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President: Mr. OTHMAN (Syrian Arab Republic)

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Abbreviations used in this record

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| ABACC | Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials |
| ABM | Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems |
| ARCAL | Regional Co-operation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean |
| ASEAN | Association of Southeast Asian Nations |
| ASSET | Analysis of Safety Significant Events Team |
| Assistance Convention | Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency |
| Bangkok Treaty | Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone |
| CTBT | Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty |
| DPRK | Democratic People's Republic of Korea |
| Early Notification Convention | Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident |
| EURATOM | European Atomic Energy Community |
| FMCT | fissile material cut-off treaty |
| INSAG | International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group |
| Interpol | International Criminal Police Organization |
| IRRT | International Regulatory Review Team |
| Joint Convention | Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management |
| Kyoto Protocol | Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change |
| MOX | Mixed oxide |
| NPP | Nuclear power plant |
| NPT | Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons |
| NPT Review Conference | Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons |
| OECD | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development |
| OPANAL | Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean |
| OSART | Operational Safety Review Team |
| Pelindaba Treaty | African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty |
| Quadripartite Agreement | Agreement between the Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards |
| R&D | Research and development |
| Rarotonga Treaty | South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty |
| RBMK | High-power channel-type reactor (Soviet Union) |

Abbreviations used in this record
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| START II | Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms |
| TCF | Technical Co-operation Fund |
| Tlatelolco Treaty | Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean |
| Trilateral Initiative | Trilateral Initiative launched by the Minister of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy, the Secretary of Energy of the United States and the Agency's Director General on 17 September 1996 to consider practical measures for the application of IAEA verification to fissile material originating from nuclear weapons |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| WATRP | Waste Management Assessment and Technical Review Programme |
| WCO | World Customs Organization |
| WWER | Water-cooled and -moderated reactor (former USSR) |

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1999 (continued)
(GC(44)/4)

1. Mr. ADAM (Belgium), having welcomed the Conference's approval of Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and the Central African Republic for membership of the Agency, said that the 2000 NPT Review Conference, while not resulting in any major breakthrough, had not been the failure which some had foreseen. One very positive aspect had been the Review Conference's reaffirmation of the international status of the Agency as a pillar of the system for the monitoring of nuclear non-proliferation.
2. The fact that the Agency had in 1999, for the first time, been able to verify both that nuclear materials had not been diverted and that undeclared nuclear activities had not been undertaken in two States demonstrated the importance of Protocols additional to safeguards agreements.
3. Belgium was unreservedly in favour of the strengthening of Agency safeguards, but attached great importance to the assurances which had been given that strengthened safeguards would not be applied in a mechanical or systematic way. Unfortunately, there seemed to be a growing tendency to diverge more and more from the Model Additional Protocol and place a broad interpretation on the concept of "complementary access", to the point where exercise of the right of complementary access was virtually a routine inspection measure.
4. Belgium was looking forward to the completion, in 2001, of the preparatory work necessary for the integration of Agency safeguards. The integrated safeguards system should, without sacrificing effectiveness, be as simple as possible and impose the minimum of constraints on States. It should not be a mere agglomeration of traditional safeguards measures, measures adopted in 1996 and measures provided for in the Model Additional Protocol. Safeguards strengthening should go hand in hand with - for example - reductions in routine inspection effort in States which had concluded Protocols additional to their safeguards agreements with the Agency and where the Agency had ascertained that there were no undeclared nuclear activities - and the reductions should not, in the long run, be confined to cases where the nuclear materials in question were of only low sensitivity.
5. Every Member State had a responsibility to help ensure that the Agency received the financial resources necessary for avoiding excessive reliance on extrabudgetary contributions. The Department of Safeguards was in a special situation in that regard, since the international community had assigned to it tasks which it simply must carry out.
6. It was important that the financial burden of safeguards be distributed fairly. In that connection, his country was pleased that agreement had been reached on revised arrangements for the assessment of Member States' contributions towards the safeguards component of the Regular Budget. It would have liked to see the "shielding" system phased out more rapidly, but was satisfied with the compromise arrived at thanks largely to the untiring efforts of Ambassador de Queiroz Duarte of Brazil.

7. As a revision of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material would absorb substantial resources, his country was closely following the current process of considering whether there was a need for a revision. So far, the need for a revision had not been demonstrated.

8. Commending the Secretariat's efforts in the area of technical co-operation, he said that the close involvement of recipient Member States in Agency technical co-operation projects was essential if such projects were to bear fruit in the long run. The success of technical co-operation projects would undoubtedly make Member States more willing to increase their contributions to the TCF.

9. Welcoming the agreement reached under Ambassador de Queiroz Duarte's guidance on the financing of technical co-operation, he said that Belgium would continue to try making contributions to the TCF which were in keeping with its share of successive TCF targets.

10. In recent years, there had been frequent announcements of the inevitable decline - even the demise - of nuclear power, at least in industrialized countries. Electricity consumption was growing rapidly, however, and pending the emergence of large-scale energy supply alternatives compatible with the objectives of Agenda 21 and the Kyoto Protocol, there might well be a future for modern nuclear power sectors based on greater transparency and higher levels of safety. In that connection, the Agency had an important role to play as a provider - through, for example, documents like the "Nuclear Technology Review 2000" - of objective information which might defuse the ideological dispute between the supporters and opponents of nuclear power.

11. His Government had decided that in Belgium the moratorium on construction of new power reactors should be maintained and that nuclear power generation should be gradually phased out (albeit with due consideration for the objectives of the Rio Conference and the Kyoto Protocol as regards the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions), but that the final shutdown of power reactors should begin only when they were 40 years old - so that there would be sufficient time to develop large-scale sources of clean, renewable energy. Questions regarding the implementation of that decision were to be examined by a Government-appointed international expert commission.

