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RECORD OF THE FIRST PLENARY MEETING

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on Monday, 17 September 2001, at 10.00 a.m.

Temporary President: Mr. OTHMAN (Syrian Arab Republic)
President: Mr. GRÖNBERG (Finland)

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[*] GC(45)/1.

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC(45)/INF/17/Rev.2.

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Abbreviations used in this record

Agreed Framework	Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Assistance Convention	Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency
CNN	Cable News Network
COP6	Sixth Session of the Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change
Cordoba Conference	International Conference on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management
CRP	Co-ordinated research programme
CSD-9	Ninth version of the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Early Notification Convention	Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GDP	Gross domestic product
HEU	High-enriched uranium
INIS	International Nuclear Information System
INPRO	International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles
Interpol	International Criminal Police Organization
ITER	International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor
Joint Convention	Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management
KEDO	Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization
Kyoto Protocol	Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
LEU	Low-enriched uranium
LWR	Light-water reactor
MOX	Mixed oxide
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	non-governmental organization
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT Review Conference	Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Nuclear Safety Convention	Convention on Nuclear Safety
NWFZ	Nuclear-weapon-free zone
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OSART	Operational Safety Review Team
R&D	Research and development
SAGSI	Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation
SIT	Sterile insect technique
TCF	Technical Co-operation Fund
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
USDOE (USDE)	United States Department of Energy
WHO	World Health Organization

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OPENING OF THE SESSION

1. The TEMPORARY PRESIDENT declared open the forty-fifth regular session of the General Conference.

2. He recalled that the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his message to staff on the tragic events of the previous week, had stated that those events made the work of the United Nations to promote peace and relieve suffering all the more important. That was certainly true of the work of the Agency. In accordance with Rule 48 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Conference, he invited delegates to observe one minute of silence dedicated to prayer or meditation.

All present rose and stood in silence for one minute.

3. The TEMPORARY PRESIDENT then, as a further mark of respect for the victims and with thoughts for their families and friends, invited the Vienna Boys' Choir to perform two songs.

The Vienna Boys' Choir performed two songs.

4. The TEMPORARY PRESIDENT thanked the Choir on behalf of the Conference for their performance.

5. Speaking on behalf of all participants, as well as on behalf of his own country, the Syrian Arab Republic, he offered his heartfelt condolences to the American people on the loss of innocent victims in the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington.

6. He expressed his gratitude to the Secretariat, the members of the General Committee and to all delegations, whose efforts during the forty-fourth session of the General Conference had greatly contributed to its success.

7. The annual session of the General Conference provided an opportunity for Member States to reaffirm their commitment to the Agency and to its predominant role in the service of prosperity, peace and security. The need for a proper balance between the safeguards system and technical co-operation, which had been highlighted at the previous General Conference, merited attention. The developing countries had accepted the consensus on the gradual abandonment of partial shielding. They hoped that contributions to the TCF would reach the target figure, and that adequate and reliable resources for technical co-operation would continue to be forthcoming.

8. Most developing countries looked to the Agency as the means whereby the transfer of technology could help to attain sustainable development. There was no doubt that plant protection and agricultural improvement were of great importance in combating malnutrition and poverty. Likewise, the medical application of irradiation techniques to diagnose and combat disease was of great importance, and should be expanded and further strengthened.

9. The previous year's General Conference had confirmed the importance of those issues by adopting resolutions designed to achieve the objective laid down in Article II of the Statute, namely to enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity. Since its inception, the Agency had always been a forum for co-operation and for the promotion of understanding between developed and developing nations, and he was sure that it would continue to fulfil that role in the future.

ELECTION OF OFFICERS AND APPOINTMENT OF THE GENERAL COMMITTEE

10. The TEMPORARY PRESIDENT invited nominations for the office of President of the Conference.

11. Mr. KIRWAN (Ireland), speaking on behalf of the Western Europe Group, proposed Mr. Grönberg (Finland) for that position.

12. Mr. Grönberg (Finland) was elected President by acclamation.

13. The TEMPORARY PRESIDENT congratulated Mr. Grönberg on his election and wished him every success in his task.

Mr. Grönberg (Finland) took the Chair.

14. The PRESIDENT thanked all delegations, particularly the members of the Western Europe Group, for the trust they had shown in him by electing him as President. He expressed appreciation to his predecessor, Mr. Othman, for his able guidance of the previous session of the General Conference.

15. The United Nations Millennium Declaration made in September 2000 had highlighted a number of objectives to which the General Assembly had assigned special significance, notably peace, security and disarmament; poverty eradication; and protection of the environment. According to the Annual Report for 2000, the Agency played a modest but important role in the achievement of those objectives. The horrendous act of terrorism which had taken place the previous week further underlined the need for the Agency to play its role in fostering peace and security. He hoped that during the coming five days a spirit of co-operation would prevail, so that the Agency could emerge stronger and more effective and would be able to fulfil its tasks even better in the future.

16. The Member States convened General Conferences annually to give guidance to the Agency's work, and to adopt resolutions and decisions giving the Director General and the Secretariat tasks on various key issues. However, delegates should keep in mind that the burden on the Secretariat resulting from such resolutions should be in proportion to the resources Member States were prepared to give to the Agency.

17. Lastly, he appealed to Members to observe the working practices for General Conferences as agreed in documents GC(XXXIII)/GEN/77 and GC(42)/4.

18. Turning to the election of officers and appointment of the General Committee, he recalled that under Rules 34 and 40 of its Rules of Procedure, the Conference had to elect 8 Vice-Presidents, the Chairperson of the Committee of the Whole, and 5 additional members of the General Committee, resulting, with himself as Chairman, in a Committee of 15. From consultations that had taken place, he understood that there was a consensus on the matter and he therefore proposed that the delegates of China, Ecuador, Germany, Malaysia, the Russian Federation, Sri Lanka, the United States of America and Zimbabwe be elected as Vice-Presidents, that Ms. Hernes (Norway) be elected as Chairperson of the Committee of the Whole and that the delegates of Argentina, Cameroon, the Czech Republic, Kuwait and Lithuania be elected as additional members of the General Committee.

19. The President's proposals were accepted.

20. The PRESIDENT further proposed that, prior to receiving the General Committee's recommendation on the provisional agenda, the General Conference should suspend Rule 42 of its Rules of Procedure and proceed with consideration of items 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8 of its agenda so as not to lose time.

21. The President's proposal was accepted.

APPLICATIONS FOR MEMBERSHIP OF THE AGENCY (GC(45)/2 and 3)

22. The PRESIDENT drew attention to documents GC(45)/2 and 3 containing applications for membership by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Botswana, respectively. Both those applications had been endorsed by the Board, which had also submitted two draft resolutions for adoption by the General Conference.

23. He took it that the Conference wished to adopt both resolutions by acclamation.

24. It was so decided.

25. Mr. TROJANOVIC (Yugoslavia) said his delegation was very pleased to be resuming its membership of the Agency after almost a decade of absence. He thanked all those who had made it possible, thereby contributing to the further development of the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Yugoslavia's policy in the field of nuclear energy had not changed since the Agency's foundation. It had acceded to a large number of conventions and treaties, including the NPT and a safeguards agreement in connection with that Treaty.

