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RECORD OF THE FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

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President: Mr. OTHMAN (Syrian Arab Republic)

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[*] GC(44)/21.

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC(44)/INF/18/Rev.2.

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Abbreviations used in this record

ARCAL	Co-operation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean
Bangkok Treaty	Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
G-7	Group of Seven [leading industrial countries]
IPPAS	International Physical Protection Advisory Service
IRRT	International Regulatory Review Team
ISOE	Information System on Occupational Exposure
MOX	Mixed oxide
NEA	Nuclear Energy Agency (of OECD)
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT Review Conference	Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
OECD/NEA	Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPANAL	Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
OSART	Operational Safety Review Team
PAEC	Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission
RCA	Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (for Asia and the Pacific)
R&D	Research and development
RIA	Radioimmunoassay
SAGTAC	Standing Advisory Group on Technical Assistance and Co-operation
SMR	Small and medium-sized reactor
TCF	Technical Co-operation Fund
Tlatelolco Treaty	Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
Transport Regulations	Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1999 (continued)
(GC(44)/4)

1. Mr. RAMAKER (Netherlands), after welcoming Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and the Central African Republic to membership of the Agency, said that the most important development in the past year had been the successful outcome of the NPT Review Conference. The fact that all the parties to the Treaty had produced a consensus document addressing all aspects of nuclear policy could not fail to exert a positive impact on the Agency's work.

2. Having signed its additional protocol two years previously together with its European partners, and having ratified it in the meantime, the Netherlands welcomed the steady growth in the number of additional protocols concluded. At the same time, considering a strong non-proliferation regime to be a major factor in establishing global peace, security and stability, the Netherlands shared the Director General's concern that the number of States which had concluded additional protocols, including those without full-scope safeguards, had fallen far short of expectations. A reinforced and integrated safeguards system was essential to the Agency's effective and credible functioning, and constituted a main pillar of the existing non-proliferation regime.

3. The Netherlands, regarding the Agency as the custodian of non-proliferation, looked forward to its expanding its activities in relation to the verification of nuclear material arising from the dismantling of nuclear weapons. The recent decision by the United States and the Russian Federation each to convert a further 34 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium to peaceful uses would offer such an opportunity. Given that the cost would be well beyond the Agency's current capacity, the two States directly involved would bear a special responsibility although other States should be prepared to contribute as well, since the conversion of nuclear material to peaceful uses benefited the entire world.

4. The Netherlands was also concerned at the cash-flow problems the Agency was experiencing in its efforts to finance its pivotal role in the field of nuclear safety and technical co-operation. The main cause was the increasing backlog in the payment of contributions by Member States. He called on those countries which had not met their financial obligations to do so in full, unconditionally and without delay. For its part, the Government of the Netherlands had decided to provide additional extrabudgetary funds to support the current year's safeguards programme.

5. Turning to the energy situation in his country, he said his Government's policy was geared to energy conservation, renewable energy sources and market liberalization. One of its main objectives was to increase the share of renewables in total primary energy consumption from its current level of 1% to 10% by the year 2020. The Netherlands now had only one nuclear power plant, at Borssele, which would stay in operation until the end of 2003. Following an in-depth study of the decommissioning options for the Dodewaard reactor which had been closed down in 1997, Parliament had recently selected a policy of postponed decommissioning lasting no more than 50 years as being the financially most viable option.

6. Other parts of the nuclear fuel cycle played a significant and successful role in the Netherlands economy. One of the major players was Urenco Nederland, which employed advanced gas ultracentrifuge technology for uranium enrichment purposes. The company, which had recently opened a fifth separation plant at the Almelo site, also used its technology in spin-off activities in the aerospace market and performed stable isotope enrichment for nuclear and medical applications.

7. Through the Nuclear Research Group of the Netherlands, his country also operated the High Flux Reactor at Petten on behalf of the European Commission. In recent years, a centre of excellence had been created around the reactor, which was one of the most powerful multi-purpose materials testing facilities in the world. With the focus mainly on medical applications, the site's interaction with the pharmaceutical industry, with several hospitals in Europe and with numerous international teams had transformed Petten into Europe's "Medical Valley". As the major European producer of medical radioisotopes the reactor had already benefited millions of patients within and outside Europe. Petten also provided other therapeutic treatments such as boron neutron capture therapy, which was currently undergoing trials involving brain cancer patients.

8. In conclusion, he wished the Conference every success, and observed that the potential of atomic energy must still be regarded with an appropriate combination of elation and caution.

9. Mr. I.H. UMAR (Nigeria) said his delegation attached great importance to the peaceful uses of nuclear science and its applications, which had served as a valuable instrument for promoting sustainable development, particularly in developing Member States, across a wide range of activities. In Nigeria, the Agency's ongoing projects complemented the Government's activities in healthcare delivery systems, radiotherapy and oncology, nuclear activation analysis, neonatal hypothyroidism screening, monitoring of pesticide residues in foodstuffs, cross-breeding of indigenous cattle for milk production, and monitoring of workers' exposure to environmental hazards.

10. Despite being a major oil producer, Nigeria acknowledged the advantages of nuclear energy and wished to keep that option open. In that regard, his country was deeply grateful to the Agency for its valuable assistance in initiating the project to install and operate a miniature neutron source reactor. Although its commissioning had been delayed for administrative and technical reasons, Nigeria was convinced that they would be resolved in due course. Within the framework of the development of an energy master plan for Nigeria, the Agency had provided training for two Nigerians under the Energy and Power Evaluation Programme. Nigeria hoped for similar contributions to its future efforts to optimize a mixed energy policy. As a sign of Nigeria's commitment to such programmes, he was pleased to announce that his Government had pledged the full amount of its contribution to the TCF.

11. In the firm belief that the Agency's safeguards system was central to global non-proliferation, peace and security, his delegation welcomed the final document of the recent NPT Review Conference in which, for the first time, the nuclear-weapon States had made an unequivocal commitment to nuclear disarmament. His delegation looked forward to

that being translated into action, particularly in the light of the continuing existence of over 30 000 nuclear warheads, the absence of a timetable for disarmament, the escalation of the arms race in outer space, and the slow pace of progress on a fissile material cut-off treaty.

12. Nigeria had recently signed the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and was proceeding with their ratification. Having also concluded the additional protocol to its safeguards agreement with the Agency, Nigeria noted with regret that the number of States which had done likewise had fallen far below expectations, particularly as universal accession was so vitally important to the effectiveness of the integrated safeguards system. He called on those countries yet to conclude an additional protocol to do so, and confirmed his Government's intention to re-examine all the disarmament treaties it had not yet signed or ratified with a view to becoming more actively involved in them.