12. Belgium had recently adopted new legislation relating to civil liability in the nuclear field. The new legislation increased the maximum damages payable in the event of a nuclear accident to 560 million euros.

13. In 1999, Belgium's nuclear power plants had operated without safety problems and in a generally satisfactory manner, accounting for a record 58.3% of electricity production. Their average availability had been 93.3% - also a record.

14. Implementation of the 1978 reprocessing contract between Synatom and Cogema had continued in 1999, the final shipments of irradiated fuel - to La Hague - taking place during the last quarter of the year. The first return shipment of highly radioactive waste resulting from reprocessing at La Hague had taken place in April 2000, without any problems, and the waste was now being stored in a specially constructed building at Belgoprocess's Dessel site.

15. The Belgian authorities were continuing to focus closely on the safe management of radioactive waste. Two programmes were under way, one covering low-level waste and the other dealing with questions of geological disposal.
16. Dismantling of the BR3 reactor, the first prototype pressurized-water reactor in Europe, was continuing.
17. The first stage in the industrial development of accelerator-driven systems for use in, for example, the transmutation of radioactive waste had been launched with the co-operation of European partners.
18. In conclusion, he thanked the Director General and the Secretariat for their unstinting efforts to maintain the high quality level for which the Agency was renowned.
19. Ms. BECERRIL (Spain) said that the outstanding performance of the Spanish economy in 1999 had been accompanied by a 6.5% increase in the consumption of electrical energy and that Spain's nuclear power plants had accounted for 28.3% of the electricity generated during the year. The plants had operated reliably, as reflected in the high availability factors recorded.
20. At the same time, the operating enterprises had taken a number of initiatives to improve competitiveness - for example, the introduction of design modifications to increase generating capacity and the closer co-ordination of management to ensure the more efficient utilization of technical and human resources.
21. Pursuant to a general radioactive waste plan adopted by the Government in 1999, work had begun on the construction of a temporary spent fuel storage facility at the Trillo Nuclear Power Station.
22. Dismantling of the Vandellós I power reactor was proceeding in accordance with a programme which envisaged a waiting period of about 30 years starting at the end of 2002, after which the final dismantling operations would be carried out.
23. Her authorities, which had in December 1999 notified the Secretariat of the completion by Spain of the internal procedures for ratification of the Protocol additional to Spain's safeguards agreement with the Agency, were concerned about the fact that many States - especially States with nuclear facilities - had not yet concluded Additional Protocols.
24. Commending the Secretariat on its safeguards integration activities, she urged the Department of Safeguards not to enter into new fields of activity that were liable to unduly distract attention and divert resources. The safeguards system needed to be overhauled, not only in the interests of greater effectiveness and efficiency but also because no lasting increase was foreseeable in the availability of financial resources. The overhaul should include a change in safeguards criteria and parameters, which would call for innovative and forward-looking decision-making. The global stagnation of the nuclear industry, with a concurrent stabilization of safeguards activities in quantitative terms, created a favourable

environment for reform and also for meeting challenges such as those presented by the verification of nuclear disarmament.

25. Spain did not attach high priority to safeguards activities in nuclear-weapon States under voluntary-offer agreements. Such activities should be allocated Regular Budget resources only if the Regular Budget financing of high-priority safeguards activities was assured, or they should be financed from extrabudgetary resources.

26. Spain was opposed to heavy reliance on extrabudgetary resources, although such resources could serve a useful purpose now that zero-real-growth budgeting had become the norm at both the national and the international level. Where conditions were attached to offers of extrabudgetary resources, the Secretariat should examine such offers carefully before accepting them.

27. At the first review meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, there had been frank discussions on such complex topics as the independence of regulatory bodies and the safety of old nuclear power plants. That augured well for the second review meeting, in 2002, and would - she hoped - encourage ratification of the Convention by those countries which, although operating or planning to operate nuclear power reactors, were not yet Contracting Parties.

28. Spain, which had ratified the Joint Convention in 1999, looked forward to its entry into force in the near future. At the same time, it hoped that, when the Joint Convention did enter into force, most of the countries where substantial amounts of spent fuel and radioactive waste arose would already be Contracting Parties. Meanwhile, Spain was ready to help in drawing up the rules for implementation of the Joint Convention in the light of the experience gained with the Convention on Nuclear Safety.

29. The dialogue between the scientific community, waste producers, waste management agencies and regulatory bodies that had been initiated at the International Conference on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management held in Córdoba, Spain, in March 2000 could prove to be a major step towards achieving an international consensus on the subject of radioactive waste management safety. Doing nothing about radioactive waste was not an acceptable option; the present generation had a duty not to pass on undue burdens to future generations, and it should therefore try to work out viable solutions. It was against that background that Spain and its European Union partners had submitted a draft resolution on "The safety of radioactive waste management". She hoped that the draft resolution would receive very broad support.

30. Spain was continuing to support the Agency's efforts to enhance nuclear, radiation and waste safety in South-East Asia, the Pacific region and the Far East, and particularly the Agency's efforts to strengthen national regulatory bodies, and it had recently made an extrabudgetary contribution in that connection. Also, experts from Spain were continuing to participate in the work of the Agency's Commission on Safety Standards and of the associated committees.

