESSION

### RECORD OF THE SECOND PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Austria Center Vienna  
on Monday, 17 September 2001, at 3.10 p.m.

President: Mr. GRÖNBERG (Finland)

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The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC(45)/INF/17/Rev.3.

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Abbreviations used in this record

AFRA	African Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology
Agreed Framework	Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Basic Safety Standards	International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
G-7	Group of Seven [leading industrial countries]
GDP	Gross domestic product
INPRO	International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT Review Conference	Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
RBMK	High-power channel-type reactor (Soviet Union)
SIT	Sterile insect technique
SSAC	State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material
TCDC	Technical co-operation among developing countries
TCF	Technical Co-operation Fund
Trilateral Initiative	Trilateral Initiative launched by the Minister of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy, the Secretary of Energy of the United States and the Agency's Director General on 17 September 1996 to consider practical measures for the application of IAEA verification to fissile material originating from nuclear weapons
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
WENRA	Western European Nuclear Regulators' Association
WWER	Water-cooled and -moderated reactor (former USSR)



GENERAL DEBATE AND THE ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2000 (continued)  
(GC(45)/4)

1. Ms. FERRERO-WALDNER (Austria) said that the recent terrorist attacks against the United States had been cowardly acts directed against all the peace-loving people and countries of the world. She extended her country's sympathy to the people of the United States, the victims and their families and friends. The tragedy was a vivid reminder of the responsibility all countries bore in trying to ensure a peaceful existence for human beings everywhere and prevent similar outrageous acts in the future. In the context of the Agency's work, that meant enhancing nuclear safety and preventing nuclear proliferation. She appealed to all Member States to maximize the safety of their nuclear installations, and to the Agency to exercise its supervisory capacity in that regard.
2. It was imperative that maximum levels of nuclear safety be maintained in all phases of the nuclear fuel cycle throughout the world. She welcomed the comprehensive reports the Secretariat had provided at the Board's meetings during the preceding week on the actions taken since the previous General Conference to address safety issues in Member States. Austria appreciated the Agency's intensive efforts to enhance nuclear safety, in particular by elaborating nuclear safety standards and providing safety services to Member States to facilitate their application, and by promoting good international safety practices.
3. The focus on increasing the safety of nuclear research reactors was particularly welcome. It was cause for concern that the Agency had no information about the condition of the vast majority of the 651 research reactors worldwide. Furthermore, over half the 284 operational research reactors were more than 30 years old and Agency missions had revealed that many had significant safety problems. Austria thus fully endorsed the Board's decision that the Secretariat should develop and implement, in conjunction with Member States, an international research reactor safety enhancement plan. It also looked forward to the formulation of a legally binding instrument on the safety of nuclear research reactors, notably through the addition of a protocol to the Convention on Nuclear Safety. A first, welcome step in that direction would be to develop a code of conduct for research reactors.
4. As one of the 26 countries which had adhered to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, Austria welcomed its entry into force and noted with satisfaction that all of its neighbours which used nuclear energy had joined that Convention. Her country was also currently finalizing its national report on implementation of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, in preparation for the second review meeting of the Contracting Parties.
5. She welcomed the agreement reached by the European Union with countries which were candidates for joining it regarding the closure of nuclear power plants which could not be upgraded to comply with prevailing practice in the Union. Austria was particularly concerned over the Temelin nuclear power plant and welcomed the initiative of the European Parliament to investigate an exit scenario for the plant, and the suggestion that the European Commission host a conference on the matter. The example of Temelin demonstrated that, when constructing a nuclear power plant, all costs had to be evaluated, especially environmental

costs. Her country also attached the utmost importance to the promotion and conclusion of the Melk process.

6. Turning to the role of nuclear power in the sustainable development debate, she noted that the outcome of the recent Sixth Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, where it had been agreed that industrialized States should refrain from using emission reduction units generated from nuclear facilities to meet their commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, had endorsed her country's long held view that nuclear power was not compatible with the concept of sustainable development. The latter, if fully applied to the energy sector, would require substantial increases in energy efficiency and savings and a switch to renewable energy sources. In any thorough discussion of the role of nuclear power, aspects such as the participation of civil society in decision making, possible radiological impacts on the public, and the capital requirements for nuclear strategies needed to be taken into account.

7. Austria welcomed the gradual development and implementation of the integrated safeguards system, which would allow the Agency to draw well-founded conclusions not only about non-diversion of declared nuclear material but also about the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. Since the system's development was dependent on the experience gained in its implementation, it was important that a large number of additional protocols be in place. Regrettably, only some 50 countries had signed additional protocols to date, and even fewer had brought them into force. Austria had recently ratified its additional protocol and had informed the European Commission accordingly. She commended the Japanese Government's efforts to foster adherence to additional protocols, and encouraged the Agency to organize similar activities along the lines of the international symposium for the Asia and Pacific region held in Tokyo earlier in the year. In the context of the preparatory meetings for the 2005 NPT Review Conference, her country would be interested in hearing other Member States' views as to whether the conclusion of additional protocols was merely an option or whether it constituted a legal obligation deriving directly from Article III(1) of the NPT.

8. It was disappointing that the Conference on Disarmament had still not been able to open negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. Austria attached high importance to such a treaty and was convinced that its verification aspect would profit enormously from the Agency's vast experience in the verification of nuclear material and activities.

9. She noted the progress that had been achieved over the preceding year with respect to security of nuclear and other radioactive material and, in particular, combating of illicit trafficking. Her country continued to support the Agency's activities in that field and she commended the role it had played in the organization of the Conference on Security of Material held in Stockholm earlier in the year. Austria had completed a three-year pilot study on practical testing of border monitoring systems at the end of 2000.

10. The Agency's work on the possible revision of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was also commendable. The expert group which had examined that issue had concluded that there was a clear need to strengthen the international physical protection regime, prompting the Director General to invite a group of legal and

technical experts to draft an amendment to strengthen the Convention. Her country hoped that that would lead to the holding of a diplomatic conference to revise the Convention.

11. Austria subscribed fully to the goals of technical co-operation. Activities in that area formed part of the obligations deriving from Article IV of the NPT. Her country supported, and would continue to support the Agency's technical co-operation activities in the field of non-power applications of nuclear energy, and had always been scrupulous in meeting its financial obligations in that regard.