13. Nigeria firmly endorsed the Agency's long-standing objective of establishing international standards for protection against the harmful effects of ionizing radiation. Since it did not yet have a nuclear regulatory authority, it welcomed the Agency's proposal to initiate a new Model Project concerned with the upgrading of radiation protection infrastructures.

14. Turning to the contentious issues of funding for technical co-operation and for safeguards, he welcomed the fact that Member States had eventually found sufficient common ground to build a consensus. However, it should not be forgotten that the ending of the safeguards shielding system had entailed considerable political sacrifice on the part of the developing Member States, whose contribution to the safeguards component in the Regular Budget had doubled while financing for technical co-operation still remained uncertain because of its voluntary nature. The long debate on those two equally important Agency activities had been characterized by a spirit of fairness, honesty and transparency that he hoped would be maintained. In particular, he urged all Member States to consolidate the areas of consensus. The debate had also highlighted the close relationship between the two issues, and he called on all Member States to observe fully both their legal obligation to contribute to safeguards funding and their moral and political commitment to the TCF. A collective effort would also be required to solve the Agency's current cash-flow problem so that its programmes could continue to be implemented efficiently and effectively.

15. In conclusion, he said there were certain fundamental development problems affecting his country and region which the Agency had the potential to alleviate. They included malaria, whose impact might be reduced if the sterile insect technique would be adapted to mosquito control and eradication; the incidence of solid cancer among the developing world's growing elderly population, which the Agency could help alleviate by strengthening the radiation therapy infrastructure of the Member States concerned; and finally de-mining, where nuclear techniques could perhaps be used to locate some of the over 60 million abandoned landmines now buried in 62 countries, which were killing or maiming some 26 000 people every year, 80% of them civilians.

16. Mr. CHIDAMBARAM (India) read out the following message on behalf of the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee:

> "We have emerged from the Millennium Summit of the United Nations with a redoubled resolve to work for balanced and sustainable socio-economic development for our people. The energy of the atom can be harnessed to further this agenda. Nuclear power provides an important and clean energy option for mitigating the energy shortfalls in the developing world. Last year, we in India commissioned two modern nuclear power reactors, built with indigenous technology and expertise. We have also succeeded in increasing the average capacity factor in our nuclear power plants to a figure of 80%. Scientific research has uncovered beneficial applications of radioisotopes and radiation in agriculture, medicine and industry.
>
> "Together with ensuring safety and monitoring safeguards, we believe that the IAEA has an important role in promoting technological capabilities among its Member States for these developmental goals. As a founder member of the Agency, India would extend its fullest support to these endeavours.
>
> "I take this opportunity to wish the 44th General Conference of the IAEA all success in its deliberations."

17. India believed that under the Statute the main objective of the Agency's activities was to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity worldwide, and that nuclear safety and safeguards constituted important and necessary supporting activities, with technology always the prime consideration.

18. His delegation endorsed the priority assigned in the Medium Term Strategy to the role of nuclear energy in the context of sustainable development, which reflected the recommendations of the Scientific Forum held during the previous session of the General Conference. His delegation also appreciated the Director General's efforts to establish a task force on enhancing the role of innovative nuclear reactors and fuel cycles in sustainable development. India would like to see such activities incorporated into the Agency's regular programme. In the context of nuclear power sustainability, India considered that expert discussions on the technical, financial and environmental aspects of the various nuclear fuel cycle options could contribute meaningfully to the Medium Term Strategy. Like other Member States of the Group of 77, India therefore welcomed the creation of the Nuclear Technology Review, its inclusion in the agendas of the Board of Governors and the General Conference, and the appointment of standing advisory groups on nuclear energy and on nuclear science and applications.

19. The substantial increase in oil prices and the level of international commitment to the Kyoto Protocol meant it was likely that some countries which had seen a slow-down in their nuclear power development programmes would reverse their policies. For its part, a country as large as India needed to achieve rapid growth in nuclear electricity generation capacity in order to satisfy rapidly growing demand.

20. Given its limited uranium resources and the need to ensure long-term energy security, India had opted for a closed nuclear fuel cycle policy based on a fast-breeder reactor programme, the use of thorium, and the associated fuel reprocessing and refabrication plants. The requisite technological resources derived mainly from a strong R&D programme centred around the 15-year-old fast breeder test reactor at Kalpakkam; its unique and indigenously developed mixed uranium-plutonium carbide fuel had performed extremely well, reaching a maximum burnup of over 53 000 MW·d/t without any failures. Construction of a 500 MW(e) prototype fast-breeder reactor was under way. The ^{233}U fuelled Kamini research reactor was also operating successfully. The use of a closed fuel cycle had also brought significant environmental benefits, since it generated very low amounts of high-level waste.

21. At the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, work was proceeding on the design and development of an advanced heavy water reactor fuelled by plutonium and uranium-233. The reactor, which would incorporate several advanced safety and control features and was designed to facilitate thorium utilization, was part of India's efforts to develop innovative reactor and fuel cycle designs for sustainable nuclear development. For the future, India looked towards increased installed capacity based on state-of-the-art thermal and fast reactors, with continuing emphasis placed on safety improvement. In that regard, his delegation welcomed the recent acknowledgement by Russia's President Putin at the United Nations Millennium Summit that the most rapid growth in energy production over the next century would occur in the developing countries, and that proliferation-resistant new nuclear technologies would need to be developed in order to reduce the ecological damage caused by greenhouse gases and to conserve existing fossil fuel reserves for non-electricity uses. The Agency, with its worldwide membership encompassing a large number of developing Member States, bore a collective responsibility to find technological solutions for such problems.

22. India was also pursuing research in non-grid-based nuclear applications such as desalination, process heat generation, and the production of non-fossil fuels and compact portable power packs. As a prelude to the larger-scale use of MOX fuel in thermal reactors, such fuel had been introduced on a limited basis in the boiling water reactors at Tarapur. Performance had been good, and the discharged assemblies were now undergoing post-irradiation examination. The experience of plutonium recycling gained to date was also important in the context of India's long-term interest in thorium, which it regarded as particularly well suited to large-scale nuclear power deployment.

23. India also continued to invest in fundamental research, for example in plasma physics, and would be pleased to participate, on the basis of its experience, in the international efforts to develop fusion power.

24. Turning to the Memorandum of Understanding signed between the Agency and the OECD/NEA, he emphasized that the strengthening of synergies anticipated by the Senior Expert Group would only come about in an atmosphere of full transparency. While that might happen in the case of specific activities pertaining to areas of common interest and co-operation, both agencies were responsible for their own activities, in accordance with their

own statutory functions, and so it would be desirable not to mention "single Agency activities" in the Memorandum.

