APPLICATION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Report by the Director General to the Board of Governors
and to the General Conference

1. In resolution GC(44)/RES/28 (2000), the General Conference, inter alia, affirmed:

   “the urgent need for all States in the Middle East to forthwith accept the application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all their nuclear activities as an important confidence-building measure among all States in the region and as a step in enhancing peace and security in the context of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ),”

and called upon all parties directly concerned:

   “to consider seriously taking the practical and appropriate steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a mutually and effectively verifiable NWFZ in the region” of the Middle East.

In this regard, the resolution reiterated the Director General’s mandate from earlier resolutions of the General Conference:

   “to continue consultations with the States of the Middle East to facilitate the early application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all nuclear activities in the region as relevant to the preparation of model agreements, as a necessary step towards the establishment of a NWFZ in the region”;

and called upon:

   “all States in the region to extend their fullest co-operation to the Director General in the fulfilment of the tasks entrusted to him”

by his mandate.
2. Resolution GC(44)/RES/28(2000) also took note:

“of the importance of the ongoing bilateral Middle East peace negotiations and the activities of the multilateral working group on Arms Control and Regional Security in promoting mutual confidence and security in the Middle East, including establishment of a NWFZ”;

and called upon the Director General, as requested by the participants:

“to render all necessary assistance to the working group in promoting that objective”.

It further called upon all States in the region:

“to take measures, including confidence-building and verification measures, aimed at establishing a NWFZ in the Middle East”

and requested the Director General:

“to submit to the Board of Governors and to the General Conference at its forty-fifth regular session a report on the implementation of this resolution”.

3. Also in the context of its Agenda Item ‘Application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East’, last year’s Regular Session of the General Conference adopted decision GC(44)/DEC/12 by which the Conference requested:

“the Director General to make arrangements to convene a forum in which participants from the Middle East and other interested parties could learn from the experience of other regions, including in the area of confidence building relevant to the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone”;

The decision also called upon:

“the Director General, with States of the Middle East and other interested parties, to develop an agenda and modalities which will help to ensure a successful forum”.

4. This report describes the steps taken in seeking to fulfil the Director General’s mandates as conferred by resolution GC(44)/RES/28 (2000) and by decision GC(44)/DEC/12.

5. In his Report to the forty-fourth regular session of the General Conference (GOV/2000/38-GC(44)/14), the Director General explained that he had taken every opportunity, in his consultations with representatives of States of the region, to reiterate his willingness to provide any assistance within his mandate and authority, related to measures, including confidence-building and verification measures, aimed at applying full-scope (i.e. comprehensive) Agency safeguards to all nuclear activities in the region and at establishing a NWFZ in the Middle East.
6. Report GOV/2000/38-GC(44)/14 also referred to the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In its Final Document, the Conference, inter alia, had welcomed the long-standing consensus, reached in the UN General Assembly, that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security. The Conference noted that a number of States of the Middle East region had acceded to the NPT since 1995 and that, with these accessions, all States of the Middle East, with the exception of Israel, were now Parties to the NPT. The Conference had also urged parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East; and reaffirmed its endorsement of the aims and objectives of the Middle East peace process and recognized that efforts in this regard, as well as other efforts, contribute to, inter alia, a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction. Also of particular relevance to the Director General’s General Conference mandate, the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference had invited those States of the region which had not yet done so to negotiate comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency and bring them into force as soon as possible. In that regard, the Document noted that in the case of States without substantial nuclear activities, the conclusion of safeguards agreements involves simplified procedures. The Final Document also welcomed the conclusion of a Protocol Additional to its comprehensive safeguards agreement by Jordan; and invited all other States in the Middle East, whether or not party to the NPT, to participate in the IAEA’s strengthened safeguards system.

7. GOV/2000/38-GC(44)/14 also recalled the letters which the Director General had written in May 1999 to Foreign Ministers of States of the Middle East region about his General Conference mandate. In these letters, he had asked for current thoughts on all matters relevant to his mandate from the General Conference, and for ideas on any practical steps which could be taken to foster a climate of confidence in the region.

Application of Full-Scope Agency Safeguards

8. Since last year’s General Conference, the Director General has regrettably been unable to make progress in fulfilling his mandate. In his contacts with representatives of Middle East States, the Director General has continued however, to stress the importance of the tasks entrusted to him and has sought to encourage ideas relevant to the implementation of his mandate. Thus, the Director General has continued to stress the emphasis placed in successive IAEA General Conference resolutions and in those of other fora, on the importance of comprehensive IAEA safeguards on all nuclear activities in the Middle East region. He has also stressed the need for all States which already have a binding obligation to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency, to do so.