12. With regard to the Agency's budget for 2002, a solution needed to be found to the problem of the increased costs which would arise initially from the implementation of new safeguards measures under additional protocols and from the development of the integrated safeguards system. Any solution considered should not disrupt the delicate balance between the different pillars of the Agency's work.

13. In conclusion, she thanked the Director General and his staff for the great efforts they had made over the preceding 12 months to live up to the high expectations of Member States. The Agency could count on Austria's continuing support for the coming year.

14. Mr. SHOUKRY (Egypt) offered his country's condolences to the United States for the victims of the dreadful events in New York and Washington, and to those other States whose citizens had lost their lives. President Mubarak had written to President Bush expressing his solidarity with the people of the United States in the face of those disgraceful terrorist acts which the Egyptian Government strongly condemned.

15. His country supported the growth in the Agency's activities and was therefore deeply concerned at the problems faced by the organization in 2000 in providing the necessary budgetary resources for many new activities within its core areas of competence. Those difficulties had been overcome thanks to the flexibility shown by a number of Member States, in particular the Group of 77 and China. In future, the Agency's budget should be viewed from an objective and practical perspective, based on priorities set by Member States and on the Statute. The former should demonstrate their commitment and not impose artificial restrictions on budgetary resources, hindering the Agency from carrying out its functions.

16. It was particularly important to maintain a balance between the Agency's different statutory activities, both in allocating funding and in deciding on areas of activity. That essential principle had been reaffirmed repeatedly in General Conference resolutions, and any attempt to detract therefrom would have harmful consequences for the organization's future and would dissuade many Member States from serious participation in its activities.

17. Since the Agency's inception, Egypt had co-operated with it closely, developing the scientific and practical skills of its manpower through the Agency's various training programmes and utilizing technical co-operation programmes to meet its socio-economic development requirements. The technical co-operation programme included a number of projects in Egypt in a variety of fields. His country was particularly grateful that the Department of Technical Co-operation had agreed to include a project on fruit fly control in

the current programme. The Agency seminar on small- and medium-sized reactors, held in Cairo in May 2001, had also yielded notably positive results.

18. Egypt made available its expertise and its facilities and laboratories to States in the region. It took an active part in the work of the Arab Atomic Energy Agency, hosting many of the events organized by the latter and providing training in topics of interest to Arab States in the fields of nuclear safety, safe transport of radioactive material, radiation monitoring and seawater desalination. In the African region, it had hosted seminars and workshops under AFRA during 2000-2001 and had supported a variety of Agency projects.

19. His country had a long-standing interest in nuclear non-proliferation issues and attached high priority to universal application of Agency comprehensive safeguards. There had been unanimous agreement at the 2000 NPT Review Conference of May 2000 on the importance of that objective. Egypt was surprised at the contradictory positions adopted by some influential States active in the non-proliferation field. The efforts of those States to deal with instances of failure to comply with internationally established principles in that area consequently lacked credibility and smacked of double standards. It was to be hoped that other members of the international community would take a clearly defined approach in non-proliferation matters and not defend principles in one forum and oppose them in another. Such behaviour undermined the non-proliferation regime.

20. Since signing the NPT in 1968, Egypt had undertaken a number of initiatives to eliminate the nuclear danger in the world in general and in the Middle East in particular. In 1974, it had called for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, an initiative which had been endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly on several occasions. In April 1990, President Mubarak had called for the establishment of a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. His country favoured the application of comprehensive safeguards to all nuclear installations in the Middle East without discrimination, the desirability of which had also been recognized by the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

21. Despite all efforts to achieve equal and mutual security for all States in the region, and the flexibility shown by Egypt in trying to understand the viewpoints of all the parties concerned and reach acceptable compromises, Israel continued to procrastinate and obstruct all efforts aimed at preventing nuclear proliferation and improving security in the region. Nevertheless, his country was determined to continue its efforts to achieve universal application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East.

22. The Agency's efforts to improve the effectiveness of its technical co-operation programmes were commendable, in particular such steps as early consultation with Member States on the details of projects to be submitted and greater co-ordination between the Secretariat and those responsible for projects. Technical co-operation activities were an essential part of the Agency's work and it was important that the funding for them was predictable. Though contributions to the TCF were voluntary, States should not take advantage of that fact to evade their obligations, particularly since all States were involved in setting the target for the Fund.



23. In conclusion, he pledged his country's continuing support for the Agency and its activities.

24. Ms. BONIVER (Italy), said that the horrible attacks on thousands of innocent people which had taken place in the preceding week deserved the strongest condemnation from all countries and she offered her sincere condolences to the people of the United States.

25. The current year marked the hundredth anniversary of the birth of Enrico Fermi, whose work had paved the way for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. To mark that fact, an international conference was being planned in Pisa which could prove a fruitful occasion to consider the viability of the nuclear option to meet world energy needs.

26. The NPT was the cornerstone of the existing non-proliferation regime, and the Agency had a fundamental role to play in implementing the Treaty. The review and strengthening of the non-proliferation regime were crucial to peace and stability and Italy therefore looked forward to the entry into force of the CTBT and supported the early establishment of the related verification regime. It also welcomed the efforts to manage and dispose of excess stocks of weapons-grade plutonium pursuant to the agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation.

27. The strengthening of the Agency's safeguards system and the signing of additional protocols to safeguards agreements should enable the Agency to provide credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities. In the coming months, Italy expected to complete the process of ratifying its additional protocol. It accorded special attention to the implementation of its safeguards agreement, and representatives of its national authorities participated regularly in the EURATOM and Agency inspections carried out at its nuclear installations.

28. In view of the importance of the universality of the NPT, her country was deeply concerned at the Agency's continuing inability to verify the correctness and completeness of the DPRK's initial declaration of nuclear material. She urged the DPRK to preserve and make available to the Agency all the information required for verification of its initial inventory, and commended the Agency on the efforts it had undertaken to monitor the freeze on the DPRK's nuclear facilities pursuant to the Agreed Framework. She also called upon Iraq to allow the Agency to implement its mandate under Security Council resolution 687 and related resolutions.

29. In response to the potential danger of illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material, Italy had recently enhanced the effectiveness of its national monitoring network. The International Conference on Security of Material, held in Stockholm earlier in the year, had addressed ways and means of preventing and intercepting illicit uses of nuclear material and radioactive sources at international level. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material could also play a major role in combating illicit trafficking, provided its limitations were seriously taken into consideration. Her Government favoured an integrated approach to the problem based on the following three measures: firstly, the adoption of a resolution at the current session of the General Conference welcoming the endorsement by the

Board of the physical protection objectives and fundamental principles referred to in document GC(45)/INF/14; secondly, the development and adoption of the security fundamentals contained in document INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (corrected); and thirdly, the revision of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, expanding its scope and incorporating the fundamental principles.