25. With regard to the financing of technical assistance, he said it was vital that all Member States should pledge and pay in full, particularly the major donors. Instead, the gap between pledges and actual contributions was widening. His country regarded technical co-operation funding as a moral obligation, rather than a purely voluntary matter, and therefore always pledged in full and paid on time. India would also like the Agency's technical co-operation programme to place greater emphasis on the promotion of self-reliance among developing Member States so that they became less dependent on the developed countries.

26. India also wished to see an improvement in the quality of safeguards implementation. Great technological advances had taken place since 1971 when the new inspection regime had been put in place, and it was time to examine whether the technological progress could not be reflected in the quality and quantity of inspection effort, with a corresponding reduction in cost. The argument that increased safeguards efforts had to be accommodated automatically as they were mandatory requirements under agreements signed in connection with the NPT brought into question the differences between statutory and mandatory activities. In that regard, since nuclear promotion was a basic statutory objective of the Agency, his delegation wondered why only 5.9% of the Regular Budget was allocated for an activity as important as nuclear power.

27. India appreciated the Agency's efforts to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. However, clandestine acquisition of sensitive technology and materials was known to have occurred in India's region, thus clearly demonstrating that prevention required real commitment by Member States. In relation to both physical protection measures and export controls, India had an exemplary record that reflected its stringent law-based system.

28. The stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction held by those that had been the first to build up such deadly arsenals remained at alarmingly high levels. India continued to press with undiminished commitment for universal, verifiable nuclear disarmament, while safeguarding its strategic space and its autonomy in decision-making. International peace could not be separated from the need for equal and legitimate security for all.

29. The beginning of a new millennium was an opportunity to take a fresh look at the role of nuclear power. It was time to dispel the public's prejudices and fears about reactor safety and the management of long-lived radioactive waste, since technological solutions were now available for both of those issues. The Agency's Member States must pool their collective wisdom and scientific knowledge in order to maximize the use of nuclear technology in addressing the challenges of global development.

30. Mr. KIENER (Switzerland), speaking also on behalf of Liechtenstein, welcomed the adoption by the recent NPT Review Conference of a balanced final declaration. Given the disparities that existed in the world nuclear order, and as long as the risk of new horizontal or vertical proliferation remained, the international community must spare no effort in that area.

31. Switzerland was concerned at the imbalance between the lack of progress in achieving the objectives of Article VI of the NPT, on the one hand, and the implementation of other parts of the Treaty affecting the non-nuclear-weapon States, in particular Articles II and III, on the other hand. The decision taken at the 1995 NPT Review Conference to extend the Treaty must be translated into a movement towards disarmament, and not simply result in an indefinite extension of the status quo to the benefit of the nuclear Powers.

32. Having recently signed an additional protocol to its safeguards agreement, Switzerland looked forward to the establishment of an integrated safeguards system that offered greater efficiency based on reduced implementation costs.

33. The Swiss Parliament had recently ratified the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, which Switzerland considered to be an essential element in the context of the ongoing efforts to formulate framework conditions for international storage of nuclear waste. Switzerland regarded the concept as particularly applicable to highly radioactive waste. The countries interested in joint storage would need to fulfil certain prior conditions, including the establishment of a potential national storage site. Switzerland's research into high-level waste storage over the past year had focused on clay formations. The next stage of that programme would be to demonstrate that a viable site for high-level waste disposal existed in Switzerland.

34. In that context, a group of experts investigating models of radioactive waste management had published a report at the beginning of the year concluding that only deep geological disposal could satisfy long-term safety requirements, and that a test gallery should be drilled on a priority basis at the Wellenberg site, which had been selected for the storage of low- and medium-level waste. The opponents of radioactive waste storage in Switzerland had welcomed the group's conclusions, thus giving reason to hope that the public debate had finally moved on after several years at a stand-still. However, not wanting to weaken their political position, those opponents remained reluctant to accept fully the conclusions of the expert group study.

35. Work on the construction of Switzerland's intermediate nuclear waste storage centre had recently been completed, and the Government had authorized its commissioning.

36. The revision of Switzerland's law on atomic energy had reached the consultation stage, and several different points of view had been communicated to the Government. Issues such as limiting the lifetime of nuclear power plants and banning nuclear fuel reprocessing had been hotly contested. On the other hand, the idea of keeping the nuclear option open and holding a referendum, if requested, on any proposal to build a new power plant had been well received. But it was clear that the Swiss population was still divided on nuclear energy.

37. A year had passed since the resumption of rail transport of spent fuel elements, following a stoppage of several months. The Swiss safety authorities reported that the measures taken to reduce contamination had been successful and that no excess levels had been detected on transports since their resumption.

38. In conclusion, he assured the Director General of Switzerland's support for the Agency's efforts to provide assured, equitable and predictable funding for technical co-operation. As always, Switzerland would pay its full contribution to the TCF. On the other hand, Switzerland continued to believe that a budget based on zero nominal growth represented the best way forward for the Agency.

39. Mr. VAITKUS (Lithuania), after welcoming the new members to the Agency and associating himself with the statement made on behalf of the European Union and associated countries, said that the past year had seen many changes relating to nuclear energy in his country. In particular, good results had been achieved in upgrading safety at the Ignalina nuclear power plant to bring it in line with international standards. Moreover, Parliament had adopted a national energy strategy in October 1999 which provided for a comprehensive assessment of the technical, economic and political factors affecting the plant's future operation. Under the terms and conditions of considerable long-term financial and technical assistance offered by the European Union, the G-7 countries, individual States and international financial institutions, the decision had been taken to shut down Unit 1 at Ignalina by 2005. The action plan for implementing the national energy strategy, which was being developed in co-operation with appropriate international institutions, would focus on the provision of new electricity resources, including potential ones based on nuclear energy. A review of the national energy strategy plan would be conducted in 2004.

40. During the remaining years of operation of Ignalina Unit 1, adequate safety levels would be maintained in accordance with the licence issued by the national regulatory authority. All aspects of the decommissioning would be co-ordinated by a commission comprising representatives of the organizations concerned. However, as Lithuania did not possess the resources to cope with the unusual and complicated problems involved in decommissioning an RBMK-type nuclear reactor, especially in areas that called for thorough expertise and safety assessments, it hoped for long-term and continuous support from the international community, and to that end had recently held an international conference for financial donors. He thanked the Agency for attending that event, and for its timely and positive response in formulating a technical co-operation project to support the decommissioning process.

41. Since Lithuania did not intend to renounce nuclear energy totally, it welcomed the Agency's intention to set up a task force on innovative reactors and fuel cycles. Its electricity grid being small, Lithuania was particularly interested in new SMRs.

42. Lithuania strongly supported the Agency's activities in the sphere of non-proliferation. Convinced that the new safeguards measures to be implemented under additional protocols would play an important role in the future, Lithuania had recently ratified its additional protocol and urged other countries to do likewise as soon as possible. In that context, it also welcomed the Agency's efforts to monitor the separation and export of neptunium and americium.