9. These points were again raised when the Director General visited Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates in February 2001 and when he visited Egypt in May. On the first aspect of his mandate, it was clear from the Director General’s discussions that there continues to be a long-standing and fundamental difference of view between Israel on the one hand and other States of the region on the other, with regard to the application of comprehensive Agency safeguards to all nuclear facilities in the region. Israel takes the view that safeguards, as well as all other regional security issues, cannot be addressed in isolation from the regional peace process but only within the context of a just and lasting peace.
settlement. The other States of the region maintain that there is no automatic sequence which links the application of comprehensive safeguards to all nuclear facilities in the Middle East to the prior conclusion of a peace settlement, and that the former would contribute to the latter.

10. During his visits to Middle East States, the Director General also reiterated that the signature and entry into force of comprehensive safeguards agreements not only fulfils the relevant States’ Treaty obligations, and helps to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, but can also play an important part in building confidence towards the goal of an eventual NWFZ. In this regard, the signature of comprehensive safeguards agreements by the authorities of Yemen on 21 September 2000 and by Oman on 28 June 2001 are welcomed. It is to be hoped that the relevant agreements will soon enter into force. It remains, however, that several States of the Middle East region that are Party to the NPT have yet to conclude their comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency.¹

**Model Agreements as a Necessary Step towards a Middle East (NWFZ)**

11. The Director General’s letter of 10 May 1999, to Foreign Ministers of States of the Middle East region (see paragraph 7 above) also addressed the second issue relevant to his mandate from resolution GC(44)/RES/28 (2000) and earlier resolutions, namely the preparation of model agreements as a necessary step towards the establishment of a Middle East NWFZ. In his letter, the Director General referred to successive reports to the General Conference, notably the report in document GC(XXXVI)/1019 of September 1992, which had given examples of the types of material obligation which might form part of an eventual Middle East NWFZ agreement. This and other reports had also suggested modalities for verifying compliance with those obligations.

12. GOV/2000/38-GC(44)/14 reproduced the text of the Director General’s letter of 10 May 1999 and of the responses received. It also provided some analysis of those responses, with regard, inter alia, to possible material obligations that might feature in a future NWFZ; to the specific obligations which might be assumed by the regional Parties to the Zone; by the IAEA; and by the nuclear-weapon States. The responses had also cited other ideas, for example that specific provisions of currently existing NWFZ Treaties might be drawn upon. Emphasis had been placed, regarding verification arrangements in a future Middle East NWFZ, on the IAEA being the main body responsible for verifying compliance with safeguards obligations with specific regional verification arrangements of complementing, rather than superseding, international verification. From the correspondence received, most of the States of the region consider that a willingness to accept IAEA safeguards on all nuclear activities in the region is, in itself, the most important confidence-building and verification measure to which successive General Conference resolutions have referred.

13. Despite further letters of 19 June 2000, the Director General has received only one additional response, from Sudan, to the matters first raised in his letter of 10 May 1999. In a letter of 3 October 2000 to the Director General (Annex 1), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sudan expresses support for the establishment of a Middle East NWFZ and views the application of comprehensive IAEA safeguards in all the countries of the Middle East as an important step towards this goal. In that context, the letter refers to efforts that have been made by States of the region to prepare a Treaty establishing the Middle East as a NWFZ. The

¹ Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia and United Arab Emirates.
letter expresses the hope that the States concerned can look to the IAEA for support in these endeavours. It emphasises not only the importance of comprehensive safeguards as a step towards the creation of a Middle East NWFZ but also as an important element of the verification of compliance with the obligations assumed by the Parties to such a Zone.

14. The Director General has not received responses to his letters of 10 May 1999 and 19 June 2000 from a number of other States of the Middle East region. It may therefore be premature to embark on the preparations of the model agreements foreseen in the resolution.

IAEA Assistance with Activities of the Multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security

15. There has been no plenary meeting of the Working Group since December 1994 and accordingly, no request by the Working Group for IAEA assistance.