30. Italy attached enormous importance to nuclear safety and the safe management of radioactive waste. In 2000, it had set up a working group on nuclear waste charged with reporting on research and studies in Italy on the siting of a national radioactive waste repository, measures to optimize provision of information to the public and levels of collaboration with local authorities and the population, and procedures to be followed in selecting a final disposal site. Her country also assigned great importance to the Agency's efforts to revise the Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material and welcomed the recent entry into force of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, which was essential to achieving and maintaining high safety levels worldwide and which Italy was committed to ratifying as early as possible. With regard to the problem of scrap containing radioactive sources or carrying radioactive contamination, detection systems had been installed at the Italian borders and at the entrances of facilities processing scrap in order to reduce the risk of radioactive contamination.

31. The Agency's technical co-operation programme helped promote national investment by recipient countries in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The possibility of partnerships with other development organizations in the technical co-operation context should be further pursued, and the Agency's efforts to situate its technical co-operation programme within the context of UNDAF and the poverty reduction strategies of the United Nations was welcome. On the one hand, the aim should be to design a programme with fewer but better projects. On the other hand, to persuade Member States to provide the necessary human resources and financial input to achieve project objectives the programme would need to be reshaped in order to increase efficiency and reduce delivery costs. Any question of the provision of permanent additional resources would also be dependent on those factors.

32. She commended the Secretariat on the initiatives it had undertaken to implement the Medium Term Strategy. Member States and the Secretariat needed to join forces to identify priorities in order to reconcile a zero-real-growth budget with the activities requested and the Agency's statutory obligations. Results-based budgeting offered a means of resolving the problem of restoring the balance between the Agency's mandatory and development activities. Prioritizing activities involved political choices which had to be made by Member States. However, the Agency could not remain neutral since it was in a position to provide Member States with useful guidance as they made those political choices, as in the past.

33. The current budgetary situation of the Agency required new approaches and solutions. The level of extrabudgetary funding had increased to 15% of the total funds required for the 2002-2003 Regular Budget. Moreover, safeguards activities were becoming more and more reliant on extrabudgetary resources, which could weaken the effectiveness of the safeguards

system. Member States should make every effort to provide the Agency with adequate and reliable resources.

34. As the fifth largest contributor to the Agency's budget, and one which consistently honoured its financial obligations, Italy trusted that its political and financial commitment to the organization would be matched by an appropriate effort on the part of the Secretariat to recruit senior staff members from under-represented Member States of which it was a notable example.

35. In conclusion, she reaffirmed her country's support for the Agency's activities in the fields of nuclear safety, nuclear verification and technical co-operation.

#### ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONFERENCE

##### (a) ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA AND ALLOCATION OF ITEMS FOR INITIAL DISCUSSION

36. The PRESIDENT said that the General Committee had recommended that the agenda for the current session consist of all the items on the provisional agenda set forth in document GC(45)/1. With regard to the allocation of items for initial discussion, the Committee had recommended that all the items listed in document GC(45)/1 be taken up for discussion as indicated in that document. It had also recommended that the order of items proposed in document GC(45)/1 be maintained.

37. The General Committee's recommendations regarding the agenda for the current session were accepted.

##### (b) CLOSING DATE OF THE SESSION AND OPENING DATE OF THE NEXT SESSION

38. The PRESIDENT said that the General Committee had recommended that the Conference set Friday, 21 September, as the closing date of the forty-fifth regular session and Monday, 16 September 2002, as the opening date of the forty-sixth regular session, which would be held in Vienna.

39. The Committee's recommendation was accepted.

#### REQUESTS FOR THE RESTORATION OF VOTING RIGHTS

40. The PRESIDENT said that the General Committee, which had had before it requests from Iraq and Kazakhstan for the restoration of their voting rights pursuant to Article XIX.A of the Statute, had postponed consideration of Iraq's request. With regard to Kazakhstan's request, the Committee had recommended that that State be permitted to vote during the current session of the Conference in view of its adherence to the payment plan it had agreed with the Agency, and that its voting rights be restored until the end of its payment plan on the understanding that the Secretariat would report annually on the status of that plan.

41. The Committee's recommendation was accepted.

GENERAL DEBATE AND THE ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2000 (resumed)  
(GC(45)/4)

42. Mr. NOVITSKY (Belarus) offered condolences to the relatives of the victims of the recent terrorist attacks in the United States. That terrible tragedy was proof of the need for the whole international community to unite in the fight against terrorism.

43. One of the many pressing problems facing mankind was climate change caused by greenhouse gas emissions. Belarus advocated the use of all available energy generation technologies to meet future energy requirements. Many States were planning to develop, or were already developing nuclear power programmes. However, the future of nuclear power depended to a great extent on the successful development of new-generation, enhanced-safety, proliferation-resistant and economically competitive reactors and fuel cycles. Belarus therefore set great store by INPRO, which should open up new opportunities in nuclear power technology. It was studying the possibility of setting up its own nuclear power programme; however, a decision would only be taken after careful scientific and economic analysis and a national referendum on the subject. In the meantime, it recognized the important contribution non-power applications of nuclear technology continued to make to sustainable development and considered that further work should be done to publicize the comparative advantages of nuclear technologies.

44. Belarus had demonstrated its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation by voluntarily renouncing nuclear weapons, signing the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State, and concluding a safeguards agreement with the Agency. It had also been one of the first States to sign the CTBT and had already ratified that Treaty. His country was committed to strengthening the international security regime, inter alia through the United Nations, and urged other countries to support its election to the Security Council.

45. Improving radiation safety was a major challenge for all States. Agency documentation on that subject should address the need to account not only for lost radiation sources, but also for located orphan sources at international level. International undertakings by States to co-operate on matters relating to the safety and security of radiation sources, including identification of the owners of lost sources, return of such sources to their country of origin, and information exchange, would facilitate the wider application of the Basic Safety Standards.

46. His country attached great importance to strengthening of the international physical protection regime and called upon all Member States to accede to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. It also welcomed the conclusions of the informal open-ended expert meeting which had been convened to discuss the possible revision of the Convention. The Agency should broaden the scope of its activities aimed at combating illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive material and continue its training and infrastructure-related activities. Belarus was also interested in participating in the programme

for return of spent fuel from research reactors which was being discussed in connection with the Trilateral Initiative.