31. Spain had hosted several OSART and ASSET missions and had also made experts of its own available for such missions. Her country would continue its policy of both using the Agency's safety-related services and helping the Agency to provide them.
32. Spain would like to see all States strengthening their national systems for the control of radiation sources. It therefore welcomed the relevant decisions which the Board of Governors had taken the previous week, especially the Board's decisions concerning the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. In Spain, a "protocol of collaboration" had been concluded the previous year between the Administration, the Nuclear Safety Board and Spanish enterprises which collected and processed scrap metal, with a view to ensuring effective radiation monitoring of the materials in question. However, the resulting measures would not completely exclude incidents unless there were rigorous controls of radioactive sources in countries of origin and co-ordinated international action. Spain therefore welcomed the fact that an International Conference of National Regulatory Authorities with competence in the Safety of Radiation Sources and the Security of Radioactive Materials was to be held in Argentina in December 2000.
33. In March 2001, Spain would be hosting an International Conference on the Radiological Protection of Patients, which was to be held in Torremolinos (Málaga). Her authorities would make every effort to ensure its success.
34. Spain, which was in favour of collaboration in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy between the Agency and other international organizations, would like to see the Memorandum of Understanding between the Agency and the Nuclear Energy Agency of OECD finally signed.
35. She welcomed the substantial increase in resources for Agency technical co-operation but expressed regret at the decline in the payment of assessed programme costs by recipient countries.
36. Welcoming the compromise reached on TCF target figures for 2001 and 2002 and Indicative Planning Figures for 2003 and 2004, she said it was time to check the growth of the TCF target while the Regular Budget remained frozen in real terms. Her country would make every effort to contribute more to the TCF, it being understood that its contributions to the TCF were voluntary - and should be viewed jointly with the other voluntary contributions which Spain made in support of Agency technical co-operation activities, such as the contribution of US \$411 000 which it had made in 1999 in support of a technical co-operation project in Ukraine.
37. The variety of ways in which Spain was supporting Agency technical co-operation was an indication of the importance which it attached to the Agency.
38. Mr. NIEWODNICZANSKI (Poland), having welcomed the approval of Tajikistan, Azerbaijan and the Central African Republic for Agency membership and having endorsed the statement which had been made on behalf of the European Union by the delegate of France, said that the great discoveries during the past century in the field of physics had yielded enormous benefits for mankind but had also created global dangers which

could be countered only with the help of a system of widely accepted international conventions aimed at ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the existence of an adequate safety culture in the peaceful applications of nuclear energies - a system in which the Agency played an important role.

39. The final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference had made it clear that Agency safeguards were recognized by the parties to the NPT as indispensable to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Moreover, the Review Conference had underlined in its final document the importance which it attached to the conclusion of Protocols additional to safeguards agreements with the Agency. The Protocol additional to Poland's safeguards agreement with the Agency had entered into force and was being implemented, and Poland would like to see many other countries concluding Additional Protocols.

40. It was a source of satisfaction that all countries operating nuclear power plants had now ratified the Early Notification Convention and that all except two had ratified the Assistance Convention and the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Only three more States needed to ratify the Joint Convention in order for it to enter into force. His country had ratified the Joint Convention on 5 May 2000, and it supported the idea - put forward by INSAG - that a protocol covering research reactors be added to the Convention on Nuclear Safety.

41. The extensive applications of radiation sources and the associated risks had fully justified the initiation by the Secretariat of discussions on a possible Code of Conduct on the Safety of Radiation Sources and the Security of Radioactive Materials.

42. The changes which had taken place during the 12 years since the entry into force of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material warranted efforts to prepare an internationally binding instrument on the physical protection of nuclear material also during use and in storage.

43. Poland, which welcomed the Agency's activities in support of efforts to combat "nuclear terrorism", had equipped almost all its border checkpoints to detect illegal movements of nuclear and other radioactive materials.

44. Poland, which welcomed the Secretariat's efforts to make Agency technical co-operation more efficient, was ready to continue making its research centres available for the provision of training under the Agency's auspices.

45. Referring to the arrangement of the Agency's major programmes and projects, he said that his country would like to see a close link between the Agency's nuclear power-related activities on one hand and its nuclear science-related activities on the other. As a country without any power reactors, however, it would not like to see the Agency's nuclear science-related activities divorced from its activities relating to - for example - research reactors, accelerators, nuclear and atomic analytical methods, human health and agriculture.

46. Calling for an enhancement of the Agency's interaction with opinion leaders, the media and civil society, especially as regards nuclear power, he said that nuclear power tended not to be mentioned in statements and reports relating to energy and the environment. In a recent

United Nations report on climate change, for example, nuclear power generation had not been included in the list of measures for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Greater use should be made of the "IAEA Bulletin" in stating the case for nuclear power.

47. Commending the Nuclear Technology Review 2000, he expressed the hope that the Secretariat would, when it prepared the next Nuclear Technology Review, take account of the comments on it made by his country's delegation during the June session of the Board.

48. Poland supported zero-real-growth budgeting in the Agency but was also concerned about the Agency's heavy reliance on extrabudgetary resources. The failure of some Member States to pay their full Regular Budget contributions and TCF target shares only made the Agency's situation worse. For its part, Poland would endeavour to continue setting a good example.

49. Mr. ADAMOV (Russian Federation), having welcomed the approval of Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and the Central African Republic for membership of the Agency, recalled that at the Millennium Summit just held in New York, the President of the Russian Federation had proposed the phasing-out of the use of highly enriched uranium and pure plutonium in nuclear power generation. The proposal had been made in the context of efforts to ensure sustainable energy supplies for mankind while at the same time resolving the problems of nuclear weapons proliferation and ecological deterioration of the planet.

50. Research carried out in the Russian Federation and other countries had shown that the objective was technically feasible, pointing the way to a resolution of the radioactive waste problem through the burning of weapons-grade plutonium and the transmutation of other radioactive materials. The Russian Federation had proposed the elaboration and implementation of an international project in that area under the auspices of the Agency.

51. The proposals had received widespread support at the 2000 NPT Review Conference and been reflected in its final document.

52. As the Director General had pointed out in his statement, the future of nuclear power would depend on success in developing innovative nuclear reactors and fuel cycles which were proliferation-resistant and economically competitive. His delegation therefore welcomed the initiative of the Director General in establishing a task force on innovative nuclear reactors and fuel cycles and hoped that it would lead to a large-scale international project under the Agency's auspices.