Decision GC(44)/DEC/12 of the General Conference: Arrangements to Convene a Forum

16. The General Conference requested the Director General to make arrangements to convene a Forum as described in paragraph 3 above. Regional tensions have slowed the process of consultations with States of the region about the Forum. The first priority has been to seek views on agenda and modalities from the States of the Middle East. Thereafter, the aim would be to ascertain the views of other interested parties. The Secretariat has attempted, over the last few months, to obtain the views of Middle East States. Most recently, the Secretariat has contacted all the Missions of the States of the Middle East to remind them that their views on the Forum would be welcomed.

17. Thus far, the Secretariat has received ideas about the Forum from seven States of the region, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, Sudan, Israel, Morocco and Iran. The relevant correspondence is reproduced in Annex 2.

18. It is clear from the letters that there appears to be no general measure of agreement on the scope of the agenda which a Forum would need to address. Jordan, Egypt, Morocco and Iran have sketched out ideas for the broad issues which the Forum would, in their view, need to focus on, leaving further refinement to the Director General. Israel has expressed the view that the Forum should focus on experience gained in Latin America. Sudan has made the point that an important first step is that Israel should become party to the NPT and place all its nuclear activities under safeguards. Iraq has reiterated the same point, stating also that the convening of the Forum is in its view of little intrinsic value until all States of the Middle East region have jointed the NPT. Iran takes the view that only Parties to the NPT, or which have “at least accepted the IAEA safeguards on their facilities, should have the right to participate in the Forum”. Reiterating many of the ideas in its letter of 26 August 1999 to the Director General, Morocco stresses that the full application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East region is distinct from, and not necessarily an intrinsic part of any regional peace settlement.

2 Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, Mauritania, Oman, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen.
19. The Secretariat will continue consultations with States of the Middle East and other interested States in order to harmonize views on the agenda and modalities of the Forum with a view to convening the Forum, and will report the outcome to next year’s General Conference.
TEXT OF LETTER OF 03 OCTOBER 2000 FROM THE
MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS
OF THE REPUBLIC OF SUDAN
ADDRESSED TO THE DIRECTOR GENERAL
OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

00-30488 (108)
Translated from Arabic

MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS
Republic of Sudan
Office of the Minister

Ref. No.: 27/4/1

Dear Mr. ElBaradei,

With reference to your letter No. 121-MI.13.4 of 19 June 2000 and its attachment, including your request for comments on the application of the IAEA’s safeguards system to all nuclear activities in the Middle East as a step towards preparing a treaty establishing the Middle East as a nuclear-weapon-free-zone, I should like to make the following points:

1. Sudan very much welcomes consultations with you on the subject of safeguards pursuant to several resolutions adopted by the Agency’s General Conference in this connection;

2. Sudan fully supports the Agency’s efforts to implement the safeguards system as an important step towards the preparation of a treaty to establish the Middle East as a nuclear-weapon-free zone on the understanding that the safeguards system that is to be applied shall be the system adopted by the Agency and signed by Sudan, which gives the State concerned the right to know the names, nationalities, and qualifications of the inspectors and the right to veto any of them;

3. It should be noted that we are currently participating in the efforts being made by the League of Arab States to prepare a treaty establishing the Middle East as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. It goes without saying that the application of the safeguards system will be an important step towards the preparation of such a treaty and compliance with it. We hope that the efforts of the League of Arab States will have your support through the Arab Group in the Agency;

4. It is well known that all States in the Middle East have signed and ratified the NPT with the exception of Israel, which continues to refuse to allow the Agency to inspect its nuclear installations and is the only nuclear Power in the Middle East. Sudan strongly supports the efforts of the Arab Group in the Agency to monitor Israel’s nuclear activities. We hope that the Agency will continue to urge Israel to comply with the Agency’s safeguards system and accede to the NPT;

Mr. M. ElBaradei
Director General
IAEA
TEXT OF LETTER OF 03 MAY 2001 FROM THE
EMBASSY OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN
ADDRESSED TO THE OFFICE OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS
OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

Reference is made to your letter addressed to H.E. Mr. Hassan Mohamed Makki, Ambassador of Yemen and Dean of Arab Ambassadors dated March 3, 2001 regarding the General Conference resolution (44)DEC/12 on the Application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East and the convening of a forum for participants from the Middle East.

After consulting with my Government on this issue I have been instructed to inform you that Jordan wishes the IAEA Secretariat to do its utmost and to maximize its effort in order to allow for such an important forum to take place. The Government of Jordan sees the convening of such a forum as an important opportunity and believes it will prove beneficiary to all the parties.