47. For the past 15 years, Belarus had been suffering from the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster: over 6000 km<sup>2</sup> of land, or 23% of its territory, could no longer be put to productive use because of radionuclide contamination, including almost 3000 km<sup>2</sup> of agricultural land; the health situation of people living in the affected areas had deteriorated; and there had been an unprecedented rise in the incidence of thyroid disease among children. The country did not have the means to cope with the problems stemming from the Chernobyl accident and was therefore grateful for the assistance it had received from the Agency. It also welcomed the proposal for an international forum on the consequences of Chernobyl. Belarus was also actively involved in the Agency's technical co-operation programme, in particular in projects aimed at mitigating the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster, one example of which was the project on production of oil from rapeseed grown on contaminated land.

48. Mr. HASSAN (Sudan) said that his country strongly condemned terrorism and violence and offered its sincere condolences to the people and Government of the United States of America, and to the families of the victims of the recent terrorist attacks. He called upon the international community to join forces to rid the world of the threat of terrorism.

49. The Agency's work in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was commendable, and Sudan also fully supported its efforts to eliminate the risks resulting from the peaceful use of nuclear energy via international agreements in that field. In that connection, he stressed the urgent need to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. That objective could only be attained through a comprehensive treaty which was binding on all parties.

50. Unfortunately however, Israel still refused to sign the NPT. He called upon the international community to reject double standards and condemn the barbaric Israeli practices in the occupied Palestinian territories. In particular, the Agency, together with the international community, should investigate the use by Israel of depleted uranium against peaceful demonstrations by Palestinians.

51. The Agency's efforts to achieve greater transparency and the more active participation by Member States in the various stages of project programming and evaluation under the technical co-operation programme were commendable, as was the emphasis on TCDC and support for less developed countries. Technical co-operation constituted an integral part of the Agency's activities pursuant to the Statute and an obligation under the NPT. It was thus important to strengthen financing thereof, and he urged Member States and donors worldwide to be generous in their pledges to the TCF.

52. The technical co-operation programme had made an outstanding contribution to improving the capabilities of developing countries in the fields of medicine, health, industry, water resources, energy, the environment, and nuclear and radiological safety. The civil war in Sudan had impeded implementation of the Agency programme on eradication of the tsetse fly using the SIT in the south of the country. The Sudanese Government was willing to

initiate a ceasefire to allow the Agency to implement its tsetse control activities. He hoped that the international community would exercise pressure on the rebels to bring about the ceasefire. He appealed to donors to support the Agency's efforts to apply the SIT to the eradication of malaria-transmitting mosquitoes. Moreover, as the problem of water shortages became progressively more acute, it was important that the Agency continued and expanded its activities on the production of potable water economically and on use of isotope hydrology for water resource management. Finally, he commended the Agency and Member States on the success of projects implemented in the African region and called upon donors to support the AFRA programme.

53. It was important that Member States supported the efforts to promote co-operation and co-ordination among the parties to nuclear and radiation safety conventions. There was also a need to elaborate legislation in that area and provide for adequate capacity-building. Sudan was making every effort to ratify agreements it had entered into in the context of the Agency. In that connection, he announced that his country had recently accepted the amendment to Article VI of the Agency's Statute, and he urged other Member States to do likewise.

54. Mr. STASHEVSKY (Ukraine) offered condolences to the United States of America in connection with the recent terrorist attacks in that country. Bitter lessons had to be learned from those events. In particular, any efforts in the fields of nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear safety and environmental protection would have to take account of the need to combat terrorism.

55. Ukraine continued to make considerable use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Nuclear power, alongside thermal power plants, would form the basis of the electricity generation sector of the country for the foreseeable future, hence the importance of taking appropriate measures to extend the operating life of nuclear power plants. Agency assistance with research, technology transfer and exchange of experience was seen as a highly important aspect of international co-operation in the nuclear field. There was also significant potential for growth in the use of nuclear energy in industry, agriculture and medicine in the country.

56. Fifteen years previously, Ukraine had battled to protect the world from the dangers of the greatest man-made disaster of the twentieth century, the Chernobyl accident. It had paid a high price in that battle, and would continue to do so for a long time to come. In keeping with its international obligations, on 15 December 2000 it had shut down the last reactor still in service in Chernobyl. Unfortunately, it continued to bear the brunt of the problems caused by the accident alone. The shutting down of Unit 3 had actually exacerbated the unresolved problems. An adequate infrastructure still needed to be put in place for the safe decommissioning of the plant, and the lost capacity had to be replaced. In particular, the large quantities of radioactive waste which would be generated during the decommissioning process would have to be disposed of. His Government was grateful for the assistance it was receiving from the European Union and the G-7 countries, in particular the United States, with those problems.

57. Work was under way to make the Shelter ecologically safe. The second phase of the work, to start soon, would entail strengthening the most critical structures, putting an optimum

containment in place, and dealing with other problems related to nuclear and radiation safety and processing of radioactive waste. Progress had been good on the whole, and the EBRD and the countries involved in carrying out the project had made a useful contribution. Finding a replacement for the lost capacity was a major problem. In that connection, he noted that the construction and commissioning of the two new units at the Khmel'nitski and Rovno nuclear power plants would be completed in line with international safety standards. Two new Agency technical co-operation projects were addressing the problems of decommissioning the Chernobyl plant and making the Shelter ecologically safe.

58. Ukraine supported unreservedly the Agency's efforts to strengthen international co-operation on nuclear, radiation, transport and waste safety. In view of the risk to the public, a conceptual and methodological basis needed to be elaborated for regulatory radiation monitoring that took account of the combined effect of radiation from different sources. The Agency should continue to work on that problem with a view to developing and improving international recommendations in the field. In that connection, the experience gathered by Ukraine in decommissioning the Chernobyl plant should be made accessible to experts from Agency Member States.