43. Turning to the question of physical protection, he thanked the Agency for the IPPAS mission to Lithuania and the assistance rendered in implementing its recommendations. His

country supported the calls for discussions on a revision of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and hoped that a common approach to the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities would be arrived at.

44. His Government fully recognized the importance of export controls as a means of curbing nuclear proliferation and had recently adopted resolutions following the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group with regard to international transfers of nuclear material, equipment and technology and dual-use equipment, materials, software and related technology.

45. Another important example of Lithuania's adapting national legislation to internationally accepted principles had been its ratification of the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency earlier in the year.

46. The Agency's valuable assistance under the technical co-operation programme in recent years had enabled Lithuania to make significant progress in the areas of radiation source management, nuclear medicine, radiotherapy, nuclear power planning and training of nuclear power plant personnel. The number of specialists from Member States undergoing training in Lithuania was also increasing steadily and he was pleased to announce that Lithuania was able to pledge a voluntary contribution for the year 2001.

47. Finally, he wished to mention that the participation by representatives of Lithuania's regulatory authorities and nuclear facilities in the NEA's ISOE programme had led to reductions in occupational exposure levels. He looked forward to further participation in that programme, which would help strengthen decision-making in his country in the area of radiation protection and nuclear safety.

48. Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan) said his country had always pursued the goals of non-proliferation and disarmament with sincerity. Only security fears resulting from the nuclear tests conducted in its neighbourhood in 1998 had forced Pakistan to demonstrate its nuclear capability. Having conducted its nuclear tests for the sake of peace and stability in South Asia, Pakistan was determined not to enter into an arms race, and would act with utmost restraint in maintaining its nuclear deterrent at the minimum possible level. It had now declared a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, and attempts were under way to build a national consensus on accession to the CTBT. Pakistan had also taken concrete steps with regard to the export of sensitive nuclear technology.

49. Nuclear power was the means by which nuclear technology achieved its greatest impact on socio-economic development. Against the global trend, nuclear power was on the increase in Asia, which looked set to become the future repository of nuclear power expertise. Nuclear power would have developed even faster in Asia had technology transfer not been blocked, even in cases affecting the safety of installations and at facilities under Agency safeguards. As a country with low fossil-fuel reserves, Pakistan had no alternative but to look to nuclear power, and it was grateful to China for supplying the 300 MW(e) Chashma plant, which was now fully operational, and to the Agency for helping to assess the plant's safety features through pre-OSART and other missions.

50. Pakistan welcomed the holding of scientific forums concurrently with the General Conference and considered the current one, on radioactive waste management, highly relevant in the context of public fears about the safety of nuclear power and waste disposal technology. Similarly, the scientific forum held the previous year had highlighted many important issues and had led to the establishment of the task force on innovative reactors and fuel cycles which Pakistan hoped would attract as broad a membership as possible.

51. In the face of an alarming increase in greenhouse gas emissions and growing evidence of global warming, nuclear power was the only existing replacement for coal. Although the amount of reactor operating experience accumulated worldwide and the increased stability, safety and economy of new reactor designs made nuclear power a viable, competitive and climate-friendly energy source, it had regrettably not been included in the Clean Development Mechanism. The Agency, as the only inter-governmental body dedicated to nuclear science and technology, therefore bore a heavy responsibility for developing a consensus among its Member States on the importance of nuclear power in the climate change scenario.

52. Now that the Convention on Nuclear Safety had been widely ratified, the Agency, which had already done so much to improve safety culture within the global nuclear community, should endeavour to provide the parties to the Convention with more co-operation and information relating to power reactor safety.

53. Pakistan endorsed the Agency's activities in the field of safeguards and looked forward to the introduction of an efficient and cost-effective integrated system. The safeguards on Pakistan's installations were operating to the Agency's satisfaction, and Pakistan had recently agreed to several proposals for further improvements, as well as acceding to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials.

54. Since supplies of fresh water would become increasingly scarce during the next century because of increasing population and industrialization, Pakistan urged the Agency to step up its efforts to promote nuclear techniques for the development and management of water resources for human, agricultural and industrial consumption.

55. He commended the Agency on its work to enhance food security based on specialized isotope and radiation techniques, which had led to an increase in cotton production and a surplus in wheat production in Pakistan.

56. The Abdus Salam International Centre for Theoretical Physics at Trieste had done much to promote scientific knowledge in developing countries, despite a meagre budget. Pakistan hoped that the Agency would continue to support the Centre and also revive its interest in its management.

57. He congratulated the Department of Technical Co-operation on the consistently high implementation rate achieved over successive years, and welcomed the fact that the Agency had accepted a number of SAGTAC's recommendations for enhancing the efficiency and usefulness of its technical co-operation activities. Pakistan had benefited greatly from such activities, and attempted for its part to contribute to them by providing training and expert services and facilities. In addition, he was pleased to announce that once again his

Government was able to pledge its full share of the TCF target. He also noted with gratification the agreement achieved on enhanced rates of attainment for contributions to the TCF and trusted it would lead to an acceleration of the Agency's technical co-operation activities.

58. The Agency's overall technical programme was endorsed by Member States in view of its importance and usefulness, but nevertheless its successful continuation depended on the provision of adequate resources. Unfortunately, for almost two decades the Agency's priorities had been inverted, with its technical programme subject to the artificial constraints of a zero-real-growth budget. It was time for delegations to devote fresh thought to the development of a programme-driven budget.

59. Recent developments in Pakistan with regard to the peaceful applications of nuclear energy included the successful commissioning of the Chashma nuclear power plant and the determined efforts which had been made to ensure the safe operation of the ageing Karachi plant. In agriculture, Pakistan's research institutes had developed and made available 35 varieties of cash crop and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) in particular was providing assistance in that area through the Agency to seven other developing countries. The PAEC had also continued to promote quality consciousness in local industry, and it had set up an isotope hydrology laboratory concerned mainly with the identification of underground water resources. In the area of human health, the PAEC had so far established twelve medical centres in all four of Pakistan's provinces offering specialized services in the fields of nuclear medicine, radiotherapy, oncology and RIA. Pakistan was also keeping abreast of developments in genetics through its Nuclear Institute for Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering, and it was particularly interested in collaborating with the Agency in applying information technology in the nuclear field.

60. In conclusion, he expressed appreciation of the Agency's efforts to keep its technical programme under continuing evaluation through the formation of standing advisory groups on nuclear applications and on nuclear energy, noting however that the recommendations of other groups such as SAGTAC and the Senior Expert Group had not yet been fully implemented, and that there appeared to be some overlap in the mandate of the various groups.