My Authorities are of the view that the time is now right to hold consultations on the points that are to be included on the Agenda of the forum. In this context, the following points stated below have been suggested by our side as also being important and as being part and parcel of the forum:

1. The importance of confidence building measures, transparency and the exchange of information between all the parties of the region in the nuclear field.
2. Learning and benefiting from the experiences of other regional groups in applying the IAEA Safeguards on all nuclear activities in that region.
3. Practical steps that need to be taken in order to achieve a Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.
4. The positive consequences of joining the NPT by all countries in the region and particularly as related to CBM’s and reducing the threat of nuclear proliferation.
5. Ways and means for exploring security considerations and cooperating so as to accommodate the needs of all concerned parties.

I look forward to hearing from you regarding the above-mentioned points and trust that you will hold the necessary consultation needed for the convening of the forum.
With reference to your letter of 20 March 2001 addressed to Ambassador Hasson Makki, Dean of Arab Group in Vienna, concerning the issue of the Forum referred to in the Presidential statement GC (44)DEC/12, issued in the context of the resolution on “Application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East”, during the 44th session of the General Conference of the IAEA in September 2000, I have the pleasure to bring to your attention the following considerations:

The Arab Republic of Egypt emphasizes that the objective of convening such a Forum should be to address the principal matter, namely the application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East.

The Arab Republic of Egypt looks forward to participating in the Secretariat’s process of consultations as regards the substantial matters associated with the convening of the Forum, in particular its agenda. In this context, the Arab Republic of Egypt proposes that the following items be included on the Forum’s Agenda:

1. Confidence building measures and increase in transparency, specifically in the nuclear domain, among the regional parties.
2. Practical experience gained by other regions in the application of the comprehensive safeguards system on regional nuclear activities and the benefits derived from such application in terms of eliminating the risks of nuclear proliferation.
3. Practical measures for implementing the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East along the same guidelines and principles applied by other regional nuclear weapon-free zones.
4. Implications of the adherence of all regional parties to the NPT, in the context of enhancing Confidence Building Measures and diminishing the threat of nuclear proliferation.
5. Ways and means of exploring security considerations of all regional parties, in particular in the nuclear field, and cooperating to achieve harmonization of such considerations.

Finally, we would appreciate being kept appraised by the IAEA Secretariat on the outcome of its consultations on this subject. Other procedural matters, such as the timing, venue, and the participants list, would be agreed upon at a subsequent stage after due consideration of the substantial matters.

I would like to take this opportunity to express to you my highest consideration.
TEXT OF LETTER OF 03 JULY 2001 FROM THE
EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ
ADDRESSED TO THE OFFICE OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS
OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

Thank you for your letter of 27th June 2001 (addressed to the Ambassador), which reflects the need of discussing the crucial and important issue of (( Application of IAEA safeguards in the middle east )) and suggesting to “ convene a forum ” to discuss (( the establishment of nuclear-weapon free-zone. ))

In response to the subject, allow me to point out that the core and major issue in this regard is “ Israel Nuclear capabilities ”. It is the only party in the region acquires nuclear capabilities, and as if now refuses to sign the comprehensive safeguard system , signed by all states in the area.

Israel, though fully aware and with complete knowledge of the devastating dangers and catastrophes resulting from storing or using nuclear capabilities, refuses to comply or abides by any treaty, accord, charter issued by the International Community related to the issue.

It is not a “forum” that would yield an objective results or a salvation to this crucial issue. The main endeavour and the one and only action accepted that would relief the area from the devastating dangerous and horrors of acquiring “nuclear capabilities” is to urge the International Organizations (as a duty and responsibility towards humanity and mankind) to practice continuous pressure over Israel to comply and abide by all treaties, accords, resolution taken in this regard, and to subject all its nuclear reactors and establishments to the ((Comprehensive Safeguards System.))

If Israel would not comply and abide by those International treaties, accords, charters; definitely no confidence – building measures could be presented for discussion, and any discussion to the subject matter at any “forum” would be in vain, and consequently would lead to “zero” results.
Reference is made to your fax dated 27 June 2001. Regarding the safeguards in the Middle East, I would like to deliver the following comments:

1) The Sudan welcomes the Consultation with the Agency on this issue that in order to implement the Resolutions adopted by the General Conference about the comprehensive implication of the IAEA Safeguards System to the Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East.