53. In its final document, the NPT Review Conference had recognized the role of nuclear power in ensuring sustainable development and stressed the need to resolve the problems of nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear safety and nuclear waste management at the technological level. Particular emphasis had been placed on the role of the Agency in assessing and promoting new nuclear power technologies.

54. The new approaches to nuclear power must not repeat the mistakes of the past, which had given rise to criticism and - in some European countries - to serious moves to abandon nuclear power. To dismiss the criticism as purely subjective would be wrong; the nuclear

community must realize that the crisis of nuclear power had profound causes and must adopt a responsible attitude towards them.

55. The safety, waste and proliferation problems associated with nuclear power were serious. In many energy-deficient parts of the world, however, the climatic conditions were such that no alternatives to nuclear power existed.

56. Against that background, his Government had in May approved a strategy for nuclear power development in Russia during the first half of the 21st century which envisaged an expansion of nuclear power generation three times greater than the expansion of other forms of power generation.

57. Nuclear power could be the motor for safe, sustainable development both in Russia and in other countries. However, free-market mechanisms alone would not ensure the necessary transition; political will and governmental support for promising technologies would be essential. In that connection, his delegation hoped that the draft resolution in document GC(44)/COM.5/L.15 would receive the Conference's support.

58. Russia's top political priorities lay in the area of disarmament. Everything should be done to reduce strategic offensive weapons while maintaining strategic stability and its primary legal basis - the ABM. The ratification by his country of START II, the ABM and the CTBT confirmed its firm commitment to strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, to disarmament and to the maintenance of strategic stability in the world.

59. For some years, Russia had been transforming highly enriched, weapons-grade uranium into reactor fuel on a large scale in co-operation with the United States. The next question was what to do with weapons-grade plutonium. His country would like to see the establishment of an international mechanism for ensuring the uninterrupted financing of a programme under which weapons-grade plutonium would also be transformed for use in the fabrication of reactor fuel.

60. Expenditure on nuclear disarmament could be partially offset by the "commercial" use of Russian MOX fuel for electricity generation in countries possessing the necessary licences, with the subsequent return of the irradiated MOX fuel to Russia for safe storage.

61. Commending the Secretariat's efforts to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system, he said that in March the Russian Federation had signed a Protocol additional to its safeguards agreement with the Agency.

62. Recalling the International Youth Nuclear Congress held in Bratislava, Slovakia, in April under the Agency's auspices, he emphasized the importance of preserving continuity of knowledge in the nuclear field.

63. In conclusion, he expressed the hope that there would be a breakthrough in the field of nuclear power so that mankind might fully exploit its potential.

64. Mr. BAPTISTA NGANAJINA (Angola), noting that the current session of the General Conference was the first session in which Angola was participating as a Member State of the Agency, said that his country, where radioactive mineral deposits had been detected in several regions, attached great importance to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for sustained socio-economic development.
65. His country, which was taking its first steps in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, had recently hosted an Agency mission organized within the framework of technical co-operation project ANG/9/002 entitled “National radiation protection infrastructure”.
66. His country’s scientists and technicians needed training in the various applications of nuclear techniques and hoped that such training would be provided by other countries both through the Agency and directly on a bilateral basis.
67. Welcoming regional efforts to increase the effectiveness of national programmes and regulatory bodies in the area of occupational radiation protection and to improve postgraduate training in radiation and waste safety, he expressed support for the activities being undertaken within the framework of AFRA, to which Angola hoped to become a party in the near future.
68. Mr. RÓNÁKY (Hungary), having welcomed the approval of Azerbaijan, the Central African Republic and Tajikistan for membership of the Agency, endorsed the statement which the delegate of France had made on behalf of the European Union.
69. The 2000 NPT Review Conference, expressing its confidence in the Agency, had adopted a programme of forward-looking measures to further strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. His country would like to see that programme implemented with a minimum of delay. It would also like to see high priority being given to the negotiation of an FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament.
70. His country, which believed that the Agency should assist in verifying nuclear arms reductions, looked forward to Agency verification of fissile material from nuclear weapons pursuant to the Trilateral Initiative.
71. The Protocol additional to Hungary’s safeguards agreement with the Agency had entered into force as of April, but his country was concerned about the slow rate at which comprehensive safeguards agreements were being concluded and the integration of safeguards measures was proceeding.
72. He commended the efforts of the Agency to implement the NPT safeguards agreement in force with Iraq and to fulfil the mandate assigned to it by the United Nations Security Council in resolutions relating to that country. Also, he expressed support for the Agency activities directed towards full implementation of the safeguards agreement with the DPRK. At the same time, he said that his country was very concerned about the lack of progress in safeguards implementation in both Iraq and the DPRK.
73. A national system designed to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear material and other radioactive substances had been established in Hungary; it had been tested late in 1999 during

an exercise conducted at a nuclear facility in Budapest. Related Agency/WCO/Interpol training courses being held within the framework of a regional technical co-operation project had benefited from the practical experience gained in equipment testing conducted at the Austrian-Hungarian border.

74. In May, Hungary's regulatory body had hosted an IRRT mission. The review team had identified a number of good practices and also made recommendations and suggestions regarding necessary or desirable improvements. A detailed action plan had been drawn up for addressing the recommendations and suggestions of the review team, which had stated in its report that they had been made to an organization "seeking to improve its performance".

75. As Hungary possessed relatively little in the way of natural energy resources, its energy security could not be maintained without nuclear power, which was not a subject of public debate in Hungary. The most important thing in that context was to ensure, through effective regulation, that nuclear facility operators maintained a vigilant approach to nuclear safety. Efforts to do that were benefiting from co-operation with the Agency and from various safety assistance programmes.