61. Ms. AL-MULLA (Kuwait), after welcoming the new Members, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan and the Central African Republic, said that one of the Agency's functions, according to its Statute, was to encourage research on and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world. Kuwait supported that role, particularly the Agency's promotion of comprehensive development plans in Member States and the use of nuclear technology in the areas of food security, agriculture, health and water resources. Kuwait's support for the Agency's technical development co-operation programme was reflected in its voluntary contribution for the year 2000. It was pleased that the Member States had agreed on a financing mechanism that took into account both the economic circumstances of the developing countries and the obligation to ensure the systematic funding of the Agency's programme.

62. The Agency played an extremely important role in strengthening nuclear safety and promoting the principle of transparency in dealing with any accidents that occurred. She urged it to continue to co-operate closely with other international organizations and interested parties in that area.

63. Safeguards were one of the pillars of the Agency and the safeguards system should be applied to all States of the Middle East region, including Israel. In that connection, Kuwait supported the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference and looked forward to reaching an agreement, as soon as possible, on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. It also urged the Agency to become more actively involved in furthering that goal. The removal of all weapons of mass destruction from the region - not only nuclear but also chemical and biological weapons - should be viewed as a concurrent or supplementary goal.

64. Kuwait attached great importance to the Agency's responsibilities vis-à-vis Iraq, not only because of its action to ensure compliance with Security Council resolutions but also because of Iraq's history of violations of the NPT, undeclared nuclear activities and concealment of relevant information from the Agency.

65. She noted with deep concern that the Agency's activities in Iraq pursuant to Security Council resolutions had been suspended since its team left Iraq on 16 December 1998. As the Agency was thus unaware of any dangerous activities that Iraq might have conducted in the meantime, the return of the team was urgently necessary. Moreover, Iraq continued to ignore Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), which reaffirmed the Agency's role in ensuring Iraq's compliance with paragraphs 12 and 13 of resolution 687 (1991) and other related resolutions. According to the Director General's report contained in document GC(44)/11 and his statement to the NPT Review Conference on 24 April 2000, the Agency had been unable to provide any measure of assurance with regard to Iraq's compliance with the relevant resolutions since December 1998. It should further be noted that the Agency had not received from Iraq the semi-annual declarations required by paragraph 22 and Annex 2 of the Agency's ongoing monitoring and verification plan regarding the current use of certain facilities and the inventory and location of radioactive materials and isotopes. Lastly, she stressed the importance of the statement by the Director General in his report that the inspection carried out by the Agency in Iraq in January 2000 under the safeguards agreement could not serve as a substitute for the Agency's activities under the relevant Security Council resolutions and that the resumption of its verification activities under those resolutions was essential for the Agency to fulfil its mandate.

66. Mr. LIPÁR (Slovakia), having endorsed the statement presented on behalf of the European Union and associated countries, said that after difficult negotiations, the 2000 NPT Review Conference had adopted consensus views on the implementation of the Treaty and future challenges. It had reconfirmed that the safeguards system was fundamental to the non-proliferation regime and that the IAEA was the competent authority for ensuring compliance with safeguards agreements. His country vigorously supported the Agency's programme to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of safeguards, and in September 1999 had signed a new safeguards agreement and an additional protocol whose

implementation was under way. All nuclear facilities and material on Slovak territory - including six reactors and an interim spent fuel storage facility - were now subject to full-scope Agency safeguards, as well as to inspections carried out by the national Nuclear Regulatory Authority.

67. According to his Government's energy strategy, nuclear energy would remain an important source in the medium term, though safety would be a precondition for its use. A project for gradual reconstruction of the Bohunice nuclear power plant was currently assessing the implementation of safety improvements in accordance with IAEA recommendations. The second unit of the Mochovce nuclear power plant had been started up after an extensive safety upgrading programme and a safety review by experts from several European countries. In connection with Slovakia's plans to join the European Union, a group of experts had also reviewed the legislative framework, the Nuclear Regulatory Authority and the safety of nuclear power plants in Slovakia.

68. With the commissioning of radioactive waste treatment and storage facilities at Bohunice and Mochovce, major steps had been taken towards safe and environmentally sound management of low- and medium-level radioactive waste. Provision had also been made for the safe storage of spent nuclear fuel in the medium term, pending investigations to find a repository that was environmentally responsible and acceptable to the public.

69. In the area of radiation protection, Slovakia had participated in the development of the Action Plan for the Safety of Radiation Sources and the Security of Radioactive Materials, believing that accidents worldwide in the management of radiation sources called for further attention from the international community.

70. The Agency’s expert services were considered an essential part of international co-operation in safety-related activities and a major aid to national regulatory decision-making. His delegation fully supported the continuation of such safety services as OSART and IRRT missions as an important step toward implementation of IAEA safety standards, the value of which, and of peer reviews of compliance with the standards, should be recognized at the political level. In that context, more attention needed to be given to preparing safety standards and initiating safety review services for other nuclear installations such as fuel cycle facilities.

71. Since the previous session of the General Conference the Agency and the Slovak Government had jointly organized four workshops and a training course for experts from the region. Slovak organizations with extensive experience in the peaceful use of nuclear energy were ready to host fellows and scientific visitors for the exchange of experience. A particularly important project for Slovakia was one on radiochemical facilities for producing medical radionuclides, which would receive Government support in the amount of US $1.45 million.

72. Citing the statement adopted by participants in the International Youth Nuclear Congress held in April 2000 in Bratislava, Slovakia, he said that the present generation had the responsibility to ensure that the nuclear option was open to future generations and that the

transfer of know-how would be effected by appropriate national and international programmes. The Agency should develop a comprehensive programme devoted to co-operation with the younger generation.

73. One of the main responsibilities of Member States was to ensure that the Agency had the necessary human and financial resources to fulfil its statutory obligations. His Government therefore welcomed the consensus which had been reached on the financing of technical co-operation and the financing of safeguards, and had decided to make a voluntary contribution to the TCF for 2001 in an amount consistent with its base rate of assessment.

74. Mr. PAULINICH (Peru) said that in December 1999, his country had been honoured by a visit from the Director General which had reinforced Peru's relationship with the Agency and offered a first-hand look at Peru's efforts in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Director General had committed the Agency to implementing projects in the border areas between Peru and Ecuador to foster co-operation between the two countries, including one aimed at expanding and improving diagnosis and treatment in nuclear medicine.

75. Having signed a safeguards agreement in connection with the Tlatelolco Treaty and the NPT, his country was committed to transparency under the Agency's safeguards system and had established the legal basis for helping to promote a climate of international security. On 22 March 2000, Peru had signed an additional protocol which, when it entered into force, would ensure that both nuclear activities and the handling of nuclear material in Peru took place within a framework of efficiency and security. In the interests of strengthening the safeguards system, his Government was prepared to hold a regional seminar for the promotion of the additional protocol in Lima in 2001.