2) We support all the efforts exerted by the IAEA on this aspect. These efforts which will lead to prepare a model treaty through which the Middle East will be a nuclear weapon-free-zone.

3) Regarding the fact that the Middle East countries signed the NPT’s except Israel which always rejects to sign or even to let the IAEA investigating and checking its nuclear premises, Sudan urges the International Community to exert all necessary pressure on Israel to sign NPT and put its nuclear activities under surveillance. We think this is an important step towards removing the double standards treatment between the countries of the area.

In this connection, the Sudan refers to the Draft Resolution on Israeli Nuclear capabilities and threat which is submitted every year by most of the Arab Missions in Vienna which can help very much in identifying this problem.
Based on decision GC(44)/DEC/12 of the 44th Regular Session of the General Conference and further to your letter of June 27, 2001 regarding inputs for developing agenda and modalities for the Forum, I am happy to transmit my Government’s views as follows:

1. The Forum will be organized as a seminar open to all interested parties.

2. The seminar should focus on experience gained in other regions with special emphasis on the prerequisites for the successful development and establishment of zones free of nuclear weapons. It should cover the political and security conditions prevailing in the regions and the confidence building measures that could facilitate the creation of NWFZs freely arrived at and based on mutual verification.

3. It is my Government’s view, that the experience gained in Latin America in this respect, could be most valuable. It is therefore suggested that the seminar be focused on the ABACC experience.

4. As the seminar’s objective is learning from the experience of Latin America, specifically ABACC’s experience, no Middle East issues will be addressed.

5. Presentations, relevant to Latin America, will be made by officials, technical experts and academicians from State Parties to ABACC, OPANAL, IAEA and others.

6. Government officials will participate as experts in non-formal capacity.

7. The seminar will also include site visits, in order to provide the participants with a vivid impression of the mutual verification regime complemented by IAEA safeguards.

8. We suggest that the seminar be hosted by ABACC.

9. The agenda and modalities will be developed by the IAEA in agreement with States of the Middle East and other interested parties.

Please find attached Israel’s proposal for the seminar’s agenda.
Seminar on Latin America NWFZ
Proposed agenda

1. Overview of the regional situation which led to the establishment of NWFZ in Latin America
   - Political, strategic and security situation prevailing in the region (intra-state and inter-state)
   - Confidence and security building measures
   - Establishment of peaceful relations and reconciliation among the nations.

2. The Bilateral dimension: Evolution of the Argentinean-Brazilian rapprochement
   - The process and steps of confidence building measures between Argentina and Brazil
   - The development of the political dialogue and the negotiation phases
   - ABACC- its mandate, mission and structure. Review of the safeguards and monitoring implementation process, the track records and the lessons learned with an emphasis on the technical methods.

3. The Quadripartite Agreement
   - Coordination and implementation activities between IAEA and ABACC- the political and organizational dimension
   - The technical verification and inspection role performed by IAEA – its nature, experience, complimentarity and co-existence
   - The nature, structure and exercise of the political authority dealing with violations and settlement of disputes.

4. The regional dimension
   The integration of ABACC and Quadripartite agreement into the political framework and the verification regime (OPANAL).

Participation and presentations made by government officials will be in their non-formal capacity.
Ref. No.: LA/AA/244

The Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Morocco to the international organizations in Vienna presents its compliments to the International Atomic Energy Agency and, with reference to its letter No. 21250 of 27 June 2001 relating to the organization of a forum on the application of safeguards in the Middle East, has the honour to inform it of the following:

1. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation sent a letter of reply to the Director General’s letter of 10 May 1999 setting out the Kingdom of Morocco’s position regarding the application of safeguards in the Middle East. This position remains unchanged, despite the political developments which have occurred in the region since that date. The Kingdom of Morocco would like the forum to consider four main points:

   a. Delimitation of the Middle East region;

   b. Application of the safeguards regime;

   c. Specific confidence-building measures and responsibilities;

   d. Surveillance and inspection measures.

   a. The draft agreement prepared by a technical committee of the League of Arab States to establish the Middle East as a zone free of weapons of mass destruction proposes that the region should cover all the territories of Member States of the League of Arab States as well as Iran and Israel. Turkey is also being proposed for inclusion in this region.

   b. The Kingdom of Morocco remains convinced that the application of comprehensive safeguards in the region is a separate issue, regardless of the political situation and the developments that may occur in the context of the peace process. The same holds true for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. There are two main reasons for holding this belief:
1. The application of the comprehensive safeguards regime is an international objective and a factor consolidating peace and security in the world. Therefore, it not only affects the countries of the region, although it is a matter of absolute priority there, but should also concern all States.