76. The safe and reliable operation of the Paks NPP had continued during 1999, thanks in no small measure to high-quality maintenance resulting no doubt from effective utilization of the NPP's Maintenance Training Centre, which had been established through an Agency Model Project and at which some 500 people had received training in 1999.

77. With energy markets becoming more competitive as a result of deregulation, an Agency-organized regional workshop on the impact of privatization and market deregulation held at the Paks NPP had been particularly timely. The participants had agreed that safety and profitability were not conflicting objectives.

78. In 1999, no events jeopardizing nuclear safety had occurred at the Paks NPP, where intensive safety upgrading activities were under way, and authorization had been given for Units 3 and 4 to continue operating for a further ten years provided that certain safety improvements were made within the very strict time frame set for them. In that connection, he noted that a pre-OSART mission to the Paks NPP was to take place in November and a fully fledged OSART mission in 2001.

79. Although further operation of the Paks NPP was widely accepted in Hungary, radioactive waste management remained a challenging issue. In 1999, following geological investigations, a site in Hungary had been declared to be potentially suitable for a repository for low- and intermediate-level waste. However, some experts had then questioned the completeness of the investigations. At Hungary's request, the Secretariat had organized a review by a WATRP team of the manner in which the investigations had been performed. The WATRP team had concluded that they had been performed in a careful, systematic manner and had confirmed the potential suitability of the site in question. Approval had now been given for continuation of the site selection programme, in line with recommendations made by the WATRP team.

80. Emphasizing the importance of public acceptance of nuclear power, he said that Hungary had in April hosted a regional public information seminar on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in Central and Eastern Europe, which had been organized by the Agency and the Hungarian Atomic Energy Agency. There had been a large number of participants, and in his view such events could contribute to increased public trust with regard to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

81. The activities of the Agency's Department of Nuclear Sciences and Applications were already contributing to increased public trust with regard to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and in that connection he welcomed the decision of the Director General to establish a Standing Advisory Group on Nuclear Applications.

82. Commending the work done by the Secretariat in the field of technical co-operation, he said that the Agency's technical co-operation activities in the European region were greatly enhanced by regular regional consultation meetings organized by the Secretariat. It was to be hoped that the next such meeting would lead to improved co-operation among regional resource centres. Hungary wished to contribute to such an improvement by sharing its expertise with other Member States.

83. Hungary, which intended to pay its full share of the TCF target for 2001, welcomed the consensus reached in the Board of Governors on the financing of safeguards and the financing of technical co-operation, although it was concerned about how late that consensus had been arrived at. It would like to see all Member States respecting the consensus.

84. Finally, he thanked the Director General and the Secretariat for their work and assured them of Hungary's support in meeting future challenges.

85. Mr. CARRERA DORAL (Cuba), having welcomed the approval of Azerbaijan, the Central African Republic and Tajikistan for membership of the Agency, said that nuclear technologies were important for sustainable development and that the use of such technologies had had a tangible impact on the principal development programmes of Cuba, which therefore attached great importance to the activities of the Agency.

86. Safety in the use of nuclear technologies had always been a high priority for the Cuban authorities, and that had led to the establishment of a solid regulatory infrastructure backed by highly qualified scientific and technical personnel with a high level of safety culture. Cuba was therefore in a position to contribute, through the Agency's technical co-operation programmes, to the strengthening of radiation protection infrastructures in other Member States in its region.

87. The Agency's technical co-operation activities were an essential part of the process of technology transfer. Over the years, Cuba had made optimum use of Agency technical assistance in high-priority programmes with a large social impact and, despite economic difficulties, had consistently fulfilled its financial obligations vis-à-vis the Agency.

88. Cuba was grateful to the Department of Technical Co-operation for the Agency technical assistance being provided to it, and particularly for the support being given to efforts to eradicate the screw worm in the Caribbean region.

89. His country, which believed very much in regional co-operation, continued to regard ARCAL as a highly suitable framework for co-operation among countries of the Latin America and Caribbean region.

90. With the needs of developing countries constantly increasing, Cuba was concerned about the decline in real terms in the financial resources available for Agency technical co-operation. A TCF with increasing and predictable resources could be achieved only through a high level of commitment on the part of Member States, and especially the advanced countries among them, not through technical subterfuges. His country therefore regretted the envisaged freezing of the TCF target at the level of \$73 million for a further two years.

91. Cuba, whose unequivocal stance in favour of nuclear disarmament was well known, supported the view that the non-proliferation regime in its present form was discriminatory and considered that the time had come for a move towards complete nuclear disarmament. His Government would welcome a strengthened - effective and efficient - safeguards system based on a universal and fair non-proliferation system leading to the immediate, complete and unconditional elimination of nuclear weapons. In keeping with Cuba's stance, a Protocol additional to the safeguards agreements between Cuba and the Agency had been signed in October 1999, during a visit by the Director General to Cuba.

92. Referring to safeguards financing, he said that the verification of non-proliferation had always been backed by increasing, predictable and assured resources. During the 30 years since the establishment of the "shielding" system, however, the gap between rich and poor countries had widened, and elimination of the "shielding" system would place greater financial burdens on countries least able to bear them. Proposals like the one aimed at elimination of the "shielding" system were obviously above all a political subterfuge reflecting the policy which the United States of America had for some years been pursuing within the United Nations system with a view to reducing its assessed contributions and forcing other countries, especially developing ones, to cover the shortfall. In his country's view, the proposal that the "shielding" system be eliminated was politically questionable and economically untenable. The level of resources made available for financing Agency activities should be determined by the mandate assigned to the Agency in its Statute.

93. At the Millennium Summit there had been agreement on the need to eradicate poverty. The Agency could contribute to the necessary efforts only if Member States displayed political maturity in fulfilling the obligations which they had pursuant to the Agency's Statute.