76. Although the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference had not fully satisfied the expectations of all non-nuclear-weapon States, it nevertheless constituted a step forward, given the divergence of States' views on compliance with their commitments under the NPT. As an illustration of its own commitment to disarmament and reducing the risk of proliferation, Peru had made a large donation of crude oil to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization. It also supported the proposal made by the United Nations Secretary-General at the Millennium Summit to convene an international conference on ways of eliminating nuclear dangers. In December 1999, Peru had hosted the OPANAL General Conference which had launched the "Lima Appeal" to the international community to create a public awareness in order to advance towards a complete prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, and it supported the proposal by the OPANAL Secretary General to hold an international conference of members of nuclear-weapon-free zones on nuclear disarmament.

77. The IAEA had an enormous responsibility in not only preventing the destructive uses, but also promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy through the transfer of nuclear technology to Member States. To that end, co-operation programmes and projects had to be allocated adequate and predictable resources, and he called upon the major donor countries to fulfil their obligations to the TCF.

78. Technical assistance under an Agency Model Project had enabled a Peruvian university to continue its efforts to promote new strains of barley and other native crops with a high nutritional value, with which about 100 000 new hectares were to be sown in the central mountain regions. Under hydrological projects being carried out jointly with Bolivia and Chile, the evaluation of stable isotopes throughout the Lake Titicaca basin was being pursued in the context of a pollution study. The Ministries of Agriculture of Peru and Chile were co-operating closely to prevent any resurgence of the Mediterranean fruit fly in border areas.

79. The Peruvian Nuclear Energy Institute was continuing with a variety of activities, including the licensing and registration of installations, dosimetric calibrations, the monitoring of background radiation, safe management of low-level radioactive waste and production of radioisotopes for use in nuclear medicine and industrial applications, both domestically and abroad. Those technical activities had been feasible only with the Agency's support, which in 1999 had been realized through 45 advisory missions and 60 purchase orders worth over half a million US dollars. An additional form of support was the provision of fellowships for training and other events abroad: in 1999, Peruvian specialists had taken advantage of 78 such opportunities.

80. The domestic procedures required for ratification of ARCAL had begun and two international events in the context of ARCAL had been organized with Agency support in Lima in 1999. The Peruvian legislature was in the final stages of approval of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, the Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. He welcomed the Secretariat's work in developing the Agency's Transport Regulations and providing up-to-date information on the adoption and implementation of their latest version.

81. He thanked the Agency's Secretariat and the Government of France for their invaluable support in the treatment of the patient irradiated in the accident at Yanango in 1999. The important experience gained therefrom would be shared with the international community through the publication of a report on the accident.

82. Mr. AL-JANABI (Iraq) observed that Iraq had been one of the first countries to join the Agency and had played an effective role in its activities. Like other Member States, it had honoured its agreements with and obligations to the organization. It had a legitimate right to avail itself of the benefits offered by the Agency in the area of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. After the perfidious aggression against Iraq in 1991, the Agency had been given a new mandate in Iraq, as defined in paragraphs 12 and 13 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), under which for many years it had performed inspection, verification and monitoring activities. In the course of those activities there had been numerous cases of abuse, blackmail, aggressive behaviour and espionage on the part of some members of the Agency’s inspection teams. Nevertheless, Iraq had co-operated effectively with the Agency and complied with all its obligations under the Security Council resolutions.

83. The Agency’s activities in Iraq had been used as a cover to prolong the blockade against Iraq, so that its credibility and its character as a specialized international technical agency had

been affected. It had been diverted from its scientific role and transformed into a political organization subject to American influence and hegemony. If it had remained faithful to its scientific mission, it could have informed the General Conference and the Security Council years ago that it had completed its work in Iraq and that only a few questions remained to be clarified which would not change the general understanding and the clear picture it had obtained of the former Iraqi nuclear programme. That had been confirmed by the Director General's numerous reports to the Security Council. For instance, paragraph 31 of the Attachment to document GOV/INF/1999/4 stated that the IAEA's extensive verification activities in Iraq, since May 1991, had yielded a technically coherent picture of Iraq's former nuclear programme and had revealed no indication that Iraq possessed nuclear weapons or any amounts of weapon-usable nuclear material, or that Iraq had retained any practical capability (facilities or hardware) for the production of such material. That statement confirmed the falseness of the American and Zionist claim that Iraq was not complying with Security Council resolutions relating to the nuclear area.

84. The Agency had recently been making statements to the effect that it had been unable to carry out its tasks and its mandate after its inspectors had left Iraq at the end of 1998. He wished to clarify the facts in that regard by emphasizing a number of points.

85. First, the inspection, monitoring and verification activities in Iraq had been used by the United States and the Zionist entity to obtain security and intelligence information about Iraq and its national leadership, as had been admitted by members of inspection teams. That had been greatly detrimental to the Agency's credibility, role and mandate.

86. Secondly, the Agency had withdrawn its inspectors from Iraq before 16 December 1998 on orders from the Chairman of the Special Commission, without authorization by the Security Council or by the Director General of the Agency. The purpose had been to facilitate the military attack against Iraq by the United States and the United Kingdom on 16-17 December 1998, which had damaged the sites subject to monitoring by the Agency, completely destroyed all monitoring equipment and seriously upset the Agency's ongoing monitoring and verification plan in Iraq.

87. Thirdly, the Agency's reports showed a confusion between its tasks in Iraq under the Security Council resolutions and its functions under its Statute and the safeguards agreements concluded with Member States. The Security Council resolutions were political instruments which lent themselves to blackmail by the United States in the Security Council and in the Agency. The implementation of safeguards agreements was the normal sphere of activity for the Agency, on which it should concentrate, and it should carry out its obligations under those agreements as provided for in the Statute and the NPT. Iraq had complied and was complying with its obligations under its safeguards agreement with the Agency, and it called upon the Agency to resume its normal functions and comply with its own obligations under that agreement.

88. Fourthly, while Iraq had complied with all its obligations under Part C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and under resolution 715 (1991), the IAEA and the Security Council had not fulfilled their counter-obligations to Iraq under resolution 687 (1991), which

provided for the lifting of the economic embargo against Iraq, as a result of the unlawful position taken by two permanent members of the Security Council, namely the United States and the United Kingdom, which were using their influence to prevent the Security Council and the IAEA from acknowledging Iraq's compliance with its obligations in order to prolong the blockade against Iraq. The Agency had also failed to carry out its obligations under paragraph 13 of resolution 687 (1991) with regard to the rights and obligations of Iraq under the NPT.