26. He pointed out that Yugoslavia had been fulfilling its obligations as a member of the Agency even during the time when it had been prohibited from taking part in many of its activities: thus, safeguards inspections had been carried out even during the difficult period of NATO air strikes, and the Agency's standards regarding the safe use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes had been incorporated into national regulations.

27. His country highly appreciated the assistance given by Agency experts in solving the problem of the spent nuclear fuel ponds of the RA research reactor in the “Vinca” Institute of Nuclear Sciences. It had provided its own financing for the project, which had been successfully completed in collaboration with Russian experts.

28. The programmes currently under way in his country included activities to provide security for the spent nuclear fuel ponds; modernize the RB research reactor at the “Vinca” Institute; permanent storage of low- and medium-level radioactive waste in interim storage at that Institute; further utilize spent cobalt-60 for industrial and medical applications in the Institute’s radiation unit for industrial sterilization; and to update regulations in the field of ionizing radiation and nuclear safety to take account of Agency recommendations and standards. All those programmes were fully in compliance with the Agency’s own long-term programmes, and Yugoslavia was counting on receiving professional and financial support for them from the Agency, particularly since it had not received such support since 1992. His delegation endorsed the Annual Report and the accounts of the Agency for 2000, as well as the proposed programme and budget for 2002-2003, but reiterated its view that resources should chiefly be allocated to the solution of serious problems of nuclear energy development and application in Member States, notably in the field of nuclear safety and protection from ionizing radiation.

29. Mr. PHILLEMONT MOTSU (Botswana) expressed his country’s willingness to carry out the obligations of membership of the Agency and to act in accordance with the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

30. Botswana was particularly interested in the use of the SIT in pest control to combat not only their devastating effect on crop and animal production but also the transmission of diseases that killed both livestock and people. Botswana hoped to collaborate with the Agency in that area when addressing the issues of food security, poverty alleviation and sustainable socio-economic development.

MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

31. Mr. BJORNSSON (Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations) read out the following message:

“I am pleased to convey my warm greetings to all the participants in the forty-fifth regular session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA plays a key role in our collective efforts to achieve the twin goals of peace and development, and has been a catalyst for the development and transfer of peaceful nuclear technologies, as well as assisting the international community in curbing nuclear weapon proliferation.

“Making progress in the areas of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament is more important than ever in the aftermath of last week’s appalling terrorist attack on the United States. The States Party to the NPT agreed last year that this challenge could not be overcome by halfway measures. Indeed, they concluded that “the total elimination of

nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.” Regrettably, several important treaties aimed at nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament or nuclear reductions still await entry into force. It is vitally important for the world community to continue its efforts to implement the commitments already made, and to further identify the ways and means of achieving nuclear disarmament as soon as possible.

“Looking towards the future, it is evident that broad international co-operation is essential to upgrade the physical protection of nuclear material, to improve capabilities for intercepting and responding to illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and other radioactive sources, and to enhance the protection of facilities against terrorism and sabotage. Another issue of fundamental importance is the enhancement of nuclear safety worldwide. I would like to commend the IAEA for its efforts in assisting the people affected by the Chernobyl accident, and in enhancing safety levels in the hope that an accident of this nature is never repeated.

“Finally, I would like to urge the IAEA to further develop its work in developing the use of nuclear energy for sustainable development. Coupled with your work in identifying environmentally sound sources of energy, these efforts can help transform nuclear energy into a universal force for progress and peace.

“The IAEA’s mission is likely to grow and deepen in the decades ahead, and as you tackle this vast array of challenges, I wish you all success.”

STATEMENT BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL

32. The DIRECTOR GENERAL, speaking on behalf of the entire staff of the Agency, extended heartfelt condolences to the people and Government of the United States of America and to all others directly affected by the recent tragedy. He prayed that they might find the strength and faith to cope with their pain and sorrow.

33. As he was about to complete four years as Director General, the Conference marked a time of personal reflection for him - a time to review some of the Agency’s achievements and some of the challenges it faced in the three areas, or pillars, of its activities: technology, safety and verification.

34. The rapid expansion in global energy demand and the growing awareness of the need for sustainable development had placed increasing emphasis on the environmental consequences of burning fossil fuels. Nuclear power was the principal alternative in the foreseeable future that could provide electricity on a large scale with practically no greenhouse gas emissions, yet it continued to be viewed with some concern regarding safety and non-proliferation.

35. The past twelve months had seen positive developments for nuclear power: reduced generating costs, improved capacity factors and the first licence extensions to 60-year lifetimes. Also, 6 new power plants had been connected to the grid in 2000 and construction had continued on a further 31. Views on the future of nuclear power were still mixed,

however. While the United States Government's new energy policy explicitly endorsed nuclear expansion, the German Government had concluded an agreement with the industry to phase out nuclear power. Those mixed views had been reflected in the conclusions reached on the role of nuclear power at major conferences on climate change and sustainable development. It was perhaps too early to forecast how the future would unfold for nuclear power. It would depend on three crucial factors: whether nuclear power could be proven to be a safe technology, whether it could be effectively safeguarded against diversion for non-peaceful purposes and whether it was economically competitive.

36. There were currently around 25 innovative reactor and fuel cycle designs in various stages of development around the world. The Agency was continuing to provide technical assistance to Member States in their development efforts. In response to a resolution adopted at the previous General Conference, the Agency had established INPRO, whose objective was to support the safe, economical and proliferation-resistant use of nuclear power and assist in meeting the global energy needs of the twenty-first century.

37. The back end of the fuel cycle, namely spent fuel and waste management and facility decommissioning, continued to be a major public concern in relation to nuclear power. While short-term concerns about waste, specifically the disposal of low-level and short-lived waste and the storage of waste in all categories, were already being dealt with safely and effectively, high-level waste management and disposal still faced public opposition in many countries. Progress towards the demonstration of successful high-level waste disposal was therefore crucial to the future of nuclear power. There had been some noteworthy steps in that direction. In May 2001, the Finnish parliament had ratified the Government's decision to construct a deep disposal facility for spent fuel at Olkiluoto. In the United States of America, a site recommendation for the proposed geological repository at Yucca Mountain might be made to the President in late 2001. The Agency was seeking to maintain international focus on waste management issues and to accelerate progress towards demonstrated solutions.

38. The other major component of the back end of the fuel cycle was facility decommissioning. For power reactors, research reactors and fuel cycle facilities alike, decommissioning planning and preparation must continue in order to ensure adequate funding, expertise and regulatory infrastructure. The Agency was active in each of those areas, providing safety standards and technical guidance, monitoring implementation by Member States and providing technical assistance to ongoing decommissioning projects.

39. A major part of the Agency's technological activity was focused on transferring nuclear technology in applications other than nuclear power. Under its CRPs and the technical co-operation programme, the Agency was building up the scientific and technological capacities of its Member States and functioned as a catalyst for social and economic development.

40. In the area of human health, for example, radiotherapy had long been recognized as a valuable tool in both the cure and palliation of cancer. Agency attention was increasingly focusing on developing countries as life expectancies and cancer rates increased. It was

seeking to build up indigenous capabilities by training practitioners, improving the quality of therapy equipment and enhancing treatment quality and effectiveness.