94. Mr. HOANG VAN HUAY (Viet Nam), having welcomed the approval of Tajikistan, Azerbaijan and the Central African Republic for membership of the Agency, said that his country, which was a party to the NPT and fully committed to nuclear

non-proliferation, welcomed the continuing efforts of the Secretariat to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system.

95. On 6 and 7 September, a workshop on Protocols additional to safeguards agreements and on legislation for safe and peaceful nuclear applications had been held in Hanoi with the assistance of Agency experts. Earlier, an ASEAN-Agency workshop on implementation of the Bangkok Treaty had been held in Thailand, demonstrating the commitment of ASEAN members to nuclear non-proliferation. As current Chairman of the Executive Committee for the Bangkok Treaty, Viet Nam looked forward to continued Agency support for implementation of the Treaty.

96. In stepping up its nuclear non-proliferation activities, the Agency should not lose sight of its developing Member States' growing needs in the area of peaceful applications of nuclear energy. Viet Nam, which shared the concerns of many other developing countries about the decline in resources for Agency technical assistance, would like to see all Member States pledging and paying their full TCF target shares.

97. Commending the efforts of the Department of Technical Co-operation, he said that Viet Nam had benefited greatly from Agency technical assistance.

98. Noting that rice production remained one of the main sectors of Viet Nam's economy, he said that new, high-yield and disease-resistant, rice varieties had been developed in the course of two Agency technical co-operation projects in Viet Nam, which would welcome Agency assistance with the establishment of a nuclear agriculture centre in the south of the country.

99. Nuclear medicine services in Viet Nam had been upgraded with assistance provided through the Agency, whose support for the establishment of a centre for accelerator-based tumour therapy would be welcome.

100. Noting that a regional training course on the radiation processing of natural polysaccharides had recently been held at the radiation technology R&D centre established in Ho Chi Minh City with Agency assistance, he said that Viet Nam was ready to make the centre's facilities available for a wide variety of regional activities, such as the modification of materials and mutation breeding.

101. On the basis of the conclusions of - inter alia - an Agency-supported pre-feasibility study relating to the introduction of nuclear power in Viet Nam, his Government had called for the preparation of a nuclear power development plan.

102. In the field of radiation protection, a national dosimetry calibration laboratory had been established, a legal and technical infrastructure had been created and a number of regulatory documents - including a national radiation protection action plan - had been drawn up. At the same time, Viet Nam would appreciate Agency support in its efforts to attain by 2002 the remaining milestones foreseen in regional Model Project RAS/9/021 on "Upgrading radiation protection infrastructure".

103. Mr. HÖGBERG (Sweden), having welcomed the approval of Tajikistan, Azerbaijan and the Central African Republic for membership of the Agency, said that the 2000 NPT Review Conference had been a resounding victory for the NPT regime. For the first time in many years, it had been possible to adopt a consensus document on the agenda for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament; and for the first time ever, the nuclear-weapon States had pledged unconditionally to eliminate their nuclear arsenals, with practical steps towards that goal identified. Sweden - like the overwhelming majority of States - regarded the final document of the Review Conference as the basis for further progress in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

104. Sweden, which also regarded the final document as a vote of confidence in the Agency's role in promoting nuclear non-proliferation, saw a growing role for the Agency as nuclear arsenals continued to shrink and more States joined in a moratorium - which, it was to be hoped, would soon become a ban - on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. It would like to see all States which were not yet parties to the NPT and the CTBT acceding to those instruments without further delay.

105. His country, which would also like to see many more States signing and ratifying Protocols additional to their safeguards agreements with the Agency, looked forward to implementation of the Agency's new, integrated safeguards approach and - through its safeguards support programme - would continue to assist the Secretariat in its efforts in that connection.

106. Sweden, which assigned high priority to international co-operation in the physical protection of nuclear material and the combating of illicit trafficking in such material, was assisting several States of Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia in that area through a security-enhancement support programme. The security of nuclear material was primarily a national responsibility, but the Agency also had an important role to play. An open-ended working group was currently considering, under Agency auspices, whether there was a need to revise the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and Sweden was looking forward to its findings. Also, the Agency was organizing a conference on "Security of material - measures to prevent, intercept and respond to illicit uses of nuclear material and radioactive sources" which was to be held in Stockholm from 7 to 11 May 2001, and Sweden hoped that it would be well attended by representatives of Member States.

107. The Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention were cornerstones of an international nuclear safety regime, and Sweden would like to see many more States acceding to them. It shared the concerns expressed by INSAG about the safety of research reactors in some countries and was voluntarily subjecting its research reactors - as well as its power reactors - to the Convention on Nuclear Safety. It would like the Agency to pay closer attention to research reactor safety issues, including the possible strengthening of the international legal regime relating to research reactors.

108. His country would also like the Agency to pay closer attention to the special safety management challenges associated with decisions to close down power reactors. A substantial number of power reactors would be approaching the end of their technical and

economic lives in the next few decades, and decisions to close down power reactors were taken also on grounds other than age.

109. In documents like the Nuclear Technology Review 2000, the Agency should take a well-balanced approach to the issue of the possible role of fission technology in sustainable development. It should present the case both for and against fission technology, indicating - for example - why the Swedish Government had, like a number of other governments, decided that fission technology was not eligible for inclusion in a sustainable energy supply programme. In his country's view, the question of the eligibility of nuclear power in relation to the trading mechanisms provided for by the Kyoto Protocol should be formally discussed only in the forums established by the Protocol for such discussions.

110. Sweden, which had pledged its full TCF target share for 2001, believed that the first step in trying to ensure that Agency technical co-operation was properly financed should be to reduce - if not eliminate - the gap between TCF targets on one hand and the total amounts actually paid into the TCF on the other. It had therefore joined in the consensus on the financing of technical co-operation reached in the Board of Governors the previous week.