89. The two States he had mentioned were carrying out daily bombing of civilian sites and public utilities in Iraq, leading to a large number of human victims, as well as damage to goods and property, in gross violation of international legality. The international community must condemn those military attacks and demand the lifting of the blockade, which had continued for ten years without legal justification - indeed which was a heinous genocidal crime against the people of Iraq and had led to the death of more than one and a half million old men, women and children.

90. Fifthly, he hoped that the Agency would declare Iraq free from the prohibited weapons and inform the Security Council that it had fulfilled its mandate under paragraphs 12 and 13 of resolution 687 (1991) and thus completed its work, thereby disproving the groundless allegations against Iraq used by the United States and the United Kingdom to prolong the blockade.

91. In summary, he wished to inform the General Conference that the implementation of the Security Council resolutions in Iraq had been completed and that there remained only political issues which were not related to the Agency's work and its technical role under those resolutions and its Statute. Therefore the item on Iraq should be removed from the Conference's agenda.

92. Iraq had enjoyed the benefits of technical co-operation with the Agency until 1991, when such co-operation had been stopped. In 1995 some projects in the areas of agriculture and medicine had been partially restored. The Agency had approved 7 projects for Iraq for the 1999-2000 biennium, including 3 regional projects for West Asia. Thereafter, Iraq had submitted 13 technical co-operation projects for 2001-2002, of which the Agency had approved only 3. However, as explained by his delegation in document INFCIRC/583, all those projects for 1999-2000 and 2001-2002 were now suspended by a decision of the Security Council's Sanctions Committee (Committee 661) making the implementation of those projects conditional upon the return of the Agency's officials to Iraq - even though a team of Agency inspectors had been to Iraq in January 2000 to carry out verification of nuclear material under the safeguards agreement. Nevertheless, Committee 661 persisted in its arbitrary position and prevented Iraq from benefiting from the Agency's technical co-operation programmes.

93. Iraq's technical projects which the Agency had approved related to the humanitarian, environmental, agricultural and medical areas and were designed to help eliminate diseases and epidemics which were killing people in Iraq every day. However, Iraq was not being allowed to participate even in the regional projects on combating the screwworm and other

pests which might threaten its neighbouring States. He therefore called upon the Conference to condemn the imposition, by the United States and the United Kingdom through Committee 661, of additional sanctions not included in the relevant Security Council resolutions against Iraq.

94. During the aggression in 1991, all nuclear installations in Iraq had been destroyed and the environment contaminated in a number of areas. Iraq had repeatedly sought the Agency's assistance in taking remedial measures at the contaminated sites and in containing the harmful effects of the contamination on humans and the environment. Iraq's own efforts in that direction had perforce been limited because of the unfair blockade. Serious steps had been taken to meet the dangers of contamination in rehabilitating the radioactive waste treatment plant at the Tuwaitha site, destroyed during the 1991 attack. In June 1995, the Agency had sent a technical team for that purpose but since then the Agency had taken no action to assist in the decontamination or in making a survey of the contaminated sites.

95. As could be seen from documents GC(42)/INF/19 and GC(43)/INF/20, Iraq had requested the Agency and the international community to provide assistance in dealing with the damage resulting from the use by American and British forces of more than 300 t of depleted uranium shells during their aggression against Iraq in 1991. Those shells had not only killed thousands of civilians but would produce lethal radiation effects on future generations. It would take years to eliminate the harmful effects on the environment, soil, water and agriculture of that contamination as well as that arising from the destruction of the nuclear installations. However, the Agency had referred Iraq's request to Committee 661 instead of shouldering its moral and technical responsibility by helping to solve that serious humanitarian problem without allowing it to be linked to political issues.

96. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was a step forward towards eliminating the danger of nuclear weapons and would help to bring tranquillity to areas of tension, such as the Middle East which was threatened by Israeli nuclear weapons. Israel's nuclear capabilities had been on the General Conference's agenda for many years, either as a separate item or in connection with the application of the Agency's comprehensive safeguards in the Middle East. During that time, Israel had rejected all resolutions on the subject and refused to sign the relevant international treaties and to place its nuclear installations under Agency safeguards. It had even attacked the credibility of the NPT and of NPT safeguards by bombing Iraq's safeguarded nuclear installations in 1981, subsequently refusing to comply with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) which condemned that attack and called upon Israel to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.

97. The final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference noted that Israel was the only party in the Middle East which had not acceded to the Treaty and had not accepted safeguards, thus holding up important steps towards the goal of making the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction. The United States and the United Kingdom allowed that state of affairs to continue instead of urging Israel to comply with the provisions which had been imposed on the other countries in the region. The international community should therefore face up to its responsibility and free the region of the Middle East from the

dangers of Israeli nuclear weapons by enjoining Israel to accept comprehensive Agency safeguards and eliminate its huge nuclear arsenal.

98. In conclusion, he hoped that the General Conference would play its part in meeting the aspirations of the Agency's Member States and especially those of the developing countries which were trying to utilize the benefits of nuclear technology for development and progress, and that it would not deprive some States of those benefits by applying the unfair double standards imposed on the Agency by the hegemonic States. He looked forward to the Agency resuming its normal relations with Iraq under the safeguards agreement and distancing itself from the positions and resolutions adopted by the Security Council under the influence of the United States and the United Kingdom.

99. Mr. HASHIM (Malaysia) welcomed the new members to the Agency and expressed his country's strong interest in assisting other developing Member States in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear technology in non-power applications. It was in that spirit that Malaysia had hosted a regional IAEA seminar which had discussed a number of strategies and approaches relevant for consideration by national nuclear institutes when pursuing self-reliance and sustainability.

100. On the funding of technical co-operation, he noted that the increased unobligated balance reflected in the Technical Co-operation Report for 1999 should not be taken as an indication of a surplus in the TCF; in fact, the target figures for the TCF were mere political gestures representing only about a third of the total actual requirements of Member States, and the apparent surplus was due to lack of adequate support from the Regular Budget for full utilization of the TCF. He commended the Department of Technical Co-operation on the programme delivery achieved despite that lack of support, and on the considerable improvements that had been made to ensure that project requests met the Model Project criteria and were consistent with national development programmes.

101. Turning to the financing of safeguards, he said the circumstances that had led to the application of the shielding system had not changed dramatically in the 30 years since its introduction and there was no urgent need to alter it. De-shielding as recently agreed upon was effectively a transfer of the obligations of developed unshielded Member States to developing Member States, and its acceptance by the latter represented a major concession for the sake of equitable distribution of obligations. The proposed timetable for the termination of shielding was unnecessarily inflexible, since a country's economic status could well change in a short period of time, as demonstrated by the Asian financial crisis; a review mechanism to cater for such changes was therefore desirable. Moreover, although per capita gross national product could be used for the categorization of Member States for de-shielding purposes, other factors also should be considered, including whether the country was a nuclear-weapon State, had a significant nuclear power programme or nuclear-fuel processing or mining activities or occupied a designated seat on the Board of Governors. The attainment of TCF target figures in accordance with the rate of attainment mechanism only partly reciprocated the concession made by the developing Member States in agreeing to the removal of shielding. It was therefore necessary to keep the financing of safeguards under

review so as to guarantee that burdens across all domains of the Agency's activities were shared equitably.