41. Nuclear techniques were gaining recognition in the area of water resource management. The Agency programme on isotope hydrology now included 75 active technical co-operation projects in some 40 Member States. In Ethiopia, the use of isotope hydrology had helped to tap a new groundwater field to provide more than 40% of Addis Ababa's water supply.

42. Agricultural yield and livestock production continued to benefit from the expanding application of the SIT. The OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, meeting in July 2001 in Lusaka, had approved a plan for the Pan-African Tsetse and Trypanosomosis Eradication Campaign (PATTEC), which would be supported by the Agency, WHO and FAO, among others. As more and more SIT applications became available, the economic and environmental benefits to the countries in question should increase significantly.

43. To conclude his review of developments in the field of nuclear technology, he highlighted three important challenges. First, the Agency must continue to encourage innovation in reactor and fuel cycle technology in a manner that matched the energy needs and requirements of users worldwide. For public acceptance, it was crucial that, like other technologies, nuclear power should be innovative and be perceived as such. Second, the focus on the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle must be increased, providing solutions that created confidence about the safety of the entire cycle. Third, the Agency must continue to provide Member States with objective and comprehensive information, including comparative assessments, to enable them to make informed choices about the use of nuclear technologies.

44. Safety in nuclear activities around the globe was also central to the future of nuclear energy. Since the Chernobyl accident, safety performance had continued to show significant improvement, but much remained to be done at both the national and international level. The development and adoption of legally binding norms had proven to be a powerful mechanism for enhancing nuclear safety worldwide. However, many States were not yet party to the major conventions, certain key areas of nuclear activity were still not the subject of conventions and some of the conventions that existed were not comprehensive in their coverage. He urged all States that had not already done so to become parties to all the safety-related conventions. Consideration should continue to be given to the merits of establishing legally binding norms in areas not currently covered by conventions.

45. The development and maintenance of a comprehensive body of safety standards, together with the provision of assistance in their implementation, was a key component of the Agency's safety role. The Agency's safety standards could influence national nuclear safety regulations, and an increasing number of States used Agency standards directly or as the reference basis for their national regulations and guidelines. The Secretariat, with the assistance of the Commission on Safety Standards, had initiated a study of the overall structure of Agency safety standards to ensure that they were complete and up-to-date.

46. Safety standards could be effective only if applied in practice. The Agency continued to assist Member States in applying its standards, promoting information exchange on best safety

practices, providing education and training for technical and regulatory personnel, tailoring technical co-operation projects to the specific safety needs of Member States and rendering a broad range of safety services in response to Member States' requests. Its safety services continued to be in high demand, particularly peer review missions in which international experts provided independent advice based on Agency safety standards and best international practices. The benefits of those services were shown by the increasing degree to which follow-up missions found that the safety problems identified had been resolved. Some services covered a broad area, such as reviews of design or operational safety, while others focused on narrower areas, such as seismic safety or equipment ageing.

47. In the past year, the Secretariat had begun to develop a more comprehensive approach to assessing the safety of a country's overall nuclear programme through "integrated safety evaluation". The aim was to provide a diagnostic of the country's overall nuclear safety profile, tailored to the degree of complexity of the country's nuclear programme and identifying those areas where safety enhancements should be focused. The results would be consolidated in a report to be prepared jointly by the Agency and the country concerned.

48. Fifteen years had now passed since the Chernobyl accident. With Agency support, two international conferences had been held in Kiev on the consequences of the accident including the health, environmental and social impacts. He had recently visited some of the affected areas in Belarus. Mistrust still prevailed among the people of the region, due in part to the contradictory data and reports about the precise environmental and health impacts of the accident from national authorities as well as from the relevant international organizations. It would be helpful to establish a common forum on the consequences of Chernobyl in which the relevant United Nations organizations and the governments of the affected countries would deliver a clear and unified message to the people of the region and the public at large.

49. Clearly, a number of challenges persisted in nuclear safety. The first was to continue to improve safety in obviously vulnerable areas, such as research reactors, and to cultivate a global nuclear safety culture. Nuclear safety was primarily a national responsibility, but it was also a legitimate international concern; nuclear safety practices, like environmental practices, had implications that transcended national boundaries. The Chernobyl accident had made that message clear and had resulted in the upgrading of safety practices in many countries, but the remaining lack of uniformity in safety practices in different countries must continue to be addressed. The second challenge, intimately linked to the first, was the international harmonization of safety norms, not simply as written but also as applied, and the development of legislative and regulatory infrastructure in all countries with the proper degree of independence, adequate financial resources and trained personnel. A third challenge related to the need for transparency in all nuclear activities, which was crucial to public acceptance. Such transparency should include effective communication on events, feedback on operational experience, self-assessments and peer reviews. Agency safety services could play an important role in that regard.

50. A final challenge, applicable to both nuclear technology and nuclear safety, concerned the substantial need for nuclear expertise and trained personnel, a need that would exist well into the future. Fundamental nuclear research had been receiving less support from

governments in recent years and many university programmes in nuclear sciences and engineering had closed because of decreasing interest. As the nuclear workforce aged and retired, the accompanying loss of institutional memory could have significant safety implications. The Agency intended to convene a meeting on that topic in the near future to discuss the size and nature of the problem, what various Member States were doing to address the issue and what could perhaps be done collaboratively.

51. In the Safeguards Implementation Report for 2000, the Agency had been able to conclude that, for all 140 States with safeguards agreements in force, nuclear material and other items placed under safeguards had remained in peaceful nuclear activities or had been otherwise adequately accounted for. For seven States, each with both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol, the Agency's evaluation had been able to provide a broader assurance that not only had there been no diversion of declared nuclear material, but also there was no indication of the presence of undeclared nuclear material or activities.

52. He remained concerned about the lack of progress in concluding comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. In the early 1990s, after the discovery of the clandestine nuclear weapons programme in Iraq, the international community had declared its readiness to give the Agency broader authority to strengthen its verification ability, particularly its ability to detect undeclared activities. Except in a limited number of countries, however, it still did not have that authority, because the requirement for a safeguards agreement and an additional protocol to be in force had not been met. Fifty States Party to the NPT still had no comprehensive safeguards agreement in force, and the Agency could not provide any safeguards assurances for those countries. Since its adoption of the Model Additional Protocol in 1997, the Board had approved additional protocols for only 58 Member States, and only 22 of those had entered into force or were being provisionally applied.

53. For nearly three years, the Agency had not been in a position to implement its mandate in Iraq under Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and related resolutions. As a consequence, it was not able at present to provide any assurance that Iraq was in compliance with its obligations under those resolutions. It remained prepared to resume its verification activities in Iraq under the relevant Security Council resolutions at short notice.

54. Since 1993, the Agency had been unable fully to implement its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the DPRK. In accordance with the Agreed Framework, however, the Agency had since November 1994 been monitoring the freeze of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactor and related facilities and had maintained a continuous inspector presence at the Nyongbyon site. It remained unable to verify the completeness and correctness of the DPRK's initial 1992 declaration, however. The work required to verify that all nuclear materials subject to safeguards in the DPRK had been declared to the Agency would take three to four years. In May 2001, the Agency had proposed to the DPRK the first concrete steps that needed to be carried out in that verification process and had indicated its readiness to start implementing those measures as soon as permitted to do so. It had not yet received a response from the DPRK, which continued to link its acceptance of Agency verification to progress in the implementation of the Agreed Framework.