59. The international community continued to face urgent problems in the nuclear and radiation safety field. Ukraine had learned first-hand the cost of underestimating safety problems. It supported the Agency's efforts to enhance safety levels and, in particular, to implement the Convention on Nuclear Safety. It also welcomed the entry into force of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. Earlier in the year, the President of Ukraine had established by decree an independent State nuclear regulatory body. His country firmly supported the efforts of the international community to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and had rigorously fulfilled its obligations in that regard, notwithstanding the difficult economic situation in the country. He thanked the Agency for its understanding attitude towards his country's problems and the support it had provided. An adequate legislative infrastructure had been put in place for the implementation of Ukraine's safeguards agreement, an SSAC had been set up, and his country was involved in the programme to prevent illicit trafficking. His Government attached particular importance to strengthening the international regime for the physical protection of nuclear material and was in favour of revising the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, in which process it was prepared to play an active part.

60. Within the technical co-operation programme, his country looked forward to ongoing co-operation with the Agency in such areas as extension of the operating life of reactors currently in service, provision of expert support on strategic planning for development of the energy sector, enhancement of the safety of nuclear power plants, decommissioning of nuclear power plants and quality assurance programmes. It was also pleased that Ukrainian nationals were being involved in regional technical co-operation projects.

61. Mr. EYYUBOV (Azerbaijan) extended his country's sympathy to the Government and people of the United States in connection with the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. Azerbaijan condemned terrorism in all its forms. It should be remembered that

uncontrolled access to nuclear material and waste constituted a potential terrorist risk to the international community.

62. International co-operation on control of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, radiation safety and other related matters was one of Azerbaijan's priorities, given its strategic geographical location. It fully supported the principle of universal nuclear disarmament and was determined to play an active role in ensuring full compliance with the international nuclear safety regime.

63. In 1997, Azerbaijan's President had called for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Southern Caucasus. Regrettably that initiative had not been carried through owing to the occupation of 20% of Azerbaijan's territory by its neighbour, Armenia. As a result, a significant proportion of the country's frontiers were no longer under Government control, which greatly increased the risk of illicit trafficking in radioactive material, thereby jeopardizing the security of the whole region. A further concern was the restart of nuclear power plants whose technology was obsolete.

64. Although Azerbaijan had no uranium mines, enrichment plants, nuclear power plants, military bases with nuclear weapons or testing grounds, the problem of dealing with radiation sources and radioactive waste had always been a pressing concern. Man's interference in the environment, together with global and regional climatic changes, was having serious, sometimes disastrous and possibly irreversible consequences for the ecosystem and the local population. A comprehensive programme to detect and dispose of radiation sources and radioactive contamination of human origin on the Apsheron Peninsula had confirmed fears. His country was counting on Agency assistance to carry out detailed radiation monitoring of the contaminated areas. Given the many different sources of radioactive waste and the serious radiation situation in many parts of the country, the problem of economically containing that waste required urgent attention.

65. In view of Azerbaijan's geopolitical situation, strict border controls were necessary to curb any attempts at the illegal trafficking of nuclear material and radiation sources through the country. In recent years, vigorous efforts had been made to provide equipment and training for border guards, customs officials and medical staff; however, those measures could not have full effect while a sizeable part of Azerbaijan's territory and frontiers remained under the control of a foreign occupying power.

66. His country was elaborating legislation on radiation safety. Laws prohibiting the import of nuclear and radioactive waste into the country had already been passed. With the Agency's assistance, legislation on accounting and control of nuclear and radioactive material had been harmonized. Training was being provided to local specialists through short courses and seminars organized by the Agency, but more assistance was required in that area, in particular for the introduction of new techniques. Another pressing task was the complete centralized inventorying and certification of all ionizing radiation sources, radioisotope equipment and other items belonging to public and private entities. It was also important to promote greater awareness of environmental issues among specialized staff and the public at large.



67. Mr. OTHMAN (Syrian Arab Republic) extended his country's sympathy to the people of the United States and the innocent victims of the recent terrorist attacks. It was imperative that the international community join forces to combat terrorism.

68. For almost a year, the Middle East had been witnessing a serious escalation in the hostilities against Palestinians by Israel. The Israeli war machine attacked children, women, the elderly and the disabled, and destroyed the homes of Palestinian families, giving no heed to international conventions and charters. Furthermore, Israel was proceeding unscrupulously to build new settlements on occupied Palestinian territories. Successive Israeli governments had failed to respect agreements concluded with their predecessors, they had adopted racist practices and had obstructed efforts to reach a permanent solution to the conflict in the region. Israel had even gone as far as to exploit the recent terrorist attacks in the United States to justify the perpetuation of its own terrorist campaign against Palestinians.

69. His country still believed that a peace that preserved the rights and dignity of all parties was possible. For four consecutive years, the agenda of the General Conference had included an item on Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat. It was time that due attention was paid to that issue, the main aim being to achieve implementation of Security Council resolution 487 (1981) which called upon Israel to place its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards. The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would remain impossible unless Israel agreed to join the NPT and subject its facilities to safeguards. All States in the Middle East with the exception of Israel had signed and ratified the NPT and had concluded safeguards agreements.

70. The 2000 NPT Review Conference had confirmed the importance of that issue and the role the Agency was called upon to play in it. Israel's possession of nuclear weapons constituted a clear threat to world peace and security, quite apart from the risk posed by its unmonitored storage of nuclear material and waste. It was unacceptable that one State should enjoy exceptional treatment at the expense of others. He therefore appealed to the international community to place pressure on Israel to subject its mysterious nuclear activities to Agency safeguards.

71. The Director General's report on the application of safeguards in the Middle East, which was contained in document GC(45)/19, indicated that the activities of the multilateral working group on arms control and regional security had been halted since 1994. Israel's refusal to abide by its commitments had blocked the peace process and threatened to explode it. Peace could not be attained without confidence-building, transparency and the necessary political will. One blatant example of double standards was that successive resolutions on the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East had failed to indicate explicitly that Israel was the only State in the region that had not yet joined the NPT.

72. There was an urgent need to raise the level of the TCF in order to ensure that assistance could be provided to the increasing number of developing Member States. Projects implemented using TCF resources helped developing countries meet their development needs through nuclear technology transfer, and such assistance should not be limited by unnecessary constraints. There was a need to review the Agency's technical co-operation strategy in close

collaboration with Member States, in particular recipient Member States, with a view to realistically evaluating that strategy.

73. In the preceding year, a group of West Asian countries had submitted a proposal to the Agency for a regional co-operation agreement. Following intensive consultations with the Secretariat, the text of an agreement had been elaborated and he hoped that it would soon be endorsed.