111. In conclusion, he said that Sweden had recently accepted the amendments to Articles VI and XIV of the Statute which had been approved by the General Conference in 1999.

112. Ms. DORAN (Ireland), after welcoming the approval of Tajikistan, Azerbaijan and the Central African Republic for membership of the Agency, said that her country had paid its full share of the target for contributions to the TCF for 2000 and hoped to contribute its full TCF target shares also in future years. The decision of her authorities to pay higher TCF contributions was in keeping with the spirit of the draft resolution on the financing of technical co-operation which the Board of Governors had, the previous week, agreed to recommend to the General Conference for adoption.

113. Recently, several positive developments had occurred in the field of nuclear disarmament. The United States and Russia had moved ahead with bilateral nuclear force reductions. Russia had ratified START II and Russia's Parliament had adopted the legislation necessary for ratification of the CTBT. The ratification of the CTBT by France and the United Kingdom, the two nuclear-weapon States belonging to the European Union, had been a significant step towards the establishment of the norm that nuclear weapons testing had no place on such a small planet.

114. The nuclear non-proliferation regime remained the cornerstone of international efforts to promote the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy and curb the spread of nuclear weapons, and the adoption of the Model Additional Protocol by the Board of Governors had been an important step towards a strengthened safeguards system. The Protocol additional to Ireland's safeguards agreement with the Agency was due to be ratified soon.

115. In 1961, when the then Foreign Minister of Ireland had tabled a resolution in the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an international agreement which would prevent nuclear proliferation, the Irish Government had believed that he was launching a process which would ultimately lead to total nuclear disarmament. The Irish Government

was still convinced that genuine international peace and security could not be established as long as States possessed nuclear weapons.

116. The outlook for the 2000 NPT Review Conference had not been promising: on one hand, 182 States had demonstrated a commitment to refrain from the acquisition of nuclear weapons; on the other, the achievement of the total elimination of nuclear weapons - the goal of the NPT - remained distant. Thanks to the spirit of co-operation, the readiness to compromise and the flexibility displayed by the States party to the NPT, however, the Review Conference had produced an agreed final document which reinforced the bargain underlying the NPT. The nuclear-weapons States had committed themselves unequivocally to accomplishing the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals through a number of steps laid down in the final document. The agreed programme of action must not lead to complacency, however, and Ireland for its part would act vigorously to ensure that the ultimate goal was achieved.

117. The Agency was playing a crucial role in the promotion of nuclear safety worldwide, despite the fact that many Member States had very divergent views about nuclear power. For Ireland, which had no wish to embark on a nuclear power programme, the trends in the global debate about nuclear power were of great interest. Those trends raised a number of important questions. For example, what was the most suitable way of protecting the present generation and future ones from the risks associated with nuclear activities? - how best to ensure the very highest standards in the area of nuclear safety? - how should one respond to advocates of nuclear power who believed that it was a great help in reducing greenhouse gas emissions? Despite its firm anti-nuclear stance, Ireland considered that such issues should be examined objectively, so that future policy-makers could make informed choices. The Secretariat must try to ensure that they were examined objectively.

118. The Tokaimura accident had shown that even in technologically advanced countries there could be deficiencies of safety culture. Her country hoped that the necessary lessons would be learned from the accident and would like to see the Secretariat playing a major role in bringing about international confidence that the deficiencies exposed by the accident had been remedied.

119. Ireland considered that all Chernobyl-type RBMKs should be shut down since, despite safety modifications, they remained less safe than other light-water reactors owing to inherent design faults. As to WWERs, Ireland considered that the earlier models should be shut down and decommissioned and that the later models should be shut down and decommissioned if they could not be upgraded to the highest international safety standards.

120. The Irish public was very concerned about nuclear facilities in the United Kingdom, especially the reprocessing plants at Sellafield. It was opposed to the continuation at Sellafield of hazardous nuclear activities such as the reprocessing of spent fuel and the on-site storage of high-level liquid waste, and her authorities had stated their total opposition to the proposed establishment of a mixed-oxide fuel fabrication plant at Sellafield. Their concerns about Sellafield had grown after the publication of critical reports regarding its safety by the United Kingdom's Nuclear Installations Inspectorate.

121. In June, Ireland and eleven other countries had called for a review of current authorizations for discharges of radioactive substances from the reprocessing plants at Sellafield and La Hague, the aim being to encourage the adoption of non-reprocessing options such as dry storage and thereby minimize the risk of radioactive pollution due to accidents. It was to be hoped that the United Kingdom and France would respond positively to the clear signal which they had received from so many of their neighbours.

122. Ireland, which would like to see nuclear safety issues receiving still higher priority within the Agency, was interested in co-operating with like-minded countries to that end.

123. Mr. HOFFMANN (Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization) said that the CTBT had been signed by 160 countries since being opened for signature and ratification on 24 September 1996. Moreover, 63 countries had already ratified it, including 30 of the 44 States whose ratification was necessary for it to enter into force.

124. The ratification by the Russian Federation at the end of June had been an important recent development in that connection.

125. The United States Senate had in October 1999 voted not to give its advice and consent to the ratification of the CTBT, but a high-level task force had been set up within the Senate to work out a bipartisan approach to ratification.

126. During a visit to China in June, where he had met the Deputy Foreign Minister and senior representatives of the legislature, he had been informed that the ratification question was being considered in the relevant committee of the National People's Congress.

127. The support for the CTBT expressed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference augured well for its early entry into force. The continuing support of States which had participated in the Review Conference for the work of the Preparatory Commission was greatly appreciated.