55. In keeping with his mandate from the General Conference, he had continued to consult with the States of the Middle East on the application of full-scope safeguards to all nuclear activities there and the development of model agreements that would contribute to the eventual establishment of a NWFZ in that region. Regrettably, he had not yet been able to make progress in fulfilling that mandate.

56. Within the framework of the initiative to submit nuclear material released from the military programmes of the Russian Federation and the United States of America to Agency verification, consultations were continuing in an effort to resolve various legal and technical issues, including the development of a new model verification agreement. In the past 12 months, progress had been made on developing technical criteria and methods for implementing verification measures, but agreement had still to be reached on the scope of those measures, the nature of the material subject to safeguards and the duration of the verification measures under the agreement. That afternoon, he would be meeting American and Russian representatives to take stock of developments and see how to move forward.

57. The first International Conference on Security of Material had been held in Stockholm in May. Security experts had emphasized not only the need for increased co-operation between relevant bodies such as customs organizations, Interpol, national governments and the Agency, but also the importance of improving awareness of potential threats, incidents of theft and sabotage and illicit trafficking, as well as the need to enhance R&D on techniques for detection and analysis. The Conference had also highlighted the Agency's key role in supporting those efforts at the national level through the development of norms and guides, the co-ordination of technological development and assistance to States in implementing security measures.

58. Stemming the spread of nuclear weapons and moving towards nuclear disarmament remained a major human endeavour, of which Agency verification was a cornerstone. A number of challenges were critical to future success.

59. The primary challenge for the Agency was the universal application of its safeguards system, namely the conclusion of the relevant safeguards agreements and additional protocols by all States that had made non-proliferation commitments and the continuation of efforts to achieve the universality of the non-proliferation regime. While that objective continued to be supported by all, the necessary actions were not being taken by Member States. That situation was unsatisfactory; the Agency could provide the required assurances only if it was given the corresponding authority. Second, the Agency must support the development of an effective national and international system for the physical protection of nuclear material and the combating of illicit trafficking in order to avoid the risk of nuclear proliferation and to protect the public from possible radiation and health effects. In the light of recent events, that imperative could not be overemphasized. Third, accelerated and tangible progress must be made towards nuclear arms control and disarmament. That was crucial for sustaining and consolidating the non-proliferation regime in the long run. The unequivocal commitment made by the nuclear-weapon States during the 2000 NPT Review Conference to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons had yet to be translated into concrete action.

60. The Agency's technical co-operation programme delivered approximately US \$65 million annually in expert services, training and equipment, complementing the Regular Budget programme under all three pillars of Agency activities but in a manner directly tied to the specific priorities of recipient Member States. The technical co-operation programme for 2000 concentrated in part on a limited number of areas in which nuclear science and technology could have a strong developmental impact in the fields of human health, agriculture, water resources management, environmental protection and industrial applications. Close attention continued to be paid to the core areas of nuclear power, nuclear safety, radiation protection and radioactive waste management. The year 2000 had been a significant milestone in the development of the Agency's approach to technical co-operation. The targets set for implementing the first phase of the technical co-operation strategy had been largely achieved. The programme had thus shifted from being technology-driven to being driven by the needs and priorities of Member States, a change reinforced by the Agency's adoption of a results-based approach to all its programmes.

61. In a resolution adopted in 2000, the General Conference had established a rate of attainment for measuring the contributions paid to the TCF as a percentage of the TCF target. The Conference had approved TCF targets of \$73 million for 2001 and 2002 and had set the rates of attainment at 80 and 85%, respectively. However, the total amount pledged and paid to the TCF as of 15 September 2001 was only \$40 million, representing a rate of attainment of only 55% so far that year. The Agency was relying on all its Member States to pledge and pay their contributions to the TCF in full and on time each year and, for Member States that had not been paying or had been paying only a portion, to pay at least an amount equivalent to the rate of attainment. That was essential for the Agency to have sufficient resources to serve the needs of Member States.

62. Over the past four years a programme of reform in the management of the Agency had been initiated. The annual Senior Management Conferences had had both catalysing and reviewing roles in that process, creating a "one-house" approach to the changes. Of particular importance had been the accelerated introduction of results-based programming and budgeting, accompanied by a transition to biennial programming and budgeting. Those changes had been facilitated by considerable restructuring within the Secretariat. Thus, while reform would remain an ongoing process and the search for efficiency gains and increases in effectiveness would remain energetic, the basic machinery was now sharp and focused.

63. Additional funding requirements and cost pressures posed a continuing and growing problem. Every year the Agency was asked to assume more responsibilities and to provide more services without a corresponding increase in the Regular Budget. The result was that many priority activities could not be implemented and many programmes suffered from squeezed resources. The compromises achieved to resolve short-term budget issues should not obscure the need for better long-term solutions. If the Agency was to fulfil its mandate while maintaining the required balance among its activities, it must find more sensible approaches to ensuring adequate and predictable funding. He urged all parties to engage in fresh thinking as to how the current budgetary approach could be improved.

64. A management challenge that the Agency faced in all aspects of its work was improvement of public outreach, namely the ability to provide objective information on the benefits of and the risks associated with nuclear technology for opinion leaders, the media, NGOs and the public at large and to explain the Agency's contribution in that regard. In August 2001, CNN TV had begun broadcasting public service announcements to give greater visibility to the important role of nuclear technology and of the Agency. The Secretariat had taken steps to revitalize the Agency's public information seminar programme and had substantially stepped up its presence on the Internet, developing the WorldAtom website into a valuable source of information.

65. Reviewing the Agency's achievements and challenges illustrated, on the one hand, how far it had come and, on the other, how much remained to be done. He was heartened by the achievements of the past four years in aligning the Agency's programmes and streamlining its structure to serve the needs of its members more effectively and efficiently, and he looked forward to the continued commitment and support of the Member States.

66. The PRESIDENT, commending the Director General on his statement, said that his interesting ideas on the challenges that lay ahead for the Agency would certainly be considered carefully by Member States.

The Director General left the meeting.

APPROVAL OF THE APPOINTMENT OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL
(GC(45)/5)

67. The PRESIDENT said that, pursuant to Article VII.A of the Statute, the Board had decided to appoint Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei to serve as Director General of the Agency for a term of four years from 1 December 2001 to 30 November 2005 and had requested the General Conference to approve that appointment by adopting the draft resolution contained in document GC(45)/5. He took it that the General Conference wished to adopt the draft resolution contained in document GC(45)/5.

68. It was so decided and the Conference confirmed the appointment of Mr. ElBaradei to the post of Director General by acclamation.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. ElBaradei re-entered the meeting.

69. The PRESIDENT informed Mr. ElBaradei that the Conference had approved his appointment to the post of Director General for another four years. He was pleased to be the first to congratulate him on behalf of the General Conference. His able and skilful leadership of the Agency during the past term gave confidence that the further term would be equally successful. He invited him to take the oath of office.