74. The Syrian Atomic Energy Commission, in collaboration with the Agency, had organized a one-year graduate diploma course in radiation protection in Arabic from which the first batch of students had graduated in the preceding year. It had also organized field training and training courses for technicians from West Asian countries on a variety of topics. His country appreciated the existing co-operation between the Agency and the Syrian Atomic Energy Commission and was eager to expand it with a view to strengthening nuclear technology development and transfer activities in Arab Member States.

75. Mr. COLOMBANI (France) offered condolences to the people of the United States and the relatives of the victims in connection with the recent terrorist attacks. France had consistently condemned all acts of terrorism.

76. The NPT was the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, of which the Agency safeguards system was an essential instrument. Two priorities had emerged from the 2000 NPT Review Conference: the need to continue working towards achieving the entry into force of the CTBT and also to open negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. He urged the members of the Conference on Disarmament to overcome their differences and open negotiations without delay. He also appealed to all States which had yet to sign or ratify the CTBT, especially those States whose ratification was a prerequisite for the entry into force of the Treaty, to do so at an early date, expressing the hope that real progress would have been made in that regard by the next NPT Review Conference.

77. To be fully effective, Agency safeguards agreements had to be universal. To date, over 50 States which were party to the NPT had yet to comply with their obligation under Article III to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency; he called upon them to do so without delay, and to sign and implement an additional protocol. In France, the parliamentary procedure for ratification of its additional protocol was under way and should be concluded soon. In countries where an additional protocol was in force, the Secretariat would be in a position to apply integrated safeguards, which was the optimum situation from the standpoint of effectiveness and cost. France actively and strongly supported the Agency's efforts to design and implement the new system.

78. The situation in Iraq remained a matter of concern. Since 16 December 1998, the Agency had not been in a position to conduct activities pursuant to the Security Council resolutions pertaining to Iraq, and it thus could not provide any assurance as to that country's compliance with its obligations. France appreciated the efforts of the Director General and the Action Team to implement the resolutions and maintain the Agency's operational

capability. It also noted that, in January 2001, the Agency had satisfactorily verified the physical inventory of nuclear material pursuant to Iraq's safeguards agreement. However, that could not be a substitute for the activities the Agency was called upon to perform under Security Council resolutions. He therefore called on Iraq to implement all Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1284, and to co-operate fully with the Agency, in particular by granting it the access required for it to carry out its mandate.

79. The Agency had made some limited progress in preparing the activities needed to verify the correctness and completeness of the DPRK's initial declaration. Nevertheless, France deplored the DPRK's continuing failure to comply with the obligations it had entered into by acceding to the NPT, and it urged the DPRK authorities to allow the Agency to carry out its mission, and to respond positively to the Agency's recent technical proposals and initiate the co-operation that would lead to the verification of its initial declaration.

80. France had been an active participant to the work of the group of experts convened to discuss whether there was a need to revise the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. While it felt that the group had found no compelling reason for revising the Convention, it had noted with interest the results of that exercise, in particular the drafting of physical protection objectives and fundamental principles which provided the conceptual framework needed for defining any physical protection policy or measure.

81. While the primary objective of the Agency's verification activities was nuclear non-proliferation, those activities were also crucial to the dissemination of knowledge and to the development of peaceful nuclear applications. France had always been a strong supporter of the Agency's technical co-operation activities. In addition to making a substantial contribution to the TCF and participating in several footnote-a/ projects, it provided services and experts to the Agency and recipient countries and hosted many trainees.

82. The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, had entered into force on 18 June 2001. France intended to meet its commitments scrupulously and to participate as actively as possible in the implementation of the Convention, in particular the review meetings. Attracting the largest possible number of parties to the Convention would bolster the international community's confidence in the quality and safety of management of the back-end of the fuel cycle in signatory countries. He therefore called upon all States which had not yet signed or ratified the Convention to do so as soon as possible so that the co-operation mechanisms provided for in the Convention could be put in place by 2002.

83. In the preceding year, WENRA had issued a report giving a comprehensive evaluation of the nuclear safety situation in countries which were candidates for European Union membership. The conclusions drawn in that document, and the progress it revealed with regard to harmonization of nuclear safety in Europe, were encouraging. France remained committed, in particular within the context of the G-7, to the objective of enhancing safety standards in Eastern Europe. That task was a long-term process, but one that had to be pursued with determination as the credibility of all nuclear activities was at stake. Finally, it should be stressed that the independence of safety authorities was of prime importance.

84. The preparation of the Agency's budget for 2002-2003 had highlighted the growing difficulty of striking a balance between the resources available to the Secretariat and the expenditure required to accomplish its tasks. He commended the efforts the Director General and the Secretariat had made to ensure better control of expenditure, and encouraged them to continue those efforts and look for further productivity gains and management savings wherever possible. Although his country supported the principle of cost neutrality in real terms, the Agency had to be able to carry out its statutory tasks, and Member States had to respond to that need in the interest of both international peace and security and the development of international co-operation for the safe and peaceful use of nuclear energy.

85. Nuclear power was currently showing clear signs of renewed vitality in countries which had chosen it as an energy source to ensure sustainable development of their economies. One consideration which had prompted a reappraisal of nuclear power's role in energy strategies had been concern over security of energy supplies. In November 2000, the European Commission, faced with the prospect of worsening energy dependency in the coming 20 years, had published a Green Paper entitled "Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply" which acknowledged the importance of nuclear power as a domestic source of electricity, its competitiveness and its continuing role in an expanded European Union over the coming 30 years.

86. The concept of energy security had always been central to France's energy strategy. By building 58 nuclear reactors which produced 76-78% of its electricity, his country had doubled its level of energy independence over a quarter of a century despite having no fossil fuel resources.

87. Other, environmental concerns had emerged in addition to the question of energy supply constraints, in particular the problem of global warming. In that context, the merits of nuclear power as an energy source which generated no greenhouse gases were indisputable. The European Commission's Green Paper also took that point into consideration and recognized that, without nuclear power, abiding by the commitments undertaken by the European Union in Kyoto would be a major challenge. Many Governments had emphasized the extraordinary asset nuclear power represented in the struggle to reduce greenhouse emissions.

88. At the same time, much thought had been devoted to the competitiveness of the nuclear option. A French report which had confirmed the competitiveness of nuclear power in France had been followed by other studies. Encouraged by the reappraisal of nuclear power, France had pursued its research work in the field, in particular within the framework of international co-operation. The Generation IV initiative, in which France was taking part, should make nuclear power even more competitive and safe, reducing waste levels and improving proliferation resistance. His country was also following closely the INPRO initiative and hoped that it would complement Generation IV. Research of that kind was indispensable to improve the acceptability of nuclear power.