2. The conclusion by all the countries of the Middle East region, including Israel, of comprehensive safeguards agreements would constitute a step towards building a climate of confidence among the States of the region and a preliminary measure to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

c. With regard to specific measures to strengthen responsibilities, the Kingdom of Morocco considers there are three types of obligation: those belonging to the Agency, and those following from the obligations of the States of the region and of the nuclear-Weapon States. For them to be implemented, it is essential for States to abide by the relevant United Nations resolutions. The Kingdom of Morocco itself holds the opinion that it is essential to draw upon the agreements related to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, in particular the Pelindaba Treaty signed in Cairo in July 1996. It is worth mentioning that the Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1995 and 2000 passed two decisions on the Middle East as a clear expression of the concern of the States Party to the Treaty about the dangers in the region resulting from undeclared nuclear activities and nuclear installations not subject to the Agency’s comprehensive safeguards regime.

- The Agency’s obligations are determined by Article III.A.5 of its Statute, which requires the Agency “to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State’s activities in the field of atomic energy”.

Furthermore, these obligations have been confirmed by operative paragraph 5 of resolution GC(44)/RES/28 requesting “the Director General to continue consultations with the States of the Middle East [to facilitate the early] application of [full-scope] Agency safeguards…”.

- Obligations of States of the region are laid down in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the same resolution.
• Paragraph 8 of resolution GC(44)/RES/28, for its part, refers to the commitment of "all …. States, especially those with a special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, to render all assistance to the Director General …".

d. With regard to inspection and surveillance measures, the Kingdom of Morocco believes that the International Atomic Energy Agency remains, in accordance with its Statute, the principal body responsible for the application of the comprehensive safeguards regime and the measures likely to appear in the agreement establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

It should be noted that the African Arab States are subject to the provisions specified in the Pelindaba Treaty.

Finally, the Kingdom of Morocco believes that even if some of the measures could be implemented autonomously, others nevertheless remain linked to the political situation and to potential developments in the process which seeks to find a just and lasting peace for all peoples of the region.

The Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Morocco to the international organizations in Vienna takes this opportunity of reiterating to the International Atomic Energy Agency the assurances of its highest esteem.

Vienna, 5 July 2001

[Stamp of the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Morocco, Vienna]
The Permanent Mission of Islamic Republic of Iran to the International Atomic Energy Agency presents its compliments to the Agency’s Secretariat and with reference to your letter dated 2001-06-27 on GC(44)/DES/12 “the Application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East” has the honour to express its views as follows:

- The 1974 Iranian initiation for the establishment of Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East prepared a common ground for the application of IAEA Safeguards in the region. Bearing in mind the importance of establishment of such a zone and application of IAEA safeguards, the Islamic Republic of Iran has always pursued the establishment of Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East through negotiations at bilateral, regional and international levels and has provided substantial contributions to UNGA resolutions, NPT Review and Extension Conference Resolution (1995), OIC Summits Resolutions etc.

- Despite the fact that the international community and the countries in the region have expressed their strong determination to establish the said Zone, the nuclear policy of the Zionist regime and its unsafeguarded facilities pose the only impediment for the establishment of the nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East.

- In the light of above, with regard to the Forum modalities, the Islamic Republic of Iran is of the opinion that in the Middle East, only parties to the NPT or those who have at least accepted the IAEA safeguards on their facilities, should have the right to participate in the Forum. This also includes the other interested NPT parties.

- The five nuclear weapon states should be invited to the Forum.

- Agenda of the Forum shall consist of the following:
  a. Report of the Director-General on number of states and facilities who have accepted safeguard agreements with the IAEA and are supervised by IAEA safeguards.
  b. Report of the Director-General on those who have not accepted safeguard agreements with IAEA and their facilities are unsafeguarded.
  c. Presentation by other regional nuclear weapons free-zone organizations such as OPANOL, with a view to exchange the ideas and to examine the experiences in the field of establishment of nuclear weapons free zones.
  d. Exploring the ways and means by which those who have opposed IAEA safeguard agreements to be forced to place their facilities under IAEA safeguard.

The Permanent Mission of Islamic Republic of Iran to the International Atomic Energy Agency avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Agency’s Secretariat the assurances of its highest consideration.