70. Mr. ELBARADEI took the following oath:

"I solemnly swear to exercise in all loyalty, discretion and conscience the functions entrusted to me as Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to discharge these functions and to regulate my conduct with the interest of the Agency only in view, and not to seek or accept instructions in regard to the performance of my duties from any government or other authority external to the Agency."

71. The DIRECTOR GENERAL said he was grateful for the General Conference's support and humbled by the confidence placed in him. He trusted that, by working together, Member States could make the world a safer and more humane place.

72. The PRESIDENT requested delegates, as the morning's meeting was already well advanced, to refrain from congratulating the Director General at this point and to save their words of congratulation for their statements in the general debate.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION FUND FOR 2002 (GC(45)/25)

73. The PRESIDENT said that, pursuant to an agreement reached in the Board of Governors in 2000, the Board recommended a figure of \$73 million as the target for contributions to the TCF for 2002. He drew attention to a table in the attachment to document GC(45)/25 which showed the contributions that each Member State would need to make in order to meet its share of that target.

74. The early pledging and payment of contributions to the TCF greatly helped the Secretariat in planning the Agency's technical co-operation programmes. Delegations in a position to do so, but which had not done so yet, were therefore urged to notify the Secretariat during the General Conference of the contributions which their governments would be making to the TCF for 2002.

75. He would report at the end of the session, under a later agenda item, on the contributions which had been pledged up to that time. He hoped to be able to report favourably on the percentage of the 2002 target figure already pledged.

GENERAL DEBATE AND THE ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2000 (GC(45)/4)

76. The PRESIDENT recalled that among the recommendations approved by the General Conference for streamlining the Conference's working practices was that delegates should limit their statements in the general debate to 15 minutes. Pointing out that over 84 delegates had already inscribed their names on the speakers' list, he said he took it that the Conference authorized him, under Rule 50 of the Rules of Procedure, to limit the duration of speeches to 15 minutes.

77. It was so decided.

78. The PRESIDENT appealed for understanding and co-operation in the arrangement of the daily speakers' list. Adjustments had been necessary to allow the participation of several Ministers and other senior officials from Member States and international organizations who were unable to spend the whole week in Vienna. Additional adjustments might be required, but he was confident that the Secretariat would do its best to cope with conflicting demands. He took it that the Conference was in agreement with those arrangements.

79. It was so agreed.

80. Mr. ABRAHAM (United States of America) said that he had been deeply moved by the memorial service commemorating those killed in the terrorist acts of September 11 in his country. He thanked all those who had offered help and sympathy in the wake of those unspeakable attacks. International expressions of support were heartening and signalled that such violence, the murder of innocents, was an attack on all civilized nations. In mourning the loss of thousands of its citizens in an appalling catastrophe, the United States of America was fully resolved to recover and respond to that vicious act of terror.

81. Nevertheless, the work of his Government continued. Congress was acting quickly and in consensus to give assistance to the victims, begin the long job of rebuilding and support the President. He was particularly proud of the employees of his department, who had been back at work the day after the terrorist attack, doing their part to keep the Government operating.

82. The current meeting was important; there were few better ways of signalling resolve than to stand together with other nations in condemning terrorism, as had been done the previous week at the United Nations Headquarters in New York, and working actively to prevent future acts of barbarism. Although the attacks had struck America, the broader target had been the entire freedom-loving world. Indeed, citizens from over 40 nations were among the victims and the United States expressed condolences to those countries. No one was immune and clearly no method could be ruled out. That fact sent an unmistakable message to the Agency. Its role in preventing the spread of dangerous nuclear materials, providing physical security over those materials, verifying peaceful uses of nuclear energy, advancing science and monitoring technology transfer would become more pivotal to international security in the years ahead. The Agency must help ensure that nuclear materials were never used as weapons of terror. In that task the Agency could rely on America's continuing and robust support. The security of his country and of others around the world largely depended upon what the Agency did to prevent the proliferation and misuse of nuclear materials.

83. At the same time, the Agency's role in helping meet global energy demands remained vital to the well-being of people and to international security. To underscore his Government's commitment to the Agency's critical work in that regard, he read out the following message from Mr. George W. Bush, President of the United States of America:

“Dear Conferees, on September 11th, the United States was attacked by terrorists in a series of vicious and despicable acts of violence. America and our friends and allies will stand together and will win the war against terrorism to ensure peace and security

for the world. As you gather for the 45th General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, I urge you to advance the role of the IAEA in securing international peace and well-being.

“The IAEA is central to the world’s efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. For more than 40 years, the IAEA and its Member States have established safeguards for special nuclear materials and the facilities that produce them. Much more remains to be done, and we will look to the IAEA to continue serving as a critical instrument to help combat the real and growing threat of nuclear proliferation.

“Early in my Administration, I ordered the development of a national energy policy to promote the dependable, affordable and environmentally sound production of energy. Nuclear energy is a key part of this endeavour. The world looks to the IAEA to promote the world-wide peaceful use of nuclear energy.

“The United States has a long tradition of strong support for the IAEA that my Administration will continue. Best wishes for a successful conference.”

84. As the President’s message noted, nuclear safety - preserving nuclear security in a dangerous world - must remain a critical priority for all. The Agency’s skills and expertise in that area would be needed more than ever. In that regard, his Government was pleased by the decision to reappoint Mr. ElBaradei as Director General and looked forward to working with him. The Agency was responsible for ensuring that the civilian use of nuclear power was for peaceful purposes only and that materials which could be used to create nuclear weapons were properly guarded and carefully accounted for. The terrible events of the previous week demonstrated in the clearest possible fashion the importance of maintaining the highest levels of security over nuclear materials. The Agency’s safeguards system was critically important to the security of the United States and the entire international community. In the year 2000 alone, the Agency had carried out more than 2500 inspections at nearly 600 facilities in 70 countries. By demonstrating that States were complying with their international non-proliferation commitments, the Agency promoted public confidence in nuclear power. It had a long and fruitful history concerning the international implementation of good physical security practices and co-operation to prevent illicit nuclear trafficking. The United States welcomed the Agency’s work in those areas and urged all countries to review and, where necessary, upgrade their national efforts.

85. In addition to its unwavering support for the Agency’s non-proliferation activities and the NPT, his country was determined to find fresh approaches to resolving proliferation problems. It was already working with Russia and other countries to improve physical protection for hundreds of tons of plutonium and enriched uranium. Earlier in the year, the United States had hosted the annual plenary of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, whose 39 members had adopted the basic principle that nuclear exports must be prohibited in cases where there was a significant risk of diversion. His Government called on all States to implement nuclear export controls in keeping with that principle and favoured strengthened international commitment and co-operation on the physical protection of nuclear materials, particularly those that could readily be converted to weapons use. The United States was

conscious of the fact that today's changing environment would require increased international co-operation and vigilance. It was essential that all countries adjust their policies accordingly. His Government's initiatives would emphasize two principles: co-operation and accountability. It would work with others, but expect them to act responsibly as well.

86. In conclusion, he said that the United States stood behind the Agency and was grateful that it would be strong and vibrant in the difficult times ahead. There was no reason to shrink from the dual responsibility of protecting the world from nuclear terrorism and providing it with abundant, safe, affordable and clean energy. His Government looked forward to strengthening the Agency's efforts and co-operating with it to achieve world peace.