89. In France, the past year had been a time of reorganization with a view to improving efficiency in research and safety, and building a first-rate industrial base. The Commissariat à l'énergie atomique had structured its research and development activities around major

themes. One related to the nuclear field and aimed at providing the scientific and technological support required to enhance competitiveness and safety, and at preparing for the future by pressing on with research on waste and future nuclear systems; a second related to fundamental research and focused on material and life sciences, placing special emphasis on the biological effects of ionizing radiation which was an issue that had a crucial impact on nuclear energy's public image; a third related to technology and defence.

90. As part of the ongoing reorganization in the field of nuclear safety and radiation protection, a new single radiation protection and nuclear safety research institute had been set up by merging two separate institutes. Moreover, in July 2000 the Government had introduced a draft law on transparency and security in the nuclear industry aimed at increasing public access to information in order to encourage constructive dialogue between the industry, the public authorities and civil society. Much progress had been made in the nuclear safety area in 2000, notably in the fields of radiation protection and environmental impact, and transparency of nuclear activities. However, the French authorities and plant operators would continue their efforts in that direction and remain vigilant, especially with regard to discharges into the environment and the role of the human factor in safety.

91. A major reorganization was currently under way in the French nuclear industry. On 3 September, a decision had been taken to combine CEA Industrie, COGEMA and FRAMATOME SA into one industrial group to be called AREVA. Its activities would be divided into two main areas: nuclear technologies and services, and information and communication technologies. It would combine all aspects of the French nuclear industry, from the fuel cycle to site clean-up and decommissioning, from engineering services to reactors and fuel, thus optimizing synergies between the different parts of the nuclear industry so as to offer better service to electricity utilities. The reorganization would also give AREVA enormous innovation capabilities in the research and development field. With a staff of 45 000 its turnover would be 10 000 million euros, three quarters of which would be in nuclear technology activities.

92. Ms. MÖLLER (Germany) offered condolences to the Government and the people of the United States of America in connection with the horrible and tragic events of the preceding week which had claimed so many lives and caused so much suffering and destruction.

93. The German Government's new policy of phasing out nuclear energy had made an important step forward over the preceding year. A text negotiated with four major utility companies had been signed in June 2001 on the basis of which the Government had introduced a bill amending key provisions of the Atomic Energy Act. The goal was to end promotion of nuclear energy and terminate, in an orderly fashion, the industrial use of nuclear energy for electricity production. The bill had been prepared in co-operation with the utility companies concerned, and it was expected to be adopted by the end of the year. That new policy would not prevent Germany from remaining an active and constructive member of the Agency.

94. Her country would, of course, continue to co-operate in nuclear research and development projects which contributed to the safe operation of nuclear power plants worldwide, and to promote improvements in the safety and proliferation resistance of nuclear installations and the fuel cycle. It would also continue to support the Agency's programmes in nuclear sciences and applications. The Agency's activities in the fields of food and agriculture, human health and water resources it viewed as being of particular importance, and it was following the Agency's project on demining techniques with particular attention. It was also aware that technical co-operation needed the full backing of all Member States, including through regular payments to the TCF.

95. Germany was committed to making the international non-proliferation system more universal and workable. It had been one of the first countries to meet the internal requirements for the entry into force of the additional protocol negotiated between the Agency and the 13 non-nuclear-weapon States of the European Union and hoped that that instrument would soon enter into force throughout the Union. It invited all Member States which had not yet done so to sign and ratify additional protocols and urged them to support the Department of Safeguards in its efforts to develop the new integrated safeguards system.

96. The Agency's programmes and activities in the field of nuclear safety were of universal importance. Together with other Member States of the European Union, Germany was currently engaged in an intensive dialogue with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe which were candidates for membership of the Union on present and future nuclear safety standards. The Agency's programmes on the safety aspects of WWER and RBMK reactors had been extremely useful in the European Union's enlargement process.

97. The Agency was one of the most important international organizations and deserved the strong support of all countries, irrespective of whether they were committed to nuclear energy or not. The world's safety and security depended on the Agency's effective and efficient work.

98. Mr. WØHLK (Denmark) said that the Danish Government and people had been deeply shocked by the horrible recent tragedy in the United States and wished to express their profound sympathy with the victims and their families.

99. The NPT was the cornerstone of global non-proliferation and an essential foundation for nuclear disarmament. The 2000 NPT Review Conference had clearly reaffirmed those universal principles, and Agency safeguards were a fundamental pillar of the international non-proliferation regime and indispensable for ensuring the implementation of the NPT. Denmark called upon those countries which were not yet party to the Treaty to join it as soon as possible and without conditions.

100. The NPT Review Conference had also endorsed the measures contained in the Model Additional Protocol which, once implemented, should greatly strengthen the safeguards system, placing the Agency in a much better position to detect clandestine nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon States. Denmark was party to the additional protocol signed by the Agency, EURATOM and the 13 non-nuclear-weapon States of the European Union in

September 1998, and it was committed to implementing the new obligations in a concerted move with its European Union partners in 2001; he urged other Member States to sign and implement additional protocols.

101. It remained cause for concern that 53 of the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT had not yet signed even basic safeguards agreements in accordance with their obligations under the Treaty. Although some agreements still pending might relate to States with no significant nuclear activities, it was important for the universality and credibility of the NPT and the safeguards system that all States comply with their obligations.

102. Supplier countries had always recognized their responsibility for ensuring that international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy did not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. That principle was enshrined in the NPT and reflected in the multilateral consultation systems on nuclear export control put into place after the entry into force of the Treaty in 1970. Effective export control was a precondition for fulfilling the commitment contained in the NPT concerning co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Nuclear Suppliers Group had made a very important contribution to the cause of nuclear non-proliferation and Denmark fully endorsed the endeavours to make the measures in the additional protocol a condition for supply, and it was working with others to promote and enhance adherence to the principles that guided the activities of the Group. Deeper understanding and broader knowledge of the above issues would be furthered through continued transparency of supplier arrangements.