128. In August, at its 12th session, chaired by Ambassador Pellicer of Mexico, the Preparatory Commission had called upon States to seize the opportunity of the Millennium Summit to sign or ratify the CTBT. Guyana, Kiribati, Nauru, Nigeria and Sierra Leone had signed it and Kiribati and the Maldives had deposited instruments of ratification during the Millennium Summit.

129. There had been significant progress with the establishment of the International Monitoring System (IMS), a global technical verification system for monitoring compliance with the CTBT. The progress made was due largely to the commitment of signatory States. A further indication of their commitment was the assessed contribution collection rate - about 92% for 2000 and 96% for 1999.

130. The Preparatory Commission's Provisional Technical Secretariat now had 242 staff members from 70 countries. Of the staff members in the Professional category, 26.57% were women.

131. With regard to the IMS, the Provisional Technical Secretariat's mandate was to develop a cost-effective global network of 321 monitoring stations - located in the 89 countries specified in the CTBT - with sensors capable of detecting, locating and identifying signals generated by a nuclear explosion using four complementary monitoring technologies: seismic, infrasound, hydro-acoustic and radionuclide. Approximately 20% of the stations had already been installed and were transmitting data to the International Data Centre (IDC) in Vienna for processing and onward transmission to signatory States for final analysis.

132. A top priority of the Preparatory Commission and its Provisional Technical Secretariat was the elaboration of a draft on-site inspection (OSI) operational manual. As to OSI equipment, the first phase in the testing of a passive seismic equipment system was scheduled to begin in October.

133. As to confidence-building measures, which were voluntary, in order to create the basic conditions for such measures the Preparatory Commission had agreed at its 9th session that a database on chemical explosions should be established.

134. The relationship agreement between the Preparatory Commission and the United Nations had entered into force, so that the Preparatory Commission was now a member of the United Nations family. That had opened the way for co-operation with other family members, and the Provisional Technical Secretariat was currently negotiating a co-operation agreement with UNDP under which the latter would provide operational support services.

135. In conclusion, he said that the Provisional Technical Secretariat looked to the signatory States to take the political steps necessary for ensuring the entry into force of the CTBT, so that all components of the envisaged regime could be brought into effect and the world made a safer and more secure place.

136. Mr. ROMÁN-MOREY (Secretary General of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean) said that the 2000 NPT Review Conference had underlined the importance both of the Agency and of nuclear-weapon-free zones for the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime.

137. In October 1999, the Director General had paid an official visit to OPANAL's headquarters, where he had attended a special session of the OPANAL Council and discussed the possibility of a seminar being held in Latin America on Agency safeguards and the Model Additional Protocol, as a follow-up to the very successful safeguards seminar organized by the Agency, OPANAL and the Government of Jamaica and held in Kingston, Jamaica, in 1996. Subsequently, senior representatives of the Agency had attended the 16th regular session of OPANAL's General Conference, held in Lima, and an OPANAL seminar on a new international disarmament agenda for the new millennium. OPANAL greatly appreciated such indications of Agency support.

138. The example set, in 1967, by the Tlatelolco Treaty had been followed in other regions - in the South Pacific, with the Rarotonga Treaty (1985); in Southeast Asia, with the Bangkok Treaty (1995); and in Africa, with the Pelindaba Treaty (1996). He expressed the hope that the current negotiations regarding the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central

Asia would prove successful and, in that connection, welcomed the decision of the Mongolian Government to declare Mongolia a nuclear-weapon-free zone. He called for intensified efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions, especially ones - such as South Asia and the Middle East - where confidence-building measures were essential for peace.

139. In his statement to the General Conference, the Director General had expressed his readiness to organize a forum in which participants from the Middle East could learn from the experience of other regions with respect to comprehensive verification arrangements and confidence-building measures that contributed to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone.¹ OPANAL would be happy to support such a forum.

140. In 1999, OPANAL's General Conference had, in a declaration (the "Lima Appeal") addressed to the international community, called for a complete prohibition of the use and production of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and had urged those States which possessed weapons of mass destruction to demonstrate, through political decisions, their determination to destroy them under United Nations supervision. It had also called for the establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones in inhabited parts of the planet.

141. In addition, OPANAL's General Conference had requested the Secretary General of OPANAL to consult with representatives of other nuclear-weapon-free zones on the possibility of holding an international conference of parties to and other signatories of the treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, the aim being to develop common policies regarding nuclear disarmament and action plans for strengthening the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. The consultations were well under way.

142. Earlier that month, the participants in a seminar on nuclear-weapon-free zones held in Uppsala, Sweden, had - in the "Uppsala Declaration" - expressed support for the holding of an international conference of the type which OPANAL's General Conference had had in mind. He would welcome the participation of the Agency's Secretariat in the planning and conduct of the conference - as a sign of the close link between the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties, the Agency's safeguards system and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

143. Mr. PALACIOS (Secretary of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials) said that during the years since the establishment of ABACC a really effective regional system for the application of safeguards to all nuclear facilities in Argentina and Brazil had been built up.

144. Co-operation between ABACC and the Agency within the framework of the Quadripartite Agreement was becoming closer and closer. For example, during the past year 20 facility attachments had been approved, bringing the number of facilities with such documents in force to 30, as had procedures for the joint use of equipment at virtually all facilities.

¹ See document GC(44)/OR.1, para. 57.

145. ABACC had - together with Argentina and Brazil - initiated talks with the Agency regarding the conclusion of a Protocol additional to the safeguards agreement between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC and the Agency. It was continuing to co-operate with EURATOM and the United States Department of Energy, and it had recently concluded a co-operation agreement with the Korean Atomic Energy Institute of the Republic of Korea.

146. Expressing support for the Secretariat's safeguards integration efforts, he said that the transparency resulting from the implementation of integrated safeguards would enable the Agency to make full use of regional safeguards systems.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.