87. Mr. OMI (Japan) expressed his sincere condolences to the families of the victims of the recent terrorist attacks in the United States of America. Such attacks posed a grave challenge to people all over the world. He believed that the Agency could make a significant contribution to world-wide efforts to combat terrorism.

88. Japan had actively promoted the peaceful use of nuclear energy as a stable component of its economic development, and would certainly increase such efforts in the coming years. As the only country to have suffered the devastation caused by atomic bombs, Japan was well aware that the economic benefits brought by nuclear energy were but a part of the overall picture, and longed for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. His Government's standing policy was that Japan must never possess, produce, or permit the importation of nuclear weapons - the so-called three non-nuclear principles. Those were the principles underlying Japan's decision to accede to the NPT in 1976 after much heated national debate, and also its solid support for the Agency's activities in the area of nuclear non-proliferation, in particular its vitally important verification responsibilities.

89. Nuclear energy was important for the world community, and especially for Japan given the scarcity of its domestic energy resources, because it provided a stable energy supply and preserved the global environment. Japan's 51 commercial nuclear reactors currently accounted for about 35 % of total national power generation; that level was expected to increase to over 40 % by 2010, following the commissioning of a further 13 reactors. As part of its long-term programme for nuclear energy, Japan had attached increased priority to R&D in relation to fast reactors and the use of plutonium in light-water reactors. Japan also continued to make steady progress towards the establishment of a nuclear fuel cycle and would continue making its use of plutonium transparent and accountable to the rest of the world.

90. Japan hoped that nuclear fusion would succeed nuclear fission as a practicable energy source during the current century. The most prominent fusion initiative, the ITER project - which was being conducted jointly by Japan, the European Union and Russia - would benefit from renewed participation by the United States of America.

91. Enhancement of the nuclear non-proliferation regime was one of the most important items on the international community's agenda. In the belief that strengthening the NPT safeguards regime represented the most realistic means of achieving that end, Japan had

promptly concluded its additional protocol and had also proposed, during the previous General Conference¹, a plan of action designed to expedite its universalization. On the basis of the plan of action and in co-operation with the Agency, Japan had organized earlier in the year an international symposium for further reinforcement of Agency safeguards in the Asia-Pacific region. He hoped that the Agency would hold similar events in other parts of the world, and pledged Japan's support in contributing both human and financial resources for that purpose. Finally, recalling the conclusion of the 2000 NPT Review Conference that early adoption of integrated safeguards would rationalize the burden of safeguards and provide an important incentive for concluding additional protocols, he urged the Secretariat to accelerate its efforts with regard to integrated safeguards.

92. The Agency bore a grave responsibility in the context of the DPRK's suspected nuclear weapons development programme. Japan intended to continue its active support of the LWR project being carried out by KEDO and urged the DPRK to improve its relationship with the Agency and fulfil promptly and completely its obligations under the safeguards agreement it had concluded with the Agency.

93. Japan welcomed the recent appointment of Mr. Tomihiro Taniguchi as the Agency's Deputy Director General for Nuclear Safety and looked forward to contributing more qualified personnel.

94. The task of ensuring nuclear safety was nowhere more urgent than in Asia, where 23 nuclear reactors were currently under construction. Japan remained ready to contribute financial and human resources towards achieving the key Agency objectives of increasing its provision of nuclear safety training and establishing new safety standards.

95. With regard to the challenge that many countries faced in managing radioactive waste, he announced that his Government intended to make a new extrabudgetary contribution to the Agency's activities in that area in 2001.

96. In keeping with Japan's policy of encouraging all international organizations to achieve zero nominal growth in their budgets as a means of promoting efficient fiscal management, he urged the Secretariat to achieve further cost reductions in all its operations and to set priorities based upon the Agency's one-house principle. An important way of meeting that challenge would be to achieve cost neutrality in the safeguards budget through increased efficiency in implementation. He asked the Secretariat to formulate a detailed plan for achieving that objective.

97. Finally, he emphasized that the future deployment of nuclear energy for destructive or positive ends was entirely in the hands of the human race. Convinced that wisdom would prevail, he said it was incumbent on the international community to make every effort to ensure that the Agency fulfilled its mission. Japan remained committed to providing the Agency with all possible support towards achieving that objective.

¹ See document GC(44)/OR.1, para. 92.

98. Mr. Young-hwan KIM (Republic of Korea), having offered his condolences to the American people for the enormous losses suffered as a result of the recent terrorist attacks, said that terrorism was the enemy of all peace-loving people around the world. He strongly denounced actions that threatened international peace and security and emphasized that his country would join in the efforts to eradicate terrorism.

99. With nuclear energy being recognized as a practical and sustainable future energy source, the Republic of Korea supported and would participate in the Agency's INPRO initiative. Korea was developing its own advanced nuclear power technology, including the APR-1400, a 1400 MW(e) next-generation reactor, and the SMART (system-integrated modular advanced reactor) for use in both desalination and power generation.

100. He welcomed the fact that the Joint Convention had entered into force in June 2001. For its part, Korea was in the process of ratifying that convention. To ensure the safety and security of radioactive materials, Korea had implemented a radiation safety information system, which monitored all stages from production to disposal via the Internet. He proposed that the Agency establish a worldwide information network on that topic.

101. Commending the Director General's timely initiative to establish an International Advisory Group for Gender Issues, he said that the role of women in nuclear activities was gaining importance in the twenty-first century and that, earlier in the year, the Republic of Korea had hosted the 9th WIN (Women in Nuclear) Global Annual Meeting, in Seoul.

102. The Republic of Korea now had 16 nuclear power plants in operation supplying 41% of the nation's total electricity. A further 4 units were under construction and it was expected that 8 more would be completed by 2015.

103. His country had established its national safeguards inspection system in 1997 and had collaborated with the Agency in implementing the New Partnership Approach, which he hoped would become a model for all international safeguards.

104. Owing to the commendable efforts of KEDO, construction work was under way for the LWR project. The DPRK had issued a permit in September 2001 allowing KEDO to begin excavation of the power block. Once the site arrangement and building infrastructure were completed, KEDO would proceed to the main construction work. Under the Agreed Framework, the DPRK should be in full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the Agency before the delivery of key nuclear components. Given the Agency's assessment that it would take three to four years to verify the correctness and completeness of the DPRK's initial report, he called on the DPRK to co-operate fully with the Agency. The General Conference had adopted a series of resolutions requesting the DPRK to come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the Agency. The Director General had pointed out in his statement to the current session of the General Conference that there had been no major developments in that connection and the Agency was still unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the DPRK's initial declaration. He therefore supported the Director General's request for the DPRK to normalize its relations with the Agency.

105. His country, which had previously proposed the establishment of an international nuclear university, commended the inclusion in the Agency's 2002-2003 programme, of a feasibility study on the establishment of the Agency-sponsored international school on nuclear science and technology and would consider making a contribution. Also on the topic of education, he called for the support and participation of Member States in the second International Youth Nuclear Congress to be held in Seoul in April 2002.

106. He noted with satisfaction that, as a result of consultation at the 30th RCA General Conference, it had been agreed by the RCA Member States that a regional office be established in the Republic of Korea. He expressed his country's willingness to contribute to the operation of that office.