103. The Danish Government attached the utmost importance to nuclear safety. Sixteen years earlier, Denmark had decided that nuclear power should not be included in its energy planning. That decision had been based on its assessment that the problems of safety and waste storage remained unsolved, despite the many years that nuclear energy had been in use. Many nuclear power plants operated at unacceptably low levels of safety, and nuclear waste management was still unsatisfactory. In particular, there was no evidence that spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste could be safely managed in the long term. For that reason, nuclear power could not be considered a sustainable source of energy. Denmark belonged to a growing group of countries which could not support nuclear power as an option in the context of sustainable development, and he trusted that that trend would be duly recognized by the Agency and its policy-making organs.

104. His country supported the ongoing endeavours to strengthen safety activities and ensure consistency between the Agency's nuclear, radiation and radioactive waste safety activities. The assistance the Agency had provided in that area to the States of Central and Eastern Europe and the newly independent States was of paramount importance. However, his Government remained of the opinion that the only defensible solution for certain reactors operating in Central and Eastern Europe and the newly independent States was to shut them down as soon as possible.

105. Denmark supported the creation of a comprehensive and legally binding safety regime founded on the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and the Convention

on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. It also endorsed the ongoing work on the revision of the latter instrument. The need to strengthen the nuclear liability regime was a matter of concern for the entire international community. The amendment of the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage were steps in the right direction.

106. Turning to the Agency's technical co-operation programme, he said that his country found it disturbing that so much effort was being expended worldwide to extend the use of nuclear power, despite the fact that no sustainable solutions had been found to the problems of safety and waste storage. In his country's view, the Agency's technical assistance activities should not be used for the general promotion of nuclear power, and no resolution should affirm that there was a consensus among Member States to further the application of nuclear power. Programmes should be demand-driven and should contribute to ensuring the highest possible safety standards in those countries which had chosen the nuclear option as part of their energy supply, or to use nuclear technology applications in their efforts to meet their development needs. That applied especially to the least developed countries among the Agency's members. It was on that understanding that Denmark had accepted the target of 73 million dollars for the TCF for 2002 and had already pledged its full share of that target. In conclusion, he urged other Member States also to pledge and pay their assessed share in full.

107. Ms. SHABANGU (South Africa) offered sympathy and condolences to the people of the United States and all countries that had suffered losses in the tragic events of the preceding week.

108. The Annual Report demonstrated the Agency's unflinching commitment to its objectives amid rising tendencies towards unilateralism in the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation field, a development which had the potential of scuttling agreed international treaty regimes and conventions in the nuclear field. The Agency was to be commended for its work in accelerating and enlarging the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world, and it could count on the co-operation and support of her country.

109. For developing countries, technical co-operation was of significant importance for their socio-economic development, and it was important to maintain an adequate balance between technical co-operation and the Agency's other statutory activities. South Africa would continue its efforts to maintain a healthy TCF by pledging and paying its target share and its assessed programme costs in full and on time, in the interests of achieving the rate of attainment set at the preceding session of the General Conference. Some thought should also be given to whether it was appropriate to endorse the judicious application by the Board of the due account principle. Giving preference to those recipients which provided financial support to the technical co-operation programme was appropriate, but such arrangements should be applied in a manner which did not discriminate against those who could not afford to provide such support. The Secretariat could also consider the possibility of gradually reducing the level of assistance provided as the GDP of recipient countries increased. Furthermore, in seeking to reduce the number of projects, due consideration should be given to ensuring that projects which enhanced socio-economic development in developing countries were not



compromised. Concerted efforts were needed to support the Partnership in Development concept and thematic planning. Moreover, some judgement should be exercised in moving towards greater utilization of regional projects.

110. With regard to the Agency's programme and budget for 2002-2003, bolder attempts should be made to minimize reliance on extrabudgetary resources, since such reliance made the Agency vulnerable to sudden decisions to withhold funds and could have a debilitating effect on the implementation of nuclear-related projects meant to advance socio-economic development in the South. The Secretariat should increase efforts to avoid unbalanced expenditure patterns in the context of the Agency's overall statutory obligations. In particular, it should strive to maintain a balance between the safeguards component of the budget and other statutory activities.

111. Demands for energy were rising and would continue to do so in the future, hence the need to consider all energy options seriously. In the preceding year, South Africa had embarked on a feasibility study and an environmental impact assessment of the pebble bed modular reactor. The feasibility study had been completed, the environmental impact assessment was nearing completion, and the evaluation of the safety aspects continued under the auspices of the national nuclear regulatory body which would also handle the licensing of both the demonstration plant and the fuel manufacturing plant. A review panel composed of local and international experts had been assembled to evaluate the detailed feasibility report. It included people who might not necessarily be in favour of the technology, in the interests of ensuring a balanced and objective analysis of the advantages and disadvantages, and that the country embarked upon a sustainable path. South Africa had also initiated a postgraduate course on pebble bed modular reactor technology in order to build capacity in that field. Although the course focused on local needs, it could serve as a foundation for an international training programme on high-temperature reactor technology.

112. In all those activities, the question of safety continued to receive serious attention, thanks to the Agency's guidance and its development of an integrated set of safety standards which sought to address, inter alia, the safety of non-reactor fuel cycle facilities. She commended the Agency's publication of safety standards on pre-disposal management of radioactive waste and regulatory control of radioactive discharges, though much work remained to be done to enhance the culture of safety.

113. More effort needed to be devoted to establishing standards on geological disposal, including more innovative solutions to the problem of radioactive waste management. South Africa would continue to assist in meeting that challenge. It was also trying to find lasting solutions to the problem of regulatory control of naturally occurring radioactive material for which internationally consistent criteria had not been fully developed.

114. Mindful of the scarcity of human capacity in the field of nuclear technology, later in the year South Africa would be hosting a regional postgraduate course on radiation protection. It appreciated the Agency's ongoing support for that programme which aimed at promoting human capacity development and ensuring that nuclear technology was used in a safe and sustainable manner.

115. South Africa was proud to be hosting the 2002 world summit on sustainable development. It was significant that the United Nations General Assembly had decided that that event, whose aim was to assess global change since the historic 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, should be held in a developing country. In Johannesburg, in September 2002, the world would take a critical look back at UNCED and the past ten years with a view to reinvigorating the global commitment to sustainable development. She called upon the Agency to contribute to the summit by highlighting the importance of nuclear power and non-power nuclear applications for global and country-specific sustainable development.

116. In conclusion, she noted that the South African Government had undertaken all the necessary steps to enable it to sign its additional protocol and was in the process of concluding the administrative requirements for it to sign the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.

The meeting rose at 6.00 p.m.