102. Malaysia welcomed the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference and its provisions regarding the strengthened safeguards system and the relationship between safeguards agreements and additional protocols. The grace period allowed for States to prepare for the implementation of additional protocols by reviewing and updating their national legal instruments was certainly helpful. He also welcomed the Conference's recommendation that the Agency and Member States should consider specific measures to assist States with limited experience in nuclear activities in fulfilling their legal requirements with a view to facilitating the conclusion and entry into force of safeguards agreements and additional protocols.

103. His delegation acknowledged the Agency's help in exploring appropriate mechanisms for implementing the Bangkok Treaty, in particular its support for the workshop on the Treaty's implementation held in Bangkok from 23 to 25 August 2000. The Treaty had been instrumental in encouraging States in the region to sign safeguards agreements with the Agency. In contrast to other nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties, the Bangkok Treaty contained provisions on nuclear safety and radiation protection, including safe disposal of nuclear and radioactive waste, that introduced an added difficulty in devising a suitable verification system. The Agency might be able to help resolve that difficulty.

104. The 27th session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, convened in Kuala Lumpur from 27 to 30 June 2000, had discussed a number of issues of relevance to the Agency, including nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, the right to develop peaceful nuclear programmes to promote economic and social development, the need for Israel to join the NPT, the desirability of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia and the dumping of nuclear and toxic waste.

105. In conclusion, he said he shared the Director General's concern about the cash-flow problems faced by the Agency. Malaysia for its part would continue to fulfil its financial commitments, including the payment of assessed programme costs and contributions to the TCF.

106. Mr. DUBOIS (Canada) noted that his country had recently deposited its instruments of acceptance of the amendment of Articles VI and XIV of the Agency's Statute and invited other Member States to take the steps required for implementation of the amendments in a timely fashion.

107. The twenty-first century could be faced with prudent optimism owing to the success of the 2000 NPT Review Conference and other progress towards arms control and disarmament worldwide. His country welcomed the recent signature of a bilateral agreement between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on the management and disposition of plutonium no longer required for military purposes. The Agency could play a key role in verification of the agreement and in ensuring that such material was never again used for military purposes.

108. Although such progress was encouraging, four Member States of the Agency - India, Pakistan, Israel and Cuba - had still not ratified the NPT. He called on those States to adhere unconditionally to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. The situation in southern Asia following the nuclear tests of 1998 and the lack of progress by India and Pakistan towards compliance with Security Council resolution 1172 (1998) remained sources of concern. Early ratification by those countries of the CTBT, as promised, would be a significant and constructive step forward. The fact that the Agency could still not provide any assurances whatsoever that Iraq was fulfilling its obligations under Security Council resolutions 687 (1991) and 1284 (1999) was also a source of concern. Canada welcomed the progress made on the Korean peninsula and had officially recognized the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in July 2000. It called on the DPRK to furnish the Agency with all the information required to verify its initial declaration under its safeguards agreement, which remained binding and in force.

109. With the entry into force on 31 May 2000 of new legislation on nuclear safety and regulatory activities in Canada, the regulatory agency had been restructured and the relevant legal regime reinforced in a clear demonstration of Canada's commitment to achieving the highest levels of safety and security. As part of its international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, his Government had recently decided to provide 5 million Canadian dollars for the development of an international training and demonstration facility for nuclear fuel waste management and disposal based at an underground research laboratory in Manitoba.

110. His country welcomed the decision of Ukraine to shut down the Chernobyl nuclear power plant on 15 December 2000 and had committed US $33 million to that vitally important project, hoping also that further progress would be made with the Shelter Implementation Plan.

111. Nuclear power currently provided about 15% of his country's electrical requirements. Without it, greenhouse gas emissions from the electrical sector would be 50% greater. Work to facilitate the restart of laid-up nuclear power plants in Ontario was continuing; such measures would help Canada to fulfil its commitments under the Kyoto Protocol.

112. Canada strongly supported the Agency's safeguards system, and he was pleased to announce that its additional protocol had entered into force on 8 September 2000. He called on other Member States which had not yet done so to sign and implement a safeguards agreement and an additional protocol as quickly as possible.

113. Canada endorsed the efforts to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards and accordingly looked forward to the implementation of integrated safeguards, which it hoped would bring a more qualitative and flexible approach without exceeding the prevailing budgetary constraints. With regard to the financing of safeguards, he welcomed the agreement which had recently been reached as it would mean that all Member States would pay their full share of the cost of that activity.

114. The physical protection of nuclear material and facilities was an integral part of an effective international non-proliferation regime, and his country believed that the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material must be strengthened to include, among other things, the physical protection of nuclear materials in domestic use, storage and transport.

115. Canada had made a voluntary contribution of over 2 million Canadian dollars to the TCF for 2000. Good results continued to be achieved by the technical co-operation programme in a difficult environment. Its total resources had reached a record high in the past year and the rate of implementation of 75% was excellent. Canada fully supported the efforts being made to improve the administration of the programme. As a major contributor to the TCF, however, it retained some reservations about the programme's financing and was disappointed in particular that contributions for 2000 had not been commensurate with expectations. Canada welcomed the decision to freeze the Fund's target at its current level for the 2001-2002 biennium as part of the new approach that would, it was to be hoped, resolve the major problem of non-payment of contributions by many Member States.

116. The NPT Review Conference had once again acknowledged the need to provide the Agency with sufficient resources to enable it to carry out its diverse responsibilities, but it was up to the Agency to ensure that its resources were used in the most effective manner possible. Canada continued to advocate nominal budgetary growth for all international organizations, including the Agency. It welcomed the considerable progress made in reducing costs and improving efficiency in various areas but believed further cost savings were possible without adversely affecting the Agency's activities.

117. Congratulating the Agency on the new results-based approach to drawing up the programme and budget, he said the process must be made as transparent and as responsive to Member States' needs as possible and must minimize duplication of activities with other international organizations. Canada fully supported the Director General's efforts to improve the Agency's management and operation and believed that greater flexibility in the allocation of resources among major programmes as priorities evolved would be beneficial for the Agency as a whole.

118. In conclusion, Canada was optimistic about the Agency's activities in the new century and was ready to co-operate with it in deriving the maximum benefits from the peaceful use of nuclear technology and nuclear energy.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.