107. He added that his country planned to establish a mirror site of the INIS in the Republic of Korea for the convenience of Asia-Pacific users.

108. He reminded the General Conference of resolution GC(45)/RES/19 regarding amendment to Article VI of the Statute, and urged Member States to take prompt action so that the amendment would enter into force as soon as possible.

109. In conclusion, he emphasized the importance of international co-operation and collaboration for the development of sustainable nuclear technology for the benefit of future generations.

110. Mr. ADAM (Belgium), speaking on behalf of the European Union and its associated states - Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Turkey - expressed his deepest sympathy to the United States of America for the great loss of life incurred in the recent terrorist attack. In that connection, he referred to the joint declaration of 14 September 2001 made by the Heads of State and Government and bodies of the European Union, condemning terrorism and expressing their willingness to fight it with all the means at their disposal.

111. Mr. ElBaradei's re-election as Director General showed the confidence the members placed in him. One problem he would have to resolve would be how to replace the many specialized staff whose contracts would expire in the near future. The European Union would welcome some clarification in that regard.

112. Given the Agency's financial constraints, the European Union was concerned by the failure of a large number of Member States to contribute to the Regular Budget. It thus welcomed the initiatives launched by the Director General, such as the one-house concept, results-based budgeting, emphasis on quality rather than quantity, and prioritization of projects to improve the overall efficiency of the Agency's activities.

113. The safeguards programme should on no account be considered as being in competition with the Agency's promotional or technical co-operation programmes. Safeguards provided the necessary confidence for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear power.

However, there was an increasing gap between expenditure on safeguards and non-proliferation activities on the one hand and Member States' contributions to the Regular Budget for that purpose on the other. The Agency must be given sufficient resources to fulfil its statutory obligations pursuant to the NPT. Excessive budgetary constraints and a lack of internal budgetary flexibility should not make that already difficult task more arduous.

114. The efficiency of the safeguards system depended on its universality. Most European Union member countries had now ratified additional protocols. He urged all Parties to the NPT which had not yet done so to conclude Agency safeguards agreements, and all those with such agreements which had not yet done so to conclude an additional protocol without further delay. Also, he called on all other States which were not party to the NPT to place their nuclear activities under Agency control.

115. The European Union supported the Agency's efforts to develop integrated safeguards. It welcomed the progress made since the previous General Conference, in particular with regard to LWRs without MOX fuel and research reactors, and looked forward to proposals for other types of facility. It recognized the importance of SAGSI and Member State support programmes in that regard. The new system must however be based on qualitative assessment. The Secretariat should pursue efforts to achieve maximum effectiveness and long-term cost neutrality through a reduction in inspection effort. In the long run, that should benefit countries that had successfully implemented additional protocols.

116. The European Union supported work undertaken by the Agency in the area of physical protection, including the findings of the expert meeting convened to discuss the need to revise the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. It urged Member States to endorse the draft resolution on the matter and looked forward to the forthcoming meeting of technical and legal experts to prepare a draft amendment to strengthen that Convention.

117. The lack of progress in implementing the safeguards agreement with the DPRK remained a matter for concern. The European Union strongly urged the DPRK to comply fully with its safeguard agreement and co-operate with the Director General without further delay, especially regarding the verification of its initial declaration.

118. The situation in Iraq was also a major concern. More than two years after the departure of the Agency's Action Team, verification activities had still not resumed. The European Union called on Iraq once again to comply strictly with all the relevant Security Council resolutions, to give the Agency the necessary access to fulfil its mandate and to co-operate with it unreservedly by providing an up-to-date and technically coherent picture of its clandestine nuclear programme. The verification of the physical inventory of nuclear materials under a routine inspection that year could not serve as a substitute for the Agency's activities under the relevant Security Council resolutions.

119. The shutdown of the Chernobyl nuclear power station in December 2000 had been an important event. The 1986 disaster had highlighted the need to accord priority to safety aspects at all stages of nuclear programmes. The European Union welcomed the Agency's successful initiatives in that area, particularly the OSART missions, as well as efforts to draft

safety standards for fuel cycle installations. Priority should be given to completing the Safety Series documents. He hoped that the second review meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety would result in further safety improvements.

120. The search must continue for long-term solutions to the problem of the safe disposal of radioactive waste and spent fuel. The Cordoba conference had shown the vital importance of public information and the Agency, given its experience and technical expertise, could play a useful role in that connection. He hoped that the development of projects on innovative reactors and cycles, such as INPRO, would open up new possibilities in the area of safety, proliferation resistance and waste reduction.

121. The European Union would continue to co-operate with the Agency in assisting Member States to foster the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, inter alia through substantial contributions to the TCF. The Secretariat should pursue its efforts to improve the effectiveness of the technical co-operation programme, for instance through the rigorous selection and assessment of projects and using modern management methods to ensure their implementation. Notwithstanding such reforms and additional budgetary allocations, the working conditions of Secretariat staff in the Department of Technical Co-operation had apparently deteriorated. He would welcome further information on the situation and on the Director General's intended course of action. Perhaps, as suggested at the meetings of the Board of Governors in June 2001, the services of an external consultant could be sought on how to make technical assistance more cost-effective. The European Union would request from the Secretariat at the appropriate time a detailed breakdown of Regular Budget expenditure on technical co-operation project support and management.

122. Technical co-operation must above all benefit the least developed countries. The European Union would look favourably on the idea of taking into account the GDP of countries when assessing their eligibility for assistance. It also wondered why many countries which for several years had failed to pay their assessed programme costs continued to benefit from the TCF.

123. It was regrettable that negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty had not yet got under way despite the appeal made at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. He called on Member States to remedy that situation without delay. He also urged Member States to sign or ratify the CTBT with a view to accelerating its entry into force.

124. In November 2000, the European Commission had published a Green Paper with a view to prompting a wide-ranging debate and reaching consensus on the security of the European Union's future energy supply. That would provide an opportunity to consider the various energy mix options available to the European Union, taking into account the need to control greenhouse gas emissions and to maintain a civil nuclear safety culture, regardless of the future of nuclear power.

125. Mr. ZHANG Huazhu (China) strongly condemned the terrorist attacks carried out in New York and Washington and expressed his heartfelt sympathy for the victims and their families.

126. One of the main tasks of the General Conference was to review the Agency's work and to outline its future objectives. Only by faithfully adhering to the Statute and maintaining the balance between its two main functions could the Agency gain vitality and function properly. Amongst its positive achievements in the preceding year, the Agency had actively participated in the work of the CSD-9 and the COP6, thereby contributing to scientific and objective evaluation of the role of nuclear energy in sustainable development. It had continued to assist its Member States in establishing and improving their nuclear safety infrastructures. It had also promoted international co-operation in the safety of nuclear waste and radiation sources and the security of radioactive materials, and had facilitated the enhancement of nuclear safety worldwide. The Agency had helped introduce nuclear applications in agriculture, water resource management, human health and environmental protection, bringing social and economic benefits to its Member States. It had also made significant progress in developing integrated safeguards while continuing to carry out its obligations under safeguards agreements, thus strengthening the international non-proliferation regime.

127. Emphasizing the importance of nuclear power to sustainable development and the Agency's role in that connection, he pointed out that the world was facing unprecedented ecological challenges. The developed countries, which accounted for about two thirds of the total greenhouse gas emissions, bore the major responsibility for global warming, while the developing countries, whose emissions were low, were faced with the task of revitalizing their economies and eliminating poverty to achieve sustainable development. The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol provided for common but differentiated responsibilities for developed and developing countries in meeting those challenges.

128. The demand for energy was increasing as the world's economy developed, and traditional energy sources like coal, petroleum and gas would still have to be used until a new clean energy source was developed. Optimized energy structure policies should be adopted to cut down pollution, and advanced technologies applied to improve the fossil fuel utilization rate. At the same time, the use of clean energy should be increased. More than 40 years of experience had demonstrated that nuclear energy was clean, safe and economical. Nuclear power now accounted for one sixth of the world's total power generation and also had helped to reduce greenhouse gas emission. China, along with many other countries, was in favour of including nuclear energy in the Clean Development Mechanism. He hoped that the Agency would make greater efforts to make the general public realize the significance of nuclear power in that regard.

129. China, the largest developing country in the world, had prepared guidelines for appropriate development of nuclear power as part of its recently published tenth five-year plan. China had 8 nuclear power units, with a total installed capacity of 6600 MW, under construction and several more were being planned. At the same time, it attached great importance to developing and using advanced technologies aimed at increasing the utilization factors of traditional fossil fuels. It was willing to co-operate with other countries to protect the world's environment.

130. Doubts continued to be expressed about nuclear proliferation, nuclear safety and the economic competitiveness of nuclear power. The Agency had a pivotal role to play in the

proper understanding and settlement of those issues. It should play a co-ordinating role in developing new nuclear energy technologies. After more than 40 years of operating experience and in the light of scientific and technological advances, attention was focusing on new-generation reactors and fuel cycles with inherent safety and non-proliferation features and economic competitiveness. At the request of its Member States, the Agency had initiated INPRO. China, which fully supported that initiative, had sent experts to the Agency to contribute. The effectiveness of that programme could be improved in a number of ways. Firstly, the Agency, the only inter-governmental organization in the nuclear field, should make greater efforts to co-ordinate and encourage more countries with R&D capability to participate in the programme. Secondly, the Agency should establish close relations with other co-operation mechanisms in that area (for example, the USDOE Generation IV International Forum) with a view to exchanging information. Thirdly, in implementing its programme, the Agency should take into account the practical requirements of the developing countries intending to develop nuclear power so that they could benefit from research results.

131. While responsibility for nuclear safety was primarily a matter for the governments of the countries concerned, the Agency should serve as the centre of international co-operation. The Agency, with the support of its Member States, had prepared many international legally binding instruments, including the Early Notification Convention, the Assistance Convention, the Nuclear Safety Convention, the Joint Convention, and a series of nuclear safety criteria. Those, together with assistance to individual Member States and the peer review mechanism, had played an important role in enhancing nuclear safety around the world. His country had received assistance under the technical co-operation programme on training for senior management at the Qinshan nuclear power plant. China commended all those efforts and hoped that the Agency would continue to play a key role in that regard.

132. The Agency's safeguards constituted an effective barrier against nuclear proliferation and its safeguards system had proven its effectiveness for more than 40 years. It was being further strengthened by the "Programme 93+2" and development of the integrated safeguards approach. China supported those efforts and looked forward to an even more effective and efficient safeguards system. He hoped that a timely report would be made by the Secretariat to the Board and the General Conference on the progress of the integrated programme and that issues of principle would be subject to the approval of those organs. China considered that the Agency had adequate legal authority and technical means to further improve the effectiveness of safeguards.

133. In conclusion, he promised China's unswerving support to the Agency in its efforts to achieve a better world for mankind.

134. Mr. VALECA (Romania), having endorsed the statement made by Belgium on behalf of the European Union, expressed gratitude for the support his country had received from the Agency in implementation of its national nuclear strategy, and also for the recent official visit made by the Director General to his country.

135. His Government attached great importance to development of the nuclear power sector. Nuclear power continued to be a reliable source of energy and by the year 2005, when Unit 2

of the Cernavoda nuclear power plant reached completion, would constitute 20% of Romania's national electricity production. Romania's national nuclear strategy also provided for the continuation of work on Unit 3. R&D efforts were focusing on ensuring the cost competitiveness and viability of nuclear energy, which his country believed should be part of the global clean energy mix. He commended the Agency's efforts to keep the nuclear option open and to ensure that nuclear power was given a full and fair hearing in multilateral debates under the UNFCCC.

136. Emphasizing the Agency's key role in the success of the NPT, he urged States that had not yet concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency to do so in accordance with their NPT obligations.

137. He reiterated Romania's commitment to its NPT obligations and said that it was giving the Agency every support in implementation of its additional protocol. The first report under Article 3 of that protocol had been submitted to the Secretariat in January 2001. A successful national workshop on the application of integrated safeguards had recently been held in Romania and had concentrated on implementation of the additional protocol at the national level, traditional safeguards measures and legal issues. New legislation was being introduced to facilitate implementation of the protocol and provide complementary access to all national nuclear facilities.

138. Commending the Agency's technical co-operation programme, particularly its fellowships, scientific visits, training courses and workshops, he said that Romania itself had hosted training courses for fellows and scientific visitors from several developing countries. Romania was willing to participate more actively in that programme and hoped that the Agency would continue to use the two nuclear facilities made available by his Government for international and regional training and research, namely the training centre for nuclear safety activities at the Cernavoda nuclear power plant and the Institute for Nuclear Research at Pitesti. The latter was managing the conversion of its Triga research reactor core from HEU to LEU. His Government attached great importance to that conversion and to the development of nuclear research activities to support nuclear energy production. It also hoped that the Institute for Nuclear Research would be integrated into the regional and international network of nuclear research centres, and be used for the production of tracers, radioisotopes and medical products.

139. Decommissioning of the VVR-S research reactor at Magurele was a priority issue and a preliminary plan had been elaborated under a national technical co-operation project. The reactor had been shut down in December 1997 and no progress had been made owing to lack of funds. An important issue yet to be solved was the management of the spent fuel originating from the reactor. Romania was hoping that it could be returned to its country of origin.

140. Romania's national nuclear programme would be ready by the end of 2001, and a draft thereof would be forwarded to the Secretariat for its consideration.

141. He expressed support for the Agency's programme and budget for 2002-2003 and hoped that appropriate balance would be maintained between its verification and promotional activities. His country would pay, in full and on time, its financial obligations to the Regular Budget and TCF, including its assessed programme costs.

142. His Government's legislative priorities in the nuclear field were to adopt a law on the promotion of nuclear activities, a law on civil liability for nuclear damage and a law on the safe management of radioactive waste and spent fuel. The first had already been drafted and took into account the directive of the European Commission on the peaceful promotion of nuclear applications. The final draft would be submitted to Parliament for approval by the second quarter of 2002. The second was also expected to be put before Parliament at about the same time, while the third was still under consideration by Parliament.

143. Finally, on legislative matters, he said that the law on the safe performance of nuclear activities, which had entered into force in 1996, had recently been amended to provide for the licensing of private consulting rooms using radioactive sources.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.